lobbying paper tom gommans

8/2/2019 Lobbying Paper Tom Gommans

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Swimming through the ‘Green Wave’

Client: Royal Dutch Shell

Issue: DIRECTIVE 2009/30/EC

Lobbyist: Tom Gommans



Index

................................................................................................................................... 1

Index ........................................................................................................................... 2

Swimming through the ‘Green Wave’.......................................................................... 3

The Fuel Quality Directive ........................................................................................... 4

Institutional context: Playing the multi-level game ................................................... 5

Socio-economic context: Economical vs Environmental interests ............................. 6

Similar cases ............................................................................................................ 6

Picking a strategy ........................................................................................................ 8

Core insider .............................................................................................................. 8

Institutional constraints .......................................................................................... 10

Tackling the comitology procedure ......................................................................... 11

The committee .................................................................................................... 11

The Council of Ministers ...................................................................................... 12

The European Parliament .................................................................................... 13

Argumentation ....................................................................................................... 14

Considerations ....................................................................................................... 15

Conclusion and expectations ..................................................................................... 16

2



Swimming through the ‘Green Wave’

As sustainability of our eco-environment had risen to the top of the global political agenda in

the beginning of the 21st century (Edwards, 2005), it had far from lost its controversial

aspects. Protagonists in the form of environmental interest groups who see their well-beloved

earth in apparent danger and adversaries in the form of big industries who are trying to

protect their economic interests still battle on the same field of politics. In between those

groups you find the politicians, waiting to be convinced by one on the two sides.

One might claim that the ‘Inconvenient truth’ has gained a lot of leverage among high-

ranked politicians (Edwards, 2005), which has shifted the politicians more to the side of the

environmentalists. We see this reflected in the plans of the European Commission to reduce

its greenhouse gas emissions (GHG-emissions) in 2020 by 20%1, against the will of big

industry interests.2 To enforce this, the European Commission has proposed a Fuel Quality

Directive3 (DIRECTIVE 2009/30/EC), wherein a GHG-emission footprint of every type of fuel is

stated, thereby degrading the types of fuel who are high on that list. This is a thorn in the

flesh of big oil companies who have invested heavily in fuels that are depicted as having a

high GHG-emission rate. The main topic of debate is one specific type of fuel; tar sands oil. Tar

sand oil is a new way of extracting oil and promises new big supplies of oil, therefore many big

oil companies have spent billions in this new opportunity. The European Commision however

has proposed a relatively high GHG-emission rate for tar sands oil, thereby making it less

attractive for the European market. As seen from the side of the industrialists you might ask if

one is able to counteract or at least reduce the current ‘Green Wave’ (Protheroet al, 2010)

and therefore not losing a lot of return from investments.

In this paper I will look at the current political situation concerning this topic and

thereby looking for options to influence politics into not adopting the current proposal for the

Fuel Quality Directive. I will do this by exploring the lobbying opportunities for one of the main

concerned big oil companies, the Royal Dutch Shell. Even though environmental concerns

have been on the forefront of politics and media, politics are changing very fast and the

current economical downfall might open a window of opportunity for policy change.

1http ://eur -lex .europa .eu /LexUriServ /LexUriServ .do ? uri= CELEX :32009 D 0406: EN :NOT2http ://www .euractiv .com /climate -environment /canada -tar -sands -lobbying -gets -murky -news -5094893http ://eur -lex .europa .eu /LexUriServ /LexUriServ .do ? uri= OJ:L :2009:140:0088:0113: EN :PDF

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http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32009D0406:EN:NOT



http://www.euractiv.com/climate-environment/canada-tar-sands-lobbying-gets-murky-news-509489



http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0088:0113:EN:PDF



















































































The Fuel Quality Directive

The European Union affirmed in 2008 that by 2020 it wants to have reduced its GHG-

emissions by 20%. To reach this goal the European Commission has proposed, among other

directives, the Fuel Quality Directive4. This directive specifies different type of fuels and how

to measure their GHG-emission rate. This has two consequences; firstly the EU will be better

able to measure to what extent is it reaching their 2020 goal and secondly it diversifies

different type of fuels in their pollution rate. The latter consequence is done by including an

GHG footprint for every common type of fuel in article 7a of the directive. This has a direct

effect on the ‘sell-ability’ of certain types of fuel, the higher the GHG-footprint the less

customers will be wanting to buy it and it may even be ruled out by government trying to

reach their own enviromental goals.5

Tar sands oil is rather high on the GHG-footprintlist with an emission rate of 107.6 Tar

sands oil production is a rather new way of extracting oil, but has raised concerns over its

effect on the environment.7 However due to it being the second largest source of oil in the

world (mainly in Canada), big oil companies have heavily invested in tar sands oil to make

sure they will be part of this new market. The investment returns of this market might

however be reduced by the GHG footprintlist. Even though tar sands oil has not been

introduced yet in Europe, it will withhold expansion to this continent and might also affect the

American market.8 Therefore efforts have been made to remove tar sands oil out of the GHG-

footprintlist in article 7a of the Fuel Quality Directive. For many years now article 7a has been

the central topic of debate. While the final amended Fuel Quality Directive was adopted in

2009, the measures have not been implemented because of article 7a. At first it seemed that

tar oil sands were going to be left out of the list, but after a consultation period9 and heavy

lobbying by environmentalists10 11, in november 2011 the European Commission has made a

proposal wherein tar sands oil is included. Through the comitology procedure, it is to be

decided if this implementation proposal is to be adopted. As I am defending the interests of

one the main big oil companies, Royal Dutch Shell, I will do anything in my (legal) power to

prevent this from happening.

4 http :// eur -lex .europa .eu /LexUriServ /LexUriServ .do ? uri= OJ :L:2009:140:0088:0113:EN:PDF5 http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/oct/04/oil-sands-imports-eu-ban6 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/transport/pdf/art7a.pdf 7 idem8 http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/aug/04/canada-tar-sands-lobbying9 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/transport/pdf/art7a.pdf 10 http://www.tarsandsaction.org/11 http://dirtyoilsands.org/

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Institutional context: Playing the multi-level game

The dispute over the implementation of article 7a is a global one and affecting and interfering

at different levels of governing. The battle is fought at the supra-national level in the EU, but

has domestic, transnational, transatlantic and global influences and consequences.

The EU has of course its environmental and economic interest but they may differ from

its member states. Certain member states are economically dependent on companies who

have heavily invested in tar sands oil and might not want to degrade tar sands oil as heavily

polluting. Shell has it foundations in the Netherlands and Brittain and might be able to

influence their politics, as this has been done before.12 The topic also affects countries outside

the European borders; mainly Canada and the United States have high stakes in tar sand oil. The measures taken could have its effect on trade relations between Europe and those

countries.13 On a global level the debate strikes WTO policy, especially the National treatment

principle found in the GATT14, GATS and TRIPS agreements. According to this principle

imported and locally-produced goods should be treated equally — at least after the foreign

goods have entered the market. The same should apply to foreign and domestic services, and

to foreign and local trademarks, copyrights and patents.15 Apart from public organs, private

interests and environmentalist interest groups play an import role in the process. Big oil

companies have high interests and high (economical) powers to influence policy. Interest

groups like Greenpeace16, the WWF17 and Friends of the Earth18 have invested time, money

and effort in actions to influence policy into declaring tar sands oil as a heavily polluting type

of fuel.

As we can see it is important that we take the context into account as a multi-level

game (Coen, 2007), wherein we do not see policy making in the EU as a top-down game, but

as a complex field of different actors who all have an influence on each other and all are in

some way or another dependent on each other. For lobbying this opens different channels to

influence European policy (Coen, 2007) (Beyers, 2004). To be most effective lobbying should

12 http://vorige.nrc.nl/multimedia/archive/00316/228136_316671a.pdf 13 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/21/us-oilsands-idUSTRE79K19P2011102114 http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm15 http://treadthemiddlepath.blogspot.com/2011/11/of-tar-sands-and-oil.html16 http://www.greenpeace.org/canada/en/campaigns/tarsands/17 http://www.wwf.org.uk/what_we_do/changing_the_way_we_live/oilsands.cfm18 http://www.foeeurope.org/press/2010/May05_Tar_sands_undermine_Europe's_climate_credentials.html

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take these different channels into account and diversify its strategies over these channels

(Beyers, 2004). For this paper, however, I will mainly focus on the opportunities inside the

European institutions and will only slightly touch other options in my considerations.

Socio-economic context: Economical vs Environmental interests

Traditional economic theory posits a trade-off between economic growth and environmental

quality (Chung & Lee, 2006). This statement has been criticized (Stern, 1996), but might still

be applicable in the case of tar sands oil.

The reserves of tar sands oil represent an enormous amount of money but by acquiring

this, the environment might be hurt. The other way around, keeping Canada’s nature the way

it is would result in an environmental treasure, but by doing so the returns of investments intar sands oils would decrease by billions. Both ends are problematic, so decisions in what

directions to move will be controversial in anyway. Therefore the direction of policy will be

likely directed by what problem is at the top of the agenda. At the moment problems and

solutions meet, windows of opportunities for policy are opened (Kingdon, 1984). Here we can

define the problem as being either economical downfall or environmental concerns and the

solutions as extracting tar sands oil or keeping Canada’s natural environment the way it is. As

told in the introduction from the year 2000 environmental issues rose to the top of the global

political agenda (Mortensen, 2010). However with the financial crisis in the second half of this

decennium and the euro-crisis in particular, economical concerns are back and underlined in

the agendas of the political leaders. As the problems are seen in an economical perspective, it

is more likely that policy will favour economically favourable solutions. Therefore there is a

window of opportunity for the prolonging of extracting tar sands oil.

Similar cases

The Brent Spar case figures some of the same actors and problems as the tar sands oil case.

The Brent Spar was an oil storage buoy of Shell that had gotten out of use and the question

rose what to do with it? Again it was a trade-off between an environmental (disassembling the

oil storage buoy at the mainland) and economical solution (sinking the Brent Spar into the

ocean). To prevent Shell from choosing the second option, Greenpeace occupied the buoy.

The occupation of the buoy by Greenpeace hit the public imagination, much to the surprise of

nearly all those involved (including the activists from Greenpeace). The images of the battle

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over the Brent Spar went all over the world and mobilised an unusual coalition of forces,

ranging from the German Chancellor to petrol buyers in various European countries.

Eventually, Shell backed out, and towed the Brent Spar to a Norwegian fjord, buying time to

think what needed to be done (Hajer, 2003).

Shell has had much to learn from the Brent Spar case. According to Bakir (2006), Shelllost the public opinion by overestimating it’s trustworthiness by the public and relying to much

on its status among multinationals as a corporate social responsible company. This was

enforced by the heavy-handed reaction of Shell on the occupation by Greenpeace. In the

years after Brent Spar Shell has tried to repair its public image by engaging in sustainability

projects and joint ventures with environmental NGO’s (Grove-White, 1997). In the tar sands oil

debate Shell should be careful to avoid hurting this public trustworthiness and monitor the

public debate sharply to keep itself away from public humiliation.

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Picking a strategy

Our analysis starts with the premise that Shell as an interest group is able to influence EU

policy. Some scholars would not include private companies like Shell in their definition of aninterest group (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998). This paper however uses the definition of

Hrebenar and Thomas (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998) for interest groups which sees interest

groups as associations, individuals or organizations who try to influence public policy. This is a

rather wide definition, but reflects in my opinion reality better than definitions that put

emphasis on voluntary membership. Companies are present at the table of bargaining that is

the EU (Coen, 1998) and play according to the same rules that apply to interest groups based

on voluntary membership (Woll, 2007), so it would be strange to exclude them from the

interest group literature by definition.

The ability of interest groups to actually influence public policy has been heavily

debated (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998). Influence is generally understood as an actor’s ability

to shape a decision in line with her preferences, or, in other words, “a causal relation between

the preferences of an actor regarding an outcome and the outcome itself” (Dür, 2008). Forty

years ago, especially in American studies, group interests were seen as a major force in the

political system. In recent years the prominence of interest groups in public policy has

declined in the eyes of students of political science (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998). But as even

sceptical scholars acknowledge that interest groups have some influence on policy outcomes

(Michalowitz, 2007) and the EU is actively trying to incorporate interest groups in the policy

process (Dür, 2008) and more so is in need of their knowledge and technical assistance (Woll,

2007), we can assume that there is an possibility to influence EU policy by an interest group

like Shell. Therefore we can see the lobby process as an exchange process (Maloney et al,

1994), wherein interest groups can give assistance in policy making in exchange for more

favourable policy outcomes. From this premise we start our analysis of which strategy we

need to take to make the impact of our lobbying campaign the most influential.

Core insider

The starting point of the analysis is my client itself. The status that an interest group holds

within the political institutions in the EU determines the way it’s able to influence politics

(Maloney et al, 1994). As I have noted that lobbying is an exchange process, we first have to

look if Shell is actually part of that process, as we can be certain that those actors that cannot

even enter into an exchange relationship are powerless (Woll, 2007). Status therefore is

8



something that is part of determining the influence of a certain interest group. Status

determines if you’re inside or outside. Although different definitions of insiders and outsiders

have been given, insiders are generally seen as interest groups who enjoy some kind of

privileged access to policy makers, whereas outsiders don’t (Maloney et al, 1994). Therefore

the insider/outsider typology refers to the possibledirectness

of communication to the policymakers. Shell has employed several professional lobbyists who engage daily in direct

conversation with policy makers and is also part of several business associations who are

consulted by the EU institutions. Therefore we can see Shell as an insider in EU politics.

As Maloney points out correctly, there are however big differences within the insider

category. Many groups are granted access to decision makers, but few have a significant

influence over substantive policy outcomes (Maloney et al, 1994). Maloney makes a division

between three different types of insider status: Core insider, specialist insider and peripheral

insider. Core insider means that you as an interest group are well respected in many policy

areas and will be able to engage in an exhange relationship with the policy makers. Peripheralinsiders value as seen by civil servants is marginal and may therefore be consulted but will be

excluded from the bargaining process. The type of insiderness is defined by the resources of

the interest group. Resources are again a debated concept, but the types of resources that are

mainly used are: economic power, (technical) knowledge, representative base,

implementation power and compliance power. If we try to determine the resourcefulness of

Shell trough these categories we find that Shell is relatively rich. Especially its economic

power is extremely big with a turnover witch exceeds 450 billion dollar19 and being one of the

six biggest companies in the world, having operations in more than 90 countries.20 Having its

base in the Nederlands and Great-Brittain, Europe’s economy is dependent on the economic

power of Shell. Regarding knowledge, the field of oil production is highly technical and

requires basic understanding of physics that most politicians lack. Shell with its technically

highly-educated employees and day-to-day experience in the working field, can help

policymakers bridge the gap in their knowledge. As being a hierarchical company its

implementation and compliance power is big compared to voluntary organisations, since

disobedient employees will risk their jobs. Shell has over 100,000 employees so one could

claim its representative base is quite large, it would however be hard to claim that Shell

represents its employees in an broad view of (moral) interest representation. But at least on

four out of five resources Shell is rich, so it’s reasonable to assume Shell to be a core insider in

European politics, especially relating to the specific topic which I am lobbying for.

19 http :// www .nu .nl/economie /2038541/ shell-verstoot -wal-mart -als -grootste -ter -wereld .html 20 http :// www .shell.com /home /content /aboutshell/at _ a _ glance /

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http://www.nu.nl/economie/2038541/shell-verstoot-wal-mart-als-grootste-ter-wereld.html






http://www.shell.com/home/content/aboutshell/at_a_glance/




















































Institutional constraints

The status of Shell as a core insider gives us the opportunity to engage in exchange

relationships with policy makers and adopt a successful insider strategy to influence policy.

Here insider strategy is referring to a strategy wherein our policy goals are to be reachedthrough direct negotiating and bargaining with policy makers. The status of being a core

insider makes insider strategy an effective and low-cost opportunity, because Shell is seen as

a respectable and knowledgeable actor and is likely to have some influence on the policy

outcome. This is especially seen as a favorable strategy for groups with incremental demands

for technical details (Maloney et al, 1994). Since we’re not demanding a different direction of

policy, but a slight amendment in one of the figures of the directive, i think it is reasonable to

state that our case falls in this category.

Some authors argue that political strategy is not only constrained by resources butmore so by the institutional environment (Beyers, 2004). The European Union however is

known to be very open to direct contact, by integrating interests groups in the policy process

and giving them positions in committees. Furthermore from the 1990’s the European

Commission has institutionalized its bargaining position with business interests and has

created a form of ‘elite pluralism’ (Coen, 2009). This elite pluralism can be characterized as an

institutional model where access continues to be biased toward business interests (Coen,

2007). Within this institutional model, policymakers seek to establish long-term relationships

with interest representatives, based on technical knowledge and reliability. The highly

personal aspect of this model, makes it very susceptible for an inside strategy, while outsidelobbying, in terms of public demonstrations are likely to hurt instead of help to establish close

relationships. In our lobby strategy we should be aware of the model, especially the way in

which policymakers favor accumulated views by associations of interest groups (Coen, 2009).

As there are so many interest groups present in the EU, it’s hard for policy makers to overview

all opinions. Therefore they favor alliances who can express their view by one voice. Shell is

part of many associations inside the EU, the European Roundtable of Industrialists for

example, and should try to express their opinion on the Fuel Quality Directive trough these

channels, as they are more likely to be influential. There are even many more opportunities

for more alliances, as Shell has many allies in this issue; countries like Canada, the United

States, Venezuela and Norway have heavily invested in tar sands oil, just as big oil companies

like ExxoMobil, BP, Statoil and Eni. The shaping of these alliances and using them will make a

more effective use of the institutional environment.

10



Tackling the comitology procedure

To further investigate our lobbying opportunities we need to take a closer look to the

procedure that determines the outcome of the issue. As already said, the directive of concern,

DIRECTIVE 2009/30/EC, has already been adopted but has not been implemented yet. As is

stated in article 7a.521, the measures necessary for the implementation of this article shall be

adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny.

The regulatory procedure with scrutiny is part of the comitology procedure and is

rather new as it has been introduced in 2006. The comitology procedure requires that

implementation measures are first proposed to a committee consisting of representatives of

the member states. Only by a qualified majority vote of the committee the Commission can

enact the proposal. In addition, after the committee has voted over the proposal, the

regulatory procedure with scrutiny allows the European Parliament (acting by absolute

majority) and the Council (acting by qualified majority) to oppose an implementing measure

proposed by the Commission (Blom-Hansen, 2011) within a three-month-period, irrespective

of the opinion of the committee. So it is exactly this stage the procedure is in right now; the

commission has proposed a way of implementing the directive (which includes tar sands oil in

the GHG-footprintlist) and this proposal has been send to the committee, while the Council

and the European Parliament are awaiting their voting. To achieve the goal of our lobby we

must either convince more than 55% of the committee, half of all Members of Parliament or

55% percent of the member states in the Council that including tar sands oil in the GHG-

footprintlist in article 7a of DIRECTIVE 2009/30/EC would be an unwise decision. This

procedure changes our lobbying opportunities compared to the “normal” co-decision

procedure. Firstly, normally the Commission would be the main target of lobbying (Coen,

2007), but in this case the commission has already made a proposal and cannot be further

influenced. Secondly, with the adding of a committee to review the proposal, a completely

new lobbying target has come up. Finally, with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny the

power of the Council and the Parliament to influence the implementation policy have grown

(Hadacre & Damen, 2009) and have therefore become more valuable lobby targets. Let’s have

a closer look at the three different lobby targets.

The committee

21 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0088:0113:EN:PDF11






The committee of concern is the Fuel Quality Committee, which consists of representatives of

all member states. The committee is the first to vote over the proposal and may therefore be

our primary target. The committees are in charge of controlling the implementation measures

taken by the Commission. It can be seen as a way in which member states are able to

overview the powers that have been delegated to the European Commission and gain backsome control (Bergström 2005; Blom-Hansen 2008). These committees function as miniature

Councils of Ministers (Blom-Hansen, 2011), voting according to the same rules and having a

representative of every member state included. Just as the Council of Ministers, committees

tend to be a podium for domestic favors. Governments see the committees as an opportunity

to get direct access and to influence European decision-making centers (Tosiek, 2010).

Comitology committees express the will of EU member states which influence decisions made

by supranational bodies. The states tend to maintain their central position also in area of

centralized implementation of EU law (Tosiek, 2010). The committee members feel they are

more committed to their own government than to the EU and they see the other members of the committee as representatives of their country, instead of more neutral experts (Egeberg

et al, 2003). These national tensions open up opportunities for our lobbying. There are several

countries that are more or less dependent on big oil companies who have heavily invested in

tar sands oil. Mainly Great-Brittain (BP)22, the Netherlands (Shell)23 and Italy (Eni)24 have

together made over 50 billion in investments and account for 23% of the votes. Shell is highly

intertwined with the Dutch government, as they exchange employees at certain departments

every year. The same can be said for BP in Brittain and Eni in Italy. These countries are

therefore to be expected to vote against the proposal or at least more easily convinced of

removing tar sands oil out of the GHG-footprintlist. Through the representatives of these

countries, it should be tried to convince other representatives to get to the necessary 55% of

votes, by showing what’s in there for them (which will be explained later on in this paper).

The Council of Ministers

As the committee on Fuel Quality functions as a miniature Council, much that has been said of

the committee also applies to the Council. But due to the fact that this is not the miniature

version, but the real one, some institutional differences change our lobby opportunities. The

22 http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/may/17/tar-sands-extraction-friends-earth

23 http://royaldutchshellplc.com/2011/07/03/mining-the-canadian-tar-sands/

24 http://www.boell.de/ecology/climate/africa-7775.html12

http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/may/17/tar-sands-extraction-friends-earth


http://royaldutchshellplc.com/2011/07/03/mining-the-canadian-tar-sands/


http://www.boell.de/ecology/climate/africa-7775.html







Council is mainly a bigger institutional organ, consisting out of different layers. These layers

can be divided into the working party level, the committee level and the ministerial level.

Starting from the working party level, composed by national officials and experts, one tries to

reach agreement over the proposal (of the Commission). If they succeed, the proposal is not

further discussed at higher levels of the Council. If they disagree, the proposal is forwarded tothe next level in the Council, who then try to reach agreement. Recent research has shown

that the amount of decisions taken on each level are quite similar. This finding revises the

conventional wisdom, which attributes an overwhelming proportion of Council decisions to the

bureaucratic level and only a minimal proportion to the political level of ministers (Häge,

2008). This tells us that in our lobbying efforts, we should take into account all levels within

the Council, as their expected effect on the outcome is more or less equal. The Council of

Ministers has been the first to use the regulatory procedure with scrutiny to block a proposal

(Hardacre & Damen, 2009), so these efforts can be worthwhile.

The European Parliament

With the introduction of the regulatory procedure with scrutiny the power given to the

Parliament has substantially increased (Hardacre & Damen, 2009) as it has gained a right of

‘ex post’ veto on implementing measures. The way the Parliament is able to oppose to a

proposal is different than the committee and the Council. The Parliament can only object if it’s

of the opinion that the proposal is not compatible with the aim of the basic instrument of the

proposal or does not respect the principles of subsidiarity or proportionality. Therefore the

argumentation to convince MEP’s should be slightly altered to apply to these three principles.

The fact remains that MEP’s are expected to take a decision on a highly technical measure, for

which they lack the necessary knowledge. As they have only three months to make up their

minds, there is not enough time to engage in an in-depth scientific research (Hardacre &

Damen, 2009). Therefore MEP’s are expected to heavily rely on external information, which

opens the door for our lobbying practices. Once we’re granted access, our lobbying efforts

should primarily be focused on the rapporteur who’s responsible for this proposal. As this

rapporteur is the one who presents the proposal in a plenary session, he or she is able to

frame the issue into a more or less favorable way. Research shows that rapporteurs are the

most powerful of parliamentarians in terms of influencing the content of outcomes (Benedetto,

2005). As political groups within the European Parliament can bid points to become the

rapporteur over a certain topic, our lobbying should strive to have an favorable political group

bid for the function of rapporteur on the Fuel Quality Directive. The Alliance of Liberals and

13



Democrats for Europe should be a good target, since it values economics as a big part of their

program and its board consists of a British chair, a Dutchman and two Italians.

Argumentation

So as we found out what our best options for lobbying are, whom to approach and in what

way, we haven’t tackled what we’re actually going to say to our lobbying targets. In order to

not only get heard, but also have an actual impact on the policy outcome the argumentation

should take some previous lobby experiences into consideration. In three case studies of

business lobbying at the European Union it was shown that even when firm preference were

effectively reflected in the policy output, the impact of business depended on the interest

government had in letting business play its role (Woll, 2007). Business interest wereencouraged to join on the policy making table when they saw a strategic advance in

cooperation. Therefore the lesson to be learned here is that we should not tell European

politicians what to do, but tell them what’s in it for them. The apparent lobbying success is

therefore not an indication of power, in the sense of victory in a business-government conflict,

but of the convergence of business and government objectives (Woll, 2007). To be successful

in our exchange relationship with the comitology committee, the Council and the European

Parliament, we should provide them with arguments which are favorable for them. As the

committee and the Council mainly represent national interests, we should look for national

advantages in removing tar sands oil out of the GHG-footprintlist. There are many options, but

I will name three here:

Removing tar sands oil out of the GHG-footprintlist in the Fuel Quality Directive will:

• Highly increase the return of the investments made by your countries’ oil companies.

• Make your country less dependent on unstable OPEC-countries, who purposely drive up

the price of fuel.

• Strengthen the relationship with your countries’ transatlantic allies, namely Canada

and the United States.

The European Parliament can only object if it’s of the opinion that the proposal is not

compatible with the aim of the basic instrument of the proposal or does not respect the

principles of subsidiarity or proportionality. Therefore arguments should be more directed in

the way of unfairness and incorrectness of the GHG-footprint measurement of tar sands oil:

14



• The GHG-footprintlist does not take into account several techniques that may reduce

the GHG-emissions of tar sands oil production drastically. Despite its short lifespan, the

extraction method has managed to decrease the GHG emissions by 34% and is

expected to further decrease in the future. The GHG-emission rate of 107 for tar sands

oil is not a fair estimation, as it is developing very fast.

• Several rapports have shown that the GHG-emission rate of tar sands oil is not as high

as stated in the Directive. Further research has to be done, before tar sands oil can be

included in the directive.

• The current footprints do not take into account the mixture process that is used in the

provision of Europe’s fuel supply. Orthodox oil is mixed with crude oil, trough many

ways of mixture. Not taking this into account, would put tar sands oil in an unfair

disadvantage

Considerations

As we do have strong allies in our goal, we may have just as strong adversaries. There’s a

strong alliance of environmental organizations who want to keep tar sands oil on the GHG-

footprintlist. They combine tactics of inside lobbying with more public campaigns. Regarding

the inside lobbying I believe Shell should be able to rely on its own capabilities, earlierexplored in this article. We have to acknowledge that we will never win the public campaign,

but can try to prevent the creation of a public disapproval similar to the Brent Spar case. The

main advice that can be given is to prevent the issue from being picked up by the mass

media, by not giving public attention to it. Another consideration we have to take into account

is the amount of time we have. The committee is expected to express its opinion in January;

from there the Council and the Parliament have a period a three months to come up with their

reaction. Considering the small amount of time we have, this reconfirms our focus on inside

lobbying, since this is the most direct way of access. The small amount of time should

however not force our lobbying efforts into putting too much pressure on politicians as this willlikely be counterproductive, as is reflected by the failure of the Canadian lobby.25

25 http://www.dominionpaper.ca/articles/399115

http://www.dominionpaper.ca/articles/3991





Conclusion and expectations

As this paper has shown, the fuel quality directive hits controversy on different levels and by

different actors. With the economic downfall there should be opportunities to lobby

successfully for the removal of tar sands oil out of the GHG-footprintlist. This is further

expressed by our analysis of our client; Royal Dutch Shell. As Shell is rather rich in resources,

it is assumed to be a core insider of the European political game. This gives us the opportunity

to engage in direct inside lobbying for our cause. The institutional environment of the EU is

suitable for this type of lobbying, as they are relying on external sources while in the process

of policy design. The institutional environment however asks for accumulated opinions and

therefore communication through alliances should be favored. Luckily in this conflict Shell has

many strong allies, with whom it should be able to cooperate. As the GHG-footprintlist

concerns an implementing measure, we have looked more in-depth to the comitology

procedure in which the policy outcome will be fostered. The comitology procedure provides

options for lobbying, since it gives us three targets for lobbying, which all have different

aspects that should be taken into account. Finally, in the exchange relationship we are going

to establish with our lobby targets, our argumentation is to be based on the interests of our

targets, since they will only take our opinion into account if there’s a strategic advantage for

them.

It’s very difficult to foresee the outcomes of our strategy. My analysis has shown that

our lobby is strong in resources and that the European Union, especially in this case, provides

good windows of opportunities to influence policy outcome. The strategy that I have chosen,

should maximize these opportunities, but that does not mean it automatically will be a

positive outcome. As our adversaries are expected to be fierce and strong, we are not the only

ones trying to influence politicians. As there is no definite right or wrong in this issue, I believe

that the outcome will be defined by the socio-economic context. As politicians have been

riding the ‘Green Wave’ for a certain period, a new tide has risen in the form of economical

downfall. Driven by this momentum and their elective consequences, I expect the outcome to

be favorable to economic concerns.

16



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lobbying paper tom gommans

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