t3 b16 dos-dod statements on terrorism 2 of 2 fdr- entire contents- pdd- reports- articles-...

8/14/2019 T3 B16 DOS-DOD Statements on Terrorism 2 of 2 Fdr- Entire Contents- PDD- Reports- Articles- Excerpts- Withdrawal Notice- 1st Pgs for Reference

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Ext rac t f rcmi iN'SDD 28 6 http:/ /www.fas.org/i rp/offdocs/nsdd286.htr

[[Presidential Directives and Executive Orders!

UNCLASSIFIEDExtract from NSDD 286

I. INTRODUCTIONA . The Policy Context

In discharging his constitutional responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations and for ensuring thesecurity of the United States, the President m a y find it necessary that activities conducted in support ofnat ional foreign policy objectives abroad be planned and executed so that the role of the United StatesGovernment is not appar ent or ac knowledged publicly. Such a ctivities, the fa ilure or exposure of whichm a y entail hiqh costs, must be conducted only af ter the President reaches an informed judqment regardingtheir utili ty in partic ular circum stances. To the extent possible, they should be c onducted only when we areconfident that, i f they are revealed, the Am erican public w ould f ind them sensible.This Directive ... sets forth revised procedures for presidential approval and review, through the Na tional_ Sec uri ty Council (NS C) process, of all "special activities" as defined by section 3.4(h) of Executive OrderN o. 12333 (December 4, 1981).These procedures are designed, inter alia, (1) to ensure that all special activities conducted by, or a t thedirection of, the United States a re consistent with na tional defense a nd foreign policies a nd applicable law;(2 ) to provide standards ensuring the Secrecy of such ac tivities even w hen the results become publiclyknownror the activities themselves are the subject of unauth orized disclosure; and (3) to implement section501 of the National Securi ty Act of T947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 413), concerning notification to Congressof such a ctivities.

B. The Role of th e Assistant to the President fo r National Security Affairs and the National SecurityCouncil S t a f fWithin the f r am e w o r k and in accordance wi th the requirements se t fo r th in N S D D 2 66 , the Assistant to thePresident for N ational Securi ty Affai rs (the "Na tional Securi ty Advisor") shall serve a s manager of theN SC process and as principal advisor on the President's staff with respect to all national securi ty affa i rsincluding special activities. The NSC staf f, through the Executive Secretary of the NSC, shall assist theNat iona l Securi ty A dvisor in discharging these responsibilities. Th e N ational Securi ty A dvisor and theN SC staff themselves shall not undertake th e conduct of special activities.


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/|j\nBar AssociationVolume 25, Number 1 STANDING COMMITTEE ON LA W AND NATIONAL SECURITY May 2003)

National Security Law n a Changed World: J/'i 'The Twelfth Annual Review of theField 75 /VEdited by Matthew Foley

On November 21-22, 2002, th e Standing Committee on Law and National Security of the American BarAssociation; the Center foHtfational Security La w of the University of the Virginia School of Law; and the Center onLaw, Ethics an d National Security of the Duke University S chool of Law; cosponsored the twelfth annual conferencedevoted to the review of developments inthe field of national security law. This conference summary is our best

pt to summarize the conference proceedings without confirming the remarks with each speaker. This documentonly a summ ary. This year also marked the 40th anniversary of the Standing Committee. One of the founding

members of the Standing Com mittee is R. Daniel McMichael. Although his schedule prevented him from being withus , he sent a letter on the occasion of the Standing Committee's anniversary. In it, he described "the imperative uponwhich the Committee wa s based: the absolute necessity of building consensus among people of varying political an dintellectual hues as to how our nation is to preserve its liberty under law in the face of those forces (and they neverseem to go away) that would have it otherwise. " In closing, M r. McMichael noted that "there is no single site uponwhich to erect a monument commemorating the founding of the Committee,~yet a monument does exist. It is theCommittee, i t s e l f , its members an d what they do. The monument still stands unblemished - and long may it be so. "

I would extend the "monument" to include al l of you who participate in the activities of the Committee throughattendance at our conferences, panels, breakfasts, and other programs, o r just by reading this newsletter. Your com-mitment to examining the important issues at the intersection of law and national security validates and sustains thevision of the Com mittee's founders. It is with these thoughts in mind that we continue the tradition of hosting theannual review of the field of national security law. -Suzanne E. Spaulding, ChairOpening Remarks


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Terrorism and U Page 1 of 23

Terrorism and U.S. Foreign PolicyPaul Pillar

Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).1: Introduction-Clinton 1998 to UNO A: "terrorism is at the top of the of the American agendaand should be at thetop of the world agenda." 1-successes:

frequency of attacks w orldwide halved from mid-1980s to 1990s [but the attacks were deadlier]; speed of solving big attacks such as Oklahoma City, WTC 1993, 1998 embassies; cooperation bw. law enforcement and intell; disrupted terrorist operations, such as FBI 1993 success in stopping Sudanese terrorists' plot to

blow up NYC landmarks-1995-98: U.S. intell focus on UBL helps make 1998 case-narrow focus on body cou nt ignores other costs of terrorism-mistake to focus on CBRN attacks; sensationalism-Clinton read a novel about terror attack on NYC w. bioengineered virus an d asked U.S. experts toevaluate the real risk p. 4-"If coun terterrorism is conceived as a wa r, it is a small step to conclud e that in this war there is nosubstitute fo r victory an d thus no room fo r compromise." p. 5-but still need finesse, accomodation, creativity; avoid absolutism-caricature of conventional school: "confrontational, fight-don't-fmesse stream of American thinkingabout terrorism" p. 8-esp. on state sponsors, engagement may be shrewder over long haul, however easy to slam as soft-June 2000 National Comm ission on Terrorism:


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Terrorism and U Page 1 of 13

The Age of Sacred TerrorDaniel Benjamin & Steven Simon

Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002).6: A Paradigm Lost-after WTC 1993, some White House, CIA, and other officials start learning curve-old paradigm on terrorism:

fight terrorists to strengthen deterrence; let no one think U.S. will jus t take it work with other states to disrupt use force when sensible no concessions, pay-offs, appeasement (unlike Europeans and the one deviation, Reagan'scalamitous arms sales to Iran) no major intl terrorist group had U.S. as its primary target most groups are state-sponsored or national-liberation fronts a second- or third-tier nuisance, not a strategic threat p. 220

-average annual fatalities were 26-less likely than lightning strikes, bathtub drownings, or poisonous bites p. 220-didn't threaten either U.S. power or large numbers of citizens-Jan. 25/93: Mir Aimal Kansi, lone Pakistani gunm an, shoots AK-47 into cars o utside CIA HQ inMcLean, killing tw o-Feb. 26/93: Ramzi Yousef attacks WTC in worst foreign terror attack on U.S. soil-June 26/93: U.S. launches 23 Tomahawks at Baghdad's mukhabarat HQ after April 1993 plot to killformer President B ush with car bomb on Kuw ait visit-first U.S. reprisal in 7 years, since Reagan's 1986 raid on T ripoli


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WH0300615Interview of the President by Bob Woodward and Dan Balz of The Washington Post,

December 20, 2001. (2 hours)(000242) President Bush says he'd asked the CIA (&NSC?) "to start thinking about how to get

"them"" in June, 2001, starting w/ UBL and al-Q. Says "I hadn't seen a report yet,interesting enough," but that they'd been getting "some intelligence hits" throughout thesummer, mainly focused on overseas.

Implies that at least one of the reasons he kept Tenet on as DCI was that he brought a lot ofknowledge on terrorism and on UBL and al-Q to the administration.

(000244) "Iknow there was a plan in the works" before 9-11, though doesn't cite when it was to be

presented (interviewers suggest 9-10), and "I don't know how mature the plan was."Mentions how impressed he was with Tenet's local knowledge presented immediately after9-11, however, ie. "My point is that they had in their mind a plan. There's no question aboutit."

Re-Question onwhether Bush wanted tohave UBL killed before 9-11: /*STell, I hadn't seen av \o that. IknewJhalw^jgjtejjyo^ word is bring him to '\ " j ^'/.justice." Statesjhat there was a s ignif icant d i f f ^ ^ ^ ^ & after 9-TT. Pre-

STC]-??'"-w w^qapK>bl?luJLJ![gf ^^ Rast^Afrirahnrnbings ,ancfothers]. And[Ijwaspregaredjto look at ajlanJhat WQuJdJxj a thoughtfj^plan that wouldBring hirjiifijijui^ to do that." But didn't feel the ~ ^~sense o f urgency, angqr a

J x

(000248) Immediately after the 9-11attacks, looking toward a response: "I remember watching in

frustration as American tried to wage a conventional war against a guerilla force in Vietnam.And I.. .just instinctively knew that we were going to have to think differently about howwe're going to fight."

"The military strategy was going to take a while to unfold. I became frustratedand let mesay this on this point. Early on, the history will show that I asked for all options on the table,and knew that we were going to have to have what they call boots on the ground, knew wewere going to have to have troops deployed.. .{But] it took a lot longer for us to get theappropriate air and rescue mission in place and the appropriate boots on the ground."

Confirms that at the Camp David meetings immediately after 9-11, Rumsfeld really didn'thave any good instant options: "The whole focus was on the fact that there was limiteditwas not a target-rich environment.. .1took from that discussion that we were not going to be


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NSC 03000832Interview o f Dr. Condoleezza Rice b y B o b W o o dw ar d (o n deep background)October 24, 2001 (7 0 mins.)(368) Rice: "Wejhiad.jnjhg late summer [nfMOl^-beeftworking on r.nnnterferrnrisrn and working

onjal Qaeda, and w orking on trying to get serious abou t going after al Qaeda. And so, th6principals and the President had abase of knowledge about this organization that probablythree m onths earlier we wouldn't have had, because we'd been through this drill of how werewe going to deal with al Qaeda. It was a major threat. W e knew that they had done theembassy bombings, suspected they had done the Cole. We'd been through a summ er wherethere was a lot of noise in the system."

Rice com ments that Tenet had been very concerned about chatter, and it looked like an attackwould occur abroad. "And, in fact, what we did was to button up abroad pretty effectively."Eg. m entions the Genoa G8, where a lot of security precautions had been taken; a couple ofwarnings about the President's security, one very serious. "And so we had done a lot abroad.One of the things that struck me is that the protocols for w hat you do abroad are prettyclear..."

Rice: "So the only point I'm making is that everybody was kind of on the same page about alQaeda, having come ou t of this review that had been done."(369) W oodward asks Rice if there was an action plan pending from this reviewRice respondsthat there was. "There w as an action plan that probably would have been dated September

10th." States that it was a directive that wou ld have gone to the President if not fo r 9-11. "Sopeople were wo rking the problem, and so there was a common basic knowledge about alQaeda."

(373) Rice says Bu sh was thinking of a military response to 9-11 from the start: ".. .the President, Ithink, never even considered that he wouldn't at some point use military force." Noconsideration of negotiation with the Taliban.(378) Rice (on recognition early on that this was a worldw ide problem): ".. .because we had adatabase abo ut al Qaeda, everybody knew it was worldwide. I think it wasn't until theintelligence briefing the next m orning [9-15] by George th at we actually knew it was 60countries. I mean, that was news to people. But that it was widespreadI mean, we'd beendealing with it in the Philippines because of the kidnapping s of those people. So w e knew


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Testimony before theNational Commission onTerrorist Attacks Upon the United StatesJuly 9,2003

The Rise and Decline of Al QaedaBy Rohan GunaratnaIntroductionFive factors contributed to the rise of Al Qaeda: First, theinevitability ofhistory - Soviet intervention in Afghanistanin December1979, US assistance to the anti-Soviet multi-national Afghan campaign, and the resultantgrowth of Islamism.The defeat of the "communist army" by the ideology of Islamism (and material supportfrom the West and the Middle East) reinforced the belief that the United States, theremaining superpower too could be defeated through guerrilla warfare and terrorism.1 Asthe proclaimed vanguardof the struggle, Al Qaeda attacked America's most outstandingeconomic, military and political landmarks on September 1 1, 2001, to show the way tothe Islamic movements, that the US too could be attacked and destroyed. Second, the international neglect of Afghanistan, especially by the US afterAfghanistan, the frontline state had won the free world the greatest victory after thedefeat of Nazi Germany in World War n.After the gravity of terrorism shifted from the Syrian controlled Bekka Valley in Lebanonto Afghanistan, the war-ravaged country evolved into a "terrorist Disneyland" hostingtraining and operational infrastructure for three-dozen Islamist groups. Until US ledcoalition intervention in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, Afghanistan trained severaltens of thousands of terrorists and guerrillas. Third, the US policy of disengagement and at times isolation frnm wnrlH affairsfacilitating terrorist groups to grow in strength, size and influence worldwideq n H theirstate sponsors a free reign.When critical, US government engaged other governments no t publics. The USgovernment is reluctant, unable, and unwilling to engage in public diplomacy especially


9/15 Campaign 2000 Promotingthe National Interest [Free Republic] Page 1 of 6


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Campaign 2000 -- Promoting the National InterestGovernment Front Page Miscellaneous Keywords: CONDOLEEZZA RICE, NATIONAL SECURITY, BUSHCABINET, RUSSIA, CHINASource: Foreign AffairsPublished: January/February 2000 Author: Condoleezza RicePosted on 12/14/2000 16:30:09 PST by LutherT.

LIFE AFTER THE COLD WARThe United States has found it exceedingly difficult to define its "national interest" in the absence of Sovietpower. That we do not know how to think about what follows the U.S.-Soviet confrontation is clear fromthe continued references to the "post-Cold War period." Yet such periods of transition are important,because they offer strategic opportunities. During these fluid times, one can affect the shape of the worldto come.The enormity of the moment is obvious. The Soviet Union was more than just a traditional globalcompetitor; it strove to lead a universal socialist alternative to markets and democracy. The Soviet Unionquarantined itself and many often-unwitting captives and clients from the rigors of internationalcapitalism. In the end, it sowed the seeds of its own destruction, becoming in isolation an economicandtechnological dinosaur.tthis is only part of the story. TheSoviet Union's collapse coincided with another great revolution.Dramatic changes in information technology and the growth of "knowledge-based" industries altered thevery basis of economic dynamism, accelerating already noticeable trends in economic interaction thatoften circumvented and ignored state boundaries. As competition for capital investment has intensified,

states have faced difficult choices about their internal economic, political, and social structures. As theprototype of this "new economy," the United States hasseen its economic influence grow and with it,its diplomatic influence. America has emerged as both the principal benefactor of these simultaneousrevolutions and their beneficiary.The process of outlining a new foreign policy must begin by recognizing that the United States is in aremarkable position. Powerful secular trends are moving the world toward economic openness and more unevenly democracy and individual liberty. Some states have one foot on the train and the otheroff. Some states still hope to find a way to decouple democracy and economic progress. Some hold on toold hatreds as diversions from the modernizing task at hand. But the United States and its allies are onthe right side of history.In such an environment, American policies must help further these favorable trends by maintaining adisciplined and consistent foreign policy that separates the important from the trivial. The Clinton

.omoting theNational Interest (PART TWO) [Free Republic] Page 1 of 5


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Campaign 2000 -- Promoting the National Interest (PART TWO)Government Miscellaneous Keywords: CONDOLEEZZA RICE, BUSH CABINET, FOREIGNRELATIONS,NATIONAL SECURITY, RUSSIA, EUROPE,CHINASource: Foreign AffairsPublished: January/February 2000 (volume 79, number 1)Author: Condoleezza RicePosted on 12/14/2000 16:35:10 PST by Luther T.

This Is The Second Part Of Condi's Article In Foreign RelationsPart One Is LHere,There is work to do with the Europeans, too, on defining what holds the transatlantic alliance together inthe absence of the Soviet threat. NATO is badly in need of attention in the wake of Kosovo and with thelooming question of its further enlargement in 2002 and beyond. The door to NATO for the remainingstates of eastern and central Europe should remain open, as many are actively preparing to meet thecriteria for membership. But the parallel track of NATO's ownevolution, its attention to the definition of itsmission, and its ability to digest and then defend new members has been neglected. Moreover, the UnitedStates has an interest in shaping the European defense identity welcoming a greater European militarycapability as long as it is within the context of NATO. NATO has avery full agenda. Membership in NATOwill mean nothing to anyone if the organization is no longer militarily capable and if it is unclear about itsmission.

America and our allies, the most daunting task is to find the right balance in our policy toward Russiaand China. Both are equally important to the future of international peace, but the challenges they poseare very different. China is a rising power; in economic terms, that should be good news, because in orderto maintain its economic dynamism, China must be more integrated into the international economy. Thiswill require increased openness and transparency and the growth of private industry. The political struggleinBeijing isover how to maintain the Communist Party's monopoly on power. Some see economic reform,growth, and a better life for the Chinese people as the key. Others see the inherent contradiction inloosening economic control and maintaining the party's political dominance. As China's economic problemsmultiply due to slowing growth rates, failing banks, inert state enterprises, and rising unemployment, thisstruggle will intensify.It is inAmerica's interest to strengthen the hands of those who seek economic integration because thiswill probably lead to sustained and organized pressures for political liberalization. There are noguarantees, but in scoresof cases from Chile to Spain to Taiwan, the link between democracy andeconomic liberalization has proven powerful over the long run. Trade and economic interaction are, in fact,good not only for America's economic growth but for its political aims as well. Human rightsconcernsshould not move to the sidelines in the meantime. Rather, the American president should press theChinese leadership for change. But it is wise to remember that our influence through moral arguments and


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UNCLASSIFIED BUT COM MISSION SENSITIVEMEMORANDUM FORTHE RECORD

Event: Background interview with Len HawleyType of event: BriefingDate: July 30, 2003, 12:30pmPrepared by : Bonnie D. JenkinsTeam Number: 3Location: 2100 K StreetParticipants - Leonard Hawley, intervieweeParticipants - Commission: Mike Hurley, Scott Allan, Alexis Albion, Daniel Byman,

Bonnie D. Jenkins, Chris KojmClassification: This was an unclassified briefingBackground on the interviewee: Mr. Hawley provides advice on current policy issues in theexecutive branch including the NSC, State Department, and the US Joint Forces Com mand. Suchpolicy advice includes CT issues. From 1999-2001, he was the Deputy Assistant Secretary ofState fo r foreign policy engagement an d political-military preparations regarding Kosovo, EastTimor, Sierra Leone, Eritrea-Ethiopa and the Congo. From 1997 - 1999he was the Director ofMultilateral Affairs at the NSC. He has worked with Benjamin, Simon an d Clarke. Below are thehighlights of his comments.Summary:Overall Policy ConsiderationsThe U S must do two things to better prep are itself for CT:1. Ensure there is unified direction on CT matters; and2. Develop a coherent strategy to do intrusive, coercive action or for trying to do reformPolicy makers need options. They require options up to the last p oint before using th e military.Hawley supported getting the military more and more involved and becoming more intrusive.However, this raises a lot of questions. On the policy level, a lot of judgement calls must bemade an d there are ma ny com plex issues raised when there is intrusive action contem plated.


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WITHDRAWAL NOTICERG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Mem orial CommissionsSERIES: 9/11 Comm ission, Team 3

NND PROJECT NUM BER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUM BER: 31107WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/21/2008

BOX: 00005 FOLDER: 0010 TAB: 2 DOC ID: 31207564COPIES: 1 PAGES: 6

RESTRICTEDThe item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

FOLDER TITLE: DOS and DOD Statements on Terrorism...DOCUMENT DATE: 07/29/2003 DOC UM ENT TYPE: Handwritten NotesFROM:TO :SUBJECT: Lunch with Len Hawley

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):9/11 Classified Information


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TheBrnoldngs Institution Page 1 o f6

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. 'GLOBAL POLITICS '1. ;;'^Brookjngs > Foreign Policy StudiesCounterterrorism TH E BROOKINGS REVIEWA NewOrganizing Principle Summer 2002 Vo120No;3for American National pp'Security?by James B. Steinberg

In his address to Congress nine days after the September 1 1 attacks,President Bush declared war on global terrorism and announced hisintent to deploy "every resource at our command" to defeat terroristnetworks and to treat states that harbor and support terrorism as"hostile regimes." Thespeech appeared to presage a politicalreorientation of U.S. foreign and security policy on a scale not seensince the early days of the Cold War, comparable in scope to theTruman Doctrine and the adoption of the strategy of containment in thelate 1940s.We helped reconstruct Europe and Japan and provided foreign aidbased on those same criteria. Wesupported a defense-industrialestablishment to assure the wherewithal to sustain our technologicaledge. Weeven sent a man to the moon to demonstrate the superiorityof Western democracy over Soviet totalitarianism and the commandeconomy.

iS E A R C H BROOKING1Advanced SearchRelated ContentAnalysis &Commentary Syed Qutb - John Lth e Islamic W or ld Cent ra l As i a : TerroReligious ExtremisiRegional Stabil i ty Countering the Ca lU.S., Hizb-u t -Tahr iReligious ExtremisiCent ra l AsiaPolicy Briefs The New Nat iona l !Stra tegy : Focus on

States T h e N e w Nat iona l '.Strategy a nd Preer Th e Bush Nat ionalSecur i ty Strategy:Evaluation

To the extent that counterterrorism becomes a comparable, neworganizing principle, it will have similarly widespread consequences fora broad range of U.S. policies. Nearly nine months after the September11 attacks, it is now possible to see the extentand the limitsofcounterterrorism as an organizing principle for U.S. foreign policy.New Friends your view

After reading this opinion,tell u s w h a t you think.W e' l l post th e mostinteresting comments.send YOUR VIEW

The clearest impact of this strategic shift canbeseen in the reorientation of U.S. relationswith key international partners, particularly inconnection with the military operations inAfghanistan. Perhaps the most dramaticillustration is Pakistan. Just before September11, U.S. relations with Pakistan had sunk to unprecedented lows.Pakistan's nuclear weapons program had led to strict sanctions;formerly close military ties had been cut off; and further sanctions hadbeen imposed when General Pervez Musharraf ousted the elected

Books & Journal America UnboundEvents Balancing Civi l Libea nd Nat iona l Securth e Post-9/11 Era :Challenge of InforrShar ing Phase III in the \N iTerrorism? ChallenOpportunities The United States ,France After the WIraqRelated ResearcProjects Terror ism Homeland Secur i tyScholars


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The United Slatesand Coercive Diplomacyedited by Robert J. Aitand Patrick M . Crouin

U N I TED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE PRESSWashington, D.C.

M a r t h a Crenshaw is tbe Col in and N a n c y C a m p l n tvofessor ofGlobal Issues an d D emo c r a t i c T h o u g h t in t h e D e p a r t m e n t ol Gov-e rn m e n t . Wesleyan Univers i ty .

Coercive Diplomacy andthe Response to TerrorismM A K T I I A C R E N S H A W

M n\ i ' i !o \ i ;n ' i n in; \r TI:.ST fo r convived i p l o ma c y . U.S. c o u n f e r t e r r o r i s m pol icy cannot rout ine ly meet( l i e b a s i c r e q u i r e m e n t s ol ( l i e s t r a t e g y . W h e n coercive d ip lo -

i n ac y i s a pp l i ed , ( b e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t w o u l d m a k e i t successful a rerarely m e t . \ \ b i l e ( b e U ni t ed Slates l ias sometimes been effective inchanging (be pol ic ies of stales ( b a t inst igate or assist terrorism, it basn ot loimd an a p p r o p r i a t e mix of ( b r ea t an d reward ( b a t could con-s t ra in ( be b eb a v ior of nonsta le adversar ies .

This c b a p l e r locnses on (be U.S. response to t e r ror i sm from 1993to ( b e "war on t e r ro r i sm" laun cbed in 2001. I t first outl ines the gen-era l co n t o u rs o l ( be ( b r e a t as it deve loped a l t e r ( be Cold War. Thisoverv iew is fol lowed by a na l ) s i s ol (be ge n e ra l con cep t of coercived i p l o m a c y in r e l a t i o n to te r ror is t strategies. Tbe p ro p o s i t i o n s ( bu sgenera ted a re ( h e n tested aga ins t t b e i n s t an ce s of post-Cold W arco u n t e r t e r ro r i sm pol icy t b a l most closely li t ( be d e f i n i t i o n of tbe con-cept ol coercive d ip lomacy. These eases, w b e n m i l i t a r y force w as usedor ( b r e a t e n e d , p ro v i d e ( be best basis lor e v a l u a t i n g ( be success or fai l -ure of tb e strategy. Tbey include tbe r e t a l i a to r y st r ike against I r aq in1993, (b reat s against Ira n fol low ing tb e b o m b i n g of U.S. military facil-ities in Saudi Arabia in 1996, cruise missile at tacks against Sudan andAfgbanis tan in 1998. an d efforts to compel tbe Tal iban to yield Osama

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