UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

January 20, 2017

Executive Board

Mr. Parth Gaikwad – President

United Nations Security Council

JIRSMUN 2017

Study Guide

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TABLE OF CONTENT

1) Letter From the President .…………………………………………………...…

2) Committee Background…….…………………………………………………...

a) Committee Introduction ……..…………………………………………………………………….

b) Members and Voting ……………………………………………………………………………….

c) History and Controversy ……………………………………………………………………………

d) Mandate of the United Nations Security Council ………………..……………………………………

3) Rules of Procedure ……………………………………………………………..

4) Introduction to the Agenda ……………………………………………………..

5) Position Paper ………………………………………………………………….

6) Timeline ……………………………………………………………………….

7) Main factions in Yemen Crisis …………………………………………………..

8) Key Fronts …………………………………………………………………….. a) Houthi’s Expansion ………………………………………………………………………………

b) Al-Qaeda presence ………………………………………………….………………………….

c) The southern movement ……………………………………………..………………………….

d) Federal Division ………………………………………………………………………………..

9) Current Situation ………………………………………………………………

10) International Involvement ………………………………………………………

11) Possible Solutions ………………………………………………………………

12) Bloc Positions …………………………………………………………………. a) Middle Eastern Nations …………………………………………………..................................

b) Central Asian Nations ……………………………………………………………………………

c) Western Liberal Democracies …………………………………………………………………….

d) Supranational Organizations ………………………………………………………………………

13) Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMA) …………..………………………………….

14) Some important links ………..…………………………………………………………………….

a) Links to important PDF’s and UN reports ………………………………………………………..

b) Links to some videos for better understanding ……………………………………………………..

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UNSC UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL

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Letter from the President

Greetings Delegates!

I am very pleased to welcome you to the simulation of the United Nations Security Council at JIRS MUN 2016. This Background Guide is designed to give you an insight into the agenda at hand. Please refer to it carefully. Remember, a thorough understanding of a problem is the first step to solving it. However, bear in mind that this Background Guide is in no way exhaustive and is only meant to provide the delegates with enough basic information to establish a platform for beginning research. Delegates are highly recommended to do a good amount of research beyond what is covered in the Guide. A few aspects that delegates should keep in mind while preparing: Mandate: Every committee of the United Nations has a very specific mandate. The discussion of an agenda and proposal for solutions should be within the mandate of the committee. Due to the

various aspects of the agenda, and certain limitations of the committee's mandate, debates in the Security Council are extremely strong and a fine balance of subjective and objective construct and argumentation. Procedure: The purpose of putting in the procedures in any committee is to ensure a more organized and efficient debate. Although the Executive Board shall be fairly strict with the Rules of Procedure, the discussion of agenda will be the main priority. So delegates are advised not to restrict their suggestions because of hesitations regarding procedure. Foreign Policy: Following the foreign policy of one’s country is one of the most important aspects of a Model UN Conference. This is what essentially differentiates a Model UN from any debating format. To violate one‘s foreign policy without adequate reason is one of the gravest mistakes a delegate can make. In case you have any doubts or queries, please feel free to drop a mail at the below mentioned email addresses, and I will get back to you as soon as possible. I expect all delegates to be well-versed with the various nuances of the agenda and geared up for a day of heated debate, learning and great fun. Looking forward to seeing you in action!

--------------------------------------------

Parth Gaikwad

President of UNSC

parth@dimun.in

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Rules of procedure

This is a flowchart indicating the flow of debate. We’re putting it here so you get a grasp of the order in

which what

happens in the conference room:

(*note that as we have only one topic for each committee, the setting of the agenda will be dismissed)

(**The debate session is composed of the general speakers’ list and numerous motions)

ROLL CALL

Every committee session begins with Roll Call. When your delegation’s name is called upon, raise your

placard high

and say “present” or “present and voting”.

GENERAL SPEAKERS’ LIST

The speaking time for the General Speakers’ List is automatically set at one minute for each delegate. If

delegates

wish to be added to the General Speakers’ List, they should simply raise their placards when the Chair

says

“Delegates who wish to be added to the General Speakers’ List, please raise your placard.” They can also

add

themselves to the List by passing a note to the dais team that says something like this: “The delegate of X

would like

to be added to the General Speakers’ List”. After giving a speech, delegates should yield their remaining

time.

YIELDING

After a delegate finishes his/her speech, the Chair will ask: “Delegate, how would you like to use your

remaining

time?” Delegates are allowed to:

Yield time back to the chair: This is the standard reply if delegates do not wish to do anything with their

remaining

time.

Yield time to another delegate: If the delegate yields his/her time to another delegate, that delegate must

use the

remaining time to make his/her remarks

Yield time to questions: If the delegate yields his/her time to questions, other delegates in the committee

room are

allowed to ask him/her questions

MOTIONS

A motion is a formal proposal raised by a delegate. In the UNA USA procedure, there are different types

of motions

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that serve different purposes. If you’re not familiar with them, they can seem pretty intimidating. And

that’s exactly

why we’re here to help! We’ll be introducing the some of the most commonly used motions in a

conference below:

MODERATED CAUCUS

The Secondary Speakers’ List is in order when a motion for a “Moderated Caucus” passes. During a

moderated

caucus, a topic is chosen, and all speeches made should comply with that specific topic. The speaking

time set for

each speaker and the “topic” of the moderated caucus is set by the delegate who raised the motion. It is

also very

important to keep in mind that there is no time-yielding for the Secondary Speakers’ List.

UNMODERATED CAUCUS

During an unmoderated caucus, delegates are encouraged to walk around in the conference room to share

their

thoughts and opinions with other delegates. The time set for a moderated caucus is set by the delegate

who raised

the motion.

INTRODUCING A DRAFT RESOLUTION TO THE COMMITTEE

This motion is raised after delegates have received their copies of “potential draft resolutions”. To

introduce a

“potential draft resolution” to the committee, sponsors of the document must first approach the podium

and read

out all of the operative clauses. Then, the entire committee will have a vote on this motion. If it passes,

the

document will shall be referred to as a “draft resolution”.

CLOSURE OF DEBATE

By raising this motion, delegates are informing the Chair that the debate has come to an end and that they

are ready

to vote on the draft resolutions. Thus, most chairs forbid delegate to raise this motion until the very last

session. If

this motion passes, the committee will automatically move into voting procedures.

SUSPENSION OF THE MEETING

To “suspend” is to “temporarily prevent from continuing or being in force or effect”. Thus, a suspension

of the

meeting would mean to temporarily end the meeting. Delegates are expected to raise this motion at the

end of each

and every (except the last) session for a lunch break, maybe. Or a doughnut break (you wish.).

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POINTS

From asking for permission to go to the restroom to asking a question about the rules of procedure, there

are

numerous situations in which a delegate would raise a “point”. There are three types of points in general:

Point of

personal privilege, point of order, and point of parliamentary inquiry.

Point of Personal Privilege

Normally, this point is used to ensure that a delegate’s personal rights are being taken into account. The

following

are several more common situations in which a delegate would raise a point of personal privilege:

asking the Chair whether you may use the restroom

asking the delegate that is currently speaking to speak up

asking to turn up/down the air conditioning

Point of Parliamentary Inquiry

If a delegate is not sure about a certain procedure, he/she may raise this point and ask the Chair about it.

Here’s an

example: “Point of parliamentary inquiry: What are some ways a delegate may yield his/her remaining

time?”

Point of Order

This point is used to indicate an instance of improper parliamentary procedure. Now, unless you’re a

veteran of

Model UN and know all of the ROPs by heart, we wouldn’t suggest you to raise this because it may seem

offensive to

your dais team (you don’t want that!). But anyhow, we’re still going to demonstrate how this point is

used: “Point of

order. The delegate believes that the Chair should not ask delegates how they would like to yield their

time during a

moderated caucus.”

VOTING PROCEDURES

Delegates are allowed to raise motions “for a roll call vote” or “to vote by acclamation”. If neither of

these motions

are raised, the committee will vote with regular voting procedures.

Roll call vote

“a roll call vote” simply means to vote by roll call. Delegates are allowed to vote “yes”, “no”, “pass”, or

“abstain”. If a

delegate votes “pass”, he/she may only vote “yes”/”no” upon the second round.

*hint: If a delegate had said “present” during roll call of the last session: allowed to vote “yes,” “no,” or

“abstain” on

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documents If a delegate had said “present and voting” during roll call of the last session: allowed to only

vote “yes”

or “no” on documents Vote by acclamation voting by acclamation simply means “to vote by clapping”.

This motion is

normally raised when there is only only dominant bloc in the committee room and that bloc is sure that no

one will

oppose its draft resolution. Thus if no one objects this motion and everyone claps when voting, the draft

resolution

passes. Standard voting procedures to vote by show of hands.

AMENDMENTS

People make mistakes, and that is okay, as long as you remember to correct them. An amendment makes

changes to

the flaws of a draft resolution. There are three types of amendments: non-substantial amendments,

friendly

amendments, and unfriendly amendments. A delegate can submit them directly by sending them to the

Chair. Keep

in mind that amendments can only be made to draft resolutions (ones that have already been introduced to

the

floor)!

Non-substantial amendments amend mistakes regarding grammar and spelling can be applied to both

preambulatory and operative clauses

i) Friendly amendments

can be submitted by any delegate in the committee room (premise: all sponsors of the DR must show their

approval

in order for the amendment to be friendly. If not all sponsors agree with it, it automatically becomes an

unfriendly

amendment) will be announced by the Chair after he/she approves it may only be applied to operative

clauses

ii) Unfriendly amendments

can be submitted by any delegate in the committee room must acquire support from at least ⅛ of all

delegates in

order to be valid for submission will be introduced to the floor if they meet the above criteria, then will be

debated

and voted on by the committee*. If it passes, the amendment will be incorporated into the draft resolution

that is

being amended may only be applied to operative clauses

(*** delegates must raise a motion to “introduce unfriendly amendments”. If the motion passes, a

secondary

speakers’ list will automatically be established. When delegates are ready to vote on the amendment, they

must

motion for a “closure of the debate”. This will directly lead to voting procedures for this amendment.)

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Committee Information

The United Nations was formed on 24 October, 1945

to promote international co-operation after the failures

of the League of Nations and the disastrous effects of

two World Wars. The Security Council is one of the

six major organs of the UN. As per Article 1 of the UN

Charter, the main purpose of the UN is to maintain

international peace and security, the development of

diplomatic ties among nations, collaboration to resolve

international clashes, and the promotion of human

rights. As the only body with the authority to issue

binding resolutions to the members of the UN, the

UNSC is the principal body assigned to this crucial task.

Members

The SC consists of 15 members – 5 permanent members and 10 nonpermanent members. The five permanent

members (P5) consist of the leaders of the victorious Allied Powers after the Second World War that were the

founding members of the UN – the United States of America; the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

Ireland; the French Republic; the Russian Federation; and the People's Republic of China. In addition, the

nonpermanent members currently consist of Angola, Eygpt, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Senegal, Spain, Ukraine,

Uruguay, and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. As per GA Resolution 1991 (1963), to ensure the representation

of a geographically and politically diverse world, 5 of the 10 are selected from Africa and Asia, 1 from Eastern

Europe, 2 from Latin America, and 2 from Western Europe and other states that do not fall under the other regional

designations. They are selected for two years terms through a majority vote of the GA, with 5 new members each

year.

Voting

For any resolution or procedural change to be passed by the SC, it must have 9 positive votes, and no P5 nation may

vote against it. This unique “veto power” is granted to them by the Charter of the United Nations. However, as the

UN is about consensus, the veto power is rarely invoked; the country may simply choose to abstain from the vote

instead. A list of every veto in the SC can be found here: http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick.

History and Controversy

Ever since the creation of the SC, it has been under constant scrutiny of the world, not least due to the veto powers

of the P5, which grants any one of them to block a draft resolution against their own interests, such as the United

States has done in the case of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Critics have also pointed out that this does not allow for fair

representation and enactment of the will of the majority. There have also been calls for the addition of new

permanent members to reflect the changing dynamics of the world. The G4 nations (Brazil, Germany, India, and

Japan),who, along with the P5 together have 9 of the world's 10 largest GDPs, have continuously been lobbying for a

permanent spot. This would however alienate almost 1.8 billion Muslims worldwide, who have not had a global

representative since the demise of the Ottoman Empire. The Cold War was a time of inaction for the SC, and only 13

peacekeeping mission were organized between 1945 and 1978. However, in modern times, the SC has taken a much

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more dynamic stance towards resolving conflicts. As the cost of resolving conflicts are very high, the SC works

towards preventing conflicts under Article 34 of the UN Charter. However, in the case of all out war, the SC is

permitted to take exception to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter (“nothing contained in the present Charter shall

authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any

state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter”) and under

Chapter VII of the UN Charter use “economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial sanctions, travel bans, and

collective military actions, including the power to deploy and direct peacekeeping forces.”1 The SC has also realized

that the period after conflict is a crucial time for countries, and so adopted Resolution 1645 (2005) to establish the

Peace building Commission (PBC) under Articles 22 and 29 of the UN Charter as a subsidiary body of the SC and the

GA. As per it's mandate, the PBC aims to “bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and

propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery” and promote reconstruction and

sustainable recovery and development.2 This multifaceted agenda demonstrates that the SC is not simply a crisis

management committee, focusing on a few high profile situations a year; rather, it is an institution continually

monitoring and managing the constantly changing range of issues and conflicts affecting the diverse regions of the

world community. With this in mind, delegates should be aware that they will have the executive authority over the

UN, and that they will have to tackle a multitude of world issues in an effective manner. It would be wise to stay up

to date with current events.

MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND LEGALITY

In accordance with Chapter V of the Charter of the United Nations, the powers and functions of the Security Council

defined in Article 24, 25 and 26, the United Nations confers the UNSC’s primary responsibility to be the

maintenance of international peace and security and allows the Council to act on its behalf whilst performing the

aforementioned functions. Binding the council to work within the boundaries of the Purposes and Principles of the

United Nations, Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII of the Charter shed light on the specific powers bestowed on the

Council. Under Article 39, Chapter VII, which states, "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any

threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression…" 1 , the council has exclusive powers to recognize

aggressors and the following article, Article 40, calls upon the involved parties to comply with "provisional

measures". Article 41 authorizes the Council to take measures not involving the use of armed forces (i.e.: trade

sanctions, embargoes, etc) where as the succeeding article, Article 42, clearly states, "Should the Security Council

consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take

such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security…".

Hence, these articles comprised within Chapter VII of the UN Charter provide guidance to the Council, on it's

working and probable course of action during an international conflict (that fits the given criteria).

Legal positivists argue that an individual (and individuals comprising of or representing a state) has a moral duty to

obey the law. But what is the law? According to Article 38(I) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,

international norms are legally binding if they are incorporated in "a. international conventions, whether general or

particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a

general practice accepted as law…" 2 . Although this Statute is technically only binding on the International court of

Justice, it is widely accepted as the authoritative statement of the sources of international law.

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AGENDA “The Situation in Yemen”

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Position Paper Policy What is a Position Paper? A position paper is a brief overview of a country’s stance on the topics being discussed by a particular committee. Though there is no specific format the position paper must follow, it should include a description of your positions your country holds on the issues on the agenda, relevant actions that your country has taken, and potential solutions that your country would support. At TCET Model United Nations, delegates should write a position paper for each of the committee’s topics. Each position paper should not exceed one page, and should all be combined into a single document per delegate. For the United Nations Security Council, position papers are mandatory, especially for a delegate to be considered for an award.

Formatting Position papers should:

Include the name of the delegate, his/her country, and the committee

Be in a standard font (e.g. Times New Roman) with a 12-point font size and 1-inch document margins

Not include illustrations, diagrams, decorations, national symbols, watermarks, or page borders

Include citations and a bibliography, in any format, giving due credit to the sources used in research (not

included in the 1-page limit)

Due Dates and Submission Procedure Position papers for this committee must be submitted by midnight on January 14

th , 2017.

Once your position paper is complete, please save the file as your last name, your first name and send it as an attachment in an email, to your committee’s email address, with the subject heading as your last name, your first name — Position Paper. Please do not add any other attachments to the email or write anything else in the body. Both your position papers should be combined into a single PDF or Word document file; position papers submitted in another format will not be accepted. Each position paper will be manually reviewed and considered for the Best Position Paper award. The Email Address to submit the position paper is parth@dimun.in

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Introduction to the Agenda

The Yemeni Civil War offers a similarly fraught geopolitical paradigm. Since its outbreak in March of

2015, the war has raged between Yemeni forces representing the recognized government of President

Hadi and revolutionary forces largely constituted by Houthi fighters and revolutionary elements of the

Yemeni security forces. The country is locked in a state of brutal warfare, as both sides jockey for control

of the capital Sana’a. Following the revolutionary forces’ (direct by the Supreme Revolutionary

Committee) overthrow of the Hadi government, an international coalition of forces headed by Saudi

Arabia has initiated aerial operations. The Saudi air force has executed a vast number of airstrikes against

revolutionary fighters, many of which have inflicted severe civilian casualties. The UN estimates that as

of March 2016 upwards of 6,300 people had died in

the conflict, which continues with unabated ferocity.

As the conflict has developed, additional actors have

entered the fray. Iran and Hezbollah have been

accused of funneling military equipment to the

revolutionary fighters: this support would be

unsurprising given the brutal rivalry between Saudi

Arabia and Iran. Also, both Iran and the Houthi

fighters support Shia Islamic practices. Furthermore,

terrorist groups including ISIS and al-Qaeda in the

Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have begun to carry out

attacks and even seize territory in Yemen. The United States has also entered the conflict alongside the

Saudi coalition forces, though it targets ISIS and AQAP exclusively. Tensions between Saudi Arabia and

the US have arisen as a result of Saudi Arabia’s indiscriminate airstrike protocols, though the US

continues to provide intelligence and logistical support for the pro-Hadi campaign.

This messy amalgamation of domestic and international actors and interests makes intervention in the

Yemeni civil war an excellent example of the balancing act that forms the core of this committee. Firstly,

it intertwines the activities of the revolutionary and government forces with the interests of regional rivals

such as Saudi Arabia and Iran in what might be conceived as a religiously and politically charged proxy

war. Secondly, the diversity of forces fighting on the ground—terrorist groups, revolutionaries,

international coalitions, and government

forces—blur the conflict’s motives. For

example, the US is involved largely to target

ISIS and AQAP, but its longstanding

strategic alliance with Saudi Arabia

associates it to some degree with the

collateral damage caused by Saudi

bombings. Blackwater mercenaries have also

been employed by coalition forces, bringing

in a complex private sector element. Thus,

the motives of a given actor are in fact

shaped not only by their individual motives

but also by their existing alignments with

and commitments to other actors.

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Timeline

1970, December 1 - The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (previously Southern Yemen) is created.

1978, June - The president of the Yemen Arab Republic is assassinated, generating renewed conflicts

throughout early 1979.

1990, May 22 - The unity of the two Yemen’s is made official: the Republic of Yemen is officially instated.

1999 - Ali Abdullah Saleh is elected as the president of the Republic of Yemen, with a 96.2% majority vote.

2004, June-August - The first Houthi rebellion is carried out - hundreds die in the north as troops lead by

Hussein al-Houthi battle military troops.

2008, January - Conflict breaks out once again between military forces and the Houthi group.

2012, February - New President al-Hadi is elected.

2014, September - The capital city is taken over by Houthi rebels.

2015, February - President al-Hadi is forced to flee the capital by Houthi rebels.

2015, March - Two suicide bombings by the Islamic State in the capital city of Sanaa kill 137 people.

2015, June - Nasser al-Wuhayshi, the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, is killed in a United

States drone strike.

2016, August – Suicide attack kills score of Military Recruits in Aden, Yemen.

2016, October – US drone strike reportedly hit two vehicles in Shabwa province on 18

September. Killed suspected members of Al Qaeda.

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Key Fronts

While the Houthis and their allies in the

Yemeni military have largely been forced out

of Yemen's formerly independent south, they

continue to hold their ground elsewhere

despite continuing airstrikes, a naval

blockade by the coalition, and the efforts of

anti-Houthi militias on the ground. Despite

gains by local anti-Houthi resistance fighters

in Ta’izz, Yemen's third largest city, the

battle continues, fuelling a deepening

humanitarian crisis. The province of Ibb, its

neighbor to the north, has witnessed a continuing back-and-forth as Houthis clash with their opponents, as has the

strategic province of Al Bayda, where the Houthis and their allies have recently managed to reverse some losses. The

Saudi-led coalition has set its sights on the desert province of Marib. Yemeni fighters trained in a Saudi military post

in Sharoura, just north of the border, have descended into the province, joining increasing numbers of coalition

troops, tribal fighters and military hardware in a forward operating base in the centre of the province. But while

coalition forecasts of the coming expulsion of the Houthis from Marib may very well be accurate, claims that Sana’a

will fall shortly after are less likely to come to fruition--something underlined by the miles of rugged mountains

separating the province from the capital.

Houthis Expansion (2012-2015)

The Houthis emerged out of Yemen’s mountainous far north in 2004 from “Believing Youth,” a revivalist movement

founded to shore up Zaidism, which local religious and social leaders feared was under threat from the encroachment

of Sunni ideologies. While initial fighting was largely limited to the Houthi family’s strongholds in mountainous areas

in Sa’da, it soon expanded to other parts of the province, spreading to northern areas of Amran and western areas of

Al Jawf in subsequent rounds of conflict. The Houthis managed to gain control of Sa’da province amid Yemen’s 2011

uprising, gradually inching closer to the national capital, Sana’a, before taking control on 21 September 2014. In the

following weeks they expanded their control south to Ibb province and west to Al Hudaydah.

The rebels forced President Hadi to resign in January 2015 and seized control of areas as far south as Abyan, Aden,

and Lahj, before being pushed back in July and August 2015 by resistance fighters supported by a Saudi-led anti-

Houthi coalition.

Al-Qaeda Presence

Jihadist fighters returning to Yemen after fighting in

Afghanistan and Iraq have for many years continued

the fight in the country’s unevenly-governed deserts

and mountains. A Yemen-based group, Al-Qaeda in

the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), is considered one of

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al-Qaeda’s most effective franchises; the United States has waged an ongoing drone campaign against AQAP in

response to the group’s attempts to strike US targets in the US itself and abroad. In the wake of Yemen’s 2011

uprising, al-Qaeda-affiliated militants—fighting under the banner of Ansar Al Sharia, or The Supporters of Islamic

Law—seized control of swathes of the southern Abyan province, establishing Islamic emirates in the towns of Ja’ar

and Zinjibar and eventually seizing the town of Rada, in Al Bayda, in early 2012. While they were pushed out of

Abyan in a US-backed Yemeni Military offensive the following spring, they re-established themselves in the

mountains of Mahfad and Azzan, before being pushed out again in 2014. In the tumult unleashed by the Houthi

takeover of Sana’a and subsequent Saudi-led coalition airstrikes, al-Qaeda-linked fighters have gained renewed

operating space, taking control of Al Mukalla, Yemen’s fifth largest port, backed by allied local forces.

Simultaneously, AQAP defectors loyal to the Islamic State militant group have increased their profile, operating

training camps in some areas of the south and taking credit for attacks on Houthi-linked targets.

The Southern Movement

Yemen’s south, which had been a separate country until 1990, attempted to secede in 1994, but was prevented as

pro-unity forces consolidated their control over the country. Under the surface, however, tensions began to build.

The 2007 emergence of the Southern Movement, an umbrella of factions and figures calling for a return to autonomy

in the south, provided a forum for grievances; in its initial stages, it was most active in the mountainous areas of Yafa,

Al Dhale and Radfan. As the government in Sana’a largely ignored its demands, the Southern Movement built up

further support—even as it remained divided in terms of organization, strategy, leadership, and ultimate aims.

Benefitting from Gulf support to anti-Houthi factions, Southern Movement-allied fighters are now the dominant

force in much of the south. But the international community remains committed to Yemen’s continued unity and,

despite significant popular support for a split, secessionists have largely been playing it carefully—for now. And while

the Saudi-led coalition may have empowered many secessionist leaders, both Saudi and Emirati leaders have

repeatedly asserted their commitment to a united Yemen.

Federal Division

Proposals for a federal system of governance in Yemen have long been in circulation, both in the aftermath of

unification and following Yemen’s 1994 civil war. They picked up considerable steam following the 2007 emergence

of the Southern Movement, as many southern leaders called for greater autonomy. A federal division of Yemen was

finally agreed in February 2014 by a subcommittee in Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference, an ambitious summit

that aimed to pave the way for the drafting of a new constitution. The proposal was accepted by the bulk of the

country’s political players, with the exception of the Houthis, who expressed reservations about the final divisions,

and some factions of the Southern Movement, who opposed the split of the former PDRY into two federal regions.

While the precise nature of devolution of powers remains unclear, the federal division splits Yemen into six regions:

Hadramawt, encompassing the Hadramawt, Mahra and Shabwa provinces; Aden, encompassing Abyan, Lahj, Al-

Dhale and Aden, Al-Janad, encompassing Ibb and Ta’iiz, Saba, encompassing Marib, Al-Jawf and Al-Bayda, Tihama,

encompassing Al-Hudayda, Rayma, Mahwit and Hajja, and Azal, encompassing Dhamar, Sana’a, Amran and Sa’da. In

recent statements, Hadi has continued to cast the federal division as sacrosanct—even if a diverse array of analysts,

diplomats and politicians continue to advocate for amendments to be made.

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Current Situation

In recent months, Yemen has entered brutal power struggles between the Houthis and the current government.

Amidst the terrorist episodes, bombings, airstrikes, and civilian unrest, the conflict has escalated to such heights that

President al-Hadi was forced to flee the capital in February of 2015. With the military having split loyalties, the

country has essentially divided into two factions; those loyal to the current President al-Hadi, namely the Sunni

Islamist population, and those loyal to the Houthis, the Zaydis. Internationally, the conflict has been seen as a struggle

between the ideologies of Sunni-ruled Saudi Arabia and Shia-ruled Iran. A coalition of five Gulf Arab states,Jordan,

Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, and led by Saudi Arabia, has shown its allegiance to President al-Hadi by launching air strikes

in late March against the Houthi rebels.

Gulf Arab states support President al-Hadi, and many accusations have been launched at Iran for backing the Houthis.

Nonetheless, the Houthis, at the time of writing, are in power, and they have publicly declared that they intend to

dissolve parliament and construct a new five-member presidential council to rule for two-year interims. Despite their

seeming immovability from current power, the Sunni tribesmen and southern leaders refuse to recognize their

governance. With President al-Hadi out of the country, they are determined to oust the Houthis on his behalf and rid

Yemen of Zaydi rule. Additionally, President Hadi is the only internationally recognized leader of Yemen, seeing as

no state has accepted the Zaydi rule as legitimate. This renders Yemen extremely unstable; without a nationally

recognized central government, the country is in a state of civil war.

In addition to the complications within the government, the situation enters another degree of complexity with the

interference of radical religious terrorist groups. Currently, both the Houthi group and President Hadi are in

opposition to al-Qaeda, situated mainly in the Arabian

Peninsula (AQAP), and has endured many attacks over the

years from the south. As the governmental infrastructure

continues to weaken, attacks com- ing from AQAP are only

exacerbating the situation. Following the rebellions of 2011,

the group was able to establish several strongholds in Abyan

province. Internationally, AQAP is considered the most

hostile and potentially dangerous branch of al-Qaeda.

Especially with the closings of al-Qaeda training bases in Pakistan and Afghanistan, more and more of al-Qaeda is

centered in AQAP. Many western countries have tried carrying out military operations against AQAP, namely the

United States, but the lack of a legitimate central government has diminished international support significantly.

While President al-Hadi was in power, there was significant improvement because of his willingness to cooperate;

now, with the Houthi regime, international support has taken a definitive shift. Nevertheless, the use of drones and

airstrikes is growing pre- cariously near civilian life. In addition to al-Qaeda, the insurgence of a Yemen branch of the

Islamic State (ISIS) also threatens the region. They seek to overpower AQAP, and have since launched many series of

attacks and suicide bombings in the capital. The insurgency of radical terrorist groups centering in Yemen brings

particular alarm to the international community; with such political instability, rapid expansion and establishment in

the region rings almost every single alarm bell on potentially dictato- rial-regime watch. Yemen is a particularly

popular topic in the international community precisely because of the imperative need to stem potential future bases.

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The current situation of Yemen would be difficult to deal with in the most developed of countries; however, with

mounds of corruption, unstable governance, and resource depletion, Yemen is nowhere near such goals. With over

ten million Yemenis food insecure, the civilians are suffering the repercussions from decades of built up government

conflict. Even during the early 2000s when there was relative peace in Yemen, the nation was far from achieving

developed status. With unemployment rates nearly doubling in the past two years and civilian poverty higher than

ever, it is to no surprise

that the ongoing conflict has exacerbated the stunt in economic growth. It is only possible to pull Yemen out of its

developing status with economic infrastructure; however, that is rendered impossible when the government is

otherwise occupied with terrorist groups, or in this case, when the government is non-existent. Other infrastructure

needed for development include education, transportation, health, and basic social services. Without education, there

will never be a population that will be able to compete with the global market; increasingly, however, parents are

opting to keep their children at home, for fear of a bombing or attack from APAQ or ISIS. Hospitals, buildings, and

schools are all equally vulnerable to attack, and so citizens live in a constant state of fear. This crisis impacts every

possible actor: the international community, the government, and the local citizens.

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International Involvement

Due to the culmination of terrorist activity in Yemen, there have been large amounts of UN and international

involvement in Yemen. UN involvement with the conflict dates back to the 1900s. Established in July of 1963, the

United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) was created in order to reinforce the implementation of the

disengagement agreement between the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia. The mission of the UNYOM ended

quite quickly, and so in late 1964 they had already withdrawn all personnel. More recently, the UNDP has taken

various steps towards helping Ye- men’s development. The Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA),

created by the UNDP, supports public administration reform, re-centralization of local governance, and

infrastructure rebuilding in all communities affected by the conflict. Working with other UN branches like the World

Bank, the program aims to empower the people of Yemen and build future foundations for a developed state.

Additionally, a resolution was passed by the UNSC on the implementation of an arms embargo against the Houthi

rebels. In terms of military intervention, though President Hadi has repeatedly requested for UNSC troops and

support, none has been given to date. Mediators, including UN peace envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, have been

granted to the country on several occasions. Numerous countries, including Russia and Pakistan, have endorsed the

end of all conflict and peaceful mediation between the rebels and the government, but none have had any tangible

impact on the current conflict.

The majority of international support has come from Saudi Arabia; the Saudi-led intervention along with nine other

Arab states has significantly decreased Houthi rebel groups’ personnel. The intervention has thus far included air

strikes, naval and aerial blockades, and a large ground intervention named operation Decisive Storm. The operation

has ended in April of 2015, and a new one was launched, coined operation Renewal of Hope. This operation’s

mandate is to protect civilians and combat terrorism; specifically, the operations undertaken by the Saudi Arabia-led

coalition are now more focused on AQAP and ISIS, as opposed to the Houthis. There has been much action taken by

the United States concerning AQAP and ISIS, including the assassination of numerous heads of al-Qaeda and frequent

drone strikes, but none directly targeting the Houthis. The majority of action taken against the Houthis has been

internal, as few international players have an interest in getting involved with the current civil war.

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Possible Solutions

There are several factors to consider when

reviewing possible solutions to the civil war in

Yemen. Firstly the geographical implications of

the region give leeway for many aggressive

military attacks by the Saudi Arabia-led

coalition of Arab states. Reasons for the

aggression of the Houthi group stem from fears

of Sunni oppression; therefore, the proximity

of Saudi Arabia to Yemen greatly exacerbates

tensions. Additionally, the nation has suffered

an extensive history of conflict. Considering

the fact that the nation used to be split into two Yemen’s, the hasty unification of the two regions left a large portion

of the population in dissent. Through the negligence and carelessness of the new government in accommodating for

both cultures, the Houthi group and the general south felt significantly socio-economically marginalized under the

new republic. Lastly, in order to reach a comprehensive solution, there must be a way to facilitate the integration of

the two conflicting religions. Though the unification of Yemen was supposed to aid the populace in putting aside their

differences for one national identity, it has yet done nothing but foster animosity from both groups.

In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that the only possible way to resolve the civil war is through a

political resolution, with no further military action. The groups have been in military conflict for decades now, and

there has been decreasing international support for

such tactics every year. The United Nations, and

much of the rest of the international community,

endorses peace treaties; with military action showing

itself to be increasingly ineffective, there must be a

ceasefire before any progres- sive negotiations are to

take place. A decrease, and eventual halt, in the

aggressive military tactics employed by both the

coalition of Arab states and the Houthis is crucial.

The biggest issue in the conflict is the oppression that

the Houthis feel that they are subject to. Thus,

peaceful coexistence of the two religious factions

must be achieved in order for the development of future Yemen. The implementation of framework to protect Shia

religious customs could be a possible solution to appease the Houthi group and restore faith in the current

government. Finally, foreign intervention and aid in the removal of AQAP and ISIS could resolve a lot of current

problems within the civil war.

It is un-doubtable that peace will never be achieved with such blatant terrorist bases set up in Yemen; so long as they

are present, there will be continued civilian unrest and fear. With the help of the international community, the end to

these terrorist groups specifically based in the region is imperative to Yemen’s future success as a nation.

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Bloc Positions

Middle Eastern Nations

After Yemen’s foreign minister called on various Arab states to intervene and halt the Houthi militia, members of the

Arab League met on March 28th. Many of these nations made it clear that they supported the Saudi-led intervention.

The following day, they voted to begin the formation of a joint military force after making it clear to the international

community that an operation was necessary. Arab League chief Nabil Elaraby outlined the views of the leaders in a

communiqué, saying: “Yemen was on the brink of the abyss, requiring effective Arab and international moves after all

means of reaching a peaceful resolution have been exhausted to end the Houthi coup and re- store legitimacy.”

However, such a force has yet to be deployed in the Yemen conflict. Meanwhile, Pakistan, a nation not part of the

Arab League, has also shown its support for the Saudi-led intervention, and has expressed that the Pakistani military is

ready evoke a strong response should Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity be effected.

Central Asian Nations

Central Asian nations such as China, Russia, and Indonesia, have all strongly condemned the military action taken by

Saudi Arabia, and hope to see a peaceful resolution to the conflict soon. Although they all support President al-Hadi,

they wish to see a more humane conduct of negotiations. President Vladimir Putin himself called upon the Arab

League for an “immediate cessation of military activities” in Yemen, and Russia has since prompted resolutions to the

United Nations Security Council for a peace treaty.

Western Liberal Democracies

Most western liberal democracies (WLDs) around the world support an end to conflict and an opening of diplomatic

discussions. They firmly back President al-Hadi, and deem the Houthi rebels illegitimate. Countries like Canada and

Germany have stated that they support Saudi Arabia’s intervention, but would strongly encourage that no additional

interventions should take place. Essentially, they believe that the conflict cannot be ended by additional violence, and

negotiating tactics would be essential to reducing civilian casualties and unrest. The United States has pledged its

support to President al-Hadi’s government, and continues to send military support and foreign aid to the country.

The United States has become one of the largest benefactors of foreign aid to the Yemeni civil war, and has sent

countless drone strikes to the AQAP and ISIS headquarters. Various other WLDs like the United Kingdom, New

Zealand, and France have all been sending foreign aid to Yemen, but not military aid.

Supranational Organizations

The European Union, the United Nations, Amnesty International, and all other supranational organizations have

strongly criticized the use of military tactics in the ongoing war. They support current President al-Hadi and his

government, and refuse to recognize the Houthi rebels as legitimate. Most bodies have deployed a number of

peacekeepers and mediators to Yemen, and hope to see troops withdraw and peaceful negotiation take place. No

military support has been given from these organizations, and they condemn Saudi Arabia for having given such aid.

They are all desperate to see the conflict ended, but through more diplomatic means than those that have been

employed thus far.

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Discussion Questions

1. Is the United States justified in sending drones to attack terrorist organizations when said drones impact

civilian lifestyle?

2. Can the Houthi group be judged on war crimes? If so, under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal

Court, an international body, or under national governance?

3. How can civilian infrastructure (hospitals, schools etc.) be better protected?

4. Is the targeting of civilian infrastructure considered a legitimate war tactic?

5. How can both the Sunni Islamists and the Shia Islamists be appeased?

6. What are the obligations of the military when fighting in civilian-populated areas?

7. How can the terrorist insurgency be mitigated?

QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER

1. How to thwart the crisis from escalating?

2. To diminish the Humanitarian crisis?

3. Role of regional key players.

4. Role of international agencies, specifically United Nations agencies.

5. To discuss the Current situation under different U.N articles and doctrines.

6. To diminish the threat of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and likeminded organization.

7. To establish and strengthen a government in the country.

8. To strengthen Yemen‘s democratic institutions.

9. To enhance the capacities of the Yemeni security agencies.

10. To discuss the role of drone strikes in the auspices of the current situation.

11. To thwart the country from becoming a global hub for terrorism.

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Some Important Links

http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11859.doc.htm

http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11915.doc.htm

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unyombackgr.html

http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=154&Body=Yemen&Body1

http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11781.doc.htm

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-damages-idUSKCN10R2B7

http://in.reuters.com/places/yemen

http://www.cfr.org/yemen/yemen-crisis/p36488

Some Video Links

(The links mentioned below are only for understanding the agenda and cannot be considered as a substantial proof or report to

any statement made in the committee.)

Origins of the crisis in Yemen

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7VGo92WWeJ4 What is Happening in Yemen? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yqns_M66sNM Rise of the Houthis- Full documentary https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y7HQRyJDTPo Yemen: Pulling The Strings- Al Jazeera World https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PXdnLA1-ZNs

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Regards

Parth Gaikwad

President United Nations Security Council

J I R S M U N 2 0 1 7

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

JIRS MUN 2017