Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945 by Philip S.KhouryReview by: C. Ernest DawnJournal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 109, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1989), pp. 449-450Published by: American Oriental SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/604153 .

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Reviews of Books 449

book under review here, where on several occasions he concludes discussions of individual problems by stating the normally accepted view of matters, while maintaining a certain distance.

Wellhausen's Arab Kingdom combined source criticism with a detailed, self-assured narrative of events. We now have even more details at our disposal, but have lost much of the old confidence. This results from the work of scholars such as Noth, Wansbrough, and Hawting himself. We may see from their example, and from such a book as Crone's Slaves on Horses, that we are not now condemned to purely negative results. But the narrative sections of The First Dynasty of Islam, while brisk and clear, avoid circumstantial detail altogether. They may even seem to constitute the bare frame of Wellhausen's old edifice of Umayyad history.

On coinage (p. 65), it is not clear what is meant by "some experiments with a new type of coinage by the Sufyanid rulers." The author here cites Walker and Grierson; as a corrective, and for an up-to-date review of Umayyad nu- mismatics, see M. L. Bates, "The Arab-Byzantine Coinage of Syria: an Innovation by 'Abd al-Malik," in A Colloquium in Memory of George Carpenter Miles, American Numismatic Society (New York, 1976), 16-27; and idem, "History, Geography and Numismatics in the First Century of Islamic Coinage," Revue Suisse de Numismatique 65 (1986): 231-62.

In any case, we may conclude that The First Dynasty of Islam is now the best introduction in English to the history of the Umayyads. Like its companion volumes The Early Abbasid Caliphate, by Hugh Kennedy (Croom Helm, 1981), and the book by Robert Irwin on the Mamluk Sultanate bearing the misleading title The Middle East in the Middle Ages (Croom Helm, 1986), it is ideal, in its length and in its style of presentation, for undergraduate survey courses. If Croom Helm and Southern Illinois University Press are planning a complete series of this type, they have found an excellent formula. The main obstacle will be the high price of a complete set.

As stated at the outset, this book is not intended to replace The Arab Kingdom and its Fall. Yet it is time to lay Wellhausen's ghost to rest, especially since in the field of biblical studies where his achievements were, if anything, even more impressive, it has long since been exorcised. In the meantime, The First Dynasty of Islam accomplishes its own goal admirably, and teachers and students of Islamic history will be grateful for this contribution.

MICHAEL BONNER

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945. By PHILIP S. KHOURY. Princeton Studies on the Near East. Princeton: PRINCETON UNI-

VERSITY PRESS, 1987. Pp. xix + 698. $55.

Syria has had the closest connection of any Arab country with Arab nationalism. Nevertheless, although postwar and, even more, post-1958 Syria has received substantial pub- lished attention, Syria between the wars has been neglected. This deficiency has now been made up admirably by Philip Khoury. His objective is a detailed investigation of "the development of Arab nationalism in Syria during the French Mandate, considering in particular the political needs of the elite which led the nationalist movement" (p. xiii). Thus, he directs his attention not only to the struggle with the French but to the politics of the nationalist elite and its interaction with other elements in Syrian society. The result is a cogent analytical narrative of events from the inauguration of the Mandate until independence, which elucidates not merely the interaction of France and the Syrians, but the roots of this interaction in the two societies.

The French administration ensured the dominance of a new ideology. When France assumed authority, Arab nationalism, which had originated as the ideology of dissi- dent upper-class notables, had become dominant as a result of the Ottoman collapse and the brief rule of Faysal's Kingdom of Syria. The French pursuit of an unbalanced mix of cultural, political, and economic interests precluded a consistent policy appropriate to the dominance of Syrian politics by Arab nationalism. The mandate system and French deficiencies-bureaucratic preconceptions and politi- cal and economic shortcomings-intensified the Mandatory's problem. In establishing the mandatory regime, the French had to suppress armed rebellions in Latakia and the Aleppo region, which received assistance from the Kemalists, while Damascus and the South were acquiescent. Damascus, how- ever, initiated the next opposition to the Mandate in the form of the activities of Shahbandar's Iron Hand Society in 1922, which stimulated the Mandatory to try federation as a solution.

The federal scheme did not quiet nationalist opposition, and when the French permitted political organization, Shah- bandar formed the People's Party in 1925. The new party had hardly been organized when an unexpected opportunity for action was created by the Druze rebellion in 1925. The Great Revolt was "a popular and widespread anti-imperialist uprising with a pronounced nationalist orientation" (p. 205), but some ethnic and religious minorities sided with the French, while important Christian and Sunnite elements were aloof. The Revolt was kept alive by the Muslim com- mercial bourgeoisie, the absentee landowning class, and the

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450 Journal of the American Oriental Society 109.3 (1989)

peasantry, though there were divisions within each class, and the first two were not sharply demarcated. Nationalism was the exclusive instrument of the urban upper and middle classes, who channeled growing mass discontent into an anti-imperialist movement. The nationalist elite envisaged a secular state but relied on Islamic symbolism to mobilize the masses.

During the Revolt, dissension within the nationalist movement intensified, and by the Revolt's end the movement was irreparably divided into two hostile factions. At the same time, the Revolt's failure made it clear to the national- ists that immediate complete independence was not attain- able, and consequently the nationalists had to govern along- side the French and work for gradual French withdrawal. The Revolt had also stimulated the French to liberalize their policy. The nationalists utilized the opportunity by forming the National Bloc, whose intention was to defeat its local rivals, comparable notables who had been cooperating with France, win access to the French, and then work with the French for the gradual achievement of independence. The result was a lively competition among notables, nationalists and moderates alike, for the allegiance of the traditional leaders of the urban quarters who could mobilize the urban masses, for only the possession of a powerful clientele could give access to the French, and, conversely, access to the French was useful in winning a clientele. The National Bloc dominated the Constituent Assembly, 1928-30. Although the Bloc and the Mandatory could not reach agreement on the Constitution, the Bloc continued its policy of "honorable co- operation," combining noticeably mild demonstrations with regular negotiations with the High Commissioner, and parti- cipated in Parliament and the cabinets of the early 1930s in an unsuccessful attempt to reach agreement with the French. The fissures, personal and regional, within the Bloc widened. The French suspended Parliament and ruled through an appointed government.

The Bloc was not entirely successful in closing ranks in order to respond. By the time that the Bloc's policy failed, "nascent radical forces had begun to challenge the old

political leadership" (p. xii) of notables. Some Bloc leaders had been paying attention to the growing "modern middle class" by organizing a youth organization which drew its membership from the increasingly numerous students. The modern middle class found independent articulation in a secret society, the Arab Liberation Society, founded in 1929, and its successor after 1933, the League of National Action, which overtook the Bloc in influence among the educated youth. These forces pressed the Bloc leadership beyond its initial intention in the demonstrations of early 1936. At this juncture, a change in the French political mood brought the National Bloc success in the 1936 Treaty.

The success was ephemeral. As changes in the French political mood and opposition from the Syrian minorities and from Turkey combined to nullify the Treaty, conflict among the nationalists intensified. The Bloc's problems were increased by its inability to deal with the Palestinian Arab rebellion in a manner which satisfied conflicting Syrian interests. Shukri al-Quwwatli, who had always been one of the most radical pan-Arabs, was the chief Syrian beneficiary of the Bloc's difficulties. Accordingly, when, under British insistence, the Free French restored parliamentary life, Quwwatli was in position to assume the leadership and head the government which won independence.

The book is solidly based on an exceptionally great range of sources. British official records and private papers provide the bulk of the evidence, but the author has made extensive use of many Arab published and oral sources, the French and Syrian archives, and Arab private papers held by the Institute of Palestine Studies. The non-British sources are of especial importance, and we must be thankful that Khoury has been able to make such good use of the French and Syrian archives in the very short time that they have been open to scholars.

The preceding bare summary can only suggest the author's rich and penetrating treatment of his subject. This reviewer has two reservations. Firstly, secondary use is made of some widely held concepts regarding economic and class develop- ments and dialectics for which the evidence is at best fragile. Secondly, British diplomatic reports sometimes are the only source used, even for purely Syrian or French activities. In most cases, the British source is not evidently biased, but the danger inherent in relying on a single self-interested source is indicated by the substantial discrepancy between British and German documents relating to German activities. But what- ever further research may disclose, this book's evidence concerning, and analysis of the nature and societal roots of, the Syrian political process under the Mandate is sufficient and convincing.

C. ERNEST DAWN

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

Philosophy in the Renaissance of Islam: Abui Sulaymln al-SijistanT and His Circle. By JOEL L. KRAEMER. Leiden: E. J. BRILL, 1986. Pp. xiv + 354. HF1 140, $63.75.

Like Prof. Kraemer's companion volume, Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: The Cultural Revival During the Buyid Age (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), this work presents an

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