t3 b18 jenkins dod reports 1 of 3 fdr- reports- testimony- 1st pgs for reference 019

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HEARING OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THEUNITED STATES

WITNESS: DR. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FORNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS CHAIR: THOMAS H. KEAN; VICE CHAIR: LEEH. HAMILTONROOM 216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.9:03 A.M. EDT, THURSDAY, APRIL 8, 2004

MR. KEAN: (Sounds gavel.) Good morning. As chair of theNational Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,I hereby convene this hearing. This is a continuation of thecommission's previous hearings on the formulation and conduct ofU.S. counterterrorism policy. The record of that hearing, by theway, including staff statements, is available on our website,www.9- llcommission.gov.We will hear from only one witness this morning, thedistinguished Dr. Rice, Condoleezza Rice, assistant to thepresident for national security affairs.Dr. Rice, we bid you a most cordial welcome to thecommission.But before I call on Dr. Rice, I would like to turn to ourvice chair for brief opening remarks.MR. KAMILTON; Good morning.Good morning, Dr. Rice. We're very pleased to have you withus this morning.Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to make astatement. I will be very brief. The purpose of our hearing thismorning is very straightforward. We want to get information andwe wanted to get it out into the public record.If we are going to fulfill our mandate, a comprehensive and

sweeping mandate, then we will have to provide a full andcomplete accounting of the events of 9/11, and that means that weare going to ask some searching and difficult questions.Our purpose is not to embarrass, it is not to put any witnesson the spot. Our purpose is to understand and to inform.Questions do not represent opinions. Our views will follow laterafter reflection on answers. We want to be thorough this morning,


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COMMISSION SENSITIVE

THE THREAT: DEFINING THE PROBLEMTerrorism is not the enemy, terrorism is a tactic.1Lorry M. Fenner

The US government and military have not yet fully transitioned from Cold War andIndustrial Age thinking and postures to face Information Age, transnational threatseffectively. Catastrophic terrorist attacks are not the only significant challenges we face,but the attacks of September 11, 2001 have shown us in dramatic terms that we can nolonger adjust gradually to globalization and the new era. We must move much morerapidly to posture and equip our people, our government and the intelligence communityto combat this challenge as well as other transnational challenges (those known andthose not yet anticipated).Hypothesis: The Intelligence Community (1C) and policy makers did not understandthe threat to US national security in the late 1990s. We focused too narrowly on UsamaBin Laden (UBL), and then incrementally enlarged that focus to al Qa'ida seniorleadership (AQSL). The narrow focus and ad hoc changes made creating acomprehensive and appropriate US Government (USG) strategy difficult. This, in turn,made the development of an effective intelligence strategy nearly impossible. Since9/11 our focus haschanged. Now it is too broad - a global war on terrorism (GWOT).2Our strategy must be grander than one that only addresses a tactic; terrorism.Although others reject this notion, we posit that the threat is ideological -violent Islamicextremism. We do not posit a "clash of civilizations", however whether our adversary isone group, al Qa'ida, or a network of groups, we must address this ideology, and wemust analyze the adversary's goals and strategy.3 Only then can we truly understandwhy the US is a target. Only then can we design a strategy or set of strategies witheffective campaign plans and tactics to defeat our adversaries.4

First, this paper posits our adversary's strategy including notional "ends, ways,and means." Next, is a review of the security environment and terrorism and theintelligence attempts to assess and respond to these. While we had a general NationalIntelligence Estimate (NIE) and an update, in the absence of a comprehensiveassessment specifically of al Qa'ida, the Counterterrorism Center worked from anarrow, DCI approved "plan". The paper ends with a call for an appropriate assessmentof the threat and proposes possibilities that would bring us closer to being able todesign an effective strategy.

Many books have been written about the threat, terrorism, and strategy. This is not meant to bea comprehensive review or overview, but a thumbnail sketch of our framework for analysis.2 Jeffrey Record, "Bounding the Global War on Terrorism," Strategic Studies Institute, December2003.3 Bard O'Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare, Brassey's Inc.,Washington, 1990. O'Neill provides a framework for analysis.4 Combating Terrorism in a Global ized World, National War College, May 2002 is one exam ple ofan analysis of a "pansurgency" and designing ends, ways and means to respond.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE 12/25/2004


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Report o f ' t h e

C O M M I S S I O N TO A S S E S ST H E BAL LI S T I C M I S S ILE T H R E A T

T O T H E U N I T E D STATES

IntelligenceSide Letter

March 18 , 1999

NCT0053073

t3 b18 jenkins dod reports 1 of 3 fdr- reports- testimony- 1st pgs for reference 019

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