Systems Analysis of Community Resilience Lynne Genik, DRDC Centre for Security Science

Ivan Deith, Serco UK

Cornwallis XVIII Presentation

April 17, 2013

Agenda

• DRDC EMBC Project Background

• Systems Analysis of Community Resilience Introduction

• Resiliency System Under Study

• Workshop Events

• Architecture Outputs

• Findings of Pemberton Study

• Evaluation of Utility of the Approach

• Potential Future Use by Municipalities

• Conclusions

• Next Steps

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DRDC EMBC Project Background

DRDC EMBC Collaborative Project

Post V2010, established “two year” DRDC EMBC

collaborative project focused on:

• Risk assessment

• Critical infrastructure

• Information sharing as it relates to above areas

DRDC goals:

• Support EMBC in achieving their objectives

• Demonstrate value of scientific approach

• Develop approaches (methodologies, tools, etc.)

that can be applied nationally

DRDC resources:

• 1.5 scientists, co-op student (1 FT term, 1 PT term),

2 contracts 5

Gap Areas Identified

DRDC identified gaps in the following areas:

• Planning

• Concepts

• Measurement and validation

• Partnerships

• Training

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DRDC Projects

Projects to address some of the gaps identified:

1. Systems Analysis of Community Resilience (with

Serco UK, completed Mar 2013)

2. Scenario “Mission to Task” Analysis (with KaDSci,

anticipated completion end of 2013)

3. CI Pilot Project (anticipated completion spring 2013)

4. Extensive Literature Searches (completed fall 2012)

This presentation focuses on the first project

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Systems Analysis of Community Resilience Introduction

What’s the Problem?

• Heavy and increasing reliance on interdependent systems

• Systems becoming more complex

• Inter-relationships often unseen/unknown

• Privatisation of many critical services (e.g. utilities)

• Fragmented control & co-ordination

• Drive for efficiency has removed layers of resilience

• Incidents expose planning and capability deficiencies 9

Typical Inquest/After Action Review Findings

• Strong performance by individual agencies, but confusion

/ inefficiency / ineffectiveness at boundary points

• Considerable planning activity but gaps & disparities from

a failure to share and reconcile plans

• Lack of joint training & exercising among responders

• Constrained and/or sub-optimal sharing of data

• Failures of communication between organisations within

complex systems

• Problems of collaboration, especially in situations where

there is no single authority with the power to instruct other

stakeholders in the system

• Lack of multi-agency situational awareness & response /

recovery capability 10

What Drives Resilience?

Wide range of factors, including:

• Inherent resilience of individual infrastructure elements

• Effectiveness of day-to-day management systems & processes

• Availability of relevant, accurate & timely info for decision making

• Communication between organisations - levels, formats, means

• Effectiveness of emergency plans, supporting training & exercising

• Available resources to deal with incidents

• How well resources are co-ordinated, deployed and commanded

…improving resilience is a broad-based &

holistic undertaking

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Community Resilience Study

• Many small and / or remote communities across

Canada

• Varying degrees of support available

• Varying degrees of planning capability / capacity

• Many communities may be unnecessarily

‘fragile’

• …how to strengthen community resilience?

• …architecture approaches suitable?

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Purpose & Objectives

Project Purpose:

• Evaluate the utility of Architectural Frameworks and Soft

Systems Methodologies in supporting a small

municipality’s holistic risk management framework for

enhancing community resilience

Objectives:

• Understand what hazards communities face, what

resources they rely on, what steps can be taken to avoid

incidents and respond to those that do happen

• Identify specific lessons that can be applied in the

Pemberton Valley but also the general points that could

be applied elsewhere

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Resiliency System Under Study

Resiliency System - Definition

• Set of plans, capabilities & resources strengthening a

community’s ability to withstand disruptive influences

and enabling it to recover from crisis events

• For example:

• River defence systems preventing flooding

• Generators providing backup power supplies at key

locations

• Emergency services providing response capabilities

• Emergency plans & arrangements enabling rapid

intervention & effective management of resources

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Pemberton Valley

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• Located 160 km north-northeast of Vancouver

• 30 km northeast of Whistler

Pemberton Valley

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Why Pemberton Valley?

• Referred by EMBC, also considered Squamish

& Bella Coola

• Pemberton Valley selected due to:

• Size: 5,000 people

• Boundaries: Able to define clear boundaries

for the extent of the study area

• Stakeholders: Communities reflecting

Canada’s cultural diversity, multiple

stakeholders spanning both public and

private sectors, existing collaborative

relationships, completed EMBC HRVA

• Engaged Emergency Planning Coordinators 18

Approach

• Pre-visit research

• Initial visit June 2012 & document review

• Workshop sessions October 2012

• Post Workshop analysis & architectural

development

• Validation sessions & scenario workshop

February 2013

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Pre-Workshop Research

• Researched provision of essential services

against 11 standard categories: • Shelter

• Water

• Food

• Energy

• Safety (inc. Emergency Services)

• Transportation

• Health

• Information & Communications Technology

• Finance

• Government Services

• Manufacturing 20

Sample Research Materials: Energy

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• Key elements of BC Hydro

infrastructure

• Availability of alternatives:

• Generators

• Independent power projects

• Carbonaceous – gas, wood burning

stoves

Considered Key Dependencies & Interdependencies: Energy Supply

Power: BC Hydro

Local ICT Infrastructure

Reservoir

SCADA Systems

Well Pumps

Telecoms switches

Cellular Networks

Fixed Circuits

Sewage Works

Lift Station Pumps

Local Emergency

Service Radio Comms

Alternative: Fire Dept ‘Manual’

Pump

Consequence: Reduced

Firefighting / rescue capacity

Public mains

Hydrants

Servers & Systems

Generator Backups?

Places of safe public resort

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Key Risks

Initial discussions with stakeholders highlighted

three key hazards:

• Flooding

• Wildfire

• Rockslides

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Flooding

• Regular problem

• Freshet (spring)

• Rain on snow (fall)

• Changes in river channel

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Wildfire

• Regular problem

• Responsibility of provincial Ministry

of Forests Wildfire Management

Branch

• Particular areas of concern include

new Mount Currie site

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Rockslides

• Relatively minor rock and debris slides

common

• Routine impingements on roads

• Major threat to new Mt Currie site

• Potential threat to Village of

Pemberton

• Mt Meager slide 2010

• Second largest in Canadian history

• Mass evacuation

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Also Considered Wider Range of Risks…

• Debris flows

• Avalanches

• Log / Ice Jams

• Severe winter storms

• Critical Infrastructure

Failure

• Key Supply Chain Failure

(etc…)

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Workshop Events

Soft Systems Methodology

• Developed by Peter

Checkland at University of

Lancaster in 1960’s

• Designed to enable

structured comparison of the

world as it is versus a range

of models of the world as it

could be

• Helps to untangle situations

with multiple goals and

multiple perspectives on

those goals

• Seven steps in a full SSM

study

• Our focus on 1-3

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Application of SSM

SSM calls for deliberately ‘broad’ research in order

to capture a wide range of perspectives

• Workshop invitees encompassed broad range

of respondents from members of the Women’s

Institute and ecological campaign groups to

pilots and road maintenance workers

SSM encourages wide range of research methods

• Used individual interviews, structured group

sessions, documentary review, observation

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Workshops October 2012

• Conducted 4 Workshops in October 2012: • Lil’wat Nation group

• Pemberton Village ‘Community’ group

• Pemberton ‘Business’ group (+ SLRD workshop Nov 2012)

• Emergency Responders Group

• Five sessions in each: • What the Valley is known for / what it provides

• Essential Services

• Hazards to essential services

• Consequences of disruption over 3 days / 3 weeks

• Expectations of service restoration after disruption

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Workshop Participants (28 Organizations)

• Mount Currie Capital Projects

• Mount Currrie Healthcare

• Mount Currie Fire

• Mount Currie Public Works

• Pemberton Women’s Institute

• Pemberton Valley Seniors

• Christian Fellowship

• Village of Pemberton Council

• Stewardship Pemberton

• Pemberton Valley Dyking District

• Flying Club

• Pemberton Valley Supermarket

• Mainroad Howe Sound Contracting

• BC Ministry of Transport

• Pemberton Chamber of Commerce

• Rotary Club

• Survey Practice

• Private Power Generator

• Riverlands Farm

• Copper Cayoose Outfitters (Adventure

Co)

• Stable Ent (Industrial Park)

• Sea to Sky Community Services

• Village of Pemberton Emergency

Planning

• Vancouver Coastal Health

• Pemberton Fire Dept

• BC Ambulance Service

• RCMP

• Village of Pemberton Public Works

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Workshops Results

High commonality in essential services

identification

• Shelter, water, food, fuel, power, roads

• Only one group (community) cited volunteers

as important resources

High commonality in top hazards: flood, fire,

land/rock slide

• Seismic, weather, rail incident distant 4-6th

• Only community raised epidemic/pandemic,

water contamination

• Only responder raised traffic incident

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Workshops Results (cont’d)

• Several groups changed content and order of

essential services during discussion on effects

of disruptions and restoration of service

• Discrepancies between public expectations and

responder groups for timelines on restoration of

• Temporary shelter

• Water supply

• Food supply

• Emergency services

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Responders’ Scenario Workshop Feb 2013

• Major earthquake centred just south of Squamish

• Sunday, July 28 at 4:15am

• Triggers landslide and rockfalls in PV

• Mt Currie new site

• Village of Pemberton

• Damage to infrastructure – reservoir, Hwy 99

• Damage in wider area including Vancouver area

• Discussed immediate response and issues 5 days later

with supply shortages

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Scenario Workshop

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Scenario Outcomes

• Would be first time dealing with major incident without external support

• Existing plans focused on ‘getting the right people in the room’ – not

providing a rolling start to response & recovery

• Would make best use of available resources and prioritise but expect

all services to be overloaded, very difficult decisions and rapid burnout

• Likely personal / professional conflicts “…my house is on Dogwood St;

would be hard to stay focused on my job”

• Would be heavily reliant on community spirit & personal networks

• Would have to draw heavily on ‘northern’ supply routes via Duffey /

Hurley

• Some useful resources are already in the Valley – if they can be

acquired

• No evidence that the community would prioritize one community over

the other

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Architecture Outputs

Enterprise Architecture

“Who, what, how…?”

Organisational structures

Breakdown of functions & operations

Relationships between tasks & organisations

Relationships between plans, policies and activity

NATO Architecture Framework (NAF)

• Mature method implemented within Serco Architecture tool

• Coherent, contiguous models of the enterprise reflecting range of

viewpoints:

System Views (NSV) describes systems and system interconnections, supporting the services

Service Views (NSOV) description of services needed to directly support the objectives

Operational Views (NOV) description of the functions, activities, organisations and information required

Capability Views (NCV) High Level Description of What needs to be in place to realise objectives

People

Capability

Business Func tion

Systems

Processes

Loc ation

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Community Resilience Framework

• Reusable template for a Community Resilience

Framework

• Specifies a generic set of capabilities, policies,

systems etc. used to provide resilience; e.g.

• Emergency Planning

• Incident Detection

• Emergency Response

• Framework sets out at high level what needs to be

done to provide resilience

• Individual architecture identifies how those things are

done in a particular community and by whom

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Canadian Community Resilience Reference Model

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Hazard: Service Matrix - Example

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Service: Service Matrix - Example

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Findings of Pemberton Study

Misaligned Policies

Goal clashes between different community groups,

where solving one problem can exacerbate another

For example, strengthening dyke protection in upper valley channels

greater volumes of water downstream

Tensions between the development of proactive and

reactive capabilities

Funds supporting proactive work have to be bid for in competition with

other schemes while eligible ‘response’ costs are met in full and eligible

‘recovery’ costs met at 80%

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Misaligned Policies

Tensions between the steps required to contain

environmental hazards and the protection of natural

habitats

For example, removal of sandbars for flood protection only permitted if

new fish habitat created elsewhere – doubling costs of work

Governance complications through differing funding

regimes for First Nations versus other element of the

community

Mitigates against coordinated initiatives

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Misaligned Expectations

Public’s expectations of disruptions in major event

may be unrealistic

Workshops results indicate that public expectations and responder

estimates on restoration of services following a major event do not

necessarily align

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Community Perspectives on Sustainability

First Nations

• Traditional skills and strong sense of

community would enable sustainment

Rural community

• Built-in resilience to certain problems

Village community

• Generally more dependent

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Essential Services

Several essential services require rapid

intervention in event of loss, especially in winter

and particularly for vulnerable people

• Shelter, food, power, emergency services,

medical services

Community considered “unsustainable” in less

than 3 weeks with loss of:

• Road network, emergency services, medical

services, water and sewer

• Exacerbated by time of year

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Planning

• Sophisticated EM response structure (British Columbia

Emergency Management System) exists, based on

Incident Command Structure (ICS)

• EMBC HRVA Tool Kit encourages communities to

consider threats and hazards and impacts but stops

short of providing framework for response plans

• Need for local plans that address the consequences of

key risk events, enabling the community to rapidly

identify and act upon priorities

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Recommendations

• Create Generic Plans

• Pre-determined restoration priority guide

• Community Resilience & vulnerable persons logs

• Community Resilience Team

• Provision of fallback generators for key infrastructure

elements

• Maximise key resources held in valley

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Potential for ‘Toolkit’ Approach:

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Conclusions

Overall Conclusions

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Next Steps

• Evaluate project outcomes and recommendations

• Provide summary and recommendations to EMBC as part

of overall DRDC EMBC project report

• As part of DRDC follow-on project, examine:

• Human and organization factors in adopting products

• Capability and cost options

• Assessment framework

• Scope of training packages

• Partnerships

• Development, test and evaluation plan

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Q & A

Questions?

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