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H

The Tactics of the Battle of

Lepanto Clarified:

The Impact of Social, Economic,

and Political Factors

on Sixteenth Century Galley Warfare

JOHN F. GUILMARTIN, JR., LT COL, USAF

A large body of naval history, reflecting a Mahanian bias, has applied to Lepanto the conditions which later prevailed inthe age of sail. Overturning with ease this baggage of ill-conceived scholarship, Colonel Guilmartin places Lepanto in its

intercultural Mediterranean setting. To explain the essential differences in design and tactical capabilities of Spanish,Venetian, and Muslim war galleys, Guilmartin downplays the narrow Mahanian emphasis on technological innovation anlays greater stress on the human factors, especially the social status of the oarsmen. Instead of portraying a "mindlessslugfest" in which the opponents fought a land battle at sea, the author has done an admirable job of reconstructing from

fragmentary evidence the tactical complexities of Lepanto.In the history of armed conflict at sea, there is no battle better known and less understood than Lepanto. The name Lepanto standforth in virtually every general history as a convenient naval semicolon separating the declining Mediterranean World from therising North Atlantic. It has been heralded by generations of historians as the beginning of the end for the Ottoman Empire; it has

been described ad nauseum by students of warfare as "the last great galley fight"; it has been routinely acknowledged by students

of literature as a source of Cervantes' inspiration.For all that, there is little consensus among scholars as to what the battle meant or how it was won and lost. This is due to a

pervasive Mahanian bias in virtually all naval history, a tendency to view the entire history of armed conflict at sea in the analyticterms applied so effectively to the naval conflicts of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by Mahan.#1 This approachreduces to confusion any effort to make tactical sense of early modern Mediterranean galley warfare in general and Lepanto in

particular. It does so by misplacingor ignoringthe impact of the human factor in the political economic and social aspects ofmaritime conflict. As evidence of the depth of the problem, consider that I have carefully avoided any reference to "naval warfareor to Lepanto as a "naval battle," phrases loaded with implicit Mahanian assumptions about the nature of the forces involved and

their objectives.#2My subject is tactics, so the digression will be brief, but it is worth noting that a substantial portion of theChristian forces engaged at Lepanto were commanded by naval entrepreneurs whose objectiveslegitimate from their point of

viewwere quite different from those that we normally associate with naval commanders in battle.#3It is worth considering also, that while recent American scholarship has illuminated the importance of Lepanto as an importantcultural and strategic watershed without having been decisive in the orthodox, Mahanian sense, the work in question was not by anaval historian, or even by a European historian, but by an orientalist, Andrew Hess. Hess's success in placing Lepanto firmly
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within an appropriate multi-cultural strategic context is largely a product of his avoidance of Westernwhich militarily, is to say

Mahaniancultural and strategic assumptions from the outset.#4Tactically, however, the darkness is nearly complete. The only work of recent scholarship to contain a comprehensive treatment o

the tactics used at Lepanto,Lepante: la crise de l'empire Ottomanby Michel Lesure of l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes tudes,#5 isneither available in English nor written in the Anglo-American tradition of naval history. When tactics are mentioned at all,Lepanto comes across in Anglo-American naval historiography as a nautical Donnybrook Fair, a mindless slugfest where the onlythought of the opposing commanders was to come to grips as quickly as possible, eliminating all nautical subtleties to engage in a"land battle at sea," whatever that means. The victory of the Holy Alliance appears more the result of brainless determination and

religious fanaticism than the product of intelligent tactics.The evidence does not support this view. Lepanto was shrewdly planned and well fought on both sides. The battle plans of theopposing commanders, Don John of Austria and Mezzinzade Ali Pasha, were well conceived, sophisticated and comprehensivewithout being excessively complicated. Both plans made the best possible use of the forces available, of the shoreline and of theinshore topography of the bottom, which is saying a great deal considering the heterogeneous nature of the two fleets. Don Johnhad particularly grave problems in the deep-seated distrust, differing objectives, and political stress within his command; stresswhich threatened to tear it apart. Since our emphasis is on the human side of armed conflict at sea, this is as good a place as any t

begin our tactical analysis.The divergence of objectives within the component States of the Holy League was sharp and barely reconcilable, a fact which wafounded in economic reality and reflected in tactical objectives. Venice wanted a short war and a quick peace, something whichgood Spaniards considered almost treasonable. War with the Turk had cut Venice's commercial lifeline to the East and fleetmobilization had gutted her workforce. With her fishermen, farmers, and merchant sailors serving afloat as oarsmen, mariners, an

fighting men, Venetian commerce ground to a haltand Venice lived on commerce. Sebastian Venier, the Venetian CapitanoGenerale de Mar, wanted a major fleet engagementsomething approaching a decisive Mahanian naval battlein the worst way

but he wanted it for anything but the proper Mahanian reasons.#6Mediterranean commerce meant little to Spain. Spain's vital trade with America was well out of the line of fire and Spanishcommanders in the Mediterranean saw themselves as soldiers in an unending holy war with the Turk, a view shared by the Pope.The pressures on Spain were therefore more narrowly fiscal and military than those on Venice. Already saddled with as large astanding peacetime galley force as she could support, Spain found her naval obligations to the Holy Alliance to be modest

expansion in an already large military budget.#7As long as strategic gains in captured port cities and destroyed Muslim forcesjustified the expense, Spain was content to keep fightingand keeping the Turks at bay in the Eastern Mediterranean, far from hi

North African and Spanish Morisco allies, justified a great deal.The objectives of Spain's Italian client stateswhich is almost, but not quite, to say the objectives of Genoa and Gian Andrea

Doriawere something else again. Genoa, like Venice, depended heavily on commerce. Forced largely to abandon hercommercial outposts in the Eastern Mediterranean after centuries of bitter conflict with Venice, Genoa still traded in the Ottomandomains. But where Venice depended upon a monopoly of specified low bulk, high value, luxury trades, the Genoese competitiv

edge was more a matter of efficiency in hauling bulk cargos.#8This gave the Genoese considerably greater latitude in negotiationwith the Turks; there are indications, for example, that Genoese merchants had provided the Tophane, the Ottoman Arsenal, with

much of its bronze for cannon founding.#9 But Genoa was also firmly within the economic and political orbit of the Spanish

Habsburgs.Characteristically, then, Genoa's main naval contribution to the Holy Alliance was in the form of 11 galleys under Gian AndreaDoria, serving under a thoroughly commercial and highly remunerative personal contract to the Spanish Crown. Not only wereDoria and his fellow condottieri well paid for their trouble on a galley per month basis (each of Doria's galleys cost Spain a third

more than an equivalent Spanish vessel#10), they were pulling down a 14 percent annual rate of interest on the money which PhilII had borrowed from them to purchase their services! Is it entirely unreasonable to assume, as the Venetians did, that Doria had

little interest in coming to hand strokes with the Ottoman forces?Mass defection of the ships of one ally or another in mid-battle was therefore a real possibility which Don John of Austria had toguard against. With this in mind, the Christian order of battle assumes considerable significance. In our analysis, the Muslim ordeof battle provides a useful check, a control group of sorts. Although there were undoubtedly differences in tactical philosophy

between the North Africanghazi#11 warriors and the officials of the central Ottoman naval establishment, the necessity for unifiecommand seems to have been clearly understood by all. Mezzinzade Ali Pasha's dispositions were therefore driven primarily by

the limitations of his tactical instrument.Just over half of the galleys in the combined Christian fleet which fought at Lepanto were Venetian, some 108 out of 206 orroughly 52 percent. Spain and her Viceroyalties of Naples and Sicily contributed 49 galleys, about 24 percent. Gian Andrea Doriahad 11 galleys in his own squadron, 5 percent, while Genoa, Savoy, and the lesser Italian naval entrepreneurs accounted foranother 23, another 12 percent. The Papal contingent put 12 galleys on line and the Knights of St. John of Malta 3-7 percent
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between them.#12These percentages are only roughly indicative of combat power. They do not, for example, include galiots and other, lesser oaredfighting craft. They do not include the six Venetian galeasses, nor do they take into account the considerable differences inmanning between the galleys of the various contingents. Nevertheless, galleys formed the main battle line, and each of the galleyincluded in our computations occupied a place there. Preservation of the tactical integrity of the line was absolutely vital to theChristian cause; Christian galleys were, on the whole, less maneuverable than their Muslim opposites, but they were more powertactically, particularly in a formal, head-on clash when arrayed in an unbroken line. This fact was well established; its recognitionwas implicit in each side's order of battle. It is fair to say therefore, that the percentages cited above give a generally accurate idea

of the relative importance of each contingent to the allied cause.Don John ordered his fleet in the traditional four divisions: a centerthe "main battle"plus left and right wings and a reserve.#

The organization into four squadrons, observed by both sides, was dictated by the inherent limitations of galleys and galley fleets

The symmetrical nature of the Muslim and Christian dispositions as stated in raw numbers are evidence of this.Each of the Christian wings on the day of battle had 53 galleys; this represented the maximum number of galleys which could

maneuver in a line abreast without losing formation integrity.#14The Muslim right wing had 54 galleys, probably for the same

reason.#15The Muslim left had no less than 87 galleys, but there is reason to believe that they were intended to turn the Christian

flank individually, catch-as-catch-can, with no pretense at formation keeping.The Christian center, with less need to maneuver than the wings, numbered 62 galleys, an arrangement mirrored by the Muslimcenter which had 61 galleys on line. Don John's reserve squadron had 38 galleysapparently those left over after putting the

largest number of galleys on line which was tactically feasible. Both Don John and Mezzinzade Ali Pasha based their tacticalplans on a center of some 61 or 62 galleys flanked by covering squadrons of marginally smaller size. But where Don Johnconcentrated his remaining galleys in a reserve squadron behind the main battle line as a defensive "stopper," Mezzinzade Ali

Pasha gave the bulk of the remaining Muslim galleys to his left wing commander, Uluch Ali, a master of maneuver,#16with the

evident hope of using their superior numbers and maneuverability to turn the Christian flank.One of Don John's earliest and most successful decisions was to break up the national contingents, distributing them between thevarious squadrons to prevent a national commander from leading his forces in mass defection at a critical point. His assignment osubordinate command reflected this philosophy: Don John in hisRealcommanded the center personally, flanked in his post ofhonor at the exact center of the line by Sebastian Venier in the Capitana of Venice to the left and Marc Antonio Colonna, the Pap

commander, to the right in the Capitana of the Pope.#17 A Venetian, Agostin Barbarigo, commanded the left wing and Gian

Andrea Doria commanded the right. A Spaniard, Don Alvaro de Bazan, commanded the reserve.But the apparent simplicity of this scheme vanishes when we consider the actual distribution of galleys, squadron by squadron. IfDon John was primarily concerned with the possibility of the mass withdrawal of a national contingent, what are we to make of thfact that no less than 77 percent of the left wing's galleys were Venetianunder a Venetian commander! This question, based onthe numbers of galleys assigned to each squadron by nationality, must be answered if we are to understand the human, tactical

questions posed by Lepanto.It is necessary, at this point to go beyond the traditional, Mahanian, analytical framework of naval history. The reasons for this ar

pivotal: Lepanto's outcome hinged on differences in the design and tactical capabilities of the warships engaged and on the way iwhich the opposing commanders used them. This idea, stated as bluntly as we have just done, is unremarkable. We have alreadymade reference to it. Technological differences in warship design was, as we would expect from a traditional perspective,important. The appearance of Venetian galeasses at Lepanto represented real technological innovation, a fact long recognized as a

major contributory factor in the Muslim defeat.The uniquely Mediterranean wrinkle lies in the fact that the key differences in technical characteristics and tactical capabilitiesamong Spanish, Venetian, and Muslim war galleys were more the product of human factors than of narrowly technical ones. Thegalley's near total dependence on human energy for tactical mobility and combat effectivenessand unlike sailing warships, thetwo were directly interrelatedgave galley warfare a character quite different from that of warfare between fleets of broadside

sailing warships.Instead, human factorspolitical, economic, and social,manifested themselves on several levels. We have briefly addressed th

political level. But human factors were also operative on a second, tactical level, a fact which accounted for important differencesin the way in which the galleys of the various contingents were armed. Before addressing this question in detail, it is necessary toexplain that the word "armed," in a proper Mediterranean context and as we shall use it throughout, encompassed both armament

and manning.#18The galleys which fought at Lepanto were armed not just with artillery, but with fighting manpower and oarsme

The term covered armament and manning indifferently, covering a galley's artillery, rowing gangthe ciurma#19and specializ

fighting men alike.
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Finally, and least obviously, human factors affected the way in which galleys were designed and fitted out, a point which is crucito an understanding of the battle of Lepanto and of Mediterranean armed conflict at sea in general. We cannot say that a Venetiangalley was "better" than a Spanish or a Papal one; we cannot say that a Neapolitan galley was superior to a Turkish galley or a

North African galiot, only that each was designed, fitted out, and armed to extract the maximum tactical benefit from the human

resources available.Having said this, we must admit that it would have been difficult for the modern, untrained eye to distinguish at a distance betwean ordinary galley of Spain, Malta, Venice, or their Muslim opponents without reference to flags, pennants, or other heraldicdevices. All had hulls about 136 feet long by about 17 or 18 feet wide topped by an outrigger assembly, the rowing frame, which

spanned some 24 feet and supported the thole pins.#20 All carried a main centerline bow gun on a forward firing mount which ran

back between the foremost oarsmen's benches on recoil. This was typically a full battery of cannon, weighing from 4,000 to 7,00pounds exclusive of the mount and firing a cast-iron cannonball of from 40 to 50 pounds.#21 This cannon was invariably flanked a pair of smaller guns (they had to be considerably smaller since there was much less room for them to recoil). These generallyweighed from 1,500 to 3,000 pounds and fired projectiles weighing from 10 to 14 pounds. They were flanked, in turn, by a secon

pair of cannons which were smaller still, typically firing a five to eight pound ball and weighing from as little as 800 to as much a1,500 pounds. One or more of these side piecesthe name of the innermost pair in Ottoman Turkish,ayka topu, meant just thatmight have been a cannon of about the same overall weight or perhaps a bit less, designed to fire a cannonball of cut stone

weighing about twice as much as its cast-iron equivalent.#22We are, of course, speaking in generalities in order to give an overalidea of what an ordinary Mediterranean war galley of 1571 was like. This is, to a degree, artificial. Standardization, except to alimited extent in Venetian practice, was nonexistent and there was enormous variation in weaponry from one galley to the next.Spanish cannon, on the whole, were longer and heavier than the norm; Venetian guns were shorter, lighter, and fired larger

projectiles, both in absolute terms and per pound of barrel weight.#23Their technically superior artillery probably enabled theVenetians to dispense with a third pair of still smaller flanking pieces, frequently carried on ordinary galleys of the western

Mediterranean, so as to lighten the ship with improved tactical mobility the benefit.#24

The cannon which we have described constituted the war galley's main battery. All were fixed to fire forward and could be trainein azimuth only by turning the ship. They were supplemented by numbers of small swivel guns, mostly mounted in the bows,

though some were also mounted at the stern and along the sides of the ship.#25Before turning to the way in which regional social and economic factors affected galley design, we must dispose of several less

crucial points of a more narrowly technical nature to set the stage for our tactical analysis.The first of these is the galeass. It has been represented in the western naval tradition as an awkward hybrid, a sailing warship witoars. In fact, it was exactly what its namegaleaza in Spanish,galee grosse in Venetoimplies, a big galley. The six Christiangaleasses which fought at Lepantothe Muslims had nonewere Venetian merchant galleys which had been laid up in theArsenal some years previously when rising operating costs, the consequence of a large crew, had made them economically non-

viable.#26 When hostilities broke out, the Arsenal took advantage of their large and stable hulls, the product of merchant origins, fit them out with a heavy artillery armament (while Venice had an adequate supply of good cannon, the Spanish, by contrast, seem

to have been short of artillery).#27Each galeass probably carried four or five full cannons, equivalent to an ordinary galley's maincenterline bow gun, plus enough lesser cannon to have provided the secondary and tertiary armament for five galleys, and then

some.#28This is beside the main point. Suffice it to say that the "large galleys" performed better under sail than ordinary galleys;this was of little tactical significance. They were considerably harder to row, which was. While considerably slower under oarsthey taxed theirciurmi badlythey could, if competently handled, maneuver effectively in support of a fleet of galleys. They we

competently handled at Lepanto.Next we have the smaller relatives of the ordinary galley, notably the galiot. Galiots typically had eighteen banks of oars; ordinargalleys typically had 24 banks by 1570, and larger than ordinary galleys, orbastardas, could have as many as 35. Quicker, handieand more maneuverable than the galley, the galiot was more lightly armed. Riding lower in the water, it was at a considerabledisadvantage in a formal, head on clash between opposing squadrons in line abreast. Galiots were highly effective in a melee and

ideal for raiding, particularly inshore, amphibious operations. With their modest logistic and manpower requirements, they weremuch favored by the lightly populated North African corsairing principalities. Both sides used still smaller oared warships,

fragatas and bergantins, to feed reinforcements into the main battle line as well as for scouting and to protect the unengaged flank

and sterns of galleys locked up in the line of battle.Finally we have the ordinary galley's big brother, the lantern galley. A characteristically Mediterranean concept, the lantern galley

was an exceptionally well armed galley, formally recognized as such.#29 Often, but not always, larger than ordinary galleys, lantegalleys were named for their larger and elaborate stern lanterns, the Mediterranean symbol of tactical superiority and combatleadershippar excellence. The equivalent term in broadside sailing warfare was "flagship," yet the two concepts are quitedissimilar. The nearest equivalent to "flagship" in Mediterranean terminology is not lantern galley, but capitanaroughly, theleader's shiporreal, a royal capitana. Each squadron and national contingent at Lepanto, however small, had its own capitana.Each such squadron also had apatrona, a vice capitana. Plainly, we are dealing with a concept quite different from that offlagship: The basic distinction inherent in the idea of a flagship is one of command. By contrast, the idea behind the lantern galley
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was leadership. An exceptionally well found and heavily armed galley, the lantern galley served as a focal point for tacticaldecision. Most lantern galleys at Lepanto were not flagships; most of the Christian capitanas andpatronas, at least, were notlantern galleys. Based on solid evidence, we know that there were 25 or 26 lantern galleys among the 206 or so Christian galleys Lepanto. Based on circumstantial, but nevertheless persuasive evidence, there were a bare minimum of 21 Muslim lantern galley

in the force of some 230 galleys and 70 galiots, and perhaps as many as 25 or 30.#30As we have indicated, the lantern galley was, by definition, superior in tactical power to an ordinary galley. This superiority wasthe product of a characteristically Mediterranean tradeoff: the lantern galley's greater weight of men and metal made her harder torow, whether the hull was actually larger than that of an ordinary galley or not. This meant a potential reduction in speed underoars; but such a reduction would have been tactically unacceptable. Speed was required for tactical reasons, to maintain place in a

line abreast, if for no other reason. The lantern galley therefore required more oarsmen. But more oarsmen meant more weight anmore weight called for still more oarsmen, a vicious circle which could not be broken.#31The lantern galley represented a deliberate and conscious sacrifice in efficiency to achieve increased combat effectiveness at anecessarily limited number of tactically critical focal points. It is worth noting that the Venetians, whose ciurmi were mostly freeand salaried, had by far the lowest proportion of lantern galleys of any national contingent, only seven out of 108 as opposed to 1

out of 75 among the galleys of Spain and her Italian clients.#32With free oarsmen who were armed and expected to fight, there w

less tactical benefit to be gained from a larger fighting complement.Having dealt with the various categories of warships on each side, we must now address the all important issue of regionalvariations in design and armament. Here, we are concerned almost exclusively with the ordinary galley. National differences

between lantern galleys were unquestionably less than the corresponding differences between ordinary galleys.#33 In any case, thmain issue with respect to lantern galleys is how many there were and where. Differences in the design and armament of galiots

were also relatively unimportant. North African galiots tended to be better armed and larger than their Christian opposites, andMuslim galiots of as many as 21 rowing banks were common.#34But aside from confusing Christian observers as to the size of thMuslim forcea large Algerian or Tunisian galiot looked like an ordinary galley at a distance and was often reported as suchth

had little bearing on the issue.Mediterranean war galleys fell, according to their design characteristics, into three basic categories: First, the galleys of Spain andher Italian client states (and many as 25 Or 30 of France, with which we are not concerned; for convenience, and because they we

basically similar, these are all termed western galleys), Venetian galleys, and Muslim galleys.#35 Although much sweat and

verbiage could be expended in an attempt to delineate precisely the characteristics of each group, the outlines are clear.The ordinary Spanish, Maltese, Sicilian, Genoese, or Papal galley was an infantry assault craft. In the 1520s and >30s, Spanishgalleys had been much like any others, but as the wage/price spiral attacked the Mediterranean world from West to East, the

Spanish were forced progressively to abandon free, salaried oarsmen in favor of cheaper slaves and convicts.#36

The attendant losin combat effectiveness and propulsive efficiencyand there can be no doubt that it was just that#37was counteracted by

embarking increasing numbers of Spanish regular infantry. Her client states followed her lead for the same economic reasons.Spain's strategic posture in the Mediterranean was basically defensive. Her Muslim enemies attacked her port cities and raided hecoasts; Spain reacted. The great expense of keeping a well-armed galley constantly in readiness during the campaigning seasonfrom late March through mid-October to combat the elusive and unpredictable Muslim raiders acted to keep the Spanish standing

fleet small.#38The lack of numbers was balanced by a galley for galley superiority in raw combat power. The galleys of Spain anher allies carried more and better specialized fighting men than any others. The weight of mensome of whom had to be reserveto guard the servile ciurmimade Spanish galleys harder to row, a problem exacerbated by the fact that Spanish cannon were

generally longer and heavier than the equivalent products of the Venetian arsenal or the Ottoman Tophane.#39Further exacerbatinthe problem were constructional differences: The galleys of Spain and her Italian clients had acquired, by 1571, a permanent raise

structure above the bow artillery, the arrumbada.#40 This served as a platform from which covering fire could be directed to cove

the assault of infantry onto the low-lying deck of an enemy galley. It was highly effective tactically. It also added weight, andadded weight was the antithesis of speed under oars, speed which had to be developed at all costs in the crunch of battle.The Spanish and their allies accepted these deficiencies and played to their strong suit. By packing the rowing benches with slaveand convictsSpanish galleys at Lepanto had 200 oarsmen for 24 banks of oarsacceleration and dash speed were maintained.The cost was in sustained rowing speed, in which Spanish galleys were admittedly inferior to those of their friends and enemies

alike.#41The strategic posture of Venice, like that of Spain, was defensive. Here, the similarities ended. Venice depended more ondiplomacy and on an extended chain of fortified ports to defend her commerce than on her small standing squadrons of galleys.Unlike Spain, she had no large force of first class regular infantry which could be used afloat and on land indifferently. WhatVenice did have was a small, but adequate, class of merchant sailors, fishermen, and coastal villagers who could be called upon to

pull an oar in time of war. Skilled oarsmen and mariners, they were tough customers who could take care of themselves in a fight
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if not exhausted from rowing.Where Spain's normal maritime posture was a wartime footing and her instrument a small force of: hard core regulars, Venicestood ready to shut down peaceful commerce in time of war in order to mobilize a sizeable force of ready reservists. This force ofoarsman/sailor/soldiers was underwritten by the unmatched technical resources of the Venetian Arsenal. Using a small but highlyskilled permanent workforce, the Arsenal built, stored, and maintained a large fleet of galleys, laid up in ordinary against the dayon which war would break out. As a result, the tiny Venetian peacetime fleet could be expanded overnight into a formidable force

totally out of proportion to Venice's modest demographic resources.Where the Spanish galley was little more than transportation for Spanish infantry, the Venetian galley was a combat assault

transport, designed to bring men and supplies into a besieged port city, unopposed if possible, opposed if necessary. The emphasiwas on speed under oars, an emphasis made necessary by Venice's lack of specialized fighting manpower and made possible by hcontinued use of free, fighting oarsmen. An important contributory factor was the lightness and excellence of Venetian ordnance.

The result was an emphasis on speed under oars and gunneryand Venetian gunners were the class of the Mediterranean.#42

Where a head-on boarding fight was the preferred option for the Spanish galley captain and his squadron commander, it was thelast resort for their Venetian opposites. This orientation was reflected in constructional details: Where the Spanish galley had aheavy permanent fighting platform above the main battery, the Venetian galley had a much lighter, removable one. It was not thathe Venetians were unwilling or unable to have at it hand-to-hand; they could and didupon occasion with gusto. It was simplythat they were acutely aware of their shortage of manpower and felt, with considerable justification, that there were usually better

ways to skin the tactical cat.Where Venice and the Habsburg Empire were on the defensive in the sixteenth century Mediterranean, the House of Osman was the attack. This, and the social and economic conditions prevailing in the Ottoman domainsfor the wage/price spiral was less

advanced than in the western Mediterraneangave the Turkish galley its unique characteristics.#43If the Spanish galley was aninfantry assault craft and the Venetian galley a tactical assault transport, the Turkish galley was an armed strategic landing craft.

Not as fast under oars as a Venetian galley, though probably a bit more maneuverable, the Turkish galley was a better sailingvessel. This was no accident. The dominant tactical function of the Venetian galley was the relief or resupply of a besiegedfortified port; that of the Turkish galley was to transport men, munitions, guns, and supplies to the site of a siege and to protectthem from interference once there. Designed for a strategic role which was palpably offensive, its tactical function was almost

purely defensive. Most of its offensive punch stemmed, almost incidentally, from the characteristics of Ottoman society. The Turand their North African allies were unique among European military establishments in possessing a sizeable corps of skilledarchers who wielded their composite, recurved bows with awesome efficiency, a direct product of the delayed impact of thewage/price spiral in the East. Badly outclassing ordinary small arms in both range and precision, Turkish archery was particularlyeffective in a free-swinging melee where the flanks of hostile galleys were exposed. Like the Venetians, the Turks relied heavily free oarsmen. While a conscripted Anatolian villager could hardly be considered the equal of a hardened Spanish infantryman, he

at least did not need to be guarded in combat. Muslim capitanas and lantern galleys were apparently rowed mainly by volunteerArabs, hard core light infantrymen who couldbe trusted to give a reasonable account of themselves in a close fight. TheJanissaries, of whom there were a fair number at Lepanto, took a back seat to no one in skill or ferocity. In place of the Venetianremovable fighting platform and the Spanish arrumbada, Turkish galleys seem to have had a low, permanent platform which

covered only the forward portions of the bow guns, leaving the breeches exposed.Lower in the water than the Christian galleys of the western Mediterranean, the Turkish galley had better sustained the speed undoars and was considerably more maneuverable. Muslim galleys drew less water than either Venetian or Western galleys, a fact of

considerable importance at Lepanto.With these characteristics in mind, we can turn to the order of battle with increased insight, addressing the opposing plans ofattack. It is plain that to both Don John and Ali Pasha the center squadrons which they commanded personally were the centers ogravity of the opposing forces. For Don John, this represented tactical opportunity; for Ali Pasha, it was an unavoidable necessity

a mandate for a defensive holding action which would have to succeed so that the battle could be won elsewhere.It was unquestionably plain to both sides that if the Christian center could maintain a solid and unbroken line, it would be able togrind down and eventually overcome anything the Muslims could put against it. This was clear from the inherent characteristics o

the opposing galleys as well as from historical precedent.#44 Christian galleys in general and Western galleys in particular had asignificant tactical edge in a formal, head-on clash. Here, their greater weight of men and metal and their specialized raised fighti

platforms would tell; the musketeers and swivel gunners atop the arrumbadas of the Western galleys, in particular, would enjoy tluxury of being able to deliver plunging fire down onto the lower Muslim decks, protected from Muslim archery by temporary

ramparts of wood and cordage, without having to worry about their exposed flanks.For the Muslims, the problem was almost insuperable. A melee, of course, was their forte. Give them a chance to catch theChristian fleet in disorder and they would have it for breakfast, as they had a Prevesa in 1538 when the great Barbarossa

outmaneuvered Andrea Doria the Elder in a brilliant game of logistic bluff#45 and at Djerba in 1560 when Piali Pasha had caught
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the younger Doria with his pants down. But against a commander of Don John's competence, this was nothing to bank on. Anypartial engagement would surely tilt toward the heavier Christian galleys so long as they held formation. It was therefore all ornothing. Mezzinzade Ali Pasha would have to plan for a full, frontal clash knowing that his center would fight at a serious

disadvantage.Don John, for his part, clearly signaled his intention of fighting only in a well ordered line by ordering the projecting "spurs" cutoff the bows of the Christian galleys so that their cannon could be depressed to bear down on the lower lying Muslim craft at the

shortest possible range.#46The "spurs," used to break down the enemy rowing frame and then serve as a boarding bridge in a flan

attack, clearly had little value in the sort of fight which he had in mind.The Muslims, of course, would do everything in their power to turn the flanks of the Christian center. In the event, they brieflysucceeded. But this was nothing to count on. Competently handled flanking squadrons could be expected to frustrate any such

attempt undertaken by anything more than the odd galiot, something which the Christian reserve could take care of handily.To get at the Christian center, therefore, Mezzinzade Ali Pasha would first have to dispose of the Christian wings. This meant thhe would have to suck them out of position, to turn their flanks, or to maneuver them so badly as to destroy their tactical integrityand produce a meleefor the Muslim squadrons would suffer the same tactical disadvantages in a head on clash on the wings asthey would in the center, He would have to quickly eliminate at least one Christian wing as a tactical factor, for his center could n

be expected to hold for long.With this in mind, his basic plan is clear. He knew that he would take grievous losses in the center, yet he had to give his wings asolid base on which to maneuver. He possessed, in addition, an advantage over Don John in that he could allow his wings to run oa comparatively loose rein. The powers of maneuver of the Muslim flanking squadrons were undoubtedly superior to their

Christian opposites, even if the Venetian galleys were individually faster. So Mezzinzade Ali Pasha backed up the galleys of hiscenter with no less than 32 galiots to feed in reinforcementsattrition fillers in the antiseptic terminology of modern war. Thesewould give the center a degree of organic close-in, flank protection in addition to that provided by the small reserve squadron so

that the wings could run more freely still.Ali Pasha then gave his wings their marching orders: Mehmet Suluk on the right would take advantage of the shallow draft of theMuslim galleys to work close inshore around the Christian flank. This was the key to the Muslim plan. If Barbarigo, commandingthe Christian Left, left him any inshore room at all, he could quickly force numbers of galleys into the Christian rear. Since a gallwas effectively helpless if attacked from the flank or rear (under such circumstances a galiot could take the measure of a first clas

galley, and often did) this would break the Christian line.Uluch Ali on the left, with unlimited searoom, was given the preponderant force, at least thirty galleys more than he could put online. He must have intended to work them around the Christian seaward flank in a loose gaggle. At the very least, this would forc

Doria to play an exceedingly cautious game; at best, it would pull him out of the fight altogether and unleash the better part ofUluch Ali's squadron into the Christian rear. The Christian reserve would then have to be dealt with, of course, but by that point tchances for confusiona factor which would work to the Muslim advantagewould be great. A bit of miscalculation or a

premature decision to commit the Christian reserve, and he would be home free, whether or not Mehmet Suluk had run his gambi

successfully on the right.The tactical opportunities inherent in the Muslim dispositions were at least as evident to Don John as they are to us. In evaluatingthe way in which he planned to deal with them, we are blessed with a revealing piece of evidence: Don John's surviving order of

march of 9 September (the order of march and order of battle were nearly the same).#47This document enables us to reconstructhis tactical rationale with confidence. The order in question covers only 188 galleys, some 18 less than were present on the day o

battle, the most notable omission being Gian Andrea Doria's squadron,#48 but they detail the exact position of each galley in the

Christian line. Better still, they give us the identity and location of the Christian lantern galleys.We noted earlier the disproportionate number of Venetian galleys on the left. Based on the raw numbers, this could be interpretedas an attempt to keep the Venetian galleys where there relative lack of tactical power would do the least harm or as an attempt to

place them where their greater speed would do the most good. On the face of things, the first alternative makes more sense. TheVenetian galleys would be maneuvering in formation with numbers of the slower Western galleys and would presumably have to

conform to their speed. More to the point; why the left?Clearly, Barbarigo's boys knew that they would have to do some fast stepping to keep Mehmet Suluk from turning them inside ouBut was their problem qualitatively different or quantitatively worse than that faced by Doria's squadron on the offshore flank!There is no answer without reference to the human factor, to the detailed differences in design and armament between the galleysof the various Mediterranean nations on which we have spent so many paragraphs andthanks to Don John's order of 9 Septemb

to the uniquely Mediterranean tactical concepts embodied in the lantern galley.
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The order of battle 9 September provides us with the key to the puzzle. When we analyze the Christian dispositions in detailanwe are able to extrapolate the order of battle of 7 October with considerable confidencea whole new picture emerges. Thedeliberate weighting of the Christian right and center with heavier, slower, Western galleys implied by the raw numbers turns outto be only the tip of the iceberg. There was, in fact, an even more pronounced internal weighting of both the center and the leftwhich the numbers alone cannot show. This is strikingly evident in the remarkably asymmetrical dispositions of Barbarigo'ssquadron, which, significantly, seem to have changed least in composition between 9 September and the battle. The raw numberstell us that only 12 of the 98 western galleys in the Christian fleet were assigned to the left; in round figures this amounted to oneout of eight in a squadron which contained a fourth of the galleys in the Christian fleet. More striking still is the fact that only fouof the 25 or 26 lantern galleys in the Christian fleet fought on the left. Three of the four, moreover, were Venetian, and there wereonly seven Venetian lantern galleys in all. Since we might reasonably assume that Venetian lantern galleys rowed better than theiWestern equivalents, the picture emerges of a deliberate emphasis on speed and maneuverability on the left at all costs. The 9

September order lists 50 galleys in Barbarigo's squadron; all but 11 of them were Venetian (the ratio was out of 53 on the day of

battle).#49 Only three of the eleven western galleys were in the left, inshore half of the squadron; no less than six of the eleven weamong the first sixteen galleys on the right, and the sole western lantern galley in Barbarigo's squadron was fourth from the right.Barbarigo led his squadron from the extreme left end of his line. The overwhelming suspicion arises that the left side of Barbarigsquadron was specifically selected for its ability to maneuver better and faster than any other part of the Christian fleetas in fac

it dida full month before the battle was joined.In contrast to the left, the internal arrangement of the Christian right was generally symmetrical. In the order of 9 September,Hector Spinola in the Capitana of Genoa led the right from the exact center of his line, an arrangement probably followed by GiaAndrea Doris when he took over the squadron (Spinola moved to the center where he fought at Don John's immediate right).Twenty-two of Spinola's forty-seven galleys were Venetian (the proportion was twenty-five out of fifty-three on the day of battledivided relatively evenly between the left and right halves of the squadron, ten on the left and twelve on the right. Of his fivelantern galleys, one was on the extreme right flank, two were at the extreme left, and one was seven places left of his own lantern

galley in the center. This arrangement may represent a slight weighting of the line to the left and a slight emphasis on mobility tothe right. Then again, it may not. The lantern galleys on the extreme flanks, for instance, were almost surely heavily manned withcarefully picked oarsmen so that they could maneuver with the more easily propelled ordinary galleys near them. Though costly iterms of manpower and therefore something which could be done only at a few carefully chosen points, this was acharacteristically Mediterranean arrangement which we know to have been a standard tactic. On the whole, the order of battle of

the Christian right was a balanced one.The Christian center, however, was unbalanced in much the same way as the left, something which does not emerge from the rawnumbers. Based on the order of 9 September and on what we know of the battle itself, Don John elected to lead from the exactcenter of his own squadron. Clearly, he had every intention of making the center of his "main battle" the tactical focal point of theentire action. He disposed his lantern galleys accordingly: No less than ten of the thirteen lantern galleys assigned to the center byhis order of 9 September were in a tight grouping around hisReal(the figure was probably eleven of fourteen on the day of battleOnly two of these, however, Sebastian Venier in the Capitana of Venice and another Venetian lantern galley, were to the left of t

Real. The other seven were to the right, interspersed with an ordinary Venetian galley and one of the Pope.The weighting of tactical power to the right and mobility to the left which these dispositions suggest becomes even more apparenwhen we consider the distribution of ordinary galleys in the Christian Center. No less than twenty of the twenty-eight Venetiangalleys in the Center were in the left half of the squadron (the proportion may have been as much as twenty-three out of thirty-on

the document is illegible in spots).#50At least twelve and perhaps thirteen of the last fifteen galleys on the left flank were Venetiathe two certain exceptions being thePatrona of Sicily, a lantern galley, and another Spanish lantern galley at the extreme end of

the line.What conclusions can we draw from the apparent dissymmetry in the Christian dispositions? First of all, it is apparent that theyrelate in some way to the proximity of the shore to the left flank. While the Christian left and center assumed imbalanced orders o

battle of a similar nature, those of the right and the Reserve (which we have not previously mentioned, but which was, if anything

more symmetrical than that of the right)#51 were basically symmetrical. Those squadrons which were expected to fight out of tou

with the shoreline, then, had symmetrical orders of battle.It is plain that Don John and Mezzinzade Ali Pasha alike intended to march and to fight with their inshore flanks close to theshoreline. This was to protect communications with their logistic support: sailing vessels packed with men, munitions, and

provisions, particularly important to the Christian fleet, and the shore itself for all important water. Galley fleets always operatedon a short logistic tether, an inescapable product of the galley's small displacement and large complement. The problem became

more serious as the scale of manning grew and the size of fleets increased.#52The huge size of the fleets in the campaign of 1571must have imposed severe logistic constraints. Neither fleet could afford to blunder around at sea, seeking some ephemeral tacticadvantage at the risk of being cut off from supply ships or the shore by an enemy in an unassailable position along the beach. Botfleets were bound to the shore logistically and based their tactical plans and maneuvers upon it. Lepanto is more properly termed

an amphibious campaign and battle than a naval one.Hence the two opposing fleets were forced to work their way cautiously along the shore toward each other, the Christians from th
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north, the Muslims from the south. The movements of such sizeable forces would have been difficult to conceal and there is everyreason to believe that the two commanders possessed excellent intelligence. In a technical sense, Lepanto may have been a meetiengagementthere is no evidence that either commander deliberately selected the location of the battlebut in fact, Lepanto wafought remarkably close to plan on both sides. When the Christian advance guard rounded Point Scropha at the northwesternentrance to the Gulf of Corinth early on the morning of 7 October to sight the Muslim fleet up the Gulf to the East, both sides wer

well prepared.There is evidence that the inshore squadrons of both fleets were well in advance of their respective centers and offshore squadronthe opposing forces advancing in staggered echelon with the seaward flanks refused. This may have been by deliberate tacticaldesign; advancing the inshore squadrons may have given the centers better inshore flank protection and enabled them, in turn, to

better support their inshore covering forces. It may have been an unavoidable result of the time and place of engagement; thecurvature of the shore dictated that the Christian right and center, in particular, had a considerably greater distance to coverbetween initial sighting and engagement. This view is supported by the fact that all of the Christian galeasses, which Don John haintended to deploy ahead of the Christian line to disorder the onrushing Muslim galleys, did not get into position. The twogaleasses assigned to the Left clearly got into position ahead of Barbarigo's galleys and did considerable damage to Mehmet Suluthe two galeasses assigned to the Center seem to have engaged with some effect as well. But the two galeasses assigned to coverDoria's line were well to the rear when the action began; it is unclear as to whether or not they ever engaged. Conversely, one ofthe two galeasses on the left, probably that of Agostin Bragadino, actually managed to reenter the battle after having initially

engaged the Muslim galleys as they swept past to attack the Christian left.Be that as it may, the battle unfolded much as Don John had intended and as Mezzinzade Ali Pasha had feared. Both commandehad planned well; both had thoroughly prepared their forces; both had delegated authority wisely. In the event, the performance ocertain of their subordinate commanders was nothing short of brilliant. The performance of the Christian left under AgostinBarbarigo, who died leading his forces at what we must assume, for lack of evidence to the contrary, to have been the critical

tactical focal point, was particularly noteworthy. In Mehmet Suluk's defense, it must be said that he played an unexpectedly badhand unexpectedly well; the inshore fight seems to have been a close one. Laurels must also go to Don Alvaro de Bazan, whocommitted the Christian Reserve at precisely the right time, using the characteristically Spanish tactical caution on which Don Johmust have depended. Uluch Ali Pasha, in perhaps the most brilliant maneuvering of the day, nearly salvaged victory from the ashof defeat. For his part, Don John commanded wisely and fought well. The fact that he delegated the more spectacular maneuverinroles to seasoned and experienced subordinatesfor he was a relatively inexperienced marinerspeaks well for him.Mezzinzade Ali Pasha erred only in accepting battle at all, and there is evidence that he was under Imperial orders to engage.There is also evidence that he underestimated the size of the force arrayed against him. In the final analysis, his only real hope forvictory was in bringing about a loss of tactical cohesion on the Christian side. Galley warfare was an explosive, all-or-nothing

business and serious ruptures in the Christian ranks could have brought victory to the Muslims almost to the last act. He nearly

succeeded.In understanding Lepanto, it is necessary to emphasize the deliberate slowness with which large fleets of galleys maneuvered.

While individual galleys could make good a flank speed of 7 to 72 knots for varying periods of time, usually a maximum of abou20 minutes, the effort required left the ciurma incapable of much of anything else.#53This could be fatal, particularly to theVenetian or Muslim galley which relied on the fighting power of its free oarsmen to compensate for a lack of specialized fightingmen in the crunch of a head-on encounter. A cruise speed of 22 or 3 knots was relatively economical of human effort, but thisalready modest speed was further reduced by the demands of formation keeping. It must be noted in passing that the option ofengaging under sail was not a viable one, wind or no wind. Galleys were poor sailers to begin with; the precise maneuveringneeded for boarding tactics could be accomplished only under oars and it was impossible to maintain a tactically viable formationunder sail. Finally, and of overwhelming importance, a galley with its mast stepped and its large lateen yard set was horriblyvulnerable to artillery fire; a single lucky shot could cut a key piece of rigging and bring the yard and sail down, crushing half the

ciurma and totally disabling a galley with a single blow.Thus, although the opposing fleets had sighted each other shortly after dawn, it was around noon before the first shots wereexchanged. This was on the inshore flank where Mehmet Suluk's galleys, probably maintaining line for as long as possible to

conceal their intentions, encountered the two Venetian galeasses covering Barbarigo's squadron. The heavy artillery of thegaleasses seems to have done considerable damage to the Muslim squadron which continued past them, breaking for the shallowinshore waters to work their way around and into the Christian rear. They very nearly succeeded. The fight was confused and bittin spots, approaching the melee that the Muslims desired so ardently. They were frustrated when Barbarigo managed, underdifficulties which we can only imagine, to pivot his entire squadron door-like, pulling his left flank backwards to change his front

by nearly 90 degrees and pin the Muslims against the shore like so many pinned butterflys.#54Barbarigo died in the struggle andChristian losses were heavyMuslim archery seems to have been particularly telling in the early stages of the fightbut the resuwas the near total annihilation of the Muslim right. This was achieved only through the ability of the galleys of the Christian left tmaneuver effectively as a formation under conditions of extreme difficulty. The galleys on the inshore end of the line would havehad to back water, using their bow artillery as best they could to cover their retrograde movement, conserving their powers ofcombat and maneuver as best they could while waiting for their commander to determine whenand ifthey could go over to thattack. Military history attests to few maneuvers more intrinsically difficult than a retrograde movement under fire. That theysucceeded in pulling it off speaks well for them, and for the skill and foresight of the Christian command in disposing their forces

in such a way as to make the maneuver possible.
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The Christian center came to grips with the Muslims perhaps a half hour later than the initial contact on the inshore flank andprobably with the issue still in doubt there. Again, the Venetian galeasses seem to have disordered and inflicted loss on theonrushing Muslim galleys as they passed. There is no evidence of disintegration of the Muslim formation, so Mezzinzade AliPasha's forces must have reformed ranks in the brief moments before contact, using reinforcing galiots to fill gaps in the line. Thefight was particularly bitter in the center, focusing on Ali Pasha's Sultana and the ChristianReal, with individual Muslim galleys

and galiots attempting to force their way through small gaps in the Christian line to outflank it internally.#55In the event, theChristians managed to hold their ranks and bear the Muslims down with greater weight. A boarding party from Don John'sReal,covered by arrow fire and musketry from Venier's galley to the left, eventually won the decks of Ali Pasha's galley and brought

back his head, but it required three renewed assaults backed by manpower from thePatrona of Spain tied up to theReal's stern fo

just that purpose. Mezzinzade Ali Pasha died in vain, but it was a near thing.It was a near thing, for as the centers locked up in mortal combat, the offshore squadrons entered into a deadly contest, a contestwhich Uluch Ali won. Just what happened and how is unclear; it is plain, however, that Uluch Ali Pasha and Gian Andrea Doriaengaged in extended maneuvering, with the net result that the Christian right became badly separated from the center. In Doria'sdefense, there is no evidence that his offshore flank was turned. There is, however, evidence that his squadron had become

fragmented and that the battle on the offshore flank had lost cohesion.#56 For reasons at which we can only guess, numbers ofChristian galleys broke formation and headed for the main fight in the center. They may have been led by captains who perceivedthat Doria was treasonously holding them out of combat; they may have been led by captains who perceived that Doria had beencompletely outmaneuvered to the point that it was too late for the niceties of formation tactics and moved, accepting thedisadvantages of a melee with the Muslims to do something, anything, before it was too late. In either case, Uluch Ali, observingthe widening gap between the bulk of the Christian right and center turned inward and shot the gap between them, slamming into

the exhausted right flank of the Christian center with deadly effect.For a brief period the issue was in doubt: the Capitana of the Knights of St. John of Malta was overrun and several galleys werecaptured. Disaster was averted by the timely arrival of the reserve under Don Alvaro de Bazan. Observing the collapse of theMuslim center before his eyes and seeing the telltale traces in the distance of the fiasco on the inshore flank, Uluch Ali gathered hremaining forces, evacuated his prize crews from the overrun Christian galleys, and ran for it down the gulf. He got away with

perhaps 30 galleys, the largest intact Muslim force to escape from the battle.And so the battle of Lepanto was over. Don John had won because he had made better use of the tactical characteristics andcapabilities of the ships and men available to him than had Mezzinzade Ali Pasha. Those characteristics and capabilities were

dictated by a whole galaxy of socioeconomic pressures and influences.This leads to a concluding assertion: That both employment tactics and weapons system design are driven directly bysocioeconomic factors, whether this is explicitly recognized or not. This is an easy assertion to make, but a difficult one to sustainwith any degree of scholarly rigor. That we have been able to do so in the case of Lepanto owes much to the unique characteristic

of early modern Mediterranean warfare at sea, characteristics which therefore deserve a closer analytical look if we intend toextrapolate them into the future.The economic component of socioeconomic factors presents few problems. Begin by positing a positive correlation between theeffectiveness of weapons systems and their cost. This correlation holds as well for the weapons of today as it does for those of thesixteenth century; it holdsthough this point is often ignoredfor costs of maintenance and operation as well as for the cost of

procurement. Barring sudden and dramatic technological breakthroughs, more effective weapons will generally impose a greater

fiscal burden.Such relationships apply generally to most societies and to most military establishments throughout history and fit well within aMahanian analytical framework. Cost affects the number of weapons that can be produced and a tradeoff develops betweenquantity and quality. The tradeoff point is determined by the relationship between tactical effectiveness and costs, except where

tradition or some other irrational factor intrudes.#57This is a fairly obvious idea which has been worked to death by modern

defense analysts, if not by historians. The phrases "cost effectiveness" and "more bang for a buck" come immediately to mind.The social dimension is, however, harder to come to grips with, though it is arguably at least as important if a good deal lessobvious. It is fairly easy to demonstrate that changes in the quality of military manpower affect tactical effectiveness; Mahan

himself did so with considerable effect, for example in his comparative analysis of French and English naval leadership.#58It isanother matter entirely to be able to establish a causal relationship between social conditions and development and selection ofeither weapons or tactics. The uniquely human nation of galley warfare has enabled us to do both. To pick an obvious point inrecapitulation, the fact that wages and prices were relatively lower in the eastern than in the western Mediterranean made freeciurmi a practical proposition for both Venice and the Ottoman Empire. This, in turn, made Eastern galleys more mobile andEastern tactics more fluid. Spain, on the other hand, was forced to adopt a heavier, less mobile, galley because of a heavydependence upon slave and convict oarsmen. This, in turn, increased her dependence on increasingly smaller numbers ofnecessarily more effective, and more costly, regular infantry with important tactical consequences. This sort of analysis, I would

argue, is not Mahanian in nature.
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We could go on at length, but I will conclude by suggesting that all weapon systems, past and present, have been designed andbuilt with a set of assumptions in mind concerning the capabilities and limitations of the intended users. These assumptions exist the mind of the designer, either implicitly or explicitly whether he be designing tanks, ships, aircraft, or small arms. They are morvisible than usual in the case of the galleys which fought at Lepanto due to the severe design constrictions imposed by the materiaand power source available to the designers. With wood as the only structural material and human muscle as the only tactical

propulsion, Turkish, Venetian, and Spanish designers were forced into the same technical box; the subtle differences between theproducts can therefore be attributed to social factors. The impact of socioeconomic factors on weapons system design is generallygradual, subtle, and masked by more obvious factors such as changes in the fiscal environment or in the availability of criticalsupplies; this does not mean that it is unimportant. Human factors dictate the effectiveness and the design of our weapons today asurely as they dictated the design and the effectiveness of the weapons of five centuries ago. Before we permit the systems analysto factor the human element out of weapons systems design altogether, we owe ourselves another look at the sixteenth century

Mediterranean and at Lepanto.

Addendum: Following presentation of this paper, the author discovered that figures for the strength andcomposition of the Ottoman left wing and center had been exchanged, an error which also appears in theanalysis of the battle in his earlier published work, Gunpowder and Galleys. Correction of the error suggestthat the Ottoman left, with 61 galleys and 32 galiots, was weighted for speed and tactical mobility rather thafor sheer combat power, a suggestion which fits the basic thrust of the tactical analysis above better than theearlier erroneous assumption. Correction of the error further indicates that the Ottoman center entered battlewith a "second echelon" of 25 galleys backing the 62 galleys of the first rank. This use of a pre-committed

reserve to make up for anticipated attrition similarly reinforces the above conclusions concerningMezzinzade Ali Pasha's tactical concept, making his reliance upon the speed and agility of the Muslimgalleys even more evident.

New Aspects of Naval History: Selected Papers Presented at the Fourth Naval History Symposium, United States NavalAcademy 25-26 October 1979. Edited by Craig L. Symonds. Annapolis, Maryland: the United States Naval Institute, 1981.

pp. 41-65#Top HomeFOOTNOTES

[1]Geoffrey Symcox, The Crisis of French Seapower, 1688-1679: from the Guerre d'Escadre to the Guerre de Course (The Hagu1974), Shows the limitations of an uncritical application of Mahan's conceptual framework to periods of armed conflict at sea oth

than that from which it was derived. The following, pp. 227-8, summarizes his position: "Mahan's vision of mighty fleets in

climactic combat drew heavily on nineteenth century ideas of the 'strategy of annihilation,' and more specifically on Jomini's

codification of the Napoleonic art of war ... both Jomini's and Mahan's theories were grounded in too narrow a period of history;

the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, the era of Nelson, Mahan's hero ... Mahan in fact deduced his principles from the

Nelsonian age and then extrapolated them to other periods ..." A discussion of problems arising from the application of Mahanianorthodoxy to Mediterranean warfare at sea in the sixteenth century (something which Mahan himself, to his credit, consideredinvalid) is in John F. Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the

Sixteenth Century (London, 1974), Ch. 1. "The Mahanians' Fallacy," pp, 221-33.[2]Guilmartin, pp. 16-22.[3]

Guilmartin, pp. 26-34. Most of the galleys provided by Spain's lesser Italian allies served under contractual arrangements of acommercial nature.

[4]Andrew C. Hess, The Forgotten Frontier, A History of the Sixteenth Century Ibero-African Frontier(Chicago, 1978),

particularly pp. 90-91.[5](Paris, 1972). Though not primarily concerned with tactics, Lesure's excellent book contains an extended account of the battle,

Part 2, "L'affrontement," Ch. I "Le 7 octobre," pp. 115-47. Lesure makes extensive use of quotes from primary source document

which are of considerable value in themselves.[6]For an overall appreciation of the Venetian strategic posture as they saw it at the time, see Alberto Tenenti, Christoforo daCanal: la Marine Vnitienne avant Lpante (Paris, 1967), p. 117. The Venetians hoped, by eliminating the Ottoman fleet, to lessethe threat to their coastal recruiting grounds and fortified ports along the Dalmatian coast and in the Greek Archipelago. The

potential of the combined Ottoman naval force for large scale raiding and siege warfare was the real Venetian target, not "control
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of the sea."[7]For an analysis of the impact of economic factors on Mediterranean galley fleets in general, see Guilmartin, pp. 105-22.[8]See Robert S. Lopez, "Market Expansion: the Case of Genoa,"Journal of Economic History, Vol. XXIV (1964).[9]William H. McNeill, Venice, the Hinge of Europe 1091-I797 (Chicago, >974) pp. 134-37 See particularly p. 135, n. 26, Citinginformation from Halil Inalcik. The Ottoman/Genoese tin trade was probably curtailed if not eliminated following theseizure ofChios from the Genoese syndicate controlling the trade in 1566, but the Genoese proclivity for trading on similar terms with Turk

and Christian in war and peace alike is well documented.[10]Guilmartin, pp. 32-33. In addition, these contracts incorporated trade and tax concessions, granted by the Spanish Crown. If w

prorate Doria's capitana andpatrona (flagship and vice flagship, see note 17, below) at a galley and a half each, as the 1571contract did, then lost export taxes on Sicilian wheat increased the cost to Spain of each galley by 7 percent. Rental charges for

loaned convict oarsmen similarly increased the cost to Spain of each galley by 6 percent and Doria's personal salary, also covered

by the contract, raised the cost of each galley another 5 percent.[11]"Ghazi,"The Encyclopedia of Islam, Ne

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