NO GOOD CHOICESAn Analysis of the Syrian Civil War and the US-Coordinated Effort to Arm

the “Good” Syrian RebelsJames McCormack

Conflict Analysis and Resolution 340

“Photo of a Jordanian Ilyushin transport (plane) taken on the [Zagreb airport] runway”

http :// www . jutarnji . hr / u -4- mjeseca - za - siriju - s -- plesa -- otislo -75- aviona - sa -3000- t - oruzja /1089573/

Executive Summary

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The Syrian Civil War has been a massively destructive and expansive

conflict, engulfing one of the Arab world's most powerful countries and

destabilizing its' neighbors. The conflict began with peaceful demonstrations

but by late 2011 had transformed into an insurgency as the opposition

armed itself against the violent repression of the regime. The insurgency

then escalated into a civil war as the rebel forces grew in strength and the

regime was forced to consolidate its forces to hold onto vital areas in the

south and west of the country.

The best theoretical framework with which to analyze the conflict is

Edward Azar's protracted social conflict (PSC) theory. The theory covers the

most important causal elements of the Syrian Civil War, the components that

determine the course of the conflict, and, barring the regional spillover, all of

the significant effects of the conflict so far.

The intervention chosen was the creation and arming of the Supreme

Military Council of the Free Syrian Army. Saudi Arabia and Qatar promised

heavy weapons to approved rebel groups if they joined a newly created rebel

organization meant to be the command structure of the Free Syrian Army at

a conference in Turkey in December, 2012. In January, 2013 Jordan began

smuggling Croatian heavy weapons purchased by Saudi Arabia to rebels in

southern Syria in an effort coordinated by the United States.

The intervention has the classic Liberal democratic goals of a stable,

moderate, democratic Syrian government after the toppling of the Assad

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regime, but it was conducted in classically Realist fashion: providing an

increase in power to the actor whose interests most closely align with

Washington and its' allies.

SYRIA GOVERNORATE MAP

http :// yallasouriya . files . wordpress . com /2013/03/ syria - provinces 2. gif

I. Introduction

One night in March of 2011, a small group of adolescent Syrian boys

decided to pull a prank. They had been watching the news from other Arab

countries engulfed in revolution, and wanted to make known their own

displeasure with the autocratic regime of Bashar al-Assad. The boys sneaked

on to their school's campus in the middle of the night and spray-painted two

slogans: “Down with Bashar al-Assad” and “Its Your Turn Doctor” (a reference

Bashar al-Assad's training as an ophthalmologist before assuming control of

Syria). The local security apparatus quickly detained 4 of the 7 boys who had

participated in the prank, and proceeded to interrogate and torture the

teenagers. (Birell, 2013)

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News of the boys' detainment spread quickly through the city of

Dera'a, and thousands of inhabitants turned out to protest for their release.

The local police responded by firing live ammunition into the crowd, killing

two. (Birell, 2013) The detainment and torture of the boys, combined with

the killing of two demonstrators, sparked a conflict that has since killed

120,000 people and driven millions of people from their homes. (BBC, 2013)

In this paper I will first provide an overview of the course of the Syrian

Civil War and its history. Then I will analyze the conflict using Edward Azar's

theory of Protracted Social Conflict and Daniel Bar-Tal's Conflictive Ethos. For

my intervention I will describe the recent supply of Croatian heavy weapons

to the forces of the Supreme Military Council of the Free Syrian Army

orchestrated by the United States, financed by Saudi Arabia, and transported

by Jordan into the south of Syria from Zagreb, Croatia. I will then provide an

analysis of the intervention using the theories of Liberalism and Realism.

Finally, I'll conclude the paper with an overview of my findings and the

limitations I faced.

II. Background: Revolution to Civil War

Prior to the revolution, the Syrian Arab Republic was effectively a one

party state, with the Ba'ath party being the totally dominant political entity

in Syria. The Ba'athists came to power in a coup in 1964, and after another

coup, Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad staged his own in 1970. He was able

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to solidify his rule by surrounding himself with fellow Alawites, most of whom

were deeply connected through tribe or family. (The World Factbook, 2013)

The only time that Hafez al-Assad's rule was seriously threatened was

during the Muslim Brotherhood's six-year Sunni insurgency waged against his

regime, which attempted to install an Islamic government. The rebellion

came to an end in 1982 when Hafez al-Assad used his most loyal military

units in conjunction with paramilitary groups; the Defense Companies

commanded by his brother Rifat, and the Ba'ath Party militia; to clear out the

cities in revolt with brutal, overwhelming force and then hold what remained

with a large garrison to ensure that the insurgency couldn't regain its

foothold. (Ajami, 2012)

Bashar al-Assad came to power at the age of 34 when his father died in

2000, despite the fact that he was a London-trained ophthalmologist. (The

World Factbook, 2013) He sped up the rate of economic liberalization begun

by his father, but this only enriched those with connections to the leadership.

It created a powerful Sunni merchant class who profited greatly off of the

privatization, in addition to the Alawites in the government, but the vast

majority of the population was left out. (Ajami, 2012) In fact by 2011, the

rate of unemployment was around 15% and heavily concentrated in the

youth. (The World Factbook, 2013)

This high unemployment drove many young Sunni men to migrate

from the countryside to the cities to search for work. (Ajami, 2012) Not only

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that, but there was a drought in 2011 (The World Factbook, 2013), which

meant severe economic hardship for the rural, largely Sunni poor, which only

spurred more men to seek jobs in the cities (Ajami, 2012). The regime did

little to help them. Therefore, when the Arab Spring did occur, it served as a

match for the tinderbox of Syria, especially among the mass of young,

unemployed Sunni men from impoverished rural areas.

The first protest was in March, 2011, in Deraa, the provincial capital of

a very rural and Sunni area of Syria, which the police responded to with live

ammunition. This sparked protests throughout the country, which were also

violently repressed. (O'Bagy, 2013) Thus began a cycle of protest and death

that spread throughout Syria, as the funerals of those killed at the previous

protest often turned into protests where more would be killed.

As the chaos of the revolution spread, citizens began to arm

themselves to defend their communities and the demonstrations, creating

neighborhood militias with whatever weapons were at hand. As time went

on, these militias began to shift from a purely defensive role to undertaking

attacks on regime soldiers. (O'Bagy, 2013) By the summer of 2011,

opposition militias composed of former civilians and military deserters were

carrying out an insurgency against the government under the name of the

“Free Syrian Army” that gradually gained momentum. The regime slowly

escalated its response, but was hamstrung due to the fact that it was only

able to deploy approximately 1/3 of its army, considering the rest too

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politically unreliable. Worried that whole units could defect en masse, the

regime has confined many of its units to their barracks or only allowed them

to operate a short distance from them . (Holliday, 2013)

A year later, by the summer of 2012, Syria was in a state of total civil

war as every governorate experienced rebel activity. Large-scale clashes

raged in Homs, Hama, Idlib, Aleppo and the Sunni suburbs of Latakia and

Damascus. The regime used its reliable maneuver units as “fire brigades” at

first, attempting the “sweep, clear, and hold” strategy of Hafez al-Assad;

using artillery to pound rebel districts and then slowly clearing the

neighborhoods block by block. This strategy was successful at first in early

2012, but as rebel activity intensified throughout the country, the Assad

regime realized that it lacked the manpower to pursue this strategy on a

national scale and moved to consolidate its forces in the regions vital to the

regime in the south and west of the country. (Holliday, 2013)

Due in large part to the regime's pull-back , the opposition has been

able to gain control over large swathes of territory in the north and east of

Syria. The Idlib, Aleppo, and Deir az-Zour governorates are all largely in

rebel hands except for hold-out regime bases and the provincial capitals,

(O'Bagy, 2013) while the ar-Raqqa governorate has been taken wholly by

rebels, led by the Salafi-Jihadi group Jabhat an-Nusra. (Lund1, 2013) The

government pulled out of the Kurdish majority al-Hasakah governorate early

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in the war, ceding it to the control of the neutral Kurdish Democratic Union

Party and its militia. (Ajami, 2012)

The Syrian opposition has been fragmented and infighting between

competing factions hasn't been uncommon. Indeed, the “Free Syrian Army”

hasn't existed in any formal command structure until the founding of the

Supreme Military Council. (Lund2, 2013) The Supreme Military Council of the

Free Syrian Army was founded in December 2012 under pressure from Saudi

Arabia and Qatar, and it only holds partial control over FSA-aligned armed

opposition groups. (Mroue/Hubbard, 2012) While the FSA does receive “non-

lethal” support from Turkey and the USA, and has been given safe haven in

Turkey, its' commanders have consistently had difficulties in supplying their

fighters. (O'Bagy, 2013)

The armed opposition doesn't just consist of the moderate, democratic

Free Syrian Army however, as hardline Sunni Salafi groups have emerged in

the course of the conflict. These groups span an ideological spectrum

ranging from desiring a Muslim Brotherhood-style government to the strict

imposition of Saudi-style Shari'a law, along with the (at best) marginalization

of other confessional groups. These groups have grown to be so powerful due

to their abundant funding from private donors in the oil-rich Arabian Gulf,

strict discipline and good organization, and the battlefield experience of

foreign members who have fought in jihadi battlefields around the world

from Algeria to Chechnya. (O'Bagy, 2012) These groups are the strongest in

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the eastern provinces of Deir az-Zour and ar-Raqqa as they are able to draw

on support from the Islamic State of Iraq through smuggling routes along the

Euphrates, although Jabhat an-Nusra has also played a pivotal role in the

battle for Aleppo. (Lund1, 2013)

The Assad regime has seen similar sectarianization, as it relies on

military units either composed of a majority of Alawites or at least with

Alawite officers, consisting of only a third of Syria's total force. To supplement

its' army's insufficient numbers, the regime has increasingly integrated

members of pro-regime paramilitary groups into its force structure, merging

them to the point where conventional military units and paramilitary units

have become practically indistinguishable. (Holliday, 2013) These

paramilitary groups are drawn from the Ba'ath party militia, members of

regime-affiliated organized crime groups, and the militias of religious

minority villages which are trained by advisers from Hizballah, the Iranian

Revolutionary Guards Corps – Quds Force, and given military armaments by

the regime. (Reuters, 2013)

The Syrian regime has been heavily reliant on support from Iran,

Russia, and to a lesser extent, Hizballah in the civil war. Iran and Russia have

both been supplying military materiel to the Assad regime, with Iran

supplying cash as well. Hizballah and Iran have also provided military

personnel to the Assad regime, but they have largely worked as advisers or

trainers for the regime paramilitary forces. (Reuters, 2013)

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So far, the Assad regime has been able to avoid any large foreign

enemy interventions, primarily due to the size and complexity of the conflict.

In addition, the Syrian military also possesses one of the most advanced air

defense networks and chemical weapon stockpiles in the region, providing it

with a significant deterrent against conventional intervention. (The World

Factbook, 2013)

III. Protracted Social Conflict Theory and the Conflictive Ethos

Applied to the Syrian Civil War

As is evident from the description of the conflict, the main domestic

parties of the Syrian Civil War are communal groups. The Assad regime and

its supporters are made up of the Alawite confessional group, the Sunnis who

have profited from its rule, and various religious minorities who fear

oppression or even genocide under majoritarian Sunni rule. Facing the

regime are the Sunnis of Syria who have been oppressed and impoverished

under Alawite rule and seek not just vengeance for the violence visited upon

them by the regime, but also the freedom of political expression and a state

which is responsive to their communal needs.

This is why I've chosen Edward Azar's Protracted Social Conflict (PSC)

as the prism through which to analyze this conflict, as his description of PSC

perfectly describes the Syrian Civil War, “The focus of these conflicts is

religious, cultural, or ethnic communal identity, which in turn is dependent

upon the satisfaction of basic needs such as those for security, communal

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recognition, and distributive justice.” (Azar, 1990) According to Azar, the

“genesis” of the conflict lies in four aspects: communal content, human

needs, governance and the state's role, and international linkages.

Communal Content: Syria's communal content is 74% Sunni (including

Kurds and Arabs), 12% Alawite, Christians and Jews 7%, 4% other Muslim

confessions. The Kurds, while majority Sunni, are a separate communal

group and make up 9% of Syria's population. (The World Factbook, 2013)

Azar points to two factors which breed a conflictual situation, the first

being the legacy of colonialism. In Syria, the rise of an Alawite dominated

regime can be traced back to the French rule of Syria, when the French

encouraged the recruitment of Alawites and other religious minorities into

the Troupes Speciale du Levant in a classic “divide and conquer” strategy,

leading to a military dominated by sectarianism. (Holliday, 2013) This

sectarian military spawned coups until the Assad regime was able to take

complete control. The second factor is “a historical pattern of rivalry and

contest among communal actors.” This too has been present in Syria, and

not just in the sectarian destruction of the Muslim Brotherhood uprising. The

Alawites were historically oppressed by the Sunni majority throughout

history, working as indentured servants and sharecroppers for Sunnis, and

then persecuted by the Ottomans who saw them as heretics. Therefore,

when the Alawites and Sunnis were integrated under a single political entity,

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despite the requests of the Alawites for an independent state, the seeds

were sown for protracted social conflict. (Ajami, 2012)

Human Needs: When a communal groups basic human needs aren't

met, this can serve as a catalyst for PSC. “Azar cites security needs,

development needs, political access needs, and identity needs...”

(Ramsbotham et al, 2011) . Under the Assad regime, only the security needs

of the Sunni majority were met, which was especially welcome after the

chaotic coups of post-independence Syria. (Ajami, 2012) However, the

community's development, political access, and identity needs have largely

been neglected by the regime. The majority of Sunnis were impoverished

during the reign of the Assad regime, and barring the merchant class of

Aleppo, were more importantly denied access to means of economic

advancement by the regime, as in Syria that primarily meant connections

with the Assad tribe. Political access was of course denied as well, as the

parliament was merely a rubber stamp and only trusted family and clan

members allowed significant decision-making roles. Sunni identity wasn't

explicitly expressed, and there was general religious tolerance, but the

government imposed a level of secularism on Syrian society which didn't

match the more conservative Sunni values, especially in rural areas. (Ajami,

2012)

Governance and the State's Role: When discussing the states of

countries undergoing protracted social conflict, Azar states, “Most states

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which experience protracted social conflict tend to be characterized by

incompetent, parochial, fragile, and authoritarian governments that fail to

satisfy most basic human needs.”(Azar, 1990) This is a perfect description of

the authoritarian Assad regime, which is staffed in the same manner as a

medieval kingdom. Bashar al-Assad exercises complete control, even

occasionally micromanaging policy; policy-makers and military leaders are

either members of the Assad family, tied into the clan Assad belongs to, or

long-time confidants of the regime. (Holliday, 2013) The primary purpose of

the regime is the survival of the Assad regime, and the second purpose is the

maximization of benefits for the regime and its supporters. (Ajami, 2012)

However, these goals do not square with effective governance or

engendering a sense of legitimacy among the population, leading to

widespread discontent. One of the most important deep causes of the

revolution, the rise in unemployment and poverty due to drought, was never

addressed due to the rigid structures of the Assad regime, which were not

inclined or able to address them. (O'Bagy, 2013)

International Linkages: According to Azar, “The role of the state in

engendering or preventing protracted social conflicts by depriving or

satsisfying basic needs is not determined solely by endogenous factors...

Formation of domestic social and political institutions and their impact on the

role of the state are greatly influenced by the patterns of linkage with the

international system.” (Azar, 1990) Syria's dedicated alliance with Iran, its

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sponsorship of Hizballah, and its attempt to maintain Lebanon under its

sphere of influence (The World Factbook, 2013) have all led to the state

undertaking policies at odds with providing the needs of its population. This

has been seen in the sanctions levied on Syria as it defies international law,

which have only resulted in extra hardship for those not well-connected

enough to afford black market prices or the finances to weather the

economic downturn. (Ajami, 2012)

Having identified the causal elements of the protracted social conflict

in Syria, now the actions taken to escalate the conflict are to be analyzed in

what Azar calls “Process Dynamics”, which “attempts to elucidate factors

which are responsible for the activation of overt conflicts.” The components

being the actions and strategies of the communal group and the state, and

the built-in properties of conflict – patterns of interaction among contestants.

(Azar, 1990)

Communal Actions and Strategies: Azar's general description of the

progress of the actions of a communal group in protracted social conflict are

closely mirrored generic descriptions of what has transpired among the

opposition in Syria. Azar describes a triggering event when the latent conflict

erupts, “a turning point at which the individual victimization is collectively

recognized.” (Azar, 1990) In this case it would be the torture and murder of

several adolescent boys who were detained after spraypainting anti-regime

slogans in Dera'a. (Birell, 2013) This then “naturally leads to collective

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protest. Collective protest is usually met by some degree of repression or

suppression.” (Azar, 1990) In the case of the Syrian revolution, the protests

were met with gunfire and imprisonment and torture by the regime security

apparatus. (Ajami, 2012)

“As the level of communal organisation and mobilization becomes

greater, communal groups attempt to formulate more diverse strategies and

tactics, which may include civil disobedience, guerrilla warfare...” (Azar,

1990) This is exactly what occurred as the opposition organized into “Local

Coordination Committees” which began as groups to coordinate protests, but

which often morphed into the command structures of militia groups. (O'Bagy,

2013)

“...communal groups tend to seek external military and economic

assistance… Often this external support is associated with hegemonic

designs... a neighboring nation can enlist the support of disenfranchised

groups to subvert their nation's ruling regime. Assistance is given as a

means of furthering the regional power-play that many nations are engaged

in.” (Azar, 1990) In the case of the Syrian Civil War, this applies perfectly, but

to the support from foreign non-state actors rather than states. Wealthy

private donors in the Arab Gulf states and the Islamic State of Iraq have

provided funding, weapons, and training to strengthen the previously

marginal Salafi-Jihadi opposition factions. (O'Bagy, 2012) These foreign non-

state actors have intervened in an attempt to achieve their dream of a Sunni

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Islamic caliphate by influencing opposition groups. (Lund1, 2013) Not only is

this related to ideological goals, but a strongly Sunni Syria would shift

balance of power in the contest between Sunni and Shi'a political forces in

the Middle East.

The moderate opposition has also attempted to reach out for foreign

aid but has been largely unsuccessful, with its extent so far being limited to

safe haven in Turkey and “non-lethal aid” from the United States. (Lund2,

2013) The moderate opposition under the auspices of the Supreme Military

Council of the Free Syrian Army (SMC) in the south of the country began to

receive heavy weapons in January (Higgins, 2013) leading to moderate

success, but these weapons have yet to significantly proliferate throughout

the country and they have yet to have a strategic impact.

State Actions and Strategies: Edward Azar posits that the regime can

resolve the protracted social conflict by accommodating communal

grievances, but this was impossible for the Assad regime, as the opposition

called for the downfall of the regime, nothing less. (Ajami, 2012) “In many

cases, a militant, harsh response constitutes the core of state strategy in

coping with communal dissent.” (Azar, 1990) This was just the response of

the Assad regime what Azar calls “coercive repression”. It resulted in, as

Azar states, “...equally militant responses from the repressed groups.” (Azar,

1990) This was the exact case in Syria as the opposition militarized in

response to the regime's violent crackdown. The regime did also attempt

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Azar's additional strategy of “instrumental co-option” early on during the

revolutionary phase in the form of a regime-approved non-violent opposition

council which possessed no actual power, and it was quickly dismissed by

the rest of the opposition. (Ajami, 2012)

Azar also discusses that the regime might attempt to “sever links

between domestic communal actors and external support groups”. This is

one strategy which the Assad regime has been unable to enact due to its

manpower shortage and Syria's long, porous borders with Lebanon, Turkey,

and Iraq. Iraq has proven to be an especially important source of supplies, as

the “ratlines” established by the Assad regime to assist the anti-American

Sunni insurgency in Iraq are now being used by Iraqi Sunnis to support Syrian

Sunnis against the Assad regime. (O'Bagy, 2013)

The regime has its own forms of external support however, as it takes

advantages of its sponsor Iran and client Hizballah to provide cash,

munitions, and professional military personnel. (Holliday, 2013) As stated by

Azar, this “facilitate[s] direct or indirect intervention of external powers,

which not only amplifies the scope of the conflict, but also makes it more

protracted.” (Azar, 1990)

Built-In Mechanisms of Conflict/Conflictive Ethos: Azar's main thesis in

this aspect of the conflict's process dynamics is that “the history of

experience in the conflict and the nature of communication among hostile

contestants are also responsible for shaping the behavioral properties of

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protracted conflict.” (Azar, 1990) What Azar goes on to describe is strikingly

similar to Bar-Tal's “Conflictive Ethos” theory, as they both describe the role

that societal beliefs and inter-communal communication have in driving the

behaviors of the contestants.

Bar-Tal's conflict ethos theory posits that the psychological stresses of

conflict “require that society members develop conditions that enable them

to cope successfully with the conflict situation” These conditions then lead to

societal beliefs which “construct society members' view of the conflict and

motivate them to act.” (Bar-Tal, 2000) This lines up perfectly with Azar's built-

in mechanisms of conflict, as they both also explain how the mind-sets of the

parties to the conflict lead to the escalation and perpetuation of the conflict.

“Parties subject to the continual stresses of protracted conflict tend to

become closed-minded... hostility begets hostility and the process becomes

institutionalized.” (Azar, 1990) “The conflictive ethos helps the society to

cope with the adversary, but at the same time fuels the conflict and

constitutes the fundamental obstacle to its resolution.” (Bar-Tal, 2000)

In the Syrian Civil War, the conflictive ethea of the respective sides

have both had time to develop and harden as the conflict has escalated and

dragged on. The Sunni majority's perception of the conflict is colored by

several major events in their communal memory: their community's

historical dominance over Syria, the brutal crackdown by Hafez al-Assad on

the Muslim Brotherhood's uprising, the denial of economic and political

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opportunities, the indifference of the regime to the economic hardship

experienced by rural Sunnis during the drought and recession of 2011.

(Ajami, 2012) More importantly however are the actions of the regime during

the civil war which have traumatized the population, the massacres,

shellings, bombings, and other horrific actions which come with sectarian

civil war.

Meanwhile the regime and its supporters remember the years of

oppression and impoverishment under the Sunni majority and are not eager

to return. This is exacerbated by the Salafi-Jihadi extremists who would make

them 2nd class citizens at best and slaughter them for being infidels at worst.

(Lund2, 2013) They are also afraid of being punished for the crimes of the

regime, and so have chosen to join it in the interest of self-preservation.

(Holliday, 2013)

The final section of Azar's protracted social conflict theory is Outcome

Analysis, which consists of his enumeration and description of the conditions

created by a protracted social conflict. Since the Syrian Civil War is far from

ending, an analysis in this section is incomplete but is still useful as some of

these conditions can already be seen.

Deterioration of Physical Security: this is obviously already widespread

throughout Syria, and has been exacerbated by the regime strategy of

bombing rebel-held areas to disrupt and displace the civilian population.

(Holliday, 2013) Azar also points out that the conflict “deprives not only the

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victimised communities, but also the dominant groups, of the economic

resources for satisfying basic needs.” (Azar, 1990)

Institutional Deformity: This is composed of two effects, the “de facto

paralysis of political institutions” and the breakdown of economic and

societal institutions. In Syria, the opposition has attempted to mitigate the

first effect by attempting governance, but has met with varying levels of

success. Once again, the moderate opposition has been hamstrung by its

lack of resources, which has prevented it from providing basic needs

(O'Bagy, 2013); the Islamists are better funded but institute an unpopular,

harsh interpretation of Shari'a law. (Lund2, 2013) The breakdown of economic

and societal institutions caused by conflict has been exacerbated by the

massive displacement of the population and economic sanctions; leading to

severe hardship for Syrians unable to afford black market prices. (Ajami,

2012)

Psychological Ossification: This is largely a retread of the previous

“built-in mechanisms of conflict/conflictive ethos”, and in Syria this has

meant a fatigue in the civilian population who largely just wish a return to

peace, but a refusal among either communal group to bargain or reason with

one another due to a zero-sum mindset.

Increased Dependency and Cliency: As the conflict protracts, both

contestants are forced to turn further to their sponsors for support, but in the

process further lose agency in their decision-making. The Assad regime has

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become increasingly reliant on the cash and munitions from Tehran (Holliday,

2013), and is therefore dependent on Iran for its survival, likely leading to

more control by Iran over Syrian foreign policy in exchange. The Salafi-Jihadis

have announced their allegiance to al-Qaeda, guaranteeing them further

support from jihadi networks, but have also increasingly opened their

organisation to leadership by non-Syrians who have come to establish an

Islamic caliphate. (Lund2, 2013) The previously-mentioned SMC are receiving

Croatian heavy weapons in a semi-covert logistical operation run by the US,

Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. (Chivers/Shmitt2, 2013) These weapons

come with the United States' expectation that the SMC will not pursue a

sectarian agenda and exclude Salafi-Jihadi factions from operating with

them.

IV. Intervention: Liberal Motives, Realist Means

As explained in the previous section, the more moderate and Western-

approved Free Syrian Army has been consistently unorganized and under-

supplied, allowing anti-Western Salafi/Jihadi groups to flourish among the

Syrian conflict with Gulf money and jihadi experience. (O'Bagy, 2012) Since

the beginning of January however, rebels under the SMC in Dera'a

governorate bordering Jordan began receiving Croatian heavy weapons. They

were able to use this materiel to bring more rebel groups under their

umbrella for larger and better-coordinated attacks and have since achieved

a string of victories. (Dupree, 2013)

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Intelligence officials from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Qatar,

Jordan, and Turkey had likely been vetting groups to be supplied, and the

approved groups were invited to a conference in Antalya, Turkey sponsored

by Saudi Arabia and Qatar in December, 2012. There they were offered

heavy weapons in exchange for joining under the direct command of the

Supreme Military Council of the Free Syrian Army, led by Brigadier General

Salim Idris. (Miller, 2013)

Weapons which Croatia had offered earlier for sale to supply the Syrian

opposition are being purchased by Saudi Arabia, then transported by

Jordanian International Air Cargo (a front company for Jordanian military

cargo), from Zagreb to Amman. From there, these weapons are smuggled

across the border and distributed to opposition groups in Dera'a governorate.

(Chivers/Schmitt2, 2013)

The weapons being supplied: multiple grenade launchers, anti-tank

rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, and mobile rocket artillery units; provide

opposition units with a level of firepower not yet largely possessed by rebel

groups in the conflict. (Higgins, 2013) This new level of firepower has led to

an increased tempo of victories by opposition units, creating a snowball

effect as the capture of regime bases provides rebel units with even more

firepower, including tanks and APC's, which then give the rebels even greater

strength to capture more bases. (Dupree, 2013)

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Not only have these weapons given the rebels an upgrade in firepower,

they have also contributed to increase in the organization of and cooperation

between rebel groups which has been so lacking among the moderate

opposition so far in the war. (Chivers/Schmitt1, 2013) Access to supplies is

the main currency among opposition groups, and having a steady supply of

materiel ensures the membership and obedience of other rebels. These new

heavy weapons has proven to be an effective incentive for cooperation, as

opposition groups across the south have taken on a level of organization and

coordination not seen before. (Miller, 2013)

This campaign in the south of the country is seen as a precursor to the

battle for Damascus, as Dera'a is much closer to the capital than Idlib and

Aleppo are. Focusing on advancing on Damascus from the south makes more

sense strategically, as supply lines from Jordan would be much shorter than

from Turkey. Additionally, opposition forces in the north would have to

capture the heavily garrisoned Hama and Homs before being able to attack

the capital directly, whereas once Dera'a is captured, the road to the capital

is open. (Weiss, 2013)

Additionally, the country being used as the source of these weapons,

Jordan, is a much more politically reliable ally to the USA and Saudi Arabia

than Turkey. (Miller, 2013) The close military and intelligence relationships

already in place between the three countries ensure that cooperation in the

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logistics and decision-making of the operation is comparatively easy as well.

(Chivers/Schmitt2, 2013)

This intervention is the result of decision-making by the Obama

administration, so analysis of the intervention must be made with its

perspective in mind. While the intervention follows Realism in its method –

increasing the power of the actor whose interests most closely align with

Washington's – the motivations and ultimate goals of the interventions are

absolutely Liberal in nature.

The Obama administration, along with most of its regional allies, hopes

for a future Syrian government that is democratic in nature and ideologically

moderate. These hopes for a liberal democratic Syria have been endangered

by the rise of Salafi-Jihadi groups. These groups are fiercely anti-Western and

draw their membership from international jihadi fighters in addition to

Syrians, and they are largely sympathetic to terrorist groups. The United

States has even gone so far as to officially label Jabhat an-Nusra, one of the

largest and most successful Salafi-Jihadi rebel groups in Syria, as a terrorist

organization. (Lund2, 2013)

Despite Washington's opposition to these extremist groups, they have

been unarguably the most powerful and well-organized rebel groups in Syria.

Meanwhile moderate opposition groups have suffered from a lack of supplies,

and more importantly, organization and cohesion.

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That has meant that the Obama administration, even if it did wish to

supply arms to the opposition, had no single, organized force to give them

to. Providing arms to the multitudinous rebel groups would be a logistical

nightmare, increase the risk of terrorist groups acquiring heavy weapons,

and lead to infighting for the weapons. Therefore, the founding of a single,

moderate, rebel command structure was necessary if the administration or

its allies were to supply the rebels with arms, as it would minimize infighting,

orchestrate the logistics itself, and most importantly serve as a unified front

against both the regime and the extremists.

This is why the founding of the Supreme Military Council was so crucial;

it was the final piece of the puzzle in allowing lethal aid to be transferred to

opposition forces approved by Washington and its allies. The administration's

hope is that the SMC will not only be a more effective fighting force, but will

also ensure that the administration's liberal democratic vision for Syria

becomes a reality once the Assad regime is toppled, replacing the Assad

regime's resistance to American hegemony with a state grateful for the

assistance it received in unseating its tyrant.

VI. Conclusion

In this paper I have provided an overview of the events of the Syrian

Civil War and the history behind it, and an analysis of the conflict using

Azar's Protracted Social Conflict theory in conjunction with Bar-Tal's

conflictive ethos. I found that the Syrian Civil War matches Azar's theory in

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almost every respect, providing an excellent framework to explain the

conflict and its drivers. I also discovered that two of PSC theory's

components are an early description of what Bar-Tal would come to call a

“conflictive ethos”, which was also useful in providing a clear structure to

explain the sectarianization of the conflict. The only serious limitation

encountered when using these theories was PSC's assumption that outside

interventions would only come from states, as has not been the case with

Syria.

I then described the intervention by the United States, Jordan, Saudia

Arabia, and Qatar to create a single, dominant command structure for the

Free Syrian Army, and arm it with heavy weapons from Croatia. I analyzed

this intervention by using Liberalism and Realism to contrast the Liberal

outlook and goals of the primary decision-maker in the intervention, the

Obama administration, with the intervention's Realist methods.

This paper was not a complete case study of the Syrian conflict, as it

did not cover the conflict surrounding Syrian Kurdistan, the massive

humanitarian crisis taking place, the breakdown in the fabric of Syrian

society, the threat posed by chemical and biological weapon use and

proliferation, or most pressingly, the critically destabilizing effects this

conflict is having on its neighbors. Despite these shortcomings, this paper

has been able to use theory to comprehensively analyze the conflict and its

causes within Syria. However, it has not looked at the possible long-term

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effects of the conflict, both for Syria and the region as a whole, which is

decidedly grim.

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Azar, Edward E. The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases. Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Dartmouth, 1990. Print.

Bar-Tal, Daniel. "From Intractable Conflict Through Conflict Resolution To Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis." Political Psychology 21.2 (2000): 351-65. Web.

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Chivers, CJ, and Eric Schmitt. "Saudis Step Up Help for Rebels in Syria With Croatian Arms." New York Times 25 Feb 2013, n. pag. Web. 27 Mar. 2013. <http :// www . nytimes . com /2013/02/26/ world / middleeast / in - shift -saudis - are - said - to - arm -rebels-in-syria.html?hp&_r=2&&pagewanted=all>.

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<http :// www . nytimes . com /2013/03/25/ world / middleeast / arms - airlift - to -syrian - rebels - expands-with-cia-aid.html?ref=middleeast&_r=0&pagewanted=all>.

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<http :// www . huffingtonpost . com /2012/12/08/ syria - rebels-military-council_n_2263256.html>.

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B: This is a well researched overview of the conflict, but could have benefited from focusing either on the Azar/Bar Tal theories, or on the realist theories of intervention. This could have helped the paper deal more directly with a particular intervention, which would also have tightened it up.

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