t2 b5 teams major policy issues fdr- entire contents- memo re major policy issues under...

8/14/2019 T2 B5 Teams Major Policy Issues Fdr- Entire Contents- Memo Re Major Policy Issues Under Consideration- By Team 609

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N A T I O N A L C O M M I S S I O N O NT E R R O R I S T A T T A C K S U P O N T H E U N I T E D S T A T ESMajor Policy Issues under Consideration (by Team)

TEAM 1A 9/11 PlotTeam 1A's mission - to write thedefinitive narrative ofthe September 11 plot - ideallyshould form the foundation for the more directly policy-oriented assignments of most ofthe other teams. W hile T eam 1A does not, therefore, anticipate taking a leading role informulating the substantive policy recommendations that w ill emerge from theC om mission's work, we may well be in a position to recommend refo rms related to thecore (and exceedingly complex) policy question of how m uch info rma tion should beavailable to the pub lic on matters of national historic importance, such as the 9/11attacks. O ne such potential recommendation that has emerged at this preliminary stageinvolves the degree to which inform ation of largely (if not exclusively) historicalsignificance is being overly protected on national security grounds.T o date, for example, the Intelligence C omm unity has resisted disclosing to us statementsmade by alleged A l Qaeda members while under custodial interrogation. Virtually allsuch information is protected by at least a S ecret classification. Quite apart from thesecurity clearances held by our team m embers and the secure na ture of the facility inwhich we work, the need to restrict access to entirely retrospective statements isquestionable, particularly where, as here, the fact of the incarceration of m any of thedetainees at issue is a matter of public record. It is far too early for us to formulate aspecific recommendation in this area, which involves the equities of many agencies anddirectly implicates the sensitive area of "sources and methods." H owever, at this stage itseems worth flagging theneed toconsider the interests of thepublic - as representedmore p articularly byjournalists, scholars, andhistorians - in gaining access to suchinformation, and asking whether the perceived sensitivity of the informa tion has beenexaggerated and accorded un due weight in the decision whether ma terial need beclassified.

TEA M 2 U.S. Intelligence Management, Collection, and Analysis1) Reforms that encourage effective leadership o f U S intelligence.2) Form ulating a national counterterrorism intelligence strategy and the need toreconsider the proper balance of technical and h uma n source intelligence.3) The necessity of combining foreign and domestic intelligence to counter the terroristthreat and the inherent challenge of balancing liberty and security in doing so.


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TEAM 3 International Counter-Terrorism Policy1. By August, 1998, it appears the USG had strategic warning that Usama bin Laden andal Qaeda posed a serious threat to U.S. national security. How did the government react? Did the USG appreciate the terrorist threat, and did it devise an appropriate strategy to

counter that threat? Were the agencies fully on board with the government's strategy? Did the strategy include all the appropriate instruments at the government's disposal

to fight terrorism? Were the agencies wielding their instruments effectively?With these questions in mind, we anticipate policy recommendations emerging from thefollowing areas of concern:Leadership: Was there a failure of leadership on the part of the White House in its lack of clear

guidance on how to respond to al Qaeda and effectively communicate policy and/orshape public opinion to support policy?

Were there failures at different levels of leadership within the agencies to respond tonational security policy (for example, within the Department of Defense)?

Priorities: Was there a failure to put counterterrorism as the national security priority on the part

of the White House? -on the part of agencies?Instruments: Were there impediments inherent to or imposed upon instruments of counterterrorism

policy that limited their effectiveness (for example, legal restraints imposed on theCIA's ability to target UBL)?

2. With the attacks on the U.S. September 11th, counterterrorism has now become thegovernment's national security priority, receiving primary focus and resources. But is thegovernment's current strategy putting too much emphasis on "swatting flies", and notfocusing sufficiently on the longer term goals of "draining the swamp" and ensuring thestrongest possible defensive posture at home? In other words, is the government focusingto o much on picking off individual agents of terrorism rather than dealing with the long-term threat of radical Islam, and implementing a broad range of effective securitymeasures to prevent another attack on America?

Longer-term strategies: Preventing the rise of terrorist sanctuaries;


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Shaping public opinion/educating the American public to appreciate the threat ofterrorism in order to allow policy makers to pursue all necessary options in the war onterrorism;Maintaining a defensive posture to effectively defend the homeland;Public diplomacy: committing resources to change negative attitudes toward the U.S.and address the root causes of terrorism.

TEAM 4 Terrorist FinancingIt appears that the Saudi government, and individuals closely associated with the Saudigovernment, give large sums of money to NGOs. Money is given by these NGOs tomosques, schools and other institutions that preach intolerant and anti-Western views,which assists terrorists in recruiting individuals to their cause. Some of the moneyappears to be given directly to terrorists and terrorist organizations.

What does the Saudi government know about the extent to which their money isgoing to these causes? To what extent is money flowing from NGOs to terroristgroups, and to what extent have Saudi officials and senior NGO officials participatedin or were willfully blind to this funding?

The United States appears to have largely failed to stop the flow of money to theseinstitutions. Is the government's failure technical (i.e., lack of intelligence,inappropriate legal or diplomatic tools, etc.), a matter of balancing of conflictingpriorities, or is it a lack of political will?

Elements within the United States government understood the al-Qaeda threat prior to9/11, but less attention was paid to understanding and acting against the financing ofterrorism. What caused this? Was there something inherently wrong with the manner in which

our government agencies are organized, funded or led that caused this, or was thissimply a failure of individuals or organizations to do what was required of them? Ifthere was problem, has it been fixed?

TEAMS Border Security andForeign VisitorsWe provisionally have identified six groupings of border security policy issues fromwhich recommendations seem likely to emerge. They are:I. Intelligence and watchlisting. Identification of individual terrorists and/or

groups and analysis of terrorist mobility patterns are the foundation for optimizingborder resources to deny terrorist access to the US. Policy issues center on howthe collection, analysis, and dissemination of this intelligence is institutionalized,


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organized, and supported to provide border security officials with timelyinformation while ensuring protection of individual rights.II. Identity security. Terrorist organizations use forged or fraudulent documents.

There is a consensus that making it difficult to counterfeit and alter internationaltravel documents will greatly enhance border security. Among the topics to beexplored are: improved technology in the form of biometric visas and passports,machine readable travel documents, and facial recognition technology;newregulation of so-called "breeder"or "feeder" documents, such as birth certificates,which are used to obtain passports and visas; national ID cards; and theorganization and scale of anti-fraud enforcement.

III. Screening and inspection: visa and border points. This arena is broad. Theissues range from whether legal standards for assessing suspected terrorists needto be changed, to whether visa issuance should be automated as in the Australianmodel, expanded to additional countries, or further curtailed in favor of pre-inspection or pre-clearance at foreign exit points. A clear area of discussion ishow the super-name checks instituted shortly after September 11, 2001 and otherrecent procedural changes have affected our security and other national interests.

IV. Border enforcement. Terrorists exploit alien smuggling, corruption, and entrywithout inspection. Issues center on the role of the military; technology such asunmanned planes, use of smart cards, fences, and new entry posts; andmobilization of enforcement and intelligence resources.

V. Internal regulation and enforcement. Stepped-up domestic immigrationregulation and enforcement of the immigration laws are perhaps the mostprominent responses to the September 11 attacks. Detentions, removals, andregistrations and new rules for change of status, student tracking, and exit-entrycontrols need to be considered for their security, constitutional, and foreign policyimpacts.

VI. International mutual assistance. US-Mexico, US-Canada, and tri-nationalcooperative efforts; international watchlist and criminal information sharing; USassistance for watchlist programs; anti-corruption and anti-fraud efforts; andregional and multilateral

TEAM 6 Domestic Intelligence & Law EnforcementThe central issue for Team 6 is: Should the FBI should retain its current role as the leadagency for domestic collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence regardingforeign terrorist activity?


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To answer this question we will need: 1) to define what we believe the agency that hassuch a role should look like and how it should operate and 2) to answer the question ofwhether the FBI currently fills that ideal (or can reasonably be expected to do so within areasonable time) or whether a new agency should be established to fill this role.

TEAM? Aviation SecurityTeam 7 has identified three issues, which in our view, should have a significant impacton the type, number, and tone of the Commission's recommendations. The decision tofocus on these areas will directly impact the work that Team 7 must conduct in order todevelop the information the Commission will need.Leadership Accountability and the Human FactorA major theme of questions from the families and followers of the Commission'sprogress is whether we plan to hold "accountable" leaders and/or those in positions ofauthority who might have prevented the 9-11 terrorist attack. The questions of "who"should be held accountable,"why" and "how" will need to be reconciled by theCommissioners.Team 7's current approach on the accountability issue is to tell the 9-11 story via ournarratives and let the administration, Congress and the public make their own decision onaccountability and the influence of human factors. The presumption is that theCommission would not issue recommendations identifying who should be held toaccount and how one would be held accountable as it pertains to actions prior to 9-11.The team has discussed outlining a general set of professional position criteria againstwhich all high level government officials, including those politically appointed, could besubjectively compared. The criteria would include specific experience, expertise, trainingan d professional development for specific positions. Developing such criteria is of valuebecause it would allow the Commission to make a statement on what it believes arereasonable expectations the public should (and should not) have of government officialswithout having to criticize the specific officials in key posts prior to 9-11.Is this the approach the Commission wants to take?Goal Setting, Prioritization, and Resource AllocationGiven the widely dispersed threats and vulnerabilities across the various modes oftransportation, the potential for the nation's transportation system to be attacked and theconsequences (economic, psychological, etc.) resulting from such an attack remainsignificant. It will be important for the Commission to address the issue of how tomanage the risks posed by terrorists across the different transportation modes and how toprioritize the allocation of both policies and resources to address those risks. Examplesof questions relevant to this issue are:


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How should the federal government conduct risk management for transportationsecurity systems?

What should be the highest resource andpolicy priorities for transportationsecurity over the next five years?

How, specifically, should the federal government more effectively prepare thecountry to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks on the transportation system?Ways and MeansA critical question relevant to the Commission's mandate is: How should we improve theprocesses, procedures andmechanisms by which we provide transportation security in thefield?. The Commission might want to focus recommendations on high priority areasincluding:

Technology: Recommendations on how best to plan, develop, finance, implementand maximize the use of advanced technology (detection/screening equipmentand information technology) to increase the effectiveness and efficiency oftransportation security processes.

Layering: Recommendations to establish a truly "layered" security system thatemploys discrete but mutually supporting security vectors that, taken as a whole,provide security quality assurance in the same way that "redundancy" servesaviation safety objectives.

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