subpoena decus tecum

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court Manila !EN BANC

RE: SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM DATED JANUARY 11, 2010 OF ACTING DIRECTOR ALEU A. AMANTE, PIAB-‐C, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN !

A.M. No. 10-‐1-‐13-‐SC

Present: PUNO, C.J., CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-‐DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, and MENDOZA, JJ. !

Promulgated: March 2, 2010 x-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐ x

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:

Before us for consideraMon are the interrelated maNers listed below.

a. The subpoena duces tecum (dated January 11, 2010 and received by this Court on January 18, 2010), issued by the Office of the Ombudsman on the “Chief, Office of the AdministraVve Services or AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE, Supreme Court, Manila,” for the submission to the Office of the Ombudsman of the latest Personal Data Sheets and last known forwarding address of former Chief JusVce Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and former Associate JusVce Ma. Alicia Austria-‐MarVnez. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in relaMon to a criminal complaint under (b) below, pursuant to SecMon 13, ArMcle XI of the ConsMtuMon and SecMon 15 of Republic Act No. 6770. The Office of the AdministraMve

Services (OAS) referred the maNer to us on January 21, 2010 with a request for clearance to release the specified documents and informaMon.

b. Copy of the criminal complaint enVtled Oliver O. Lozano and Evangeline

Lozano-‐Endriano v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-‐C-‐C-‐09-‐0527-‐J, cited by the Ombudsman as basis for the the subpoena duces tecum it issued. We secured a copy of this criminal complaint from the Ombudsman to determine the legality and propriety of the subpoena duces tecum sought.

c. Order dated February 4, 2010 (which the Court received on February 9,

2010), signed by AcVng Director Maribeth Taytaon-‐Padios of the Office of the Ombudsman (with the approval of Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Navarro-‐GuVerrez), dismissing the Lozano complaint and referring it to the Supreme Court for appropriate acVon. The order was premised on the Memorandum[1] issued on July 31, 2003 by Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo who directed that all complaints against judges and other members of the Judiciary be immediately dismissed and referred to the Supreme Court for appropriate acMon. !

OUR RULING I. The Subpoena Duces Tecum

In light of the Ombudsman’s dismissal order of February 4, 2010, any quesMon relaMng to the legality and propriety of the subpoena duces tecum the Ombudsman issued has been rendered moot and academic. The subpoena duces tecum merely drew its life and conMnued viability from the underlying criminal complaint, and the complaint’s dismissal – belated though it may be – cannot but have the effect of rendering the need for the subpoena duces tecum academic.

As guide in the issuance of compulsory processes to Members of this Court, past

and present, in relaMon to complaints touching on the exercise of our judicial funcMons, we deem it appropriate to discuss for the record the extent of the Ombudsman’s authority in these types of complaints.

In the appropriate case, the Office of the Ombudsman has full authority to issue subpoenas, including subpoena duces tecum, for compulsory aNendance of witnesses and the producMon of documents and informaMon relaMng to maNers under its invesMgaMon.[2] The grant of this authority, however, is not unlimited, as the Ombudsman must necessarily observe and abide by the terms of the ConsMtuMon and our laws, the Rules of Court and the applicable jurisprudence on the issuance, service, validity and efficacy of subpoenas. Under the Rules of Court, the issuance of subpoenas, including a subpoena duces tecum, operates under the requirements of reasonableness and relevance.[3] For the producMon of documents to be reasonable and for the documents themselves to be relevant, the maNer under inquiry should, in the first place, be one that the Ombudsman can legiMmately entertain, invesMgate and rule upon.

In the present case, the “maNer” that gave rise to the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum was a criminal complaint filed by the complainants Lozano for the alleged violaMon by reMred Supreme Court Chief JusMce Hilario Davide, Jr. and reMred Associate JusMce Ma. Alicia Austria-‐MarMnez of SecMon 3(e) of R.A. 3019, as amended (the AnM-‐Gral and Corrupt PracMces Act).

A first step in considering whether a criminal complaint (and its aNendant compulsory processes) is within the authority of the Ombudsman to entertain (and to issue), is to consider the nature of the powers of the Supreme Court. This Court, by consMtuMonal design, is supreme in its task of adjudicaMon; judicial power is vested solely in the Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts, not only to seNle actual controversies, but also to determine whether grave abuse of discreMon amounMng to lack or excess of jurisdicMon has been commiNed in any branch or instrumentality of government.[4] As a rule, all decisions and determinaMons in the exercise of judicial power ulMmately go to and stop at the Supreme Court whose judgment is final. This consJtuJonal scheme cannot be thwarted or subverted through a criminal complaint that, under the guise of impuJng a misdeed to the Court and its Members, seeks to revive and re-‐liJgate maNers that have long been laid to rest by the Court. EffecMvely, such criminal complaint is a collateral aNack on a judgment of this Court that, by consMtuMonal mandate, is final and already beyond quesMon.

A simple jurisprudenMal research would easily reveal that this Court has had the

occasion to rule on the liability of JusMces of the Supreme Court for violaMon of SecMon 3(e) of R.A. 3019—the very same provision that the complainants Lozano invoke in this case.

In In re Wenceslao Laureta,[5] the client of ANy. Laureta filed a complaint with the

Tanodbayan charging Members of the Supreme Court with violaMon of SecMon 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for having knowingly, deliberately and with bad faith rendered an unjust resoluMon in a land dispute. The Court unequivocally ruled that insofar as this Court and its Divisions are concerned, a charge of violaMon of the AnM-‐Gral and Corrupt PracMces Act on the ground that such collecMve decision is “unjust” should not prosper; the parMes cannot “reliMgate in another forum the final judgment of the Court,” as to do so is to subordinate the Court, in the exercise of its judicial funcMons, to another body.[6]

In re Joaquin T. Borromeo[7] reiterates the Laureta ruling, parMcularly that (1) judgments of the Supreme Court are not reviewable; (2) administraMve, civil and criminal complaints against a judge should not be turned into subsMtutes for appeal; (3) only courts may declare a judgment unjust; and (4) a situaMon where the Ombudsman is made to determine whether or not a judgment of the Court is unjust is an absurdity. The Court further discussed the requisites for the prosecuMon of judges, as follows:

That is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this impropriety, of rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order; but, taking account of all the foregoing consideraMons, the indispensable requisites are that there be a final declaraMon by a

competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and there be also evidence of malice and bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order.

Thus, consistent with the nature of the power of this Court under our consMtuMonal scheme, only this Court – not the Ombudsman – can declare a Supreme Court judgment to be unjust.

In Alzua v. Arnalot,[8] the Court ruled that “judges of superior and general jurisdicMon are not liable to respond in civil acMon for damages, and provided this raMonale for this ruling: Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the acMon of the judge would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful.” The same raMonale applies to the indiscriminate aNribuMon of criminal liability to judicial officials.

Plainly, under these rulings, a criminal complaint for violaMon of SecMon 3(e) of

RA 3019, based on the legal correctness of the official acts of JusEces of the Supreme Court, cannot prosper and should not be entertained. This is not to say that Members of the Court are absolutely immune from suit during their term, for they are not. The ConsMtuMon provides that the appropriate recourse against them is to seek their removal from office if they are guilty of culpable violaMon of the ConsMtuMon, treason, bribery, gral and corrupMon, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.[9] Only aler removal can they be criminally proceeded against for their transgressions. While in office and therealer, and for their official acts that do not consMtute impeachable offenses, recourses against them and their liabiliMes therefor are as defined in the above rulings.

SecMon 22 of Republic Act No. 6770, in fact, specifically grants the Ombudsman the authority to invesMgate impeachable officers, but only when such invesMgaMon is warranted:

SecMon 22. InvesEgatory Power. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to invesMgate any serious misconduct in office allegedly commiNed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.

Conversely, if a complaint against an impeachable officer is unwarranted for lack of legal basis and for clear misapplicaMon of law and jurisprudence, the Ombudsman should spare these officers from the harassment of an unjusMfied invesMgaMon. The present criminal complaint against the reMred JusMces is one such case where an invesMgaMon is not warranted, based as it is on the legal correctness of their official acts, and the Ombudsman should have immediately recognized the criminal complaint for what it is, instead of iniMally proceeding with its invesMgaMon and issuing a subpoena duces tecum.

II. The Ombudsman’s Dismissal of the Criminal Complant

As the Ombudsman’s dismissal of the criminal complaint (Oliver O. Lozano and

Evangeline Lozano-‐Endriano v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-‐C-‐C-‐09-‐0527-‐J) clearly implied, no complete dismissal took place as the maNer was simply “referred to the Supreme Court for appropriate acEon.”

Although it was belatedly made, we cannot fault this Ombudsman acMon for the

reasons we have already discussed above. While both accused are now reMred from the service, the complaint against them sMll qualifies for exclusive consideraMon by this Court as the acts complained of spring from their judicial acMons while they were with the Court. From this perspecMve, we therefore pass upon the prima facie merits of the complainants Lozano’s criminal complaint.

a. Grounds for the Dismissal of the Complaint By its express terms, the criminal complaint stemmed from the parMcipaMon of

the accused in the ResoluMon the First Division of this Court issued in Heirs of Antonio Pael v. Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. Nos. 133547 and 133843. The reMred Chief JusMce and reMred Associate JusMce allegedly commiNed the following unlawful acts:

1) Overturning the findings of fact of the CA; 2) StaMng in the ResoluMon that the “Chin-‐Mallari property overlaps the UP

property,” when the DENR Survey Report stated that the “UP Mtle/property overlaps the Chin-‐Mallari property;”

3) Issuing a ResoluMon, for which three JusMces voted, to set aside a Decision

for which five JusMces voted.

By these acts, the reMred Members of this Court are being held criminally

accountable on the theory that they violated the ConsEtuEon and the law in their ruling in the cited cases, thereby causing “undue injury” to the parEes to these cases.

Aler due consideraMon, we dismiss the criminal complaint against reMred Chief

JusMce Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and reMred Associate JusMce Ma. Alicia Austria-‐MarMnez under SecMon 3(e) of RA 3019. We fully expound on the reasons for this conclusion in the discussions below.

a. Contrary to the complainants’ posiVon,

the Supreme Court has the power to review the lower courts’ findings of fact.

The Supreme Court is the highest court of the land with the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or cerEorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of the lower courts.[10] It has the authority to promulgate rules on pracMce, pleadings and admission to the bar, and suspend the operaMon of these rules in the interest of jusMce.[11] Jurisprudence holds, too, that the Supreme Court may exercise these powers over the factual findings of the lower courts, among other prerogaMves, in the following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded enMrely on speculaMons, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd of impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discreMon; (4) when the judgment is based on a misappreciaMon of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicMng; (6) when, in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citaMon of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the peMMon as well as in the peMMoner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[12] Thus, contrary to the complainants Lozano’ asserMons in their complaint, the Supreme Court, in the proper cases, can and does rule on factual submissions before it, and even reverses the lower court’s factual findings when the circumstances call for this acMon.

b. ConsVtuVonal Provisions were misused.

The complainants Lozano appear to us to have brazenly misquoted and misused applicable consMtuMonal provisions to jusMfy their case against the reMred JusMces. We refer parMcularly to their use (or strictly, misuse) of ArVcle X, SecVon 2(3) of the 1973 ConsVtuVon which they claim to be the governing rule that the reMred JusMces should have followed in acMng on Pael. This consMtuMonal provision states:

Cases heard by a division shall be decided

with the concurrence of at least five Members, but if such required number is not obtained the case shall be decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sisng en banc.[13]

For failure of the reMred JusMces to act according to these terms, the complainants claim that the former subverted the ConsMtuMon by reversing, by a vote of a majority of only three members, the decision of the First Division unanimously approved by its full membership of five members.

Had the complainants bothered to carefully consider the facts and developments in Pael and accordingly related these to the applicable consJtuJonal provision, they would have discovered that Pael was decided in 2003 when the 1987 ConsVtuVon, not the 1973 ConsVtuVon, was the prevailing Charter. They then would have

easily learned of the manner cases are heard and decided by Division before the Supreme Court under the 1987 ConsMtuMon. SecVon 4(3), ArVcle VIII of this ConsMtuMon provides:

Cases or maNers heard by a division shall be

decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberaMons on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sisng en banc.” (Emphasis supplied.)

This was the provision that governed in 2003 and sMll governs to this day. Thus, the complainants’ argument and basis for their criminal complaint – that in ruling on a moMon for reconsideraMon, all five members of the Division should concur – is totally wrong.

c. The elements of the offense charged are not sufficiently alleged in the complaint

A public official can violate SecMon 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019[14] in two

ways: (1) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference;[15] in either case, these acts must be commiNed with manifest parMality, evident bad faith, or gross and inexcusable negligence.

“ParMality” is defined as a bias or disposiMon to see and report maNers as

wished for, rather than as they are. “Bad faith” connotes not only bad judgment or negligence, but also a dishonest purpose, a conscious wrongdoing, or a breach of duty amounMng to fraud. “Gross negligence,” on the other hand, is characterized by the want of even slight care, acMng or omisng to act in a situaMon where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intenMonally, with a conscious indifference to consequences as far as other persons are concerned.[16]

The criminal complaint in this case failed to allege the facts and circumstances

showing that the reMred JusMces acted with parMality, bad faith or negligence. A judicial officer’s act in reviewing the findings of fact in a decision and voMng for its reversal cannot by itself consMtute a violaMon of SecMon 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 in the absence of facts, alleged and proven, demonstraMng a dishonest purpose, conscious parMality, extrinsic fraud, or any wrongdoing on his or her part. A complainant’s mere disagreement with the magistrate’s own conclusions, to be sure, does not jusMfy a criminal charge under SecMon 3(e) against the laNer. In the absence of alleged and proven parMcular acts of manifest parMality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, good faith and regularity are generally presumed in the performance of official duMes by public officers.[17]

For the criminal complaint’s fatal omissions and resultant failure to allege a

prima facie case, it rightully deserves immediate dismissal. III. The Complainants’ PotenVal Liability for Filing the Ombudsman Complaint

In light of the above conclusions and under the aNendant circumstances of the

criminal complaints, we cannot avoid considering whether the complainants Lozano acted properly as members of the Bar, as officers of this Court, and as professionals governed by norms of ethical behavior, in filing their complaint.

In their criminal complaint, the complainants gave a slanted view of the powers of this Court to suit their purposes; for these same purposes, they wrongly cited and misapplied the provisions of the ConsMtuMon, not just any ordinary statute. As lawyers, the complainants must be familiar and well acquainted with the fundamental law of the land, and are charged with the duty to apply the consMtuMonal provisions in light of their prevailing jurisprudenMal interpretaMon. As law pracMMoners acMve in the legal and poliMcal circles, the complainants can hardly be characterized as “unknowing” in their misuse and misapplicaMon of consMtuMonal provisions. They should, at the very least, know that the 1973 ConsMtuMon and its provisions have been superseded by the 1987 ConsMtuMon, and that they cannot assail – invoking the 1973 ConsMtuMon – the judicial acts of members of the Supreme Court carried out in 2003 when the 1987 ConsMtuMon was in effect. Their misuse of the ConsMtuMon is made more reprehensible when the overriding thrust of their criminal complaint is considered; they used the 1973 provisions to falsely aNribute malice and injusMce to the Supreme Court and its Members.

In our view, the complainants’ errors do not belong to the genre of plain and simple errors that lawyers commit in the pracMce of their profession. Their plain disregard, misuse and misrepresentaMon of consMtuMonal provisions consMtute serious misconduct that reflects on their fitness for conMnued membership in the Philippine Bar. At the very least, their transgressions are blatant violaMons of Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

Rule 10.02. A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperaVve by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved. (Emphasis provided.)

To emphasize the importance of requiring lawyers to act candidly and in good faith, an idenMcal provision is found in Cannon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Moreover, lawyers are sworn to “do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court…” before

they are even admiNed to the Bar. All these the complainants appear to have seriously violated.

In the interest of due process and fair play, the complainants Lozano should be heard, in relaMon to their criminal complaint before the Ombudsman against reMred Chief JusMce Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and reMred Associate JusMce Ma. Alicia Austria-‐MarMnez, on why they should not be held accountable and accordingly penalized for violaMons of their duMes as members of the Bar and officers of this Court, and of the ethics of the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the criminal complaint enMtled Oliver O. Lozano, et al. v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-‐C-‐C-‐09-‐0527-‐J for uNer lack of merit, and DECLARE as MOOT and ACADEMIC the quesMon of compliance with the subpoena duces tecum dated January 11, 2010 that the Ombudsman issued against this Court.

We hereby ORDER the complainants ANy. Oliver O. Lozano and ANy. Evangeline

Lozano-‐Endriano to EXPLAIN IN WRITING to this Court, within a non-‐extendible period of 15 days from receipt of this ResoluMon, why they should not be penalized as members of the Bar and as officers of this Court, for their open disregard of the plain terms of the ConsMtuMon and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, and their misuse and misrepresentaMon of consMtuMonal provisions in their criminal complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman, enMtled Oliver O. Lozano, et al. v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-‐C-‐C-‐09-‐0527-‐J.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief JusMce

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate JusMce

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate JusMce

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate JusMce

ARTURO D. BRION Associate JusMce

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate JusMce

!

ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate JusMce

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate JusMce

RENATO C. CORONA Associate JusMce

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate JusMce

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-‐DE CASTRO Associate JusMce

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate JusMce

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate JusMce

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate JusMce

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate JusMce

![1] The perMnent part of the Memorandum reads:

Henceforth, on the basis of the foregoing, and in keeping with the spirit of the stated doctrine, all criminal complaints against judged and other members of the Supreme Court shall be immediately DISMISSED and REFERRED to the Supreme Court for appropriate acMon. The dismissal shall not in any manner touch on the merits of the complaint, and shall be made for the sole purpose of referring the same to the Supreme Court. (emphasis found in the original.)

[2] SecMon 15 of Rep. Act No. 6770 reads: SecMon 15. Powers, FuncMons and DuMes.—The

Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers funcMons and duMes:

x x x x

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitaMons as it may provide in its rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relaMng to contracts or transacMons entered into by his office involving the

disbursement or use of public funds or properMes, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate acMon; (5) Request any government agency for assistance and informaMon necessary in the discharge of its responsibiliMes, and to examine, if necessary, perMnent records and documents.

Paragraphs 4 and 5 of SecMon 13, Rule XI of the ConsMtuMon are similarly phrased:

SecMon 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following funcMons and duMes:

x x x x (4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitaMons as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relaMng to contracts or transacMons entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properMes, and report any irregularity to the C omm i s s i o n o n A u d i t f o r appropriate acMon. (5) Request any government agency for assistance and informaMon in the discharge of its responsibiliMes, and to examine, if necessary, perMnent records and informaMon.

[3] See: SecMons 3 and 4, Rule 21, Rules of Court. [4] CONSTITUTION, ArMcle VIII, SecMon 1. [5] 232 Phil 353 (1987). [6] To quote the perMnent porMons of Laureta, pp. 384-‐388:

As aptly declared in the Chief JusMce’s Statement

of December 24, 1986, which the Court hereby adopts in toto, “It is elementary that the Supreme Court is supreme—the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all jusMciable disputes public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them ‘unjust.’” It is elementary that “(A)s has ever been stressed since the early case of Arnedo v. Llorente (18 Phil 257, 263[1911]) ‘controlling and irresisMble reasons of public policy and of sound pracMce in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgment of courts determining controversies submiNed to them should become

final at some definite Mme fixed by law or by a rule of pracMce recognized by law, so as to be therealer beyond the control even of the court which rendered them for the purpose of correcMng errors of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion of the court it may have fallen….”

Respondents should have known that the provisions of ArMcle 204 of the Revised Penal Code as to ‘rendering knowingly unjust judgment’ refer to an individual judge who does so “in any case submiNed to him for decision” and even then, it is not the prosecutor who would pass judgment on the “unjustness” of the decision rendered by him but the proper appellate court with jurisdicMon to review the same, either of the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents should likewise know that said penal arJcle has no applicaJon to the members of a collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisions who reach their conclusions in consultaEon and accordingly render their collecEve judgment aRer due deliberaEon. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of violaJon of the AnJ-‐GraV and Corrupt PracJces Act on the ground that such a collecJve decision is “unjust” cannot prosper. (emphasis supplied)

xxxx

To subject to the threat and ordeal of invesMgaMon and prosecuMon, a judge, more so a member of the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in regular exercise of official duty and judicial funcMons is to subvert and undermine the very independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the execuMve. xxxx

To allow liMgants to go beyond the Court’s resoluMon and claim that the members acted “with deliberate bad faith” and rendered an “unjust resoluMon” in disregard or violaMon of the duty of their high office to act upon their own independent consideraMon and judgment of the maNer at hand would be to destroy the authenMcity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resoluMon and to disregard uNerly the presumpMon of regular performance of official duty. To allow such collateral aNack would destroy the separaMon of powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all jusMciable disputes.

DissaMsfied liMgants and/or their counsels cannot

without violaMng the separaMon of powers mandated by the ConsMtuMon reliVgate in another forum the final judgment of this Court on legal issues submiNed by them and their adversaries for final determinaMon to and by the Supreme Court and which fall within judicial power to determine and adjudicate

exclusively vested by the ConsMtuMon in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.

[7] 311 Phil 441, 509 (1995). [8] 21 Phil 308, 326 (1912). [9] CONSTITUTION, ArMcle XI, SecMon 2. [10] CONSTITUTION, ArMcle VIII, SecMon 5(2). [11] Id., SecMon 5(5). [12] Reyes v. Montemayor, G.R. No. 166516, September 3, 2009; Uy v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 157851, June

29, 2007, 526 SCRA 73, 83-‐84; Malison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147776, July 10, 2007, 527 SCRA 109. 117; and Buenaventura v. Republic, G.R. No. 166865, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 271, 282.

[13] Part of the Criminal Complaint-‐Affidavit for Corrupt PracMces, signed by ANy. Oliver O. Lozano and ANy. Evangeline Lozano-‐Endriano, received by the Ombudsman on September 8, 2009, Ombudsman Records, pp. 1089-‐1189,1090.

[14] SecMon 3. Corrupt pracMces of public officers.—In addiMon to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by exisMng law, the following shall consMtute corrupt pracMces of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x x (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administraMve or judicial funcMons through manifest parMality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of the offices or government corporaMons charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

x x x x [15] Velasco v. Sandiganbayan, 492 Phil 669, 677 (2005). [16] Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, 462 Phil 712, 721 (2003); and Mendoza-‐Arce v. Office of the

Ombudsman, 430 Phil 101, 115 (2002). [17] Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, 462 Phil 712, 722 (2003).

subpoena decus tecum

Documents