Challenges to UN emergency preparedness, humanitarian coordination & response to nuclear detonation events• Study released in summer

2014• Carried out in cooperation

with UNDP and OCHA• Study carried out by UNIDIR

(Borrie and Caughley)

Oslo conference summary point #1:

“It is unlikely that any state or international body could address the immediate humanitarian

emergency caused by a nuclear weapon detonation in an adequate manner and provide

sufficient assistance to those affected. Moreover, it might not be possible to establish

such capacities, even if it were attempted.”

Led to peer-reviewed UNIDIR research, funded by governments of Norway and Ireland.

3 Questions

1. What would happen if a NWD event occurred?

2. What points of reference and procedures does the UN have?

3. Bearing in mind the answers to these questions… currently, what could – or would – the UN-coordinated humanitarian system do?

Humanitarian cluster systemFigure courtesy of IASC

About risk• Risk is “the probability of an event multiplied

by its consequences”.NWD events in populated areas are low

probability / high consequenceLow probability events are not no probability

eventsWe assume the risk of a NWD event to be greater

than zero, but don’t quantify it.We don’t take a view on whether a single or

multiple NWD event is more likely.

ImportantNuclear weapon detonation events (NWD):Have certain things in common with

Civil nuclear/radiological emergenciesSudden onset major natural disasters (e.g.

earthquakes, tsunamis, mass firesBut they are different in important ways

Great numbers of people with 3rd degree burns, multiple trauma

Radiation sickness, fallout etc.

Courtesy of Christopf Wirz, Spiez Lab

• Blast

• Thermal radiation (heat) Many fires

• Prompt radiation

• Radioactive fallout

• Other effects incl flash and electro-magnetic pulse (EMP)

• Fear, disruption etc

Blast and heat effects will cause the greatest harm and destruction.

Effects

Our research indicates

• Huge variation in potential scenarios in which nuclear weapon detonation events could occur.

• However, the Oslo conference finding appears to be valid in most plausible scenarios involving a nuclear weapon detonation event in a highly populated area.

• Findings associated with such a “reality check”….

1. The current level of awareness within the humanitarian system is low about the specificities of NWD or its ability to respond to them.

2. For the UN to be called upon presupposes the situation is already beyond a state’s capacity to respond effectively to assist the victims (i.e widespread harm has already occurred / is occurring).

3. The UN is unlikely to be able to offer coordinated humanitarian assistance in the immediate aftermath Could make a difference in several ways though, including in longer term thru IASC cluster system

6 main findings (1)

4. At present there are several major challenges to prompt and effective use of the humanitarian cluster system in the context of a NWD event.

5. Threat of further detonations could vastly complicate humanitarian decision making.

6. The best approach is prevention However, UN could plan for the likely challenges of ‘lower-end’ NWD events since this could make a difference to level of overall suffering: we would argue it has a duty to do so.

6 main findings (2)

i. Give focused attention to the issue in the IASCii. Assign responsibility to an IASC task team,

and invite IACRNE to participateiii. Study and simulate varied NWD scenarios

with a view to humanitarian responseiv. Include representative NWD scenarios in

future revisions of plans for large, complex, sudden-onset disasters

v. Review current capacities and plans

Study findings suggest the humanitarian system consider the following:

iv. Prompt relevant humanitarian and specialized agencies (e.g. IAEA, WHO, CTBTO) to clarify their mandates, policies, roles and capabilities with a view to response to NWD events.

v. Lend thought to how inter-state processes could impinge on timely humanitarian response

« Winging it is not a plan »

Study findings suggest states consider the following:

Knowledge for Action

Full study is available at:

www.unidir.org/illusionofsafety

Available in PDF for free, or printed copies can be ordered

There will also be an article on the study in the Sept/Oct 2014 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists