t8 b19 miles kara trips fdr- interview guide- neads rome ny

8/14/2019 T8 B19 Miles Kara Trips Fdr- Interview Guide- NEADS Rome NY

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Interview GuideNortheast A ir Defense SectorRome, New York

D ates: TBD

Note: W ith possible exception of the Commanding Officer and the Operations Officer al linterviewees will first be asked to, in narrative form without interruption, provide theirrecollection of events as they unfold ed on 9/11. The detailed interview gu ide can then beused to m ake sure all relevant points are covered.

Commission Sensit ive


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Commanding OfficerPersonal DataName: Rank:

Years in Position on 9/11:Current Position: Phone:E-mail :

Start with short career history with emphasis on air defense experience.

Morning of 9/111. W here were you on the m orning of 9/11 and how did you become awareof the developing situation?2. W hat were your imm ediate orders and actions when you became aware?3. What comm unication means were imm ediately available to you and towhom?

4. Explain how you deconflicted the on-going exercise and how youorganized your force s to meet the challenge?5. What processes and procedures were in place for you to gain situationalawareness and how quickly were you able to do so?6. W hat initial guidance did you receive from CONR, if any. At what pointdid you receive guidance and what was it?7. Did you person ally have any contact with FAA at any level or withN OR A D at any level? How about the NM CC or other W ashington areaentity?8. Did you persona lly have any contact with th e Wings at Otis and Langley?If so what w ere the details of that contact?

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9. How did you manage events of the morningwhat was your relationshipwith the Mission Control Commander and the Director of Operations?10. W hat inpu t did you have to the decisions to scramblefrom Otis? FromLangley?11. What input did you have to the decisions to continue routine scheduledtraining at Otis? Elsew here? W as that training exercise-related?12. In the hunt fo r American Air 11 what do you recall about the effort toestablish its altitude? W hat capability does the Sector have to do so?Manning the W a t c h

13. What standards did you establish fo r your SAOC to identify specialtracks or other unknown tracks of interest?14. How did you decide when an officer is sufficiently trained and capableto perform duty as a Mission C ontrol Comm ander?15. Where did Major Nasypany rank among the Mission ControlCom manders and alternates w ho performed that duty?16. How often and in what m anner did you test or exercise your watchteams to deal with unknown targets?17. How often and when did you conduct such tests or exercises to dealwith a hijacking?The Scram bles, Interception and Shootdown Auth ority18. W hat orders did you understand the scram bled pilots to have as they gotin the air that morning? W hat were they supposed to do? W hat were theirorders concerning expenditure of ordnance?19. At what time did you become aware of guidance to take positive actionagainst hijacked commercial airliners and how and from whom did youreceive that guidance?

Commission Sensitive


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20. At what time and how did you become aware that Andrews fighters hadbeen alerted and then scram bled?21. At one time C ON R cautioned NE AD S that it did not have control ofAndrews and Atlantic City fighters. How was that caution com municated toyou an d what steps did you take to gain control?22. W hat conversations did you have with senior officers of the DCANGconcerning the An drews fighters?The Tough Questions23. The families and the Am erican public do not understand w hy scrambledfighters did not simply kick in the afterburner and head straight for eitherNew York City in the case of Otis or Washington DC in the case of Langley.How wo uld you have us answer that concern?24. The families and the Am erican public are also confused as to the timethat NEAD S was notified by the FAA. How did the 0840 time become th eagreed upon time between NORAD and the FAA and what input did youhave to that agreement?25. What did you document here at NE ADS as the time of the notification?26. How did the NORAD Publ ic Affairs Office acquire th e notion thatnotification came either as early as 0835 or shortly after 0830?Lessons Learned27. Shifting gears now, in the aftermath of 9/11 what immediate changesdid you make in the w ay you did business, apart from the 24-hr CAPrequirement?

28. How much of that changed survived and became institutionalized?29. W hat are the two or three dom estic air defe nse lessons learned fromevents of 9/11?



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30 . Could, today, your SAOC pick up and identify an unknown or specialtrack such as A A 1 1 ? How about AA77 where height-finding was notavailable?Conclus ion31. What have w e not asked you that we sho uld have asked?32. W hat did you com e prepared to talk about or inform us that we have notasked you?33. W ho, particularly at CO NR , N O R A D , the W ings and FAA must weinterview in order to understand events of 9/11 and their impact today?34 . What after action rev iew, "hot w ash", or other critique did you conduct?If done, where would we find a copy of the resu lts?

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Operations OfficerDOC (or SAOC supervisor)Battle Com m an d er

N o te : Th i s guide appl ies to a l l three potent ia l in terviewees

Personal Data ~N a m e : O/W/SU&x> Rank:Position on9/1 1 : pOCurrent Posi t ion:_ UJJ CL_^._ Phone:E-mail:

Start with career his tory, with emp hasis on ai r defens e trainingMorning of 9/111. Where were you on the morn i ng of 9/11 a n d how d id you become aware\ ofthe d eve lop i ng s i tu a t i on?

\ 2. What w ere your immed ia te orders and actions when youbecame aware?3 . What comm un ica tion means w ere immedia te ly ava i lab le to you and tow h o m ?4. Expla in how you deconfl icted the on-going exercise and how youorganized your forces to meet the challenge?5. What processes and procedures were in place for you to gain situationalawareness a n d how quickly were you able to do so?6. What ini t ia l gu idance did you receive from CONR, if any. At what pointd id you receive gu idan ce an d wha t was i t?



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7. Did you personally have any contact with FAA at any level or withNORAD at any level? How about th e NMCC or other Washington areaentity?8. Did you personally have any contact with the Wings at Otis and Langley?If so what were the details of that contact?9. How did you manage events of the mo rningw hat was your relationshipwith the Mission Control Commander and the Exercise Commander?10. What input did you have to the decisions to scramblefrom Otis? FromLangley?11. What input did you have to the decisions to continue routine scheduledtraining at Otis? Elsew here? W as that training exercise-related?12. In the hunt for American Air 11 what do you recall about the effort toestablish its altitude? What capability does th e Sector have to do so?Running the Watch13. What standards did you establish fo r your SAOC to identify specialtracks or other unknown tracks of interest?14. How did you decide when an officer is sufficiently trained and capableto perform duty as a M ission Control C omm ander?15. Where did M ajor Nasypany rank among th e Mission ControlCom manders and alternates who perfo rmed that duty?16. How often and in what manner did you test or exercise your watchteams to deal with unknown targets?

17. How often and when did you conduct such tests or exercises to dealwith a hijacking?18. Walk us through th e standards that existed at the time, time-wise, fromfirst notification or aw areness of a special situation to fighters in the sky.How much time does the ID Tech have, the Weapons Section, MCC, theWing, Other? Any changes to those standards.



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The Scrambles, Interception and Shootdown Authority19. W hat orders did you understand the scrambled pilots to have as they gotin the air that morning? W hat were they supposed to do? W hat were theirorders concerning expenditure of ordnance?20. At w hat time did you becom e aware of guidance to take positive actionagainst hijacked commercial airliners and how and from whom did youreceive that guidance?21. A t what time and how did you become aware that Andrews fighters hadbeen alerted and then scrambled?22. At one time CONR cautioned NEADS that it did not have control ofAndrews and Atlantic City fighters. How was that caution communicated toyou and what steps d id you take to gain control?23. W hat conversations did you have with senior officers of the DCANGconcerning the Andrews fighters?The Tough Q uestions24. The families and the American public do not understand w hy scrambledfighters did not simply kick in the afterburner and head straight fo r eitherNew York City in the case of Otis or Washington DC in the case of Langley.How would you have us answer that concern?25. The families and the Am erican public are also confused as to the tim ethat NEADS was notified by the FAA. How did the 0840 time become theagreed upon time between N O R A D and the FAA and what input did youhave to that agreement?26. W hat did you docum ent here at NE AD S as the time of the notification?27. How did the NORAD Publ ic Affairs Office acquire th e notion thatnotification came either as early as 0835 or shortly after 0830?



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Lessons Learned28. Shif t ing gears now, in the aftermath of 9/11 what immediate changesdid you make in the way you did business, apart from th e 24-hr CA Prequirement?29. How much of that changed survived and became insti tutionalized?30. Wh at are the two or three dom estic air defen se lessons learned fromevents of 9/11?31. Could, today, your SA OC pick up and identify an unknown or specialt rack such as AA 11? How about AA7 7 where height-f inding was notavailable?Conclusion32. What have we not asked you that we should have asked?33. Wh at did you come prepared to talk about or inform us that we have n otasked you?34. Who, particularly at CONR, NOR AD, the Wings and FAA must weinterview in order to understand even ts of 9/11 and their impact today?Added for the Battle Com mand er1. W h at was the array of communicat ions in the Battle Cab, to whom was itconnected and how effective was the arrangement?2. What was the relat ionship between the Mission Control Comman der andthe Bat t le Cab? Wh at could the MCC do on his own and what did he h aveto check with the Battle Cab?3. W ho actually issued the scramble orders, MCC or Battle Cab?Added for the Operations Officer(s)1. At one t ime the posit ion of MCC did not exist and the senior watchofficer was the SD (Senior Director). Why was the role of the SD retained



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in addition to that of the MCC? Didn't that add a level of managementperhaps not needed? Tell us about the maturation of this new role for the SDand how that role in conjunct ion with the role of the MC C and the WeaponsOfficer played out on 9/11.

Commission Sensit ive


11/21

Mission Control CommanderPersonal DataName: Rank:

Position on 9/11:Current Position: Phone:E-mail:

Preliminary1. Tell us about your background. W hat training did you receive to becomea Mission Control Com mander, what qualifications did you have to meet,and when did you first perform this duty on your own?2. How we ll prepared were you for events as they unfold ed on 9/11? Howmu ch did your training help, or hind er, and what did you have to make up onyour own?3. H ow often and to what extent did you train or exercise for a hijackingscenario?4. Were you ever made aware that commercial airplanes might be used asweapons?5. How integral was the crew you had on duty on 9/11 usual crew whohabitually worked together or did you have substitutes as part of your teamthat day?6. How was the relationship established between your operation and theongoing exercise? H ow were the two separated? W ere they on the SAOCfloor with you?7. What "pre-game" discussion did you and Major Deskins hold on shiftchange the m orning of 9/11 ? Did you talk about the habitual tendency ofexercise events to bleed into real world events or vice versa, and what to doabout that?



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8. How often and to what extent were you briefed on the threat youconfronted each time you assumed duty? Did those briefing s ever speak to adomestic air defen se threat of any nature, but specifically a hijacking, orworse, a suicide hi jacking?Morning of 9/119. Okay, now take us to the morn ing of 9/11 and walk us through whathappened, in order, as best you can recall.[Note: Following points must be addressed either during his narrative orafterwards}

Which noti f icat ion came firstBoston or Otis? How were the two deconfl ic ted? How did Major Deskins get in the act as an M CC? ^ What prompted the ID Tech to began work so quickly? What was the separate role of the Surveillance Tech? We re you aware that N Truro radar was down for PMI? Did it make a difference? Can the ARS R-4 radar primary return feed be used by NEADS toestablish alti tude? If so, how and by who m is that done? What is a special track*?^- What is a Z poin t and who establishes it?" Once established, then what happens?-^ What situational awareness did you have about AA1 1 ? We re you aware that FAA manage rs at Boston and Hern don hadobserved that AA11 was descending and slowing? How hard is it to work up a track on an unknow n over land asopposed to over water? Shouldn't it be easier less clutter? W as the AA11 track as a transponding aircraft on your scope or any

Sector scope? If not, the reason for that is? When you gave orders affecting Otis or Langley who carried themout? Explain the different roles of the MCC/T, SD, and Weapons Officeras you organized for battle on 9/11.



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What situational awareness did you have at the moment th e first planeimpacted the North tower. Ab out A A 1 1 , about what hit the tower,about UA175.Transcipts sho w that at about the mom ent of imp act an ID techexclaimed "there it is right where sh e said it was." Explain that as itwas relayed to you .Did the ID Tech have th e capability at that point to determinealtitude?If not, isn't that a capability of the ARSR -4 radar that NEA DS uses?Once Otis was airborne what happenedwhy th e path they took?W ho determines the mach after launch, you or the w ing?How were you r instructions relayed to the pilots?From you r position who could you talk to? Pilots? W ing? Otis? BattleCab? CONR? NORAD? NM CC/Washington DC?W hat was the thou ght process that led to the early battle stations f orLangley?W hy the delay, then, in scrambling Langley?What other USAF fighter assets, if any, could you draw upon?What was the thought process that led to a Langley scramble first Eastand then to the North?At what poin t did you gain situation al awareness, if at all, that A A 1 1had impacted the first tower? UA175 the second?How did Delta89 becom e a possible hijack?W as that th e third Boston-departure plane that was at issue?At what po int, if at all, did you gain awareness that AA7 7 was ahijack?That AA77, not A A 1 1 was the fast mover approaching the DC areafrom th e west?Tell us about the And rews scramble were you aware they had beenalerted and then scrambled ou tside of your purview?The first Andrews fighter up did one circle and landed im med iatelywhat w as that all about?At one point CONR cautioned NEA DS to get control of fighters fromAnd rews and Atlantic City. How did you accomplish that?W hen did you become aware that fighters could engage com mercialairliners? W ho informed you and in what manner?

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T he Transcript and the Scrambles11. Over and above th e previous discussion, walk through his transcript withthe MC C to clarify any remaining points to :- Understand who was talking, when

- Determine who was relaying his orders to the pilots- Establish what his thought processes were that led to the scrambledecisions- Learn what inform ation caused him to "fight" th e Otis and Langleyfighters the way he did- Determine how much he was guided or informed by the Battle Cab,CONR, and NORA D- Estab lish his situational awareness of each of the four hijackedaircraft as the mo rning proceeded

Conclusion11. What have we not asked you that we should have?12. What did you come prepared to talk about that we have not asked you?13. Who, at any level, in either NO RAD or FAA, or elsewhere must we talkto in order to understand and be informed about events as they unfolded onthe morning of 9/11 .



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Lieutenant Colonel DeskinsPersonal Data ~ -Na m e : dgur ajL^Twy^ Rank: Q"

Position on9/1 1 : "A -VJOCurrent Position: rQ)_ Phone:E-mail:

Prel iminary1 . Tell us about your backgro und . W hat training did you receive to becomea M ission C ontrol C omm ander, what qua lifications did you have to meet, X^and when did you first perform this duty on your own?2. How well prepared were you for events as they unfolded on 9/1 1? H owmuch did your training help, or hinder, and what did you have to make up onyour own?3. H ow often and to what extent did you train or exercise for a hijackingscenario?4. Were you ever made aware that commercial airplanes might be usedweapons?5. Why did you happen to be present on the SAOC floor that day? Were^you the exercise MCC and is that why you were called to the phone to taketh e call from Joe Cooper?6. How was the relationship established between your exercise and normaloperations? H ow were the two separated? W ere your exercise staff on theS A O C floor with you? H ow robust w as that staff compared to the watch X,staff? \. Was the watch staff perform ing both exsimultaneously? If so, why?7. Wh a t "pre-game" discussion did you and M ajor Nasypany hold on shiftchange the morning of 9/11? Did you talk about the habitual tendency of

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exercise events to bleed into real world events or vice versa, and what to do-about that?8. How often and to what extent w ere you br iefe d on the threat facing theSector? Did those briefings ever speak to a domestic air defense threat^fany nature, but specifically a hijacking , or worse, a suicide hijacking?Morning of 9/119. Okay, now take us to the morning of 9/11 and walk us through w hathappened, in order, as best you can recall. v[Note: Follow ing poin ts m ust be addressed either during her narrative orafterwards}

N Why was she called to the phone and not M ajor Nasypany? Was their some uncertainty, despite SgtPowell's early awareness thatthe call might be for the exerciser^ Once Major Nasypany 's team w ent to work in earnest what did shedo, where did shegoV\ Given that she is a pu blic persona, how did that come about and whatinformation did she actually impart and what time of notification did\sh e provide?

Conclus ion10. What have w e not asked you that we should have?11. What did you come prepared to talk about that we have not asked you?12. Who, at any level, in either NOR A D or FAA, or elsewhere must we talkto in order to understand and be inf ormed about events as they un folded onth e morning of 9/11.



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MCC/T

Personal DataName: Rank:Position on 9/11:Current Po sition: Phone:E-mail :

Background1. Tell us about your background. W hat t raining did you receive to becomea M CC /T, what q ualifications did you have to meet, and when did you firstperform this duty on your own?2. How we ll prep ared were you for events as they unfolded on 9/11? H owmuch did your training help, or hinder, and what did you have to make up onyour own?3. How often and to what extent did you train or exercise for a hijackingscenario?4. Were you ever made aw are that com mercial airplanes might be used asweapons?5. How integral was the crew you had on duty on 9/11usual crew whohabitually wo rked together o r did you have substitutes as part of your teamthat day?6. How was the relationship established between your operation and theongoing exercise? H ow were the two separated? W ere they on the SAOCfloor with you?7. What "pre-game" discussion did you an d the exercise senior NCO holdon shift change the morning of 9/11? Did you talk about the habitual

Com mission Sensit ive


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tendency of exercise events to bleed into real world events or vice versa, andwhat to do about that?8. How often and to what extent were you briefed on the threat youconfronted each time you assumed d uty? Did those briefings ever speak to adomestic air de fense threat of any nature, but spec ifically a hijacking, orworse, a suicide hijacking?M orning of 9/119. Okay, now take us to the morning of 9/11 and walk us through whathappened, in order, as best you can recall.[Note: Follow ing points m ust be addresse d either durin g his narrative orafterwards}

W hich notification came firstBoston or Otis? What was your specific role in sorting out the first fe w chaoticmoments? Did you, if fact, run the floor for the MCC? W as the division of labor among th e watch sectionsID,Surveillance, Weaponsclearly understood and followed that day? Did you have to order exercise participants out of the road or did youintegrate them in some manner? Did you have the "A" team on duty or were there substitutes on watchfor what ever th e reason? Who does the M CC/T talk to Ba ttle Cab, outside agencies, CONRwhat is the division of labor between you and the M CC incom mu nicating inform ation to others? What was your personal situational awareness in the hunt for AA11?

Conclusion10 . W hat have we not asked you that we should have?11 . What did you com e prepared to talk about that we have n ot asked you?



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12. Who, at any level, in either NORAD or FAA, or elsewhere m ust we talkto in order to understand and b e informed about events as they u nfolded onthe morning of 9/11 .



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Weapons, Survei l lance and Identification SectionsNo te: This form at will be u sed, with slight variation, for the supervisors of the threesections, and the four or 5 watch s tandersSenior Director, Weapons Officer, WeaponsNC O , Surveil lance Tech, ID Tech.The ID Tech w ill be asked abo ut the hunt for AAl 1, the SD and W eapons folks aboutthe scram bles and the S urve illance Tech ab out situational awareness.The three supervisors will be asked about training, threat awareness, standards, andqualifications to stand watch. They w ill be asked to rate the persons on duty that day andhow substitutes are integrated into the mix . They w ill be asked how new individuals areintegrated into the watch. They will be asked fo r check lists as they existed that day and

for a summ ary of changes made s ince 9/11 based o n the experience o f that day.

Personal DataName: Rank:Position on 9/11:Current Position: Phone:E-mai l :

Background1. Tell us about your backgrou nd. W hat t ra ining did you receive to becomea , what qualifications did you have to meet , and when did youfirst perform this duty on your own?2. How well prepared were you for events as they unfolded on 9/11? Howmuch did your t ra ining help, or hinder, and what did you have to make up onyour own?3. How often and to what extent did you train or exercise for a hijackingscenario?4. Were you ever made aware that commercial airplanes might be used asweapons?

Commiss ion Sens i t ive


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t8 b19 miles kara trips fdr- interview guide- neads rome ny

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