system & network engineering, university of amsterdam … · 2017-04-25 · trusted data...

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Distributed Big Data Assets Sharing & Processing. C. de Laat (moderator), L. Gommans, R. Wilson System & Network Engineering, University of Amsterdam AirFrance KLM CIENA

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Page 1: System & Network Engineering, University of Amsterdam … · 2017-04-25 · Trusted Data Processing in Untrusted Environments. Lessons learned from SC16 SCinetINDIS 15h05 Leon Gommans,

Distributed Big Data Assets Sharing & Processing.

C. de Laat (moderator), L. Gommans, R. Wilson

System & Network Engineering, University of AmsterdamAirFrance KLM

CIENA

Page 2: System & Network Engineering, University of Amsterdam … · 2017-04-25 · Trusted Data Processing in Untrusted Environments. Lessons learned from SC16 SCinetINDIS 15h05 Leon Gommans,

Fading Trust in InternetDependencyTrust

1980 2017

ResearchGap!

Page 3: System & Network Engineering, University of Amsterdam … · 2017-04-25 · Trusted Data Processing in Untrusted Environments. Lessons learned from SC16 SCinetINDIS 15h05 Leon Gommans,

Main problem statement• Organizations that normally compete have to bring data

together to achieve a common goal!• The shared data may be used for that goal but not for

any other!• Data may have to be processed in untrusted data

centers.– How to enforce that using modern Cyber Infrastructure?– How to organize such alliances?– How to translate from strategic via tactical to operational level?– What are the different fundamental data infrastructure models

to consider?

Strategic Level

Tactical Level

Operational Level

Page 4: System & Network Engineering, University of Amsterdam … · 2017-04-25 · Trusted Data Processing in Untrusted Environments. Lessons learned from SC16 SCinetINDIS 15h05 Leon Gommans,

ISPNFV

Networks of ScienceDMZ’s & SDX’sclient 1

client 2

client 3

client 4

client n

SDN

InternetPeer ISP’s

Func-c1

Func-c3

DTN

Petabyte email service J

DMZ

DMZ

DMZ

DMZ

DMZ

DMZ contains DTN

SDXNFVFunc-c4

ISP

ISP

SDXISP

SDX

DTN

Supercomputingcenters

(NCSA, ANL, LBNL)

Page 5: System & Network Engineering, University of Amsterdam … · 2017-04-25 · Trusted Data Processing in Untrusted Environments. Lessons learned from SC16 SCinetINDIS 15h05 Leon Gommans,

Secure Policy Enforced Data Processing

Data-1

Data-2

Comp

Viz

Untrusted Unsecure Cloud or SuperCenterOrg 1 Org 2

Org 3 Org 4

Secure Virtual PC

• Bringing data and processing software from competing organisations together for common goal• Docker with encryption, policy engine, certs/keys, blockchain and secure networking• Data Docker (virtual encrypted hard drive)• Compute Docker (protected application, signed algorithms)• Visualization Docker (to visualize output)

Page 6: System & Network Engineering, University of Amsterdam … · 2017-04-25 · Trusted Data Processing in Untrusted Environments. Lessons learned from SC16 SCinetINDIS 15h05 Leon Gommans,
Page 7: System & Network Engineering, University of Amsterdam … · 2017-04-25 · Trusted Data Processing in Untrusted Environments. Lessons learned from SC16 SCinetINDIS 15h05 Leon Gommans,

Program:15h00 Cees de Laat, University of Amsterdam

Trusted Data Processing in Untrusted Environments.Lessons learned from SC16 SCinet INDIS

15h05 Leon Gommans, Air France KLMTrusted Big Data Sharing.

15h25 Rodney WilsonProgrammable Supernetworks supporting ScienceDMZ based Networking.

15h30 Panel of stakeholders; members:Inder Monga - ESnetMatt Zekauskas - Internet2Jerry Sobieski - NORDUnet & GEANTAdam Slagell - NCSALeon Gommans - Air France KLMRod Wilson - CIENA

15h30 Flash talks (~3 min each) by Inder, Matt, Jerry, Adam15h45 Panel discussion moderated by Cees de Laat16h00 End of session.