study on legal instruments and lessons learned from the evaluations...

Study on Legal Instruments and Lessons Learned from the Evaluat ions Managed by the

Jo int Evaluat ion Unit

Final Report

Volume 2 The Intervention Logics

July 2011

Evaluation for the European Commission

PARTICIP GmbH Germany

Framework contract for Multi-country thematic and regional/country-level strategy evaluation studies and synthesis in the area of external co-

operation

Aide à la Décision

Economique Belgium

LOT 5: Evaluation of EC main policies and strategies in the areas of

external cooperation

Italy

Ref.: EuropeAid/122888/C/SER/Multi Request for Service: 2010/247813

Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik

Germany

Study on Legal Instrument and Lessons

Learned from the Evaluations Managed by the Joint Evaluation Unit

European Centre for Development

Policy Management Belgium

Overseas Development

Institute, United Kingdom

FINAL REPORT

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July 2011

This evaluation was carried out by The European Centre for Deve lopment

Pol i cy Management

The evaluation team was composed by: James Mackie (Team leader), Niels Keijzer, Faten Aggad, Alisa Herrero-Cangas, Simone Görtz, Eunike Spierings, Sophie Papalexiou, Christopher Veit, Véronique Girard. James Mackie was the evaluation manager. The evaluation is being managed by the Joint Evaluation Unit. The authors accept sole responsibility for this report, drawn up on behalf of the Commission of the European Union. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission

Study on Legal Instruments and Lessons Learned from the Evaluations Managed by the Joint

Evaluation Unit

Final Report

The report consists of 3 volumes: Volume 1: Draft Final Summary Report Volume 2: The Intervention Logics Volume 3: The Review of Evaluation Reports VOLUME 1: DRAFT FINAL REPORT 1. Introduction 2. Conceptual Framework 3. Methodology 4. Phases 1 and 2: The Intervention Logic of the Legal Instruments 5. Phase 3: Linking Evaluation Results (2006-2011) to the Legal Instruments Objectives 6. Phase 4: Recommendations for the Future Legal Instruments and their Evaluation 7. Concluding Remarks 8. Bibliography Annex: Reconstructed Intervention Logics VOLUME 2: THE INTERVENTION LOGICS 1. Introduction: The Intervention Logics for the Legal Instruments 2. Phase 1: Constructing the Faithful Intervention Logics

2.1 Step 1: Analysis of the Legal Instruments / Intervention Logic Diagrams 2.2 Step 2: Comparison of Legal Instruments

3. Phase 2: Analysing the Reconstructed Intervention Logics 3.1 Evidence Collected 3.2 Synthesis of the Evidence from Phase 2 3.3 Some Critical Questions Emerging from Phase 2

Annex 1: Comparing the 2004 DCECI Proposal with the 2006 DCI Regulation Annex 2: Comparing the 2004 ENPI Proposal with the 2006 ENPI Regulation Annex 3: Comparing the 2004 DCECI Proposal with the 2006 ICI Regulation Annex 4: Comparing the Original EC Proposal on the EIDHR (2006) with the Changes Introduced to the Final Text of the Regulation (2006) Annex 5: Comparing the Nuclear Safety Provisions in the 2004 IfS Proposal with the 2007 INSC Regulation Annex 6: Faithful Intervention Logics Annex 7: Reconstructed Intervention Logics VOLUME 3: THE REVIEW OF EVALUATION REPORTS About this Volume 1. Analysis of the Evaluation Evidence 2. Synthesis of the Phase 3 Evidence on the Six Legal Instruments 3. Review of Evidence on Implementation Issues Annex 1: Grid for Analysing Evaluation Reports Annex 2: Trends in Management, Modality, Approach and Performance

STATUS AND VERSION OF THE DOCUMENT

Version Date provided Status Validation/

comments by Date of validation/

comments

1 25/03/2011 Draft

2 16/05/2011 Revised Draft

3 26/07/2011 Final

4

Study on Legal Instruments and Lessons Learned from the Evaluations Managed by the Joint Evaluation Unit PARTICIP-ADE-DIE-DRN-ECDPM-ODI

Final Report July 2011 Page i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Introduction: The Intervention Logics for the Legal Instruments ................................. 1

2 Phase 1 : Constructing the Faithful Intervention Logics ................................................ 22.1 STEP 1: ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL INSTRUMENTS / INTERVENTION LOGIC DIAGRAMS ..... 2

2.1.1 Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) .................................................................. 22.1.2 European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) .................................................... 72.1.3 European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) ........................... 92.1.4 Instrument for Stability (IfS) ............................................................................................. 102.1.5 Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries (ICI) ............................... 132.1.6 Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) ..................................................... 14

2.2 STEP 2: COMPARISON OF THE LEGAL INSTRUMENTS ............................................................ 16

3 Phase 2 : Analyzing the Reconstructed Intervention Logics ........................................ 193.1 EVIDENCE COLLECTED .............................................................................................................. 21

3.1.1 The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) ....................................................... 213.1.2 The European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) ........................................ 233.1.3 Instrument for Stability (IfS) ............................................................................................. 263.1.4 Industrialised Countries Instrument (ICI) ...................................................................... 293.1.5 European Instrument on Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) ......................... 323.1.6 Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) ..................................................... 35

3.2 SYNTHESIS OF THE EVIDENCE FROM PHASE 2 ....................................................................... 403.2.1 The Differences between the Faithful and the Reconstructed Intervention Logics 403.2.2 Degree of Detail on Objectives and Earmarking .......................................................... 413.2.3 Global Objectives that Implies a Mix of ODA and Non-ODA ................................. 413.2.4 Differences on Geographic Coverage ............................................................................. 413.2.5 Differences on Management of the Implementation Issues between the Proposals and the Actual Regulations ............................................................................................................. 423.2.6 Differences on Processes for Planning and M&E ........................................................ 42

3.3 SOME CRITICAL QUESTIONS EMERGING FROM PHASE 2 ...................................................... 43

Annex 1: Comparing the 2004 DCECI Proposal with the 2006 DCI Regulation ............... 46

Annex 2: Comparing the 2004 ENPI Proposal with the 2006 ENPI Regulation ............... 47

Annex 3: Comparing the 2004 DCECI Proposal with the 2006 ICI Regulation ................ 48

Annex 4: Comparing the Original EC Proposal on the EIDHR (2006) with the Changes Introduced to the Final Text of the RRegulation (2006) .................................................... 49

Annex 5: Comparing the Nuclear Safety Provisions in the 2004 IfS Proposal with the 2007 INSC Regulation ................................................................................................................ 50

Annex 6: Faithful Intervention Logics ................................................................................ 51

Annex 7: Reconstructed Intervention Logics ..................................................................... 57


Final Report July 2011 Page ii

List of Tables: Table 1: Key evaluation terms for the intervention logic (DG Budget 2004) .................................... 2Table 2: Grid for structured comparison of faithful and reconstructed logics ................................. 20Table 3: Overview of ICI activities in 2007 and 2009 .......................................................................... 31Table 4: Summary of the outcome of the analysis of different key elements of the intervention

logics .................................................................................................................................................... 37 List of Figures: Figure 1: Overlapping partnerships ........................................................................................................... 7


Final Report July 2011 Page iii

ACRONYMS

3Cs Coherence, Complementarity and Coordination AAP Annual Action Programme ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific countries ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEC ASEAN Secretariat BS Budget support CBC Cross Border Cooperation CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy COM European Commission Communication CSO Civil Society Organisation CSP Country Strategy Paper DAC Development Assistance Committee DCECI Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation Instrument DCI Development Cooperation Instrument DEVCO Directorate General Development and Co-operatoin DG RELEX Directorate General External Relations EC European Commission ECHO Directorate General Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection EDF European Development Fund EEA European Economic Area EEAS European External Action Service EIA Extended Impact Assessment EIB European Investment Bank EIDHR European Instrument on Democracy and Human Rights ENP European Neighbourhood Policy ENPI The European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument EP European Parliament ERDF European Regional Development Funds ESDP European Security and Defense Policy ETP European Training Programme EU European Union EUD European Union Delegation Euratom European Atomic Energy Community FDI Foreign Direct Investment FIL Faithful Intervention Logic GBS General Budget Support IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICC International Criminal Court ICI Industrialised Countries Instrument IFI International finance institution IfS Instrument for Stability IL Intervention Logic INSC Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation IP Investment Promotion IPA Pre-Accession Assistance JEU Joint Evaluation Unit JRC Joint Research Centre LICs Local Information Commission


Final Report July 2011 Page iv

M&E Monitoring & Evaluation MDGs Millennium Development Goals MEDA Instrument of economic and financial cooperation under the Euro-

Mediterranean partnership MEP Member of Parliament MICs Monitoring and Information Centre MS Member State MTR Mid-Term Review NA Not Applicable NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NRM Natural resource management NSA Non-State Actor ODA Official Development Assistance OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OJ Office Journal of the European Communities OSA On-site assistance and design safety PCA Partnership and Co-operation Agreement PCD Policy Coherence for Development PCM Project Cycle Management PEGASE Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion de l'Aide Socio-Economique NIP National Indicative Programme RIP Regional Indicative Programme PKO Peace keeping operations PMU Programme Management Unit PR Progress Report PRSPs Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers RG Reference Group RWM Radioactive waste management and safeguards SEC Secretariat of the Council of the European Union SIGMA Support for Improvement in Governance and Management SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises SQ Study Question TACIS Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States TAIEX Technical Assistance and Information Exchange TDCA Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement TEC Treaty establishing the European Community TEU Treaty on European Union TORs Terms of Reference UN United Nations WTO World Trade Organisation


Final Report July 2011 Page 1

1 INTRODUCTION: THE INTERVENTION LOGICS FOR THE LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

This second Volume of the final report relates to the analysis made of the 6 Council regulations describing the legal instruments, and subsequent analysis of ex-ante impact assessments, the initial proposals of the EC on the legal instrument and other documents such as Annual Action Plans for the implementation of the instrument. The analysis of the regulations (Phase 1 of this Study) resulted in faithful intervention logics, which were constructed and discussed with the Reference Group (RG) during the inception phase of this study. The analysis of complementary documents with the aim of ‘reconstructing’ the intervention logics (Phase 2 of this Study) was taken forward and subsequently discussed with the RG during the desk phase of this study. While the key findings and implications of these two Phases for the Study are summarised in Volume 1, this current Volume presents the more detailed findings, results, and analysis of both Phases 1 and 2 of the study so as to allow the reader to find additional information.



2 PHASE 1 : CONSTRUCTING THE FAITHFUL INTERVENTION LOGICS

The Study Team proceeded to the analysis of the Regulations of the legal instruments and sought to summarise these in what were termed ‘faithful’ intervention logics (IL) in that they kept to the elements available in the regulations. A standard format for these ILs was proposed and then used for all. Individual team members who had most knowledge of the instrument in question prepared an initial draft and then a second draft based on comments provided by the team member with most knowledge of the IL approach. These second drafts were then all systematically reviewed by two team members for quality and for consistency in presentation. The RG meeting suggested the use of a standardised terminology in the ILs in order to ensure a common understanding of what is implied. The Study Team therefore adopted the definitions as provided in ‘Evaluating EU Activities: A Practical Guide for Commission Services’, DG Budget, July 2004 and rechecked the ILs accordingly.

Table 1: Key evaluation terms for the intervention logic (DG Budget 2004)

Concept Definition

Outputs What is directly produced/supplied through the implementation process. Indicators at this level are called output indicators. i.) what should be delivered, and ii.) at what time

Results Immediate or initial effect Intermediate impacts Outcome of an intervention Global impacts Longer-term effects / outcomes of an intervention In addition to the definitions above, the term ‘activities’ as opposed to inputs was used, even though this is not defined in the DG Budget list. ‘Activities’ were defined as the areas of interventions of the instrument targeted at achieving the global impact. After examining the possible alternatives this choice was discussed and agreed in consultation with the JEU. The rationale for this choice is first that the level of documents being analysed, that of legal instrument rather than policy papers, strategy papers or programme documents, means that only certain types of steps in the logical chain appear. Second the purpose of these intervention logics is simply to understand the basic logic of each instrument and none of them specify anything that could realistically be called inputs. However they do typically list a series of areas of possible interventions that the Commission can undertake in seeking to achieve the desired global impact of the instrument and it is useful for the clarity of the logic to represent these in the diagram.

2.1 Step 1: Analysis of the Legal Instruments / Intervention Logic Diagrams

2.1.1 Development Cooperat ion Instrument (DCI)

In 2004 the Commission made a proposal to establish a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation (DCECI), in the broader context of the restructuring of Community instruments to implement external assistance under the 2007-2013 financial perspectives. A new framework for planning and delivering assistance was proposed in order to make the Community's external assistance more effective. With the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENPI) already in place this would be the third general, geographic instrument providing direct support for European Union´s external policies, besides of thematic instruments such as the instrument for stability (IfS) and humanitarian aid.



The Commission’s initial proposal for a Regulation establishing the DCECI was the largest, in both funding and scope, of the four new external aid instruments proposed by the Commission. The regulation as such did not exist before, and in the initial proposal it is stated that this instrument would made it necessary to repeal 16 Regulations, by 1 January 2007.1 The initial DCECI was meant as the cornerstone of the new external financing instruments. It covered not only cooperation with all developing countries, including the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, but also with industrialised countries. For this reason the initial Commission proposal had a double legal base, Articles 181A and 179 TEC, the latter bringing the proposal under the co-decision procedure pursuant to Article 251 TEC (Bartelt, 2008: 657).2 The DCECI also included thematic initiatives like environment, human and social development, migration and asylum, human rights and democracy, food security and non-state actors. The objective of this instrument was to have been “support for development cooperation, economic cooperation, financial cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation and any form of cooperation with countries, territories and regions that are not Community Member States and are not eligible for Community aid under the IPA or the ENPI instruments, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can, by reason of the scale of the action, be better achieved by the Community” (EC, 2004: 12). The European Parliament Committee on Development (2005), using its legal powers under the co-decision procedure, unanimously rejected the proposed regulation in the 1st reading. 3 Its

1 The following regulations were repealed by the DCI (a) No 1568/2003 of 15 July 2003 on aid to fight poverty diseases (HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria) in developing countries, (b) No 1567/2003 of 15 July 2003 on aid for policies and actions on reproductive and sexual health and rights in developing

countries, (c) No 2493/2000 of 7 November 2000 on measures to promote the full integration of the environmental dimension in the

development process of developing countries, (d) No 2494/2000 of 7 November 2000 on measures to promote the conservation and sustainable management of tropical

forests and other forests in developing countries, (e) No 975/1999 of 29 April 1999 laying down the requirements for the implementation of development cooperation which

contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms,

(f) No 806/2004 of 21 April 2004 on promoting gender equality in development cooperation, (g) No 1659/98 of 17 July 1998 on decentralised cooperation, amended and extended by Nos 995/2002 and 625/2004, (h) No 1658/98 of 17 July 1998 on co-financing operations with European non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in fields of

interest to the developing countries, (i) No 1292/96 of 27 June 1996 on food-aid policy and food-aid management and special operations in support of food security,

amended by No 1726/2001 of 23 July 2001 amending Article 21 of No 1292/96 on food aid policy and food-aid management and special operations in support of food security,

(j) No 382/2001 of 26 February 2001 concerning the implementation of projects promoting cooperation and commercial relations between the European Union and the industrialised countries of North America, the Far East and Australasia and repealing No 1035/1999,

(k) No 1726/2000 of 29 June 2000 on development cooperation with South Africa, (l) No 443/92 of 25 February 1992 (ALA) on financial and technical assistance to, and economic cooperation with, the

developing countries in Asia and Latin America, (m) No 2258/96 of 22 November 1996 on rehabilitation and reconstruction operations in developing countries, (n) No 2130/2001 of 29 October 2001 on operations to aid uprooted people in Asian and Latin American developing countries, (o) No 550/97 of 24 March 1997 on HIV/AIDS-related operations in developing countries and (p) No 1484/97 of 22 July 1997 on aid for population policies and programmes in developing countries 2 Under the co-decision procedure the Parliament is on the same footing as the Council as Community legislator. This procedure

considerably increased the legislative powers of the Parliament insofar as the proposed act is deemed not to have been adopted if it rejects the common position of the Council by absolute majority in second reading (Bartelt, 2008).

3 In 2005 the Committee on Development rejected the Commission proposal and asked for a new proposal taking into account the Parliament’s concerns. The main concern was the far-reaching political and budgetary management consequences of establishing a single financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation (DCECI) which would replace 16 existing regulations. The DCECI would be merging together in an unnatural alliance two policy domains (economic cooperation and development cooperation) with quite distinct finalities and work methods, to the detriment of development cooperation. Also the marginalisation of the role and the powers of Parliament (proposed procedures) were seen as a problem (Committee on Development, 2005). Other comments include the Commission has greatly diluted the development focus of the Regulation. The absence of a policy in what is said to be a policy-driven instrument, policy objectives were lacking and a reference to the DPS, which was being revised at that time. The EC Treaty provides the basis



main concern was the far-reaching political and budgetary management consequences of establishing a single financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation (DCECI), which would replace 16 existing regulations. MEPs also argued that the EU's development policy should preserve its independence and not become part of economic cooperation. Moreover, the Committee argued that this regulation would result in combining two policy areas with separate goals, which could be to the detriment of development cooperation. MEPs further argued that the regulation would undermine Parliament's powers, since it would give extensive powers of implementation to the Commission and Council, at the expense of the Parliament's legislative and budgetary powers. The European Parliament also wished to transform the proposed Regulation into a procedural instrument and favoured policy priorities being established by separate co-decided Regulations (Council, 2006). The Council for its part decided in December 2005 that the EDF should not be included in the EU budget thereby removing another part of the proposed coverage of the new instrument. The following months a number of trilateral meetings (European Parliament, Council, and Commission) took place to discuss the new instruments and the DCECI in particular. During these meetings, the European Parliament strongly argued for a separate regulation, as opposed to a thematic programme, given the special character of EU action on democracy and human rights (Bartelt, 2008: 659). The trilateral discussions led to some progress on several important issues, namely: expiry clause, review clause and the legal base for the Instrument for Stability. In March 2006 the Committee on Development approved the proposal as amended (Committee on Development, 2006a, 2006b).4 But, unlike the Committee on Development, both the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on International Trade were of the opinion that both economic cooperation and development cooperation should be part of the same regulation.

for a separate development policy for developing countries while the DCECI fails to distinguish between developing and industrialised countries and giving the EC the space to the Commission to carry out any action not covered by the other regulations. There is no need to have an "economic and development instrument" to facilitate economic actions in developing countries as the Commission clearly considerd that the development legal base is appropriate for actions in the economic sphere in developing countries. The proposed regulation failed to meet considerations with regard to transparency and democratic oversight. The given objective was a non-exhaustive list giving, in very general terms, a non-exhaustive list of sectors which may be supported, not mentioning the MDGs. And with such a broad objective decisions on sectors to be supported could be made without need to refer to Parliament. The financial envelope does not earmark funds for specific policy objectives, and the only specific envelope mentioned is that corresponding to the EDF, for ACP countries, as it allows for fungibility it is not possible to separate the financial allocation for development from that for other objectives, notably economic policy objectives. Finally it mixes objectives and policies (including encouraging trade between the European Community and industrialised countries, managing asylum and migration flows, as well as counter-terrorism measures, mentioned several times in the Legislative Financial Statement and therefore presumably covered by "inter alia" in the legal text).

4 The main amendments included: Removal of ‘economic cooperation’ from the title of the instrument Removal of all references to non-developing / industrialised countries and accentuation of development cooperation policy. -Add the need for an additional instrument for the promotion and protection of democracy and human rights. -Add the essential economic and trade-related dimension of development policy -Add references to gender equality, human rights and other universal values the EU stands for -Add references to (elements of) the European Consensus on Development -Add references to EC Treaty texts and OECD as EC is a member of the OECD -Instead of ensuring effective bridging between operations financed from different EC financing instruments, it now refers only

to humanitarian reconstruction and long-term development assistance. -Adding that accompanying measures for sugar protocol countries are to be financed through the DCECI -Adding the requirement for a development impact assessment for all measures financed under this regulation. -And several additions to ensure the power of the EP to exercise its democratic role in the policy-making procedure of

establishing priorities and allocating funds to concrete programs.



An exchange of letters between President Barroso and President Borrell in June 2006 finally paved the way for an overall agreement on the package of external instruments including a separate Human Rights Instrument and a new architecture involving a maximum of three instruments out of the DCECI (Industrialised Countries Instrument (ICI), a geographic Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and possibly a thematic DCI) (EC, 2006). In the same month, following earlier actions from the European Parliament, the EC presented a proposal for a new regulation that would continue the EIDHR as a separate instrument, as described in more detail in the relevant section in this report. President Barroso’s letter indicated that the Commission would accept splitting the DCECI, providing that a broad definition of development cooperation would be ensured. The DCI would contain an indicative financial breakdown as well as increased policy content regarding geographic and thematic programmes to address Parliament’s main concern that its powers as co-legislator should be fully respected. After further tripartite discussions between the Parliament’s DEVE negotiating team, the Presidency and the Commission in August and September 2006, an agreement was reached on a negotiated common position. To avoid going into conciliation, the Council already included large parts of the Parliament’s amendments in its common position, so that the latter could approve it in second reading without further amendments (Bartelt, 2008: 660). Compromise was reached on the outstanding issues which had previously been defined by Parliament as ‘breaking points’ and relate to eligibility of assistance as Official Development Assistance (ODA), sectoral spending targets, the structure of the thematic programmes and the dialogue with the Parliament on the draft programming documents. One of the compromises reached was the inclusion of specific articles on thematic programmes to add policy content in response to Parliament’s request for better defined policy priorities in the form of policy setting regulations and additional articles with policy content were added for the implementation of the geographic programmes (Bartelt, 2008: 661, 664). This negotiated common position, which was adopted by the Council on 16 October 2006, was approved by Parliament’s DEVE committee on 3 October (EC, 2006). The negotiated common position (EC, 2006) reflected the following key elements: • A separate instrument for democracy and human rights and a separate instrument for

cooperation with industrialised countries • A single legal basis, Article 179 • Increased focus on development of objectives and principles • Articles have been included to add policy content to geographic cooperation and thematic

programmes in response to Parliament’s request for policy setting regulations. • The Sugar Protocol ACP countries article reflects the existing Regulation 266/2006

establishing accompanying measures for Sugar Protocol countries affected by the reform of the EU sugar regime.

• Detailed provisions with regard to programming and the allocation of funds. • Reporting and evaluation: Evaluation and reporting will have an increased focus on social

sectors and on progress made towards achieving the MDGs. The implementation of geographic and thematic programmes will be evaluated where appropriate by means of independent external evaluations.

The Council’s position of 23 October 2006 indicates that the EU ministers shared some of the European Parliament’s concerns such as the lack of policy content in the initial Commission



proposal. The Council took a different route in order to preserve its legislative powers. Rather than reducing the initial Commission proposal to a procedural instrument, requiring the Commission to make use of its right of initiative to present proposals for additional policy regulations, the Council felt that it would be more appropriate to introduce policy content in the provisions of the Regulation. Therefore, Articles 5 to 10 of the Common Position set the policy for geographical programmes, while Articles 11 to 16 provide for the content of thematic programmes. Also the inclusion of the indicative financial breakdown was a response to the shared concern with the European Parliament of the need for greater involvement of both Institutions in resource allocation (Council, 2006). On 17 October 2006 the GAERC approved regulations providing the legal basis for spending as from 1 January 2007 under the EU's new financial framework in a financing instrument for development cooperation, with nearly EUR 17 billion for seven years (GAERC, 2006). Interventions are planned at two mutually-reinforcing levels. The first is geographic, covering Asia, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and South Africa, the second thematic, enabling regional programmes to be reinforced in response to specific needs, such as migration, education, and health. ACP countries can also benefit from the thematic programmes, and a specific amount is earmarked for ACP countries that need assistance in adjusting to the effects of the EU's sugar sector reform. Moreover, the DCI allows for a simplified system by replacing a series of existing instruments by a single financing instrument, enabling all EU interventions to be decided on the basis of the same principles and to follow a simpler decision-making procedure. In December 2006 the Committee on Development (2006c) approved the amended Commission proposal. Important elements incorporated at the request of the EC are the time-limited legislation, a specific instrument for development policy, a separate Instrument for Human Rights, a single legal base for development, policymaking by co-decision, more detailed financial provisions. The Committee highlighted that the regulation for the first time enshrines in legal text the internationally-accepted definition of development policy set by the OECD Development Assistance Committee, and further referred to the agreement on spending targets attached to DCI, the democratic scrutiny of programming documents and the increased role for Parliament in the mid-term review (Committee on Development, 2006c).

The DCI Intervention Logic

The faithful Intervention Logic for the DCI reflects the logic of the longest regulation text of all six instruments covered by this study. Using up 30 pages of the Official EU Journal, and containing Articles such as nr. 5 which includes specific planned impacts that list from A to Z, it is perhaps no surprise that the Intervention Logic diagram is rather full and does not contain clear gaps between the different components. The instrument also has a high coverage of different developing countries and regions, given that its geographic programmes cover four regions and one additional country (South-Africa), while its thematic programmes can be implemented in all developing countries. In accordance with the principle of a differentiated approach allowing for tailor-made cooperation (while ensuring consistency with the overall objective in Article 2), the regulation’s text reflects a need for sufficient degrees of flexibility in programming and implementation. Given its wide palette of objectives and expected results, and by including both a geographic and thematic instrument, there is in fact a relative high room to manoeuvre in the implementation phase, while at the same time the document does feature a rather clear hierarchy of objectives with regionally disaggregated results. One issue however is that these results (as well as the



specific impacts to which these are required to contribute) do not at all reflect SMART principles and on paper resemble actions or a ‘focus/direction’ rather than results per sé.

Relationship of the DCI with Other Regulations:

When comparing the DCI Intervention Logic with those prepared for the other five instruments, a number of overlaps emerge: • Most clear of all, there is an overlap with the EIDHR. Given that democracy, good

governance, and respect for human rights and the rule of law appear in the overall objective (and hence ‘global impacts’ of the Intervention Logic), the document still resembles its original intention to include the EIDHR among the other thematic programmes. In fact, the regulation includes frequent references to democracy (8 times), good governance (9 times), human rights (15 times) and the rule of law (9 times).

• Given that the original proposal from the Commission reflected a combination of ODA and non-ODA sources, the regulation also has important interrelations with the higher income countries instrument. In fact, the two instruments may often be used in middle-income countries, which reflects the EC’s push for a more elaborate and synergetic ‘policy mix’, and general principle 2 (Art 3) indicates that many of the lower middle income countries face problems similar to those of low income countries.

• Finally, a number of the interventions financed under the DCI’s thematic programmes (especially investing in people, non-state actors and environment) as implemented in ENPI countries may overlap with the geographic programmes implemented in these countries.

• Finally, Article 13(2)(e) which describes the thematic programme on energy refers to “the replacement of especially damaging energy sources by others which are less so” can be seen as implicitly linked with the instrument for nuclear safety.

2.1.2 European Neighbourhood Pol i cy Instrument (ENPI)

The European Council identified the enlargement of the European Union in 2002 as an opportunity to further the relations with the EU’s neighbours based on shared political and economic values, to contribute to avoiding new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new EU borders. The European Neighbourhood Policy was developed to address these objectives. It applies to the EU's immediate neighbours by land or sea – Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. Although Russia is also a neighbour of the EU, relations are instead developed through a Strategic Partnership covering four “common spaces”. The ENP was first outlined in a Commission Communication on Wider Europe in March 2003, followed by a more developed Strategy Paper on the European Neighbourhood Policy published in May 2004. The latter sets out in concrete terms, how the EU proposes to work more closely with the neighbouring countries. As part of its report on implementation, in December 2006, the Commission made proposals as to how the policy could be further strengthened. The instrument to support the implementation of priorities defined in the ENP Action Plans (as well as the Strategic Partnership with Russia) is the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The Council Regulation 1638/2006 from 24 October 2006 (hereafter the ENPI Regulation) lays down the provisions for the establishment of the ENPI. ENPI is the instrument for the implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). For the



budgetary period (2007-2013), approximately €12 billion are made available by EC to support ENP priorities via ENPI. The ENPI Council Regulation replaces the Regulation E1762/92 (Mediterranean non-EU members, June 1992), the Regulation 1734/94 ( Gaza and West Bank, July 1994), the Regulation 1488/96 (so called MEDA, July 1996). It also replaces the Regulation 99/2000 (so-called TACIS, eastern Europe and Central Asia, December 1999) that expired in December. The ENPI Council Regulation is largely based on the Commission Strategy Paper of 2004.

The ENPI Policy Framework

The policy framework of the ENP underpins the implementation framework for the ENPI. The instrument also identifies the European Community Development Policy (European Consensus on Development, December 2005) as another point of reference. Further, as the partner countries pertain to different regions, the ENPI Regulation lays down a general principle of coherence between ENP and European strategies for each region:

• The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership

• The Eastern Partnership (December 2008) (however this is not mentioned in the ENPI regulation from 2006,

• the Northern Dimension (EU- Russia, Norway, Iceland)

• the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership • the EU Strategy for Africa (for

Mediterranean Partner countries of Northern Africa)

The ENPI Intervention Logic

In constructing the intervention logic diagram of the ENPI regulation it was found that

• Impacts are well described in the Regulation (in the form of objectives). • Global Objectives are listed in the form of areas of intervention. • No tangible outputs are listed. • The means are described at length, both in their nature (action programmes, strategies) and

implementation method (programmes, projects, investment funds, etc.) • Particular importance is given to one of the underlying strategy, namely the Cross Border

Cooperation, which is implemented through Joint Action programmes. Within these, the Community assistance benefits directly not only Partner countries but also Member States.

• Important overarching principles underpin the Intervention Logic: o Partnership and Joint Ownership principle, which we place in the impact section o Complementarity with other policies implemented through other regulations, which

we place both in the expected results and activities sections.

Figure 1: Overlapping partnerships



o Need for one single instrument replacing several existing ones to ensure coherence and simplifying programming and management, which we place in the activities section.

Relationship of the ENPI with Other Regulations

• The need to ensure coherence between the assistance provided under the ENPI Regulation and others including the EIB is underlined (art. 5 . 2), and in particular:

o Euratom (Art 7.5) o Instrument for Stability (Art. 7.5)

• No other Regulations are explicitly mentioned but the need to ensure coherence with the EIDHR can be derived from the overarching principle of commitment to common values.

2.1.3 European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)

The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) was established by Regulation No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006. The Instrument, which aims at promoting democratic values and human rights worldwide, came into force in January 2007 and will expire in 31 December 2013.5 It replaces the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, which expired in 31 December 2006. The EIDHR benefits from a financial envelop totalling € 1.104 Million.6 The EIDHR – the instrument – differs from the EIDHR - the Initiative – in that it no longer focuses on the promotion of conflict prevention. In its initial proposal for the Regulation establishing the DCECI, which it submitted to the Parliament and the Council in September 2004, the Commission proposed that the new DCECI would repeal Council Regulation (EC) No 975/1999 of 29 April 1999 laying down the requirements for the implementation of development cooperation which contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms (European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights).7 The main motivation for such proposal was to attempt to rationalise the number of thematic programmes.8 However, the European Parliament rejected this proposal. Following intense discussions the instrument was eventually established to operate independently whilst continuing to complement and reinforce related Community instruments for external assistance, the Partnership Agreement between Members of the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group and the European Community and its member states as well as humanitarian aid.9

5 Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on establishing a

financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide, Official Journal of the European Union 29 December 2006

6 Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on establishing a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide, Art. 21, Official Journal of the European Union 29 December 2006,

7 Proposal of the Commission on the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation, COM (2004), 629, 29 September 2004 8 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on External Actions through Thematic Programmes under the Future Financial Perspectives 2007-2013, COM 2005 (324) Final, pg 2 9 Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on establishing a

financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide, Preamble, Official Journal of the European Union 29 December 2006



The EIDHR Intervention Logic

In constructing the intervention logic for the EIDHR regulation it was found that the: • The Principles are related to the broader principles as enshrined in the European Consensus

on Development and the Treaty of the European Union. • Impacts are well described in the Regulation. • The outputs are not defined in the Regulation • The results, with the exception of one result, are clearly linked to the activities that are

planned to be undertaken under the instrument

Relationship of the EIDHR with Other Regulations

The need to ensure complementarity with other Community Instruments (Preamble, par. 10, 11, 12) as well as principles (Preamble, par. 6), including: the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, the Development Cooperation Instrument, the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries and High Income Countries and Territories, the Instrument for Stability and other thematic programmes.

2.1.4 Instrument for Stabi l i ty (I fS)

Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2006 established an Instrument for Stability (IfS).10 The date of entry into force was 14/12/2006 on the 20th day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union and it applies from 1 January 2007 to 31st of December 2013. The IfS has a financial envelope of €2,062 million for this period. A number of EC Regulations were repealed by the coming into force of the Instrument for Stability (see Article 26). Specifically regulations repealed covered: aid to uprooted people in Asia and Latin America; anti-personnel mines; support to UN mission in Kosovo and High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina; north-south cooperation in the campaign against drugs and drug addiction and rehabilitation and reconstruction.11 Yet the IfS’ most relevant predecessor that was repealed is the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) which existed from 26 February 2001 to 31st of December 2006 (Council Regulation (EC) No 381/2001). The Instrument for Stability builds on, and is related to, but is quite different from the Rapid Reaction Mechanism. The RRM was not a financial instrument in its own right, but rather provided for a mechanism aiming to accelerate a number of other financial instruments (which were listed in the annex of its regulation No 381/2001). There were intense negotiations between the Council, Commission and Parliament over the Instrument for Stability from the time when the initial proposal was put forward by the Commission in 2004 up to its adoption in 2006. An important difference to the RRM is that the IfS was established under the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) Articles 179(1) (development cooperation with developing countries) and 181a (economic, financial and technical cooperation with industrialized countries)

10 Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 15 November 2006 establishing an

Instrument for Stability. 11 Ibid, Article 26.



acting in accordance with Article 251 rather than the RRM that was established under Article 308. The initial proposal from the Commission for IfS was based on Article 308.12 This article allows for greater flexibility in the Commission working with the Council but only a consultative role for the Parliament. The initial proposal also mentions Article 203 establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The original argumentation from the Commission was that TEC Article 179 and 181a and were insufficient to justify the financing of peace-keeping (hence the necessity for TEC Article 308 or to cover nuclear safety (hence the inclusion of Article 203 of the Euratom Treaty). The Parliament reacted to the initial proposal and in the negotiating process with the Council and the Commission it was agreed to use TEC Articles 179(1) and 181a in accordance with Article 251 which gave the Parliament more powers than the consultative process accorded to it under Article 308. As previously noted the initial proposal from the Commission had two important objectives that were not included in the final legislation for the Instrument for Stability.13 The first proposal not to be included in the final version was a specific objective for the IfS to promote nuclear safety and the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This was removed and a separate legal instrument the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation based on Article 203 of the Euratom treaty was created.14 Yet the IfS did retain a specific aspect to address, “risk mitigation and preparedness relating to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or agents” (Article 4 (2)). The second specific objective initially proposed but that was not included in the final regulation was on “Special provisions applicable to peace-support operations” specifically the “development of peace-keeping and peace-support capacity”15. The removal of references to peace-keeping and peace-support as was agreed in the final trilateral negotiations did raise some criticism from certain sections of the European Commission and European Parliament. Yet the IfS retained a commitment to support “non-military technical cooperation to strengthen overall civilian control, and oversight over the security system” (Article 3 (2) (c)), and also, “financial and technical assistance for the implementation of those Recommendations made by the UN Peacebuilding Commission falling within the objectives of Community cooperation policy” (Article 4 (3)). A further contextual background to the negotiations for this financial instrument is that it took place at the time of a pending case taken by the Commission against the Council to the European Court of Justice around competence in small arms and light weapons (SALW). The final ruling of the case was on the 28th of May 200816 so well after the entry into force of the IfS. Apart from a different legal basis and enlarged focus the IfS differs from its predecessor the RRM in two important ways. Firstly the temporal basis of RRM actions was limited to 6 months only (whereas even short-term measures of the IfS can be 18 months with an extension to 24 months in exceptional circumstances). The IfS also has a significant component dedicated to longer-term capacity building. Second difference was the financial resources, the resources

12 European Commission 2004, Proposal for a regulation of the Council establishing an Instrument for Stability, Brussels 13 European Commission, 2004, Proposal for a regulation of the Council establishing an Instrument for Stability, Brussels 14 See separate note on this instrument for further background 15 European Commission, 2004, Proposal for a regulation of the Council establishing an Instrument for Stability, Brussels 16 The final ruling settled on by the Court provided for a broader basis for work in the SALW area than that agreed by the

Council and the EP in the IfS in 2006; see Judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-91/05 Commission v Council <http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2009-03/cp080031en.pdf>



accessed through the RRM were around €30 million a year17, while the IfS was significantly larger and had a dedicated financial envelope of €2,062 million for period 2007 – 2013 (making a potential average of €294 million a year).

The IfS Intervention Logic and Relationship with Other Instruments

The global impact the Instrument for Stability is designed to make a contribution to conflict prevention and the promotion of stable conditions for development and human rights, democracy and fundamental freedoms. The IfS is essentially split into two parts, firstly: a short-term rapid response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis to contribute to stability, and secondly a longer term element to help build capacity to address specific global and transregional threats. These two elements link to their own cluster of specific results, outputs, and to a certain extent activities that are managed in different ways and have a clear preference for the amount of priorities. Important principles underpin the IfS at all stages. Assistance under the IfS is only to be provided to the extent that an adequate response cannot be provided by other community instruments. It is also required to be complementary to other humanitarian aid and long-term cooperation instruments. It is designed to be flexible in its approach to decision-making and budget allocation yet consistent with the community’s overall strategic policy framework for any given country. In context of crisis it is supposed to provide a ‘bridging’ between different community instruments.

Relationship of the IfS with Other Regulations

The principles raised in the previous paragraph are important in understanding the coherence, complementarity and synergy of the IfS with different instruments. Parts of activities, outputs and the global goal referred to in the IfS can be found in other instruments (particularly DCI, ENPI, EIDHR, Nuclear Safety Cooperation) or are heavily inferred by them. Specifically there is some overlap with the instrument of Nuclear Safety Cooperation in outputs and intermediary results (preamble, 1 art and 2) in both outputs and results in IfS art 4, 2. The EIDHR in outputs (art 2) and IfS (art 3, 2) and the global impact IfS (preamble 2, 1) and EIDHR (preamble 4). In the case of the DCI there is a direct overlap from the impacts (art 5 w-z) and IfS outputs (article 3,2) there is also again overlap in the global impacts of the DCI (art 2) and the IfS (pre 2 and 1). In the case of activities and outputs of ENPI and similar to those of IfS (art 1, and art 4) including IfS results (art 4 (1), (2), (3)). Yet it is the quick and flexible response and global and trans-regional capacity building element that are unique to the IfS – as is its “bridging” role that seeks to “help establish or re-establish the conditions for the community’s development and cooperation policies.” In this sense it is the principles, method and approach, which is the added value of the IfS rather than the uniqueness of activities, outputs or global impact per se. Therefore the success of the IfS delivering on its global impact is by explicit design, dependent on how it links to and is complementary to other community instruments that allow for a comprehensive “preventative” and integrated approach.

17 Ganzle, S. 2009. Coping with the ‘Security-Development Nexus’: The European Community’s Instrument for Stability –

Rationale and Potential, German Development Institute, Bonn, p. 6.



2.1.5 Instrument for Cooperat ion with Industr ia l i sed Countr ies (ICI)

The financing Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised and other High-Income Countries and Territories (ICI) entered into force in December 2006. The instrument repealed Council Regulation (EC) No 382/2001 concerning the implementation of projects promoting cooperation and commercial relations between the EU and the industrialized countries of North America, the Far East and Australasia18. The ICI was created after a long negotiation between Council, Commission and Parliament on the simplification of external relations instruments. a) The initial Commission proposal for a Development Cooperation and Economic

Cooperation Instrument (DCECI) proposed a double legal basis: Article 179 TEC (development cooperation with developing countries) and Article 181a TEC (economic, financial and technical cooperation with industrialized countries). This would allow the European Community to support both development policy and all forms of cooperation (economic, financial and technical) with developing countries, countries in transition and industrialized countries under one single instrument.

b) The European Parliament rejected this proposal after the first reading for two main reasons.

First, it was argued that the DCECI unnaturally merged together two distinct policy domains - economic cooperation and development cooperation. In the view of Parliament, this ran against the principles laid down in the EC Treaty and the Draft Constitution, which provide the basis for a separate development policy for developing countries. Second, the DCECI marginalized the role of the European Parliament as it did not recognize the legislative authority’s right to set spending targets. In addition, as the DCECI did not earmark funds for specific policy objectives, Parliament was concerned that development funds would actually be directed towards economic cooperation with industrialized countries. Consequently, Parliament proposed to delete relations with industrialized countries from the Regulation. Parliament argued that even if the new Article 181a TEC on economic cooperation would be required for economic actions in developing countries, nothing would prevent the Commission from proposing separate instruments for developing and industrialised countries19.

c) After the vote at first reading, intensive discussions between the three institutions took place

in order to find a solution. The negotiated common position included the provision for a separate instrument for cooperation with industrialized countries, finding its legal basis in Article 181a TEC, and meaning that financial support via this instrument does not count as ODA. It also included agreement on the Development Cooperation Instrument and ensured that Parliament’s co-decision powers were fully safeguarded20.

The ICI Intervention Logic

The Regulation provides for fairly simple programming and implementation modalities. The

18 Regulation EC No382/2001 covered relations – namely economical - with the United States of America, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia and New Zealand only. The ICI broadened the geographic scope to include high-income countries of the Gulf region (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) and high-income countries in East Asia (Brunei, Chinese Taipei, Hong-Kong, Macao, Singapore). 19 See report by Gay Mitchell, Committee of Development, on Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the

Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation, 21st March 2005. 20 Note from Presidency to Permanent Representative Committee on ‘Community Instruments for external assistance – outcome

of the trialogue and way forward’, Brussels June 2006.



Commission draws multiannual cooperation programmes setting out Community’s strategic interests and priorities, general objectives and expected results. Multiannual cooperation programmes are to be implemented through annual action programmes, specifying fields of intervention, the management procedures and the operations to be financed. The intervention logic is driven by numerous general principles: subsidiarity and complementarity, a differentiated approach for each partner, and promotion of important European values such as democracy, rule of law and respect of human rights. The Regulation defines a broad scope of cooperation with ICI, identified as important partners and players in multilateral fora and global governance. Cooperation covers economic, commercial, academic, cultural and other exchanges between a diversified range of actors at different levels: bilateral, regional and multilateral. It also covers actions that promote awareness on and visibility of the EU in ICI countries. At the output level, the logic is not clear in the Regulation but rather depends on the content of the respective annual action programmes. By leaving this question to another process it is not possible to judge from the Regulation what the precise intention was. Moreover, the annual plans vary from one year to the next. It is therefore not possible at this stage to judge how far the outputs will de facto be able to link to the global objectives and results. This should become clearer in later phases of the study. The Regulation is also quite strong in defending the added value of a single instrument for diversified bilateral cooperation (economy of scale, greater efficiency and EU visibility). It is surprising that similar intermediary impacts are not defined for the regional and multilateral level, as this weakens the links with global impacts. Finally, it is unclear whether visibility of the EU will result naturally from cooperation activities and how it will contribute to the global impact. As mentioned above the ICI was basically carved out of the DCECI and does not seem to overlap with the geographic scope of other instruments – except for two countries (Oman and Saudi Arabia), which are covered by both the ICI and the DCI. Thematically the ICI shares the global objective of consolidating or promoting democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms in partner countries with the DCI, the EIDHR, and the IfS,. However, apart from the application of the general principles it remains unclear how the proposed intervention logic will directly contribute to this common global impact.

2.1.6 Instrument for Nuclear Safe ty Cooperat ion (INSC)

The instrument was first proposed by the Commission as part of the proposed new Instrument for Stability21 but ultimately it was established as a separate instrument in its own right with the regulation being published in the Official Journal22 on 22 March 2007 to apply as from 1 January 2007 along with the other new instruments. Bartelt23 explains that the decision to split them into two arose out of the Parliament’s wish to have co-decision control over the IfS which meant it had to be based on a different treaty article than that proposed by the Commission. The Parliament was however happy to see the INSC based on the Euratom Treaty (Article 203).

21 European Commission, 29.9.2004, Proposal for a Regulation of the Council establishing an Instrument of Stability,

2004/0223(CNS) 22 Council Regulation (Euratom) No 300/2007 of 19 February 2007 establishing an Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation,

OJ of the EU, 22.3.2007, OJ L 81/1 23 Bartelt, S. 2008. The Institutional Interplay Regarding the New Architeccture for the EC’s External Assistance, European Law

Journal, Vol 14, pp.659-679, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford.



From the start the Preamble of the Regulation situates the INSC clearly in the new framework of instruments for the external assistance aspects of the EU for the financial perspectives of 2007 to 2013. The instrument is described as a complementary instrument to the others with global coverage in all third countries with whom the EU seeks to cooperate on the promotion of nuclear safety. It clearly is intended for use with the EU’s immediate neighbours with the second article of the preamble referring to the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 and how this incident highlighted the global importance of nuclear safety. But it is also clear that the INSC can be used further afield and to promote multilateral cooperation through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The INSC replaces (and repeals) previous Euratom regulations relating to the provision of assistance to states in Eastern Europe and Asia, and support to the Chernobyl Shelter Fund24. Beyond the Euratom Treaty the Preamble links the INSC both to the 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety and to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. It is thus intended to provide a legal base for spending in the discharge of the EU’s obligations under these international treaties. The Commission’s original proposal for the regulation indicated that the link between nuclear dafety and the IfS related to their wish to support work against the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) which involved not only nuclear but also chemical weapons. Ultimately the INSC however only focuses on nuclear safety and the IfS has retained the coverage for support to anti-terrorism work and work on the control of illicit trafficking in chemical, biological and indeed nuclear materials. The INSC therefore is clearly focussed on promoting cooperation on nuclear safety on an on-going basis and not on crisis measures, which come under the IfS.

The INSC Intervention Logic

The proposed intervention logic diagram for the INSC demonstrates that the Regulation is generally clear about where it wants to get to and about where to start from, but far less explicit about the path to achieve the desired impact. Thus on the right hand side of the diagram the impacts it seeks to achieve both at a global level (‘elimination of hazards to the public’ and ‘high level of nuclear safety worldwide’) and at an intermediary level (‘high level of nuclear safety radiation protection and application of efficient safeguards on nuclear materials in third countries’) are clearly spelt out. A number of mores specific results (e.g. ‘EU citizens are protected from radiation’, ‘nuclear accidents are prevented’, etc.) can also be deduced from the text. Starting at the other end of the logic (left of diagram) certain principles are stipulated in the Preamble. The Article 2 on Purpose lists a series of initiatives the INSC should support both in terms of promoting effective nuclear safety and establishing regulatory frameworks and systems, or again systems for the prevention of accidents and for the mitigation of consequences should they occur. Equally, a broad menu of different types of measures that can be taken or modalities to be used are authorised giving the Commission as implementing authority plenty of scope and space for the management of the instrument. Finally the Regulation indicates that the Commission should use various programming, management and financing procedures (strategy papers, indicative programmes, action

24 Council Regulation No 300/2007, Preamble paragraph 14



programmes, co-financing, etc.) but does not go further than that to say what it should programme in terms of actions or indeed achieve in terms of outputs. This is left to the discretion of the Commission as the implementing authority. This would seem to be an appropriate division of tasks and responsibilities as it should not be the role of the budgetary authority (Council and Parliament) to get involved in the daily management of execution. Accusations of micro-management by the legislator was precisely one of the criticisms the whole reform of the instruments for external assistance was intended to counter. The INSC Regulation is thus a fairly straightforward and simple regulation with a limited and well identified scope based on established experience in a well defined area. It has a specific legal base in the treaties that is not shared with the other instruments and it is clearly complementary to them in this respect. Its global geographic coverage (all third countries beyond the EU) and clearly defined and very specialist subject matter means that it is should combine easily with any of the geographic instruments or indeed thematic instruments. The fact that it focuses on medium and longer term actions rather than rapid response (as well as having a completely separate legal base) also means there is a clear dividing line between it and the IfS. Coherence, complementarity and synergies with the other instruments therefore appear relatively straightforward to assure. What is less immediately evident is whether in practice there are any gaps or overlaps between the INSC and the other instruments.

2.2 Step 2: Comparison of the Legal Instruments

The comparison of the faithful intervention logics of the instruments pointed to a number of findings. a. First it is quickly apparent that initially at least the regulations were written according to a

fairly standard format, which in turn results in often fairly similar IL diagrams that are strong in certain areas are weaker in others. Thus the identification of an overall objective or ‘global impact’ as well as a limited number of subsidiary or ‘intermediary impacts’ was relatively straightforward in all cases. The regulations also all define a number of general principles and while there is a certain similarity in these there are also areas of difference depending on the subject matter of the instrument. There is usually also a listing of the appropriate activities covered by the instrument and of the measures that can be taken or modalities the EC can use in order to achieve the objectives as specified. For most of the instruments these are enounced in a fairly open fashion given the Commission considerable room for manoeuvre. What is less clear in the regulations is the outputs expected and the results though these can often be deduced from the suggested activities. This is also not necessarily surprising given the role of the instruments and the need to allow sufficient lee way for proper management by those charged with the administration of the funds.

b. It is thus this middle ground between the activities and results that is left as the terrain on

which the Commission should devise appropriate implementation strategies. In the intervention logics however this appears as a visual ‘gap’ in the logic, given that the regulations generally do not specify how the activities are expected to translate into the desired results. Such gaps in the logic will mean that it is not entirely clear how the budgetary authority expected its instructions in the instruments to be carried out. But this is not necessarily negative in practice if the general logic is clear enough and gives sufficient guidance and enough flexibility for the executive branch to then devise appropriate strategies for the achievement of the objectives and the desired global impact. The intervention logics indicate that from one instrument to another a different balance between ‘prescription’ and



‘flexibility’ in the middle-level is achieved, which the study will further look into in its subsequent phases.

c. A more serious form of gap would be if the parameters provided by the activities and results

spelt out in the instrument were too restrictive to a degree that they actually hampered the proper administration of the funds and the achievement of the objectives of the instrument. For example one of the desired results of any of the instruments might be that the budgetary authority wanted to through one of the instruments to support multi-lateral organisations, but then the potential activities did not list grants to be made for supporting the operating costs of such organisations. The only form of support the Commission could then provide might be for project funds or capital costs depending what other activities were in the list. An examination of the intervention logics has however not revealed any such gaps.

d. For the purposes of analysis one obvious step is to divide the regulations into two broad

categories. Those which are primarily geographic in coverage (ENPI, ICI and DCI Geographic – logically one could add the EDF if it were also part of the budget) and those that are thematic (EIDHR, INSC, IfS and DCI Thematic), but interestingly this does not give rise to much difference in the layout of the regulation or the intervention logics. The DCI because it has both geographic and thematic elements is first divided on this basis but thereafter the logic is fairly consistent in both cases. In addition, the DCI shows some degree of hierarchy between both elements by stating that the thematic element will be subsidiary to the geographic element and that the former “(…) shall add value to and be additional to, and coherent with, actions funded under geographic programmes (Art 11).”

e. The geographic grouping of countries into particular instruments is also on the basis of a

certain thematic logic. Thus the ENPI covers all the EU’s neighbour countries. On the other hand both the groupings for the ICI and DCI are based on a simple developed/developing country split the criteria for which are provided by the UNCTAD list. Once in these groupings it is then assumed that the EU’s cooperation with them will exhibit common features and this inevitably implies a certain crudeness in the identification of type of measures that may or may not be appropriate for individual countries in each group. Thus, for instance, all cooperation with DCI countries is deemed to be oriented towards poverty eradication, although specific objectives are mentioned for the four regions and South Africa which are consistent with this overall objective. Ultimately one can imagine that this probably also leads to logical inconsistencies in the interventions implemented in individual countries, which in turn implies a certain flexibility is required in the way the instruments are finally used.

f. One key distinction between the instruments can however be made based on the guidance

the regulations provide on the ODA (Official Development Assistance) or non-ODA nature of the funding to be used. This is reflected in the intervention logics. Most of the regulations see to keep the two separate and not ‘mix’ ODA and non-ODA funding, even though they were adopted at a time when the Commission was emphasising the importance of a ‘policy mix’. Thus it is apparent that efforts have been made to keep the DCI, EIDHR and IfS strictly ODA-focused and the ICI and INSC instruments are strictly focus on non-ODA spending. Thus it is just the ENPI that presents the only real ‘mix’ of ODA and non-ODA. As a result, the strict ODA instruments show overall objectives that are closely tuned to the Union’s legal basis for development cooperation, while the other instruments are more focused towards external action objectives and/or show a wider orientation. The importance of the distinction between ODA and non-ODA funding is also shown in the interventions made by the EP and some Council members in relation to the original Commission



proposals, which were more focused on realising a practical mix or blending of ODA and non-ODA funding.

g. In terms of gaps and overlaps between the instruments the most obvious ones are in the

areas where the political negotiation over the creation of instruments resulted in a new instrument being created that was not in the Commission’s original proposal. The DCI can thus still cover a lot of work that can nominally now be done under the EIDHR and the IfS. Separating these two parts out from the original DCECI has thus not resulted in a very clear distinction particularly in the EIDHR case. However, the unique feature of the IfS is its rapid response capability and here at least there is a carefully thought through effort at synergy between the two instruments. The basis of the complementarity or synergy that is expected between the EIDHR and the DCI is however not apparent from the two regulations and this may therefore give rise to confusion that then has to be sorted out at the programming level.

h. In separating out the ICI from the DCI it becomes more difficult for the Commission to

support economic cooperation with DCI countries especially in the middle income countries in this group. This is due to the strictness of the distinction made between ODA and non-ODA funds coupled with the geographic coverage of some of the instruments which results in certain types of actions not necessarily being fundable in certain geographic areas. It would appear for instance that this created a gap between the DCI and ICI regulations that later had to be resolved with proposals for adapting the ICI instrument in 200925 (this will be followed up in the next phase of the study).

i. Lastly it would seem that the fairly narrow focus of the INSC and it precise objective should

mean that complementarities are relatively easy to work between its use and that of the three instruments whose geographic coverage it shares, the ENPI, ICI and DCI. What may be me harder to determine in practice is when to use the INSC with respect to the IfS as the latter does also cover nuclear safety in certain circumstances.

j. Another area of comparison is the degree of prescriptiveness in each instrument as

evidenced by the varying number of different activities and results listed in each diagram. One hypothesis for explaining this is that the diagrams where a lot of activities and results are listed (eg. the DCI or the IfS) are for the instruments where the Parliament was most wary of giving the Commission flexibility and wanted to retain as much oversight and control as possible. Conversely where there are less specifications one would assume that there was a higher degree of trust or that the subject matter of the instrument (eg. INSC) was fairly clearly defined and not subject to much debate or discussion. These variations may however also be explained by the level of pre-existing experience in the area and where a new instrument was replacing an existing instrument more or less one to one the past experience made it possible to write a degree of detail into the instrument more easily.

25 European Commission, 22 April 2009, Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1934/2006,

COM(2009) 197 final/2



3 PHASE 2 : ANALYZING THE RECONSTRUCTED INTERVENTION LOGICS

Part 1 of this Report aimed at constructing the intervention logic of the six legal instruments on the basis of a faithful reflection of the regulations. It is then concluded with some key conclusions emerging from the analysis and comparison of the different ‘faithful’ intervention logics. This part of the report will complete such ILs by developing ‘reconstructed’ logics. Methodology As per the Terms of Reference (TORs) of the study, this second phase of the study seeks to develop a ‘reconstructed intervention logic’ for each of the six legal instruments under study. These ‘reconstructed’ logics are an attempt to improve on the faithful logics as developed in the launch note of this Study by taking into account information from other sources rather than just that derived from the regulations alone. As with the faithful logics these new ‘reconstructed’ diagrams are intended as simplified tools to analyse the logic chain and are not meant to detail every single step of how the impact intends to be achieved; at the same time the intention of this exercise is to make the logic chain clearer so they are a bit more detailed than the faithful diagrams. To quote the ToR (Section 3.3): “The purpose of this phase should be:

“1) To review the initial impact assessment or ex-ante evaluation of the 6 legal instruments in order to identify the expected impacts of those instruments and to explain how they were planned to be achieved. 2) To compare the expected impacts with the impacts found in step one and describe the differences where they exist.”

More specifically, it was originally hoped that by studying the impact assessments done for the six legal instruments it would be possible to improve the Study’s understanding of the expected impacts of these instruments and describe how it was envisaged these might occur. ‘Impact’ was defined as a ‘term used to describe the effects of an intervention on society’. Already in the Inception Report of the Study it was noted that impact assessments did not exist for all the instruments and it was agreed with the Reference Group that a number of other sources could be used to complement the analysis. Each of the instruments was therefore analysed through a comparison of the original European Commission (EC) proposal and the final regulation and an analysis of the EC’s Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the Instruments. In some cases this analysis was done using a comparative table as an intermediary tool. This also provided in the report for reference purposes. Only in two cases, the European Instrument on Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and the Industrialised Countries Instrument (ICI), did any impact assessments actually exist. These were therefore also used as part of the process of evidence collection for these two instruments. When available other documents, such as annual action plans (eg. in the case of the EIDHR and the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI)) or documents synthesising such plans (eg. INSC), were also used to help further improve the reconstructed intervention logics. In order to ensure a smooth flow in the logic, a chronological approach was taken in the analysis of these documents. As a result the order in which the different documents are analysed and presented in the sections for each instrument below vary from one instrument to the next. In a



few cases the documentary research was complemented by information from discussions with relevant Commission staff. In addition, each section also contains a part on the reconstructed intervention logic for that instrument and another part comparing the faithful and reconstructed logics. The reconstructed logics are in Annex 7. For the comparison between the faithful and reconstructed intervention logics a set of seven questions were developed to provide a common assessment grid as indicated in the Inception Report. These are outlined in Table 2 below. The questions are based on the main issues that arose in the comparison of the legal instruments based on the faithful intervention logics that was reported on in the Inception Report (Section 6.2)

Table 2: Grid for structured comparison of faithful and reconstructed logics

Key questions: 1. Does the original EC proposal contain a similar degree of detail in terms of objectives and ‘earmarking’ of the

legal instruments to specific sectors, needs and ends? 2. Does the original EC proposal contain a global objective that implies a ‘mix’ of development and wider external

objectives, hence implying a close link between ODA and non-ODA financing? 3. Compared to the final proposals, do the original proposals show clearer and closer linkages between the

intermediate impacts and global impact, and are the latter more segmented in the eventual regulations? 4. Are there certain differences between the original proposals and the resulting regulations in relation to the

management of the implementation of the EC’s interventions that they entail? 5. Are there differences in the geographic coverage as a result of differences observed under question 2 above? 6. What are the differences between key processes for planning, monitoring and evaluation? 7. Based on the reconstructed logic, is there room to improve the faithful intervention logic? The answers to these questions are provided in a single summary table (Table 4) for all six instruments for easy comparison as well as being integrated in the argumentation in the sections for each legal instrument. The information provided in Table 4 was then used in the last section of this chapter to synthesise the evidence collected to provide an overall analysis. This overall analysis regroups the information in a slightly different manner than that used in the common assessment grid in order to improve the flow in the presentation. Six headings are used for this final analysis. These are: 1) The differences between the faithful and the reconstructed intervention logic 2) The degree of detail on objectives and earmarking 3) Global objectives that imply a mix of ODA and non-ODA 4) Differences on geographic coverage 5) Differences on governance between the proposals and actual regulations 6) Differences on processes for planning and M&E Finally, on the basis of this analysis, the Study team draws a number of critical questions, which would form the basis for recommendations to be provided in phase 4 of the Study.



3.1 Evidence Collected

3.1.1 The Deve lopment Cooperat ion Instrument (DCI)

Comparison of Original EC Proposal with the DCI Regulation

As per the TOR’s second objective, an analysis was made to identify the expected impacts of the Commission’s original proposed instrument and compare this with the impacts found in the adopted regulation as explored in phase 1 of this study. By providing a description and analysis of the process leading to the adopted regulation, in this case the Development Cooperation Instrument, phase 1 has already provided an important basis for this analysis. Phase 1 highlighted that, compared to the other legal instruments, the DCI has gone through both an intensive and extensive period of negotiation and resulted in a rather long and detailed regulation. The contested nature is also shown by a specific Communication by the Commission to the European Parliament (EP) that was sent on 24 October 2006 to convey the common position of the Council as well as additional declarations from the Commission. This Communication also highlighted the various changes made and described the structure of the regulation, which entered into force in January 2007.26 As a first step to meeting the TOR’s objective, a comparison was made of the EC’s proposal for a financing instrument for ‘development cooperation and economic cooperation’ (DCECI) as published in September 2004 with the regulation adopted more than two years later on 18 December 2006. Annex 1 compares the structure and content of the original proposal and the regulation, which indicates the following key differences in more detail: • The original proposal suggested making all countries except EU member states and

IPA/ENPI partner countries eligible, with the DCI restricting eligibility to DAC aid recipients and regions containing at least one of these countries.

• The original proposal suggested covering development cooperation, economic, financial, scientific, technical cooperation and all other forms of cooperation, to be implemented in accordance with principles and objectives of Community external action. The DCI having the primary objective of eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as well as the promotion of democracy, good governance and respect for human rights and for the rule of law (with five additional objectives consistent with this overall objective).

• The DCECI still anticipated a budgetisation of the European Development Fund (EDF), while the DCI regulation covers five regions under the geographic programmes (non-ACP except South-Africa) with thematic programmes covering all developing regions.

• The DCI is more specific and demanding in terms of the participatory development approach (including exchanges with the EP and civil society), and refers to the EU Consensus on Development as providing a general framework, orientations and focus.

• The DCECI only including overall objectives and a very long list of areas to which funded measures will relate, while the DCI specifying overall objectives, general objectives for geographic and thematic cooperation overall, as well as specific objectives for individual regions and thematic cooperation areas.

26 Commission of the European Communities (2006a)



Findings on the DCI from the EC’s Mid Term Review of the Financial Instruments

A Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the EU financial instruments was published in September 2009 and substantially covered the DCI (13 of 35 pages). While much of the text is used to present a tentative though positive narrative description at the input level in the geographic progress, the Commission highlights a few challenges: • The difference of opinion between the EC and the EP on whether some activities were

eligible under the DCI, resulting in the Commission amending or withdrawing activities in four cases.

• The EC’s view that with the rise of the emerging economies; the possibility of funding measures beyond ODA (Official Development Assistance) was becoming increasingly important, by referring to four preparatory actions that had to be launched by the budget authority.

• Moreover, the EP has objected to using the DCI for financing the European mobility component of an Erasmus Mundus External Cooperation Window on the basis that it cannot be funded through ODA.

Based on these examples, the EC concludes that the “current DCI Regulation constrains the scope of the bilateral geographical cooperation with eligible countries by requiring all measures financed to fulfil the OECD/DAC criteria for Official Development Assistance. Legislative follow-up to the Preparatory Action is proposed to fill this gap in order to have an enabling instrument to cover activities, in particular to emerging countries, which do not meet ODA criteria.” The MTR further reports on the delivery against the commitments undertaken, with reference to the benchmarking of percentages of funding used for certain sectors as desired by the EP, while making a plea to replace the input-benchmarking system by a more systematic follow up of the official sectors with the aim to make sure that the social sectors are referred to in national development plans and are well-covered by donors. In relation to the thematic programmes of the DCI, the MTR mainly refers to delay in implementation due to differences of views between the Commission and the Member States on eligible countries, and a clear dominance on the use of the call for proposals instrument, which is mostly used for annual implementation. The MTR does not report on how the thematic and geographic actions interrelate, but from the general description it seems as if the two main elements of the DCI operate and function relatively independently from one another. Besides the procedural aspects referred to, it is also noted that the EC’s Food Facility would have implications on the thematic programme on food security. Based on the analysis made, the MTR makes two proposals: (1) giving legislative follow-up to the Preparatory Actions for non-ODA activities in developing countries; and (2) making one technical amendment in relation to taxes and duties issues. Country strategy papers and annual action programmes in relation to these for the DCI can be found on the website of the European External Action Service, while the strategy papers and action plans for the thematic instruments can be found on the EuropeAid website. The financial framework for the implementation of DCI over the period 2007-2013 is Euro 16.897 billion including: Euro 10.057 billion for the geographic programmes, Euro 5.596 billion for the



thematic programmes and Euro 1.244 billion for the ACP Sugar Protocol countries.27 While not mentioning exact figures, the financial instruments’ MTR indicates that spending in thematic programmes is progressing at a slower pace compared to the geographic programmes. Brief MTRs for the geographic countries are available on the EEAS (European External Action Service) website for a limited number of DCI eligible countries, while country strategy papers are available for practically all of them. MTRs for the thematic instruments are not available online, but all programming documents are available on the EuropeAid website. These pages confirm that calls for proposals/tenders are the only means used to manage and deliver the funding.

Reconstructing the DCI Intervention Logic

Based on the above analysis, the intervention logic was reconstructed further and is shown in Annex 7. The main changes and additions are as follows: • A reference to ‘preparatory actions’ that the EC has had to use to support measures, which it

considered could not be financed under the DCI. This observation is interesting in that the MTR does not refer to the ICI regulation that could play a role in this, given that such an interaction was foreseen in the EC’s original proposal that basically proposed a combined DCI and ICI regulation.

• A reference to one of the modes of financing as recognised in the dominating the design of interventions in the thematic programmes (namely tenders/call for proposals).

• The addition of a question mark where the interrelations between the thematic and geographic programmes are concerned, given that the MTR does not refer to such and interaction.

• A reference to the interaction between the food security thematic instrument and the EU Food Facility in the activities column.

• An assumed link with impacts achieved by the EIDHR instrument and one of the DCI’s expected impacts as highlighted in Art 2 (1): Support to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance, gender equality and related international law.

3.1.2 The European Neighbourhood Pol i cy Instrument (ENPI)

Comparison of Original EC Proposal with the ENPI Regulation

As per the TOR’s second objective, an analysis was made to identify the expected impacts of the Commission’s original proposed instrument and compare this with the impacts found in the adopted regulation as explored in phase 1 of this study. By providing a description and analysis of the process leading to the adopted regulation, in this case the ENPI, phase 1 has already provided an important basis for this analysis. Phase 1 highlighted that, whilst certain other legal instruments have gone through both an intensive and extensive period of negotiation, which resulted in a rather long and detailed regulation, there were much less differences between the original Commission Proposal from September 2004 and the Regulation as it was adopted in 2006 but still, several important aspects of the original proposal had been modified through the negotiation process.

27 Source: European Feminist Forum (2008)



As a first step to meeting the TOR’s objective, a comparison was made of the EC’s proposal for a regulation laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument as published in September 2004 with the regulation adopted more than two years later on 18 December 2006. Annex 2 compares the structure and content of the original proposal and the final regulation, which indicates the following key differences in more detail: • The original proposal insists on the new original feature of cross border cooperation and its

consistency and alignment with the ERDF28. This is much less developed in the adopted regulation, in particular the importance given to alignment with ERDF and other European regional development policies.

• The original proposal describes in substantial details the areas promoted, the description is somewhat shortened and condensed in the Regulation.

• The original proposal provides substantial details about the thematic dimension of the ENPI, in terms of scope, type of programme, and implementation provisions. The thematic dimension is much less developed in the adopted regulation, but still mentioned as one among 29 possible areas for cooperation.

• The final Regulation includes the European Investment Bank (EIB) in the committee responsible for the follow up of the ENPI implementation

• The importance of aligning with the priorities as agreed in the bilateral Action Plans is made the most essential principle in the Commission original proposal. Whilst this is retained in the Regulation, this element becomes one among other policies.

Findings on the ENPI from the EC’s Mid Term Review of the Financial Instruments

A MTR of the EU financial instruments was published in September 2009 covering also ENPI. In this text, the overall framework of implementation is updated, with the addition of the Eastern Partnership to the dimensions already existing (ENP Action Plans, EU-Russia Strategy Partnership, Union for the Mediterranean, Black Sea Synergy). The review takes stock of progress in individual countries, as well as providing an opinion on the overall progress in implementing the ENP. Several important challenges are highlighted: • The importance of the ENPI Cross Border Cooperation (and the alignment to ERDF is

stressed again) and the prospects for strategic successes

• The success met by EC instruments such as Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA in the neighbouring countries, thereby emphasizing the role of the member States in providing expertise

• The establishment of the Neighbourhood Investment Facility, as a tool to facilitate leverage

• The fact that the Regulation does not unambiguously provide the possibility of establishing revolving funds limits possibilities to support private sector and small and medium enterprises (SMEs)

• The efficient and flexible implementation of special measures through specially designed instruments such as PEGASE, again emphasizing the cooperation between Member States and Commission

28 ERDF: European Regional Development Funds



• The tightness of the financial envelope to cover individual country commitments, promote regional initiatives and respond adequately to crisis situations.

The EC concludes that the “current the ENPI has gone a long way towards addressing its declared objectives…” The MTR makes a specific reference the benefits from the thematic programmes of the DCI, within which an envelope of Euro 465 million has been set aside for the neighbouring countries. Based on the analysis made, the MTR concludes that the provisions of the ENPI appear adequate to sustain cooperation with the neighbouring countries provided that two issues are addressed: the possibility of establishing revolving funds, and to respond to needs linked to crisis situations29 Country strategy papers and annual action programmes in relation to these for the ENPI can be found on the website of the EuropeAid website. The financial framework for the implementation of ENPI over the period 2007-2013 is Euro 11.181 billion, and at the time of the MTR, absorption was above the planned level (43.5% instead of 38.3%). The slow start of the Cross-border Cooperation (CBC) programmes is mentioned, however due to the fact that delays have occurred. Nevertheless it should be noted that 13 programmes were established and implemented.

Findings on the ENPI from the Progress Reports, Country Strategy and Action Plans

Recent progress reports confirm the overall finding from the MTR, namely that the ENP implementation is well underway, and that overall, strategies are coherent with ENPI objectives on the one hand, and Action Plan priorities are in line with the National Indicative Programme priorities and broadly correspond to those mentioned in the strategies. We have noted the following points from the Progress reports/ country strategies: • Delivery mechanisms:

- Delivery through budget support requires that the framework is reinforced, notably through strengthening of Public Financial Management [PR Ukraine Section 8 par. 2].

- Other aid modalities, such as individual projects and twinning, continue to be important, possibly in complementarity with Budget Support. They are used in particular where objectives are clearly defined (e.g. legal adjustments, EU best practice) [CS 2007-2013 Egypt p. 31 ff].

• Convergence / coherence between planning and strategy documents: mention is made that strategy document should not detail interventions, and that this should be done within the Action plan (Country Strategy Ukraine 2001-2013 Section 4.2)

• Incentivising of partner countries (positive mention made of measures enabling to incentivize committed partner countries (PR Ukraine – Section 8 para 3)

• Coordination: in all PR, a mention of support provided through the thematic instruments EIDHR, INSC, IfS, are mentioned and the need for reinforced coordination is underlined. However, the quality of the coordination is perceived to be good.

29 such as in the occupied Palestinian Territories or in Georgia



Reconstructing the ENPI Intervention Logic

Based on the above analysis, the intervention logic was reconstructed further and is shown in Annex 7. Clear reference is made in the MTR and in the Commission Staff document on Strengthening the ENPI to the results which, if obtained , will incentivise the Neighbouring Countries to implement the reforms: “the more progress, the deeper the relationship, the more support” . These results are:

• Tangible economic integration and trade

• Improvement of Mobility and migration management

• People to people exchanges

In addition, thematic support (as opposed to bilateral), political, regional and financial dialogues are seen as the key results, which will enable the achievement of objectives and global impact. Complementary areas of intervention / activities are also identified: maritime dialogue and cooperation. The main changes and additions made from the faithful intervention logic to the reconstructed logic are as follows: • At the activities’ level, additions were made in the areas of:

- Implementation of regional flagship initiatives - Promotion of maritime support - Special measures implementations;

• The outputs level, has been simplified by regrouping them into six coherent categories: - Economic integration and trade - Mobility & migration - People to people exchanges - Thematic support (regional dimension) - Political co-operation - Management of crisis situation.

3.1.3 Instrument for Stabi l i ty (I fS)

Comparison of Original EC Proposal with the IfS Regulation

As per the TOR’s second objective, an analysis was made to identify the expected impacts of the Commission’s original proposed instrument and compare this with the impacts found in the adopted regulation as explored in phase 1 of this study. By providing a description of the process leading to the adopted regulation, the Instrument of Stability, phase 1 has already provided an important basis for this analysis. Further exploring this the initial changes from the initial proposal to the adoption are: 1. The initial proposal from the Commission for IfS was based on it being governed by Article

308 of TEC.30 This article allows for greater flexibility in the Commission working with the Council but only a consultative role for the Parliament. The initial proposal also mentions Article 203 establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The original argumentation from the Commission was that TEC Article 179 and 181a were insufficient to

30 Commission of the European Communities(2004)



justify the financing of peace-keeping (hence the necessity for TEC Article 308 or to cover nuclear safety and hence the inclusion of Article 203 of the Euratom Treaty).

2. In the original proposal the Commission31 had the specific objective for the IfS to promote nuclear safety and the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This was removed and a separate legal instrument the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation based on Article 203 of the Euratom treaty was created.32 Yet the IfS did retain a specific aspect to address, “risk mitigation and preparedness relating to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or agents” (Article 4 (2)).

3. In the original proposal there was the provision for “Special provisions applicable to peace-support operations” specifically the “development of peace-keeping and peace-support capacity” 33. This would have been a significant area of intervention influencing, activities, outputs, results and impacts. This was removed. Yet the IfS retained a commitment to support “non-military technical cooperation to strengthen overall civilian control, and oversight over the security system” (Article 3 (2) (c)), and also, “financial and technical assistance for the implementation of those Recommendations made by the UN Peacebuilding Commission falling within the objectives of Community cooperation policy” (Article 4 (3)).

4. The original proposal contained intended to deliver Community exceptional assistance measures alongside measures adopted by the Council under Title V of the TEU relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

5. The original proposal was more ambiguous about its support to non-state actors for longer term capacity building in stability related issues.

The Process and Outcome of the Negotiations on the IfS

The negotiations were rather around two camps one that favoured a wide and community-friendly approach, while the other advocated by big member-states was interested in a more limited scope of action for the IfS.34 1. The Parliament negotiated that the IfS would be governed under TEC Article 179 and 181a

giving the Parliament greater authority over the IfS. While the IfS is designed to be as flexible as possible other measures were added to the governance of the spending above certain limits.

2. A separate Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation was created therefore removing the necessity to have the IfS refer to Article 203 of the Euratom Treaty or cover this area.

3. The removal of references to peace-keeping and peace-support as was agreed in the final trilateral negotiations on the objection from some Member States. This did raise some criticism from certain sections of the European Commission and European Parliament who wished to retain this.

4. The final proposal noted that actions taken under the IfS may be complementary to and should be consistent with measures adopted by the EU in pursuit of Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives within the framework of Title V rather than the stronger wording in the original proposal.

5. Also several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were active in lobbying the parliament to create specific provisions to support longer-term capacity building in the field of peacebuilding which became after the intervention of the Parliament more clearly enshrined

31 Commission of the European Communities(2004) 32 See separate note on this instrument for Nuclear Safety for further background 33 Commission of the European Communities(2004) 34 Ganzle (2009), p 62



in Article 4 (3). A further contextual background to the negotiations for this financial instrument is that it took place at the time of a pending case taken by the Commission against the Council to the European Court of Justice around competence in small arms issues. The final ruling of the case was on the 28th of May 200835, well after the entry into force of the IfS, yet this did have consequences for the MTR. The European Parliament accepted the Commission proposal with a number of amendments in its first reading, with the Council agreeing the final text in its meeting on the 7 November 2006.

Findings on the IfS from the EC’s Mid Term Review of the Financial Instruments

A MTR of the EU financial instruments, published in September 2009, covers the IfS. There are three significant changes associated with the MTR. Of these three, one relates to a change in the overarching EU policy context clarifying in one dedicated area where the scope of the IfS could be expanded, and two relate to experiences with implementing the IfS and are more of a technical nature. The first change arose from the fact that the Court case between the Commission and the Council on the issue of competence in Small Arm was resolved. It firmly found in favour of the Commission. The second change was because the MTR found that the rules of origin on some calls of proposals did not allow for the participation of OECD countries that were not European Economic Area (EEA) or EU members. The third was that the financial envelope earmarked for certain provisions was insufficient for the task at hand. Based on the analysis made, the Communication on the MTR makes three proposals for amendments: • To amend Article 3(2)(i) and 4(1)(a) in the light of the Court’s rulings and to abolish the

restriction on support for measures to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

• To insert a technical amendment to Article 17 in order to open up participation in the award of procurement or grant contracts for measures under Article 4(3), as is already the case for measures under Article 3.

• To amend Article 24 to increase the maximum share of measures under Article 4(1) from 7% to 10%.

• While no amendment to the regulations were made there was also a commitment to ensure that Article 4(3) was used to support a Peace-Building Partnership including resources for NGOs and specialist NSA as envisaged in the original negotiations. This commitment was part of an exchange of letters between the Commission and the Parliament in the negotiations for the Instrument for Stability.

The Commission in its staff working paper accompanying the MTR communication noted that, “The provisions of this new financial instrument are adequate to pursue the objectives provided

35 See Court of Justice of the European Communities (2008)



that the amendments requested are adopted” and generally has a very positive assessment of the IfS as it had been implemented.

Reconstructing the IfS Intervention Logic

Based on the above analysis, the intervention logic was reconstructed further and is shown in Annex 7 (Changes are marked in red text on the diagram). The main changes and additions are as follows: • Amend the output level to show more clearly specific support for measure to combat the

proliferation of light weapons • Amend the amount from 27% to 30% for all actions under Article 4 thereby incorporating

the increase in the maximum share of measures under Article 4(1) from 7% to 10%.

3.1.4 Industr ia l i sed Countr ies Instrument (ICI)

Comparing the Original EC Proposal with the ICI Regulation

The analysis of phase 1 already described in some detail how the ICI was carved out of the DCECI following the discussion with the Parliament about the DCECI regulation proposal. The initial Commission proposal for the DCECI was mainly driven by the principle of simplifying the architecture for programming and implementing interventions in the area of EU development cooperation and external relations. It proposed a double legal basis: Article 179 TEC (development cooperation with developing countries) and Article 181a TEC (economic, financial and technical cooperation with industrialized countries). This basis would have allowed interventions funded under this regulation to support both development cooperation and all other forms of cooperation (economic, financial and technical) with developing countries, countries in transition and industrialized countries under one single instrument. The European Commission argued that an economic and development instrument would facilitate economic development in developing countries. The EP rejected this proposal after the first reading for two main reasons. It argued that the DCECI unnaturally merged together two policy domains - economic cooperation and development cooperation. In the view of the EP, this ran against the principles laid out in the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), which provides the basis for a separate development policy for developing countries. The Parliament’s second objection to the proposal was that the DCECI marginalized the role of the EP by not recognizing the legislative authority’s right to set spending targets. Indeed, the DCECI did not earmark funds for specific policy instruments and only referred to the overall size of the budget (with or without a budgetised EDF) in Article 24 of the proposed regulation. Allocations would have had been determined by “programming documents” over which the Parliament “would have had no say”36. The Parliament thus expressed its concern that development funds could not be directed towards development priority areas, or that development funds could be directed towards cooperation with industrialized countries under the DCECI. Based on these arguments, the Parliament proposed to remove relations with industrialized countries from the regulation and to create a specific instrument on development cooperation, exclusively based on Art.179. The Parliament argued that even if the new Article 181a TEC on

36 Mitchell (2005)



economic cooperation would be required for economic actions in developing countries, nothing would prevent the Commission from proposing separate instruments for developing and industrialised countries37. The EP therefore recommended the Commission to propose a separate instrument covering Art 181a only. After the vote at first reading, intensive discussions between the three institutions took place in order to find a solution. The negotiated common position included the provision for a separate instrument for cooperation with industrialized countries and a single legal basis (Article 179 TEC) for the DCI, which included a broad definition of development cooperation38. It also ensured that Parliament’s co-decision powers were fully safeguarded (full comparison between the original text of the EC and the final regulation are outlined in Annex 3)39.

Evidence on the ICI from the MTR and Other Sources

While the DCI focuses on poverty reduction under Article 179 TEC, the ICI is meant to focus on industrialised partner countries under article 181a. Financial support via this instrument does not count as ODA. This, however, limited the scope of the ICI to exclude countries falling under the DCI40 except for two countries (Oman and Saudi Arabia), which are covered by both the ICI and the DCI. While the MTR of 2009 acknowledged the ICI as an ‘effective’ instrument not in need of any amendments, the reasons for the subsequent discussions of amending the ICI regulation in terms of the scope of countries covered is due to the shortcomings of the DCI instrument in the case of transitional countries as indicated by the disagreement between Commission and Parliament about the ex-ante ODA eligibility of certain programmed actions. As mentioned above at the output level of the ICI’s intervention logic’s activities are being implemented through multi-annual action programmes. Taking a look at DG RELEX’s annual activity reports of 2007 and 2009, for example, the links between activities and results in the intervention logic become clearer when it is outlined what these programmes entail and how they contribute to strengthening links at bilateral- and multilateral levels. While awareness for and visibility of the EU can be linked to these activities, too, it is less clear how those activities will strengthen links at the regional level.

37 See Committee on Development (2005) 38 This broad definition led to new discussion between Commission and Parliament about the ex-ante ODA eligibility of certain

programmed actions and the proposal to amending the ICI regulation to allow the ICI to finance measures for non-ODA activities in DCI countries due to shortcomings in the DCI regulation (cf. European Union (2005),p.507; European Union (2008a), p.213; European Union (2008b), p.337; European Union (2008c), p.642; Commission of the European Communities (2009a), p.6f; Commission of the European Communities (2009b), p.4,6,9

39 Council of the European Union (2006) 40 Commission of the European Communities (2009a), p.5f



Table 3: Overview of ICI activities in 2007 and 2009

Areas of Cooperation Examples of Programme Outputs (Art. 4.1) Promote cooperation, partnerships and joint undertakings between economic, academic and scientific actors in the Community and partner countries

• Summits (US, Japan, Canada, South Korea) • Partnership Cooperation Agreements

(Singapore, Brunei)

(Art. 4.2) Stimulate bilateral trade, investment flows and economic partnerships

• Transatlantic Economic Council • European Training Programme (ETP)

(Art. 4.5) Promote cooperative projects in areas of mutual interest (research, science and technology, energy, transport, and environmental matters.

• Convergence of positions on energy and climate change

• Energy Council (US) • CA, NZ, NO participating in the EU‘s ESDP

mission in Afghanistan (Art. 4.6) Enhance awareness about and understanding of the EU and its visibility in partner countries

• 26 EU Centres (as of 2009)

(Art. 4.7) Support specific initiatives that provide impetus to deepening and broadening bilateral relations

• Transatlantic methods for handling global challenges EU-US“

Concerning the impacts and global impacts, the history of the development of the ICI helps to explain the crucial difference between the original proposal and the final regulation: most of the objectives and global impacts envisaged in the original proposal were directed at development cooperation and to a lesser extent to cooperation with industrialized countries, while the final regulation of the ICI focused exclusively on economic, financial and technical cooperation with industrialized countries. An understanding of this evolution can assist in explaining the missing link between the global impact of “developing and consolidating the Union’s principles in partner countries and regions through dialogue and cooperation” that is aimed for and the preceding steps in the intervention logic. However, it remains unclear how exactly these principles are to be developed and consolidated. Thus, while the states41 covered by Regulation EC No382/200142 can be said to have their foundations in similar principles to those of the EU as outlined in Article 3.143 of the ICI regulation, this is not so clear for some of the other states added to the regulation44 and even more for those that are being considered for inclusion by an amendment to the regulation45. Many of this latter group especially can be considered as at least partly deviating from these principles. Therefore, one would assume that in the ICI, there was a need to add measures to the intervention logic in order to facilitate the implementation of this global impact. On the other hand, the ICI regulation centres on economic, financial and technical cooperation which traditionally does focus much less on reinforcing liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law than does development cooperation. The reference to these principles and the lack of any indication of measures supporting their development and consolidation in partner countries by the ICI’s intervention logic can hence be considered a side-effect of the separation of the DCECI into two financial instruments. At the

41 United States of America, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia and New Zealand 42 It is interesting to note here Regulation EC No382/2001 does not contain any reference to these principles. 43 Article 3.1 of the ICI Regulation: “The EU is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental

freedoms and the rule of law and seeks to promote commitment to these principles in partner countries through dialogue and cooperation” 44 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Brunei, Chinese Taipei, Hong-Kong, Macao, Singapore 45 Argentina, Bolivia, brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,

Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, DR of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Viet Nam, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, Iraq, Yemen, South Africa



moment the only direct link to this global impact in the ICI’s faithful intervention logic can be drawn from the general principles guiding the regulation.

Impact Assessment of the ICI

The 2009 impact assessment of the ICI regulation dealt with options for handling programmes in countries covered by the DCI regulation (such as the Brazil Euro-Centre, the Malaysia EU visibility programme) which the EP considered as not meeting the criteria for ODA eligibility. The ICI impact assessment identified a legislative gap due to the limited scope of the DCI regulation. By analysing the underlying drivers of the problem of the DCI the impact assessment concluded the splitting up of the DCECI into DCI and ICI had been counterproductive in the first place. Faced with the restrictions of the current set of instruments - and after comparing different options - the impact assessment recommended to amend the ICI regulation in order to fill this legislative gap.

3.1.5 European Instrument on Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)

As per the TOR’s second objective, an analysis was made to identify the expected impacts of the impact assessment and the Commission’s original proposed instrument and compare this with the impacts found in the adopted regulation as explored in phase 1 of this study. By providing a description and analysis of the process leading to the adopted regulation, in this case the EIDHR, phase 1 has already provided some basis for this analysis. This phase will however deepen the analysis of such process. As a first step to meeting the TOR’s objective, an analysis of the Extended Impact Assessment (EIA) is provided in order to assess what the initially intended impacts were. Then a comparison was made of the EC’s proposal for a financing instrument on the ‘Thematic Programme for the Promotion of Democracy and human rights worldwide’ as published in January 2006 with the regulation adopted later that year. Annex 4 compares the structure and content of the original proposal and the regulation. Furthermore, in order to assist in the reconstruction of the intervention logic, the Study Team also relied on annual action plans of the EIDHR. All these elements are described in the sections that follow.

Comparison of the Extended Impact Assessment with the Final EIDHR Regulation

As stated in its introduction, the available EIA of 200346 aimed at providing a continuing legal basis for the Community’s funding of human rights and democratisation projects under the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights which was due to expire on 31 December 2004, that is two full years before the package of new legal instruments had to be introduced for the 2007 Financial Perspective. In other words, the Impact Assessment was not undertaken on the basis of policy proposals for this new package, but rather for legal reasons due to the expiry of the old instrument and as a result did not really assess the expected impacts of the new legal instrument. Rather the EIA broadly discussed the issue of tracking impact and noted the difficulties experienced in identifying impacts in the area of human rights and democracy. Nonetheless, the EIA highlighted the following aspects related to the formulation of a future regulation:

46 Commission of the European Communities (2003): SEC (2003) 1170



The EIA recommended that EIDHR remains ‘an independent but [a] necessarily complementary Community instrument based on and justified by its distinctive added value in promoting human rights and democratisation in third countries’.47 Furthermore, the EIA argued that in the event of non-legislation of the EIDHR ‘there would be no Community funds anymore available to projects of civil society organisations promoting human rights and democratisation in third countries, as there would be no basic act on the basis of which appropriation could be implemented…it would [also] bring to a halt European Union Election Observation Missions due to unavailability or inaccessibility of funds’.48 Nonetheless, the proposal of the Commission as presented in 2005, for the new post-2007 legal instruments, went against this advice and suggested a fundamental change to the legislative framework of the policy when it proposed to mainstream the EIDHR into the new legal instruments rather than continue to have a separate instrument. The EP subsequently used the same arguments provided by the EIA in order to argue its case for keeping the EIDHR separate. The EIA pointed to the need to ensure flexibility in the Programming of the EIDHR; an aspect that has been taken on board judging by the gap at output level in the Faithful Intervention Logic provided in the phase 1 of this Study. The EIA thus argues that ‘while the aims, objectives and implementing procedures of an instrument such as the EIDHR must be precise in both design and expected level of performance, sufficient flexibility must be provided to allow for creative initiatives and reactions to unforeseen developments’.49 Some flexibility was therefore enshrined in the final regulation (i.e. flexible funds to support human right defenders). However it is not clear whether there was a link between this recommendation of the EIA and the decision to leave such flexibility in the final regulation. The EIA highlighted the difficulty of attributing developments in the area of human rights and democratisation to the EIDHR. It noted the complexity of monitoring impact in this area of support. The need for regular monitoring of implementation was emphasised by the EIA in order to feed back into the programming cycle and to provide more focus in the quality of projects and on their (flexible) design, definition of outcomes and monitoring and evaluations. The conclusion of the EIA noted that these weaknesses are best addressed through improved programming and implementation procedures and not through a change in the legislative framework of the EIDHR. The final regulation seems to have taken on board this recommendation as demonstrated by the gap at the output level (normally the realm of programming). However it is not clear whether there was a link between this recommendation of the EIA and the decision to leave such flexibility in the final regulation.

Comparison of Original EC Proposal with the EIDHR Regulation

The EC’s Communication to the Parliament and the Council of August 2005 pertaining to the External Actions Through Thematic Programmes under the Future Financial Perspectives 2007-2013 proposed the creation of a thematic programme on Democracy and Human Rights. The Thematic Programmes, which were proposed within the framework of a simplified structure for the delivery of the Community’s external assistance, focussed on specific areas of interest to a group of partner countries regardless of their geographic location. They were designed as a complement to the proposed horizontal instruments (humanitarian aid instrument, stability instrument, instrument for macro-financial assistance) and geographic instruments (instrument for pre-accession assistance, ENPI and the DCECI).

47 Commission of the European Communities (2003), p. 10 48 Commission of the European Communities (2003), p. 19 49 Commission of the European Communities (2003), p. 20



The Thematic Programme on Democracy and Human Rights was proposed by the Commission as a programme that covers ‘global, regional and country-specific financial support to actions, which are primarily implemented by non-state actors, civil society-based, and regional and international organisations’.50 Its focus would include support to the international criminal system and the International Criminal Court, the abolition of the death penalty, the fight against torture and racism, discrimination against minorities and indigenous peoples, and democratisation and election observation – most of which were maintained as areas of intervention of the new legal instrument. The Commission proposed that this Thematic Programme be implemented through the three geographic instruments mentioned earlier as well as the Stability Instrument. Subsequently, the EC prepared a Communication on Thematic Programme for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights Worldwide under the Future Financial Perspectives (2007-2013) which would be implemented through the geographic instruments. The EP position on the proposal noted that the ‘promotion, development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms constitute a prime objective of the Community's development policy and economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries’ and as a result called for the establishment of a ‘specific financial resources and a specific financing instrument that can continue to work in an independent manner whilst remaining complementary to and reinforcing related Community instruments for external assistance, the Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, and humanitarian aid’.51 The position provided several amendment proposals, which have appeared in the new EC proposal on the Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights.

The Final EIDHR Regulation

Taking into account the demands from the EP for a separate fully-fledged instrument, the EC then developed a proposal for a regulation on establishing a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide.52 The details of this proposal were largely based on the EC Communication on Thematic Programme for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights Worldwide under the Future Financial Perspectives (2007-2013) supplemented by inputs from the EP. The text of the final regulation thus included some key EP points, and notably, the link with conflict prevention in the EIDHR was removed. Annex 4 compares the key differences that resulted from the negotiations process. Notably, it indicates the following key differences in more detail: • The original proposal by the Commission proposed that the EIDHR be transformed into a

thematic programme. Following negotiations with the EP, the EIDHR was maintained as a separate instrument

• The final regulation has more earmarking of activities as a result of negotiations with the EP • The final regulation made more space for flexible funding procedures in order to respond to

the needs of human rights defenders as requested by the EP

50 Commission of the European Communities (2005) 51 Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 12 December 2006, P6_TA(2006)0548 52 Commission of the European Communities (2006b)



Findings on the EIDHR from the EC’s Mid Term Review of the Financial Instruments

A MTR of the EU financial instruments was published in September 2009 and substantially covered the DCI (13 of 35 pages). On the EIDHR the review concluded that: • The regulation was adequate in supporting policy objectives53 • The wording of Article 13(6) of the EIDHR and Article 25(2) of the DCI be harmonized to

read as follows: ‘Community financing shall, in principle, not be used for paying taxes, duties or charges in beneficiary countries’. This was related to issues (not specified in the MTR) on the implementation of programmes by NGOs.

Annual Action Programmes (AAPs) of the EIDHR (2007-2009)

The Annual Action Programmes of the EIDHR provide information on a number of facets of the EIDHR implementation. The three reviewed AAPs stated objectives that were largely aligned with the objectives of the EIDHR regulations. However, they provide a more detailed analysis especially at the results and outputs levels. These were particularly useful in the reconstruction of the logic in terms of: • Completing the output level on the basis of information provided in the (ex ante) AAPs of

three years (2007, 2008, 2009)

• An additional intended result was identified and added to the results level (‘Creation of a political and civil society environment conducive to sustainable development’)

3.1.6 Instrument for Nuclear Safe ty Cooperat ion (INSC)

Comparing the Original EC Proposal with the INSC Regulation

As indicated in the Inception Report (section 6.1.6) the INSC was originally proposed as part of the new Instrument for Stability, but as the Parliament wanted co-decision control over the IfS an agreement was reached to create a separate instrument for nuclear safety and cooperation. Annex 5 below provides a section by section comparison of the two documents, focusing on the specific issue of nuclear safety in the case of the IfS proposal. This shows that while the basic structure of the two is very similar, the INSC regulation is both simpler and more specific than the original proposal for an IfS regulation. The latter is worded in more generic terms but also has to provide for a far wider range of options and possibilities. At the same time it generally leaves more space for Commission interpretation during management. A good example of this is the two articles on the oversight Committee outlined in the Final Provisions of both texts. In the INSC regulation this article is considerably more detailed, for instance spelling out quite a number of the rules of procedure for the committee, whereas in the original proposal these are to be agreed by the committee itself. Because the focus of the INSC regulation is far more specific it is also possible to be more precise in quite a number of the articles relating to both the objectives and purpose as well as to the types of measures to be used during implementation. Thus the original proposal of the Commission does not provide any more useful insights into the intervention logic for the INSC. Rather the reverse, it is the INSC regulation that provides a clearer picture of the intended 53 Commission of the European Communities (2009c)



intervention logic. To improve on the ‘faithful logic’ for the INSC Regulation it is therefore necessary to turn to other sources for further details on which to base the ‘reconstructed logic’. These are most usefully found in the Annual Action Programmes (AAPs) for the first few years of the INSC (2007-2009). Presentations by the staff of the Joint Research Council of the European Commission54 to be found on the internet and Commission proposals for these AAPs55 provide a useful summary of some of their key features. From this it is apparent that the INSC is implemented through a series of programmes in a range of different countries including Russia and countries from the ex-Soviet Union (Belus, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Georgia) as well as a number of countries in the Middle East (Jordan, Egypt) and a couple in Asia and Latin America. The main activities can be grouped under four main headings: • OSA: On site assistance and design safety • RA: Support to national regulatory authorities • RWM: Radioactive waste management and safeguards • IAEA: Cooperation with the IAEA not just at the international level but also at the level

of individual third countries. This work replaces the TACIS programme in the same area from 2005 and 2006. The INSC reference amount for 2007-2013 is Euro 524 million. During the 2007-2009 period the three AAPs amounted to just under Euro 200 million. Nearly half of this was spent on radioactive waste management and safeguards (RWM – 47%) and a further third on on-site assistance and design safety (OSA – 34%) illustrating well the main emphases of the instrument at least in terms of the volume of expenditure.

Findings on the INSC from the EC’s Mid Term Review of the Financial Instruments

The European Commission Communication56 on the MTR of the external action instruments concludes that “As regards these four instruments [EIDHR, IfS, INSC & ICI] no problems have been encountered in policy formulation and the Regulations have proven adequate to support the policy objectives (except for the proposed amendments on the IfS and for the tax issue on the EIDHR)”. (Section 4.4, p.9) The more detailed Commission Staff Working Document57 concludes for the INSC that the transition from the TACIS went smoothly and “… cooperation aspects have been reinforced, including co-financing and that the geographic coverage has been extended to cover other third countries” (Section 6.3, p.35). Satisfaction is also expressed with the financial reference amount and so no changes are proposed.

54 Schenkel (2009) and Abousahi (2010). See also Proposal for a Commission Decision on the AAP 2008 in favour of Russia,

Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Belarus, Jordan and Egypt for NSC financed under Article 19 06 04 01 of the general budget of the EC.

55 See for instance: Proposal for a Commission Decision on the AAP 2008 in favour of Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Belarus, Jordan and Egypt for NSC financed under Article 19 06 04 01 of the general budget of the EC.

56 Commission of the European Communities (2009c) 57 Commission of the European Communities (2009b)



Table 4: Summary of the outcome of the analysis of different key elements of the intervention logics

Key questions

Assumptions and/or expected results as formulated by the Study Team DCI ENPI IfS ICI EIDHR INSC

1. Does the original EC proposal contain a similar degree of detail in terms of objectives and ‘earmarking’ of the legal instruments to specific sectors, needs and ends?

The original proposal contained a much lower degree of earmarking. This is most clearly shown by the total absence of specific objectives at the regional geographic and thematic level in the DCECI proposal.

The original proposal contained at least a similar degree of earmarking. Some features of the ENPI CBC are described in more detail in the original EC proposal.

A major area of potential activities, outputs, results and impacts was removed on the insistance primarily of member-states in relation to “peace-keeping and peace-support”. A more specific focus on measures that could be used to support NSAs and other specialist organizations was added in the negotiation by the Parliament in Article 4 (3).

The original proposal contained broader objectives. The regulation is more specific in terms of who the target countries are but at the same time is less specific in terms of what the measures proposed shall relate to.

By and large the text of the final regulation is not drastically different from the original EC proposal with the exception of the objectives sections where there have been numerous additions as to the aim and scope of the regulation.

No there is less detail in the original proposal for the IfS than in the actual INSC Regulation. Because the Regulation covers a more restricted field than the proposal it amounts to a stricter earmarking of funds than was originally proposed by the Commission.

2. Does the original EC proposal contain a global objective that implies a ‘mix’ of development and wider external objectives, hence implying a close link between ODA and non-ODA financing?

The original proposal aimed at ensuring a linkage between Articles 179 and 181a of the Treaty on European Community, hence precisely aiming at such a ‘mix’ of ODA and non-ODA financing. The financial provisions article (Art 24 DCECI proposal) however only mentioned the total amount and the proportion reserved for geographic cooperation with ACP countries. This made it very difficult to see how different interventions as financed through ODA and non-ODA means were to interrelate, given that the proposed regulation text provided no such legal specification and guidance.

The original proposal’s global objective is to develop an area of prosperity involving the EU and the neighbouring countries, based on key founding principles of the EU

Yes it does. This is the very essence of the Instrument for Stability in the original proposal and its finally agreed governance (in the TEC the link between Articles 179 and 181a).

The original proposal aimed at ensuring a linkage between Articles 179 and 181a of the Treaty on European Community, hence precisely aiming at such a ‘mix’ of ODA and non-ODA financing. The financial provisions article (Art 24 DCECI proposal) however only mentioned the total amount and the proportion reserved for geographic cooperation with ACP countries. This made it very difficult to see how different interventions as financed through ODA and non-ODA means were to interrelate, given that the proposed regulation text provided no such legal specification and guidance.

The original proposal aimed at ensuring a linkage between Articles 179 and 181a of the Treaty on European Community, hence precisely aiming at such a ‘mix’ of ODA and non-ODA financing. Support through the instrument is provided for both ACP and non-ACP countries making it possible to ensure the mix between ODA and non-ODA

There is no apparent mixing of funds though some of the INSC budget is spent in developing countries covered by the DCI and other amounts in neighbourhood countries covered by the ENPI. There is a clearly stated intention that INSC funds should be seen as complementary to funds from the other external action instruments.



Key questions Assumptions and/or expected results as formulated by the Study Team

DCI ENPI IfS ICI EIDHR INSC 3. Compared to the

final proposals, do the original proposals show clearer and closer linkages between the intermediate impacts and global impact, and is the latter more segmented in the eventual regulations?

This is difficult to conclude for the DCI, though it is clear that the linkages between impact and global impact is more elaborate and complex than in the original proposals, for reasons explained under question 1.

The original proposal, in its Memorandum, describes very clearly the overall context in which the ENPI will apply and the interlinkages between the other related EU policies. This part, is very condensed in the Regulation.

Only one major area of intervention was removed that is “peace-keeping and peace-support” in the negotiations that would be logical to include in the pursuit of the global impact of the instrument. Yet these could also be covered under the CFSP budget (yet this has a different governance structure). This is the most significant change and evolution from the original proposal to the final proposal.

More than half of the impacts of the original proposal are different from those in the regulation. Given this restriction the linkages are not necessarily clearer in the original proposal nor are the impacts more segmented.

The original proposal describes clearly the overall context in which the regulation will apply and the interlink ages between the other related EU policies. As a result the same degree of details on this topic is available in both documents. However, it is the measures and areas of intervention to achieve such impacts that has been strengthened in the final regulation

Yes, though for added detail to complete the gaps in the ‘faithful IL’ it is necessary to refer to the Annual Action Programmes.

4. Are there certain differences between the original proposals and the resulting regulations in relation to the ‘governance’ of the implementation of the EC’s interventions which they entail?

This is clearly shown by the strong differences between the original general principles article and the DCI general principles article, given that the latter is twice as long and contains more elaborate guidance on the roles of NSAs and the EP.

No. Yes the original proposals envisage a lesser role for the Parliament and to a lesser extent the Council which was subsequently revised in negotiation. Also the removal of the requirement for reference to the Euratom Treaty and the creation of a separate instrument for nuclear safety cleared the way for greater Parliamentary oversight. The Parliament has since taken a very active role in “governing” the IfS.

The texts of the proposal and the regulation are very similar.

No Yes, the provisions for the Committee in the INSC regulation (Art. 19) are more detailed than in the original proposal

5. Are there differences in the geographic coverage as a result of differences observed under question 2 above?

The DCECI also proposed to cover high-income countries, while the DCI only covers countries listed as ODA recipients by the OECD/DAC.

No, but there is less focus on the thematic dimension of ENPI in the resulting regulation

No, however there were problems associated with the rules of origin for proposals that excluded OECD countries that were not EU/EEA members such as Canada and Switzerland – this was proposed to be amended in the MTR.

The DCECI proposed to include developing countries and industrialised countries, while the ICI only covers the latter and activities, which are clearly not ODA eligible.

No No



Key questions Assumptions and/or expected results as formulated by the Study Team

DCI ENPI IfS ICI EIDHR INSC 6. What are the

differences between key processes for planning, monitoring and evaluation?

The proposals and the resulting text are very similar.

The proposals and the resulting text are very similar.

A greater role for the Parliament is included in the final text and more specifics requirement with dates are made for a final evaluation review to be presented to the Parliament. The original proposal did not contain a requirement with a specific figure attached to it to go through the procedures outlined in article 22 (2). However this requirement and some thresholds were added to the final proposal, namely of EUR 20 million for Exceptional Assistance Measures and Special Measures costing more than EUR 5 million.

Programming is more clearly related to the Community’s interests, in the implementation phase the EIB does not play a role anymore. It is suggested to include associate stakeholder and non-state actors in the evaluation in the regulation.

The proposals and the resulting text are largely similar with the only exception being a reference in the final regulation to the need to ensure that ‘Proposals by the European Parliament or the Council for independent external evaluations shall be taken into due account’ (Art. 16.1)

No major differences are apparent though at times the INSC regulation is more specific in its references to measures and procedures appropriate to the field of nuclear safety.

7. Based on the reconstructed logic, is there room to improve the faithful intervention logic?

Yes, and these improvements have been made in the reconstructed intervention logic, and are outlined in the text. In particular additions were made relating to: • Preparatory actions by the EC • Modes of financing • A question was raised relating to

the interrelationship between the thematic and geographic programmes

• The interaction between the food security thematic programme and the EU Food Facility

• An assumed link with the EIDHR

Yes, and these improvements have been made in the reconstructed intervention logic, and are outlined in the text. At the activities’ level, additions were made in the areas of: • Implementation of regional

flagship initiatives • Promotion of maritime

support • Special measures

implementations; The outputs level, has been simplified by regrouping them into six coherent categories: • Economic integration & trade • Mobility & migration • People to people exchanges • Thematic support (regional

dimension) • Political co-operation • Management of crisis

situation.

Minor changes only. The major changes occurred at the stage before the adoption of the regulation. The Mid-Term Review proposed only minor changes to one area of action (Small Arms and Light Weapons) and the weighting of funding between the two major areas of intervention. See attached diagram.

The reconstructed intervention logic shows that on the output level most activities can be linked to the results via the action programmes and thus reinforce the first global impact. An assumed link to the result of strengthening links at the regional level could, however, not be found. Moreover it became clear the second global impact does not seem to be supported by any of the preceding steps of the intervention logic and might have difficulties being reinforced and supported by relying on the general principles only. Either measures to support these principles as laid out in the DCECI Art.1(3) are taken or the global impact is to be substituted by another to make the intervention logic more consistent.

It is difficult to conclude that the faithful intervention logic could be improved since the main gap was identified at the output level. Such gap can be explained by the recommendations of the EIA and the need for the ooutputs to be defined during the programming phase

Yes – particularly based on details from the AAPs.



3.2 Synthesis of the Evidence from Phase 2

This last section of Part 1 of the Desk Report seeks to synthesise the evidence collected (and presented in Table 4) to provide an overall analysis for Phase 2. This overall analysis is laid out according to six headings derived from the material collected above. These are: 1. The differences between the faithful and the reconstructed intervention logics 2. The degree of detail on objectives and earmarking 3. Global objectives that implies a mix of ODA and non-ODA 4. Differences on geographic coverage 5. Differences regarding the management of the implementation of the regulation between

the proposals and final regulations 6. Differences on processes for planning and M&E

3.2.1 The Dif f erences between the Faithful and the Reconstructed Intervent ion Logics

The reconstructed logics (see annex 7) show that the main gaps of items that were not identifiable in the faithful reconstruction logic provided in Phase 1 of the study (see annex 6) and which were filled by using evidence collected during Phase 2, were mostly at the Output level of the intervention logics. In the case of the EIDHR and the DCI additional intervention logic Results (1 in each case) were identified. In the case of the ENPI additional Activities were added to the reconstructed logic as a result of the analysis of Annual Action Programmes. Overall this indicates that the Regulations, while generally strong on indicating Impacts and Results, are not too specific on Outputs leaving this to be specified more clearly in lower level programming documents during the first stages of the implementation of the instrument. In general therefore the main difference between the faithful and the reconstructed intervention logics lies in the greater clarity on Outputs that it was possible to provide after studying other documents. A comparison between the initial proposals on the legal instruments and the final approved regulations indicate that the level of detail in the linkages between the intermediate and the global impacts varies considerably. While some regulations include more details of linkages between intermediate and global impacts, others include less. The impacts of the DCI and the ICI have both changed as a result of the splitting up of the DCECI. In the case of the DCI the final regulation included a greater degree of detail as a result of negotiations. The ICI regulation also introduced new impacts as a result of a similar split. A similar trend is noticeable with the IfS and the INSC which became more detailed after being split apart. This suggests that in the negotiations between the Commission and the Budgetary Authority at the time, there was a tendency to pin matters down more and be more specific. There are exceptions to this however. The ENPI saw a reduction of the level of details in the final regulation as compared to the initial proposal. In the case of the EIDHR, the initial proposal did not elaborate on such linkages nor was the level of details increased in the final regulations. This was probably intentional as there appears to have been some awareness of a need to keep the definition of impacts as broad as possible given the complex environment the two regulations focus on. This was noted in particular in the Impact Assessment of the EIDHR, which explicitly stated that ‘considering the intricate scope of human rights and democracy issues, and the high complexity of the relationship between cause and effect in these areas, such a general statement on the expected effects of the overall policy objective…appears appropriate’.58 58 Commission of the European Communities (2003), p. 6



3.2.2 Degree o f Detai l on Objec t ives and Earmarking

Table 4 shows that in most case there was an increase in the level of earmarking (degree of specification of activities) of the use to which funds in the instrument could be put in the final regulation compared to that initially proposed by the EC. This confirms the tendency, observed in the previous paragraphs, that the negotiations on the Regulation usually resulted in the text of the instrument becoming more specific. The ENPI final regulation, is however slightly different in that it included at least a similar level of detail as the original proposal and was not altered by the involvement of the EP except on the thematic programmes which were removed in the final regulation. One reason that might explain this is that the ENPI was the only instrument that was not divided or extracted from broader EC proposals and as a result the negotiations between the EP and the EC did not require major changes to the EC’s proposal.

3.2.3 Global Objec t ives that Implies a Mix of ODA and Non-ODA

Def in i t ion o f ODA ‘Grants or Loans to countries and territories on Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipients (developing countries) which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms [if a loan, having a Grant Element (q.v.) of at least 25 per cent]. In addition to financial flows, Technical Co-operation (q.v.) is included in aid. Grants, Loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. For the treatment of the forgiveness of Loans originally extended for military purposes, see Notes on Definitions and Measurement below. Transfer payments to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations or insurance payouts) are in general not counted.’ – OECD DAC In all cases, there is an indication that the regulations sought to ensure a mix between ODA and non-ODA funds in the implementation of the instrument. In the case of thematic programmes this is to be expected as they were designed to allow the flexible use of resources in both ODA and non-ODA eligible countries. The presence of a mix between ODA and non-ODA in geographical instruments indicate that greater flexibility is sought in order to ensure, especially in developing regions, a mix between ODA in order to meet poverty reduction targets and non-ODA in order to deal with the need of emerging economies. In the case of the DCI however it was noted during the MTR that differences had arisen between the EC and the EP on questions of the eligibility of certain activities because they did not conform to ODA criteria laid down by the OECD/DAC. The implication is that while the Regulation does allow for a mix of ODA and non-ODA funding the tendency of the Parliament was to view the DCI funds as to be used very largely if not entirely as ODA. Several of the regulations put considerable emphasis on the fact the instrument in question is intended to be complementary with other instruments and that funds from different sources should be combined as appropriate. Complementarity between instruments was therefore an important policy point that both the Commission and the Budgetary Authority were in agreement on.

3.2.4 Differences on Geographic Coverage

In its original proposals the Commission only proposed one instrument with a specific geographic coverage, the ENPI, to cover the EU neighbourhood countries. Otherwise it sought to have no geographic restrictions. In the case of the DCECI this was contested in the negotiations with the Budgetary Authority. From this emerged three new instruments: two of which with a specified geographic coverage (DCI and ICI) and one without (EIDHR).



The final result was that differences on geographic coverage are clearly stipulated in the regulations. While three out of the six instruments (IfS, EIDHR, INSC) are designed in order to be flexibly used across the world, the other three instruments are limited to specific regions, that is in the EU neighbourhood countries (ENPI), all developing countries including both LICs and MICs (DCI) and finally all industrialised countries (ICI). The countries covered by the ENPI and the DCI are not mutually exclusive however, allowing the thematic programmes element of the DCI to also be used in developing countries in the neighbourhood category.

3.2.5 Differences on Management o f the Implementat ion Issues between the Proposals and the Actual Regulat ions

From a comitology or governance perspective, in half the cases (ENPI, ICI and EIDHR) no major changes were introduced to the final regulation compared to the original proposal of the European Commission. On the other hand, the final DCI regulation is far more specific than the original DCECI proposal from the Commission and also contains more elaborate guidance on the role of the EP. For the IfS and the INSC the whole discussion about splitting the originally proposed instrument essentially revolved around the question of its governance and the appropriate legal base to use in the treaties. In the case of the IfS the final result thus puts greater emphasis on the role of the EP. For the INSC more details are specified on the procedures of the committee for overseeing implementation than were provided in the initial EC proposal (art. 19). The essential conclusion that one may draw from this would seem to be that there were two cases where the Budgetary Authority and it would seem mostly the European Parliament was wary of how the Commission might manage the instrument: that is the DCI and the IfS. In these cases it therefore sought to specify the use of the instrument and its governance more carefully in the regulation. On the other hand with the EIDHR where there had also been a disagreement about the original proposal once the EP’s basic point on the need for a separate instrument was accepted, there appears to have been more agreement on the manner it which it should be used and the EP saw no need to tighten up the governance of the instrument further.

3.2.6 Differences on Processes for Planning and M&E

Broadly speaking, the initial Commission proposals and the final regulations include a similar level of information on programming and monitoring processes to be used in the management of the instruments. In some cases however (EIDHR, ICI, DCI) there is a stronger role given to specific stakeholders such as CSOs as implementation, monitoring and evaluation actors. This therefore does not seem to have been an area of contention or lengthy debate between the EC and the Budgetary Authority.



3.3 Some Critical Questions Emerging from Phase 2

The six points raised above identify a number of conclusions on the regulations. In particular a few issues stand out: In most cases where the negotiation process leading up to the adoption of the final regulation was more intense, this has resulted in more detail in the final regulations largely as a result of the input of the EP. Some of this extra detail is evident in the longer lists of activities and programmes in the intervention logics of such instruments as the DCI. However, this does not necessarily mean the logic chains of the instruments in question are any clearer as the regulations still leave open many of the linkages that would be required to get a full and clear picture of how the parties expected the instruments to actually achieve the impacts they sought.

Generally the final regulations contain a similar level of detail at the Impact and the Result levels. However the degree of detail at the Output level varies considerably from one regulation to another. What is not clear is what effect the degree of detail at Output level might have on the successful implementation of the regulation.

The ODA/non-ODA distinction in the different instruments is not clearly specified in the regulations and has led to some inter-institutional debate. This is therefore an issue that would benefit from further discussion when designing the regulations for future instruments. Finally and partly, in relation to the previous observation, the evidence (mainly from the MTR) shows that the degree of complementarity expected between the different instruments in practice, and especially between thematic and geographic instruments, is not always clear. Based on these observations it would seem important to retain a number of pertinent questions that could be useful to consider in the formulation of the next round of financial instruments for EU external action. 1. Should the ‘ log i c chain’ be fur ther c lar i f i ed in the regulat ion? The previous section highlighted the fact that the final regulations include more details than initially proposed by the EC. As explained this essentially resulted from the negotiations with the Budgetary Authority and particularly the EP. The resulting areas of intervention were however not prioritised nor were they related to a clearly spelt out ‘logic chain’. From the evidence available it seems that in least in some cases, this resulted in certain areas of intervention being prioritised over others, thereby resulting in gaps in the implementation of the intervention logic if it is assumed that it is the combination of the different areas of intervention that would result in the achievement of the impact. However, given the absence of a clearly spelt out ‘impact logic chain’ (the relationship between the impacts, results, outputs and activities and how they are expected to influence on one another) it is difficult to assess whether the intervention logic has been compromised as a result of some actions being prioritised over others. In such a case a clearer outline of the ‘logic chain’ maybe required. However, the Study Team recognises that this may be best done not in the regulation itself, but in some form of complementary policy document. Such a document could be drawn by the EC to provide a general framework to ensure a common-base and guide the choices made in the regional and country strategies so as to ensure that they are aligned with the regulation. 2. Should there be a pr ior i t i sat ion o f ac t iv i t i es in the regulat ion? In relation to the previous question, this Phase of the Study has shown that the negotiations process tends to lead to an increase in the number of activities and outputs to be delivered under the regulation. However, this increase in detail is not accompanied by any indication of



prioritisation or of what are seen as the primary activities that are key in order to achieve the intended impact of the regulation. Greater detail thus does not necessarily help with the achievement of the desired result. However, it can be noted that prioritisation of certain activities, for instance if based on the promotion of EU values, can be ensured through the focus on thematic instruments which however need to be more focussed, including in terms of the activities it intends to undertake on the basis of a pre-defined intervention logic. 3. Should there be a greater l eve l o f detai l in the regulat ions? The MTR did not identify any major problems faced in the implementation of the regulations as a result of any gaps existing in their logic chains (i.e. output level). This leads one to conclude that the absence of a greater level of detail does not pose a threat to the effective implementation of the regulations. However, the MTR did identify some issues pertaining to disagreements between the Commission and the Parliament over the eligibility of certain activities to be undertaken as well as on the type of outputs (eg. case of Small Arms with the IfS). In other words while the lack of detail in certain parts of the intervention logic of the instruments does not appear to have led to implementation difficulties it has led to a small number of disagreements between the EC and the EP over what they each saw as eligible activities. From the MTR, the number of such cases does not appear to be very high. Nonetheless, it is clear that a minimum level of detail is required, as too little detail would leave the budgetary authority with a very limited indication of how the funds will be spent and therefore reduce accountability. On the other hand too much could easily result in micro-management. The MTR provides an indication of whether implementation difficulties were encountered or not. However, what it did not do was to reach a real judgement on whether the instruments achieved the impacts specified in each of the regulations and whether or not this was made more or less difficult by the degree of detail in the regulation. For this more complex question we will have to wait to see if the material collected in Phase 3 of the study provides the evidence for such a judgement. 4. Should the div is ion between ODA and non-ODA cont inue to guide the implementat ion o f the regulat ions? One reoccurring issue identified in the MTR pertains to the eligibility of certain types of expenditure as ODA. Some regulations (ENPI, DCI, ICI) were particularly faced by implementation challenges as a result of disagreements on what activities are eligible as ODA. This seems to have largely arisen out of an expectation in some quarters that funds for developing countries in the DCI should all be seen as ODA compatible. The thematic instruments (INSC, EIDHR and IfS) have not faced this issue probably partly because their funds can be spent anywhere in the world, but also because the expenditure they support would not always be expected to be classified as ODA. Whether or not funds under a particular instrument are expected to be spent as ODA would therefore seem to be an important issue to clarify in future regulations. In any case it seems important to delink the geographic coverage issue from the ODA/non-ODA criteria for two main reasons. First, common sense suggests that there will always be some activities to be funded in a developing country that are worthwhile but not necessarily ODA compatible. Second just because a country is developing does not necessarily mean that promoting development should be the only action the EU supports in that country. Even in the case of the DCI, where this is clearly very important, an alternative might be to agree an indicative target of what percentage of DCI funds should be spent as ODA. 5. Does geographic coverage provide a good cr i t er ion for dis t inguishing between instruments? According to the MTR, the thematic regulations (IfS, EIDHR, INSC) have broadly achieved their objectives. The same applies to the geographic instruments (ENPI, DCI, ICI). Yet it is only in the case of the ENPI where the MTR was able to note that complementarity with the thematic instruments was successful. In the case of the DCI the



tension between thematic and geographic interventions was noted within the regulation itself. This raises the question of whether the EU policies should be primarily differentiated by geographic or/and thematic considerations. There are arguments in favour on the one hand for the maintenance of the current scenario where both geographic and thematic instruments would co-exist and on the other hand a scenario where one of the types of instruments (geographic or thematic) is dropped. In reflecting on this choice it would be important to identify possible criteria for deciding which type of instruments would be necessary, their number (what number of instruments is realistically manageable) and their scope. One possibility might be to base such a choice on the policy documents of the Union as well as the overall objectives of the Union as embedded in the Treaty of Lisbon and the Europe 2020 Strategy. This might allow for a clearer link between the regulations and the policies pursued by the Union.



ANNEX 1: COMPARING THE 2004 DCECI PROPOSAL WITH THE 2006 DCI REGULATION

Function and Article Proposed financing instrument for development

cooperation and economic cooperation (DCECI) [27 Articles in total]

Adopted financing instrument for development cooperation (DCI)

[41 Articles in total] Preambule 20 paragraphs 29 paragraphs

Purpose and scope: Art 1

3 paragraphs (third paragraph consisting of 31 sub-objectives) • All countr i es/reg ions e l i g ib l e except EU MS and

IPA/ENPI e l ig ib l e . • Reference to TEC Arti c l e s 179 and 181a:

deve lopment cooperat ion, e conomic , f inanc ia l , s c i ent i f i c , t e chnica l cooperat ion and a l l o ther forms o f cooperat ion to be covered . All to be implemented in accordance wi th pr inc ip l es and ob je c t ives o f Community external ac t ion .

3 paragraphs • All countr i es (and reg ions in which they ’r e lo cated) e l i g ib l e

as per the DAC l i s t o f a id re c ip i ents . Reg ion de f ined as ‘g eographica l ent i ty compris ing more than one deve loping country ’ .

Objectives (DCECI Art 1, DCI Art 2) (objectives included in Art 1)

6 paragraphs • Primary and overarching ob je c t ive i s eradicat ion o f pover ty

in the context o f sus ta inable deve lopment , inc luding pursui t o f the MDGs as we l l as the promot ion o f democracy , good governance and respec t for human r ights and for the ru le o f law.

• Consis t ent wi th that overarching ob je c t ive , f ive addi t ional ob je c t ives are ment ioned.

• Legal f ramework prov ided by TEC, genera l f ramework, or i entat ions and focus prov ided by EU Consensus on Deve lopment .

• Reference to fu l f i l lment o f c r i t er ia for ODA by intervent ions .

General principles: Art 2 DCECI, DCI Art 3)

5 Paragraphs • Consis t ency in external ac t ion • Coordinat ion and complementar i ty ( inc luding

mult i la tera l ) • Alignment to nat ional deve lopment p lans whi l e

s eeking to promote EU values

10 Paragraphs; in addition to modified DCECI proposals: • Priority for least developed and low income countries,

appropriate attention to pro-poor support in middle income countries

• Policy coherence for development required • Mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues and various best

practices that are to be promoted • References to need to inform and consult with EP, and seek

regular exchanges of information with civil society

Sub-objectives for geographic and

thematic instrument

Absent, while Art. 3 does refer to ‘global initiatives’ in addition to geographical and thematic programmes. Articles 4 – 6 cover: (1) strategy papers and multiannual programming of geographic programmes (Art 4 and 5, with the same title), adoption of multiannual programming papers (Art 6)

Articles 4-5 detail overall objectives for geographic programmes Articles 6-10 detail specific regional objectives Article 11 details overall objectives for thematic programmes, subsidiary to geographic programmes Articles 12-17 detail objectives for specific thematic initiatives

Implementation (Title III)

Articles 7- 20, structured as follows: • Adoption of action programmes (Art 7) • Special measures not provided for in strategy papers or

multiannual indicative programmes (Art 8) • Eligibility (Art 9) • Types of financing (14 types mentioned in Art 10) • Support measures (Art 11) • Cofinancing (Art 12) • Management procedures (Art 13) • Budget commitments (Art 14) • Protecting the Community’s financial interests (Art 15) • Public procurement procedures, grant award

procedures (Art 16) • Prefinancing (Art 17) • Funds made available to the European Investment

Bank or other financial intermediaries (Art 18) • Evaluation (Art 19)

Articles 22-33; structured as follows (Articles in bold when not in DCECI): • Adoption of annual action programmes (Art 22) • Special measures not provided for in strategy papers or

multiannual indicative programmes (Art 23) • Eligibility (Art 24) • Types of financing (14 types mentioned in Art 25) • Support measures (Art 26) • Cofinancing (Art 27) • Management procedures (Art 28) • Budget commitments (Art 29) • Protecting the Community’s financial interests (Art 30) • Public procurement procedures, grant award procedures (Art

31) • Funds made available to the European Investment Bank or

other financial intermediaries (Art 32) • Evaluation (Art 33)

Final provisions (Title IV)

Articles 20-27, structured as follows: • Annual report (Art 20) • Committee (Art 21) • Participation by a third country not eligible under this

Regulation (Art 22) • Suspension of assistance (Art 23) • Financial provisions (Art 24): referring to €44,229

million in total of which €23,572 million for the ACP excluding East Timor and South Africa

• Review (Article 25) • Repeal of Regulations (Art 26) • Entering into force (Art 27)

Articles 34-41, structured as follows: • Annual report (Art 34) • Committee (Art 35) • Participation by a third country not eligible under this

Regulation (Art 36) • Suspension of assistance (Art 37) • Financial provisions (Art 38): referring to €16,897 million,

budgetisation and ACP not referred to • Repeal of Regulations (Art 39) • Review (Art 40) • Entering into force (Art 41)



ANNEX 2: COMPARING THE 2004 ENPI PROPOSAL WITH THE 2006 ENPI REGULATION


cooperation and economic cooperation (ENPI) [32 Art i c l e s in to ta l]

Adopted financing instrument for development cooperation (ENPI) [32 Art i c l e s in to ta l]

Preamble 19 paragraphs 23 paragraphs

Subject Matter and scope: Art 1

3 paragraphs (third paragraph consisting of 31 sub-objectives) • Reference to Annex 1 (eligible countries) • Community assistance may be used for partner

countries , and partner countries and member states (CBC)

• Statement on the founding values of the Union

3 paragraphs • Same

Scope of assistance: Art 2

2 paragraphs (second paragraph lists 25 areas of assistance). (Objectives/ areas where assistance will be provided Paragraph w includes post crisis, conflict prevention and disaster preparedness

2 paragraphs • second paragraph lists 29 areas of assistance – some of

the original are split into their components). • However the paragraph aa focuses on post-crisis

support and disaster preparedness, but the reference to conflict prevention is removed

Policy Framework: Art 3

1 paragraph • Consistency in external action • Partnership and cooperation agreements,

Commissions communications

2 paragraphs An additional paragraph : Where no agreements, as mentioned in paragraph 1,between the European Union and partner countries exist, Community assistance may be provided when it proves useful to pursue European Union policy objectives, and shall be programmed on the basis of such objectives

Complementarity, partnership and co-

financing: Art.4

4 paragraphs • Complementarity of the contribution • Partnership (2 sub-paragraphs) • Co-financing

Same

Coherence, compatibility and

coordination: Art 5

4 paragraphs • Consistency with Community policies, bilateral and

multilateral agreement • Consistency with other internal and external

instruments including EIB • Coordination of EC and MS respective assistance

programmes • Coordination with multinational and regional

organisations and entities

Same

Programming and allocation of Funds

(Title II)

2 articles Art 6: type of programmes (country-multicountry, regional and subregional cooperation programmes; cross–border, transregional cooperation programmes, thematic programmes Art 7: programming and allocation of funds

Same but reference to thematic programmes is removed

Cross-Border Cooperation

(Title III)

Articles 9-11, structured as follows: • Geographical eligibility (Art 8) • Programming (Art 9) • Management of Programmes 10) • Implementing Rules (Art 11)

Same

Implementation (Title IV)

Articles 12-24, structured as follows: • Adoption of Action Programmes (art 12) • Adoption of special measures (Art 13) • Eligibility (Art 14) • Type of measures (Art 15) • Support measures (Art 16) • Cofinancing (Art 17) • Management procedures (Art 18) • Budget commitments (Art 19) • Protecting the Community’s financial interests (Art 20) • Participation in tenders and contracts (Art 21) • Prefinancing (Art 22) • Funds made available by EIB (Art 23) • Evaluation (Art 24)

Same

Final Provisions (Title V)

Articles 25-32, structured as follows: • Annual Report (Art 25) • Committee (Art 26) • Participation by third country (Art 27) • Suspension of assistance (Art 28) • Financial Reference amount (Art 29) • Review (Art 30) • Repeal (Art 31) • Entry into force (Art 32)

Same



ANNEX 3: COMPARING THE 2004 DCECI PROPOSAL WITH THE 2006 ICI REGULATION


cooperation and economic cooperation (DCECI) [27 Arti c l e s in to ta l]

Adopted financing instrument for development cooperation (DCI)

[19 Arti c l e s in to ta l] Preamble 20 paragraphs 10 paragraphs

Purpose and scope: (DCECI Art 1, ICI Art

2)

3 paragraphs (third paragraph consisting of 31 sub-objectives) • All countries/regions eligible except EU MS and

IPA/ENPI eligible. • Reference to TEC Articles 179 and 181a: development

cooperation, economic, financial, scientific, technical cooperation and all other forms of cooperation to be covered. All to be implemented in accordance with principles and objectives of Community external action.

2 paragraphs on scope • aimed at industrialised partner countries which share similar

structures • also covers newly industrialised countries with which the

Community has a strategic interest in promoting links • refers to countries in the Annex but (1) other countries might be

eligible (2) list in the Annex is to be amended in accordance with OECD/DAC reviews of its list of developing countries

Objectives (DCECI Art 1, ICI Art 1)

(objectives included in Art 1)

2 paragraphs • cooperation with industrialised and other high-income countries

and territories • create a favourable environment for the development of relations

with these countries and promote dialogue while fostering the Community’s interests

General principles: Art 2 DCECI, DCI Art 3)

5 Paragraphs • Consistency in external action • Coordination and complementarity (including multilateral

and regional organisations) • Alignment to national development plans while seeking to

promote commitment to EU values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights

5 Paragraphs; • Seeking to promote EU principles of liberty, democracy, respect

for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law • differentiated approach (partner countries context, EU’s interests

and priorities) • ensure coherence with other areas of external action • complement and add value to measures undertaken by MS and EU

Areas of cooperation (Article 4, ICI) Absent

1 Article (7 paragraphs) • cooperation between economic, academic and scientific actors • stimulation of trade and investments • promotion of dialogues (including NGOs) • people-to-people links, education, intellectual and cultural

exchange • cooperation in research, science, technology (incl. climate change) • understanding and visibility of EU in partner countries • flexible support for specific initiatives

Programming and allocation of funds (Title II, DCECI;

Article 5, ICI)

4 Articles (12 paragraphs) • measures financed under geographic or thematic

programmes (strategy papers, multiannual programmes; thematic strategy papers, action programmes)

• strategy papers to be based on dialogue with partner countries which involves civil society to ensure ownership

• in circumstances such as crises, post-conflict situations or threats to democracy, the rule of law, human rights or fundamental freedoms ad hoc review of the strategy

• Commission, MS and other development actors to consult to ensure complementarities

• ensure consistency between thematic and geographical programmes

1 article (3 paragraphs) • actions carried out in the framework of multiannual cooperation

programmes • programmes to be set out in the Community’s strategic interests

and priorities, the general objectives and the expected results • review at mid-term, or ad hoc if necessary

Implementation (Title III, Articles 7-19 DCECI; Articles 7-13,

ICI)

12 Articles (33 paragraphs), structured as follows: • Adoption of action progs (Art 7) • Special measures not provided for in strategy papers or

multiannual indicative programmes (Art 8) • Eligibility (Art 9) • Types of financing (14 types mentioned in Art 10) • Support measures (Art 11) • Cofinancing (Art 12) • Management procedures (Art 13) • Budget commitments (Art 14) • Protecting the Community’s financial interests (Art 15) • Public procurement procedures, grant award

procedures (Art 16) • Prefinancing (Art 17) • Funds made available to the European Investment

Bank or other financial intermediaries (Art 18) • Evaluation (Art 19)

7 articles (21 paragraphs) ; structured as follows ( • Implementation (Adoption of annual action programmes (Art 6)) • Eligibility (Art 7) • Types of financing (4 types mentioned in Art 8) • Support measures (Art 9) • Cofinancing (Art 10) • Management procedures (Art 11) • Protecting the Community’s financial interests (Art 12) • Evaluation (Art 13) (paragraph 3: associate relevant

stakeholders, including non-State actors in the evaluation phase)

Final provisions (Title IV, Article 20-27, DCECI; Articles 14-19,

ICI)

8 Articles (14 paragraphs), structured as follows: • Annual report (Art 20) • Committee (Art 21) • Participation by a third country not eligible under this

Regulation (Art 22) • Suspension of assistance (Art 23) • Financial provisions (Art 24): referring to €44,229 million

in total of which €23,572 million for the ACP excluding East Timor and South Africa

• Review (Article 25) • Repeal of Regulations (Art 26) • Entering into force (Art 27)

6 Articles (9 paragraphs), structured as follows: • Annual report (Art 14) • Committee (Art 15) • Financial provisions (Art 16): referring to €172 million for period

of 2007-1013 • Repeal (Art 17) • Review (Art 18) • Entering into force (Art 19)



ANNEX 4: COMPARING THE ORIGINAL EC PROPOSAL ON THE EIDHR (2006) WITH THE CHANGES INTRODUCED TO THE FINAL TEXT OF THE RREGULATION (2006)

Function and Article Original Commission Proposal (20 art i c l e s in to ta l )

Final adopted text (21 art i c l e s in to ta l )

Preamble

20 Paragraphs • Reference to TEC Articles 179 and 181a:

development cooperation, economic, financial, scientific, technical cooperation and all other forms of cooperation to be covered. All to be implemented in accordance with principles and objectives of Community external action

• Instrument established to complement other legal instruments

• Regional scope: global

24 Paragraphs • Same • Expands reference to the European Consensus on

Development • Additional reference to the role of parliaments in the

promotion of democracy and human rights • Additional reference to the need to respond in a flexible

manner to the specific needs of human rights defenders • Placing limitations on the expenditure for EU Election

Observations Missions under this regulation

Objectives: Article 1 2 Paragraphs (2nd paragraph lists 4 aims of the regulation) Four objectives were identified in the initial proposal.

2 Paragraphs (2nd paragraph lists 3 aims of the regulation) Three objectives were identified. The first and second objectives as presented in the EC’s proposal were merged. The other two objectives were also expanded in scope notably to place a greater emphasis on the role of civil society and on the need to support the reliability of electoral processes.

Scope: Article 2

3 Paragraphs, 4 sub-paragraphs Four areas were identified in the original proposal: a) Support for democracy and processes of

democratisation, in particular by strengthening the role of civil society

b) The promotion and defence of human rights and

fundamental freedoms as proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments concerning civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.

c) the strengthening of the international framework for

the protection of human rights, the rule of law and the promotion of democracy

d) building confidence in and enhancing the reliability

and transparency of democratic electoral processes

3 Paragraphs, 4 sub-paragraphs Similarly, four areas were identified. Although the last two areas remain generally similar, the scope of the first two areas has been adjusted both broadly and in terms of the sub-activities a) Promotion and enhancement of participatory and

representative democracy, including parliamentary democracy, and the processes of democratisation, mainly through civil society organisations

b) the promotion and protection of human rights and

fundamental freedoms, as proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human rights and other international and regional instruments concerning civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, mainly through civil society organisations, relating to inter alia:

c) the strengthening of the international framework for the

protection of human rights, justice, the rule of law and the promotion of democracy

d) Building confidence in and enhancing the reliability and

transparency of democratic electoral processes, in particular:

Complementarity and Coherence of Community Assistance:

Article 3

4 Paragraphs • Regulation is complementary to other Community

regulations • EC has responsibility to ensure coherence with the

overall strategic framework of the Community • Coordination between EC and MS • Regular exchanges with the EP • Regular dialogue with CSOs

4 Paragraphs • Same but with an addition that dialogue with CSOs should

also be expanded to CSOs in third countries

Implementation: Arts 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9

3 Measures • Strategy Papers • Annual Action Programmes • Special Measures

4 Measures • Same • Ad hoc Measures added in order to cater for needs of

human rights defenders

Eligibility: Article 10

2 Paragraphs (4 points under 1st paragraph) • Civil society organisations and community-based

organisations • Non-profit agencies, institutions and organisations

and networks at different levels • International and regional inter-governmental

organisations • Natural persons

2 Paragraphs (5 points under 1st paragraph) • Same • Addition of parliamentary bodies

Types of financing: Article 12

5 Paragraphs • Projects and programmes • Grants for projects submitted by international and

regional inter-governmental organisations • Grants operating the costs of the European Inter-

University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation

• Contributions to international funds • Human and material resources for effective

implementation of the EU Election Observations Missions

• Public contracts • Mesures are elegible for co-financing from other

actors

6 Paragraphs • Same • Addition of grants to finance human rights defenders as

well as the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights



ANNEX 5: COMPARING THE NUCLEAR SAFETY PROVISIONS IN THE 2004 IFS PROPOSAL WITH THE 2007 INSC REGULATION

Function and Article

Proposed Council Regulation for establishing an Instrument for Stability [27

Art i c l e s in to ta l]

Adopted financing instrument for nuclear safety and cooperation (INSC)

[19 Art i c l e s in to ta l]

Preamble 24 paragraphs with references to both Euratom Treaty and EU and UN commitments on conflict prevention and peace keeping

10 paragraphs with references purely to Euratom and past EU work obn nuclear safety. Also a reference to package of external action instruments

Objectives and scope: (IfS proposal Art 1, INSC Art 1)

Refers to promotion of peace and stability and assuring safety and security of populations in third countries. Describes a broad range of crisis situations, instability, terrorism, threats and WMD. Reference to need for capacity building for PKOs and peace work

Very short article stipulating overall objective: “The Community shall finance measures to support the promotion of a high level nuclear safety, radiation protection and the application of efficient and effective safeguards of nuclear material in third countries in line with the provisions of this Regulation.”

Purpose (IfS proposal Art 2,

INSC Art 2)

Introduction referring to complementarity with assistance under other instruments (humanitarian aid, IPA, ENPI and DCECI) Long list of items of which only a few relate to nuclear safety but also to threats from chemical and biological agents, inter alia: • Promotion of a nuclear safety culture • Establishment and implementation of nuclear

safeguards • Reduction of stockpiles of fissile material • Effective control and detection of illicit

traffic

Similar introduction referring to complementarity with assistance under other instruments (humanitarian aid, IPA, ENPI, DCI, EIDHR and ICI) Then provides a more specific list of purposes relating purely to nuclear safety that includes all of the same items in the original IfS proposal, and some more specific details, for instance: • Support for regulatory bodies and regulatory

frameworks • The need to draw on the experience of local

operators • Safe transport, treatment and spent of spent

nuclear fuel • Measures to promote international cooperation

notably through the IAEA

Title II: Programming and allocation of funds: (IfS proposal Art 4-9,

INSC Art 3-4)

No specific references to nuclear safety at all. Instead generic articles on: • Measures and programmes as well as multi-

annual programmes • Special provisions for exceptional measures,

interim programmes and for PKOs

Short articles on the use of multi-annual strategy papers and indicative programmes. Also reference to need for consistency for measures taken under other EC instruments for external assistance

Title III: Implementation

(IfS proposal Art 10-23, INSC Art 5-17)

Covers a range of practical issues relating to financing decisions,, eligibility, types of measures, support, cofinancing, management, budget commitments, financial interests of the EC, rules of origin, grants and evaluation. Nothing specific on nuclear safety apart from references to Euratom legal texts inter alia.

While there are some generic provisions here there is also some much more specific articles relating directly to the field of nuclear safety • Article 7 on Eligibility contains a list of types of

organisations and bodies that can be funded • Article 8 has a list of Types of Measures that can

be taken which is more detailed than the equivalent provisions in the original proposal for the IfS

• Article 10 on Cofinancing is largely similar in both texts

• Article 11 on Management Procedures is similar yet in places more specific as is Article 13 on the Protection of financial interests

• Article 14 on Rules of participation and origin is considerably more detailed

Final provisions (IfS proposal Art 24-28, INSC Art 18-23)

The articles on reporting (Art 24), review (26) and entry into force (28) are all seemingly standard articles. However, the article on the Committee (25) is relatively simple whereas that on repeal (27) contains a relatively long list of regulations that would be repealed by this proposal.

The two articles that are substantially different from the original IfS proposal are first that on the Committee (19) which is very detailed in comparison suggesting that it was the outcome of a fair amount of negotiation. Second, the article on Repeal (22) which is much simpler as it only refers to one Euratom Regulation and two Decisions.



ANNEX 6: FAITHFUL INTERVENTION LOGICS

General principles (Art 3): 1. Promotion of democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedom 2. Differentiated approach for tailor-made cooperation

3. Mainstreaming cross cutting-issues: (7 issues mentioned in Art 3(3)), particular attention to 6 other issues mentioned in the same paragraph.

4. Promoting policy coherence for development (Art 2 of DCI to be taken into account for all policy areas), and seek coherence

between DCI actions and other areas of external action 5. Improve coordination and complementarity with MS actions 6. Information exchange with MS, with other donors, aiming for joint action.

7. EU promotes multi-lateral answers to global challenges. 8. Promote effective cooperation with countries and regions (4 actions)

9. EC seeks regular exchanges of views with the EP 10. EC seeks regular exchanges of information with civil society

Faithful intervention logic: Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)

Impacts Global Impacts

Outputs Activities Results

Art 2

: Poverty

era

dic

atio

n in

conte

xt o

f susta

inable

develo

pm

ent, in

clu

din

g th

e M

DG

s, a

s w

ell a

s

pro

motio

n o

f dem

ocra

cy, g

ood g

overn

ance a

nd re

spect fo

r hum

an rig

hts

and fo

r the ru

le o

f law

. Art. 2 1. Support to democracy, the rule of

law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance, gender

equality and related international law;

2. Foster sustainable development [4 sub-aspects] of countries and regions,

particularly the most disadvantaged; 3. Encourage smooth and gradual

integration into the world economy; 4. Promote sustainable

management of global natural

resources for sustainable development [3 sub-aspects] ;

5. Strengthen relation between the EC

and Countries/ regions.

Geographic interventions (Art 5)

in Country Strategy Papers and multi-annual indicative

programmes:

1.!Latin America (Art 6)

2.!Asia (Art 7) 3.!Central Asia (Art 8)

4.!Middle-East (Art 9) 5.!South-Africa (Art 10)

Thematic interventions (Art 11)

in Strategy Papers and multi-annual indicative

programmes:

1.!Investing in people (Art

12) 2.!Environment and

sustainable management of natural resources

including energy (Art 13)

3.!Non-State Actors and local authorities in

development (Art 14)

4.!Food security (Art 15) 5.!Migration and Asylum

(Art 16) 6.!ACP Sugar Protocol

countries (Art 17)

Latin America: (Art 6) 1.!Social cohesion promoted 2.!Greater regional integration encouraged 3.!Reinforcement of good governance and public institutions, protection of human rights supported 4.!Common EU-Latin American higher education area supported 5.!Sustainable development promoted

Interventions in the

context of Geographic

Programmes (Art 5) in the thirteen forms listed in Article 25 programmed and

implemented

Interventions in the context of Thematic Programmes (Art

11), using forms of financing listed in Art 25 programmed and

implemented

Asia: (Art 7) 1.!MDGs (Health/education) through policy dialogue promoted 2.!Governance in particular in fragile states addressed 3.!Contribute to control of epidemics 4.!Sustainable development promoted 5.!Production, use and drugs trafficking combated

Central Asia: (Art 8) 1.!constitutional reforms and administrative/regulatory approximation promoted 2.!Development market economy and integrating in WTO (addressing social aspects) promoted 3.!Efficient border management and cross-border cooperation supported 4.!Production, use and drugs trafficking combated 5.!HIV/Aids pandemic addressed 6.!Regional cooperation, dialogue and integration promoted

Middle East (Art 9): 1.!Social cohesion encourage 2.!Economic diversification, market economy, integration in WTO promoted 3.!Regional cooperation, dialogue and integration promoted 4.!Conclusion of international agreements and effective implementation of international law, including UN resolutions. Supported 5.!Governance issues in particular in fragile states addressed

South-Africa:(Art 10): 1.!Democratic society, good governance, rule of law, regional/continental stability + integration consolidated 2.!Adjustment in context of TDCA and other regional trade arrangements supported 3.!Fight against poverty, inequality and exclusion supported 4.!HIV/Aids pandemic addressed

Art 11: “A thematic programme shall be subsidiary to programmes referred to in Art 5-10.” “actions undertaken through thematic programmes shall add value to and be additional to, and coherent with, actions funded under geographic programmes.”

Specific objectives “Investing in people” (Art 12)

Specific objectives “Environment and sustainable management of natural resources including energy” (Art 13)

Specific objectives “Non-State Actors and local authorities in development” (Art 124)

Specific objectives “Food Security” (Art 15)

Specific objectives “Migration and Asylum” (Art 16)

Specific objectives “ACP Sugar Protocol” (Art 17)

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Art. 2

Commitments to EU values as liberty,

democracy, Human Rights, fundamental freedoms and rule

of law are promoted (Art. 1)

Enhance role of civil society

Promote media pluralism

Provide electoral observation and assistance

Support the health sector Governance

Outputs Impacts Activities

European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) Global Impact

Develo

pm

ent o

f an a

rea o

f pro

sperity

and g

ood n

eig

hborlin

ess b

etw

een E

U

and p

artn

ers

(Art. 1

)

Enhanced cooperation and

progressive economic

integration is promoted (Art. 2)

Democratisation promoted

Promote multicultural dialogue

Promote political dialogue

Foster the development of civil society and NGOs

Support actions aimed at increasing food safety

Promote policies for social development, inclusion, gender, employment and social protection

Strengthen impartiality-effectiveness of judiciary system

Support fight against corruption

Strengthen of Public Administration

Strengthen of Justice and Home Affairs

Protect Human Rights and Freedoms

Pursue regional and local development in rural and urban areas

Promote cooperation in higher education and mobility of teachers, students and researchers

Protect historical and cultural heritage and promoting tourism

Promote environmental protection

Promote cooperation in energy, transport and telecommunications

Support joint local initiatives for sustainable economic, social and environmental development

Promote development of a market economy

Promote cross border Cooperation

Encourage communication and promote exchange among the partners

Support Administrative cooperation in the area of taxation

COFINANCING (Art. 4)

Special measures implementation (art.13)

General Principles (Art. 5): Partnership and Joint Ownership; complementarity with other policies implemented through other regulations, coherence and simplification of programming and management

Results

Partner countries efforts aimed at promoting good governance and equitable social and economic

development are supported (Art. 2)

Partnership and cooperation

agreements other existing or future agreements are

implemented (Art. 2)

Policies for poverty reduction supported

Regional and subregional cooperation and integration

promoted

Partner countries participate in community programmes

and agencies

Rule of law and good governance promoted

Post-crisis situations supported

Imbalances reduced. Regional and local

development capacities improved

Policies for Health, Education and Training

promoted

Sustainable development promoted in all aspects

Efficient and secure border management ensured

Communication among partners improved

Transparency and exchange of information in the area of taxation assured to combat

tax avoidance

Art. 2

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Contribution to help preserve, establish, or re-establish conditions [for]! Community’s development and cooperation policies (In situations of crisis or emerging crisis, to contribute to stability) (Art 1 (2) (a))

P

rovid

e T

echnic

al a

nd fin

ancia

l assis

tance (A

rt 3 (2

)) (Art 4

) thro

ugh p

roje

cts

and p

rogra

mm

es; s

ecto

ral o

r genera

l budget s

upport

Contribution to help build capacity to address specific global and transregional threats (In stable situations) (Art 1 (2) (b))

Results Impacts Activities

Instrument for Stability (IfS)

Global Impact

Conflic

t pre

ventio

n (p

re 2

) [and th

e ] p

rom

otio

n o

f sta

ble

conditio

ns fo

r develo

pm

ent a

nd h

um

an rig

hts

, dem

ocra

cy a

nd fu

ndam

enta

l freedom

s (p

rem

1),

Outputs

Impact of use and access to illicit firearms addressed (Art3,2 (i))

Support risk education, victim assistance, mine detection and clearance and, stockpile destruction (Art 3, 2 (h))

Support to survey activities, victim assistance, raising public awareness and the development of legal and administrative expertise and good practice (Art 3, 2, (i))

Socio-economic impact of antipersonnel mines and UXO addressed (Art 3, 2 (h))

Confidence-building, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation efforts undertaken (Art 3, 2 (a))

Interim administrations established and functioning (Art 3, 2 (b))

Democratic, pluralistic state institutions developed, including measures to enhance women in such institutions (Art 3, 2 (c))

International criminal tribunals / truth and reconciliation commission supported (Article 3, 2 (d))

Key infrastructure rehabilitated and economic activity restarted (Art 3, 2 (e)) Civilian demobilized & former combatants reintegrated (Art3,2(f))

Social effects of restructuring armed forces mitigated (Art 3,2 (g))

Specific needs of women and children including gender based violence met (Art 3, 2, (j))

Victims of armed conflict rehabilitated & reintegrated (Art 3,2,k))

Human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law promoted and defended , (Art 3, 2 (l))

natural resources equitably accessed and transparently managed (Art 3, 2, (m))

Impact of sudden population movements addressed (Art 3,2,(n))

Threats to law and order, to security and safety of individuals, critical infrastructure and to public health addressed (Art 4, (1))

Assistance provided for risk mitigation and preparedness relating to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or agents (Art 4 (2) )

Strengthened capacity of international, regional and sub-regional organisations, state and non-state actors (Art 4, (3))

Building capacity,promoting early warning, confidence building, mediation and reconciliations and emerging inter-community tension. Know-how transfer, exchange of information, risk/threat assessment, research and analysis, earning warning systems & training !Art 4,(3)) Pre and post crisis capacity built (Art 4, (3))

Support measures for implementation of international standards in risk awareness, vulnerability analysis, emergency preparedness through trans-regional cooperation (Art 4, 1 (b))

Best practices related to the reduction of demand, production and harm of drugs promoted (Art 4, 1, (a))

Capacity of law enforcement and judicial and civil authorities strengthened (Art 4, 1 (a))

Trans-regional coop with third countries strengthened (Art 4,1(a))

Assistance! with fight against terrorism; legislation, financial law, customs law, immigration law provided (Art 4 1 (a))

Threats to national transport, energy operations and critical infrastructure addressed (Art 4, 1 (b))

Contribution to adequate response to sudden major threats to public health / epidemics made (Art 4, 1 (c))

Contribute to ensuring adequate emergency planning, management of vaccine and pharmaceutical stockpiles, international cooperation, early warming and alert systems (Art 4,1,c)

Civilian research as an alternative to defence related-research promoted (Art 4, 2, (a))

Enhanced safety practices where sensitive chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials are stored (Art 4, 2, (b))

Weapons-related facilities converted (Art 4, 2, (c))

Illicit trafficking in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials controlled (Art 4, 2, (d))

Export on dual-use goods effectively controlled (Art 4, 2, (e))

General Principles : ! May be complementary to and … consistent with measures adopted by the EU in pursuit of CFSP (pream 3); ! Complementarity of community assistance - assistance under this Instrument only to the extent that an adequate response cannot be provide under [other] instruments (Art 2) and complementary to humanitarian aid and long-term cooperation instruments (pream 10); ! Flexible approach in decision-making and budget allocation (preamble 8); !Effective bridging between Community instruments in context of crisis (preamble 9); !Enhanced cooperation between member-states and commission (pream 12) Art 2) !Consistent with Community’s overall strategic policy framework for the partner country (Art 2);

In exceptional and unforeseen situations - areas not expressly covered in (Art 3, 2) are covered

Contribution to the development of a comprehensive prevention approach to State fragility, conflict, natural disasters, and other types of crises (pream 4)

Exceptional Assistance Measures and Interim Response Programme – 18 months in duration (Art 3, 6, 6 (2))

Multi-country Strategy Papers, Thematic Strategy Papers, and Multi-annual Indicative Programmes ; Annual Action Programmes and Special Measures (Art 6, 7, 8, 9)– Not more than 27% of financial envelope (Art 24)

?

Effective civilian disaster-preparedness – and clean up measures to major environmental incidents developed(Art 4,2(f))

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(Art. 4.1) Promote cooperation, partnerships and joint undertakings between economic, academic and scientific actors in the Community and partner countries

(Art. 4.2) Stimulate bilateral trade , investment flows and economic partnerships



(Art. 4.6) Enhance awareness about and understanding of the EU and its visibility in partner countries

(Art. 4.4) Promote people-to-people links, education and training programmes and intellectual exchanges and the enhancement of mutual understanding between cultures and civilisations

(Art. 4.3) Promote dialogues between political, economic and social actors and other non-governmental organisations in relevant sectors

Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries and High Income Countries (ICI)



Contribution to achieving economies of scale, synergy effects, greater effectiveness and visibility for Community action at bilateral level (Preamble 6)

(Art. 1

.2) S

tren

gth

en

links a

nd

to e

ng

ag

e fu

rthe

r with

In

du

stria

lise

d C

ou

ntrie

s o

n a

bila

tera

l, reg

ion

al o

r m

ultila

tera

l ba

sis

in o

rde

r to c

rea

te a

mo

re fa

vo

ura

ble

e

nviro

nm

en

t for th

e d

eve

lop

me

nt o

f the

rela

tion

s o

f the

C

om

mu

nity

with

the

se

co

un

tries a

nd

territo

ries a

nd

p

rom

ote

dia

log

ue

wh

ile fo

ste

ring

Co

mm

un

ity's

inte

rests

. Links strengthened at bilateral level (Art. 1.2)

Links strengthened at regional level (Art. 1.2)

Links strengthened at multilateral level (Art. 1.2)

Awareness about and understanding of the EU and its visibility in partner countries enhanced (Art. 4.6)

Contribution to creating an environment conducive to pursuing and developing its relations with those countries and territories (Preamble 4 and Art. 1.2)

General Principles: principles laid out in bilateral instruments (Preamble 3.4); the principles of liberty, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and rule of law (art. 3.1), coherence with other areas of external action (Art. 3.4)

(Art. 3

.1) D

eve

lop

an

d c

on

so

lida

te

the

Un

ion

’s p

rincip

les in

pa

rtne

r co

un

tries a

nd

reg

ion

s th

rou

gh

d

ialo

gu

e a

nd

co

op

era

tion

vis

ibility

for th

e C

om

mu

nity

actio

n

(Art. 4.) Give speciifc attention to actions with regional dimension

?

?

?

?

?

?

?

?

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Art. 1.2. (a) Respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms enhanced Democracy and democratic reform in third countries consolidated Civil society active in the field of human rights and democracy promotion strengthened

Art. 1.2 (b) International and regional framework for the protection, promotion and monitoring of human rights, strengthened Democracy and the rule of law promoted

Art. 1.2. (c) Confidence in the reliability

of electoral processes built and enhanced

Promote and enhancement of participatory and representative democracy, including parliamentary democracy and the process of democratisation (art. 2)

Contribution to the achievement of objectives of the development policy statement on the European Consensus on Development with respect to the promotion of human rights, good governance and democratisation


European Instrument for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)

Global Impact

Co

ntrib

ute

to th

e a

ch

ieve

me

nt o

f the

M

DG

s (P

rea

mb

le p

ar. 4

)

Outputs

?

General Principles (preamble + Art. 2)): Principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law;

general principles established by the International Bill of Human Rights, and any other human rights instrument adopted within the framework of the

United Nations as well as relevant human rights instruments; promotion and protection of gender equality , the rights of the child, rights of indigenous

peoples, rights to persons with disabilities and principles such as empowerment participation, non-discrimination of vulnerable groups and accountability

Promote and protect of human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international and regional instruments (art. 2)

Strengthen the international framework for the protection of human rights, justice, the rule of law and the promotion of democracy (art. 2)

Build confidence in and enhancing the reliability and transparency of democratic electoral processes (Art. 2)

Ach

ieve

ob

jectiv

e 1

1 (1

) of th

e T

rea

ty o

f the

E

uro

pe

an

Un

ion

(Pre

am

ble

pa

r. 6)

C

om

ple

me

nta

rity to

oth

er C

om

mu

nity

instru

me

nts

pro

vid

ed

in

the

are

a o

f De

mo

cra

cy a

nd

Hu

ma

n R

igh

ts

?

?

?

?

?

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Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)

Hig

h le

ve

l of n

ucle

ar s

afe

ty w

orld

wid

e

(Ob

jectiv

e o

f 19

94

Co

nve

ntio

n o

n N

ucle

ar

Sa

fety

) (Pre

am

ble

3)

Contribution to support high level of nuclear safety, radiation protection and application of efficient and effective safeguards of nuclear material in third countries (Preamble 1 & Art.1)

Promote an effective nuclear safety culture at all levels through (Art 2): •! Continuous support for regulatory bodies, technical support organisations and reinforcement of a regulatory framework notably through licensing •! Drawing on experience of operators •! Safe transport, treatment and disposal •! Strategies for decommissioning

Promote effective regulatory framework procedures and systems for pprotection against radiation (Art 2)

Establish arrangements for the prevention of accidents and mitigation of consequences should they occur (Art 2)

Establish regulatory framework and methodologies for the implementation of nuclear safeguards for accounting and control of fissile materials (Art 2)

Promote international cooperation with relevant organisations (eg IAEA)

Co

nd

ition

s o

f nu

cle

ar s

afe

ty n

ece

ssa

ry to

the

e

limin

atio

n o

f ha

za

rds to

the

life a

nd

he

alth

of th

e p

ub

lic (O

bje

ctiv

e o

f the

Eu

rato

m T

rea

ty)

(Pre

am

ble

2)

EU citizens are protected against radiation

Safeguards for accounting and control of fissile materials are implemented

Effective nuclear safety culture exists at all levels

The consequences of nuclear accidents are mitigated

Nuclear accidents are prevented

The EU cooperates with the IAEA

?

?

?

?

?

?

General Principles: Complementarity of this instrument with other EU external action instruments (Preamble 1), EU should fulfill its obligations under international conventions/treaties (Preamble 3), The Community should continue to pursue close cooperation with the IAEA (Preamble4), Safety in Europe is linked to nuclear safety in third countries (Preamble 5), The responsibility for nuclear safety of the installation should rest with the operator and the State having jurisdiction over the installation (Preamble 11)



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ANNEX 7: RECONSTRUCTED INTERVENTION LOGICS

General principles (Art 3): 1. Promotion of democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedom 2. Differentiated approach for tailor-made cooperation

3. Mainstreaming cross cutting-issues: (7 issues mentioned in Art 3(3)), particular attention to 6 other issues mentioned in the same paragraph.

4. Promoting policy coherence for development (Art 2 of DCI to be taken into account for all policy areas), and seek coherence

between DCI actions and other areas of external action 5. Improve coordination and complementarity with MS actions 6. Information exchange with MS, with other donors, aiming for joint action.

7. EU promotes multi-lateral answers to global challenges. 8. Promote effective cooperation with countries and regions (4 actions)

9. EC seeks regular exchanges of views with the EP 10. EC seeks regular exchanges of information with civil society

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B8*/.\/$(6^*/0)*4$!J1)."(19*1#$,1-$454#,.1,67*$9,1,@*9*1#$(3$1,#5",7$"*4(5"/*4$.1/75-.1@$*1*"@+"$N!"#$QKP$

B8*/.\/$(6^*/0)*4$!Y(1HB#,#*$!/#("4$,1-$7(/,7$,5#;(".0*4$.1$-*)*7(89*1#"$N!"#$Q%G$

B8*/.\/$(6^*/0)*4$!E((-$B*/5".#+"$N!"#$QOP$

B8*/.\/$(6^*/0)*4$!<.@",0(1$,1-$!4+759"$N!"#$QSP$

B8*/.\/$(6^*/0)*4$!!L'$B5@,"$'"(#(/(7"$N!"#$QTP$



Commitments to EU values as liberty,

democracy, Human Rights, fundamental freedoms and rule

of law are promoted (Art. 1)

Enhance role of civil society

Promote media pluralism

Provide electoral observation and assistance

Support the health sector Governance

Outputs Intermediate Impacts Activities

Reconstructed Intervention Logic: European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) Global Impact

De

ve

lop

me

nt o

f an

are

a o

f pro

sp

erity

an

d g

oo

d n

eig

hb

orlin

ess b

etw

ee

n E

U

an

d p

artn

ers

(Art. 1

)

Enhanced cooperation and

progressive economic

integration is promoted (Art. 2)

Promote multicultural dialogue

Promote political dialogue

Foster the development of civil society and NGOs

Support actions aimed at increasing food safety

Promote policies for social development, inclusion, gender, employment and social protection

Strengthen impartiality-effectiveness of judiciary system

Support fight against corruption

Strengthen of Public Administration

Strengthen of Justice and Home Affairs

Protect Human Rights and Freedoms

Pursue regional and local development in rural and urban areas

Promote cooperation in higher education and mobility of teachers, students and researchers

Protect historical and cultural heritage and promoting tourism

Promote environmental protection

Promote cooperation in energy, transport and telecommunications

Support joint local initiatives for sustainable economic, social and environmental development

Promote development of a market economy

Promote cross border Cooperation

Encourage communication and promote exchange among the partners

Support Administrative cooperation in the area of taxation

COFINANCING (Art. 4)

General Principles (Art. 5): Partnership and Joint Ownership; complementarity with other policies implemented through other regulations, coherence and simplification of programming and management

Results

Partner countries efforts aimed at promoting good governance and equitable social and economic

development are supported (Art. 2)

Partnership and cooperation

agreements other existing or future agreements are

implemented (Art. 2)

Trade and economic integration are promoted

Thematic (regional dimension is build)

Implement regional flagship initiatives

Mobility is facilitated and migration is managed

EC

Sta

ff D

oc.

21

./4

/20

09

a

cco

mp

an

yin

g t

he

MT

R o

f F

IEA

Art

. 2

Special measures implementation (art 13)

Co

mm

un

ica

tio

n o

f E

C t

o E

P a

nd

C

ou

ncil

on

Str

en

gth

en

ing

th

e E

NP

People to people exchanges are promoted

Political cooperation is strengthened

Promote maritime dialogue

Management of Crisis situation is supported



Contribution to help preserve, establish, or re-establish conditions [for]! Community!s development and cooperation policies (In situations of crisis or emerging crisis, to contribute to stability) (Art 1 (2) (a))

P

rovid

e T

echnic

al a

nd

financia

l assis

tance

(Art 3

(2)) (A

rt 4) th

rough

pro

jects

and p

rogra

mm

es; s

ecto

ral o

r ge

ne

ral b

udget s

upp

ort

Contribution to help build capacity to address specific global and transregional threats (In stable situations) (Art 1 (2) (b))


Reconstructed Intervention logic: Instrument for Stability (IfS)

Global Impact

Conflic

t pre

ventio

n (p

re 2

) [and th

e ] p

rom

otio

n o

f sta

ble

cond

ition

s fo

r deve

lop

me

nt a

nd h

um

an rig

hts

, d

em

ocra

cy a

nd

fund

am

enta

l free

do

ms (p

rem

1),

Outputs

Support risk education, victim assistance, mine detection and clearance and, stockpile destruction (Art 3, 2 (h))

Support to survey activities, victim assistance, raising public awareness and the development of legal and administrative expertise and good practice (Art 3, 2, (i))

Confidence-building, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation efforts undertaken (Art 3, 2 (a))

Interim administrations established and functioning (Art 3, 2 (b))

Democratic, pluralistic state institutions developed, including measures to enhance women in such institutions (Art 3, 2 (c))

International criminal tribunals / truth and reconciliation commission supported (Article 3, 2 (d)) Civilian demobilized & former combatants reintegrated (Art3,2(f))

Key infrastructure rehabilitated and economic activity restarted (Art 3, 2 (e))

Social effects of restructuring armed forces mitigated (Art 3,2 (g))

Specific needs of women and children including gender based violence met (Art 3, 2, (j))

Victims of armed conflict rehabilitated & reintegrated (Art 3,2,k))

Human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law promoted and defended , (Art 3, 2 (l))

natural resources equitably accessed and transparently managed (Art 3, 2, (m))

Impact of sudden population movements addressed (Art 3,2,(n))

Threats to law and order, to security and safety of individuals, critical infrastructure and to public health addressed (Art 4, (1))

Assistance provided for risk mitigation and preparedness relating to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or agents (Art 4 (2) )

Strengthened capacity of international, regional and sub-regional organisations, state and non-state actors (Art 4, (3))

Building capacity,promoting early warning, confidence building, mediation and reconciliations and emerging inter-community tension. Know-how transfer, exchange of information, risk/threat assessment, research and analysis, earning warning systems & training !Art 4,(3))

Pre and post crisis capacity built (Art 4, (3))

Support measures for implementation of international standards in risk awareness, vulnerability analysis, emergency preparedness through trans-regional cooperation (Art 4, 1 (b))

Best practices related to the reduction of demand, production and harm of drugs promoted (Art 4, 1, (a))

Capacity of law enforcement and judicial and civil authorities strengthened (Art 4, 1 (a))

Trans-regional coop with third countries strengthened (Art 4,1(a))

Assistance! with fight against terrorism; legislation, financial law, customs law, immigration law provided (Art 4 1 (a))

Contribute to ensuring adequate emergency planning, management of vaccine and pharmaceutical stockpiles, international cooperation, early warming and alert systems (Art 4,1,c)

Civilian research as an alternative to defence related-research promoted (Art 4, 2, (a))

General Principles : ! May be complementary to and … consistent with measures adopted by the EU in pursuit of CFSP (pream 3); ! Complementarity of community assistance - assistance under this Instrument only to the extent that an adequate response cannot be provide under [other] instruments (Art 2) and complementary to humanitarian aid and long-term cooperation instruments (pream 10); ! Flexible approach in decision-making and budget allocation (preamble 8); !Effective bridging between Community instruments in context of crisis (preamble 9); !Enhanced cooperation between member-states and commission (pream 12) Art 2) !Consistent with Community!s overall strategic policy framework for the partner country (Art 2);

Contribution to the development of a comprehensive prevention approach to State fragility, conflict, natural disasters, and other types of crises (pream 4)

Exceptional Assistance Measures and Interim Response Programme – 18 months in duration (Art 3, 6, 6 (2))

Multi-country Strategy Papers, Thematic Strategy Papers, and Multi-annual Indicative Programmes ; Annual Action Programmes and Special Measures (Art 6, 7, 8, 9)– Not more than 30% of financial envelope (Art 24)

?

Combat proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons Measures

Socio-economic impact of antipersonnel mines and UXO addressed (Art 3, 2 (h))

Impact of use and access to illicit firearms addressed and combat prolifaeration of Small Arms and Light Weapons (Art3,2 (i))

In exceptional and unforeseen situations - areas not expressly covered in (Art 3, 2) are covered

Threats to national transport, energy operations and critical infrastructure addressed (Art 4, 1 (b))

Contribution to adequate response to sudden major threats to public health / epidemics made (Art 4, 1 (c))

Enhanced safety practices where sensitive chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials are stored (Art 4, 2, (b))

Weapons-related facilities converted (Art 4, 2, (c))

Illicit trafficking in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials controlled (Art 4, 2, (d))

Export on dual-use goods effectively controlled (Art 4, 2, (e))

Effective civilian disaster-preparedness – and clean up measures to major environmental incidents developed(Art 4,2(f))



(Art. 4.1) Promote cooperation, partnerships and joint undertakings between economic, academic and scientific actors in the Community and partner countries

(Art. 4.2) Stimulate bilateral trade , investment flows and economic partnerships



(Art. 4.6) Enhance awareness about and understanding of the EU and its visibility in partner countries

(Art. 4.4) Promote people-to-people links, education and training programmes and intellectual exchanges and the enhancement of mutual understanding between cultures and civilisations

(Art. 4.3) Promote dialogues between political, economic and social actors and other non-governmental organisations in relevant sectors

Reconstructed Intervention Logic: Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries and High Income Countries (ICI)



Contribution to achieving economies of scale, synergy effects, greater effectiveness and visibility for Community action at bilateral level (Preamble 6)

(Art. 1

.2) S

tren

gth

en

links a

nd

to e

ng

ag

e fu

rthe

r with

In

du

stria

lise

d C

ou

ntrie

s o

n a

bila

tera

l, reg

ion

al o

r m

ultila

tera

l ba

sis

in o

rde

r to c

rea

te a

mo

re fa

vo

ura

ble

e

nviro

nm

en

t for th

e d

eve

lop

me

nt o

f the

rela

tion

s o

f the

C

om

mu

nity

with

the

se

co

un

tries a

nd

territo

ries a

nd

p

rom

ote

dia

log

ue

wh

ile fo

ste

ring

Co

mm

un

ity's

inte

rests

.

Links strengthened at bilateral level (Art. 1.2)

Links strengthened at regional level (Art. 1.2)

Links strengthened at multilateral level (Art. 1.2)

Awareness about and understanding of the EU and its visibility in partner countries enhanced (Art. 4.6)

Contribution to creating an environment conducive to pursuing and developing its relations with those countries and territories (Preamble 4 and Art. 1.2)

General Principles: principles laid out in bilateral instruments (Preamble 3.4); the principles of liberty, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and rule of law (art. 3.1), coherence with other areas of external action (Art. 3.4)

(Art. 3

.1) D

eve

lop

an

d c

on

so

lida

te

the

Un

ion

’s p

rincip

les in

pa

rtne

r co

un

tries a

nd

reg

ion

s th

rou

gh

d

ialo

gu

e a

nd

co

op

era

tion

vis

ibility

for th

e C

om

mu

nity

actio

n

(Art. 4.) Give speciifc attention to actions with regional dimension

As la

id o

ut

in th

e (

mu

lti-)

an

nu

al a

ctio

n p

rog

ram

me

s

DCECI Art. 1, 3 Measures relating to principles

DCECI Art. 1, 3 Measures relating to principles

?



Art. 1.2. (a) Respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms enhanced Democracy and democratic reform in third countries consolidated

Art. 1.2 (b) International and regional framework for the protection, promotion and monitoring of human rights, strengthened Democracy and the rule of law promoted

Art. 1.2. (c) Confidence in the reliability

of electoral processes built and enhanced

Promote and enhancement of participatory and representative democracy, including parliamentary democracy and the process of democratisation (art. 2)

Contribution to the achievement of objectives of the development policy statement on the European Consensus on Development with respect to the promotion of human rights, good governance and democratisation


Reconstructed Intervention Logic: European Instrument for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)

Global Impact

C o

ntrib

ute

to th

e a

ch

ieve

me

nt o

f the

M

DG

s (P

rea

mb

le p

ar. 4

)

Outputs

Creation of a political and civil society environment conducive to sustainable

development

General Principles (preamble + Art. 2)): Principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law;

general principles established by the International Bill of Human Rights, and any other human rights instrument adopted within the framework of the

United Nations as well as relevant human rights instruments; promotion and protection of gender equality , the rights of the child, rights of indigenous

peoples, rights to persons with disabilities and principles such as empowerment participation, non-discrimination of vulnerable groups and accountability

Promote and protect of human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international and regional instruments (art. 2)

Strengthen the international framework for the protection of human rights, justice, the rule of law and the promotion of democracy (art. 2)

Build confidence in and enhancing the reliability and transparency of democratic electoral processes (Art. 2)

Ach

ieve

ob

jectiv

e 1

1 (1

) of th

e T

rea

ty o

f the

E

uro

pe

an

Un

ion

(Pre

am

ble

pa

r. 6)

Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms enhanced in countries and regions at

most risk

Human Rights defenders supported

Equality between ethnic and racially excluded groups promoted and rights of traditionally

excluded protected

ICC Strengthened

EU election Observations Missions Project supported

Calls for Proposals

European Humanities University Trust Fund contributed to

Country-based support schemes

UN Masters Programme on Human Rights and Democratisation supported

Civil Society participation promoted

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Supported

Media freedom, professionalism and pluralism promoted

Respect for international humanitarian law enhanced

Human Rights and Democracy Actions on torture and other forms of ill-treatment supported

Civil Society campaigns for the effective functioning of the ICC supported

Contribution to the general and specific situations in the human rights and democratisation fiels in developing countries and third countries other than developing countries



Reconstructed Intervention Logic: Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)

Hig

h le

vel o

f nucle

ar s

afe

ty w

orld

wid

e

(Obje

ctiv

e o

f 1994 C

onventio

n o

n N

ucle

ar

Safe

ty) (P

ream

ble

3)

Contribution to support high level of nuclear safety, radiation protection and application of efficient and effective safeguards of nuclear material in third countries (Preamble 1 & Art.1)

Promote an effective nuclear safety culture at all levels through (Art 2): •! Continuous support for regulatory bodies, technical support organisations and reinforcement of a regulatory framework notably through licensing •! Drawing on experience of operators •! Safe transport, treatment and disposal •! Strategies for decommissioning

Promote effective regulatory framework procedures and systems for pprotection against radiation (Art 2)

Establish arrangements for the prevention of accidents and mitigation of consequences should they occur (Art 2)

Establish regulatory framework and methodologies for the implementation of nuclear safeguards for accounting and control of fissile materials (Art 2)

Promote international cooperation with relevant organisations (eg IAEA)

Conditio

ns o

f nucle

ar s

afe

ty n

ecessary

to th

e

elim

inatio

n o

f hazard

s to

the life

and h

ealth

of th

e

public

(Obje

ctiv

e o

f the E

ura

tom

Tre

aty

) (P

ream

ble

2)

EU citizens are protected against radiation

Safeguards for accounting and control of fissile materials are implemented

Effective nuclear safety culture exists at all levels

The consequences of nuclear accidents are mitigated

Nuclear accidents are prevented

The EU cooperates with the IAEA

Cooperation with the IAEA

Assistance to the Regulatory Authority

General Principles: Complementarity of this instrument with other EU external action instruments (Preamble 1), EU should fulfill its obligations under international conventions/treaties (Preamble 3), The Community should continue to pursue close cooperation with the IAEA (Preamble4), Safety in Europe is linked to nuclear safety in third countries (Preamble 5), The responsibility for nuclear safety of the installation should rest with the operator and the State having jurisdiction over the installation (Preamble 11)



Radioactive waste

management & safeguards

On-site assistance & design safety

work

Russia

Ukraine

Armenia

Georgia

Annual Action Plans

Belarus

Jordan

Egypt

Brazil

Morocco

Vietnam

Philippines

Uzbekistan

study on legal instruments and lessons learned from the evaluations...

Documents