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CIENTIFIC

UARTERLY

NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY

QUARTERLYQUARTERLYQUARTERLYQUARTERLY

no 4(89)no 4(89)no 4(89)no 4(89)

WARSAWARSAWARSAWARSAWWWW 2012 2012 2012 2012

SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE Associate Professor Andrzej Glen, Ph.D. – chairman, Professor Stanisław Zajas, Ph.D. – deputy-chairman, Associate Professor Waldemar Kaczmarek, Ph.D. – Management and

Command Faculty, Associate Professor Waldemar Kitler, Ph.D. – National Security Faculty, Dr James Corum – Baltic defence College, Col. Miroslaw Dimitrov, Associate Professor – National Defence Academy in Sofia, Lieutenant-General Professor Teodor Frunzeti, Ph.D.

– National Defence University in Bucharest, Doc. Ing. Mariana Kuffova, Associate Professor – Armed Forces Academy in Slovakia, Professor Pavel Necas – Armed Forces

Academy in Slovakia, Col. Dimitar Tashkov, Associate Professor, Ph.D. – National Defence Academy in Sofia, M.A. Adam Szynal

Thematic editor: Assoc. Prof. Piotr Gawliczek, PhD

The list of reviewers: Colonel Instructor Stan ANTON, Ph.D.;

Commander Professor Vasile BUCINSCHI, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Dipl. Eng. Pavel BUČKA, Ph.D.; Colonel Assoc. Prof. Gheorghe CALOPĂREANU, Ph.D. ;

Colonel Miroslav Stefan DIMITROV, Assoc. Prof.; Colonel Instructor Pascu FURNICĂ, Ph.D.; Doc. Ing. Peter LIPTAK, Cs.C.; Colonel Assoc. Prof. Iulian MARTIN, Ph.D.;

Colonel Professor Dimitar NEDYLKOV; Colonel Assoc. Prof. Constantin POPESCU, Ph.D.; Colonel Professor Ion ROCEANU, Ph.D.; Researcher Alexandra SARCINSCHI,

Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Dipl. Eng. Peter SPILÝ, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Andrzej Glen, Ph.D.; Prof. Waldemar KACZMAREK, Ph.D.;

Assoc. Prof. Waldemar KITLER, Ph.D.; Col. Assoc. Prof. Dariusz KOZERAWSKI, Ph.D.; Prof. Stanisław KOZIEJ, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof.Marian KOZUB, Ph.D.;

Assoc. Prof.Zdzisław KURASIŃSKI, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Józef MARCZAK, Ph.D.; Col. Assoc. Prof. Maciej MARSZAŁEK, Ph.D.; Col. Assoc. Prof. Wojciech NYSZK, Ph.D.;

Maj.Gen. Assoc. Prof. Bogusław PACEK, Ph.D.; Prof. Jacek PAWŁOWSKI, Ph.D.; Prof. Piotr SIENKIEWICZ, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Stanisław SIRKO, Ph.D.;

Assoc. Prof. Zenon STACHOWIAK, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof.Jeremiasz ŚLIPIEC, Ph.D.; Col. Prof. Jarosław WOŁEJSZO, Ph.D.; Col. Assoc. Prof. Marek WRZOSEK, Ph.D.;

Prof. Stanisław ZAJAS, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Janusz ZUZIAK, Ph.D.

Editorial committee: Anna Doraczyńska, M.A. – chief editor (tel. 6/813-516),

Jeremy Wysakowski-Walters, M.A. – editing of papers in English

Address: 00-910 Warszawa 72 al. gen. Antoniego Chruściela 103, bl. 4

tel./fax: (6)813-516 e-mail: [email protected]

The papers published in the „NDU Scientific Quarterly” are reviewed by experts.

They express individual opinions of the authors; they are also verified by an anti-plagiarism system.

National Defence University

Typesetting, printing and binding: Publishing House of National Defence University, order no 1089/2012, edition of 100 copies

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T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S Assoc. Prof. Robert KUPIECKI, Ph.D. What is the future of NATO? Lecture given at the inauguration of the academic year at the National Defence University, Warsaw, 28th September 2012 ..............................................................5 NATIONAL SECURITY Maj. Gen. Assoc. Prof. Bogusław PACEK, Ph.D. New missions of the European Union ................................................................................................12 Assoc. Prof. Andrzej GLEN, Ph.D. The Cognitive basis of air defence ......................................................................................................25 Col. Leszek ELAK, Ph.D. Reasons for contemporary conflicts – an outline of the problem ........................................................46 Lt. Col. Krzysztof DABIK, Ph.D. Security in social contract theories .....................................................................................................55 Lt. Col. Jarosław JABŁOŃSKI The building of knowledge capacity in the national security system ..................................................63 Andrzej ZAPAŁOWSKI, Ph.D. Challenges to the security of Poland related with the regionalization of Ukraine ...............................74 ART OF WAR Col. Tomasz RUBAJ, D.Sc. Fire support – an integral part of contemporary operations ................................................................90 Col. Waldemar SCHEFFS, D.Sc. The Automation of Electronic Equipment in Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare ...........................104 Jarosław SOLARZ, Ph.D. CBRN reconnaissance in the Polish Armed Forces ..........................................................................126 Emilia MIKOŁAJEWSKA, Ph.D. Maj (ret.) Dariusz MIKOŁAJEWSKI MSc From swarm intelligence to multiagent systems for mobile robot navigation ..................................137 ECONOMY OF SECURITY AND LOGISTICS Col. Assoc. Prof. Wojciech NYSZK , Ph.D. Optimization of logistic system in the polish armed forces ..............................................................151

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Lt. Col. Sylwester T. KUREK, D.Sc. Prof. Janusz PŁACZEK, Ph.D. The essence of security economics as a scientific discipline ............................................................161 Lt. Col. Sławomir BYŁEŃ, Ph.D. The Optimization of Logistics Costs in Computer Assisted Command Post Exercises ....................175 Aleksandra KACZMAREK, PhD student Corporate Social Responsibility From The Perspective of The First Decade of 21st Century in Poland ....................................................................................................193 VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND PREPARATION Prof. Józef JANCZAK, Ph.D. Maj. Grzegorz PILARSKI, M.A. The Platform of Heterogenic Simulation Environment ....................................................................199 Justyna LIPIŃSKA, Ph.D. Public information of the polish armed forces ..................................................................................206 Elżbieta OLZACKA, M.A. A "Cultural turn" in the study and conduct of warfare - a new analytical perspective ......................217 Elżbieta POSŁUSZNA, Ph.D. Typological Aspects of Single Issue Terrorism ................................................................................232 Assoc. Prof. Ilona POLITOWICZ, Ph.D. Assoc. Prof. Piotr MAKOWSKI, Ph.D. Agata NIEDZIÓŁKA, M.A. Space marketing – innovative ideas produce creative technologies ..................................................242 Marcin KRUPA, M.A. A behavioral model determining the impact of USA military activity on the global number of wars ......................................................................................................................260

EXPERIENCE Anna MILER, Ph.D. Function and responsibilities of CIMIC in operations on Balkans ...................................................277 COMMENTS, REVIEWS AND REPORTS Aneta NOWAKOWSKA-KRYSTMAN, Ph.D. Bartosz Bolechów, Terrorism, actors, extras, viewers, PWN, Warszawa 2010, ss. 399 ..................295

WHAS IS THE FUTURE OF NATO?

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WHAT FUTURE IS THERE FOR NATO?

Lecture given at the inauguration of the academic

year at the National Defense Academy, Warsaw,

28th

September 2012

Assoc. Prof. Robert KUPIECKI, Ph.D. Undersecretary of Defense

Honorable Minister,

Honorable Rector-Commandant,

Honorable Guests,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great honor and pleasure for me to participate in the inauguration of the

academic year here at the National Defense Academy. It is the largest and by far

the most important Polish academic institution educating officers and civilian

experts in various specializations associated with the military, defense and national

security. Good education and practice are of great importance in building effective

solutions in these fields.

Speaking to the academic personnel and the administrative staff under the new

leadership of the Rector-Commandant Maj. Gen. Boguslaw Pacek, as well as the

course participants and Academy supporters, I would like to wish you all

a successful academic year and that you continue with distinction your dedicated

service to Poland, the Ministry of Defense and the Polish Armed Forces.

In the Ministry we expect from the Academy “fresh” military and strategic

thinking and I am speaking here also on behalf of my boss, the Minister of National

Defense Mr. Tomasz Siemoniak. The NDA should lead in raising the competence

of state institutions and promoting the knowledge pertaining to defense among our

citizens.

I wish the new recipients of academic degrees good luck in their scientific

research.


I think that the question regarding the future of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization has not been chosen by accident as the topic of the inaugural lecture.

By referring to the future "in general" I mean an inquiry into the reasons for its

existence in the contemporary world while the future "in particular" means in other

words the importance of NATO to the Member States.

NDU Scientific Quarterly no 4(89) 2012

ROBERT KUPIECKI

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In the latter case we refer to the widely perceived mission of NATO composed

of the classical function of collective defense and the new expeditionary tasks

taken up by the Alliance following the end of the Cold War.

A regular and sound reflection on the condition of NATO is needed.

Testing the value and quality of the Atlantic Alliance is fundamental for the

security of the Member States and the stability of their surroundings. This also

concerns Poland which develops its defense plans and capabilities in harmony with

NATO planning and operational requirements.

Hence, the defence and security advantages offered by the Atlantic Alliance

must be of interest to Poland in a natural and obvious way. Difficult questions

asked in our country and by other Allies should be perceived as guidance in the

process leading to a correct strategic diagnosis.

Questions about the future of the North Atlantic Alliance have remained valid

since its very inception in 1949. Many have shared the view that NATO did not

have a chance to become a reality. In fact, on both sides of the Atlantic it embraced

countries which differed in terms of the pressure felt from the Communist bloc, the

military potential they had at their disppsal, political will, aspirations and public

sensitivity to military matters.

Frequent internal disputes and crises in the history of NATO for many have

been vivid evidence that it cannot work. Former Secretary General of NATO Paul-

Henri Spaak was once asked if those disputes posed an existential threat to NATO.

He then accurately remarked that for an alliance of free and democratic states

disputes are a proof of its vitality and a confirmation of the fact that NATO is just

doing its job.

It is worth to continue with this line of reasoning also today. Not to

underestimate or diminish the contemporary challenges facing the Atlantic

Alliance but to remind us of its essence. It is a voluntary commitment of the

Member States who jointly decide on what they have in common.

This quick lesson of the Alliance’s real politik does not mean praise for

relativization of mutual obligations but is a reminder that they function in the real

world. It is defined by both the needs and opportunities, but also limitations. In

order to overcome them the Atlantic Alliance has developed unprecedented

instruments of consultation and military cooperation.

The sum of all weaknesses in the real world never creates any strength.

Still, the strength comes from overcoming weaknesses through smart cooperation,

solidarity, pooling of military capabilities, forging political consensus and bold

action, where necessary and when there is political will. In the case of NATO, by

bringing the potential of Europe and America together this strength has neither a

precedent in history nor a good alternative for the future.

We want it to be credible but no matter how it is perceived, the very existence

of NATO is a strategic asset for the Member States. It forces possible adversaries,

who would contemplate a "provocation", to reconsider their options.


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They must take into account in their plans the fact that any possible conflict

with a NATO country is not worthwhile, its price will be high and its scale cannot

be maintained in the low-intensity rigors.

Even if one asks whether the mechanism of mutual guarantees will actually

work, we know that a prudent planner and a strategist must assume that this will

happen and consequently abandon evil intensions. This mechanism has been

working effectively for 63 years and therefore it is worth to work persistently to

ensure that its credibility is preserved in the future.

One researcher, immediately after the Cold War compared NATO to

a prestigious theatre which had never given a performance. However, with the

quality of art acquired through many rehearsals and mastering skills, nobody

wanted to challenge its reputation.

Using this “theatre” parallel, today we are enriched with the experience of

a few allied "shows”. They have solved the Post-Cold War dilemmas included in

the following questions:

– will the Atlantic Alliance have a raison d'être without a clearly defined

enemy?

– will the Atlantic Alliance be able to adapt to an uncertain world of

multidimensional threats emerging outside the North Atlantic area?

– finally, will the ambitiously integrating Europe need guarantees and the

military presence of the United States?

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Kosovo and in Macedonia, in the airspace of Serbia,

in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, in the Gulf of Aden and on the Mediterranean Sea

NATO has proven not only its usefulness but also indispensability. NATO was the

only international actor able to support its value – based declarations on the

credible factor of military power.

It has also opened new areas of cooperation, ranging out from combating

terrorism, alleviating the effects of natural disasters to energy security. It has also

started broad partnership cooperation with many countries in the world.

NATO is not looking for the enemy and is not hostile to anyone. This also

applies to Russia, with whom the Atlantic Alliance has been trying to develop

strategic cooperation framework for almost two decades. So far, these efforts have

been without a major breakthrough or understanding from the other side, but also

not without a slow progress.

If all this were to prove the weakness of NATO, one may wonder how else to

define NATO’s power?

Part of the problem of perception comes from the fact that in today's world of

quick tabloid and television analysis, every argument and example can well support

the reasoning of either disputing party.

Let’s consider one of numerous examples – NATO operation in Libya. The

operation has achieved its goals. It has actually shown the allied interdependence,

the importance of US military potential and the directions in which the European

ROBERT KUPIECKI

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allies should develop their military capabilities. NATO operation in Libya has also

accelerated decisions and demonstrated the need for a rational approach to the

build – up of defense capabilities. The Alliance refers to this as "smart defense"

and the European Union calls it "pooling and sharing". In every case it means

"more cooperation" and "more solidarity".

For the critics of NATO, the operation in Libya has become an ultimate proof

of the fall of the Atlantic Alliance, the military collapse of its European part and

the prominence of the US military role. One publicist has compared this situation

to Snow White, whose skirt 27 dwarfs were tightly holding on to. We have heard

such ominous visions before, for example, when some analysts put the NATO

mission in Afghanistan in Hamletian categories of ‘to be or not to be’.

To those who are unfamiliar with the subject I will highlight the role of the

Polish member of the Madeline Albright Group in the course of work on the report

preceding the Lisbon strategic concept. He restored the right proportions for this

matter and adequate provisions on Afghanistan as a task and mission of the

Atlantic Alliance, rather than its raison d'être.

Many extreme voices are heard on the future of NATO. However, it is worth

finding in them premises for constructive action as a collective effort and on the

national level.

If anyone should have doubts why in Poland we are carrying out our own

ambitious plans of military modernization, supported both by the President and

Prime Minister, he or she should remember that the essence of the alliance

contained in article 5 of the Washington Treaty takes its roots in national actions as

described in article 3 of this document.

In short, these provisions mean that while expecting assistance from others,

first you have to do everything you can to provide for your own defense. Therefore,

in doing our job it is worth analyzing what our allies are doing in this matter.

While thinking of the future of NATO, however, one should get rid of the

demobilizing perspective of NATO decline and collapse, not for the sake of

“official optimism” but the well perceived national and allied interest.

Before this year's NATO summit in Chicago in May, the Foreign Policy

magazine asked 57 prominent politicians from Atlantic Alliance countries, how

they predicted its future. Their responses are very interesting.

All respondents answered positively the questions whether NATO should

continue to exist and whether the U.S. engagement in Europe should be

maintained.

But the question of what its main objectives should be, divided those

politicians: 14 of them pointed at the collective defense, 2 at out-of-area missions,

no one pointed at global military missions and guarding against Russia, 31 named

the combination of many functions whereas the remaining pointed at other issues.

On a lighter note, Sweden was recognized as the most desired new NATO

member; greatest preference for the removal was expressed with regard of a


9

southern country. There were also 9 other candidates for the expulsion from NATO

- nobody indicated Poland which I perceive as a sign of our reliability.

The results of this poll (and I only quote its small portion), in comparison with

the results of the NATO Summit in Chicago strengthen the optimistic approach

towards the future of NATO.

In my opinion the challenges facing NATO point at two types of issues which

the allies will have to deal with:

– first, what type and scale of tasks will NATO be used for in the future? After

all it isn't a universal remedy for all the problems of world;

– second, what type of military capabilities should the Alliance have to remain

credible in the anticipated missions and how to develop such desired capabilities?


The Atlantic Alliance was created in order to defend its members. Its other

functions, set by NATO Strategic Concept of 2010, such as crisis management and

cooperation with partner states, are supposed to serve the implementation of NATO

key mission.

Allies vary in terms of the importance they attach to these functions. Some

NATO countries situated far from the areas where traditional threats may originate

from are mainly interested in stabilization operations, often far from their own

borders. Others want to be reassured that NATO, while tackling the challenges

within its borders, will be able to defend them.

Therefore, the problem with finding the right balance for these tasks seems to

be the most important today.

It concerns not only the military efforts and political attention but also

decisions on the use of limited resources. Even more, decisions regarding one type

of mission sometimes affect the availability of resources for other types. Although

this dilemma does not always appear in such a sharp contrast, it should not be

neglected.

The Allies have only one set of forces, one budget and different needs. Thus,

they have to be addressed in such a way that the ensuing balance becomes

a guarantee and a source of allied trust. This, in turn, should create political will to

support current NATO missions.

Poland effectively works to ensure that the Alliance has updated its operational

plans which would enable it to strengthen our defense in case of a threat.

NATO also needs capabilities enabling the conduct of high intensity and large

scale operations. One should remember that this potential can also be used in

stabilization missions well outside its area.

We are also seeking funds for co-financing NATO’s military infrastructure

essential for collective defense. The idea is that the states have the ability to receive

assistance from other NATO members on their own territory. It can also be used to

support expeditionary missions.

ROBERT KUPIECKI

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Finally, we want the requirements for collective defense to be included in allied

training and the exercises policy.

From this perspective the Summit in Chicago has met our expectations. It has

confirmed collective defense as the main function of NATO. While making

recommendations for further development of the defense capabilities the Summit

also highlighted the initiatives and tasks which are most important for us, for

example, the development of interoperability between the allied forces or regular

exercises which also allow testing collective defense scenarios.

As I have already pointed out, Poland makes every effort to develop its own

capabilities in synergy with NATO solutions. Good examples here are our plans to

strengthen air and missile defense as the Polish contribution to the NATO BMD

program.

It does not mean, of course, that we are reluctant to crisis management or the

cooperation with partner countries. We have been actively involved in those

activities since 1994 and we view them as related with the security of our country.

Another issue is NATO military effectiveness. The economic crisis in Europe

has caused reductions in defense budgets and a subsequent decrease in the allied

military capabilities. It concerns the tasks related to both collective defense and

expeditionary missions. Poland with its growing defense spending, including the

modernization of the armed forces, is a positive exception in Europe.

The key issue in preventing the effects of the reduction in defense spending

will be multinational cooperation initiatives like Smart Defense.

However, they cannot serve as a pretext for further cuts nor dilute

commitments through complicated procedures which prevent or slow down the

action. They will also have to facilitate the use of jointly acquired capabilities or

lending them to other allies.

The rational approach to multinational defense building is an art not a science.

Solutions in this regard must meet the priority needs of Member States; whereas

NATO and the EU should cooperate closely.

Preservation of the transatlantic ties is no less important both politically and

militarily. The increasing involvement of the United States outside Europe creates

the temptation to weaken these ties. Therefore fewer U.S. troops in Europe must

mean more effective efforts to achieve the interoperability of forces, including

exercises and training as well as greater regional impact stemming from their

presence.

The development of the military capabilities of the European states is the other

side of this process. Although it is difficult in current budgetary realities it is

necessary for raising the profile of the European Union on the international arena

and maintaining the political and military ties with the US.

The outgoing US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates made reference to this in

his farewell address. The truth of his words has been confirmed by NATO

operational activities.


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In the world of contemporary challenges I am confident about the future of

NATO. And it depends on the Member States, their ability to combine and wisely

manage their resources, to find partners supporting the Allied missions, prudence

in strategy making and perhaps also a reduction of global ambitions.

In 2014, NATO will change its tasks in Afghanistan and significantly reduce

the number of its troops in this country.

So perhaps it is unrealistic to expect that we will be able to do more with less,

not only in Afghanistan. To be realistic is an important call for allied strategy.

However, reduced global ambitions do not necessarily mean less global

importance for NATO, especially in its usefulness for the Member States.

Today's NATO is not "an alliance from the days of our fathers" as the

Americans like to say meaning that it used to be better. However, it is able to make

its members safe, protect their development, save the lives of innocent people

threatened by the bloody tyrants, and encourage more partners.

There is no alternative to NATO now or in the foreseeable future; an

alternative which will be able to provide military capabilities for difficult

operations.

Let us not forget that it is still attractive for countries striving to join the

Atlantic Alliance. The enlargement process has not been completed yet.

When thinking about the future of NATO one should keep all these issues in

mind.

Thank you for your attention.

BOGUSŁAW PACEK

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NEW MISSIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Maj. Gen. Assoc. Prof. Bogusław PACEK, Ph.D. Rector-Commandant, NDU Warsaw

Abstract

The article deals with the new military missions under the European Union flag, as

part of the Common Security and Defence Policy. This paper covers three missions. The

first one being in South Sudan which aims to strengthen the security of the Juba

International Airport. The second one is in the Horn of Africa, focusing on the regional

maritime capabilities building. The third one is in the geographic region of Sahel, focusing

on the training of the security forces of the Republic of Niger. The planning and financial

aspects of these missions are described and the mission is stated as having strategic goals

in line with the assumptions of the European Security Strategy, namely – the protection of

the European continent against destabilising factors.

Key words – European Union, security, civilian missions, crisis management

Introduction Between the years 2009 and 2011 the Common Security and Defence Policy

(CSDP) was passing through a difficult period. There were no new missions deployed, defence budget was reduced, there were advanced considerations to terminate some of the functioning missions and operations. There was a lack of concrete visions for further CSDP development. Reasons for this impasse were undoubtedly enhanced by the budget crisis of the Euro zone, which brought about a bigger interest of the European Union (EU) member states’ politicians in financial issues rather than defence.

On the 1 January 2012, the first anniversary of the EU diplomatic service, formally known as the European External Action Service (EEAS), was celebrated. It assembles all planning and executive tools of the Union’s civilian missions and

NATIONAL SECURITY



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military operations1. However, the Secretary General of the EEAS stated that the creation of a fully operational diplomatic body is an effort involving a minimum of 10 years intensive work for all departments and their personnel.

Despite the presented difficulties, the EU managed to commence three new missions in the framework of the CSDP. All three were deployed to the African continent, in the areas of the Horn of Africa, Sahel and South Sudan. All of them are still in their initial phases, nevertheless apart from constraints stemming from politico-strategic conditions, their planning was considerably influenced by budgetary aspects.

These three new engagements were purposely considered as civilian missions and not military operations even though after some modifications the encountered conditions would enable them the use of military tools. The reason for this is that civilian missions are normally financed from the Union’s budget, while military operations are financed through the Athena2 mechanism, a common pot into which member states are obliged to make financial contributions proportionate to their Gross National Product. During a period of financial crisis this proposal is seen as unpopular and cannot be accepted by some of the member states.

During extensive consultations conducted while preparing the missions, EU member states' ambassadors and other representatives clearly pointed out that the austerity measures are to be respected. Negative comments for the above indicated that this type of planning does not have a lot in common with crisis management, which should be first of all characterised by a fast decision-making process and not the arranging of challenges in a way that would bring the biggest possible financial savings.

The afore mentioned aspects, dealing with the creation of the optimised diplomatic tool, are the reasons to present in this article the key findings related to the main factors as far as the new missions of the European Union are concerned. The assumption has been to find the answer to the general problem of how and

why the European Union should develop its capabilities to execute civilian

missions. The problem formulated in this way could be solved by defining the demanded planning and executive tools, which are at at the disposal of the European Union.

The research activities have been undertaken, describing the following working hypothesis: the development of the totally functioning diplomatic tool, mainly

through the integration of the various expert capabilities (diplomatic, political,

military, technological and others) permits the setting up of effective

1 EEAS Implementation Report. European External Action Service. Brussels 2012. p. 3. 2 Athena – European Union mechanism of administering finances which are used for covering

common costs of EU military crisis management operations. Costs covered through the Athena can be in the areas of transportation, infrastructure, medical support and the so-called national expenses (NBC – National Borne Costs) for accommodation, fuel, etc. (European Union Military Staff Glossary of Acronyms and Definitions. Council of the European Union. Brussels 2007. p. 36)

BOGUSŁAW PACEK

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coordination mechanisms and rules for the decision making process among

the EU member states. In the described crisis realities of the EU, civilian missions are the most desired

solutions in the area of crisis management. The EU conducts civilian missions in the scope of policing, border policing, customs, rule of law, administration, civil protection, monitoring missions, security sector reform (SSR) and the supporting of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)3.

A comprehensive approach to any crisis situation is another requirement sought in the EU. In this aspect it is less important to plan jointly the civilian and military dimensions of a given engagement in one theatre of operations. The most essential problem appears in the field of integrating other EU instruments into a crisis response. These instruments belong mainly to the European Commission (EC), namely the Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation (DEVCO), whose representatives participate in the planning of each crisis management mission and operation. The Treaty of Lisbon4 in Article 28 A extorts that all available tools are to be used for dealing with crises. In the case of the CSDP these tools are mainly used for (i) complementing missions’ efforts during their duration and (ii) as part of their exit strategies aiming at ensuring the continuation of a missions’ achievements once they are terminated. However, because of lengthy EC financial planning process, benefiting from these tools is often heavily constrained.

Mission No 1.

South Sudan – strengthening security of the Juba

International Airport (JIA) – mission EUAVSEC South Sudan

(EU Aviation Security South Sudan) On the 1 January 1956 Sudan announced independence from the United

Kingdom and Egypt. The Sudanese territory consisted of the islamic North, of Arabic origin, and the catholic South, inhabited by black African people who immediately started their effort to gain independence through the creation of a separate state.

Without the Southern Sudanese having possibilities to gain independence by peaceful means, a war broke out in 1983 along a temporarily agreed borderline of both regions, which was regarded as one of the bloodiest conflicts in the world.

As a result approximately 2 million people were killed and another 4 million were declared refugees. Fighting ended in 2005 with the signature of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the North and the South. This agreement granted autonomy to the southern provinces of Sudan. In January 2011 a referendum in the

3 Ibidem p. 46. 4 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the

European Community. European Union. Brussels 2007. p. 45.


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South took place. Almost 99 percent of the voters voted for separation from the North, with the aim of creating a separate country. On the 9 July 2011 the South claimed independence. A new state was created: South Sudan. Its independence was recognised by the main international organisations and the majority of the world's countries. Unfortunately, in spite of having vast oilfields and other minerals, the country of South Sudan is one of the poorest and least developed states in the world.

The EU is deeply engaged in delivering support to South Sudan. Together with EU member states active individually in South Sudan, in particular Germany, the United Kingdom and Norway, the EU is the biggest financial aid donor. In May 2011 the European Development Fund (EDF) released an additional 200 million Euros allocated proportionally to the needs to different areas. In accordance with the EU Comprehensive Approach to Sudan and South Sudan,5 EU efforts are focusing on 1) Health, 2) Education, 3) Food security and Rural development, 4) Rule of Law; this is in line with the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) priorities for assistance. In addition, the EU and its Member States are providing technical and financial support for peaceful co-existence through the Early Warning System of the African Peace Facility and the Instrument for Stability, which funds conflict prevention and peace-building efforts with a focus on the border areas and basic social services. In the frame of point 4), the Council of the European Union invited the European Union External Action Service to develop CSDP options for potential support to the state of South Sudan which would be complementary to other efforts.

An inter-institutional European Union specialist team, during its visit to South Sudan at the beginning of 2011, identified the following areas6, in which the Union could be involved in the frame of Common Security and Defence Policy: (i) capacity building of the South Sudanese Police Service SSPS in the field of investigations, (ii) creation and training of South Sudanese border police and (iii) enhancing the security of the Juba International Airport (Juba – the capital of the Republic of South Sudan).

After long and extensive discussions among the European Union member states which were held in working groups and Committee, it was decided that the option (iii) with regard to the security at the Juba airport will be further developed.

As a newly independent country, the GOSS was facing a series of significant challenges to the establishment of a fully functional and compliant transport hub for commercial and passenger purposes. The Juba airport was not designed to be a major departure and arrival point, rather it was set up as a regional, small-scale airport capable of dealing with domestic air traffic. The terminal was very small and struggled to cope with an ever-increasing passenger load.

5 EU Comprehensive Approach to Sudan and South Sudan. Council of the European Union.

Brussels 2011. p. 4. 6 CSDP options paper for South Sudan. Council of the European Union. Brussels 2011. p. 2.

BOGUSŁAW PACEK

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Nearly all international air traffic is received at this airport. The poor condition of the infrastructure, limited existing security arrangements and a lack of basic equipment drastically impaired the flow of passengers and goods. Moreover the airport stood as an open door to terrorism that could target the South Sudanese and the numerous internationals present in country, while on the other hand connecting with airports in major international African traffic hubs.

The security arrangements in place fell short of international standards. The work of security and police services showed not only a lack of coordination but also an obvious lack of individual skills. Taking the above into consideration the airport is likely to act as a magnet to unscrupulous persons seeking easy access to international flights, including criminals and terrorists trying to identify the weakest link in any regional airport network.

The European Union engagement in enhancing the security of the Juba International Airport is taking place upon the request and agreement of the government of South Sudan. The Union’s commitment is to train and raise the quality of security service activities to a level fulfilling requirements of the International Civi Aviation Organization (ICAO)7.

The civilian mission, EUAVSEC South Sudan, is a good example of an integrated approach to a crisis. Except for the CSDP mission’s effort, the financial instruments of the European Commission are used for budgeting of the airport's equipment. Moreover, cooperation with other partners during the planning phase of the mission brought about complementarities with the United Nations International Organization for Migration (IOM) which is training the airport personnel in immigration procedures and with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which is conducting training of customs procedures.

In the mission there are approximately 50 personnel with a mixture of expertise including police, border police and installations security. Personnel are unarmed, do not have executive powers and cannot substitute the autonomous airport security. They are performing tasks of training, monitoring, mentoring, advising as well as the coordination of security services and activities of the airport. The mission’s initial mandate has been set up for 12 months since the date of the achievement of the Initial Operational Capability (IOC).

In the future it is possible that the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy engagement in South Sudan will be farther enhanced. The Political and Security Committee obliged the European External Action Service to consider other strategic options within the framework of a strategic review for the EUAVSEC South Sudan.

7 Crisis Management Concept – CSDP mission in South Sudan). European External Action

Service. Brussels 2011. p. 5.


17

Mission No 2.

Horn of Africa – Regional Maritime Capabilities Building (RMCB) –

mission EUCAP Nestor The sea route through the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden

possesses the biggest strategic importance of all sea routes in the world. Within the space of a year thousands of transport vessels go through it. Costs of cargo transported through it each year surpass billions of dollars. This route is also used for the transportation of various types of dangerous cargo such as military equipment, weapons and ammunition, which in the case of them falling into the wrong hands could be threatening to the whole region.

Starting from 2005, piracy began to flourish on these waters. As a result of huge ransoms paid by sea companies for the release of the hijacked vessels and their crews, the assets of pirates got considerably higher with some part of the funds being devoted to buying better ships and weapons, something that made the efficiency of piracy grow even further. The piracy was practiced by, among others, local fishermen who developed a standard action plan, starting from the observation of a potential victim vessel, for which usually a slowly moving target was chosen, without security ships or helicopters. The attacks used to take place in the narrow Gulf of Aden, where transport vessels had to slow down and pirates could potentially attack from all directions.

Victims of Somalian pirates were often vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP), which paradoxically transported food for Somalia. The piracy itself was caused by crisis and extreme poverty in this country. International organisations clearly indicated that without proper actions in-land, inside the country, prevention against piracy on the sea would not bring the required effects.

In the efforts of fighting piracy are engaged, among others, the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and the European Union’s EUNAVFOR Atalanta operation. With the aim of protecting their own vessels, many states possess in the Horn of Africa war ships, including global leaders such as China, India, Japan and Russia.

The „maritime capabilities” should be understood as capabilities for an effective management of the overall marine domain. They are an indispensable condition for performing basic state functions in the area of marine planning and conduct, search and rescue operations and customs duties. Critical aspects of maritime capabilities are the law enforcement and the rule of law.

Structurally, the maritime capabilities consist of four pillars: law, training, equipment and information. Their effective co-functioning will ensure that the states of the Horn of Africa will be in possession of an efficient tool for fighting piracy.

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Source: drawn by the author.

Picture 1. Pillars of the maritime capabilities)

The naval operation of the European Union: EUNAVFOR Atalanta started

in 2008. In accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1846, Atalanta performs tasks of, among others, ensuring security to WFP vessels, merchant vessels, and fishing companies; it fulfils tasks of deterrence, prevention and intervention, aiming at ending piracy acts in the operation’s area of responsibility and also detaining and transferring to other respective services and authorities individuals suspected of participation in piracy activities.

Reg

ion

al

Ma

riti

me

Ca

pa

city

Bu

ild

ing

(RM

CB

)

Training:

– Navy,

– Police,

– Border guard,

– Support personnel.

Equipment:

– Patrol boats,

– Communication,

– Maintenance,

– Supply system.

Information:

– Gathering of information,

– Transformation of information,

– Exchange of information,

– Creation of a common operational picture.

Law:

– Suitable national laws of respective states,

– Agreements for detainees’ hand-over,

– Criminal intelligence and investigation capacities,

– Courts,

– Prisons.


19

The strategic End State of this operation is a continued reduction, and potentially a thorough elimination, of piracy on the waters of the Horn of Africa. It is obvious that this objective will not be received only as a result of activities on sea. This is why the European Union, being one of the leading international organisations in the region, deployed a new mission of maritime capabilities building EUCAP Nestor, whose main objective would be to contribute to the continued reduction of piracy, something that creates conditions for the achieving of EUNAVFOR Atalanta’s End State.

EUCAP Nestor is a European Union civilian mission conducted in the frame of the Common Security and Defence Policy, with the participation of military experts, including naval ones. It creates synergy effects not only with Atalanta, but also with the EU Training Mission Somalia (EUTM), whose main objective is to contribute to the development of the Somalian security sector through broadened officer and soldier training and formation.

Source: drawn by the author.

Picture 2. Integrated EU Approach against piracy in the Horn of Africa

Planning for the EUCAP Nestor mission started in 2010, however discrepancies among the European Union’s Member States regarding its possible character, blocked the decision-making processes. Initially it was considered as another military operation, nevertheless because of the previously presented financial aspects, the EU decided to deploy a civilian mission.

The EUCAP Nestor is a part of a broader EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa (Picture 2). An initial mandate for this mission was predicted to last 24 months. During the mid-mandate a strategic review was foreseen. Basing on this review, decisions will be made for the termination or an extension of the mission.

It is predicted that the piracy in the Horn of Africa will be eliminated when three factors will be coexisting8:

• Stabilization of the situation in Somalia. • Acts of piracy will be properly punished. • Regional maritime capabilities will be enhanced. The European Union is making efforts to implement all these factors. The EUCAP Nestor mission is complex and ambitious. To approach the

problem of building the regional maritime capabilities in an integrated manner, it

8 Crisis Management Concept for Regional Maritime Capabilities Building in the Horn of Africa. European External Action Service. Brussels 2011. p. 8.

EU NAVFOR Atalanta

EUTM Somalia

EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa

EU NAVFOR

Atalanta EUTM Somalia

EUCAP Nestor

BOGUSŁAW PACEK

20

was planned that the mission will be operational in eight states of the region: Djibouti, Kenya, Yemen, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Somalia and Tanzania.

To properly coordinate actions with other organisations, the European Union signed strategic partnerships with, among others, the African Union (AU), the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

The European Union’s political objective is to considerably contribute to international efforts aiming at the elimination of piracy in the Horn of Africa and such reinforcement of the maritime capabilities of the region’s states which would allow them to control their own territorial waters and economic areas and in a farther perspective to take over full responsibility for security issues.

Political efforts of the European Union will not only be limited to the organisation of Common Security and Defence Policy missions but will be more complex. The Union’s financial instruments also participate in this project; among others the European Development Fund (EDF) and the Instrument for Stability (IfS). All proposed actions are carefully coordinated to prevent a duplication of efforts.

It was decided that the EUCAP Nestor would have the following tasks9: 1. Training of functionaries of border guard, police, and support services and

selected navy officers in suitable expertise areas; indispensable for an efficient fight against piracy.

2. Expert mentoring in the fields of law, criminal intelligence, investigations, court and prison functions and maritime operational issues.

3. Coordination of the delivery and distribution of specialist equipment. There are two ways of providing training: − Using the Regional Training Centre in Djibouti (DRTC), established basing

on the Djibouti Code of Conduct, promoting the fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa. The DRTC is financed by the European Union and Japan.

− Using the Maritime Training and Support Teams (MTSTs), possessing mobility capabilities to redeploy and conduct trainings in all states of the region.

Each of the states of the Horn of Africa in which the EUCAP Nestor is operational, is in a different strategic situation. Therefore to each of them a different individual approach has been used. These states differ as to law systems in force, security forces’ structures or the level of training and equipping of respective formations.

9 Crisis Management Concept for Regional Maritime Capabilities Building in the Horn of Africa.

European External Action Service. Brussels 2011. p. 11.


21

Mission No 3.

Sahel – training of security forces of the Republic of Niger –

mission EUCAP Sahel Niger

The Sahel is a geographical region in Africa, bordering with the Sahara southern regions, extending from Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Sudan and Eritrea to Ethiopia. Its western part, except for the Niger Delta, and some mountainous areas, are a sterile desert. On these fields there are several ethnically diversified desert tribes with the most numerous being Tuaregs, aiming at establishing their own independent country – Azawad.

The Sahel is one of the poorest regions of the world. It faces simultaneously the challenges of extreme poverty, the effects of climate change, frequent food crises, rapid population growth, fragile governance, unresolved internal tensions, the risk of Islamist radicalisation, illicit trafficking and terrorist-linked security threats. The situation has also deteriorated due to the outcomes of the Libyan crisis. As a result, numerous groups of fighters and bandits, but also considerable amounts of military equipment, weapons and ammunition have migrated from Libya to the Sahelian states10. The states of the region have to face these challenges directly. The three core Sahelian states are Mauritania, Mali and Niger. Some of the challenges posed impact on neighbouring countries, including Algeria, Morocco and Nigeria. Their engagement is necessary to help resolve them; and the problems facing the Sahel not only affect the local populations but increasingly impact directly on the interests of European citizens.

Northern regions of the Republic of Mali, in which lawlessness reigns without the presence of any governmental security forces, became a safe haven to the Al-Qaida Maghreb Islamique (AQMI) (Picture 3). Current AQMI’s activities are not only common criminal activities but also murders of white European and American citizens, something that is efficiently blocking all Western investment in the region.

Forces, resources and operational capabilities of the Al-Qaida in the Republic of Mali are growing much faster than those of governmental security services. Additionally, deteriorating security conditions make it difficult for humanitarian aid to be delivered.

The situation has also been worsened by the coup d’état on 21 March 2012 in Mali’s capital city – Bamako. It was conducted by representatives of the Malian army as a protest against the government which used to send soldiers to fight the better trained and equipped Tuaregs in the north of Mali. As s result, plenty of Malian soldiers were killed during these fights.

10 Crisis Management Concept for a CSDP mission in the Sahel. European External Action

Service. Brussels 2011. p. 3.

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Zone under control

Zone of direct activities

Region of Sahel

Source: European Union Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. European External Action Service. Brussels 2011.

Picture 3. Activities of Al-Qaida in the states of Sahel

In the presented situation, the Republic of Niger is one of the last strongholds

of stability in the region. Niger’s politicians show clear willingness to resolve existing problems, in particular to prevent their spilling over into other states of the region. The government of the Republic of Niger, as the only one of the three mentioned Sahelian states (Mali, Mauritania, Niger) into which the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy mission could be deployed, expressed a strong will to welcome this mission on their territory.

The European Union (EU) has a longstanding interest in reducing insecurity and improving development in the Sahel region. The EU’s political objective is to enhance stability, security, good governance and social cohesion in the Sahel, and especially Niger, and help establish the conditions for local and national sustainable development.


23

The EU strategic objective has been defined so as to contribute to improving the capacity of Nigerien Security Forces to fight terrorism and organised crime in an effective, coherent and coordinated manner and to support and advise on the implementation of their own strategies for security and development.

To achieve these objectives, the EU has deployed a civilian CSDP Advisory, Assistance and Training mission to Niger – EUCAP Sahel Niger – to contribute to strengthening the capacities of Niger to fight terrorism and respond to urgent needs in organised crime, in order to improve the control of their territory, allowing for the execution of development-related projects and facilitating development.

In the Republic of Niger there are three types of security forces: Gendarmerie, National Police and National Guard. Their operational skills are not satisfactory. It is on these three service that the EUCAP is focusing.

The mission consists of approximately 40 personnel with a mixture of expertise, with the majority of police officers specialising in law enforcement, public order, criminal intelligence, investigations, forensic techniques, combating terrorism and organised crime. The personnel are unarmed, do not have executive powers and cannot substitute the autonomous security forces. The EU force is performing tasks of training, monitoring, mentoring, advising and coordination of the three Nigerien security forces. The mission’s initial mandate has been set up for 24 months. During the mid-mandate a strategic review will be conducted basing on which recommendations will be made to the Political and Security Committee regarding the future of the mission. It is probable that the mission will be extended territorially to Mali and Mauritania, to make combating of organised crime and terrorism more effective.

Similarly to EUCAP Nestor and the EUAVSEC South Sudan, EUCAP Sahel Niger is an integrated part of a complex international effort, to aid the states of the Sahel to regain stability and security. Among the international organisations present in Niger, the United Nations, the African Union and the ECOWAS11 should be listed, while among states – Canada, France and the USA are actively supporting the training and equipping of military and civilian forces of the Sahelian countries.

Conclusion The presented progress in deploying new crisis management Common Security

and Defence Policy missions eludes to an optimistic trait regarding CSDP’s future, which was until recently unclear. The political and strategic objectives of the three

11 ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States. Regional group of 15 Western

Africa states; established in 1975. Its goal is to promote economic integration in the fields of industry, transport, telecommunication, natural resources, finance and socio-cultural issues. (Source: www.ecowas.int)

BOGUSŁAW PACEK

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new missions remain in line with the European Security Strategy, whose main goal is to define activities helping to defend Europe from destabilising factors, but first of all from acts of terrorism, organised crime and regional conflicts.

It is possible to assess, as a result of the research efforts, that the goal has been achieved, and the working hypothesis has been verified positively.

The building of security in the closest vicinity of Europe is of special importance for Europe, that is why the European Union has a longstanding interest in political stability in Africa. Apart from the three described missions, there is also the issue of Libya remaining unresolved as to the scope of potential EU engagement, with the works currently ongoing.

Bibliography

Crisis Management Concept for Regional Maritime Capabilities Building in the Horn of Africa. European External Action Service. Brussels 2011.

Crisis Management Concept for a CSDP mission in the Sahel. European External Action Service. Brussels 2011.

Crisis Management Concept – CSDP mission in South Sudan. European External Action Service. Brussels 2011.

European Union Comprehensive Approach to Sudan and South Sudan. Council of the European Union. Brussels 2011.

European Union Military Staff Glossary of Acronyms and Definitions. Council of the European Union. Brussels 2007.

Rapport de démarrage de l’Instrument de stabilité pour contre-terrorisme Sahel. CIVIPOL. Brussels 2012.

EEAS Implementation Report. European External Action Service. Brussels 2012. European Union Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. European External

Action Service. Brussels 2011. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the

European Community. European Union. Brussels 2007. CSDP options paper for South Sudan. European External Action Service. Brussels 2011.

THE COGNITIVE BASIS O FAIR DEFENCE

25

THE COGNITIVE BASIS OF AIR DEFENCE

Assoc. Prof. Andrzej GLEN, Ph.D. National Defence University

Abstract

The article includes a description of the axiological, ontological and epistemological

basis of the phenomena of air defence (AD). It characterises the value system of AD, and

explains how AD exists in the physical and conceptual reality. AD is defined in a broad

sense as part of the air security of the state and in a narrow sense as part of the armed

struggle. It specifies the mode of understanding of the whole complex system of AD, as well

as the mission, domain and goal of AD. The essence of AD is explained with regard to its

subject, object, the type of actions and the nature of an air attack.

Key words – air defence, value, existence, mission, domain

Introduction In the last century, airspace became one of the spheres of the Earth's environment

most intensively used by humans. Thanks to the scientific and technological revolution of the twentieth century possibilities became a reality. The product of this revolution was the airplane at the beginning of that century. The dynamics of aviation development resulted in the fact that after over one hundred years from the flight in 1903 of the first Flyer 1 airplane of the Wright brothers, aircraft driven by piston and jet engines are omnipresent in human life. The aforementioned omnipresence includes unfortunately also creating numerous threats both of a non-military and military nature. It is hard nowadays to imagine any armed conflict in the world without the involvement of aircrafts, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles. However, it is easy to notice the significant dynamics of the growth and robotization of airspace exploitation for the purposes of battle. Also, the peaceful exploitation of airspace is characterised by the high dynamics of growth combined with a tendency to extend the scope of use to aerospace.

While exploiting the airspace so intensely, mankind wants to do it both in the military and non-military sphere, with the assurance of one of his existential needs,


ANDRZEJ GLEN

26

i.e. security needs. Currently, security is being understood in a narrow scope, in the sense of an absence of threats, and in the broad sense as a certainty of existence, survival, maintenance of identity and development in terms of threats. However, the state’s existence, survival, maintenance of identity and development in terms of air threats is regarded as its security. In a systemic presentation, the air security of the state can be considered as being isolated from the state’s security system in terms of a collective accumulation of airspace purposely in terms of the secure and effective, as well as economical and ecological, use of airspace, prepared staff, constructed devices and developed principles, methods, modes, and procedures along with relations of matter, energy and information exchanges that connect those resources, arranged to ensure the existence, survival, identity and development of the country in an air threat environment1. Within the concepts of a state’s air security it is easy to notice a set of values, such as: efficacy, sense of threat absence, ecology, economy, and the direct operation of state security systems in the military and non-military aspects. Air defence (AD), both in time of war and peace, as well as crisis, is today an inherent part of the security system of each country.

Currently, the perception of the function of air defence in the world is changing. More and more often it is treated not as a part of the battle, but much more broadly as part of the security system of the state, region, or alliance. The system of integrated and extended AD NATINEADS (NATO Integrated Extended Air Defence System) already functions during peacetime, protecting the integrity of the alliance’s airspace.

At present, AD is rather oriented to perform new tasks, which to this point have been unusual for it. Nowadays, already during peacetime, fighters are in full readiness to combat threats of a RENEGADE type. Whereas, the ground-based systems of AD are used to combat missiles and mortar bombs attacking NATO military contingent bases, which perform their tasks far beyond the borders of the alliance, and also to combat various types of manned and unmanned aircraft used for terrorist and criminal purposes.

Meanwhile, the theory of air defence remained in the phase of interpreting of this phenomenon, especially as part of the battle. In the research literature on the subject (both domestic and foreign) one comes across only a few, contributive entries indicating the need for an extension and redefinition of AD. Therefore, the classic situation (as regards the formulation of scientific problems) of ignorance arose from a discrepancy between the state of theory and practice. AD theory was delineated probably during the development period of AD, where the existing principles and methods of AD can be further used to solve problems of fighting with traditional, classic air threats, and at the same time it is necessary to take an attempt to develop AD theory in order to make it more adequate to the new, asymmetrical, military and non-military air challenges and threats.

1 A. Glen, System bezpieczeństwa powietrznego państwa, NDU Scientific Quarterly, AON, 4/2008.


27

The specified prerequisites of AD theory extension resulted in that the following article includes the most important content of the research description on the cognitive basis of AD, in which it was assumed to obtain an answer to the general problem question: What cognitive basis should direct the development

of AD theory(and how it is to be formulated)? The problem formulated this way can be solved by specifying the ontological, axiological and epistemological

basis of AD theory, which was taken as the purpose of the research. The accomplishment of the purpose of research and solving a general problem, in turn, required their structuralisation. It was recognised that such structuring is possible by dividing the problem into the following three detailed problems: how does AD

exist in the real and conceptual spheres?, what system of values underlies the

organisation of AD?, how to understand both AD alone and its basic

categories? The study was operationalised by formulating the following working hypothesis:

most probably AD exists both in the real and conceptual sphere, as the collective ontic object consisting of items and interactions which join them together. The value system is likely to be arranged in AD for the balanced accomplishment of two autotelic values – efficacy and security. Finally, with a high probability, contemporary AD ought to be understood in a broader sense than has been done so far, and its extension should result from changes in the environment that currently surround AD .

Such structured research methodology required axiological, ontological and epistemological settlement of AD theory. The axiology relations with ontology and the epistemology underlining it have been explained by L.J. Krzyżanowski2. The author reminds us that conducting analysis, and drawing conclusions in the fields of ontology and epistemology would not be possible without continuing valuation; that is accepting and rejecting hypotheses, classification, hierarchy of concepts and categories. Following the advice of L.J. Krzyżanowski, the extension and arrangement of AD theory was preceded by the identification of the value system3. The arrangement and selection of cognitive actions during the implementation of the aforementioned research activities, was based on specific methodological guidelines, which include the following definition: The values, to

the materialisation of which an entity aspires, influence the behaviour, including

human actions, directly and through the attitudes and motives, and constitute

criteria for the selection of both individual goals and internalized collective

common goals4.

2 See L.J. Krzyżanowski, Podstawy nauki zarządzania, PWN, Warszawa 1985; tenże

O podstawach kierowania organizacjami inaczej, PWN, Warszawa 1999. 3 According to L. Krzyżanowski, a value is accepted as [...] the product of feelings, convictions

or beliefs of some entity: individual, social group, local community, national and other cultural

community or global society of what, in the natural and psycho-social and cultural reality is

positively evaluated and deemed to be worthy of craving and aspirations. L. Krzyżanowski O podstawach kierowania....wyd. cyt., p. 205.

4 Ibidem, p. 206.

ANDRZEJ GLEN

28

Axiological basis Identifying the values of AD, giving them a significance hierarchy and

specifying interrelations between different types of values5, should allow for the consideration of the axiological impact on the developed system of AD knowledge. The first declared conceptualised measure in AD is the arrangement and extension of the value system acknowledged by the AD system staff. To the question of what is a positively assessed subject of ultimate goals in AD, we often intuitively answer, that it is effectiveness. Meanwhile, the analysis of AD history allows us to collect enough facts to be able to formulate on their basis the opinion that frequently in history efficacy and security played interchangeably the role of a final (autotelic) value in AD. Security as an AD value is understood as: a condition in

which the individual, social group, organisation, or state, has no sense of threat to

their existence or fundamental interests; a situation in which there are formal,

institutional, or practical guarantees of protection6, while efficacy is perceived as

one, next to cost-effectiveness, profitability, energy, precaution in the form of

efficacy of action assessed in terms of approaching the goal that has been

intentional and constitutes the basis of this assessment7.

In the history of AD, the staff was usually guided in their activity by efficacy and security. While observing the actions within AD it is possible to notice a permanent relativisation of these values to the intensity level of the combat. The aforementioned relations allow one to notice the regularity, which consists in that in AD, in the actions of higher combat intensity, the efficacy is a significantly higher value, while in the actions conducted in conditions closer to peace (e.g. humanitarian operations) – this would be security.

The aforementioned arguments allow one to make a conclusion that the autotelic values in AD are both the efficacy and security, and that the hierarchical position of the efficacy and security in AD is not constant in nature, and the significance hierarchy of the two values aforementioned changes within the combat intensity function (The regularity of the relativisation of efficacy and security values in AD to the intensity of combat is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 in a simplified manner).

5 To the basic types of value in the axiological system being created, I include the objective (autotelic) and indirect (instrumental) values.

6 R. Smolski, M. Smolski, E.H. Stadtmüller, Słownik encyklopedyczny edukacja obywatelska, Wydawnictwa Europa, Warszawa 1999.

7 Encyklopedia organizacji i zarządzania, PWE, Warszawa 1981, p. 471, 485.


29

Source: Own work.

Figure 1. The value of the AD efficacy in the intensity of military operations function

Source: Own work.

Figure 2. The security value in AD in the intensity of military operations function

In the research conducted, a number of historically shaped indirect

(instrumental) values were revealed, which are sought in AD. These values include: efficiency, detection, simplicity, harmony, flexibility, and synergy. To flexibility, however, regulation and once more identification are relativized. The activity of AD affects directly the detection and efficiency (see Figure 3).

Security value

peace crisis conflict war 0 0,5 1

1

Combat intensity

0,5

Efficacy

value

peace crisis conflict war 0 0,5 1

1

Combat

intensity

0,5

ANDRZEJ GLEN

30

Source: Own work.

Figure 3. The value system model of AD

Efficiency and detection, in turn, remain in relation to autotelic efficacy. Yet,

the systems’ flexibility8 has its limits and then the value, which is the simplicity of action, reveals its significance in achieving both final values - efficacy and security. Moreover, synergy largely contributes to the final effect of efficient action in AD. Achieving this value seems to be impossible without the integration of actions of various entities implementing the tasks of AD. EFFICACY

The specifying of the value system of AD was considered as a research activity allowing, in an orderly manner, to logically move to determining the position of theory of being with reference to AD.

8 An engineer would call the democratic pluralism a flexibility built into the system that,

however, must have limits. [...]However, where on the operational efficiency decide micro millimeters

and nanoseconds, there appears fortune, as the new God of war, which decides on the success or

destruction, a fortune in a pure state, somewhat exaggerated and taken out from the microscopic

dimensions of atomic physics, since it is just that the fastest and most perfect systems finally reach the

Heisenberg uncertainty relation, which nothing will defeat, since it constitutes a fundamental

property of matter in the whole Universe. S. Lem, Biblioteka XXI wieku, Wydawnictwa Literackie, Kraków 1986, p. 51, 52.

EFFICACY SECURITY

HARMONY

FLEXIBILITY

SYNERGY

DETECTION

COORDINATION

Identification

Regulation

Integration

Identification

ACTIVITY

SIMPLICITY EFFICIENCY


31

Ontological basis The features discovered so far and the probable value system that characterises

AD indicate the praxeology-organizational nature of this phenomenon. Therefore, as the most appropriate, the ontological regard for air defence was recognised, the one which is representative of the praxeological and organisational mainstreams. It was therefore accepted that it is convenient to explain the ontological nature of AD phenomenon for the sake of ontological realism.

When searching for the essence of AD being, it should be emphasised that all that exists is a being and creates some universe of being, and whatever exists, is a partial being, a constituent material of this universe. If AD exists objectively, independently of the awareness of the knowing subject, it should be a partial being, a part of the objectively existing reality. Most of the doubts as to the existence of AD can be explained by answering the question - whether and how does AD exist?

First of all, in the reality that surrounds us it is possible to notice, in non-military crisis situations, armed conflict, or at war, the external in respect, to the knowing subject, existence of AD phenomena. The reality compels the subject to solve problems, overcome difficulties associated with AD. Therefore, AD opposes it regardless of its consciousness, thus it exists objectively.

However, AD exists also inherently in respect to the knowing subject. The evidence for such AD existence, found in this place of article, is even the description of observations, impressions and ideas established by the author in the course of the ontological nature analysis of the research subject. Thus, AD remains in the awareness and consciousness of the researcher in the form of his own impressions, experiences, and ideas. This manner of existence does not fulfil the conditions of the objective existence, therefore, AD exists also subjectively.

A researcher associating with AD phenomenon, finally meets with a number of established products of the intellect in the form of doctrines, manuals, and instructions, collected in compact studies, describing and explaining the procedures9 specific to AD. These products, as a result of their preservation by record, do not fulfil all the criteria of the subjective existence, also equally difficult is to recognise their existence as an objective one. They are in some sense placed transcendently in respect to the researcher, yet they are too dependent on his process of reasoning to be considered as part of the objective reality. It is therefore necessary to find indirect, between the objective and subjective, intersubjective means of AD existence.

Summing up this part of the analysis of the ontological nature of AD phenomenon, it is possible to state the objective, subjective and intersubjective existence of the research subject. Going back to the question: whether and how AD exists?, the first part of it should be an affirmative answer. However, the answer to the second part of question requires reducing the possible means of AD existence.

9 Such is the nature of the present article.

ANDRZEJ GLEN

32

The reduction was made with the use of Ingarden’s modes of existence (modus

existentiae)10. Ingarden distinguishes two modes of existence – the real being and the intentionally conceptual, thus unreal, illusory. Comparing these modes of existence with the analysis conducted thus far, it can be concluded that if each component of being exists really or conceptually, then it is also these two modes of existence: the real and conceptual that AD adopts. Confirming the position of AD in the realistic part of the surrounding reality us, it is necessary to verify the concreteness and abstraction aspect of the living objects.

The actions in AD are performed by people. These people, called in this work the AD staff, belong to a particular social group. They bring in the field of AD attitudes and behaviour typical for this environment, finally they hold the relevant knowledge and skills in the area of AD. In AD, the devices used are constructed purposely for it, moreover, the physical features which characterise AD differ from those describing other phenomena observed in a battle. Thus, AD is physically determined. AD can be observed only in a specifically defined sector of the environment – airspace, in a specifically set time – it is, therefore, defined by time and space. AD, therefore, can be considered as a specific object, existentially completed, thus, existing objectively.

At this point of the ontological analysis it is possible to answer the question, how AD exists in the real sphere of the reality surrounding us. However, the question remains of the existence of AD in the other mode of existence proposed by Ingarden – conceptual. But, if to look at AD as a conceptual object, it is possible to notice its abstracting from reality. The conceptual objects – models of real objects, detach themselves from reality, are made schematic in their matter content and indeterminate.

The conducted ontological analysis allowed to assign AD to the real and conceptual sphere of reality. The Ingarden modus existentiae proved to be helpful in this research activity. The same distinguished author of the realistic perception of the world (Ingarden) invented existential moments (moment existentiae),11 a tool allowing one to specify the examined part of reality as an existential object and to verify whether it has the features of a real being. The existential moments are the reliable criterion of the affiliation evaluation of the object examined with regards to the real or conceptual sphere of the existential universe.

In assessing the AD phenomenon in terms of Ingarden’s existential moments and acting according to the indications of ontological realism12, the independence

10 See R. Ingarden, Spór o istnienie świata, PWN, Warszawa 1960, p. 93-102. 11 Ibidem. 12 The real objects, always existentially derived of some other real objects, are self existential,

because on their own, that is in their quality content, have the existential foundation; at the same time

they are self-reliant, if they do not necessarily have to coexist within one and the same unity with

some other object, but being existentially self-reliant they are always dependent on some other real

objects, with which they enter into causal connection, otherwise they would not be components of the

real being. L. J. Krzyżanowski, O podstawach kierowania…,op.cit. p. 161.


33

and existential primordiality of AD should be rejected. AD, as the real object functioning in the armed forces, in the crisis and conflict reality, (Figure 4.), is a derivative of the people – military commanders – who are its creators.

Source: Own work.

Figure. 4. The evaluation model of air defence as the real object, according to the Ingarden’s

moment existentiae criterion

Moreover, AD is in causal connection with many other real objects on which it

is dependent. Above all, these are the connections with coverable objects. AD enters in casual connection with them by exchanging energy (for example, in the course of the use of electronic identification systems to distinguish their own from the foreign aircrafts) and information (for example, on mutual movements of AD forces and objects of cover). The lack of objects of cover obviously causes the AD's existence only as a conceptual object (Figure 5.).

Source: Own work.

Figure 5. The evaluation model of air defence as the conceptual object, according to the

Ingarden’s moment existentiae criterion

However, it can be observed in situations of crisis and conflict that AD has in its

quality content the existential foundation. The qualitative content consists of other real objects of AD, which include the specialised staff and devices deliberately created for AD. From the point of view of the pair of existential moments i.e. self existence – nonexistence of self, AD is a self existent object, thus real.

primordiality derivation

self existence nonexistance of self

self-reliance not self-reliance

dependence independence

AD

primordiality derivation

self existence nonexistence of self

self-reliance not self-reliance

dependency independence

AD

ANDRZEJ GLEN

34

The analysis of the next pair of existential moments: the existential self-

reliance – non self-reliance, shows, however, that AD is not existentially self-reliant and must co-exist within the same unity with the state’s air security system, alliance, or, at least, with the armed forces’ battle system. The existence of AD outside these systems does not make much sense, because AD alone cannot solve all the problems facing the country and its armed forces in non-military or military crisis situations.

Generalising the completed phase of ontological analysis, it can be stated that AD as a real object is existentially derivative of other real objects – the state security system, or its armed forces, it is self existent, but not self-reliant, as it must coexist within one and the same unity with these systems, finally, it is existentially

dependent on other real objects with which it enters into causal connections i.e. the objects of cover, the absence of which prevents the existence of AD as a real object.

However, AD being perceived as a conceptual object, can be described as an existentially derivative of socio-psycho-bio-physical real objects – people, nonexistent of self since its existential foundation derives not from its qualitative content, but from the quasi-objective creations of the human intellect, preserved by their release. AD must coexist with them as their carriers, so it is not existentially self-reliant and dependent on them, and consequently in this case it is not a component of the existential real universe sphere.

It can be stated, that AD, in both the examined approaches to ontology, is part of both the real and conceptual sphere of the existential universe. Furthermore, it is also possible to note that causal connections take place only in the real layer of the existential universe between the real objects. Connections of this type in the conceptual sphere, must, however, be intentionally determined, they cannot take place without the participation of the human intellect.

Summarising the outcomes of the conducted ontological analysis of AD as a part of the real and conceptual sphere of existential universe, it can be concluded that:

1) AD, as a part of the real sphere, exists self existentially, but not self-reliantly, co-existing, at least, with the system of the armed forces, and mostly also with the security system of state; moreover, it is existentially derivative of the armed forces and dependent on the objects of cover by entering with them in causal connections and is fully completed existentially and concretised.

2) AD as a component of the conceptual sphere, that is as a product of real entities (systems of the armed forces) is nonexistent of self, not self-reliant, and its content is characterised by indefinability. In addition, when proceeding with the study of AD, we must remember that as part of the real reality also the part of conceptual sphere built on it should be taken into account, because reality – in the broad sense – make up both of these layers, as shown in Figure 6.


35

Source: Own work.

Figure 6. Air Defence as a part of existential universe, according to Ingarden’s modus

existentiae

The established ontological regularities of AD existence constituted only the

specific phase in explaining the ontological nature of the research subject. However, already at this stage the complexity of the AD phenomenon could be noticed, while so far only the ontological nature of AD as a real object – a thing – has been determined. Meanwhile, the needs to determine the appropriate epistemological approach to new challenges facing AD, require the conclusions resulting from the ontic complexity of the studied phenomenon to be taken into account.

If we assume that AD is characterised by complexity and inconstancy, and that the only philosophical category complying with Ingarden's conditions of moment

existentiae and modus existentiae is a thing, then the ontological description of AD needs the use of an additional philosophical category. Such a category is a relation, which includes the features of an ontic being. Relations are divided into ratios and actions. The ratio of one object to another is a stated category, but not a real one, because as a result of it the features of the real object do not change, but what changes are only the relative qualities. Thus, this change is unstable in nature, because nothing changes in the real object after the cessation of the ratio relation. The actions, however […] are real, based on specific, it is a physically, temporally

and spatially determined transferring of matter, energy and information. […] the

changes in the interaction of objects-things are their result13

. The impacts in AD as a real object, may for example change the quality level

of staff training, cause the undertaking of or resigning from any action, direct (control) the aircrafts’ flight. It is therefore reasonable to use actions as an

13 Ibidem, p. 166.

people, devices, airspace

Theory, doctrines, methods, forms, modes, procedures

AD of AF, LF, N

real sphere

conceptual sphere

Intergrated AD

ANDRZEJ GLEN

36

additional category when describing the ontological nature of the phenomenon. Demonstrating the ontological complexity and inconstancy of AD requires, however, adding also the collective set category to reflect the co-occurences and interaction of things and actions.

The explanation of AD as an ontic collective object, which is a fragment of the real being of a unique structure, should explain the existential nature of the research sufficiently to draw conclusions for its proper and full understanding. A structure should be understood here as the totality of relations of comprising and acting; as specified as the set of parts that make up the whole collective set of AD. The complexity of the description required to increase the readability is presented in Figure 7. showing the AD model as an ontic collective object. In the conducted analysis of AD structure there has also been used the already specified ontological regularities of the studied phenomenon.

Source: Own work.

Figure 7. The model of air defence as an ontic collective object

It was established that AD exists independently in each type of the armed

forces (TAF). In that case, the reference level (zero) in the construction of the ontological structure will be the very AD of air force as well as navy and ground forces. The derivation of the studied phenomenon was also established. Thus, AD

Intergrated AD

AD of the Air Force

AD of AF unit

AD of other components

AD of AF unit

Elements of command

the relation of comprising the relation of interaction

The reference level – zero

Immanent structure of KPP

Deep structure of AD Elements of reconnaissance

Elements of destruction


37

through the comprising relations will be included in the object of a higher order, and that will be an integrated air defence. At the same time, AD will connect with the interaction relations with similar ontic objects of other types of armed forces (TAF) in the objective unity, that is, unity within the AD object.

In turn, AD of other TAF consist of objects of a directly lower rank – AD of other TAF units, and the interaction that connects them determines the immanent structure of the object of study, i.e. AD. The elements of command, reconnaissance and destruction, constituting AD, create on the other hand a deep structure, and the interaction that connects them determines the deep structure within the AD object.

Epistemological basis From a cognitive point of view, AD is the area of knowledge and skills, in

which the unity of understanding which characterise the phenomenon of states, events, and processes, is one of the conditions for the success of most of the hostilities conducted today, non-war operations, as well as peaceful non-military actions in emergency situations. The internalisation of the basic terms used in the process of AD cognition should, as a result, lead to the full dissemination of their uniform understanding. It is therefore necessary to take a theory cognitive position in respect to the epistemological categories as "totality", "complex", "system". It is necessary to uniform the understanding of the aforementioned concepts, without which it would be impossible to use the term: the epistemological position of AD.

The totality of AD is a set of AD elements of Air Force, Ground Forces, Navy, combined with AD by the comprising relation.

Source: Own work.

Figure 8. The model of the air defence whole

The AD complex is a collection of its elements of command, destruction, informing, assistance, and supply, among which there are complementary relations (Fig. 9.).

AD OF GROUND FORCES

OF NAVY

OF AIR FORCE

ANDRZEJ GLEN

38

Source: Own work.

Figure 9. The model of air defence complex

Finally, the AD system should be understood as being separate from the state’s

air security system and the armed forces system; the collective14 and ordered collection of human resources (the staff), specialised technical equipment, airspace, methods, modes and procedures of action and interactions of matter, energy and information that connect and order them for the efficient and secure combat by means of air attack (MoAA) in the air.

The AD system is expressed in Figure 10. by a dark oval, within which the key system resources have been included in the form of three slightly brighter ovals. These resources are: creative – the staff, natural – the airspace, and artificial – the technical equipment along with the principles, methods, procedures for their use.

All the three types of aforementioned resources overlap, thereby expressing the ties that connect them, and constitute the structure of AD. The dashed lines in the figure indicate the relations of the system with the surroundings. Inside the model, the structure of the system was illustrated with two darker ovals. The top oval illustrates the authority performing in the system the role of executive member establishing the domain, mission and objectives of AD. The lower, on the other hand, expresses a basic, executive level of AD together with the subsystems of: destruction, information, support and supply. These subsystems transform the resources that flow into the system in the services (products) provided for the state’s air security systems of the state and the armed forces as well as the coverable objects placed in the first of the lighter ovals surrounding AD system – in its immediate surroundings. The second and the brightest oval represents the

14 The collection in the collective sense […] called the mereological collection, by which a

complex totality (set, pack, aggregate) is meant, (juxtaposed) from the objects that are its parts

(components). See ibidem, p. 124.

AD

INFORMING DISTRUCTION

SUPPORT SUPPLY

COMMAND


39

resources from which the AD system must derive the supply. The small white ovals illustrate other systems with which the AD system enters into an interaction relation.

Source: Own work.

Figure 10. The model of air defence system

As it was found earlier, all relations (ratios and interactions) that connect the

elements of the system are oriented as AD’s objectives. Before explaining the concept of AD’s “objective” category, it is necessary to refer, in the course of explaining the structure of AD system, to the two newly introduced concepts related to the activities of the governing bodies of the system – the "mission" and "domain". The mission will be regarded as the object of aspirations, i.e. the permanent aspirations of AD as regards the security of the state and the armed forces whereas the domain of AD will represent the area and type of the undertaken within operations.

After expressing my attitude to the category of "mission" and "domain", let us now turn to a full explanation of the concept of "object" that directs the AD system.

ANDRZEJ GLEN

40

From the point of view of the research process requirements and taking into account the availability of the desired results of an AD operation as well as the time factor, the studies used in the initial phase the four categories of objective: ideal, intention, purpose and task. The first of these – the ideal – was based on the established value system15 in AD. The ideal determines a perfect state in the AD object, which is unattainable, but also one for which it should be aimed for. The intention determines the category of objective defined objectively, describing the state of AD, which can be achieved in an unspecified perspective. The categories, which are most often used in a later phase of determining the AD state – is a purpose and task. They objectively and subjectively define the future and desired result of AD’s actions, those possible and predicted to be achieved within a specified lapse of time and time limit, were assumed as a purpose in the aforementioned presentation. The task was termed as being separate objectively and subjectively, in time and space; and in general procedurally, a part of the purpose provided for the implementation in the agreed period or time limit, set in a lapse of time predicted to achieve the purpose16.

In the description of AD, there were also used two epistemological categories, the explanation of which was considered as necessary to obtain an internalized perception of this phenomenon. These categories are "procedure" and "function". Procedure, from French procédure as proceder 'proceed', from Latin procedere, is that which is established by normative rules and procedure17 in AD matters. Function is the same as the set of potential, usually repetitive, conventional and procedurally formal actions, separated due to their content and relativisation to the objective of AD.

Before attempting to define and partly redefine the objective of AD, it was considered necessary to specify the two concepts not applied yet in the theory of AD: missions and domain. An ability in times of peace, crisis and war on the

territory of country, of armies and other objects to prevent the incurring of

losses of military and non-military means of air attack was regarded as the mission of AD. As for AD domain, we can regard the actions undertaken in AD

as part of the two basic functions of AD: the destruction caused by MoAA and

informing about them. The AD objective has been defined so far18 in the broad sense from the point of

view of the national defence system, as the state's achievement of a condition of

15 Commencing the arrangement of instruments from the category of objectives, I am formulating

a draft thesis that the objectives of the "organization", as any other objectives, derive from the values,

in this case, from the valuesdeclared by the participants of 'organization', and by its social and

institutional surrounding, with which it conduct, as an open system, an exchange of material, nominal

and immaterial goods. See L. Krzyżanowski, O podstawach kierowania... wyd. cyt., p. 250. 16 Ibidem., p. 252–253. 17 W praktyce tryb ten będą określały stałe procedury operacyjne OP, wytworzone przez

określone organy dowodzenia (najczęściej dowódcę operacyjnego). 18 See B. Zdrodowski, Teoria OP, AON, Warszawa 2002.


41

national security in its air area, while in terms of air defence – a part of an armed struggle, as the prevention of an opponent’s MoAA to attain their objectives, thereby creating favourable conditions to conduct an armed struggle in the broader sense in the air threat conditions.

A careful axiological and theoretical analysis of a state’s air security category reveals that among the values directing the objective of the state’s security system19, at present, next to efficacy and security, also ecology and economy are included. While the first two listed values are common to the state’s air security and AD, the other two: the economy and ecology of using airspace with AD domain, have little in common.

Thus, it is suggested, that the AD objective, in its broad sense, and from the point of view of the state’s air security, is to consider to be preventing military and non-military means of air attack from causing losses to the covered objects and army in times of peace, crisis and war both within the country and outside it, not allowing these objects to function normally. In such an adopted definition of the objective of AD, for the "normal" functioning it is considered that such a state of the covered system exists in which its structure and functions performed were not affected to such an extent as to not allow for the implementation of the mission, domain, purpose and tasks of the system.

In case of a narrow understanding of AD objective, in terms of an armed struggle, it was recognised that it requires only a small adjustment related to the current scheme of air threats20, in which on the first division level the military and non-military air threats were distinguished. The military threats include those in which the source of danger are the armed forces of the state, alliance, and or coalition of states, while the non-military ones include those threats the source of which should be traced in the terrorist and criminal activity, which does not involve the armed forces of any country.

After the aforementioned adjustment was made, it is suggested that as a pat of the objective of AD, treated as part of the armed struggle in its narrow sense, should be the prevention of the military MoAA of the enemy to cause losses to

the covered objects, compromising the operational power of these covered

objects, that is, losses that do not allow the covered objects to accomplish their

tasks21

. The essence of such a defined AD objective explains the interpretation of AD objectives introduced to the theory of AD by B. Zdrodowski which is included in Figure 14.

In accordance with that interpretation, the covered troops (objects) can perform combat tasks if they have at their disposal the size of the battle potential (PBpotrz) at least sufficient for it. The opponent having at his disposal a means, including

19 See A. Glen, Bezpieczeństwo powietrzne elementem systemu bezpieczeństwa państwa, w Zarządzanie kryzysowe w Polsce, WSH, Pułtusk, 2007.

20 See A, Glen, J. Nowak, Sytuacje kryzysowe w polskiej przestrzeni powietrznej ich źródła, AON, Warszawa 2008.

21 Lt. B. Zdrodowski, Teoria …, wyd. cyt.

ANDRZEJ GLEN

42

MoAA (PBŚNP), aims to reduce the battle potential (PBdysp) of the covered troops (objects), to a level that prevents the execution of their tasks, they have specific capabilities at their disposal (MŚNP)

Source :B. Zdrodowski, Teoria…, wyd. cyt.

Figure 11. A graphic interpretation of air defence objective

Each of the symbols in Figure 11. stand for: – PBdysp – a baseline battle potential of the covered objects; – PBpotrz- a battle potential of the covered objects necessary to accomplish

the task; – PBkryt- a critical battle potential, determining the threshold of maximum

losses which the covered objects may suffer as a result of MoAA impact; – MŚNP – the capabilities of MoAA; – PBŚNP – a battle potential of MoAA; – MBOP – the battle capabilities of AD; – PBOP – a battle potential of AD. The difference between the baseline battle potential (PBdysp), and the battle

potential necessary of the covered troops (objects) (Pbpotrz) is termed as a critical battle potential (PBKryt), that is, such loss which we accept without the threat of not being able to accomplish a task.

PBdysp - PBpotrz = PBKryt

where: – PBdysp - the baseline battle potential of the covered troops (objects); – PBpotrz - the battle potential necessary for the covered troops (objects) to

accomplish the tasks; – PBKryt – the critical battle potential, acceptable for loss, without the threat

of not being able to accomplish the task.


43

If the capabilities of MoAA (MŚNP) are greater than the critical battle potential (PB-Crit), then it should be considered that the MoAA will accomplish their tasks:

– when MŚNP > PBKryt then MoAA are able to accomplish the task. – when MŚNP < PBKryt then AD is able to accomplish the task. From the interpretation of AD objective results it can be seen that to achieve

this objective it is necessary to affect MoAA in such a way which enables the reduction of their battle potential (PBŚNP) to a level where the battle capabilities of MoAA (MŚNP) will be smaller than the critical potential of the covered troops (objects) (PBKryt), thus ensuring the accomplishment of the mission by the troops (objects).

Another important category of AD are the functions. The objective of AD, understood both in a broad and a narrow sense, is achieved by implementing two key functions22:

– of the destruction of MoAA in the air; – of informing on air threat.

Source:B. Zdrodowski, Teoria …, wyd. cyt.

Figure 12. The air defence functions

In addition to the basic functions in AD – as a complex category – there should

be a managerial (command) function exercised. Moreover, for the efficient performance of the destruction and informing functions it is also necessary to fulfil security functions, i.e. of support and supply. (see Fig. 12.). The informing on MoAA, from a formal point of view, should be placed within the security functions, supplying informationally the basic AD processes. However, for the sake of the crucial, for the Ad system, importance of informing, this function was raised in AD to the basic level.

22 Ibidem.

EXECUTING

AD FUNCTIONS

COMMAND

BASIC:

- destruction

- information

about MoAA

ASSISTING

SUPPORTING:

- increase basic functions

capability

- decrease MoAA capability

SUPPLYING:

- logistically

- staff

- information

ANDRZEJ GLEN

44

Source :Own work on the basis of B. Zdrodowski, Teoria OP, AON, Warszawa 1996.

Figure 13. The division of air force

The final specification of the contemporary concept of AD requires the

classification of the objective phenomenon using clear criteria of division. These criteria include: the subject and object of AD and the type of actions of the AD and the opponent with which the battle is to be undertaken (see Fig. 13). As a result, there were determined the air defence of: the territory of the country, the armed forces, other objects; along with: space defence, air defence, missile defence, specialist and non-specialist defence, active and passive defence.

The scope of AD depends on the same criteria by which the classification was made. Thus, AD may include combating the opponent’s aviation in the air by the use of ground forces or to undertake the battle with all MoAA (aircrafts, missiles and battlespace powers) on land and in aerospace, by all specialist and non-specialist forces, engaging in both active as well as passive actions.

Conclusions Summarising the results of the research obtained in the course of the cognitive

identification of the theoretical basis of OP (AD), the broad and narrow sense of AD may be regarded as justified.

AIR DEFENCE

SPECIALIST NON-SPECIALIST

A TYPE OF AD SUBJECT

AIR DEFENCE

ACTIVE PASSIVE

TYPES OF AD ACTIONS

AIR DEFENCE

AIR FORCE THE TERRITORY OF THE COUNTRY

OBJECTS

THE OBJECT OF AD

AIR DEFENCE

SPACE DEFENCE AIR DEFENCE MISSILE DEFENCE

A TYPE OF ŚNP


45

In the broad sense, AD should be comprehended as part of a state’s air security aimed at preventing military and non-military means of air attack from causing losses in times of peace, crisis and war, to the covered objects and troops both on the territory of country and outside, not allowing these covered objects to function normally.

However, in the narrow sense, AD should be interpreted as part of the armed struggle aimed at preventing the military MoAA of the opponent from causing losses to the covered objects, excessing the critical battle potential of those covered objects, that is, the losses that do not allow the covered objects accomplish their tasks.

Moreover, when describing and explaining the phenomenon of AD, especially determining its referent, there should be considered the AD divisions according to the criteria of: object, type of entity, type of MoAA, type of AD actions, and the divisions denotations and connotations of AD resulting from these.

Bibliography

Encyklopedia organizacji i zarządzania, PWE, Warszawa 1981.

Glen A., Bezpieczeństwo powietrzne elementem systemu bezpieczeństwa państwa, w: Zarządzanie kryzysowe w Polsce, WSH, Pułtusk, 2007.

Glen A., Nowak J., Sytuacje kryzysowe w polskiej przestrzeni powietrznej ich źródła, AON, Warszawa 2008.

Glen A., System bezpieczeństwa powietrznego państwa, NDU Scientific Quarterly, AON, 4/2008.

Ingarden R., Spór o istnienie świata, PWN, Warszawa 1960. Krzyżanowski L.J., O podstawach kierowania organizacjami inaczej, PWN, Warszawa

1999. Krzyżanowski L.J., Podstawy nauki zarządzania, PWN, Warszawa 1985. Lem S., Biblioteka XXI wieku, Wydawnictwa Literackie, Kraków 1986. Smolski R., Smolski M., Stadtmüller E.H., Słownik encyklopedyczny edukacja obywatelska,

Wydawnictwa Europa, Warszawa 1999.

Zdrodowski B., Teoria OP, AON, Warszawa 2002.

LESZEK ELAK

46

REASONS FOR CONTEMPORARY

CONFLICTS – AN OUTLINE

OF THE PROBLEM

Col. Leszek ELAK, Ph.D. National Defence University

Abstract

The article presents the modern approach to the problem of armed conflicts in the world.

Armed conflicts lead societies to demoralization and weaken growth opportunities of states.

Furthermore, they often destroy all social structures and serve as a backing of numerous social

pathologies. The number of parties involved in the conflict, and the aspirations of the leaders,

and external interventions (intrusions) often prolong the conflict, even making impossible

finding any peaceful solutions. The author, in this article characterized reasons of nowadays

military conflicts and presented the consequences resulting therefrom.

Key words – conflict, state, war

Currently, there is a general feeling that the outbreak of a global war is

unlikely. However, attention is drawn increasingly to the probability of an

increased number of local crises, consisting of country-to-country or regional

conflicts which, in the case of their escalation may lead to war on a wider scale.

Nevertheless, according to C. Clausewitz – each era has its war. The turn of 21st

century coincided with a transition to a new era – a so-called information era, in

turn coinciding with a general civilisation change. So the current era will probably

also have their war1. Recently, in national security and defence strategies, the main

focus is taken by defensive strategy (war strategy). Currently at the forefront, can

be seen the crisis strategies or the strategies of crisis response.

Conflicts or wars break out in different situations - both against relations

between individuals, as well as between individual social groups or between

countries. The essence of conflicts and wars constitute defined contradictions,

occurring between two or more parties, which usually result from a difference of

interests2. A conflict of interest is to be found both within individual countries, and

between them. In other words, in the first case we are dealing with an intra-state or

1 See Balcerowicz, B. 2002. Peace and un-peace. Bellona, Warsaw 2002, pp. 167. 2 See Cziomer, E. 2000. Outline of contemporary international relations. PWN, Cracow 2000,

pp. 203.


REASONS FOR CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS – AN OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEM

47

local conflict, and in the second case with international conflict. This conflict of

interest refers to relations between the state regarding national and political values

as: sovereignty, independence, self-determination and territorial integrity.

Therefore we can speak about an international conflict only when the participating

warring parties, not only have contradictory interests, but realise it; which is in turn

reflected in their behaviour, proceedings and action. It is also important to

distinguish such conflict from normal relations occurring as part of inter-state

rivalry3. Both international and local conflicts affect indirectly the security of its

neighbouring countries and their citizens.

Until recently, the defence systems of states were adjusted to the implementation

of the tasks in the framework of peace and war. As a result of many changes at the

end of the 20th century, and in the beginning of the 21st century the likelihood of

armed conflicts on a large scale has decreased significantly, but new categories

of security risks have appeared. This situation has meant that attention began to be

attached to the issues relating to crisis situations caused by the various threats, both

military and non-military. A common system of state defence (the alliance) should

be able to resist any risks causing crisis situations in the area of the country and

beyond its borders4.

A serious threat is the escalation of local conflicts in to international conflicts.

This may occur in cases where: there are uncontrolled supplies of weapons,

diplomatic pressures are being exerted by external members, common actions are

agreed in issues like combating international terrorism outside the state as well as

the armed intervention of neighbouring countries or external powers.

Often two interchangeable concepts are being used – war and armed conflict.

Therefore, both these concepts require clarification. The concept of war is to be

distinguished from other forms of combat such as gang actions, political and armed

revolutions. War is a social, historical and class phenomenon, consisting of the

regulating of disputes or execution of political objectives by the application of

violence through the use of the armed forces5. War is also a continuation of politics

conducted by the means of violence, in order to compel the opponent to meet our

will. It [the war] bears also the nature of the bloody armed struggle, conducted by

the organised armed forces6. The war is not just a political deed, but the real tool of

politics, a furthering series of political relations, carrying them out with other

means7. And the armed conflict should be considered to be the actions of the armed

forces of the opposing parties (states, nations, classes, and social groups) carried

out on a limited (in relation to the used measures, area, duration) scale8. The armed

3 Ibidem. 4 Sobolewski, G. 2009. Emergency response in an urban environment. National Defense

Academy, Warsaw 2009, pp. 78. 5 Universal Encyklopedia, PWN, Warsaw 1976, vol. IV, pp. 697. 6 Skibiński, F. 1978. Reflections on the art of war. Warsaw 1978, pp. 29. 7 von Clausewitz, C. 1958. About war. Warsaw 1958, pp. 15. 8 Mucha, L. 1991. Armed violence. Warsaw 1991, pp. 33.

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48

conflict can be treated as a kind of armed violence consisted of striving to achieve

the purposes of the state (the coalition, social group) by reciprocal action using the

armed forces or organised and armed groups. The application of this criteria

regarding ways to use armed conflicts allows one to distinguish between war and

border armed conflicts9. According to another source

10 the armed conflict is an

ambiguous term, as to which there is no compatible acceptance in science. Among

the various types of war, there is listed a conflict of reduced intensity, which is

being described as: armed action in the field between peace and an open war using

strictly limited forces and methods. Traditionally war is characterised by the

following characteristics11

:

– two or more organised armed forces, of which, at least on one side, are

involved are regular troops, paramilitary troops take part in the fight;

– both fighting parties must be organised according to a certain pattern, and in

addition to that, there is a planned and organised structure of armed actions, even if

it only confines to defence;

– there is a chronological – fixed continuation of an armed conflict or

correlation of strategic and tactical purpose of command level.

And the features distinguishing the armed conflict shall be primarily taken as:

– existence of at least two entities fighting on a limited scale;

– use of organised armed forces by the fighting parties against the armed

forces of an adversary;

– usage of methods and measures of armed struggle.

In the 1990s a qualitative change occurred in conflicts and wars. The most

important elements are12

:

– a clear dominance of conflicts and wars of an internal nature, which gradually

become international and constitute a serious threat to neighbouring countries: the

conflict in the former Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo) and numerous

conflicts in the former Yugoslavia;

– a serious increase of conflicts in connection with the disintegration of

multinational states (USSR, Yugoslavia, Sudan);

– an exacerbation of conflicts over tensions of an ethnic-national-religious

character;

– an increase of war damage and losses among the civilian population, which

in many cases are greater than among the parties directly involved;

– difficulties in the peaceful resolution of international disputes;

– international terrorism and organised crime;

– participation of international organisations in resolving conflicts and local crises.

9 Glossary of basic terms of safety. Warsaw 1994, pp. 12.

10 Dupuy, T. N. 1993. International Military and Defense Encyclopedia. Vol. 6, Washington

1993, pp. 2886. 11 Cziomer, E. 2000. Outline..., pp. 204. 12 Ibidem, pp. 217.


49

At this point it would be worth narrowing down and analysing the theories of

wars and causes of conflicts and also responding to the question of why war

happens in these and not other times, between only those countries and not others

and what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the outbreak of war or

conflict. The theories of the causes of wars can be divided, according to the level of

analysis13

:

1. the system – the main reasons for the wars derive from the structure of the

international system;

2. the state – its nature and character of the society are crucial;

3. the decision-making process, organisational and bureaucratic mechanisms,

particularly in crisis situations

There are many theories of the reasons for wars. The first noteworthy is the

realist theory of the balance of forces, which relies on the fact that the members

shall endeavour to avoid hegemonies and maintain their independence. The balance

of powers is such a system of international relations, in which any one power may

not influence on the other or impose on them their rights14

. In accordance with this

theory, one should create alliances, in order to protect against the undue advantage

of others – external balancing, unlike internal balancing, which follows through

armaments. Military potential should be stable and possible to measure, so that

member states could properly define it: what is necessary for a proper balancing.

Technological changes in the sphere of military may influence disturbing because:

– they create uncertainty about the actual strength of individual states;

– they create an opportunity to use technology to the advantage of one state,

before the technology spreads;

– they stimulate arms races15

.

Another theory is the theory of overwhelming force, which says that equal

distribution of forces creates the danger of believing in victory by one of the

parties. The advantage of one state is the guarantor of greater stability; the war is

unnecessary for the stronger one and too risky for the weaker one. The next theory

– the theory of force transition proclaims that the main sources of war are changes

of the forces relationship arising as a result of the different pace of economic

growth. The dominant state shall bear the costs associated with maintenance of the

system, while its rivals benefit from this without incurring costs16

. Another theory

proclaims that the country whose strength is growing, may initiate the war in order

to obtain impact and political importance in accordance with its economic and

military status. The likelihood of war breaking out is the greatest when the

development of the rising country is quick, and its strength close to the strength of

the dominant country, especially in the absence of a tradition of cooperation

13 Czaputowicz, J. 1998. System or chaos. PWN, Warsaw 1998, pp. 18. 14 Stefanowicz, J. 1996. International Order : Experience and Future. Warsaw 1996, pp. 140. 15 Czaputowicz, J. 1 System or chaos. Op.cit, pp. 19. 16 Houweling, H. 1998. Power transition as a cause of war. Journal of Conflict Resolution 1998,

vol. 32, no 1.

LESZEK ELAK

50

between them and when the revisionist state is attempting to alter and replace the

existing international order with its own order17

.

Some theories show that the reasons for the wars lie rather in the nature of the

state and its society. They override the statement that the international system

affects the outbreak of wars and conflicts. According to them, relative prosperity

and social consensus minimise the likelihood of a war. On the other hand the

religious differences and nationalism disturbs and heighten the aggression which as

a consequence, can lead to war. The uncontrolled internal situation in the country

leads the authorities to initiate a war, in order to increase the national unity and to

strengthen its[the country’s] position. Often the authorities and politicians behave

irrationally and their heads-up lead to a disregard of the future wars costs. They

often derive personal benefits from the war without incurring the direct costs18

. In

the mainstream of those theories there is also the democratic theory, in the light of

which the democratic states do not start wars. Other theories of wars causes

concern wars at the level of the decision-making process – military doctrine (the

offensive -increases the likelihood, the defensive – reduces it), as well as

investigating the causes of wars in conflicts between the parties involved in the

dispute, the lack of information, underestimating or overestimating the forces or

the intentions of the opponent.

In the subject of literature we can find the long cycle theory. According to it,

the international system returns after a period of time to the point of take-off. An

excessive extension of the dominant state leads to its collapse. The change of

leadership in the world follows in cycles more or less every 100 years: the world

superpower in the 16th century was Portugal, in the 17th - the Netherlands, in the

18th and 19th - England19

. Currently from the 20th century the United States has

served this role.

Academics examining the causes of the wars came to interesting conclusions20

in the sixties. The results obtained were valid for the times and have proven that:

– conflicts and internal disorders are frequent cause of wars;

– the equability of forces degradation between the main countries reduces the

risk of war;

– the rapid development of one state increases the risk of war;

– a very small or very large degree of force polarisation increases the risk of war;

– arms races leads to the escalations ending in war.

Other studies of the wars 21

in the years 1816-1980 have led to the conclusion

that a weaker state cannot reasonably attack a stronger one – unless, in an alliance;

17 Organski, A. F. K. 1968. World politics. New York 1968, pp. 376. 18 Czaputowicz, J. 1998. System or chaos. Op.cit, pp. 20. 19 Modelski, G. 1998. The long cycle of global politics and the nation-state. Comparative Studies in

Society and History, 1998, no 20, pp. 214-235; Czaputowicz, J. 1998. System or chaos. Op.cit, pp. 20. 20 See Desler, D. 1991. Beyoned correlates. Toward a casual theory of war. International Studies

Quartely 1991, pp. 339-341; Singer, J. D. 1978 -1980. The correlates of war, New York 1979-1980. 21 Comp. Czaputowicz, J. 1998. System or chaos. Op.cit, pp. 21.


51

the powers more often participate in wars of lesser importance than other states and

expectations as to preserving the third countries may be crucial for the start of the

war. Moreover in a situation where the expected losses of one state exceed the

potential gains of another state, there is a strong likelihood of negotiations, the

allied state may affect the stronger state only in certain situations and the wars

between allies are more frequent than between enemies.

By analysing the theories of the causes of wars and conflicts one cannot

overlook assumptions of the peace and conflicts studies, which detect causes in

three categories:

1. structural – dependent on their intellectual, economical, technical,

infrastructural, industrial, agricultural development, the geopolitical situation and

historical circumstances;

2. cyclical – alliances, coalitions, social behaviour under the influence of

propaganda, indoctrination and ideology;

3. other – unforeseen incidents, provocations, etc.

Summarising the above considerations, it is clear that there is a belief that the

heterogeneity of the modern world, the diversity, intensity and multidimensional

nature of international relations generate in a natural way disputes and

contradictions. Therefore, the most important causes of wars are the following

factors22

:

– economical:

• poverty;

• access to natural resources;

• tensions of an internal nature;

• external dependence;

• place in the international division of labor;

– political:

• internal, social tensions;

• ethnic classifications;

• territorial claims;

• refugees and displaced people;

• a sense of external threat;

• activities of the opposition;

– ideological:

• the political system;

• past history;

• racial prejudice;

– religious;

– ecological:

• natural and environmental disasters;

22 Borkowski, R. 2001. The conflicts of the modern world. Scientific – Didactic Academic

Publisher, Cracow 2001, pp. 42.

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52

• environmental degradation;

• water shortages;

• globalization;

• instability of energy markets;

• migration of the population;

• diseases of civilization;

• shrinking of natural resources;

• ecological terrorism;

– organized crime;

– international terrorism.

Given the previously presented theories of the causes of wars and conflicts, it

should be noted that it happens rarely, that at the root of the conflict lays only one

reason. There are a whole combination of reasons leading to conflicts. The country

leaders controlled by their own political ambitions, internal agreements and

emotions, trying to strengthen or maintain their position as a state in the

international arena, referring to the reasons of state, have made their own

interpretation of the conflict situation. Disregarding the interests of their partner or

the international law, they have made decisions about the use of force. These

factors determine the nature of the conflict, which is seldom clear. A conflict is

often accompanied by ethnic and religious tensions, often by the interference of

third countries. It creates a conglomerate of the causative mechanisms that are

difficult to explain. Sometimes, the given region of the world is dominated by

a specific cause of conflict which reveals itself in other areas, for example,

territorial disputes sometimes have a very long pedigree. Particularly disturbing are

those whose origin is closely connected with the collapse of colonialism.

Boundaries erected individually by European countries remained unchanged. Not

following the natural ethnic or cultural distribution, they enclosed in the structure

of the state lots of conflicting interests and attitudes. In another case, the dominant

causes are raw materials, where it is not only about access to resources, but also

differences of opinions concerning their distribution23

.

The most important consequence of the majority of contemporary armed

conflicts is a kind of de-institutionalisation, which means there is no central control

and rules of action for the parties to the conflict. De-institutionalisation, compared

to traditionally comprehended wars, manifests itself primarily in two interrelated

elements24

:

– diversity of warring parties;

– brutalisation of the conflict.

Contemporary armed conflicts are characterised by a diversity of warring

parties and thus subject to some kind of privatisation. The participants of the

conflict in addition to the regular army (and sometimes instead of them) are various

23 Ibidem, pp. 42-23. 24 Ibidem, pp. 118.


53

non-state subjects, ranging from a loosely organised band of armed and

paramilitary groups, ethnic groups, tribes, clans, drug cartels, companies engaged

in supplying mercenaries, as well as further warlords or partisans similar to the

state army25

. It encourages the incorporation of external state, and especially non-

state, actors in the conflict. The vast majority of participants of this kind of wars

confined its activity to the territory (countries) covered by the fights. However,

some of them, at the same time, engage in activities in the form of asymmetric

threats to other countries. An example of this might be terrorist activities of some

Islamist terrorist organisations, and especially such as Al Qaeda26

.

The second aspect of the de-institutionalisation of modern armed conflict is the

widely understood brutalisation of conflicts. It is characterised primarily by the use

of combat methods different from typical interstate wars, often treated as inhumane

and unacceptable under international law. Its expression is also a frequent focus of

activities connected with, and including attacks on, civilians belonging to different

ethnic or religious community.

Outlined above, two characteristics of contemporary conflicts affect very

significantly the developmental abilities of the asymmetric threats constituting

subjects. Some Islamic terrorist groups have been formed during or as a result of

armed conflict. Moreover, most of the course of armed conflict enables the

operation of organisations and criminal groups asymmetrically – it enables the

recruiting of new members, as well as opens a very broad perspective for their

existing participants to gain relevant militant experience. Possibilities of

recruitment of new members are being increased by the fact that the asymmetric

threat is constituted by both cultural or religious factors. Another convenience for

organisations and groups is the increased availability of certain types of weapons

(small arms)27

.

The important consequence of modern warfare, and above all their costs and

negative consequences for the international system, is also a substantial modification of

roles and responsibilities of regular armed forces and especially the troops in

countries belonging to NATO or the EU. Currently their traditional function,

defence against external aggression from other states, has lost its importance; so

the main task and actions actually performed by modern armed forces are several

missions related to the need to intervene in internal conflicts (including

peacekeeping or humanitarian operations) as well as the need for post-conflict

stabilisation and reconstruction. This raises important implications for NATO and

EU countries: in addition to the reorganisation of their respective armed forces,

there is the issue of intervening in conflicts where they themselves are not directly

concerned (for among other reasons due to geographical distance). This leads to

25 Cienciara, A. 2010. International conflict - a theoretical approach. International Relations,

University of Warsaw, Warsaw 2010, p. 106. 26 Borkowski, R. 2001. The conflicts…. pp. 118. 27 Ibidem, pp. 119.

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a significant asymmetry in the determination or the will to participate in the

conflict between the forces of intervention (stabilisation) and the local combatants.

The consequence of this is the susceptibility of intervention (stabilising) forces due

to the asymmetrical nature of the methodology employed and consequently the

negative effects of entities, which in turn constitute asymmetric threats. The fact

that the state of the transatlantic area engage militarily in conflicts in remote and

culturally different regions of the world, can be interpreted by some of the local

community as objectionable unauthorised interference in their internal affairs and

a manifestation of imperialism28

.

Armed conflicts lead to a demoralisation of societies and weaken the

development prospects of countries. They often destroy all social structures and are

the underlying causes of numerous social pathologies. Often the number of

participating parties to the conflict, the aspirations of leaders and interference from

the outside prolong conflicts preventing the establishment of peace. Then the fights

lasts until all the forces and motivations of the combatants become exhausted.

Therefore, the reduction of armed conflicts and settlement of disputes, ie. opposing

views of interested parties, using peaceful means for the international community is

one of the most important problems to be solved at the present time.

28 Ibidem, pp. 120.

SECURITY IN SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORIES

55


Lt. Col. Krzysztof DRABIK, Ph.D. National Defence University

Abstract

Security is a basic need and practical aim of safe existence, survival and development.

This fundamental attribute is important for every rational being and it is anchored in the

social contract theory. An agreement between individuals at the ethical and social level

reveals a method to achieve security. Here, ethical principles and the political system of the

state are the basis for safe human existence.

Key words – security, contract theories, politics

The dichotomy of the natural state and political state The elementary components of the discourse on human security are the

functional principles of the social structure built upon social contract. They are key determinants when analysing the creation of security, and even indispensable when thinking of it.

The social contract theory indicates a possible origin of the initial rules that form the basis to discuss the prospects of the shaping of security. The hypothetical character of this theory does not disqualify its practical effects in a social reality. Just as the a priori assumption of the need for an axiom in logic allows for the adoption of a particular method of defining concepts and proving judgements. The social contract theory allows for the formulation of convincing assumptions describing a model of the social structure in a country. Thus, it is used for diagnosing and formulating conclusions about methods of shaping security. An important indicator of the role played by the contract between individuals is the difference between the natural state and the political state, or the application of the principles of justice.

Thomas Hobbes highlighted the significant dichotomy between these states. And so, in the state of nature there is no law that would allow for meeting the needs of an individual, which would not interfere with the same rights of another individual. Everyone has the right to freedom (or rather liberty) without any restrictions. In this case there is a conflict of individual interests that are derived


KRZYSZTOF DRABIK

56

from the right of everyone to everything. On the other hand, having no restrictions to the natural law would initiate a war of all against all.

Hobbes' dichotomy between the natural state and political state emphasises the importance of a legally authorised agreement between individuals. The agreement is primarily intended to eliminate the imperfections of the natural state, i.e. to restrict the rights of everybody to everything1. The category of freedom is defined in another, let's call it a social (community), dimension. The point of freedom lies in its limitations, which are the areas of freedom of other individuals.

The social contract organises the structure of a community of individuals. They formulate a set of rules for interconnected functioning on individual and institutional levels. The scope of the contract includes the process of creating security for individuals and the entire political community. Only in a legal system that is based on the initial contract, does the principle of justice comes into force, and it covers the whole of social functioning.

The theory of justice as the basis for the creation of a well-organised

social system The American philosopher John Rawls used the social contract theory to

construct a theory of justice. It seems that social contract theories are adequate for the construction of social, ethical, political and other theories that consider a social community to be the basis for scientific reflection. The social contract allows us to determine the so-called primary principles that become points of reference for further regulations of functioning social communities. Rawls used the social contract theory on purpose. For him it represented a good starting point for the formulation of the primary principles of justice in the so-called initial situation. The contract allows one to develop a consensus whether it concerns the principles of justice, or the functioning of the legislative, executive, judicial branches of the state or the functioning of other state institutions. And so, legal principles in the social contract theory are devoid of an origin a priori.

In his attempt to design a theory of justice, Rawls chose the social contract path, which has become the primary method of determining the principles of justice. In this approach, the importance of justice has a significant impact on the direction of the shaping of security, which lasts as long as the individuals follow the rules adopted in the initial situation. Thus, security is closely related to the structure of the primary rules set by the social contract. Failure to comply with these principles shall initiate risks and have a negative impact on the continuity of the existence, survival and development prospects of security subjects.

1 Locke's dichotomy has a less expressive form. The rule bellum omnium contra omnes is not in

force, but the imperfections of natural state result from the need to overcome the principle nemo iudex

in causa sua.


57

One should take into account the fundamental reservation about the substance of the principles established in the social contract. These rules are the result of a collective consensus, i.e. of such an agreement that may be accepted to an optimal degree by all individuals. It is not an easy task because of the differences that identify the specific and individual personality, life experiences, and existential circumstances of each person. Rawls shows the importance of such diversity and proposes, adequately to the strictly philosophical nature of the social contract theory, a solution that seems to be far from a practical implementation. It involves the application of the so-called veil of ignorance when determining the primary principles of justice. The veil of ignorance allows individuals to take a break from the sociological situation in which they are at the moment. It means a primary nullification of their social and professional status, their positions and roles they play in the social structure. This creates the initial situation, where people are a relatively isolated set of elements, independent of circumstances and relationships of a sociological origin. Such "sociological insulation" allows us to create an initial situation where the possibilities of using private class interests, professional interests etc. in determining the primary principles of justice are limited.

No one is guided by the so-called class interests when formulating a principle of justice that is characterised by impartiality. Thus, the concept of justice as impartiality is a public concept: covering society as a whole, regardless of the natural differences between individuals. As emphasised by Rawls, "a society is well-ordered when it is not only designed to advance the good of its members but when it is also effectively regulated by a public conception of justice"2.

The consequence of the author's philosophical reflection is to derive practical principles of justice from the abstract idea of human intuition, as the power to express judgements that are arbitrary but significant in its effects. Here, the abstraction realm expressed in judgements a priori pervades the practice of social life in the form of general principles of justice. It is the transition from theory to practice. The initial situation and the veil of ignorance are the theoretical foundation of the theory of justice as impartiality. Thus, Rawls's theory, as well as the long tradition of social contract theory, reflects the power required for the formation of social practice. The need to move from theory to practice, especially in concepts of social structures was expressively articulated by Jürgen Habermas: "No theory and no enlightenment can take off our shoulders the burden of the risk of involvement in one of the sides and the unintended consequences of this involvement. Attempts at emancipation, which are also attempts to implement the utopian content of cultural traditions, can be interpreted as a practical necessity, pointing to the conflicts generated by the system (which must be explained by theory) and the avoidable suffering and repressions"3. Habermas's observation sits

2 J. Rawls, A theory of Justice, translated by M. Panufnik, PWN, Warszawa 2009, p. 31. 3 J. Habermas, Theory and Practice, translated by M. Łukasiewicz, Z. Krasnodębski, Państwowy

Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa 1983, p. 62.

KRZYSZTOF DRABIK

58

well with Rawls's writings on social theory. In an initial situation, it is better to adopt the principles of justice by an agreement and to implement them in practice, than to suffer because of the undetermined fundamental principles that should be the basis for a well-organised society. It is not enough to adopt by agreement a certain state model (social and political institutions). First, basic principles for their operation must be formulated. Then the social and institutional structure of the state will be well organised.

The social contract theory provides a description of the origins of the state. It is a legitimate institution as long as it is based on an organized social structure; the state is the people who constitute it. The situation is no different from the social-theory-based theory of justice as impartiality by Rawls. Principles of justice are not the product of an external entity, they are the result of an agreement between people in the initial situation.

The social contract theory is thoroughly imbued with humanism and it is far from non-human justifications. Therefore, it is people who constitute the state and the rules for its functioning, they also are responsible for the continuity of the state and its development. This significant attribute of the social contract theory was highlighted by Thomas Hobbes in the following words: "Though nothing can be immortal which mortals make; yet, if men had the use of reason they pretend to, their Commonwealths might be secured, at least, from perishing by internal diseases. For by the nature of their institution, they are designed to live as long as mankind, or as the laws of nature, or as justice itself, which gives them life. Therefore when they come to be dissolved, not by external violence, but intestine disorder, the fault is not in men as they are the matter, but as they are the makers and orderers of them"4.

The security principle in the tradition of the social contract The initial situation derived by Rawls from the tradition of the social contract

in order to formulate a theory of justice as impartiality is an important interpretation of the reflection on the security problem. The deductive method and the high level of abstraction of the social contract discussion provides a basis for the formulation of assumptions and theses that will also determine human existence, survival and development. It should be emphasised that the adoption of the primary rules in the hypothetical initial situation can adequately reflect the method of reasoning in search of safe forms of existence. This is about transferring the social contract method onto the broader platform of security considerations.

In the social contract tradition, state-building concepts prevail, in which the hypothetical state of nature gives way to a rational agreement that includes basic functioning principles of a social (political) community. Legal norms, institutions,

4 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, translated by Cz. Znamierowski, PWN, Warszawa 1954, p. 285.


59

power - all these are the product of an agreement between individuals who are aware of the fact that greater benefits can be achieved in a political society than in the atomised state of nature.

In the history of the social contract concept there are two mainstreams, which, on the one hand, present a strict state-building character (the theory of Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke), while on the other hand, illustrate the ethical dimension, which appears in Rawls's theory of justice. I call the first one - the social-contract-trend, and the other one - the pre-social-contract trend. From the philosophical point of view, we can see here a hierarchy, a process of deductive analysis, of transiting from the ethical matter (general) to the political matter (specific).

Formulation of the theory of justice in the initial situation is the first step to create other agreements of political provenance. And so, the method of creating a socio-institutional state depends on the adopted initial criterion, which is the theory of justice as impartiality. This ethical initial basis introduces the parties to the next stage of social contract tools.

As previously mentioned, the primary theory of justice and the secondary theory of the social contract are differentiated by the degree of abstraction. While traditional political agreements could be considered to be abstract, the theory of justice presents a higher level of abstraction. Importantly, the criterion of abstraction concerns the method of reaching a consensus, which results in a certain social contract. The content of this agreement is by all means of a practical nature. This distinction highlights the common ground for theory and practice. It's about finding a theoretical method to determine the initial principles that should be in force in a well-organised society.

Morality as a regulator of the functioning of social groups is the foundation for other regulations – legal, economic, political, cultural etc. So the ethical pre-social-contract trend lays down rules for the classical social-contract-trend. This observation is important when defining security based on the theory of the social contract. So how do we combine the reflection on the ethical and political mainstream with the general theory of human security?

Security in philosophical terms is a dignified form of existence, which allows survival and the continuation of this existence. It is necessary to specify the elements contributing to the creation of a dignified existence form. With regard to the social contract theory, a dignified existence form is shaped by the implementation of ethical principles of justice and social contract related socio-political agreements. The desired level of security is achieved by a man on the ethical and socio-political basis. Security is genetically related to ethical and social principles. Development of security is not possible without the adoption of an ethical and socio-political context. In this perspective it seems reasonable to distinguish a third trend in the tradition of the social contract - the post-social-

contract trend where security is a general result of the consensus reached by parties.

KRZYSZTOF DRABIK

60

Development of human security is a rational act of changing the environment and one's dispositions in such a way that it covers the needs for existence, survival and development to the utmost. So, it is not a process independent from individual intentions5. In reflecting on security, the subject, his choices and rational volitional acts are the important factors. Rawls brings the realm of morality, as an evolving social and natural phenomena, to a rational ethical contract, which is a specified and primary point of reference for secondary social and political contracts. The primary and undefinable morality in view of the theory of justice is gaining a particular ethical dimension. From multi-faceted moral judgements, the parties negotiate precise primary rules for further, more detailed, contracts. Thus, ethics is the foundation for regulations of the social structure, for both righteous institutions and righteous human deeds. The pre-social-contract ethical principle shapes the social-contract political principle, which in turn creates an area of human security within a post-social-contract principle of security. A secure (dignified) existence form and development of an individual is possible on an ethical and political foundation. The abstract hierarchy of these principles is presented below:

The pre-social-contract principle

(the theory of justice as impartiality) the need for security morality

The social-contract principle

(the theory of the social contract)

The post-social-contract principle

(the principle of security) In this approach, security as a rational and practical act of creating safe

existence, survival and development is a secondary element to the ethical and political contract. There can be no security without ethical, social and legal foundation. Similarly, you can not refer to principles of justice, if no laws are in force (natural and positive). This ontological hierarchy is presented in social contract theories, among which the most expressive one is the theory of Hobbes. The natural state is a war of all against all, no one can feel safe. Only the

5 I leave out here the factors of randomness and random natural forces, which are the

determinants of security beyond the control of human activity.


61

establishment of legal norms on the basis of a contract between an individual and his sovereign and other individuals creates a safe form of existence. Hobbes confirms the thesis that the social-contract principle is primary to the security principle.

Security in a psychological and praxeological sense The concept of security as a human need should be distinguished from the

concept of security as a practical effect of human activities. The natural need for existence and development is primary to other higher-order needs. The need for security is an integral part of existence and regardless of external circumstances, it directs the way an individual acts. Also in the state of nature, individuals seek to maximize security, but due to the lack of a normative system, or the non-genuine implementation thereof, the need for security is not satisfied adequately to the actual expectations.

Security perceived as a need defines the motivational realm and provides the basis to take adequate steps to satisfy this need. From the point of view of our discussion, the practical dimension of security is important in the form of actual regulations regulating the dignified form of existence and the development of an individual. The practical trend in defining the concept of security leads to the satisfying of the security needs by the pre-social-contract ethical principle (the principle of justice) and the social-contract socio-political principle.

The need for survival and development would be possible to implement in a hypothetical world of atomised individuals, whose areas of freedom have no points of contact. In this case, ethical, social, and political principles, and finally principles of security in the described sense would not play any role in the life of autonomous individuals. However, the aim is to establish such a normative system (security system), which takes into account the natural social dispositions of individuals and the interpenetration of areas of individual freedom. Locke interestingly presented the issue of autonomy and the inevitability of the conclusion of the social contract. When individuals can make use of free natural resources for example by adopting new areas of land for cultivation, it is not necessary to comply with contractual standards. However, when natural resources run out, then it is necessary to establish rules for the distribution of these resources.

The core of social contract theories is the assumption a priori about the need to create organised social structures which, by their nature, but also because of the objective situation, strive to create a safe system of interdependence. These interdependencies are typical for every social community. The aim is for the social system to be safe, and it can be achieved by consensual agreement on ethical and socio-political grounds.

KRZYSZTOF DRABIK

62

Conclusion An important ascertainment in the reflection on security, in view of social

contract theories, is the thesis that the primary need for human existence, survival and development is determined by the post-social-contract security principle. And so, the need for safe existence and growth takes an actual real form in arrangements of the ethical and socio-political dimension. The will to survive reaches its apogee in the social contract that creates an area of collective security. The signatories of the ethical and socio-political contract satisfy their primary need for security in real conditions of collective existence. Here, the primary need is satisfied in the practice of the social creation of security. The desire to exist, survive and develop finds its form in security contracts.

The ascertainment that defines security as a post-social-contract element makes the concept of security more psychological and sociological in nature. Security in the perspective of social contract theory has two meanings: personal and structural. This includes both an individual and institutional dimension of safe existence and development. In a social structure, personal individual rights to be safe are important, as well as a system of just institutions, creating structural environment of security.

The post-social-contract principle indicates the unidirectional nature of the shape of security. It concerns the initial conditions in the process of creating security. As already pointed out by Aristotle, a person can become fully operational only in a self-sufficient institution such as state. A state satisfies all human needs and to go beyond the jurisdiction of the state means to fall beyond the security area, not only the structural, but also the personal security area. An individual outside the social structure is not safe, not only because of the lack of self-sufficient and protective institutions, but primarily because of shortage of psychological stimuli.

The phenomenon of social isolation is not just about a hypothetical situation of existence outside a state, but it concerns the actual situation of many people, living in a society, but suffering from their inability to satisfy their need for affiliation. Thus, being a member of a social group has a strict psychological grounding and it creates a naturalistic justification for the legitimacy of social contract concepts. Primary social dispositions, even in the form of affiliation needs, create the initial dispositions of individuals to be a party to the social contract. These dispositions are conducive for the formation of security that reaches its optimum in the social structure created on the basis of an ethical and socio-political contract.

THE BUILDING OF KNOWLEDGE CAPACITY IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM

63

Lt. Col. Jarosław JABŁOŃSKI

THE BUILDING OF KNOWLEDGE CAPACITY

IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM

Abstract

Despite indications in the National Security Strategy of the inter-exchange of

experiences as part of the integration of security systems, the Lessons Learned System has

only the Ministry of Home Affairs (The Bank of Best Practices in the Police) and the

Ministry of Defence (The Polish Armed Forces Lessons Learned System). However, there is

not a national system (structure, process, tools) that could integrate all national security

entities through a process of knowledge sharing. Structure dedicated professionals in the

structures of national security entities using a unified knowledge management process and

modern communication technology can play an integration role of national security entities

by building capacity in the area of national security.

Key words – national security, knowledge management systems, lessons learned

system

Introduction

The ability to process large amounts of information (knowledge), obtained as

a result of activities in the field of national security has increased significantly

since it was decided to start using in the process of information systems. Recently,

it has been more evident that the belief that in addition to an exclusive collection of

dry data and information, and the subsequent analysis of the entities responsible for

maintaining security, it becomes necessary to achieve progressively higher and

higher levels in this area, by the merger and subsequent use in practice of two key

factors. Theoretical knowledge and experience nurtured by the work (service) in

units of national security. Both of these ingredients, when they are integrally linked

in an inseparable whole and continuously updated will have an increasing impact

on the security of each state. Unfortunately, experience shows that very often

a large part of the theoretical knowledge and previous experience is irretrievably

lost because of the routine treatment with standard methods and tools for

knowledge management.

Practically since the mid-1990s, the degree of participation of military

structures responsible for the security of the Polish crisis, conflict and military

operations has been increasing. One of the desirable effects of this is the generation


JAROSŁAW JABŁOŃSKI

64

of an unprecedented amount of observation and experience acquired by the staff of

these structures. At the same time it becomes a major challenge due to the fact that

knowledge and experience acquired as a result of daily practice are located almost

exclusively in the minds of the staff of the national security structures. Hence, it

becomes very difficult or even impossible to collect, manage, and transfer the need

for security policies and provide for the next generation. The vast majority of

information collected is too often irretrievably lost, causing the frequent repetition

of the same mistakes in the practical realisation of the next national security policy

objectives. The large fluctuations of personnel in the security structures are

a natural process. For instance, one of the most common reasons for the resignation

of the most experienced security staff is significant physical exhaustion, as a result

of the service (work) in very serious and complex conditions. When we add, the

general reluctance of young people to the wider bureaucracy (and as such they

consider including the creation of procedures, training programs, reports,

proposals, studies, etc.), resulting in activation of the mentioned factors, we will

receive a significant cause of the loss of the wider potential in national security

structures.

In addition to the material potential (in military terms it is called a combat

potential), a significant component of the value of each structure responsible for

national security and one of the major elements of its characteristics is the

intellectual potential. Hence, the members of structures implementing national

security policy objectives at the tactical level, very often acting in a hostile and

isolated environment in terms of safety and time constraints, must temporarily and

independently make decisions of varying difficulty and complexity, based only on

their own knowledge and their intellectual potential.

This process can take place through appropriate techniques and methods of

knowledge management and can be distinguished by the Lessons Learned System

(LLS). The LLS has a relatively short history, dating back to the early 1990s. The

need for the development of knowledge management was first seen by consulting

firms, treating knowledge as a product. They quickly began to create a repository

containing the experience and expertise of their consultants, in such companies as:

Knowledge Curve (Pricewaterhouse Coopers) Kworld (KPMG), Knowledge

Xchange (Andersen). Over the next few years, the knowledge management process

found a permanent place in the structure of the U.S. military and NATO. In the

meantime, because of the enormous development of information technology, the

creation of knowledge management systems was a natural result. National security

elements, using knowledge management systems supported by new technology,

helped to avoid some mistakes.

This type of problem while taking care of knowledge from national security

activities was also faced in the Polish defence system by Armed Forces. The Polish

Armed Forces must be able to manage large volumes of knowledge and

information inside their structure and outside to the NATO LLS. There was the


65

urgent need for the development of a process of using experience, to be able to

enhance the efficiency of national security. This meant forcing the Polish political

and military decision-makers to focus on the creation mechanism of drawing

conclusions from the experience gained so far, mainly in order to achieve a higher

level of management reporting to national security structures.

Development of appropriate processes and creating effective mechanisms for

implementing lessons requires a comprehensive engagement in the entire country

with all national security actors. Interdepartmental cooperation, based on the

relevant exchange system will allow the increase of the level of their performance

in the framework of the Polish security system. One of the significant positive

effects of this system is the building of the LLS, which should support the saving

of time and money for all those involved in the future of the national security

system.

None of the national security entities (Police, the Polish Armed Forces) has

LLS with leading characteristics and cannot be considered as a standard tool.

However, the process of LLS creation has started. Although it still requires the

development of many more organisational projects, in order to obtain the required

quality. So, there is a kind of indisputable need for the experience of countries that

already have such systems, in the final phase of construction of the Polish National

LLS (POL N LLS) to use the experience to achieve the expected results.

One of characteristic feature of the present time is the rapid development of the

IT sector, with particular emphasis on the use of networked interactive cooperation.

It provides some kind of universal access to the means and methods of data

collection, processing, and exchange of experience. It means that they are

distributed with rapid access to the information. A properly designed and build

LLS may allow wide access by the security structures and security Subject Matter

Experts, in order to achieve some level of synergy in improving national security

policy. On the other hand, digitisation does not solve the problem. However, it can

allow the efficiently and timely exchange of experience between national security

organisations. This kind of approach will be legitimate to draw attention to the use

of LLS as a knowledge management tool, in order to obtain the improved

efficiency of security policy.

During the world economic crisis, when many countries started to look for an

increase in the efficiency of their own security systems, knowledge management

tools and the integration of security structures were common practices. An

appropriately added LLS could help to achieve the next level of integration of

distributed safety systems, which is required both by politicians and security

agents, realising their specific goals. The modern LLS relies on electronic systems,

allowing a quick exchange of knowledge between policy makers establishing the

scope of security policy goals and the providers of these goals. It is essential to

obtain information superiority and to create the right conditions for conducting

high-quality, network-centric national security policy. It is therefore important that


66

the actions of each player in the national security system, characterised by far-

reaching synergies arising from the cooperation, are based on the joint use of the

knowledge acquired within the National LLS.

Current status

The current "National Polish Security Strategy" from 2007 (SBN 2007) draws

attention to the state decision-making bodies and the use by them of all available

opportunities aimed at improving the safety and integrated approach to the national

security system. Hence, the integration of national security has to be based on:

competencies, skills and expertise of people working in the various sub-systems,

interdepartmental cooperation in scale, tightening the bonds of alliance and

implementation of solutions for workforce management and the use of inter-

institutional exchange.

Although SBN 2007 has a very high level of generality, the creation of the

Integrated National Security System (INSS) indicates some factors determining the

efficiency of an integrated security system. The exchange of knowledge between

security organisations efficiently is one of the five determinants of an efficient

integrated national security system. Additionally, the sharing of knowledge in the

field of security allows the harmonisation of military cooperation and civil entities

of an integrated national security system. What is more important, we have three

areas of national security, nine sectors and more than 30 entities dedicated to work

in an integrated national security system. It is advisable at this point to draw

attention to SBN 2007: “(...) a fully integrated national security system requires (…

the state to ...) continue to improve communication between all elements of the

system, and thus the existence of the requirement to integrate all those national

security by means of modern communication.”

Returning to the efficiency factors of an integrated national security system, the

process of exchange of expertise and experience between the elements of the

national security system must be made not only in one particular area but also

between the same parties of the security sector, as well as the end of the entire

security system. It is vital for the security management subsystem, which should be

based on mutual trust between the people working (serving) in its structure, who

have to have both access to the knowledge databases and rights to share their

knowledge.

Stanislaw Koziej pinpointed what “(...) should be especially strongly

emphasised is the need for an integrated civil-military approach to the construction

of national security management system (...) the era of an exclusively specialised

departmental approach has long since ended. Thinking in terms of government

departments is perhaps appropriate in other spheres of activity of the state, but not

in regard to security. (…).”


67

For such purposes at the national level it is time to build an inter-agency

structure working closely to the state’ decision-maker and holding together the

whole strategic effort of national security instruments. When considering only one

of the factors in the smooth functioning of an integrated national security system

(inter-institutional exchange of experience), it turns out that there is a requirement

of the exercise of administrative, organisational and proper approach in the field of

interpersonal relationships (i.e., willingness to share such negative experiences).

The proper functioning of an integrated national security system is first necessary

for harmonious co-operation based on knowledge management within a single

subsystem (i.e the utilisation of the Armed Forces experiences) and after that to

achieve the same quality level in interagency cooperation and finally at the

strategic and political level. As was mentioned above, the feature belongs to the

multi-stakeholder approach to national security, the process of building and

integrating security subsystems, including the system to use the experiences.

Integration of national security entails a need for a broader type of action to

transform existing structures, policies and rules that should be focused primarily on

improving its efficiency. At the end of SBN 2007 the authors point to the need for

the transformation of the security system and subsystem targeting both national

security and the military executive subsystems to the level of multi-department.

This process required the development of the Polish security system and entailed

the introduction of various integration activities involving all safety system entities.

As a minimum is should include: integration management system (at all levels),

professionalization of specialised subsystems and widespread regulations for the

safety of the preparation (activation of the local authorities).

Particularly, the integration of management systems in the national security

system in accordance with the views of Stanislaw Koziej should be accelerated and

include: (...) a higher level of consolidation, namely integration in the sphere of

national security – a unified opposition to any threat (military and non-military,

internal and external – and capture opportunities, take on challenges and reduce

risks in all of these dimensions), with the system using all (military and civilian)

resources of the state.

Integration of multi-stakeholder security system becomes one of the new

challenges of the security system. However, maintaining a uniform direction in

ensuring the safety of the security held by a multi-stakeholder system requires the

organiser to carry out periodic reviews. Therefore, many countries have decided to

organise a strategic review of national security, as a tool for verifying the security

of its policies and to identify future directions of its development.

Another common point with the Polish National Security Planning (according

to SBN 2007) is the requirement of transformation processes in all national security

instruments. In accordance with “The Polish National Strategic Review” (2011) the

transformation process is indicated as a strategic objective of the authorities and

public administration. The main determinant of the transformation is the permanent


68

changing of the security environment. The transformation required the activity of

all national security subsystems with the main focus on the transformation of the

military subsystem. Just as was the case in SBN 2007 in the exchange of

experience, the SOP 2011 emphasises the importance of Transformation is a long-

term process, using advances in technology and modern methods of management

and control of the armed forces. The following tools are used in transformation: the

development of new concepts and their verification through experimentation,

defence planning based on the development of skills and experience to use the

system.

Both, SBN 2007 and “The Polish Defence Strategy of 2009” (SO 2009)

pointed out on the exchange of experiences as a significant part of the national

security transformation process which have to take place in military instruments.

There is an unquestionable need to carry out the future development of the armed

forces (transformation) and it has to support knowledge- based activities. Such an

approach requires military and civilian decisions taken by the government, which

will include searching appropriate mechanisms and procedures for harmonising the

activities of all entities involved in security operation on strategic, operational and

tactical levels.

The Polish Armed Forces LLS

The Polish Armed Forces Lessons Learned System (AF LLS) has been initiated

with the development of “The First Strategic Defence Review” in 2007. Despite

the existence for many years in the AF LLS of reporting mechanisms using After

Action Procedures it was found that there was not proper promotion of, and

sometimes even negligible, experience sharing and observation from the

participation of Polish Armed Forces in military operations.

The process of collecting applications and the experience of the work carried

out, both analytical and planning, working on the introduction of the Armed Forces

resulted in some residual system solutions. The lack of a systematic approach

caused in certain Ministry of Defence structures a decrease of efficiency of

functioning.

The major reason for such a situation was a lack of dedicated structure for

knowledge management in the Ministry of Defence and what is more important the

limited use of modern knowledge management tools. The Armed Forces LLS

construction started in parallel, leading the legislative, regulatory documents,

including creating and conducting an analysis of already existing systems in the

world. Legislative work was based on the Organisational Regulations and Defence

Development Programme of the Polish Armed Forces in 2007-2012.

The basis of the system construction was issued by the Chief of the General

Staff, Polish Army, in an order dated February 2007, which was the first formal


69

step in the construction of the so-called The System of Collection and

Dissemination of Experience (SCDE). The order stated the Deputy Chief of the

General Staff of the Polish Army was the primary supervisor of the implementation

and operation of the SCDE, with particular emphasis on the participation of the

Armed Forces in military operations outside the country. It is assumed that there is

a need for an annual assessment of the effects of the system, with the main

emphasis on the identification of military operational areas requiring further

improvement.

An important part of that order was to include into the SCDE process several

departments of Defence: Transition, Budget, Foreign Affairs and Military

Armament Policy. Hence, for the construction of the theoretical assumptions of the

system the National Defence Academy was actively enrolled. The first phase

covered 2007 and consisted of the collection and dissemination of conclusions and

experiences of the Polish Military Contingents (PMC) abroad. At the tactical level

abroad, military units identified problems and experience and deployed

applications in three areas of interest: operations outside the country, training and

exercises. From 2007 the SCDE system did not have a dedicated organisational

structure to perform the tasks, the participants in the system were all organisational

units of the Armed Forces, supervised by the Training Branch (P-7) of the General

Staff. In the second phase, implemented in 2008, there was an expansion in the

number of system’s areas of interest and the range of data collection from national

and international training and ongoing military operations.

The next step was to establish, by order of the Chief of General Staff (August

2008), a Working Group with the main responsibility to prepare, organise and

implement the modern AF LLS. The Working Group developed the "Concept of

AF LLS," which contained a main development direction of the system based on

both a full-time and training structure and unified LL process. The Concept was

released on 17 June 2009 by the Chief of General Staff, with the previous changes

in the SCDE to the LLS, and what is more important additions in order to

determine the national usability. Hence, the Concept made a strong impetus in the

AF LLS for the interdepartmental cooperation in the national security system and

the NATO LLS.

In order to maintain interoperability with NATO LLS, the development of the

AF LLS was based on the guidelines contained in the policy documents of the

Alliance (Bi-SC Directive Lessons Learned (LL) Directive 80-6 and NATO

Lessons Learned Policy). Furthermore, in accordance with the recommendations

contained in the "Vision of the Polish Armed Forces - 2030", for responding to

urgent requirements for improving the operational capacity of the AF and how to

carry out the process of the unification of analytical research in the Armed Forces,

the AF LLS is a system corresponding to the above recommendations.

According to the normative documents, improving the functioning of the AF in

times of peace, crisis and war in the light of experience is the main goal of AF


70

LLS. The result of the application of LLS in the Armed Forces should be a formal

change in the areas of operational capabilities. The utilisation of the result of the

LL Process (LLP) is implementing changes in the following functional components:

D – doctrine, O – organisation (structure), T – training, M – armament and military

equipment, L – Leadership, P – staff, F-infrastructure, I – interoperability.

The national structure for AF LLS was supervised by the Deputy Chief of the

General Staff, and since 1 January 2012, when it reached full operational

capability, the Doctrine and Training Centre of The Armed Forces (DTC AF) in

Bydgoszcz. Additionally, the Centre performs the function of the organiser and

coordinator of the system and is responsible for conducting the Armed Forces LL

Central Database (CBD).

According to the doctrinal documents the process of building on experience

was based on the assumptions used in the NATO LLP. Identification of the

observation begins the process of building on the experience. The LL cells report

observations of a need to make changes in the areas of interest. The observations

are consolidated and approved in the form of research problems and are included in

the Priority Requirements Analytical List; classified with a fixed priority (called

the Prioritised List of Analysis Requirements). Observations of changes needed to

be made in areas of the strategic-level military structures are reported to Chief of

General Staff by the DTC AF by organisational units of the Ministry of Defence

cells inside the General Staff, Armed Forces Operational Command, Command of

the Armed Forces, the Armed Forces Support Inspectorate, Inspectorate of Military

Health Service and the Military Police Headquarters.

The analysis process consists of five phases designed to translate an observation

into lessons learned. On the national level each phase is implemented by the

Department of Dissemination Applications and Lessons the DTC AF.

After the initial phase, the Chief of General Staff (or the Operational Command

Commander or respectively by the Commander of the Armed Forces Service

Branch, the Support Inspectorate of AF, the Commander of the Military Police, the

Inspectorate of Military Health Service, the Inspectorate of Military Health

Service) accepts a final report submitted by the Chief Executive Board of the DTC

AF. Additionally, this phase determines, or makes it, the responsibility of the

parent institution of the Contractor to assign appropriate corrective actions.

The second phase is carried out to determine the effectiveness of corrective

actions and determine whether the observation need of the LLP has been

eliminated in accordance with the successive stages of the process, including

corrective actions. The Verification may require additional examination in order to

correct and achieve the effectiveness of planned corrective actions. Implementation

of the second phase of the cell also indicates the use of experience. The process

also participates in another part of the structure of the DTC AF: the Experiment

and Implementation Branch, or in appropriate cases at the request of the head of

the cell. It uses the experiences of different organisational unit (internal) of the AF.


71

The completion process is to implement changes, which improve operational

capabilities (solving the problem). The LLS is supported by computer software at

all phases of process management, database management and dissemination of

experiences. The LLS personnel acuities and the DTC AF cell perform their tasks

based on the work plan for the year, which is draw from the Priority Research

Letters (created once a year and verified every six months).

The Priority List is approved by the Head of Research of the DTC AF. The

General Staff is reported to the DTC AF about proposals of research problems and

informed about all national and operational levels of MoD institutions. At the

operational level the Priority Analysis List is approved by the appropriate

operational level commander. The list is drawn up on the basis of observations and

proposals for research problems raised by internal units Command (Inspectorate

Headquarters) organisational units subordinate to the tactical level (including

sections' and specialists' experience) and senior managers. The way to implement

the identification of problems and experiences, and the implementation of remedial

programs specifies all structural elements, such as functional Operational

Commander of the AF and is supervised by the DTC AF.

The cooperation at the MoD level consists of four areas: a transformation

cooperation with the department for a proposals preparation in order to reach the

requirements of the Priority Analysis List (developed by the DTC AF); the DTC

AF cooperation with the stockholder of the project; as requested, a share of

information contained in the CBD AF LL Armed Forces; and as required, and use

of expert knowledge and the exchange of information on ongoing projects.

The Polish AF dedicated structure consists of three levels. At the strategic level

is the Dissemination Division of Applications and Experiences in the DTC AF. At

the operational level (Land Forces Command, Headquarters Air Force, Naval

Command, Special Forces Command, Operations Command, Inspectorate Support

of AF, Military Health Service Inspectorate, Military Police Headquarters) there

has been organised since 2008, a Branches and Departments Use of Experience. At

the tactical level in the initial period (2008-2010), is an almost not existent

dedicated structure of the AF LLS. Tasks resulting from the implementation of the

tasks in the AF LLS at the tactical level are carried out in departments responsible

for training.


72

Conclusion

At present The Polish Armed Forces are a leading player in the security system

for the construction site and the development of their intellectual potential.

Becomes justify continuation of this process to the next phase to create such

a platform for mutual cooperation of security entities, which will enable the fast

exchange of experiences and the implementation of all stakeholders, including the

military and non-military.

With respect to our country it is very important, that despite the many projects

involving the Polish system, still the use of experience differs from the standards

experienced by more experienced countries, although the analysis shows that the

use of the implemented Polish system already shows dividends. Also, the economic

crisis that gripped our country, means that the resources devoted to security are

unfortunately limited. Hence, building the National LLS, which in itself does not

require large amounts of money, and, under the requirements of today's global

political realities must find support among the decision-makers in whose favour it

will operate. It is also necessary to further modernise, and as the present needs of

the development of new procedures, mechanisms and tools that will enable a more

efficient use of knowledge in strengthening the security of Poland and its citizens.

Each system, including even the best acting in the national security community

has a certain amount of chaos. Hence, the need for an overarching structure for the

coordination of interaction processes, which therefore can be more effectively used

by the leading security policy.

And the meaning of Experience Exploitation System (SWD) is best illustrated

by comparing it to one of the many links in the chain called "the Polish security"

while observing the rule paraphrased William James, "a chain is only as strong as

its weakest link ...". Therefore, in the interest of every citizen of our country it

should be that SWD, as one of the many links of the national security system, gets

stronger.

However, even the greatest knowledge management systems, which have the

largest current information processing capabilities and the best performance

indicators are virtually useless if they are not sufficiently reliable. Even the best

system, if it has cyclical failures, is worse than the one that works reliably,

although it is inferior in terms of performance. Specific requirements for a system

involving the use of experience, working for national security, should be based

primarily on well-designed knowledge management processes.

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ANDRZEJ ZAPAŁOWSKI

74

CHALLENGES TO THE SECURITY OF

POLAND RELATED WITH THE

REGIONALIZATION OF UKRAINE

Andrzej ZAPAŁOWSKI, Ph.D. Uniwersytet Rzeszowski

Abstract

The article discusses the relevant safety of the Polish political and social conditions in

Ukraine, which may significantly increase the instability in Central Europe in the near

future.

At the moment, Poland, as in the past, being kind of the geopolitical lock limiting

Russia’s influence to Central and Eastern Europe, is particularly vulnerable to various

measures.

Russia, in deliberately and consciously way, is rebuilding its empire to establish the

privileged position in Eastern Europe. The current Kremlin’s actions are slightly alarming,

since they are taking place in the time when the NATO and the European Union, on which

the Polish fundamentally security is based, are becoming weaker.

Taking into consideration the rapidly changing situation by the Eastern Polish Border,

there are necessary actions to take, which will redefine the policy of the Polish National

Security as well as by influencing the European Union and the NATO, will allow us to

maintain our position in Central Europe

In the face of varying international situation, it is required to change the essential

establishment of the National Security Strategy in favor to Poland.

Key words – security, Poland, Ukraine One of the paradigms of security is predictability and surprise, as well as the

constant variability of the geopolitical conditions, especially in the regions with highly variable borders. There are no stable states, no stable alliances, no durable strategies, especially in terms of the geopolitical conditions of Poland. In this case, the issue of adapting the Polish security strategy to those changing conditions is of crucial importance.

Apart from the Balkans, it is mainly Central-Eastern Europe that has been the area in Europe with many changes in borders over the last two hundred years. The purpose of this article is to present the main challenges related with the possible


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changes of the internal situation in Ukraine, and their influence on the state of Polish security in terms of the strategic shield1.

The text below constitutes a general analysis of the geopolitical situation in Ukraine, and indicates the possible scenarios for the development of the situation in that country. Naturally, the most favourable situation for Polish security would be the maintenance of the current state and territorial structure of Ukraine. However, Polish state interests require that the suitable steps related with state security are taken on the basis of the possible, and in some cases – probable, scenarios of events in Ukraine.

A shift in the geopolitics of security in Eastern Europe After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and later – after Poland joined, in

institutional terms, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the geography of international security in Eastern Europe changed. The decisive moment for the loss of the superpower position of Russia was when Belarus, and especially Ukraine, became liberated from under its direct supremacy. For Poland, the appearance of new states on one hand created an area in the east that would provide the long-expected strategic shield, and on the other – forced the responsible support of the new state on its way to independent existence. Thus, the geopolitical situation of Warsaw changed over a very short period of time. Poland was forced to actively participate in the construction of the new mass security system in Europe, especially through the process of reorienting the main political and military alliances, and on the other hand – to participate in strengthening the process of stabilization in independent Ukraine, which at that time was a nuclear power.

For Poland, similarly to the majority of states in the world, the independence referendum of 1991 was a big surprise2. The fact that the majority of the society, consisting of many nations and largely using the Russian language, was in favour of independence for Ukraine, demonstrated the internal separatist tendencies of that region inhabited by about twelve million ethnic Russians, inside the Soviet Union.

1 The strategic shield refers to military and non-military undertakings and includes the operation

performed constantly during both periods of peace and crisis as security against surprise attacks and other forms of violence [quoted from:] R. Jakubczak, J. Marczak, K. Gąsiorek, Założenia polityki i

strategii bezpieczeństwa narodowego [Assumptions of the national security policy and strategy.] [in:] Podstawy bezpieczeństwa narodowego Polski w erze globalizacji [The fundaments of the Polish

national security in the era of globalization] , Warsaw 2008, p. 130. 2 84.18% of the citizens of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic took part in the referendum of

1 December 1991. 90.32% of the votes were for independence. The Crimea was the only place where the percentage of the “for” votes was different from the Ukrainian average – it was 54.19%.

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This also demonstrated the first tendencies of division inside the new state organism in the form of the independence of the Crimea3.

The significant error, of the then world leaders, was the assumption that those tendencies constituted the intention of isolating a new social organism, a kind of society for which the Ukrainian identity was the chance to establish an independent state structure that would identify itself more through the Ukrainian state than through its Ukrainian ethnicity. The perspective of the Ukrainian state in the minds of its respective parts, was underestimated. What is more, for the Ukrainian politicians the state self-identification was confronted with the national self-identification (with its main headquarters in western Ukraine). With the passing of time, that inconsistency came to fruition causing a situation when several million Ukrainians from the western regions took up an impossible task, i.e. on one hand, to nationalize the Ukrainians from central Ukraine by implementing the tradition of the Cossacks into its catalogue of Ukrainian identity, and on the other – “to convert” about twelve million Russians in the east and south to ethnic Ukrainian identity. The demographic, economic, and especially cultural potential of the Ukrainians from the west did not allow that concept to win, because it was not possible to implement it over several decades. Also the historical and identity-related experiences, especially related with the legacy of the first half of 20th century, played a significant role.

Another mistake that caused a situation of instability in Ukraine was when the United States and the Western European countries entered the struggle for political and economic influence which, especially after the expansion of NATO in 1999, was interpreted by Russia as the attempt to restore a military block in Ukraine which would downgrade the position of Moscow as a significant participant in global political relationships. We did not have to wait long until Russia undertook countermeasures. The use of the energy-political threat became an inherent part of the expectations of the Russian minority and of the Russian-speaking society which was downgraded to the level of a russified social group by the new personnel mainly from western Ukraine. Moreover, Russia gave the chance to cooperate in its new economy to the new group of oligarchs from the eastern regions of that country, giving them a certain guarantee of establishing their own capital groups through the privatized main sectors of Ukrainian economy. For Russia it was a guarantee of maintaining significant influences in most areas of Ukraine. What is more, Kiev’s policy to maintain proportional relationships with NATO and Russia, prolonged for two decades, resulted in larger divisions in the society of the former Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Instead of integrating the society on the basis of the historical and cultural values important for both groups, the state allowed, and often participated in, the designation of new areas of division.

3 The autonomy of that region was proclaimed in 1991. In view of the risk of secession, the

Ukrainian authorities consented to the autonomy proclaimed on 5 May 1992 and granted the republic the status of an autonomous region.


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Another factor that had a negative influence on the deregulation of the social situation in Ukraine, was the influence of the diaspora, usually Canadian Diaspora which tried to introduce in Ukraine, through various circles in that country, the various ideas which had lost currency while confronted with the reality of a few decades years earlier. That state and formative anachronism resulted in deepened divisions in reference to the World War II tradition which is crucial for Ukrainian society, which actually resulted in the establishment of a political and territorial organism that had not been known in the history of the Ukrainian statehood. It is mainly the attitude of the western regions of Ukraine to the tradition of the “Patriotic War” which was identified as the beginning of the occupation of Ukraine by the Soviet military. That state resulted in a situation when, in popular opinion, at least twelve million Ukrainian citizens actually became the society identified with the hated Soviet invader. This division gave birth to new divisions, especially political ones. For millions of Russian-speaking Ukrainians outside the cultural magnet, Russia became not only a natural ally, but mainly an important political centre in the world, which centre stood up for the cultural values of that community, while at the same time their own country became increasingly foreign.

A change of the geostrategic order in Eastern Europe at the beginning

of 21st century

At present Poland, just like in the past, is especially exposed to various

activities resulting from the fact that it constitutes a geopolitical threshold for Russia, which reduces the influences of that state in Central and Eastern Europe. At present Russia continues to dismiss the principles and values of Latin civilization, as the main quality of its international politics, especially in the situation when the fight for status and spheres of influence has become again the main issue of international politics. Russia reconstructs the Russian empire consciously and with premeditation, and wants to hold a privileged position in Eastern Europe. It continues to strive to recover the position that was once exceptional in that part of Europe over the last few centuries. Moscow’s main aim in Eastern Europe is at least to convert that area into a neutral strategic zone.

The present activities of the Kremlin are very alarming, because they occur in a period when the NATO and the European Union, on which Polish security is based, are becoming weaker. The main EU states, among others Germany and Great Britain, cut expenditure on their military. Last year Germany changed its military strategy and the priorities of its armed forces4. What is more NATO,

4 J. Gotkowska, Bundeswehra 3.0 polityczny, wojskowy i społeczny wymiar reformy sił

zbrojnych RFN [Bundeswehra 3.0, the political, military and social dimension of the reform of the military forces of the FRG], Centre for Eastern Studies, Punkt Widzenia No. 28, Warsaw, May 2012.

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without the crucial logistics and military engagement of the United States, is not able to perform a large military operation.

After 1990 the main expression of Polish efforts in the international arena was the issue of entering NATO and the European Union. That main basic direction of the Polish activities, related with security, has been visible until today in the State Security Strategy5, in which the guarantee of state security is mainly contingent upon the defence capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while the domestic defensive potential plays only a secondary role. That assumption is completely wrong from the point of view of Polish national interests and demonstrates that the potential threats to state security are not realistically addressed by the authors of that document. What follows from it has far-reaching consequences in the form of the operating plans of the Polish Armed Forces that are disproportionate (limited) in comparison with the threats6.

Currently, the activities aimed at gaining certain influence over the specific areas or regions in the world are performed through various methods. They include, for example: a quasi-war (e.g. Afghanistan), economic activities (e.g. Greece), influencing and creating the attitudes of the border communities (e.g. eastern Ukraine), psychological activities (e.g. the repeated referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland), activities in cyberspace (e.g. an attack on the Estonian government servers in 20077). A very interesting tendency in that regard was noted by General Rupert Smith who stated that: “… at present we are living in a completely new era of conflicts – maybe even a new paradigm – which I describe as “the war among civilians”, that is a war which addresses both political and military issues”8.

In the current geostrategic conditions of European security, Poland continues to play the role of an important threshold in Central and Eastern Europe. The threshold which, through its membership in NATO and the EU, successfully blocks the dissemination of Russian influences in Central Europe. The effectiveness of those activities in the future will condition the maintenance of the EU’s economic position at the current level and the cohesion of NATO in terms of its defensive

5 Domestic Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw 2007. 6 R. Jakubczak, K. Gąsiorek, H. M. Królikowski, J. Marczak, Działania nieregularne. Element

strategii bezpieczeństwa narodowego Polski [Irregular activities. The element of the Polish national

security strategy], Warsaw 2011, pp. 285-291; R. Jakubczak, J. Marczak, Obrona Terytorialna

Polski na progu XXI w. [The Territorial Defense of Poland at the beginning of the 21st century], Warsaw 1998, pp. 221-224; J. Marczak, Strategiczna ocena działań zmierzających do zniesienia

powszechnej obowiązkowej służby wojskowej w Polsce w 2008 r.[The strategic assessment of the

activities aimed at abolishing the obligatory military service in Poland] [in:] Podstawy

bezpieczeństwa narodowego… [The basics of national security…], appendix 13. 7 K. Popławski, Kiedy science fiction staje się życiem [When science fiction becomes real] [in:]

Nowa Europa Wschodnia No. 3-4/2012, pp. 46-51. 8 R. Smith, Przydatność siły militarnej. Sztuka wojenna we współczesnym świecie [The

usefullness of the military force. The art of war in the modern world.], Warsaw 2010, p.16.


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potential, and through that – the maintenance of a high level of displacement of other parties in the region.

The current situation of Poland and its function for European security seems to be more and more complicated. It is influenced on one hand by our engagement in the Eastern Partnership, and on the other – by the Russian efforts to recover its crucial position in Ukraine. Although Vladimir Putin devoted the first two terms of his presidency to recovering economic power, he is currently striving to recover political influences on the area of the former Soviet Union9.

One of the aims of the reintegration of the mentioned area is the construction of a Eurasian Union, which is highly probable for Russia in political and economic terms. For Russia, the country that constituted a civilization on its own and which wanted to maintain an actual influence on its gigantic territory (the territory being a peculiar demographic desert), the acquisition of stable influences in the area of Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, has been a strategic purpose10.

The problem of many politicians and people dealing with international security is that they perceive Russia and the Asian countries through the European system of values and culture, which used to be the dominant element of international relations over the previous centuries when the old continent was the centre of the world in terms of economy and culture. At present, with the declining position of Europe, the economic influences of the world have shifted towards Asia. However, from the previous century, when it used to be a power, Europe retained its rhetoric and a peculiar manner of “instructing” the world.

What has been an increasingly visible aim of Moscow politics in Europe is, apart from the political reintegration of the former Soviet republics, the recovery of Russian influence in Central Europe, whether those countries are members of NATO or not. Naturally, the effectiveness of that policy requires a limited consent from the USA.

Poland plays a special role in Russia’s plans by attempting to neutralize Russian influence in Eastern Europe. Moscow realizes what the position of Poland in Europe is, despite its small military potential. The main aim is to establish strong economic relations with European countries so as to not let Russia penetrate the Polish market in an extensive manner.

The threat of a conflict inside Europe in the foreseeable future is slim, with the exception of the Balkan states. Russia may not count on such a scenario. Francis Fukujama11 is party correct by saying that there will be no wars between the states with stabilized, liberal political systems. He formulated an opinion that the democratic processes which take place in states with market economies, preclude

9 The leading representatives of that trend in the Russian geopolitics are professors Alexandr Dugin (originator of the concept of the current Eurasian movement) and Sergey Karaganov (originator of the Union of Europe and Russia).

10 L. Sawin, Renesans eurazjatyzmu [The renaissance of Eurasianism], Geopolityka No. 6 (9) 2011, pp. 2-8.

11 F. Fukujama, Koniec historii [End of History], Poznań 2000.

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war. According to the author, that opinion is correct only in reference to the states of the so-called old Europe. It does not refer to the European countries with fresh democracy and changing borders, at least in terms of the last two hundred years. The fight for spheres of influence and for shifting them has reappeared precisely on the areas where the borders kept changing in the 19th and 20th century. Naturally, for now this conflict has demonstrated itself as slight economic and social changes.

By restoring its position in the world, Moscow will aim to have its influences secured at its western borders. The scope of its policy of confrontation outside the area of former Soviet republics, will be limited.

The whole picture is complicated by the changing American strategies and priorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. During the meeting in Lisbon in November 2010, the NATO member states adopted a new strategy that stated that Russia’s position is significant in terms of consultations related with the construction of new weapon systems, especially the anti-missile defence system of the NATO12. As Bolesław Balcerowicz stated, that document is the result of from many compromises, and compromise is its trademark13.

The significance of article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in the above strategy has a realistic meaning only if the societies of the NATO states are willing to implement it. As early as during the Russian-Georgian war, the then prime minister of the Netherlands stated publically that if Georgia belonged to NATO, that state would not have met the treaty obligations. A similar statement was made then by the leader of the liberal fraction in the European Parliament – Cohn-Bendit. Taking the above precedential statements into account, it must be emphasized that the best guarantee of security for Poland, the guarantee that article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty will be fulfilled, has been provided by the United States, if we assume that our country would be significant for the American interests in this part of the world at the precise moment.

The current decrease of the security guarantees from the USA for the European members of NATO, including Poland, has been influenced by the American Domestic Defense Strategy14 amended in January 2012. A significant element of that strategy is the clear change of the priorities related with the USA’s security as regards the decrease of the military presence in Europe in favour of its increase in Asia. These activities are related with the significant increase in the military potential of China and India. That change has a very particular significance for Europe. About 10,000 American soldiers will leave Europe, and the units that will stay on the old continent will mainly perform logistic tasks for the American troops

12 Koncepcja strategiczna obrony i bezpieczeństwa członków organizacji Traktatu

Północnoatlantyckiego, przyjęta przez szefów państw i rządów w Lizbonie [The Strategic Concept for

the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization adopted by Heads

of State and Government In Lisbon] [in:] Rocznik Strategiczny 2010/2011, Warsaw 2011, pp. 23-33. 13 B. Balcerowicz, Koncepcja strategiczna NATO 2010. Wymiar wojskowy [The 2010 NATO Strategic

Concept. The Military Dimension] [in:] Rocznik Strategiczny 2010/2011, Warsaw 2011, p. 46. 14 http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf


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stationed in the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan. And so, Europe will be devoid of significant operational American troops, which confirms the argument that the continent has ceased to be a priority for the USA.

The second guarantee of security for Poland, i.e. the European Union, has not been able, despite its efforts, to establish the announced 100 thousand-strong army. It is not even able to perform large operations outside Europe independently. And so, the military component of that organization does not play a crucial role in the military security of Poland. The only significant role is played by the political dimension of the participation in the EU, due to the fact that our country entered the area of influence of the old Europe. For France, Spain or Italy influence in the Mediterranean Sea is more important than in Eastern Europe. What is more, the majority of the countries of the old EU continue to decrease their spendings on defence, which makes them review the main areas of their previous national interests in favour of Africa, and the alliance solutions are becoming for them less and less important. Besides, for several years France and Germany have been communicating individually with Russia with regard to security issues15.

At present, the EU countries, with their half a billion citizens, would not be able to achieve even 30% of what the American military could. That demonstrates the actual picture of the military position of the old continent in the world. Russia, an area four times smaller, with an economy which is backward in comparison with that of the EU, is more important in terms of security in the world, than the EU.

An important premise that has changed the position of Warsaw on the map of the global security system, has been a shift in the American approach to partnership with Russia. Currently Moscow seems to be a significant and desirable partner for the USA in Asia (the issue of China or North Korea). It seems that the weakened activeness of the USA in Eastern Europe has resulted from the American political elites acknowledging the defeat of the Washington policy in that part of the world and allowing for Russia to have more influence in the post-Soviet area. In a way, this is the price that satisfies Moscow in exchange for cooperation between the USA and Russia in Asia.

Challenges to the security of Poland in the east In the light of changes in the current system of European security, there arises

a question of what is the most sensitive direction for Polish military security. The issue of Kaliningrad has had a crucial role. Although from the operational point of view the area of Kaliningrad is too small to pose a threat for the whole Polish state, together with Belarus it continues to remain a real, not to say deadly, threat for Poland. If we take into account the potential of the new initiative in the form of

15 Polityka zagraniczna Polski w trudnym roku 2010 [Poland's foreign policy in the difficult year

2010] [in:] Rocznik Strategiczny 2010/2011, p. 310.

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a Eurasian Union, headed by Russia and Kazakhstan, and in the future – maybe also by Ukraine, the situation will occur to be of vital importance for Poland.

Another element significant to the security of Poland has been the issue of Ukraine. In the short term, a significant threat to state security may appear from that direction, although not a threat to its existence. Why? Kaliningrad is a region of Russia, and so long as the current system of security in the world is not broken, there exists no direct military threat from it. Currently Belarus does not pose a military threat, not only due to the military potential of that state, but mainly due to the fact that the foreign policy and military forces of that country are controlled by Moscow.

The question arises of what might happen in Ukraine in the foreseeable future that would influence the security of our country. While analyzing the situation in that region, we should pay attention to the processes which have been occurring in that state for several years.

Firstly, there is a distinct outline of division lines and an emphasized lack of historical identity in the state as a whole within today’s borders. In the area of today’s Ukraine, there has never existed a political organism with a capital city in Kiev. Currently, that state is inhabited by a number of ethnic Russians, mainly living in eastern and southern Ukraine, comparable with the number of the Galician Ukrainians living in three or four regions in the west, with a distinct national identity.

Therefore, there exists a clear influence from Russia in political, spiritual and social issues in eastern and southern Ukraine. It is an area of several hundred thousand square kilometres, and the number of citizens comparable to an average European state.

A significant mistake from the European and American politicians and strategists, has been to treat the entire Ukrainian state as an area in which the mentality and civilization conditionings of the population may be changed. Currently Europe has problems with much bigger communities striving for the autonomy of their regions, and ignoring such processes in Ukraine constitutes a fundamental strategic mistake.

At present, any talks about Ukraine without Russia and the authorities of the pro-Russian Party of Regions (whether it is in power or not) are doomed to fail, because it is an area which, according to most Russians, is a part of Russia located outside its administrative borderlines. For Russia, with its tragic demographic situation, the possibility to constantly use the dozen of millions of Russians in Ukraine, has been an issue of utmost importance for Russian security.

In Poland, politicians continue to be unaware of the capacity for Poland to influence the situation in Ukraine. Warsaw undertook (with support from the USA and some European countries) to shape the political situation in an area comparable to that of Poland (meaning eastern and southern Ukraine), inhabited by over 20 million people, mainly Russians. These politicians, driven by the old geolitical


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concepts of Intermarium16 or Giedroyc17 tried to use the Russian weakness and play for Ukraine, but in fact led to an influence of the Russians in that country.

Another mistake made by the Polish and Western politicians has been to perceive the western and eastern areas of Ukraine as similar communities. Although many geopoliticians underlined the civilization differences between the regions of this country and the lack of their internal cohesion, it seems that their output was not analyzed frequently enough. One of the authors who explicitly addressed the issue of the civilizational division of Ukraine was Samuel Huntington18 who emphasized the possibility of secession of Western Ukraine. According to him, it would only happen upon a definite deterioration of the relations between Western Europe and Russia, and as a result of tensions provoked by rivalizing parties. However, Huntington did not take into account the social tension which might appear from inside Western Ukraine, caused by a far-reaching integration of Ukraine and Russia. Earlier it was Feliks Konieczny19 who paid attention to the inability of two civilizations to coexist permanently in the area of one state (due to the lack of synthesis between civilizations). According to him, such coexistence will shortly lead to one party displacing the other, or to a dynamic conflict between them.

In the western provinces of Ukraine, such a process of “clash of civilizations” has been ongoing for some time now. What should be noted is that in that region, constituting about twelve percent of the area and inhabitants of Ukraine, the power is exercised by the politicians invoking a vision for Ukraine that’s completely different from the remaining areas of that country.

That situation signifies only that the Western political centres play a game for Ukraine through the communities with distinct anti-Russian attitudes, while the ideology on which those operations are based, is irrelevant. The question remains how will those communities behave in the case of a shift in European policy, mainly as regards the policy of NATO with regard to Russia. Will they continue to support the national communities in Ukraine and indirectly lead to a division of that state, thus creating a political and economic problem for themselves (such

16 Intermarium – the political idea promoted by the circles associated with Józef Piłsudski prior

to the I World War, which consisted in the establishment of a federation of the states of Central and Eastern Europe. Ultimately, Intermarium was to include the area between the Adriatic, Baltic and Black Seas, i.e.: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine, Czechslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Jugoslavia, and possibly Finland. The proposed federation was to refer to the Jagiellonioan traditions of the multicultural Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Piłsudski believed that that federation would help the Central European states to avoid the domination of Germany or Russia.

17 The koncept of Jerzy Giedroyc formulated in 1974 in the Parisian “Kultura” monthly magazine, where he presented the contept that the independence of Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus is a factor favourable to the independence of Poland, while the domination of those countries by Russia would pave the way to enslave also of Poland. After 1990 that concept became the guideline of the Polish policy towards Russia and the Eastern European states.

18 S.P. Huntington, Zderzenie cywilizacji [Clash of Civilizations], Warsaw 2006, p. 276. 19 F. Koneczny, Prawa dziejowe [Historical laws], Komorów 1997, pp. 237-260, 439.

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a state would have to be supported financially, just like Kosovo right now), or will they attempt to calm down the social moods in that part of Europe?

A problem appears in the form of the strong determination of the society of that region on its way towards secession. In western Ukraine it is not only some Galician Ukrainians that strive for a distinct character or autonomy for their region. There is also the issue of the Carpatho-Rusyns who have strived for autonomy for their region and who have considered themselves largely as a nation distinct from the Ukrainians20. There is a problem of the autonomy of Romanians and Hungarians. In the Chernivtsi Oblast, as many as 50 thousand citizens have Romanian citizenship, while in the Berehove region 76% of citizens are Hungarians, and the regional council adopted the national anthem of Hungary as the anthem of the self-government authority21.

Another area of confrontation has been the issue of the Supreme Council of Ukraine outvoting the right to use a regional language in the areas inhabited by at least 10% of national minorities. Under the new statute, Russian language would become the regional language of 13 out of 27 regions of Ukraine, including in Kiev and Sevastopol. The Crimean Tatar (Crimean) language would become the regional language in the Crimea, the Hungarian language – in the Zakarpattia Oblast, and Romanian – in Chernivtsi Oblast. The current language confrontation is one of the main social catalysts in Ukraine. Professor Roman Szporluk from Harvard was correct to state that: “millions of people who consider Russian to be their language, voted for independence on 1 December 1991. Taking that into account, the citizens whose mother tongue is Ukrainian, have a special political and moral obligation towards them. If we take that into consideration, if we treat the population as two parts – the “leading” part and the “national minorities”, we will face quickly the perspective of the territorial and ethnic disintegration of Ukraine. (…) Thus, the fact that the Ukrainian nation is bilingual needs to be taken into account while establishing a state. (…) The easiest way to destroy Ukraine is to start the ukrainization of the non-Ukrainian citizens. The biggest threat to an independent Ukraine is posed by language fanatics”22. That voice of reason not only in reference to the language act, but also in reference to the attempt to ukrainize the national minorities, has been a fundamental problem on which the future of Ukraine will depend. Either the actual state in the form of various traditions and cultures of the respective regions will be sanctioned, or the process of disintegration of Ukraine will start.

20 Rusini nie chcą Ukrainy [The Rusyns do not want Ukraine], www.konserwatyzm.pl [21

December 2011] 21 Mały krok do Wielkich Węgier [A small step towards the Great Hungary],

http://www.kresy.pl/publicystyka,wydarzenia-tygodnia?zobacz%2Fmaly-krok-do-wielkich-wegier&fb_source=message [2012-04-13]

22 "Wojna słów" na Ukrainie [„A war of the words In Ukraine”], http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/wojna-slow-na-ukrainie,1,5182570,wiadomosc.html [7 VII 2012]


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In the presented situation, that part of Ukraine has the potential for an ethnic-based conflict destabilizing the situation in that part of Europe, and the dynamic course of that process may result in a lack of stability in south-eastern Poland (refugees). Moreover, the mentioned area may be negatively affected by the Russian army stationed in Transnistria.

Having analyzed the above situation, all the facts indicate that it is Russia, and not Europe, who has the key to the decisions concerning the future of Ukraine. For Moscow there exist two fundamental solutions. The first one is striving to take control over the whole of Ukraine and to pacify the western regions of Ukraine through economic and administrative methods. The second one – making the decision to regionalize them, on the basis of the Crimean casus, with a separate parliament, and transforming Ukraine into a federal state at first, and then, over the next few years, pushing that region out of the federation and towards its independence. Naturally, there exists a third scenario which is highly unlikely. The eastern and southern lands of the current Ukraine are annexed to Russia, while western and Central Ukraine form a joint state23. That scenario is highly unlikely for two reasons. First, such operations would provide a precedent in Europe in the form of annexation by a superpower of part of the territory of a weaker neighbour, which certainly would invoke resistance from the international community, and second – Russia would not allow the nationalist trends, with clear anti-Russian attitudes, to move east, as that might pose a threat of loss of influences in that area.

The first two scenarios are very dangerous for Poland and its national security. In the case of the first scenario, practically the entire eastern border of Poland would constitute a border with the Russian area of influence (the Belarussian and Ukrainian states certainly would remain on the map of the world). Therefore, Poland would be susceptible to tensions stimulated by Moscow, and would lose its economic activity areas because of negative relationships with Russia. In the

23 Such a vision was presented by Volodymyr Horbulin and Alexander Lytwynenko (the former

experts of the Ukrainian Council of National Security and Defense) who published their conjectures in an opinion-forming weekly magazine "Dzerkało Tyżnia". According to them, the vision of a protectorate, and then of division of the country into three, is realistic. They emphasize that the concept of Russia’s foreign policy and its National Security Strategy include clear expressions associated with Russian interests in Ukraine. They refer to prevention of Ukraine becoming a member of NATO and to “defending the interests of the Russian-speaking community”, i.e. making Ukraine stay in the Russian sphere of influences and privileged interests. According to those experts, the preservation of the territorial unity of Ukraine is dependent on whether it will adopt “special relations” with the Russian Federation, i.e. if it will assume Russian patronage. The analysts also stated that the establishment of a protectorate is not necessarily the ultimate aim for Moscow. Maybe it would only be a transition stage before the further division of Ukraine, probably into three parts, in accordance with the model published (probably by the Russian intelligence services) in the Italian geopolitical magazine “Limes”. That partitioning would look as follows: the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine would be annexed to Russia, central Ukraine would be governed by a puppet government, while the western part of the country, as the “main violator of the peace” would be completely isolated [quoted after:] http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/boja-sie-ze-rosja-podzieli-ukraine-na-trzy-czesci, 109489.html [2009-09-19]

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second scenario, Poland would border the West-Ukrainian state with a pauperized society, with a claim-based and nationalist attitude to its surroundings and susceptible to provocations threatening the stability of the borderline areas.

We should ask a question of whether in Ukraine, including the western regions, there is a sufficient potential and social determination to perform the aforementioned scenarios. Observing the publications of intellectuals from Lviv, it seems that yes (Jarosław Hrycak24, Mykoła Rabczuk25 Wasyl Rasewycz26, Wołodymir Pawliw27 or even Marian Mudryj28). These authors draw attention to the fact that the culture of Galician Ukraininans mixes with Cossack and Russian socities. The only possibility of maintaining the identity of western Ukraine is autonomy.

The problem of reaching the “Galician autonomy” relies on the issue of how to achieve it - as in Czechoslovakia in 1993 or Yugoslavia. Parliamentary voting in autumn 2012 might be helpful to answer this question. It depends which way Ukraine will choose and which way Russia will lead it.

The changes which were brought about on 08 June 2012 i.e. establishing the new Strategy of National Security of Ukraine entitled “Ukraine in the world which changes” and Military Doctrine, significantly influenced and defined Ukrainian policy as the policy of beyond blocking.29 The president of Ukraine, signing the aforementioned document fulfilled the expectations of Moscow in the form of Ukraine’s resignation from becoming a member of NATO. He has shown that national security policy is of secondary importance. This state is reflected in the current condition of the Ukrainian army which in size is comparable to the Polish army and has approximately 130 thousand soldiers. However, with reference to military equipment and its usefulness, the Ukrainian army is in deep crisis. Within the last three years, Ukraine spent more than two times less money on defence than Poland i.e. 0.8 % of GDP.30 In the current budgetary year, there is visible a slight increase of expenditures, mainly for repairs of military equipment.

24 ederation –chance for Ukraine, www.zaxid.net [22 I 2011] 26 Ukraine as a second Ulster, http://www.easternpartnership.org/community/interview/ukraine-

second-ulster [20 IX 2011] 26 Federalisation: challanges and threats,

http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?federalizatsiya_vikliki_i_riziki&objectId=1256477 [1 VI 2012]

27 Ukraine -Galicia at the crossroads: between the impossible and undesired, http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?galitske_perehrestya_mizh_nemozhlivim_i_nebazhanim&objectId=1256057 [27 V 2012]

28 Ukraininan Piedmont has always been Kiev, http://geopolityka.net/ukrainskim-piemontem-zawsze-byl-kijow/, http://www.chasipodii.net/article/9937/ [3 V 2012]

29 President Janukovic defines the vision of the security of Ukraine, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2012-06-13/prezydent-janukowycz-okresla-wizje-bezpieczenstwa-ukrainy [22 VI 2012]

30 http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20120125/170941238.html [2 VII 2012]; Anna Dudek states that expenditures on military purposes as the percentage of GDP for Ukraine in 2009 as 2.9% [in:] Strategic Annual 2011/2012, Warsaw 2012, p. 414. However, according to the Centre of Eastern Studies in the years 2005-2008, the real ratio of expenditures on defence in Ukrainian GDP decreased


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For Janukovic, the guarantor of military security is Russia, he only cares for internal security. In February 2012, the opposition blamed the president for putting a son in law of a former vice prime-minister of Russia into the position of Minister of Defence; the person had gained citizenship in 2005, he was Russian formerly.31 With reference to the problems with security, Kiev underlines short-term real threats i.e. existence of quasi states on independent territories and precedences of acknowledging their sovereignty (in relation to separatist tendencies), an increase in rivalry for access to natural resources and control of the routes of their delivery. In a regional dimension, the main threats rely on activation of processes for creating so called impact zones, threats of the preventive use of military forces and an increase in the militarisation of the region. The factors that directly threaten the defence of Ukraine were an unregulated conflict in Transnistria, the issue of dividing the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait, as well as the lack of the demarcation of the national border with Russia, Belarussia and Moldavia and unregulated issues connected with the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet.32

At present, the guarantors of the independence of Ukraine are mainly oligarchs, as they have a significant influence on the parliament and the government. These oligarchs care for not being in the common national body i.e. Russia as they would lose their position of influencing politics and would be subject to the Kremlin.

Assessing the Polish politics in the East, the state of failure is noticeable. Poland was to be connected with Ukraine by strategic partnership. However, after two decades, we have slight economic influence and limited political cooperation. We are almost absent, both culturally and scientifically. This has been a failure of all subsequent governments.

Conclusions for Polish policy and security strategy Keeping in mind the dynamically changing situation on the eastern borders of

Poland, it is vital for Poland to redefine its national security policy as well as actively influence the EU and NATO in the scope of maintaining a presence in Central Europe. Russia in its relations with NATO still differentiates the rights to security of “old” and “new” members of the pact.33. Command of NATO belongs to “old” members of the Treaty.

from 1.3% to 0.99% (in accordance with assumptions of the programme of reforming military forces in 2005, Ukraine was to spend 2% GDP) [in:] N. Orłowska-Chyż, PGradual degradation of

Ukrainian army, Week in the East of 14.10.2009 31 S. Matuszak, Ukraine [in:] New Eastern Europe no. 3-4 /2012, p. 16. 32 President Janukovic defines the vision of the security of Ukraine,

http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2012-06-13/prezydent-janukowycz-okresla-wizje-bezpieczenstwa-ukrainy [22 VI 2012]

33 A.D. Rotfeld, NATO summit in Lizbon: what next? [in:] Strategic Annual 2010/2011, Warsaw 2011, p. 36.

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For Poland, due to the changing situation, it is required to change significant assumptions of the National Security Strategy, connected with the long lasting process of the decomposition of the security institutions which are significant for collective security. It is mainly about the gradual withdrawal of the USA from Europe and the weakening, at the same time, of the structure of collective deterrence and the European Union suffering from a deep crisis. This situation requires cooperation with the USA beyond NATO in the field of security with the possibility of placing several US garrisons in Poland.

Another indispensible step is the implementation of Poland’s own, national structure of deterrence by means of common Territorial Defence and maintaining operating troops at the same level. The common self-defence of citizens utilising both government and non-governmental forms of security organisations constitutes the essence of modern, common, national security of a democratic and independent Poland which would be an answer to the challenges from the East.

It is indispensible to prepare structures of the state for the possible changes of the internal situation in Ukraine with reference to new scenarios in the development of the internal situation. Assuming the scenario of the decomposition of Ukraine in the form of its regionalisation or secession of some of the regions, much emigration or even “escapes” may by anticipated, which may undoubtedly influence the internal situation in Poland. It must be remembered that in western Ukraine, there are descendants of the people which were forced to emigrate after the Second World War. Mass emigration of these people into the territory of Podkarpacie or Lubelskie may have an unfavourable influence in the form of vulnerability to the national destabilisation of the border area.

In case of the political and social conflict in Ukraine, Poland should be neutral and not support any party. For Warsaw, the partner shall be the centre of legal and real power in Kiev. Experiences of Poland’s engagement in the Orange Revolution are a significant experience of political and economic losses and profits where Poland suffered significant economic losses.

An important action in the scope of regional security is to assume proper actions aimed at finding possibilities of creating local economic and political partnership in the form of the Kaliningrad Triangle i.e. the cooperation axis: Berlin-Warsaw-Moscow, which would stabilise the situation in Eastern Europe and constitute an element of a strategic shield for Poland. Tightening international cooperation in this capacity, especially in connection with a growing number of border threats (nuclear power stations, floods, illegal migration, organised crime), forces a necessity of broad cooperation, including aid, in the scope of security, creating durable institutions and procedures of neighbourhood cooperation.

Poland should increase economic cooperation with Far Eastern and Central African countries as an element of the diversification of the economic security of Poland, as well as undertake further actions for the benefit of the diversification of directions and sources of gaining energetic resources.


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In summary, we are dealing with a situation in which the United States is profoundly limiting its presence in Europe; the European Union, due to its deep economic crisis is not a significant guarantor in the field of security, Russia is re-establishing influences in the territory of post-soviet republics; and Poland, in its basic assumptions, is still attached to geopolitical concepts from over 20 years ago, not to say over 100 years ago.

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FIRE SUPPORT – AN INTEGRAL PART OF

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONS

Col. Tomasz RUBAJ, D.Sc. National Defence University

Abstract

The paper presents the essence, the general conditions and components (subsystems) of

the joint fire support. It was noted that the need of conducting of joint fire support, due to

the complexity of the contemporary operating environment and decentralization of

operations, are also more and more present at the tactical level, the lowest level

of command. The general structure of joint fire support and within it a brief description of

fire support participants was presented. The needs for coordination and synchronization,

resulting in the integration of three main areas of the joint fire support: reconnaissance,

command and control and effectors/delivering platforms from different components

(operating in different operating environments) has been indicated.

The importance and responsibility for planning and integration of joint fire support

with warfighting and joint functions was also discussed. In this scope, article is limited only

to illustrate the need of integration of fire and fire support with maneuver – as integration

of two complementary functions. In conclusion author pointed out the expanding and

evolving nature of the engagement and influence (encompassing fires and effects), which

increasingly affects not only the physical plane, but also takes place in the sphere of non-

physical activities (cognitive plane/domain), and is caused by the needs of the present and

expected in the nearest future operating environment.

Key words – Fires, Support, Fire Support, Joint Fire Support

“The beginning of wisdom is calling things by their right

names”.

Confucius

As was stated in the ancient quotation above, the first basic problem to define

and explain is terminology. Analyses of foreign sources leads to the a` priori con-

ART OF WAR


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clusion that the starting point for consideration should be fire. Fire as one of the elements of combat power (warfighting functions at the tactical and the joint func-tions at the operational level) was and still remains an omnipresent factor in com-manders' hands and allows them to have an influence on the outcome of battles, operations and campaigns.

It ought to underlined, that there is an analogy with our national war art be-cause in the theory of fire support, fire is the basic term and includes other classifi-cations including direct fire, indirect fire, operational fire etc.

Fire is defined as the use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. All fire is normally synchronised and integrated to achieve synergistic results. Fire can be delivered by air, land, maritime, or special operations forces (SOF)1. In the definition presented above the environmental

criteria has been introduced and fire is produced by various assets operating in an air, land and maritime environment – as part of a Joint Operations Area (JOA).

According to other sources fire is produced during the employment of forces from two or more components (component/service criteria) in a coordinated ac-tion to produce desired effects in support of a common objective – in this case fires is called Joint Fires (JF)2. When fires/joint fires assist air, land, maritime, and SOF to move, manoeuvre, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters are called Fire Support/Joint Fire Support (JFS).

The most common definition presented in various sources treat Fire sup-port/Joint Fire Support as the collective and coordinated use of the fire of land and sea based indirect fire systems, armed aircraft, aviation, electronic warfare and non-lethal munitions against ground targets to support combat operations at both the operational and tactical levels3. FS/JFS is the integration of fire and effects to delay, disrupt or destroy enemy forces, combat functions, and facilities in pursuit of operational or tactical objectives. It shatters the enemy’s cohesion and under-mines his will to fight. The inherent flexibility of fire support allows it to bring fire to bear in deep, close and rear operations – in a geographical dimension or in shap-ing, decisive and sustaining operations – in order to provide and effect dimension, if necessary simultaneously. It is therefore essential that it is integrated fully into the operational plan. It must be synchronised with other battlespace activities in terms of time, space and purpose to achieve the optimum concentration of force. Target priorities and engagement criteria must be established and fire support used aggressively, in concert with ISTAR systems capable of acquiring targets and car-rying out battle damage assessment.

1 Joint Fire Support, JP-3.09, Joint Chief of Staff, 2010. 2 Fires applied during the employment of forces from two or more components, in coordinated

action toward a common objective, AAP-6, NATO glossary of terms and definitions, NSA, Brussels 2011, p. 2-J-1. There is an analogy to the term of Joint Operations/ Allied Joint Operations.

3 eg. ATP-3.2, Land Operations, Brussels 2003, p. 2-5.

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From a general perspective, FS/JFS encompasses three basic subsystems, also referred to as – three vital components: surveillance and target acquisition (STA); command and control information system (C2IS); weapon (delivering) systems (See Figure 1).

Figure 1. Subsystems of a Fire Support System

In the latest standardization agreements JFS is called Indirect Fire System (IFS)

and has been divided into five crucial elements. JFS/IFS is a system of systems, the main characteristics of which are its 24/7 ability to function (24 hours a day and 7 days a week without interruption), all-weather capability to acquire ground tar-gets and achieve effects over a wide area and in depth. It should be able to deliver guided or unguided munitions in order to strike point or area targets. The JFS/IFS is a system which includes the following elements4:

• A family of Surveillance, Target Acquisition (STA) systems which are linked to the wider ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Re-connaissance) system;

• A command, control and information system (C²IS) which provides a com-mand and control network over the battlefield and enables artillery commanders to act as fire and effect integrators also responsible for operational environment man-agement in all dimensions;

• Delivery platforms like guns, rockets and missiles launchers, mortars, com-bat or weaponised/armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV);

• A variety of precision-guided, conventional and non-lethal munitions; • An ammunition resupply system.

4 NATO Indirect Fire Systems Tactical Doctrine AArtyP-5(A), NSA, Brussels 2010, p. 2-1.


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IFS/JFS units are characterised by a very flexible organisation in order to be able to deploy and operate in a highly centralised or decentralised manner. Result-ing from this flexible structure, IFS/JFS units are able to perform efficiently in a complex operational environment.

The first subsystem – STA, closely connected with the ISTAR system, consists of assets organic to the JFS/IFS units STA (See Figure 2). STA sources provide the means to successfully detect, locate, identify, track and classify targets. These sys-tems include many individuals, units, and resources on the battlefield that help with the effective employment of the weapon. They yield basic data and information for fire support as well as contribute to the development of situational awareness (SA). JFS/IFS STA assets can be used for non-JFS/IFS intelligence collection tasks, but such use must be weighed against the need to acquire JFS/IFS targets. Sensors not belonging to JFS/IFS systems (e.g. sensors of reccee unit5) could also contribute to the target acquisition process.

Figure 2. Subsystems of an IFS/JFS system

5 eg. Air Reconnaissance and Surveillance, Aviation Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare (EW)

Sensors, Long Range Patrols (LPR).

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Command Control and Information System (C²IS) provides a command and control network over the battlespace. There are many developed Fire Control Sys-tems linked to the manoeuvre Command and Control Systems. In my opinion we should discus Joint Fires Command and Control Systems rather than about Fire Control Systems because modern systems play not only Fire Control/Direction roles, but also: Tactical Fire Control – planning and coordination, Technical Fire Control – during mission execution, Movement Control, Combat Service Support and fulfil Airspace Management functions.

A few years ago a new NATO initiative concerning Fire Command and Control Systems was established. Their purpose still remains to achieve interoperability between different system from leading countries. Artillery Support Cooperation Activity - ASCA (the name of the initiative – focused on cooperation data and ex-perience exchanging between: American AFATDS (Advanced Field Artillery Tac-tical Data System); German ADLER (germ. Artillerie Daten Lage Einsatz Re-chnerverbund – System); British BATES (Battlefield Artillery Target Engagement System), French ATLAS System and Italian SIR System.

For example AFATDS is a Joint Fire Support Battle Command system. It pro-vides complete flexibility to manage attacks on preplanned and time-sensitive tar-gets. AFATDS provides fully automated support for planning, coordinating, con-trolling, and executing fire and effects. It supports weapon systems such as mortars, field artillery cannons, rockets, close air support, attack helicopters, and Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) systems. AFATDS also acts as a fire support "server" to LAN-based and Tactical Internet-based clients, including the AFATDS Effects Management Tool (EMT), and the USMC Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC) EMT. The system is used in all U.S. Army echelons from weap-ons platoon to corps and in the Marine Corps from a firing battery to Marine Expe-ditionary Forces. AFATDS is installed aboard the U.S. Navy LHA/LHD Class big deck amphibious ships to support Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs) during am-phibious operations6.

In Command and Control Information System (C2IS) there are also located JFS planning and coordination elements. It must be underlined that there are different solutions implemented in different countries. In most cases fire elements are repre-sented at all levels (from Corps to Battalion) as Joint Fire and Effect Elements – Centres/Cells/Groups/Teams.

Through their Joint Fire Support Centres/Cells//Teams, the TF staff (Brigade sized or higher) plan fire and effects, in that they match the manoeuvre com-mander’s intent and scheme of manoeuvre to those fire assets available. They book, arrange and liaise to ensure that the assets are available at the correct time and are able to operate in the specified area with all logistic, ROE and other requirements. Through their Brigade Joint Fire Support Cell, the Brigade staff further integrate the fire assets available by conducting Battlespace management (BM), timings,

6 Source: www.raytheon.com (Access October 2012).


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routes, weapon loads and communications infrastructures. The Fires Support Team (FST) make the most appropriate use of allocated fire assets in order to achieve the effect required by the Manoeuvre Commander. The chosen asset will minimise the risk of fratricide or further encroachment upon the operation of other assets7. Solu-tions discussed above, as an example JFS planning and coordination elements or-ganisation, are presented in the Figure 3.

Source: Fire Support Integration Paper, CDoD, 2008, page 8.

Figure 3. JFS planning and coordination elements

Attack resources encompasses land, air and sea based delivering platforms

which are able to engage targets at the proper time, place and with the appropriate volume of fire. There are sources which divide attack resources in two categories - lethal and non-lethal (eg. Electronic Attack, Computer Network Attack, PSYOPS, Information Warfare, Obscurant Fires & Illumination. In considerations provided below only lethal means will be discussed8.

a. Land-based JFS/IFS uses a variety of weapon systems and ammunitions (guided and unguided) in order to cover the entire battlefield with indirect fire de-

7 Fire Support Integration Paper, Canadian DoD, 2008, p. 8. 8 NATO Indirect Fire Systems Tactical Doctrine AArtyP-5(A), NSA, Brussels 2012, pages 3-1

and 3-2.

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livering a variety of effects, as determined by the manoeuvre commander. There are three principal types of ground-based indirect fire weapon systems. These are:

• Mortar uses self-propelled, towed and man-portable equipment. In general it is integrated in the JFS/IFS and uses precision as well as unguided ammunitions;

• Tube artillery uses self-propelled and towed gun equipment and is charac-terised by a high responsiveness, accuracy, and the capability to deliver sustained fire. An extensive selection of ammunition, coupled with sophisticated target ac-quisition assets permit the engagement of both point and area targets and a target effect adjusted to the tactical requirements.

• Rocket/Missile artillery uses guided or unguided ammunition and its long range enables it to strike high pay off targets throughout the depth of the battle-field. It has the capability to deliver a very heavy weight of fire for a short period.

b. Air-based JFS/IFS – called also in many sources Anti Surface Force Air Operations (ASFAO)

• Fixed Wing. ASFAO will be used in two aspects: Anti-surface warfare op-erations (maritime) and air-land operations. Air-land operations consist of Air In-terdiction (AI) which is mainly used for operational level objectives and Close Air Support (CAS) which is mainly used for tactical level objectives. CAS is an air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. The mission must always be supported by a qualified Tactical Air Control Parties Forward Air Controller or TACP (FAC) and is flown in direct sup-port of ground forces, in offensive and defensive operations, to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix or delay enemy forces where they are in close proximity to friendly forces. This team should be included in the Joint Fire Support Element (JFSE) in order to ease integration of all fire support assets.

• Rotary Wing. The primary missions of rotary wing assets are divided in two basic types of attack: Interdiction Attack (IA) and Close Combat Attack (CCA). IA is a hasty or deliberate attack either to divert, disrupt, delay, degrade, or destroy the adversary before they can be used effectively against friendly forces. IA is con-ducted at such a distance from friendly forces that detailed integration with ground forces is not required. CCA is a hasty or deliberate attack providing air-to-ground fire for friendly units engaged in close combat. Due to the close proximity of friendly forces, detailed integration is desirable but not always possible.

• Combat Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (C UAV) / Weaponised/Armed UAV.

C UAV (or Weaponised/Armed UAV) is an armed UAV that can be used in a re-connaissance role and/or combat actions.

c. Sea-based JFS/IFS called also Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS). • Some land operations may be supported by sea based indirect fire systems

such as amphibious operations and defence of coastal areas (contribution of the Maritime Component to Joint Operations). The coordination of naval fire happens at every level. Specialist naval fire support coordinators may be used for liaison


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through the Supporting Arms Coordination Centre (SACC). If there is no allocated maritime fire support observer for ground troops, the JFSE has the additional re-sponsibility of observing and controlling NSFS in support of the land component. A maritime fire support group consists of naval combatants assigned to support Land Forces operations ashore using naval gunfire support (NGS) and guided mis-sile support. Due to the multi-role character of many naval combatants, units of an escort/screening group may conduct fire support missions without being formed into a separate fire support group and vice versa. NGS can provide large volumes of immediately available, responsive fire support to Land Combat Forces operating near coastal waters.

• The general mission of NSFS ship units in an amphibious operation is to support the assault by destroying or neutralising (1) shore installations that oppose the approach of ships and aircraft, (2) defences that may oppose the landing force (LF), and (3) defences that may oppose the post-landing advance of the LF. When the number of ships permits, each assault battalion will be assigned a ship in direct support (DS). The DS mission establishes a one-to-one relationship between a NSFS ship and the supported unit. The ship delivers fire on planned targets and targets of opportunity in her zone of fire, which normally corresponds to the zone of action of the supported unit. When possible, ships capable of performing simul-taneous missions will be given a DS mission to allow for maximum firepower to the forward units of the LF. The general support (GS) mission requires a NSFS ship to support the force as a whole or that portion of the force to which the ship is assigned. A ship in a GS role attacks targets in the zone of fire which corresponds to the zone of action of the supported unit. Prearranged fire is delivered in accor-dance with a schedule of fire published in the ATF OPORD and the NSFS plan in the LF OPORD. Fire may also be allocated to a subordinate unit for a specific mis-sion(s). Upon completion of the mission(s), the ship reverts to the GS role. Ships in a GS role support regimental-sized units or larger.

Conventional and precision-guided munitions. The JFS/IFS munitions are divided into two different categories9:

1. Unguided Munitions. It follows the ballistic trajectory. Their accuracy is di-rectly related to the delivery platform (e.g. Topographical, Meteorological and ballistic data). The ability to guarantee first round effective fire is dependent on the accuracy. The accuracy of the system can be improved through registration fires, calibration or/and adjustment.

2. Precision Guided Munitions (PGM). PGM are munitions for which the effect and its point of delivery, in time and space, may be controlled, either internally or externally, after departure from the launch platform. PGM can be divided in the following types:

– Laser-Guided Projectiles (LGP); – Terminally Homing Projectiles (THP);

9 Ibidem, p. 3-3 and 3-4.

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– Trajectory Correctable Munitions as e.g. Course Correcting Fuzes (CCF) or GPS guided munitions,

– Sensor Fuzed (Sub) Munitions, – Loitering munitions (LM)10, – Video link lock-on munitions. An ammunition resupply system. The overall capability of the JFS/IFS is to

a great extent dependent on an effective logistic support system. The timely and guaranteed resupply of ammunition is a critical factor. Therefore, the logistic sup-port system of the JFS/IFS has to be capable of resupplying the various compo-nents of the assets in all weather and terrain conditions. This is complicated by the dispersed deployment of the components. The system possess a significant trans-port capability. This has to include the capacity to carry a basic load of ammuni-tion. Ammunition resupply system should be controlled by an effective logistic management system, capable of monitoring stock levels throughout the supply chain and facilitating the timely movement of stocks.

The role of JFS/IFS is to support the ground manoeuvre forces with fire and effect. The artillery commander at all levels is the JFS/IFS adviser of the manoeu-vre commander and an expert supporting manoeuvre forces with all types of fires. They are responsible for the integration, synchronisation and coordination of fire support delivered by air, maritime and land effectors, in time, space and purpose, in support of the common land operational objective. It only emphasises the fact that synchronisation of JFS with the supported forces is essential. JFS may thus provide lethal or non-lethal effects in such a way as to have synergistic effects on land op-erations. Nevertheless, IFS provides close and deep fire support, counter battery fire and contributes to the suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD).

The tasks of JFS/IFS are based on the concept of operations and the intent of the manoeuvre commander. These are the basis for combat organisation. In detail:

– Allocation of IFS assets (effectors and sensors). – Taking part in the intelligence cycle and STA. – Fire support and effects integration. – Command and Control (C²) of all IFS. – Coordinating the Joint Fire Support effects. – Liaison and cooperation with other services, branches and combined forces. – Execution of combat service support. – Force protection.

10 Loitering munitions: Munitions able to remain in position over a target area and to be reas-

signed a target in flight. During the attack phase target can be aborted with the munition returning to the loitering mode. These munitions are delivered by a wide range of platforms e.g. rocket launcher, plane or ship. Details concerning this specific topic are given in Artillery Procedures AArtyP-1(B), NSA, Brussels 2009.


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Effectiveness of the JFS/IFS effort is measured by creating desired effects on the enemy, setting conditions for decisive operations, and supporting force/joint force operations. Effective JFS/IFS support depends on planning for the suc-

cessful performance of the following four basic fire support tasks: (1) Support Forces in Contact. The commander must provide responsive

JFS/IFS that protects and ensures freedom of manoeuvre to forces in contact with the enemy throughout the operational area.

(2) Support the Concept of Operation. Commanders set the conditions for decisive operations by successfully attacking prioritised targets.

(3) Synchronise JFS/IFS. JFS/IFS is synchronised through fire support coordination, beginning with the commander’s estimate and CONOPS. Joint fire support must be planned both continuously and concurrently with the development of the scheme of manoeuvre. Further, operations providing joint fire support must be synchronised with other joint force operations (e.g., air operations, intelligence functions, special operations, and IO) in order to optimise the application of limited resources, achieve synergy, and avoid fratricide.

(4) Sustain JFS/IFS. Joint fire support planners must formulate joint fire sup-port plans to reflect logistic limitations and to exploit logistic capabilities. Ammu-nition, fuel, food, water, maintenance, transportation, and medical support are all critical in sustaining joint fire support operations.

As can be seen from the appraisal provided so far, Joint Fire Support doesn’t exist in a separate manner in the battlespace/Joint Operational Environment, how-ever in specified periods of battle/operation, commanders can dominate the above areas covering them with reconnaissance and fire, without sending troops there. Moreover, fire has a unique ability to engage targets in depth (especially in shaping operations) in order to reduce enemy combat power before close combat (decisive operations) occurs.

At the tactical level fire exists between elements of combat power. Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time. As far as Army forces are concerned, their combat power is generated by converting potential into effec-tive action.

There are eight elements of combat power (See figure 4): the six warfighting functions (mission command, movement and manoeuvre, intelligence, fires, sus-tainment, and protection) which are multiplied by leadership and complemented by information. In other words, commanders apply combat power through the war-fighting functions using leadership and information.

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Source: Operations, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, February 2011, page 4-1.

Figure 4. The elements of combat power

A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organisations,

information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. Decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations combine all the warfighting functions to generate combat power. Addi-tionally, all warfighting functions possess scalable capabilities to mass lethal and nonlethal effects. No warfighting function is exclusively decisive, shaping, or sus-taining. The Army’s warfighting functions are fundamentally linked to the joint functions.

At the operational level there are joint functions. Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help JFCs integrate, synchronise, and direct joint operations. Functions that are common to joint operations at all levels of war fall into six basic groups — C2, intelligence, fire, movement and manoeu-vre, protection, and sustainment. Fire is closely connected with all joint functions (elements of combat power), and especially with manoeuvre.

The foundations of joint fire support are based on the elements of combat

power, the principles of joint operations and joint functions. The elements of combat power are combined to provide the basis for the generation of overwhelm-ing firepower. The fire support system has its roots in the firepower element of

combat power. The fire function encompasses a number of tasks (or missions, actions, and

processes). Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritising targets and match-ing the appropriate response to them, while considering operational requirements


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and capabilities. Targeting supports the process of linking the desired effects of fire to actions and tasks at the component level.

The art and science of Joint Fire Support is how to synchronise joint fire and manoeuvre in support of JFC objectives. Coordination between components in order to maximise the target detection, planning and execution of targets to create the effects desired with attack resources is the critical function of the Joint Fire

Support System. As was mentioned, Joint Fire Support may include, but is not limited to, the le-

thal effects of air support by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, naval surface fire sup-port, artillery, mortars, rockets, and missiles, as well as nonlethal effects of some EA actions and space control operations, as well as other nonlethal capabilities. Integration and synchronisation of joint fire and joint fire support with the fire and manoeuvre of the supported force is essential. The JFC helps to ensure this unity of effort by doing the following:

– Coordinating Reconnaissance, Surveillance & Target Acquisition; – Developing plans & orders; – Running a Joint Targeting & Coordination Board; – Supporting a Joint Fires Element or augmenting the fires staff as required. To express the Joint Fire Integration idea I would like to quote the Fire Integra-

tion principle: “The integration of deconflicted fire with movement to achieve

manoeuvre”. Synchronised Joint Fire Support requires the coordinated interaction of all of

the elements of the fire support system, thorough and continuous planning, aggres-sive coordination, and vigorous execution.

To synchronise joint fire support operations, “commanders and staffs must

have a thorough knowledge of each Service’s doctrine, major systems, significant

capabilities and limitations and often their Tactics, Techniques and Procedures”. Combining Joint Fire Support and manoeuvre relies on the fundamental and

beneficial effects of teamwork, unity of effort, and synchronisation of capabilities in time, space, and purpose. Manoeuvre and Joint Fire Support are complemen-

tary functions that are essential to achieving the Joint Force Commander's

(JFC) objectives. Joint Fire Support neutralises, destroys, or suppresses enemy forces and disrupts enemy manoeuvre, both on the surface and in the air, which assists the manoeuvre of friendly forces.

The JFC is responsible for ensuring the synchronisation and integration of

joint fire. The challenge for the JFC is to integrate and synchronise the wide range of capabilities at his disposal. The operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) serves as the JFC’s principal staff advisor for the coordination, integration, and synchronisation of Joint Fire Support with other major elements of operations. The J-3 recommends, coordinates, reviews, designates, and disseminates fire support coordination measures, manoeuvre control measures, and airspace coordinating measures as part of the overall concept of the operations for joint fire and joint fire

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support. The JFC may approve the formation of a Joint Fire Element (JFE)

within J-3. The JFE advises the JFC and assists J-3 in joint fire planning, coordina-tion, and execution. The JFE would be composed of a variety of experts from the joint force headquarters, the components, the combatant command, and other sup-porting organisations as required. Typically, JFCs organise joint targeting coordi-nation boards (JTCBs). If the JFC so designates, a JTCB may be either an integrat-ing centre for this effort or a JFC-level review mechanism. The joint targeting coordination board normally reviews target information, develops targeting guid-ance and priorities, and prepares and refines joint target lists. The JFE would also take the lead on providing the Joint Fire information for any Operations Plans, Orders or Fragos. JFE has numerous functions throughout the Joint meetings, working groups and boards in order to enable the targeting process.

To summarise, I would like to underline, that the latest standardisation agree-ments have extended the range of capabilities from the influence on enemy forces to the sphere of influence in order to achieve desired effect, not only physical but also psychological. Therefore, Joint Fire Support (JFS) and Effects is the coordi-nated and integrated employment of all weapon platforms delivering fire (it in-cludes land, air, naval delivered indirect fires) to achieve the required effects on ground targets to support land operations in the full spectrum of conflict. It encom-passes the integration of indirect fire and effect in order to influence the adver-sary forces, installations or functions. Joint Fire Support Element (JFSE) could either encompass influencing elements such as PSYOPS, CIMIC, and EW or be incorporated in a wider cell dealing with the overall influence on activities. Lethal and non-lethal – these more and more common functions, seek not only physical effect, but more importantly, effects on the understanding, perception and will of the adversary.

The necessity of conducting JFS more often occurs and reflects the tactical level as well, because of the complexity of the contemporary operational environ-ment (non- linear and non-continuous battlespace, dispersion of forces, high opera-tions tempo, and the short time of reaction required in most cases). For this reason JFS should be coordinated, synchronised and integrated in the frame of three vital components: surveillance and target acquisition (STA); command and control (C2); and weapon (delivering) systems. Among these assets Field Artillery Forces posses a relevant part of each mentioned subsystems and their capabilities have an influ-ence on battle during shaping and decisive operations. The chosen solutions from different countries presented here have been experimented with and put into prac-tice, and experiences from latest and current peace support and stability operations, indicate planes and directions of further researches and development of Joint Fire Support and Effect System, and have proved its` crucial role in contemporary op-erational environment.


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Instead of a final conclusion I would like to quote General George S. Patton in what he said to his soldiers prior to US involvement in World War II - he reflected on combined arms/ joint warfare and comparing it to an orchestra:

Bibliography

AAP-6, NATO glossary of terms and definitions, NSA, Brussels 2011. Artillery Procedures AArtyP-1(B), NSA, Brussels 2009., Bailey J. B. A. Maj. Gen., Field Artillery and Firepower, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis

2004. Fire Support Integration Paper, Canadian Department of Defense, 2008. Joint Fire Support, JP-3.09, Joint Chief of Staff, 2010. Joint fire support in 2020, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey-California, 2006. NATO Field Artillery Tactical Doctrine AArtyP-5 , NSA, Brussels 2001. NATO Indirect Fire Systems Tactical Doctrine AArtyP-5(A), NSA, Brussels 2010. Operations, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, February 2011. Rubaj T., Połączone wsparcie ogniowe – zdolności i atrybuty operacyjne sił oraz wybrane

aspekty organizowania, Zeszyty CSAiU, Toruń 2008. Rubaj T., Artyleria w połączonym wsparciu ogniowym, referat wygłoszony podczas Semi-

narium Naukowego w WSOWLąd. nt. Artyleria we współczesnych operacjach, ZN WSO WLąd. Nr 2/2012, Wrocław 2012.

Połączone wsparcie ogniowe - integralna część współczesnych operacji, materiały z Semi-narium Naukowego zorganizowanego przez Zakład Wsparcia Działań IWLąd. WZiD AON w dniu 03.04.2012 r. (w opracowaniu).

“There is still a tendency in each separate unit...to be a one-handed puncher. By that I mean that the rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the artillery-man to fire...That is not the way to win battles. If the band played a piece first with the piccolo, then with the brass horn, then with the clarinet, and then with the trumpet, there would be a hell of a lot of noise but no music. To get the harmony in music each instrument must support the others. To get harmony in battle, each weapon must support the other. Team play wins. You musicians of Mars must not wait for the band leader to signal you...You must each of your own volition see to it that you come into this concert at the proper place and at the proper time...”

General George S. Patton, Jr., 8 July 1941,

address to the men of the 2nd Armored Division,

The Patton Papers, Vol. II, 1974

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THE AUTOMATION OF ELECTRONIC

EQUIPMENT IN CYBERSPACE AND

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Col. Waldemar SCHEFFS, D.Sc. National Defence University

Abstract

Gaining the upper hand and, in the long run, achieving victory is an aim that each of

the battling parties strives at. Supremacy can be achieved through a variety of measures

ranging from political pressures to military action. The rapid technological advancement of

IT engineering has given rise to clandestine and intense war in the electromagnetic and IT

environment. A signal transmitted simultaneously to a large number of receivers has

become a tool to wage this kind of war. The signal itself is devoid of power and mass.

However, when combined with the signal that transmits it, it becomes a decisive factor and

stage of military action.

New technologies have given rise to new potential areas of warfare. Cyberspace is the

most telling example of an artificially created environment in which bits transmitted

through an appropriate signal play the dominant role. This new warfare environment has

been claiming an ever larger proportion of the ways of sending and receiving information:

command, reconnaissance and electronic war, among many others. An in-depth grasp of

the functioning of electrical apparatuses in a new environment constitutes the gist of the

paper at hand.

The article mentions topics closely connected with the automation of electrical devices

operating under two different conditions: cybernetic and electromagnetic. One dovetails

with the other and both could use the same type of equipment, yet their functions differ. The

common area of operation of equipment in both environments and the possibility of their

undergoing the process of automation allow whole new reconnaissance systems to be

developed. Furthermore, the paper attempts to define the foregoing environments through

the prism of operating in network-centred environment. At the same time some effort will be

made to point to a new meaning of the concept “work in an electronic environment” taking

its source in information hostilities.

Key words – electronic warfare, cyberspace


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Introduction Since the middle of the 20th century we have been observing a revolution in

science and a rapid development of the industrial world which is characterised by the vast production and consumption of a variety of goods manufactured by man along with those used as crude resources. Not only have electronic devices dominated the life of man, but also industry in general, the lion share of which has been taken up by the military. Currently many scientists are of the opinion that Electronics and Informatics have become part and parcel of everyone`s daily life.

Military engineering in WW II was developing fast, as seen from that time. Electronic equipment was very modern (electron lamps, triodes, pentodes), yet not without limitations: mainly power consumption and size. The first major breakthrough came with the scientific design and development of the magatron lamp used in radio detectors. The revolution proper transpired with the close of WW II. The transistor and integrated circuits triggered a boom in electronic circuits of various use. The military sees in it a great potential and have put electronic devices to a wider use in such areas as communications, reconnaissance, air defence, and artillery. Electronic equipment is used in military vehicles on a more regular basis (tanks, armored vehicles, wheeled vehicles, and modern stealth aircraft steered by man). Perhaps in the not so distant future similar aircraft following on from UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) will be carrying out military action.

Airspace is not the only area where electrical devices reign supreme. The navy with its warships and submarines is yet another example of metal leviathans packed full with missile steering equipment, command, recon, communication, electronic battle, unit control etc. Any one vessel is a self-contained stronghold. Be it alone or in a group of vessels, it is capable of locating, recognising, and destroying a target at a large distance. Warships are equipped with stale-of-the-art technology, being a live example of how to forge cutting edge ideas into practicability.

Without electronic equipment and computerisation space flight would remain unattainable. The recent mission of the last space shuttle, Atlantis, does not put pay to space exploration. It merely marks an end of a stage, in which Electronics and Informatics have dwarfed the obsolete technology. Needless to say, one must not disregard military engineering on land. Steel stallions are movable robots, in which electrical apparatus serves as a basis for a well-aimed fire. The crew operates a vehicle enabling the defeat of the opponent from a safe distance. Finally and most importantly, there is the human soldier. The soldier of today may not be a cyber-soldier yet; however, taking into account the sheer amount of electrical military gadgets at his disposal, one can go as far as to talk about a revolution with respect to soldiers` add-ons. While personal firearms are still considered the basis of any soldier’s equipment, every so often one hears about PDA computer terminals enabling more efficient command, sending information concerning hostile

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reconnaissance and enabling more efficient fire, at the same time staying clear, out of sight.

All of the afore-mentioned electronic devices remain operative in electronic, electromagnetic or IT environments. Separately or together with others, the devices can all be identified and jammed with electromagnetic energy or with a signal carrying a program that infects an operative system.

The problems seem to lie with the identification of devices working for electronic warfare systems on the one hand, and those that could be used in an information environment, on the other. As inanimate matter, electronic equipment in general, and its operativeness in particular, can undergo automation.

Caution should be kept as to which devices and in which order, as well as to whose benefit can undergo this process. This paper is devoted to these particular issues. The first two chapters are concerned with the use of electronic equipment in an electromagnetic (environment) and cybernetic exploited in electronic warfare systems. The contents of those chapters exemplify the possibilities of identification of devices with a practical potential in both environments being the same apparatus but serving different functions.

Hostilities in an Electronic Warfare Environment

Electromagnetic Waves as a Combat Environment

Until relatively recently the range of light visible to the naked eye was sole range of the spectrum used inadvertently by man. In battle the visible light spectrum was initially used to collect data through observation and to transmit a priori established light, smoke and similar signals. However, those ranges of the spectrum, as well as the subsequent means capable of transmission, were considerably limited by the distance to which signals were relayed. Inevitably, transmission was dependent on the broadcasting position (Data Terminal Position) as well as particular transmission sectors. Not until the invention/discovery of radio waves was the electromagnetic space used to its full potential. Following this, the possibility of confrontation in this very environment materialised.

The last decade of the 19th century saw the first confrontation in the electromagnetic space. This was marked by the invention of the first wire telegraphs and the transmission of militarily useful signals via radio waves. War, as seen from this perspective, began to take shape at the turn of the 20th century. It was at that time that a certain level of technology was reached allowing the radio to pay service to the military. Almost simultaneously, with this new use for the radio, there was a sudden outbreak of war within the electromagnetic space. At the very beginning, military operations aimed at intercepting and deciphering information sent via radio. Moreover, as a standard procedure they sent out signals in order to disrupt the ones sent by the enemy. With radio technology ever quickening its pace


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of development, new methods of waging clandestine war began to emerge. Novel solutions, based on divergent scientific thought began to emerge, these included: reconnaissance, pre-emptive strikes, radio-location, and radio propaganda.

In the years separating the two World Wars the seeming gigantic radio-electronic advancement did not translate itself into new modes of combat nor into an improvement in combat methodology. The main area of confrontation was reconnaissance and warmongering done via radio programs. This was mainly in the KF band. By contrast during the 2nd World War, following 1940, the opposing armies saw a rapid development in the forms and means of waging electromagnetic warfare.

The allied forces` scientists and engineers brought to a successful end a multitude of programs that provided the military with a substantial quantity of modern reconnaissance and jamming equipment capable of efficient work across a variety of frequencies. Furthermore, this new technology could emit signals disrupting electromagnetic energy of a considerable intensity.

The Third Reich and other Axis Powers were unceasingly carrying out developmental research. They were focusing acutely on defence reconnaissance and radio-wave interferences. Through such steps they strived at maintaining the survivability of their radio-electronic systems. The aftermath of World War Two was characterised by an intensive speeding up in the improvement of technology and forms of waging electronic war. The whole process was further galvanised by experiences gained from different local wars and pockets of military conflict. Especially relevant ones to the issue discussed here are the following: The Korean War of 1950s, The Vietnam War (1964 – 1973), The Middle East Conflicts (fought in the years 1967, 1973, 1981), The Falklands War (1982), The Persian Gulf War (1990 - 1991), The War in Yugoslavia (1999).

The aforementioned conflicts have all paved the way for modern electromagnetic warfare. Operations carried out across FM waves have come to be dominant in the aerial, marine, and ultimately cosmic environment. This viewpoint is very clearly reflected in West European countries` policies and in their use of electromagnetic warfare systems.

The Iron Curtain countries of the Cold War period firmly believed that an electronic appliances` primary function should rest with ground forces. It played a secondary role when it came to the Navy, and Airforce. The overall proportions of this technology being installed and their tactical usage are visible to this day. Such a glaring disparity of approaches to the same issue takes its source in World War Two experiences. It is also justifiable by the scientific and technological boom in the Western Block. More importantly, one must not disregard here the ongoing arms race. Its two main sides: The USA and The USSR were bent on worldwide domination and were in an urgent need of advanced reconnaissance systems that would remain operative over vast distances.

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At that time it was only long range aircraft that could meet the high technical standards set for reconnaissance. Back then space reconnaissance was at its “drawing board” stage. US strategic reconnaissance gave rise to new directions on the development of electronic equipment, including recon and jamming devices. Long range reconnaissance with an accompanying spurious signal stands at the center of innovativeness. It constitutes the essence of technological thought and prevails in the construction and later use of electronic devices. The electromagnetic wave setting has become an undeniable domain in the arms race and covert operations.

The Work of Electronic Warfare Systems under Electromagnetic Conditions

In accordance with the established doctrinal provisions, operations taking place within an electromagnetic setting are carried out in all manner of military activities and should be taken for granted. Such operations are mainly the domain of special units equipped with reconnaissance, jamming, and electronic defence systems. The electromagnetic setting allows for electronic warfare. Thus, the operational area of electronic warfare is electromagnetic space as well as radio-electronic sources emitting and receiving electromagnetic energy. The EW (electromagnetic warfare) setting is characterised by the following traits: the range of electromagnetic spectrum used, the density of frequencies used, the surrounding density of electromagnetic energy, the total number of operating electromagnetic devices per square kilometer, the deployment of individual radio-magnetic devices and their proximity in relation to the contact line of troops, the specification and distribution of key military facilities e.g., main communication junctions, radar stations, reconnaissance centers, communication satellites. Electronic war spans over the same range of frequencies used by hostile radio-electronic systems which include communications, radio location, tele-detection, and radio navigation. The relevant band range from 30 KHz to 40 GHz to infrared and finally to light visible to human eye. The deployment of particular radio-electronic devices determines which areas and which frontiers are manned with the required amount of equipment. Being familiar with charts down to the minutest detail is key in estimating the effectiveness of RM (radio magnetic) interference from specific sources. Moreover, it is essential that there be a detailed specification of vital RE (radio electronic) facilities as well as their viable positions. This is done in order to set a proper course of action for reconnaissance and allow an appropriate amount of time for jamming with the use of electromagnetic impulse or munitions.

Electronic Warfare with diversified operational and tactical activities of troops strives at gaining information about the systems and measures of electronic ground forces; the aircraft forces and their defence potential; the navy; and weapons operating in outer space. Disruption and deliberate disorganisation of the reconnaissance systems of hostile armies and their commanding officers is central to its definition. Of all the mentioned ways of waging this kind of war, the EM


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waves setting is slowly but surely taking the lead. One can provide a number of examples of armament systems where electronic devices play a subsidiary role in achieving the expected results is of top priority:

1. command and communications systems (C2W) 2. radio-technical systems 3. munitions control systems (missiles, UAV) 4. reconnaissance systems (e.g. optoelectronics) 5. aircraft defence breaking systems (SEAD) 6. electronic warfare systems (including EM impulses) 7. IT systems (including cybernetic systems) 8. navigation systems (GPS, Glonass) 9. various back-up systems used by the navy and ground forces The electronic equipment in question is being used continuously irrespective of

war, crisis or peace. The only factor susceptible to change is the extent of military operations in each of the respective states.

The approach toward the work of electronic devices in the EW environment within the Polish Armed Forces and in relation to the whole theory refers to specific tasks and is strictly task-oriented. During peace, military headquarters make all the necessary preparations over a certain timespan. Those preparations are subsequently tasted on the range. The planning officers of particular electronic combat units analyse hostile activity, assess potential risks, plan the chain of operation stages, see them through, and finally check whether the entire enterprise has yielded the expected results. They verify this by receiving the enemy`s signals from particular bandwidths. Should the operation turn out a success they proceed with the next stage. If the results do not come up to the expectations, the whole procedure is repeated or the final decision verified and the operation continues. The rule of thumb in operations and planning is: plan-realise-check-verify. It has a strong footing and immense historical background and has been widely used by virtually any armed forces involved in electronic warfare.

For almost eight years now a new concept concerning EW has been on NATO`s agenda. Its centrepiece is to ascertain specified end results even prior to planners beginning their work. The concept came to view in a publication issued in 2008 under the title, NATO Electronic Warfare Policy (MC 0064/10). It rests with the planner to define the results of electronic combat operations conducted under electromagnetic conditions. Moreover, it is their duty to assess how this will affect the success of the operation. This leads to an entirely new outlook on the planning phase, the preparation, and the actual carrying out of electronic combat.

The previous approach had it that with a certain amount and specific type of EW equipment, the enemy`s EW potential was expected to be diminished. What was taken into consideration was the degree of damage to hostile electronic potential with a rough estimate of the outcome of the battle. The operation was to be repeated until the desired effect was reached. The latest approach, by contrast, is

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achieving the objective by any means. Depending on the challenge ahead a varying amount of equipment and munitions is used in order to accomplish the end result. If the EW arsenal of a given country happens to be insufficient, it is enhanced by a surplus from other NATO states. Thus the new framing of electronic warfare assumes joint operations. In a leap-frog over the next few subsections, it could be claimed that such operations will most certainly play a fundamental role in future electromagnetic warfare.

The Automation of the Work of Electrical Equipment in Electronic warfare

Systems

The concept of automation is applicable to both the analytical and planning process. Moreover, it also refers to the procedure of realising combat operations via the electronic route. Finally, one can talk about the automation of information transfer to the decision-maker and back. A consequential question follows: can all processes be automated? Furthermore also, can all reconnaissance and jamming devices be coupled into separate automated systems? The latest generation of these technology items leaves the assembly-line semi- or fully automated and serve as multi-task appliances. We run up against problems trying to piece together the old with the cutting edge. Keeping to standards in this situation boarders on the impossible. Some items fail to be automated due to their technological incompatibility. Others can be automated, however only to some extent. Financial and technical analyses state in no uncertain terms that building EW systems on older generation devices will generate financial losses. A more advisable solution would be the development of a whole new system based on our own engineering thought and with the aid of domestic industry. To better understand the problems connected with automation, it is essential to possess a good knowledge of the characteristics of conducting operations in an electromagnetic environment. The Polish Armed Forces fight this war mainly from the ground and the sea. In other words, operations are run in a limited two-dimensional environment. Here we can talk about the width and depth of the battlefield zone. The potential role of the airspace has been underscored, but thus far severely underused. The possibility of realising tasks has been diminished by tactical units' demarcation lines as well as the limited range of communication between them. The pervasiveness of EW combat can be impeded by the inability to receive electromagnetic emission i.e. the radio horizon for VHF, UHF, SHF, and EFH bands. Also, of much relevance here is the distribution of hostile electrical equipment. The total number of EW systems at the Polish Armed Forces` disposal leaves much to be desired. Currently, we are far from possessing a fully fledged automated EW system. Not even the automated system Wołczenica can render the military fully automated. It is still the case that many subunits fight with no automation whatsoever when it comes to tactics and operation. The whole of reconnaissance and jamming is done manually through sound waves from command post subunits. This leaves the commanding officer of


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the subunit with insufficient time for reaction to the rapidly changing conditions on the battlefield. Combat dynamics is characterised by a quick pace of change. Consequently, without an instantaneous reaction to the detected sources, the tactical unit will be exposed to electronic hostilities from the enemy. In practice, there is no need to jam every single source. In some situations it is left to the soldier`s discretion to decide which source should take priority. That is why automated command and control apparatus should be equipped with manually operable equivalent.

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Control relations at the level of EW subunit The exchange of information The relation of command from the command post of the tactical unit

Picture 1. EW Company formation at the tactical level

The tactical operating of a EW company via radio is by direct orders issued by

G2 SD tactical unit (pic. 1). The entire system is controlled by the EW chief commander and individual posts are run by the EW company commander. The update on the progress of the operation is sent to the analysis and assessment team in the G2 unit. The presented command mode of the EW company devoid of a fast radio connection severely undermines the effectiveness of electromagnetic combat. This is also the case at the operational level. Without automated systems, the HF band cannot be used to its full potential. A particular subunit equipped with outdated technology does not match the high standards of the modern battlefield. The lack of automated systems controlling reconnaissance and jamming has its consequences in the located radio signal being terminated even before the jamming initiates. The HF jamming subunit works in phonic-manual mode most of the time, although it also has an in-built semi-automated control unit. Its wear and tear

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causes its fallibility. The EW system code-named Przebiśnieg was to have been an answer to these shortcomings. The system is used by an EW company at the tactical level. It constitutes an internally automated system at the subunit level. It has significantly improved the system`s detection, tracking, and jamming capabilities. Up to now, it has not reached the required reconnaissance penetration across the entire reconnaissance zone of the tactical unit, approximately 50 km., even though the antenna was operating at 50 meters above sea level. Each subunit in the system is controlled via radio using a TDMA time loop emitted from the commanding vehicle. This is synonymous with automation. What is more, each system is perfectly capable of individual work, being independent from others, and aggregating information intercepted by the commanding vehicle.

However, one downside of the system is the yet unresolved problem of a simultaneous display of the results obtained from reconnaissance and tracking in the EW company command vehicle. The commanding officer has only radio or radio location devices to rely on. He or she does not have insight into data verification essential in assessing the tactical and/or operational character of each source. Yet, the very basic design flaw of the Przebiśnieg system is the lack of direct connection of automatic data transmission and control in the commanding tactical unit. The commanding unit should be able to send and receive data to and from the system respectively. It is a top priority that this missing element be designed, developed, and put to use in the ground forces. It is vital that a vehicle receiving and sending data automatically should be able to make use of the existing means of transmission. Otherwise the system will co-operate with the EW subunit only. If this is the case neither the commanding officer nor the headquarters will receive data in real time but with a considerable time lag. There is a real danger that vital decisions will be taken based on partial data. This being said, it is obvious that automation of EW subunits is an absolute necessity.

In the future development of EW systems the main emphasis will be placed on data transmission. The speed with which reconnaissance and prevention function have a major say in the efficiency of the systems. A fast track to achieving this goal is possessing a perfect medium of data transmission. Still in the pipeline, the system Kaktus is to meet this requirement. It will be able to transmit data in almost real time. The system, apart from having an internal automated module, will be equipped with external modules as well. With a variety of communication systems data aberration will hardly be noticed. Such a technical solution ensures the unhindered flow of information in the form of written text, graphics or images. The messages will be able to carry substantial byte-load and will not lose out on quality. For the operation to be carried out in sync with the commanding unit an appropriate reception model is a prerequisite. A separate transmitting vehicle with a direct access to the internal system of data circulation should also meet this condition; without one, even the best system remains a manually operated device of very limited use. In these types of units, data have to be collected first, then


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processed, and finally presented to the commander, who is the ultimate decision-maker. Needless to say, it takes a considerable amount of time for the data to complete the full cycle.

Currently, EW units in the Polish Army have a large portion of this technology produced abroad. The technology is being used at different frequency bands. The vast majority serves to identify and track radio sources. The search and interception of signals relevant for EW units is central to reconnaissance proceedings. The technology used today is capable of detecting most signals, the medium being electromagnetic waves at virtually all frequency bands. The intercepted signals are not always broadcast by radio transmitters. Often the source of transmission cannot be established with certainty. The spectral analysis of such signals helps conclude that their origin may as well be radio waves, computer emission or microwaves. Signals of this type will also be detected and intercepted. Going back to the Przebiśnieg system again, it must be pointed out that there is a possibility to detect and track electronic devices that are beyond the interest of military decision-makers. Radio receivers are designed to receive a signal up to 3GHz and radio location receivers up to 18 GHz. The problem lies in their ability to identify signals. With an appropriate database built up of signals carrying no information at all such identification is possible. Therefore, reconnaissance appliances can serve a double function. Some will satisfy the needs of EW, others can be used as multifunctional recon apparatus, depending on the need and applicability. Apart from EW purposes, multifunctional receivers will be searching for atypical signals at different bandwidths. With available database patterns serving a touchstone function, it will be possible to identify and jam the source of emission. Here the jamming procedure is a whole different issue in itself. Jamming devices emit energy that makes hostile devices dysfunctional. The information thus transmitted changes its character, and in other situations it is destroyed. The role of those devices is twofold as well. They may be used in EW systems. They may also be used as signals distorting the signal proper in computer networks. If it is assumed that spurious signals carry an additional program such as a virus, then this kind of hostility lies in the domain of the cybernetic environment and can be dubbed cybernetic warfare.

The Cybernetic Environment – Terminology Operations across and within computer networks should be understood through

the prism of the changes that have been taking place during military conflicts as well as operations other than war. With the end of the Cold War period and the global, bipolar, military status quo, an entirely new political situation has emerged. The situation has changed dramatically when it comes to global security. Over the last few decades we have been witnessing emergency situations we never faced

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before. An immediate result of those changes is a non-standard use of armed forces and a new approach toward planning, commanding, controlling, and collaborating with domestic troops as well as allied forces abroad. We are also observing a major change in the attitudes toward non-military organisations, for instance, humanitarian organisations under military supervision. The massive influence those changes have, has given rise to a number of asymmetric effects on domestic and hostile forces. This exemplifies new hazards in the area of military operations. The traditional methods of waging war are being superseded by surprise attacks using small groups of troops in many places simultaneously. A physical attack, aside from gunfire, has come to be associated with other mediums and cyberattack certainly counts as one of them.

Cyberspace is the “primordial soup” that spawned all manner of means of information transfer, be it the spoken word, printed messages or images at present, and holographic images in the future. As far as easy availability of information is concerned, global data transfer constitutes a bona-fide revolution. The military are trying to make the most of this state of affairs. Any commanding officer`s decision can be tracked online. Commanders and their troops have become mass media hostages. Their decisions are assessed by domestic and foreign audience. The cybernetic setting, which has become their working ambience, is transparent to public opinion always hankering after the latest developments.

The fast tempo of development in the IT area made such easy access to information possible. Countries all over the globe started coming up with different definitions of information networks. The concept as we know it began to take on new meaning when approached from a global perspective. It has been extended to encapsulate gathering data, detecting and jamming the information setting. For some time there has been a noticeable increase in the bulk of material published on the topic of cyberspace. Many authors have been taking the term for granted, without giving much thought to its true meaning. Some of them seem to blur and skew its meaning in attempting to present their views. One consequence of the nascent change was a new doctrine proposed by the US Armed Forces in December 2008. It was made public as The National Military Strategy for

Cyberspace Operations (NMS-CO). It defines the cybernetic domain, enumerates potential threats, and nephralgic areas. It constitutes a basis for further military action in this area. The doctrine itself is an expression of a multidimensional strategic approach by the US Army to the use of cybernetic operations ensuring the nation`s supremacy in this field. According to the doctrine, this objective is to be achieved through an integrated cybernetic offence with defensive operations aided by highly-qualified personnel. The doctrine is an attempt at defining cyberspace.

Cyberspace is a domain characterised by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum for gathering, modifying, and exchanging data via network systems and the accompanying physical infrastructure. The document contains an older definition from a previous publication (JP 1-02). It reads as


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follows: cyberspace – a virtual environment in which digitalized information is made available via computer networks.

These two framings of cyberspace differ glaringly when juxtaposed. While in the older version access to data is exclusively through computer networks, the latest version includes a selection of electronic devices and accompanying physical infrastructure. Both definitions refer to already existing information networks. However, cyberspace`s social dimension should also be taken into account. Traditional social relations stand in great contrast to the ones maintained over and with the help of the Internet. Time and space lose their core meaning in cyberspace. Interpersonal relations are of the essence. In this respect borders between countries have ceased to exist and people using the Web have become uncontrollable. Everyone is connected to everyone else while remaining an anonymous netizen.

It should be reiterated that cyberspace can be approached from different angles. It could be treated as a human activity aided by information technology, where all activity is synonymous with technology, and where geographical notions are irrelevant. As was pointed out by P. Villo “… its elements are devoid of an expansiveness dimension, they function within and can be subsumed under a specific timeframe across which information flows. […] Integrated computers and computer displays render the division into the here and there non-existent.

It is almost a cliché to say that cyberspace is a new medium transferring data at light speed by means of bits. Even without a sharpened definition we seem to know instantly that what authors have in mind are computer networks in general and the Internet in particular. Cyberspace is treated as something created artificially. A value stripped of geographic parameters, immeasurable and limitless. As Z. Bauman pointedly observed: ”its frames and boundaries are measured by the current level of IT advancement and the extent to which the world has been Interneticized”. Indeed, what we call distance in cyberspace is far from being an objective impersonal datum physical in character. All remaining factors, by means of which group identities arise, gain and preserve their uniqueness.

The character of contact between networking users has changed since the first stages of cyberspace. Interpersonal relations have turned into a form of partnership, while freedom of speech is gaining wider and wider ground. Territorialism has become a thing of the past. It is no longer possible to control who communicates what to whom. The most pressing issue then is not so much an unimpeded flow of information but the control of virtual space. Democratic countries wanting to control cyberspace are obliged to adhere to fundamental human rights, the freedom of expression being one of them. It has been decided that since cyberspace cannot be controlled, the effects of its functioning ought to be minimised.

The results of those measures can be observed in a limiting of access to some Internet content for underage users. Access to sites promoting pornography and violence are automatically censored. Similar steps are taken by companies toward their employees. The same is the case with authorities banning access to

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aggressive, subversive or otherwise unwanted Internet content. In some Asian and Arabic countries such practice has become standard. Many authoritarian regimes go to great lengths to keep their society ignorant. They purposefully block Internet sites, some of which are fertile ground for insurgency. Such countermeasures may prove effective, as a broadband connection in these countries is still a rarity.

Cyberspace is thoroughly discussed in an official document published in Poland in 2008 entitled Governmental Program for Cyberspace Protection for the

years 2009-2011 – Provisions. It is a reaction to different measures taken by the EU. The document provides specific guidelines for the Polish presence in cyberspace. It also provides a simple definition of the term, which reads: Cyberspace is communication space consisting of a system of internet links. It provides some names of governmental organisations working in the cyberspace environment, which include: MSWiA, ABW, MON, SKW. Moreover, it mentions non-governmental organisations, and owners of resources, etc. It informs that the Polish Ministry of Defence (MON) has been granted its own share of responsibility for cyberspace. The legal basis for the Armed Forces jurisdiction is the document Decision of MON nr. 375/MON dated 29/07/2008 concerning the response to

computer incidents in the National Defence Department. This can be taken as red that the military had already been involved in cyberspace activities.

Following government decisions The Minister of National Defence formed The Polish Armed Forces Centre for Cybernetic Security, which is to be in charge of cybernetic hostilities at the operational level. Professionals working at the office define operations in cyberspace as an easy access to and wide use of electromagnetic waves. Following their idea of cybernetic activity; It is a global

expanse within an IT setting comprising the Internet, telecommunications

networks, and IT systems. Cyberspace can be understood as accomplishing

different objectives via cyberspace route. Those measures include activities whose

aim is to gain and protect relevant data. This take on the matter corresponds with the American definition. Cybernetic operations are a true evolutionary milestone. Obviously, the trend setting country in this respect is The United States of America. It can boast the most advanced IT in the world. With the document DD 3 – The US tries to define cyberspace, extending its core meaning to include cybernetic operations and cybernetic defence.

The concept has been extended to include by an IT domain. Here, cyber-ops are explained away as cybernetic solutions where self-interest plays a key role. Such operations include activities in IT networks and activities defending the Global Information Grid. The set of aforementioned definitions help to sharpen the concept of the cybernetic advantage to operating in cyberspace as a method of carrying out hostilities in a given time and domain without unwanted interference.


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The Correlation of Electrical Apparatus After WW2 both civil and military theoreticians were of the view that future

wars will be strictly tied with outer-space and the electromagnetic spectrum. The views expresses placed the EW waves as the most palpable background for military conflict. This claim is substantiated by numerous examples of the use of electronic weapons throughout history. The evidence for the shift toward the EM dimension is further confirmed by many innovations introduced to the field over the years. The view expressed by the historian Michael Howard in his book War in the

History of Europe tellingly frames the issues related to the development and use of electronic means of communication, cryptography, reconnaissance, and radio location. (…) The side that prevailed eventually was more capable of keeping track

of the enemy`s movements, deciphering its messages, and at the same time it could

keep its own secrets secret. During World War Two this would not have been

possible without the know-how of intercepting radio signals. It can be assumed that already in those years a new war environment was being

exploited. One can bring forward countless examples of attempts at categorizing military activities and defining all war dimensions.

Up until recently military confrontation was taking place in a three-dimensional environment. This matches very closely human cognition and understanding. Strife at a modern battlefield transcends these barriers. Some theorist talk about as many as six modern warfare dimensions altogether. One of them is Colonel R. Grabau of the German Armed Forces who discusses the multidimensionality of war by pointing to six aspects in waging it. The first three are rather standard and include the following: X-width, Z-depth, and H-height. Additionally, he introduces time, information, and electromagnetic spectrum. He envisages the last three factors to be decisive in future conflicts.

The same conclusion was reached independently by a colonel from the United States Airforce in the first years of the 1990s. Colonel John Warder put forward his claim of strategic paralysis, where he presented his Warden`s Model. According to his theory, any enemy can be seen as a collective system of subsystems. Thus, any organisation can be regarded as a structure composed of five inner rings that form a unit and serve different functions. He includes in his model a number of organisations: companies, the military, terrorist organisations, organised crime, among others. Here is an approximation of how his model is supposed to work:

1. Political elites i.e. the controlling factor. 2. Basic institutions – earlier referred to as organic needs transferring energy

from one ring to another. 3. Infrastructure. 4. Society – the human factor. 5. Defence Systems – composed of demographic groups.

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The model is organised along the following lines; each of Warden`s rings functions in a specific settling: the sea, ground, air, outer-space, cyberspace. Taking into account current conditions, the model calls for a slight modernisation. Nowadays the preferred setting for various activities is electronic rather than electromagnetic. Thus the fifth ring is divided into two parts, the cybernetic setting and the electromagnetic setting.

Defense Systems

Society

Infrastrucure

Basic Institutions

Ground

Air

Sea

Electronic Setting

EM Environment

Political Elites

Cosmos

Cybernetic Environment

Source: Own work.

Picture 2. A modified version of Warden’s Model

The problems with automation of electronic devices concern the EW waves

environment. Neither automation nor electronic systems are issues keenly pursued by Polish military decision-makers. The past as well as ongoing military conflicts especially in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan provide irrefutable evidence that the IT setting is becoming more and more important in battle. Hence the questions: can electronic equipment be used to detect IT networks? If that is the case, then which devices are these specifically? Can these devices also work in other environments? Perhaps they are operating within a yet undefined one.

Traditionally a battlefield used to be described as a closed geographical area, within which hostilities are carried out. The very definition of the battlefield imposed ways of waging war. Nowadays modern combat uses other environments as well. By their nature, they are far removed from the battlefield in a geographical sense, which is responsible for the radical change in the ways war is waged. This is noticeable even at a very fundamental level. As a case in point we can observe network-centric hostilities connected with maintaining a continuous, unimpeded flow of information from the decision-maker to appropriate sensors. Multifunctional


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devices of a global range help individual troops accomplish strategic goals. They keep soldiers up-dated by a continuous flow of data so that they can take optimal decisions. Another telling example is antiterrorist hostilities, especially the ones in a network-centric environment. In the case of opposing an unidentified enemy it is difficult to talk about a battlefield as such. In this context military operations rarely bring the expected result. Asymmetrical conflicts are characterised by an atypical battlespace area. The enemy and its pursuer are constantly on the move. The side whose position is compromised loses out. Conversely, the side fighting by stealth controls the situation.

A reaction to this state of affairs was a new concept proposed by the US military. What used to be called a battlefield is now superseded by the battlespace. It includes strategic, operational and tactical conditions irrespective of their geographical location. From this angle, operations even at the tactical level are conditioned by a vast number of factors, most of which lie beyond the commonly understood battlefield. Here, one can talk about other settings for activities. Generally speaking, traditionally organised operations limit the manoeuvrability of the commanding officer with respect to the monitoring and assessment of the situation. His recon capacity is not fully used. This situation is instantly resolved with the application of a network centric approach toward military operations. In other words, the IT and electromagnetic environments prevail.

Geospace IT Warfare

Environment

Network-Centric Environment

Electronic Environmnet

Working environment of electronic devices in

Electronic Warfare

Working environment of electronic devices in cybernetic operations

Electronic Devices.

Electronic Devices.

Electronic Devices.

Electronic Devices.

Electronic Devices.

Source: Own work.

Picture 3. The working environment of electrical devices in an Electronic Warfare and

Network-Centric Setting

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The use of electromagnetic energy in air, outer-space, and water, as well as the use of computer systems in cyberspace directed military action toward a totally new environment where Electronics plays the most important role. Obviously, arms in the traditional understanding will long remain a vital part of any army`s arsenal. However, they will probably be used to scare off potential enemies. The common denominator for this environment are electronic systems and devices. We have thus entered a new era of the electronic environment. One cannot overvalue its role as it is used to operate and control virtually every piece of equipment. Man is an essential component of this mechanism. Autonomous military operations are now possible, which is another great achievement in the field of cybernetic science. Independent operations carried out at sea, in the air or on land with the use of electronic equipment further bear out the claim that we are witnessing the emergence of a novel battlefield environment. With this in mind, the electronic environment can be described as follows:

• The set of all objects including their attributes and dependencies between them, which due to certain criteria of assignment to the system, have been excluded from it.

• The totality of inanimate elements both natural and created by man existing within a particular area including the links and dependencies between them.

The concept of the setting in which electronic devices function has been narrowed down to the total number of inanimate elements resulting from human activities in a particular time and space.

This paper has viewed the electromagnetic setting from many different angles. A considerable amount of space has also been devoted to a number of problems connected with an automation of electrical devices in their working environment. A different issue is automation in other environments. The resultant question is, can equipment functioning in other settings also be automated. The characteristics of the setting have been provided. The conclusion is that electrical devices functioning in this setting are mainly computers. However, apart from them, there is a wide range of auxiliary appliances.

Carrying out operations in cyberspace means facing the same challenges pertaining to Electronic Warfare. The hostilities in both environments are comparable if one assumes that the means of combat in cyberspace are reconnaissance, jamming, and defence. The fundamental question is whether they are the same in nature. Cybernetic reconnaissance aims at gaining information about the movement of objects in computer networks. In other words, it is concerned with gathering data that is of interest to the recipient, intercepting information from identified objects, detecting relevant sources and tracking them. Therefore, it can be concluded that these are very similar tasks that lie at the core of Electronic Warfare. What has partially changed are the tools used to accomplish these goals. The radio receiver has given way to the computer equipped with appropriate software. This software constitutes the key and is the fundamental difference between cybernetic and


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electromagnetic warfare. With a closer look at the issue one encounters a further problem. Computers are equipped with receiver-transmitter devices such as Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. Consequently, an electronic appliance together with a computer form a transmitter-receiver system. Through their protocols, Wi-Fi devices allow for data to be transmitted over a long distance by means of 2.4 GHz electromagnetic waves. Taking this into consideration we can say that receiving devices are starting to function like similar devices used in EW. In a nutshell, information reconnaissance is electronic reconnaissance realised by searching emission sources, intercepting and tracking signals transmitted via electromagnetic waves. What changes is the character of the detected devices. By contrast, information reconnaissance within cybernetic warfare focuses on the search for objects, programs, and their interception, detection and tracking in computer networks with the use of impulses and, to some extent, electromagnetic waves. The way to access computer networks is via the electromagnetic spectrum or direct connection to the network.

G2

Source: Own work.

Picture 4. The idea of radio-electronic reconnaissance

Granting the fact that that under certain conditions radio-electronic and

information reconnaissance is feasible by means of electromagnetic waves, one may wonder whether it would be possible to construct a universal tracking device. Such a hypothesised item would be able to monitor computer networks and other electronic equipment working at similar frequencies for both cybernetic and electromagnetic warfare. If we assume that EW breaks out in a civic setting then construction of the device is viable. With just one such remotely splayed item capable of receiving a wide frequency spectrum, it would be possible to gain access

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to electronic devices of interest to EW and to receive impulses at the working frequency of practically any network. Remote connection to such equipment would make it possible to connect to any particular network undetected.

G2

Direct connection to network

Intercepting radiotransmission in computer networks

Interception radiotrasmission from own unit

Source: Own work

Picture 5. The idea of cybernetic reconnaissance

Intercepting radiotransmission in computer networks via common electronic device

universal electronic device

EW subunits

CW subunits

Source: Own work.

Picture 6. A model of a common locating device in electronic and cybernetic warfare


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Apart from electronic devices typical for electronic warfare, cybernetic warfare will also be using jamming devices and technology for cybernetic defense. Interference and jamming in this sense is tantamount to introducing spying software into computer networks. This means gaining specific data in specific networks and computers using all manner of methods. Moreover, what is also understood by jamming is introducing software in order to cause physical damage to software e.g., destruction of database content, virus infection, overload causing hardware to go haywire, deliberate overloading of the CPU, RAM, and graphics board. Broadly speaking, there are two ways of accessing computer networks. Breaking into computers from any place on the globe. The other being direct connection to network. Many receivers take necessary safety precautions, which prevents access to their databases. Information seekers are expected to possess a formidable body of knowledge, which with the level of IT education available, is not a problem at all. Additionally, a much more severe problem is posed by networks located outside the reach of cyber-warriors. Providing special units with universal devices might be a solution to this problem. Such devices could be used for electronic reconnaissance in the traditional sense, but at the same time they could monitor a given area for networks of interest. As soon as one has been located, then with the use of appropriate software, cybernetic warfare ensues.

Automation and the universality of reconnaissance have been mainly due to cost cuts and tightening of the budgets. Another consequence is the miniaturisation of devices and gear. The smaller a device is, the less it costs to produce. The best examples are sensory devices, whose functions range from detecting to jamming to booby traps.

Another issue is computer network security. From the point of view of cybernetic warfare, defence comes down to the technical protection of computers with the help of programs, monitoring devices, the surveillance systems. Furthermore, it includes barring access of unwanted individuals and/or programs to the network itself, the server, identification cards, and finally to the premises.

The automation of electrical devices for the needs of both EW and CW is possible to a certain extent and in relation to highly specialised reconnaissance devices. Experience gained from past military conflicts teaches us that the future combat environment will force us to change much in our ideas and attitudes. The proposals made in this paper may contribute to finding novel technical solutions.

Conclusion The ongoing evolution in the organisation of military operations in

environments other than electromagnetic, as well as the permanent reorganisation of reconnaissance does not concern only structural and doctrinal changes. Focus on other environments means a deep transformation, which is predicted to last

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relatively long, perhaps even more than twenty years. The heart of the matter is the a change in the mentality and concepts concerned with activities in IT networks and approaching electronic devices from a broader perspective. The electronic and cybernetic dimension is becoming a reality. Personal, tactical, structural and technological changes impress upon us different attitude toward functional and constructional considerations of electronic devices operating within different environments. Homogenous devices operating within a single setting are costly, inordinate in size, and easily detectable on the battlefield. By contrast, miniaturised multifunctional devices will be able to achieve levels of efficiency unattainable for older technology. They will excel at accomplishing complex tasks. Thus, automation of such devices is a prerequisite and a necessity.

These changes are being made and probably will be taking place during missions organised by the military. This is taken to mean that altogether three processes are taking place in parallel: (1) the participation of reconnaissance in missions with the use of state-of –the-art recon gear, (2) automation systems, (3) the search for new technological solutions. That is why reconnaissance operations will be carried out under very hard conditions. Taking this into consideration, it can be assumed that in the coming years the dominant environment for The Polish Armed Forces will be the electromagnetic environment. The automation of systems will be developed systematically. When it comes to the cybernetic environment, the automation of devices is limited in range. Yet, considering the difficulties accessing certain networks, especially LAN networks, common electrical devices (sensors) could undergo this process.

New concepts referring to electronic equipment are discussed by different panels of experts. It is for academics to decide whether some will enter the technical language. After verification from scientific circles they will be included in doctrines and books. Those considerations are still to come.

Automation and miniaturisation are changing scientists` views on problems of reconnaissance in different environments. Not only do the EW units work in the EM spectrum, but they are also looking for ways to expand and work efficiently in other environments. With hindsight, the rapid development of technology and the speed of changes will cause a revolutionary shift from the electromagnetic spectrum to a wholly new environment. It barely needs pointing out that we must do all there is within our power not to miss it and keep abreast with the times.

Bibliography

Bauman Z., Globalizacja, czyli komu globalizacja, a komu lokalizacja, “Studia

socjologiczne”, nr 3, 1997. Bauman Z, Globalizacja, Warszawa 2000. Bógdał-Brzeinska A., Gawrycki M. F., Cyberterroryzm i problemy bezpieczeństwa

informacyjnego we współczesnym świecie, ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2003.


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Czeszejko S. Działania elektroniczne w NATO i Siłach Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej

– próba kategoryzacji, AON, Warszawa 2011 Cyberspace Operations (DD 3-12), Centrum Rozwoju Doktryn i Edukacji Sił Powietrznych

USA, 2010. Grabau, Sześć wymiarów wojny, WPZ nr 1,2,3, Warszawa, 1987 Howard M, Wojna w dziejach Europy, Ossolineum, Wrocław 1990. Konopka L., Walka sieciocentryczne sposobem działania sił zbrojnych w przyszłości, Myśl

Wojskowa, nr 2/2006. Mały słownik Cybernetyczny, Wiedza Powszechna, Warszawa 1973. Materiały robocze Centrum Bezpieczeństwa Cybernetycznego, Białobrzegi, 2011. National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations – NMS-CO, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Waszyngton, 2006, Price A., Narzędzia mroku, Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, Wrocław 2006 Rządowy program ochrony cyberprzestrzeni RP na lata 2009-2011 – założenia, Warszawa,

2009. Scheffs W., Walka elektroniczna w operacji i walce, AON, Warszawa 2005. Scheffs W, Środowisko działania sensorów walki elektronicznej, ZN AON nr 4/2010 Sienkiewicz P., Wizje i modele wojny informacyjnej. w: Społeczeństwo informacyjne –

wizja czy rzeczywistość ?, Biblioteka Główna Akademii Górniczo-Hutniczej, Kraków 2003.

Vego M., Systemowe kontra klasyczne podejście do działań bojowych, Kwartalnik Bellona nr 2, Warszawa, 2009.

http://en.wikipedia.org/cybrprzestrzeń

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CBRN RECONNAISSANCE IN THE POLISH

ARMED FORCES

Jarosław SOLARZ, Ph.D. National Defence University

Abstract

Modern combat operations are carried out in a constantly changing reality. The

speed and diversity of these changes means that parties to the conflict work with limited access to information. For many years, it has been known that one of the most difficult types of combat operations are conducted in terms of the use of weapons of mass destruction. The immense power of destruction combined with the

massive contamination typical for that weapon means that the problem of quickly

gathering reliable information about WMD strikes and contaminations is still extremely important. For this purpose, CBRN reconnaissance has been developed,

however because of the importance of the project and the considerable diversity

there are several interpretations as to what it involves. This article is an attempt to assess the relevance and credibility of the various

theories of CBRN reconnaissance. It discusses the history of that type of reconnaissance, its nature and numerous application examples. The analysis

examined the rules in force in Poland's CBRN reconnaissance which result from the

current understanding of doctrine. In addition to considerations relating to the

reconnaissance, the U.S. solution were presented as a comparison. Particular attention was paid to the analysis of tasks, methods and techniques of

CBRN reconnaissance, which in most cases still remain unclear. At the same time effort has been taken to present proper, according to the author, an interpretation of all these

elements of CBRN reconnaissance, allowing for the verification of the suitability of existing tasks, methods and techniques and to propose a more useful solution.

Key words – CBRN, WMD

Modern threats, manifested in the form of various types of contamination can

be diverse in nature. In general, however, there are no major problems in dividing

them into two separate, quite different types. The first one is derived from strictly

military threats, specifically threats generated by nuclear, chemical and biological

weapons. The second type of threats, occurring also in peacetime, usually are the

result of the potential impact of large numbers of toxic industrial chemicals which

occur in the national economy.


CBRN RECONNAISSANCE IN THE POLISH ARMED FORCES

127

For many years in the Polish Armed Forces, to overcome these threats,

a number of different projects have been prepared, which now operate under the

concept of CBRN Defence1.

Currently, CBRN Defence is seen as a set of undertakings carried out in order

to deter the enemy from using WMD and ensuring the security of forces during

operations in terms of contaminations caused by the use of nuclear, biological,

chemical and radiological weapons as well as by the release of dangerous

substances in situations other than a WMD strike2.

The achievement of such a formulated goal of CBRN Defence will never be an

easy task. This is due to the enormous potential for destruction, which targeted

accurately can cause death and destruction on a scale rarely seen. An additional

complication is the unusual variation of mass destruction, which makes the defence

effort very different. But in all cases, to achieve the objective of CBRN Defence it

should be pursued by the full and proper use of all available forces and means.

The implementation of these tasks are carried out within the wide spectrum of

CBRN Defence System, in which the tasks conducted first are those whose purpose

is to avoid contamination. Among them, certainly, CBRN reconnaissance should

be found; however, is that the case?

The purpose of this article is to identify the place and role of CBRN

reconnaissance in the Polish Armed Forces within the overall task of determining

the functioning of a modern CBRN Defence System. During the investigation

answers will be sought to the questions: What is the CBRN Defence System and

what made it? What is CBRN reconnaissance? What are the methods, tasks and

techniques of modern CBRN reconnaissance?

A Brief History

As mentioned, in the past there operated a number of terms relating to the

general sense of defence against weapons of mass destruction. In certain periods

there simultaneously operate two or even three types of combat service support.

Originally, this was due to the separation of the various "defences" into anti-

chemical, anti-biological (antibacterial)3 or anti-nuclear, but later, after

simultaneously been used for a long time there developed an anti-chemical defence

1 Previously, there were anti-chemical defence, chemical support, anti-gas defense, anti-nuclear

defence and anti-biological defence - see. I. Nowak, J. Solarz, Ewolucja zadań obrony

przeciwchemicznej w Wojsku Polskim, ZN AON, No. 3/1998 Warsaw. 2 Obrona przed bronią masowego rażenia w operacjach połączonych, DD/3.8, MON, Warsaw

2004, p. 5. 3 In this respect, the detection of biological attacks was more wishful thinking than a real

possibility, so this aspect of the story appeared in OPBMR rather rarely. This was due to very poor

technical preparation of troops in this area. Even today only a few armies in the world are supplied

with equipment to identify biological contamination.

JAROSŁAW SOLARZ

128

(chemical support) together with Defence Against Weapons of Mass Destruction

(OPBMR).

Just as many, if not more numerous, were the changes in the specific activities

that occurred within OPBMR, chemical support or anti-chemical defence. Despite

these changes each time the tasks were among those more or less related to CBRN

reconnaissance or CBRN detection. Among them were found quite "exotic" tasks,

such as for example the observation of preparations for an assault by toxic agents

or the detection of enemy preparations for the use of nuclear, chemical and

biological weapons. The list of tasks associated with CBRN reconnaissance, which

occurred over the years in anti-chemical defence, CBRN defence and other early

varieties of "defence" is shown in Figure 1.

Source: Retrieved own study on the basis of I. Nowak, J. Solarz, Ewolucja zadań ..., ed. cited

Figure 1. Evolution of CBRN reconnaissance tasks

1934-1939 Contamination reconnaissance

1924-1934 Observation of preparations for

the assault toxic agents

1918-1924Observation of preparations

for the chemical assault

1941 – 1945 (West)

Reconnaissance and marking of contaminated

areas

1943 – 1955 (East)Chemical reconnaissance

Nuclear reconnaissance

Infection reconnaissance

1955 - 1964 Chemical and nuclear reconnaissance

1964 - 1976Chemical and nuclear reconnaissance

(detection)

CBRN DEFENSE

Reconnaissance of contamination

and infection

1976 - 1985

CBRN DEFENSE

1985 – 1994

Detection of enemy preparations to use

nuclear, chemical and biological weapons,

CHEMICAL SUPPORT

1985 - 1990ANTICHEMICAL DEFENSE

1990 - 1994 Detection of nuclear detonations and chemical

attacks and incendiary agents

Chemical, nuclear and biological reconnaissance

1994 – 2004Detection of nuclear and chemical attacks;

CBRN monitoring (reconnaissance)

CHEMICAL SUPPORT

Chemical and nuclear reconnaissance

Detection of nuclear detonations and

chemical attacks and incendiary agents


129

From the information contained in figure 1 it can be concluded that despite the

many changes in terminology and how to interpret the various projects they are all

related to a specific task area. Basically, it can be assumed that the tasks were of

two types, either related to contamination reconnaissance or complex detection

of enemy strikes using nuclear, chemical or biological methods.

The realisation of CBRN reconnaissance tasks has always been a challenge,

mainly because it required careful coordination and a lot of effort and resources.

All these efforts, however, were strongly associated with other projects CBRN

Defence, because only together could they constitute a whole, aimed at achieving

the CBRN Defence objectives.

CBRN Defence System

To achieve these objectives the CBRN Defence System was established, which,

according to the definition is an orderly arrangement functioning in times of peace

and war, focusing on the coordination of planning and organisation – with

executive regulations realised by the elements in such a way as to provide the

strength and resources to achieve the goals CBRN Defence4.

To ensure an integrated whole, aimed at achieving the objectives CBRN

Defence, the system should take into account all possible aspects of the defence.

Thus it must include specific, specially prepared subsystems, which will make

possible the achievement of the individual objectives involved. In fact the CBRN

Defence system consists of five stand-alone subsystems, interconnected and

correlated in such a way as to obtain the best possible result. These sub-systems

are: CBRN detection, CBRN protection, CBRN decontamination, rescue and

management. Graphic characteristics of the system are presented in Figure 2.

The structure and nature of the respective subsystems leads to the conclusion

that the survival of the dangers of a WMD attack or onset of a ROTA event will be

based on three basic pillars, namely the detection of threats, CBRN protection and

their elimination. Proper coordination of these tasks will be possible only after

combining the total with the management subsystem.

From this observation it follows that one of the essential elements of the system

is a subsystem of detection of CBRN strikes and contamination. It is in fact,

a system whose primary goal is to quickly assemble the fullest information about

the risks generated by weapons of mass destruction or ROTA events. To

accomplish the tasks of this subsystem the following were stablished: CBRN

Warning and Reporting System (SWS), which includes: a sources of information

(detection units); analytical laboratories; and CBRN warning and reporting centres.

4 See. J. Solarz, E. Malicki, M. Młynarczyk, Wojska chemiczne w systemie obrony przed bronią

masowego rażenia, AON, Warsaw 2009, p. 9.

JAROSŁAW SOLARZ

130

RESCUE

SUB-SYSTEM

CBRN

DECONTAMINATION

SUB-SYSTEM

CBRN PROTECTION

CBRN DETECTION

SUB-SYSTEM

SUB-SYSTEM

Figure 2. CBRN Defence System components

It is easy to note that to date none of the names for any of the elements of the

system gives reference to the principle of CBRN reconnaissance. This does not

mean, however, that this type of reconnaissance has already completely

disappeared. Quite the contrary, by penetrating deeper into the structure of the

Warning and Reporting System the traces of CBRN reconnaissance will become

highly visible5.

CBRN Defence tasks

Another clue leading to CBRN reconnaissance are OPBMR tasks. The definition

of defence against weapons of mass destruction implies that it is a set of

undertakings ... which in a simple and effective way should ensure the realisation

of its objectives. Currently6, in line with the doctrinal requirements, we distinguish

five tasks, which include:

– Detection, identification and monitoring (DIM);

– CBRN Warning and Reporting;

– CBRN Protection;

– Hazard Management;

– Medical Countermeasures and Support.

Even a preliminary analysis of these tasks indicates that, in principle, they are

not single projects, but all of them are groups, incorporating a number of different,

often very complex tasks.

In the first case we are dealing with the project, defined as DIM, which stands

for detection, identification, and monitoring. The Polish equivalent is the same, on

5 For example, in the form of sub-units, reconnaissance patrols and checkpoints. 6 Previously, the number and nature of individual CBRN tasks varied widely. See. I. Nowak,

J. Solarz, Ewolucja zadań obrony.., Ed. cited.


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the condition that the first element will be seen as “detekcja”, not as sometimes

happens “wykrywanie”. But still no word about CBRN reconnaissance, with the

exception of the DD/3.8 document, which places it among CBRN detection. This

interpretation is not correct, and the only acceptable alternative appears to be the

detection of contamination (strokes).

The problem of understanding the detection of contamination is another aspect

that needs to be developed. There is a peculiar duality of the concept, which is to

detect contamination while being assimilated in the detection of the same

contaminants (i.e. finding the fact of contamination) and the detection of WMD

strikes and other events leading to the formation of contamination. Both

interpretations are appropriate and should be considered together.

The second element located in the name of the task is identification of the

contamination, which is based on the sampling of contaminated materials and their

study aiming to identify the type, nature and character of the contaminant. The last

element of DIM is the monitoring, the action, the purpose of which is to observe

the level of the hazard. It is based on a continuous or periodic occurrence of

pollution control (or lack thereof), which allows for a quick and flexible response

to changing threat levels and to plan further action on the affected area.

In general, it can be concluded that the primary goal of respective DIM

elements is the adequate military response to the threat of contamination due to the

presence of chemical, biological and nuclear substances. Typical ways of reacting

may be as follows:

1. DETECTION – alerting troops and launching procedures and protective

measures;

2. IDENTIFICATION – determining the nature and level of risk, optimising

safety procedures and risk management;

3. MONITORING – control over the level of threat and response to changes.

Separation of respective DIM elements indicates the apparent specificity of the

tasks that are carried out in the framework, and that no major obstacles can be

performed separately. Despite this, individual perceptions of individual DIM

elements are not a good idea, as detection, identification and monitoring of

contamination are a consistent, comprehensive and interconnected conglomeration

of projects and tasks that need to be considered together. In practice, all of these

tasks are carried out in this manner.

The basic task of detection is the early detection of the presence of chemical or

biological agents or radioactive material, which adversely affects the health, before

they have a negative impact on the realisation of tasks (resulting in alarming)7. As

7 You have to remember that in nature we find a number of naturally occurring chemicals,

biological materials, and radioactive substances. Their common presence is harmless until the

moment when they exceed certain levels of contamination defined (for each substance). This may

occur for example, after WMD attack or releasing of toxic industrial chemicals.

JAROSŁAW SOLARZ

132

a result, early information can be sent which will enable the troops to adopt an

appropriate level of personal protective equipment (warning).

Due to the required speed of detection of contamination their full identification

is excluded. Typically, the information obtained is limited to the detection of

whether a hazard exists or not. In general, detectors may be only a function of

warning, which in turn would allow for a significant reduction in the time required

for training, as well as the size and weight of the detectors.

A more detailed diagnosis of the danger arises only at a later stage in the

process of identifying contamination. Its main task is to define (determine the

characteristics, the analysis of) the nature of the substance or species in terms of

their quantity and quality. In this way, we get an opportunity to confirm the type

and nature of the risk and to optimise the level of protection as well as to select

appropriate risk management measures. Generally speaking, the information

obtained details the identifying information provided by the detectors.

The last step in DIM is monitoring, during which scouts conduct a continuous

or periodic monitoring of the presence (or absence) of contamination. It can be

carried out in relation to contaminants of all types: chemical, biological and

nuclear.

The three parts of DIM gives the impression that these three elements are its

tasks. However, even a cursory analysis of the source document allows you to

identify the actual tasks performed in the DIM. According to ATP-3.8.18 there are:

– CBRN Reconnaissance;

– CBRN Sampling in accordance with SIBCRA Standards (AEP-10/AEP-49)

and STANAG 2112)9;

– CBRN Field Analysis;

– CBRN Forensic Analysis.

It is easy to notice that it is only here for the first time, that the term CBRN

Reconnaissance is presented. To clearly understand and properly qualified this it is

worth comparing the different elements in the DIM-tasks that are carried out within

its framework. In this way we obtain a statement shown in Figure 3.

From the data presented in the figure it follows that the three tasks carried out

in the framework of DIM are directly related to the identification of contaminants.

Thus, CBRN reconnaissance should include both the detection and monitoring of

contamination. This interpretation, however, is not the end of the process because

as it turns out, some tasks of identification will be carried within CBRN

reconnaissance. This is a sampling of contaminated material, although, unlike the

SIBCRA teams, mainly for operational purposes and on a much smaller scale.

8 ATP-3.8.1 CBRN Defence on operations, volume I, Brussels 2010, s. 7-8. 9 AEP-49 NATO handbook for sampling and identification of radiological agents. (SIRA),

Brussels 2006; AEP-10 NATO handbook for sampling and identification of biological and chemical

agents, Brussels 2000; STANAG 2112 Nuclear, biological and chemical reconnaissance, Brussels

2005.


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CBRN RECONNAISSANCECBRN RECONNAISSANCE

CBRN SAMPLINGCBRN SAMPLING

CBRN FIELD ANALYSISCBRN FIELD ANALYSIS

CBRN FORENSIC ANALYSISCBRN FORENSIC ANALYSIS

DETECTIONDETECTION

IDENTYFICATIONIDENTYFICATION

MONITORINGMONITORING

Figure 3. Diagnosis of contamination vs DIM

So if we accept that some of the tasks associated with the identification of

contaminants also fall under the term CBRN reconnaissance then we get the full

picture of this project. In summary, we can conclude that the place of CBRN

reconnaissance is on the whole an area specified for the detection, identification

and monitoring of contamination with the exception of the part that relates to the

identification carried out by specialised SIBCRA teams.

The graphic interpretation of the space occupied by CBRN reconnaissance in

the DIM is shown in Figure 4.

CBRN DETECTION CBRN

IDENTYFIKATION

CBRN MONITORING

CBR

N R

ECON

NAISSAN

CE

CBR

N REC

ONN

AISSANCE

CBR

N R

ECO

NN

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Figure 4. The space occupied by CBRN reconnaissance in the DIM

For a better understanding of the nature, place and role CBRN reconnaissance

its methods and tasks should be presented. It turns out, however, that even this is

not entirely clear. The problem stems from the different approaches to the tasks of

JAROSŁAW SOLARZ

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CBRN reconnaissance. According to the previously quoted ATP-3.8.1 in CBRN

reconnaissance tasks we include:

1. CBRN Surveillance;

2. CBRN Field Reconnaissance, including reconnaissance of the road (route),

zone, and the area;

3. CBRN Sensitive Site Reconnaissance;

4. CBRN Survey;

5. CBRN Monitoring.

The analysis of the cited "tasks" leads to the conclusion that they are rather

types, forms and methods of CBRN reconnaissance, maintained in specific

circumstances, in terms of need and opportunity. In this way, it is hard to talk about

tasks, which are known to be typical for the activities10

conducted under CBRN

reconnaissance, and not as a form or method of the same reconnaissance.

There seems to be a much better interpretation of reconnaissance tasks found in

the FM 3-11.19 study11

. According to the American point of view, CBRN

reconnaissance considered as the main way to avoid contamination includes tasks

in which the further implementation will lead to achieving the final objective.

These tasks include:

1. Contamination detection (detection);

2. Identification of contamination (identification);

3. Determination of contaminated land (marking);

4. Reporting about contamination (reporting);

5. Contaminated material sampling (sampling).

The presented set of tasks explicitly specify the form, scope and sequence of

the respective steps (tasks) of CBRN reconnaissance, and ensure the achievement

of the objective in a complete and comprehensive manner.

According to the above, first we should make a note of the fact of

contamination detection, then determine (identify) the contamination, after that we

need to mark the contaminated area, and finally give a report of contaminations. In

addition, in some situations, you may need to load samples of contaminated

material. It should be noted that all of these tasks (except perhaps the last) will be

conducted in the same way, regardless of the method of reconnaissance.

At this point, it might be considered that the problem of tasks and methods for

CBRN reconnaissance has been resolved. Unfortunately, references of CBRN

reconnaissance methods are difficult to find in the literature, both academic and

instructional. Instead, we can meet tasks which, as previously noted, do not fulfil

the standard criteria for the tasks, and are more suited to the form or method. What

10 Task is an activity to be performed – see. Słownik języka polskiego, PWN, Tom 3, Warsaw

1989, p. 898. 11 Multi-service tactics, techniques, and procedures for NBC reconnaissance, Washington 2004,

s. I-1.


135

is more, in the previously mentioned U.S. proposals, we can find projects treated

not only as tasks, but also as missions12

.

These are:

1. Search (searches)

2. Specific identification of contamination (surveys)

3. Observation (surveillance)

4. Contaminated material sampling (sampling)

5. Reconnaissance of roads, areas and zones (router, area, zone reconnaissance)

A careful analysis of the set of tasks leads to the conclusion that the second

interpretation of tasks (by FM 3-11.19) is a specific combination of the two

previously discussed solutions. Thus, interpretation introduces a mess that not only

does not help the understanding of CBRN reconnaissance but actually it makes it

complicated. It seems that the authors of this document, by introducing two

different interpretations of CBRN reconnaissance tasks, lost their way a little bit

and as a result instead of the bright, clear image of reconnaissance, created an

interpretive chaos.

Conclusions

Summing up the discussion, you can confidently say that CBRN reconnaissance is

realised within the detection, identification and monitoring (DIM) which is one of

the five projects that CBRN Defence consist of. The only problem that arises is the

need for understanding the project as a unified whole, without a separate

examination of its individual components. Only in this way will you be able to look

inside and see the reconnaissance, which, as it turns out, is only apparently hidden

somewhere. On the other hand, CBRN reconnaissance is an essential pillar of the

CBRN Defence System, in which it is an integral part of the warning and reporting

subsystem.

The currently existing division of CBRN reconnaissance tasks (ATP - 3.8.1)

is unclear, and the confrontation with the existing rules of reconnaissance is

confusing. Moreover, other existing approaches and interpretations are also

inconsistent and vary greatly, even within a single publication. For this reason,

there is a need for a separation of the tasks and methods of CBRN reconnaissance

and an unambiguous interpretation. The proposed solutions are shown in Figure 5.

12 There.

JAROSŁAW SOLARZ

136

TA

SK

ST

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METHODS (TECHNICS, FORMS?):METHODS (TECHNICS, FORMS?):

1. CBRN DETECTION 1. CBRN DETECTION

2. CBRN IDENTYFICATION2. CBRN IDENTYFICATION

3. MARKING3. MARKING

4. SAMPLING4. SAMPLING

5. REPORTING5. REPORTING

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Figure 5. Proposed tasks and methods of CBRN reconnaissance

OD INTELIGENCJI ROJU DO WIELOAGENTOWYCH SYSTEMÓW DO NAWIGACJI…

137

FROM SWARM INTELLIGENCE

TO MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS FOR

MOBILE ROBOT NAVIGATION

Emilia MIKOŁAJEWSKA, Ph.D. Maj (ret.) Dariusz MIKOŁAJEWSKI MSc

Abstract

Swarm intelligence is perceived as complex social behaviour emerging from simple

interactions of unsophisticated agents. It is derived from the collective behaviour of natural

systems, e.g. ant colonies, but may be adapted to artificial systems. This situation gives

various chances for military use of swarm intelligence technology to navigate mobile

robots. This article aims at investigating the extent to which the available opportunities in

this area are being exploited.

Key words – robotics, artificial intelligence, swarm intelligence, military applications, battlefield robots

Introduction We are deeply convinced that many commanders observing the harmonious,

rapid manoeuvres of shoals of fish or flocks, think how is it possible and dreamt of similar harmony of subordinated military units. But this is not science fiction – scientists are aware of advantages derived from nature imitation. Information technology solutions based on natural (biological) patterns play an important role in the genesis of artificial neural networks (ANN), genetic algorithms (GA), simulated annealing, swarm intelligence1, and many others. There are a lot of useful solutions based on biological patterns, what more their number increases with each day (e.g. chemical computers (biomolecule-based computing2)). The cause of this situation is the perceived difficulties in effectively solving some important scientific problems using only classical hardware and software. Despite

1 Kennedy J., Eberhart R. C. Swarm Intelligence. Morgan Kaufman Publishers, San Francisco

2001; Hantak C. Comparison of parallel hardware based and graphics hardware based platforms for swarm intelligence simulations. Integrative Paper, UNC-Chapel Hill 2003; Bonabeau E., Dorigo M., Theraulaz G. Swarm intelligence: from natural to artificial systems. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999.

2 See also research of I. Willner (Hebrew University, Jerusalem).


EMILIA MIKOŁAJEWSKA, DARIUSZ MIKOŁAJEWSKI

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quick development, current possibilities of „classical” information technology are limited by:

− computationally complicated problems (even despite well known algorithm), e.g. chess games,

− adaptive systems fading dynamical change of situation/environment, e.g. business management, stock exchange simulations, etc.,

− fully-autonomous systems, − fuzzy-logic systems, e.g. intelligent human-machine interaction, multimodal

interaction with speech recognition. Despite the aforementioned advantages, we should be aware of the limitations

of the methods which nature uses to solve its problems: − nature makes compromises, e.g. choosing first useful, but not optimal

solution, − nature's strategies are not always successful (i.e. may be deceptive), − some natural mechanisms may be to difficult to capture and formulate the

algorithm, − some problems, despite being efficiently solved by nature, may be solved

better (more efficiently, quicker, cheaper, etc.) another way – due to this, people use a much larger number of means than nature.

Swarm intelligence is perceived similar to some kind of computational problems by:

1. goal: optimalisation of task fulfilling, 2. basic application range: − search (e.g. for food), − route selection (e.g. shoals of fish, flocks), − transport (ants), − complex group behaviour emerging from simple activities of individuals

(ants, termites, bees, etc.). Thus similar solutions may be used to solve similar problems: − multiple interactions among autonomous agents scattered on an area

(important because of their task), − self-organising control and co-operation (without central management), − labour division and task allocation.

Swarm intelligence as a basement for multi-agent systems Swarm intelligence is a perceived feature of the system, which is characterised

by coherent global patterns emerging from collective behaviour of simple agents interacting locally with the other similar agents and the environment. Thus swarm intelligence provides a framework useful the in research of collective (distracted) problem solving approaches which operate without central control or any global


139

model. The same way is possible for complex behaviour of the group (swarm, colony) consisting of autonomous individuals (agents) fulfilling simple activities within a determined close environment. Complex behaviour of the whole group, necessary to fulfil task and achieve success, emerges as a result of the group ability to self-organise the agents' activities. Functions of agents themselves are usually simple and limited, influencing the simplicity of the agents’ construction. Single agent have not got any global (comprehensive) knowledge, apart from “local” knowledge about its close environment (“neighbourhood”). The agent gets to know about this neighbourhood thanks to:

− interactions with it (using artificial „senses”), − interactions with the closest similar agents (at least one agent) – this is

a process of exchange of „local” knowledge among agents, − environment modification – as optional indirect way of communication

among agents. The activity of agents is usually strictly limited. They can move or modify their

environment. An agent (if it can choice) takes a decision concerning the next step (activity) on the strength of the current status of the closest neighbourhood. More than one option makes this choice rather random, but generally selected activities are more probable than the other. Single agents are relatively independent – they have not got superiors or even any global plan. Thus their behaviour depends on two main issues:

− preliminary programming, called „local plan”, consisting of the rules of operation: e.g.: move randomly and search for food, if you find food: pick it up, remember location of the food, and then return to the group,

− interactions with the closest agents and environment, consisting of the rules of operation: e.g. inform closest agents, where the food is.

Swarm intelligence uses two key mechanisms: − self-organisation – global structures emerge from repetitive local

interactions, resulting in a process similar to collective decision making, − stigmergy – stimulation through work, consisting of indirect communication

and/or coordination based on environment modification, useful e.g. for cooperative transport purposes.

Self-Organisation within the group of agents thanks to both direct and indirect interactions is perceived as very effective. Solutions found due to aforementioned collective decision making are much more complex than possible for a single agent. What is more this result, similar to the effect of distributed processing, is achieved without any defined complex computational processing. Agents may learn how to assess the stimulation and its meaning (positive or negative) – this process provides an exchange of knowledge between individual learning and group learning. In spite of the fact that not all mechanisms of swarm intelligence are clear. We can define basic features of the swarm intelligence:


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− simple and cheap, but autonomous individuals (agents), − distributed control, − purposeful use of interactions: agent-agent, agent-environment, and agent-

environment-agent, − use of direct or indirect communication (including stigmergy),

− scalability: from several agents to many thousands of agents, − increased operational reliability thanks to redundancy and simple

construction of agents (homogenous or heterogenous). Thus an artificial swarm intelligence system should be: − simple, − adaptive, − stable (i.e. behaviour of the agents should be coherent and aiming at the

same goal), − sufficient in the area of quality of operation, i.e. result of operation may be

perceived as satisfying, but not necessarily optimal (the best possible), − in selected cases: should provide various reactions in the same conditions. Current areas of swarm intelligence application are as follows: – optimisation, e.g. in telecommunication networks, – robotics, – movement patterns within transport and production systems, – simulation of group (social) behaviour. Examples of swarm intelligence application are as follows: − searching (e.g. food) by social insects as pattern of optimisation e.g. in

telecommunication networks and travelling salesman problem (TSP), − cooperative transport in insects – important for specialists in robotics, − adaptive labour division and task allocation in ants – undisturbed despite

lack of central control, global situation assessment, and systems to pass directions on – as patterns of control algorithms (e.g. in robots) resistant to interferences,

− nest building by social insects – as patterns for self-reconfigured robots and systems,

− group sorting and classification – useful in automatic data analysis systems, − movement of shoals of fish or flocks – useful in crowd movement analysis,

traffic analysis (including rush hours, traffic jams, etc.), − alife (artificial life) simulations – from simple forms of artificial life to

advanced simulations of social and/or evolutionary processes, − tests of distributed systems, wide area systems, and software. The best optimisation techniques based on swarm intelligence are perceived as

(depends on the task): − Ant Colony Optimisation (ACO), − Particle Swarm Optimisation (PSO).


141

There is need to admit, that due to the quick development and diversity of solutions there is a lack of common criteria for the purposes of assessment and compartmentalisation of swarm intelligence systems. Practice shows useful tools in the aforementioned area: simulations, and compartment of flexibility and resistance to errors (similar to robots competitions).

Ant Colony Optimisation Colonies of social insects (ants, termites, bees) are able to fulfil tasks requiring

flexibility and intelligence based on single insects (simple, unified individuals, without knowledge, without intelligence). Single insects use their senses and play their role based on very simple rules. The spectrum of their possible behaviour is significantly limited. What's more, single insects do not know about the general status of the whole colony, directions of its development, and tasks division. Global structure (e.g. ant hill) emerges from activities of a lot of single insects. What's more – it is stable, self-controlled, adaptive (e.g. to changes within environment) unit3.

One of the most important pieces of research on social insects is on methods of cooperative terrain search (e.g. for food). Despite the fact that a single ant is able to search only a small part of terrain, ants divide work and co-operate e.g. exploiting food resource found by one of them. Thus group behaviour of an ant colony is perceived as a compound of interactions among single ants belonging to the colony. Because of it there is a possible resultant complex in ant colony behaviour.

First attempts of the ACO4 application to optimise artificial systems took place in the 1980s. Ants become the general concept of a pheromone trail in communication derived from biological patterns. Bonabeau et al. showed the first ACO system in 1989. This system provided simple rules concerning the behaviour of single ants (agents) within a moving column of ants. Indirect communication uses pheromone trails: a route with pheromone (laid down by an ant which found food) seems be more attractive for other ants. Thus a stronger pheromone trial indicates not only information, but even a call for help (e.g. in food transport). Pheromone evaporates, so if no ant refreshed it (e.g. after food resource exploitation), this route becomes unattractive. A second important ant feature is the ability to find the shortest path from the food resource to the ant hill. Pheromone trails play a key role in it. Ants create (and maintain) pheromone trails, but the shortest path is the most attended, the transfer takes the shortest time period, thus

3 Dorigo M., Stützle T. Ant Colony Optimization. MIT Press, Massachusets 2004; Dorigo M., Di Caro G. Ant Algorithms for Discrete Optimization. Artificial Life, 1999, 5(3): 137–172.

4 Navarro Varela G., Sinclair M. C. Ant Colony Optimisation for virtual-wavelength-path routing and wavelength allocation. Materiały Congress on Evolutionary Computation (CEC’99), 1999; White T., Bieszczad A., Pagurek B. Distributed fault location in networks using mobile agents. Materiały 3rd International Workshop on Agents in Telecommunication Applications IATA’98, 1998.


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this way is the most common refreshed with pheromone, and the most attractive. Thus we can observe the global solution for a whole group of ants derived from the behaviour of every single ant. What is more: if any obstacle will appear on the aforementioned shortest path – the same mechanism will provide the shortest avoidance or (if avoidance is not possible) even the new (shortest in the new conditions) path. Scientists perceive the aforementioned mechanisms as being very effective, because they are useful since millions of years.

Substituting ants with simple (artificial) agents we can observe simple framework for various tasks. Basic task seems be simulation of travelling salesman problem. More complex task is simulation of the telecommunication network overload, freight transportation, or traffic monitoring. Some aspects of ACO are useful for logistical support (including e.g. drugs for hospitals), task allocation, and even (in selected cases) strategies of operation for whole companies5.

Proper use of ACO requires: − proper analogy choice, − proper environment simulation, including its dynamical changes, − proper simulation of agents' behaviour (especially heterogenous agents

fulfilling different tasks), − proper choice of the simplest rules concerning agents’ activity, based on

experience, and providing required group behaviour – thus rules do not limit behaviour of single agents, and let them find unknown, better solutions, especially if the current solution is not useful,

− that the result may be satisfying (e.g. meeting the criteria), but not always optimal (the best possible).

Features of insects significantly influencing success (both natural and artificial systems) are as follows:

− flexibility – ability to adapt to various environment conditions, − operational reliability – group fulfil its tasks despite errors (or even damage)

of several single agents, − self-control – lack of central control and management system.

5 Mohamad M. M. Articulated robots motion planning using foraging ant strategy. Journal of

Information Technology - Special Issues in Artificial Intelligence, 2008, 20(4): 163–181; Mohamad M. M., Taylor N. K., Dunnigan M. W. Articulated robot motion planning using Ant Colony Optimisation. Materiały 3rd International IEEE Conference on Intelligent Systems, 2006, ss. 690–695; Mohamad M. M., Dunnigan M. W., Taylor N. K. Foraging Ant Motion Planning for Articulated Robots. Materiały International Joint Conference SICE-ICASE, 2006, ss. 4285–4290; Mohamad M. M., Dunnigan M. W., Taylor N. K. Ant Colony Robot Motion Planning. Materiały IEEE International Conference on Computer as a Tool: EUROCON 2005, ss. 213-216.


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Particle Swarm Optimisation The concept of PSO was developed by social psychologist James Kennedy and

engineer (electrician) Russell Eberhart in 1995. It derives from earlier research on the behaviour of flocks (of birds). The behaviour of a flock emerges from simple rules describing activity of single birds during flight:

− set direction and speed aiming at remaining inside the flock, − set direction and speed aiming at not collide with other birds (in the closest

neighbourhood). If any bird flies towards discovered food, the closest birds follow it. As a

consequence whole flock files in the same direction, unless another bird discovers a more attractive source of food. Implicit rules allow for synchronous and collision-free movement, due to efforts of individual birds to remain at the optimal distance to neighbours. Making the analogy: aforementioned food searching is similar to searching within an area of potential solutions for the best of them. The distinction of the best solution from the others needs to allow for comparison (by particular single particle) of an individual's own results with the results of its „neighbours”. If the results of one of the “neighbours” are better then its own, the particle follows it – this way the best tactics are copied by others6. Thus generally PSO constitutes a simulation of a simplified social system7. But we should be aware, that human behaviour is much more complex, e.g. may be based on feelings and opinions.

Due to the aforemetioned analogy the two basic mechanisms controlling the searching algorithms of PSO are as follows:

− exploration of the space in the searching process aims at the area of the best previous solutions – it influences a quick convergence of the algorithm, but may terminate only on the first found solution, e.g. local minima instead of the global minima,

− use of information concerning previous achievements in searching process – PSO's one-way information sharing method: only the best (local or global) individual (particle) may share its knowledge with the others; what's more each of the individuals bases action on its own experience (including its own best position to compare with the proposed one).

Advantages of PSO are as follows: − few parameters controlling optimisation process, − handy representation of solutions, − simple rule of transformation from one solution to another.

6 Basement of PSO’s genesis is perceived assumption that social information sparing among

individuals form the same team/community constitutes significant evolutionary advantage. 7 Fealko D. R. Evaluationg Particle Swarm Intelligence Techniques for solving university

examination timetabling problems. Doctoral thesis. Nova Southeastern University 2005.


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Applications of PSO have to establish undisturbed equilibrium between individual behaviour and group behaviour due to:

− focus on individual behaviour which causes separate searching for the solution and a lack of knowledge sharing with „neighbours” (result: endless searching procedures or termination on the first found solution, e.g. local minima),

− focus on group behaviour which causes common reaping benefits from knowledge of the other individuals (result: lack of individual search, group focus on the first found solution, e.g. local minima).

Evidence from experiments proved that not numerous „neighbourhood” provides increased model efficacy. In the case of PSO “neighbour” means: next in the row/column, but not exactly “close”, because distances between particles may be bigger.

PSO algorithms are perceived as efficient in solving a wide spectrum of problems, independent in the number of dimensions or size of problems. The biggest advantage may be their simplicity and scalability, and moreover:

− rapid solving of non-typical problems, − ability of the optimisation of difficult mathematical problems, both analog

and discrete.

Multiagent systems One of the most interesting forms of co-activity (cooperation or competition) of

huge groups of simple agents are perceived multi-agent systems (MAS). MAS are similar to ACO or PSO. The general result (as realisation of the system goal) emerges from a compound of activities of a lot of simple agents, interacting with each-other, based on basic rules implemented in each of the agents. Thus MAS constitutes intelligent distributed software.

The description of the agent (in a MAS context) changes depending on task and application. In the most general case agent consists of two main parts: software (logical, as information), and hardware (physical, as robot, other machine or e.g. part of production line). Thus a dedicated technology of software is necessary. The aforementioned technology should provide simulation and implementation of individual and social behaviour in distributed systems.

Multi-agent system consists of such elements as: environment, objects in the environment, agents in the environment, and relationships among agents. Thus features of a multi-agent system are as follows:

− it consists of autonomous agents: each of them fulfils its own task, and this task may be (but not necessarily) coherent with tasks/goals of the whole group of agents,

− way/kind of communication describes environment, − decision making is distributed (i.e. every agent has its own level of

autonomy).


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Agents may exchange messages with each other. Basic types of aforementioned messages are as follows: proposal of (particular) activity, rejection/approval of this offer, and counter-proposal. Agent, as a form of artificial intelligence, may attempt to communicate to the other agent(s) – e.g. in the case of a task fulfilment demand, or reject it (e.g. if it may decrease probability of task fulfilment). Aforementioned issues are a part of agent’s autonomy within control system8.

Paradigms of multi-agent systems are as follows: − reactivity – environment observation and timely reaction to its changes, − proactivity – reaction to changes in environment and activity towards

(purposefully) making changes in it, − autonomy of agents – agent may act individually (without other agents or

people), having control of its status and activities, − ability for social behaviour – possibility of co-operation with other agents,

people, including self-organisation and grouping/clustering, − rationality – agents activity is determined by success (goals) achievement (so

called control by goals), − ability to communicate – ability to share knowledge with other agents,

control system, and environment (e.g. for threat identification purposes), − ability to learn and flexibility/adaptation – agents improve their operation

with time, − mobility – ability to change location within environment9. Basic tasks of multi-agent systems are as follows: environment sweeping/search,

movement control, movement within formation. Aforementioned tasks may be fulfilled by four basic kinds of agents:

− logical agent – its decision is a result of deduction, − reactive agent – its decision is a result of environment analysis (situation to

action mapping), − bdi agent (beliefs-desires-intentions) – its decision depends on bdi

combination, − layered architectures – its decision is a result of the co-operation of software

layers (horizontal or vertical) – each of them is responsible for the other layer of environment abstraction10.

Basic classification of multi-agent technologies is as follows: − based on agent paradigms: Prometheus, Styx, HLIM, Cassiopeia, Tropos,

GAIA, MASE, SODA, etc..,

8 Hakansson A. Agent and multi agent systems technologies and applications. Springer Verlag,

New York - Heidelberg 2010. 9 Wooldridge M., Jennings N. R. Intelligent agents: theory and practice. The Knowledge

Engineering Review, 1995, 10(2): 115-152. 10 Gnatowski M. Wykorzytsanie systemów wieloagentowych we współdziałaniu robotów

mobilnych. Rozprawa doktorska. Instytut Podstawowych Problemów Techniki Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Warszawa 2005.


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− based on object orientation: MASSIVE, AOMEM, ODAC, AOAD, DESIRE, MASB, AAI, etc.,

− based on knowledge engineering (KE): CommonKADS, MASCommonKADS, CoMoMAS itp.,

− based on requirements engineering (RE)11. Thus multi-agent systems constitute a practical programmatic implementation

of distributed artificial intelligence - DAI12. The most important military applications of multi-agent systems are as follows: − multi-level adaptive simulations of warfare13, − route planning with the passing by of danger zones, − fulfilling various tasks providing situation awareness, − Interoperable Command & Control based on MultiAgent Systems –

IC2MAS), − multi-agent robots. It seems that the aforementioned applications will be a significant part of the

autonomous military technology, based on both programmable agents, land robots (including mechanical mole robots), flying robots, and buoyant robots. They may constitute an important part of the Net Enabled Capability and Common Operational Picture paradigms.

Multi-agent robots

Useful examples of the effective application of multi-agents systems are constituted by multi-agent robots. Single autonomous robots are currently technologically accessible. The next step is the use of teams of robots, co-operating with each-other, and aiming at the same goal. But we should be aware that there is no assumption that one robot is one agent. Relationships of robot-agents are much more complicated. Basic are as follows:

− extended agent – agent is built both in robot and control system, − agent built in robot, and its image is built in control system, mainly for

simulation purposes, − agent built in control system, and robot is only its tool,

11 Alonso F., Frutos S., Martinez L. i wsp. Towards a natural agent paradigm development

methodology. MATES 2004, LNAI 3187, s. 155-168. 12 Cetnarowicz K. Pojęcie M-agenta i koncepcja systemów wieloagentowych. [In:] Stanek S. (ed.)

Rozwój informatycznych systemów wieloagentowych w srodowiskach społeczno-gospodarczych. Wydawnictwo Placet, Warszawa 2008; Cetnarowicz K., Dreżewski R., Byrski A. i wsp. Agentowe metody inteligencji obliczeniowej. [In:] Stanek S (ed.) Rozwój informatycznych systemów wieloagentowych w środowiskach społeczno-gospodarczych. Wydawnictwo Placet, Warszawa 2008.

13 See also research of B. Kamiński from Division of Decision Analysis and Suport, Institute of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics.


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− group of agents built in control system, controlling simultaneously one robot or even group of robots14.

Important issue seems be the architecture of the robot(s): – deliberative – robot has its own model of environment, and changes in it are

made by contact, – behavioural – robot has not got its own model of environment, but gets to

know about the environment during observation, action, and reaction, – hybrid – tasks are divided into the two aforementioned types15. Examples of the aforementioned architecture constitute: AuRA, CEBOT,

ATLANTIS, SSS, TCA, SAPHIRA, ARA, DAMN, 3T, ALLIANCE, BERRA, SWARM-BOTS, YAVUZ, BUSQUETS, VOMAS or Tripodal Schematic Control Architecture.

There is a need to admit that agents do not always have concordant (or even consistent) goals – see e.g. problem of common access to the same resource. Thus full cooperation of all agents may be not possible (e.g. ACO may not be applicable). This situation requires the modification of the single agent software: the adding of a bit of competition among agents may provide quicker and more effective task completion.

Tasks for groups of robots can be divided into: – tasks, which can be fulfilled by a single robot, but group of robot will fulfil it

quicker, and/or more effectively, etc. (e.g. through task sharing), – task which cannot be fulfilled by a single robot, and only a group of co-

operating robots can achieve the success (e.g. cooperative transport). Teams of homogenous robots are redundant: one robot can play the role of

another (e.g. in the case of serious damage). From the other point of view heterogenous robots, fulfilling different tasks within the team, provide a wider spectrum of possible applications for the whole team. Their specialty differ, but this feature may be necessary in more complex tasks.

Applications of multi-agent robots are wide: from industry16, through health care (micro-robots and nano-robots17), to the role of advanced tools in search and

14 Gnatowski M. Wykorzytsanie systemów wieloagentowych we współdziałaniu robotów mobilnych. Rozprawa doktorska. Instytut Podstawowych Problemów Techniki Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Warszawa 2005.

15 Gnatowski M. Wykorzytsanie systemów wieloagentowych we współdziałaniu robotów mobilnych. Rozprawa doktorska. Instytut Podstawowych Problemów Techniki Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Warszawa 2005.

16 Krasiński A. Wieloagentowy system robotów mobilnych. Opis projektu. Prace Naukowe Instytutu Cybernetyki Technicznej Politechniki Wrocławskiej, 1998, 98: 241-247; Gnatowski M. Wykorzystanie systemów wieloagentowych we współdziałaniu robotów mobilnych. Rozprawa doktorska. Instytut Podstawowych Problemów Techniki Polskiej Akademii Nauk 2005; Bartyna W., Ambroszkiewicz S. Architektura systemu wielorobotowego, język komunikacji i protokoły. Materiały X Krajowej Konferencja Robotyki, Miechowice 2008; Ambroszkiewicz S., Cetnarowicz K. On situating agents in multi-robot systems. Materiały CS&P'2005 Workshop; Skrzypczyński P. A Team of Mobile Robots and Monitoring Sensors – from Concept to Experiment. Advanced Robotics, 2004, 18(6): 583–610.


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rescue operations, etc. Multi-agent robots may be useful in military applications too. Battlefields based on Net Enabled Capability (NEC) needs these solutions as a useful supplementation of weapon systems, reconnaissance and identification systems, fulfilling stealthily important tasks behind enemy lines independent of weather conditions for example. Teams of homogenous multi-agent robots (even: flying or buoyant) due to their numerical force and redundancy are extremely resistant to damage. What more every agent is able to replicate another one (e.g. one damaged). Use of multi-agent robots in search and rescue operations, both in urban complexes, and terrain hard to reach due to other causes will significantly increase current possibilities18.

According to current knowledge multi-agents robots for military purposes should provide:

− flexibility, including supplementation and modernisation during operation, − ability to fulfil tasks even in very hard conditions (loss of many agents/robots,

severe damages) – result may be only satisfying (e.g. fulfilling criteria), but not optimal (the best possible),

− ability to work in various conditions (as a part of land forces, navy, air forces, and even in space),

− ability to use heterogenous agents (for task division purposes), − ability to work using incomplete information (e.g. unknown area) or in

quickly changing environment (e.g. location of people within the closest neighbourhood),

− ability to collaborate with single soldier or military unit – collaborative robotics,

− stability, − effectiveness. Military possibilities of multi-agent robots was noticed earl19. Research is being

conducted almost all around the world, including NATO countries. Leading research centres are as follows:

− DARPA – UltraLog and Cougar projects20, − NASA Ames Research Centre and NASA Glenn Research Centre21, In the beginning almost the whole effort was focused on robots able to work in

space, including exploration of neighbouring planets. Military applications of the aforementioned robots resulted from their ability to fulfil tasks in variable

17 Mikołajewska E., Mikołajewski D. Neurorehabilitacja XXI wieku. Techniki teleinformatyczne. Impuls, Kraków 2011; Mikołajewska E., Mikołajewski D. Roboty rehabilitacyjne. Rehabilitacja w Praktyce, 2010, 4: 49-53.

18 Looije R., Neerincx M., Kruijff G.-J. M. Affective collaborative robots for safety & crisis management in the field. Materiały ISCRAM 2007 - Intelligent Human Computer Systems for Crisis Response and Management 2007.

19 Multi-Robot Systems in Military Domains. RTO TECHNICAL REPORT TR-IST-032/RTG-014. 20 Por. Integrated Computerized Deployment System (ICODES). 21 Wong E., Litt J. S. Autonomous multi-agent robotics for inspection and repair of propulsion

systems. Materiały AIAA 1st Intelligent Systems Technical Conference 2004.


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(including unpredictable) conditions and environments, despite loss of a significant part of agents. This makes multi-agent robots an almost ideal tool on the battlefield.

Applications of

cooperative

robots

Route

reconnaissance

Combat and

indirect suport, air

suport, naval

support, increased

mobility

Weapon

carriers, medical

systems carriers

Reconnaissance

(incl. NBC) and

target

intelligence

Search

and rescue

operations

Diversion

Transport

& Logistics

Patrols (incl.

patrolboats),

warning systems

UNASSISTED WITHIN TEAMS:

ROBOTS + PEOPLE

Fig. 1. Selected military applications of multiagent systems of mobile robots

The most important Polish research centres in the area of multi-agent systems

and multi-agent robots are perceived as the Institute of Computer Science at the Polish Academy of Sciences, AGH University of Science and Technology in Cracow, and Poznań University of Technology. Moreover, research on selected issues of multi-agent systems and multi-agent robots are conducted in the majority of Polish universities, as part of artificial intelligence and/or robotics.


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Conclusions Multi-agent robots are still at the beginning of their development. Further

development needs more research in the area of perception, navigation, planning, distributed control, etc. This situation allows for other chances for the military use of swarm intelligence technology to navigate mobile robots, as an alternative for humanoid robots, and the supplementing of other dynamically developed solutions: exoskeleton with the living operator22. A key issue may be human-machine interaction and the ability of intuitive cooperation between humans and the independent robotic environment, increasing their effectiveness on net-centric battlefield.

22 E. Mikołajewska, D. Mikołajewski: Egzoszkielet jako szczególna forma robota – zastosowania

cywilne i wojskowe. „Kwartalnik Bellona” 2011, nr 1, s. 160-169; E. Mikołajewska, D. Mikołajewski: Zastosowania automatyki i robotyki w wózkach dla niepełnosprawnych i egzoszkieletach medycznych. „Pomiary Automatyka Robotyka”, 2011, nr 5, s. 58-64; E. Mikołajewska, D. Mikołajewski: Exoskeletons in neurological diseases - current and potential future applications. “Advances in Clinical and Experimental Medicine”, 2011, nr 20(2), s. 227–233; E. Mikołajewska Neurorehabilitacja. Zaopatrzenie ortopedyczne. Wydawnictwo Lekarskie PZWL, Warszawa 2009, s. 74-76.

OPTIMIZATION OF LOGISTIC SYSTEM IN THE POLISH ARMED FORCES

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OPTIMIZATION OF LOGISTIC SYSTEM

IN THE POLISH ARMED FORCES

Col. Assoc. Prof. Wojciech NYSZK, Ph.D. National Defence University

Abstract

The optimisation of the logistic system results from the urgency of complex problems

and regulations appearing due to the logistic transformations in the Polish Armed Forces

and also from adjusting its structures for tasks and commitments as well as for the planned

and performed organisational-functional changes. The goal of elaboration is to introduce

these changes in the process of the logistic support of military troops during peacetime,

mainly at the angle of tasks performed by military logistics according to the needs at all

army organisational levels. Undoubtedly, an essential factor for implementing changes

adjusted to the logistic system of the Polish Armed Forces is the membership of Poland in

the North-Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the European Union (EU). It requires the necessity

of taking permanent actions aiming at, among other things, the complex integration of the

logistic system in the Polish Armed Forces with the structures of Alliance, mainly with its

procedures to achieve the essential level of standardisation and unification. The general

purpose of this process is an increase in the effectiveness of military forces and the

enlargement of the access to defence resources of the member states. Removal of

inaccuracies in logistics of the Polish Armed Forces is accomplished at stages. The basis

for the undertaken ventures are the decisions of the Minister of National Defence, records

in the programs of Armed Forces development and the plans of development for the

logistics imposing the new task-structural competences or verifying the existing ones.

Key words – logistic system, subsystem, codification, logistic equipment, stationary

logistic potential

ECONOMY OF SECURITY AND LOGISTICS


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Introduction

Membership of the Polish Republic in NATO intensified the adaptation process

in the Armed Forces. This process is aiming at reaching a required level of

standardisation in all military activities and its functioning systems, including

logistics.

The transformations of the Polish Armed Forces and their involvement in

NATO structures also forced the need for transforming the logistic system at an

angle of adjusting it to the standards obligatory both in the armies of the EU and

NATO.

The result of these changes was the acceptance by Poland of the long-term

requirements of defense initiatives resulting in a wide spectrum of allied

commitments in the consecutive editions of NATO Armed Forces Objectives as –

Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). A

very important role was also played by the conclusions resulting from crisis

reactions and operations in the on the Balkans, 11th September in U.S. and military

actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Outline of the functioning of the logistic system of the polish armed

forces

The act of The Polish Armed Forces being involved in task accomplishment as

part of the NATO Alliance generated new requirements for military logistics

demanding a systemic and far-reaching approach.

The tasks of the logistic system were divided into the six basic areas that were

not covered by the assumptions of logistic doctrine. In such a logistic system as the

Polish Armed Forces all subsystems at the particular levels of organisation in the

army did not have any parallels. At the central level, the logistic system of the

Polish Armed Forces was formed only by the three subsystems; managerial,

material and technical. The Chief of the General Board of Logistics was

responsible for the logistic system of the Polish Army. The Board of Logistic

Planning and the Material-Technical Board in the General Staff were subordinated

to the Chief. The Material-Technical Board functioning in the structure of General

Staff was an organisational cell appropriate for creating the directions of

development and elaborating the structures of functional-organisational logistics in

the Polish Armed Forces during peacetime, crisis and war. The Chief of the

General Board of Logistics supervised the operational readiness of the logistic

system. He established and determined the main directions and ways of task

accomplishment for the logistics in the national and international area. The other

elements of the subsystem were beyond the responsibility area of the Chief.


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To appreciate the importance of problems in the General Board of Logistics

2000 – 2004 the basic trends of optimisation were specified to adjust the logistic

system for the standards obligatory in the NATO Armies and the EU. The urgency

of optimisation came also from:

− a necessity of setting in order the task priorities specified in legal regulations

and decisions of the Ministry of National Defence;

− a necessity of adapting areas of competence in logistics, which were

dispersed till now, to the tasks resulting from “The Logistic Doctrine of Polish

Armed Forces”. The purpose of doctrine is to draft procedures essential for

managing logistics in the Polish Armed Forces including cooperation with logistics

of commands in the NATO and international organisations supporting the logistics

of the Polish Armed forces during peacetime and war;

− the providing of a 30-day self-sufficiency fixed length of time for Polish

military troops during operations abroad;

− the need to provide a considerable flexibility in possibilities of logistic

adaptation to various climatic conditions;

− lack of commonly functioning software systems to support the management

of logistics;

− insufficient progress in indexation and codification;

− low level of staff professionalisation.

An important factor determining the state of the logistic system and

possibilities of its essential changes was a lack of impact of the Chief of General

Board of Logistics (coordinator) on the allocation of financial assets for task

accomplishment. A systemic lack of grounds for direct impact on achieving the

logistic purposes financed by branches of the Polish Armed Forces was acutely

experienced. It caused either obstacles or made at impossible to execute the task

accomplishment in the required ranges and to the planned deadlines. The applied

system of persuasion was not always so effective, especially in a situation of the

permanent shortage of financial assets.

The limitation of military expenses implied the necessity of actions tending to

improve the management efficiency that was quite possible due to a unification and

integration of the entire logistic system. It forced the centralisation of the logistics

management processes.

Taking advantage of the conclusions from the currently functioning logistic

system in the General Board of Logistics of the Chief, the Concept of

reorganisation of the Logistic System in the Ministry of National Defence was

elaborated with the following assumptions:

1. Optimisation and adaptation of the executive potential of logistics in the

three branches of the Polish Armed Forces to the real needs resulting from previous

commitments together with the accomplishment of the regional logistic system.

2. Removal of the basic obstacles that curtail and disturb the functioning and

efficacy of logistics in the Polish Armed Forces.

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3. Restructuring of logistic systems in an essential range according to new

conditionings in the Polish Armed Forces and NATO.

When fulfilling the assumptions of “Concept ….” from the part of the logistic

potential at the level of General Staff and the branches of Armed Forces by the end

of 2006 the legal body for guiding the executive logistics was established as the

Inspectorate of Logistic Support for the Armed Forces. Now it is the Central

Logistic Organ in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and is the only one to provide

complex logistic support inside the state and for military troops in missions abroad.

Simultaneously the Inspectorate of Logistic Support has the authorisation of the

competent entity to keep at its disposal the financial assets of the second degree.

The Inspectorate of Logistic Support for the Armed Forces is the decisive

centre capable of the complicated solving of tasks in the range of:

1. The competence function for logistic equipment.

2. The Central Logistic Organ standardising the entire management of logistic

resources from their implementation to withdrawal.

3. Moreover the Inspectorate performs tasks in:

a) adjusting the logistic system of Polish Armed Forces to requirements of

NATO and the EU,

b) elaborating the rules to protect needs of mobilisation and war concerning the

combat and material assets, including assessment of size, dislocation and rules of

gathering, deployment,

c) supplementing the needs of logistics in a framework of:

- maintaining the budgetary and mobilisation reserves of the state,

- preparing the GN for the tasks resulting from PMG,

- support of domestic and allied forces by the civil sector,

d) responsibility for achieving the logistic purposes on the scale of the Armed

Forces,

e) coordination of the entire complexity of a mission resulting from the duties

of host nation and the state sending its military troops abroad.

Simultaneously, the Inspectorate of Logistic Support took over part of the tasks

from the General Board of Logistics, most of the tasks from branches of the Polish

Armed Forces (with exception to tasks connected with logistic planning) and tasks

from the Head of Transportation and Troop Movement, as well as part of the tasks

from the Infrastructure Department of the Ministry of National Defence.

The creation of the Inspectorate made it possible to bring order into problems

connected with the issues of command and the performance of tasks in the rear

zone, especially in a framework of logistic support (including HNS) and its

functional connections with the system beyond the military.

After the creation of the Inspectorate of Logistic Support the logistic system at

particular levels of organisation in the Polish armed Forces is composed of:

1. The Board of Logistic Planning – as part of the structures of General Staff –

as the logistic planning section that preforms the function of the organiser of the


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logistic system and it is responsible for contributing to the elaboration of the

development program of the Polish Armed Forces. It is also responsible for the

proposals for the medium and long-term development programme of the PAF in a

framework of improving the logistic system.

2. Sections of logistic planning G/A/ N-4 at the level of military branches of

PAF.

3. Logistic planning in the military staffs (G/A/ N-4 and the Chief) and their

executive structures at the tactical level covering the mobile units and logistic

devices designated for direct logistic support during peacetime and war.

The organisational structures of logistics at this level provide management of

logistic support in the military units and cooperation with the logistic structures of

NATO according to the Objectives of The Polish Republic Armed Forces.

Moreover, at this level the intention tend to remove the financial-economic tasks

from the commanders responsibility on account of operational-educational tasks.

For this purpose there is a specialised military unit: the Military Economic Section

that is subordinated to the Inspectorate of Logistic Support.

The final model of the logistic system in the polish armed forces

In the final model a logistic system should be characterised by mobility,

flexibility, simplicity and an ability for rapid reaction. It ought to be organised in

such a way to provide for self-sufficiency and to make possible task

accomplishment and maintenance of combat capacity in the supported troops.

A method for improving its efficiency is to reorganise the logistic structures and to

combine them with a decrease in the cost of the functioning of military units in the

particular branches of the Armed Forces and the continuation of ventures

connected with the integration of logistic subunits at the tactical level. The results

of this program show an improvement of the system dealing with the management

logistic resources.

The implemented concept will rationally relieve the commanders’ burden of

financial-economic tasks and will not deprive them of deciding about priorities in

a framework of logistic and financial support of military units.

As a consequence of the planned changes in the logistic system of the Ministry

of National Defence the Military Economic Sections, as the support unit

subordinated to the military bases, gather the needs and deliver supplies as well as

render services for the supported units according to the priorities settled by the

commanders of branches in the PAF.

Taking into account the experiences resulting from long-term participation of

Polish military units in peacekeeping operations, it is necessary to notice the need

of implementing the logistic solutions according to NATO standards, that is

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156

a condition enabling them to function without conflict in a multinational

environment.

In the case of supporting troops in allied operations, it is extremely important to

gain a transparent uniformity of documents and procedures used by logistic organs

in staffs and military units. That in turns, may constitute the basis for success in the

domain of logistic interoperability. It is a factor stimulating the proper functioning

of multinational logistics.

Obtaining a prospective model for the functioning of a logistic system should

be considered with optimising the structures of the stationary logistic potential of

the Armed Forces submitted to the Chief of Inspectorate of Logistic Support. The

restructuring and optimisation of the stationary logistic potential is possible on

account of the forming of Regional Logistic Bases on the grounds of dispersed

stationary elements of technical and material support.

In the final model (after 2012), 4 Regional Logistic Bases will render logistical

services in the region of responsibility for the military units of all military branches

in the Armed Forces regardless of their subordination.

The next very important element at the disposal of modern logistics is

a possibility of searching for new solutions for the performance of logistic support

using outsourcing.

A modern battlefield develops due to technical and civilisation progress. It

generates new demands also in the framework of military support.

One of the methods of improving army logistic support is the use of an external

supply of sources and services rendered by non-military entities.

The concept of outsourcing has been widely applied in the activity of economic

entities; that is the new strategy of management connected with delegating outside

the tasks not connected directly with the basic activity of an organisation. That is

why the organisation can focus its resources and assets on the areas constituting the

basis of its activity.

Experiences of many states within the framework of NATO point at the great

possibility of effectively using this form of service rendering.

The departmental Team (Group) for implementing the contract system of

services beyond the military was established by the Minister of National Defence.

This Team specified the area where an array of proposals concerning rendering

services in the following domains is included:

• Repairs and services for military equipment, telecommunication nets and

computer equipment,

• Leasing vehicles, load equipment, machines, aggregates and specialised

devices,

• Utilisation of combat assets, rockets, fuels, rubber goods, chemical agents,

disinfectants, medical waste, expired supplies as well as toxic waste,

• Transport,

• Gathering and storing reserve supplies,


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• Social cover of the military,

• Maintenance of military estates,

• Training sessions,

• Legal and administration assistance,

• Security of facilities,

• Security of the Polish Logistical Components (nutrition, services of laundry

and repairs, supplies of fuels and grease products, supplies of common use assets,

organisation of camps, accommodation and social services, repairs of modern

equipment.

However, the priority in seeking new solutions should be the combat readiness

of military troops and their capability to perform tasks and missions during

peacetime, crisis and war. The Armed Forces ought to preserve skills for

performing training and support with security during the situation of crisis and

direct threat. Disturbances in rendering services provided by civil contractors

cannot influence the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. It seems that the

solution employed within a framework of outsourcing should be supplementary to

a support system and functional security in the range of Armed Forces having a

positive correlation.

A lack of systemic solutions in this range also results, among other things from

a limitation of the legal system of the Polish Republic and legal gaps regulating

these problems at various levels of departments.

It concerns among others the things regulations in a legal act on public

finances, public orders, taxes from goods and services, VAT, the signing of

agreements by the units of the public finances sector and the departmental

regulations in the range of military commanders responsibility as well as the

branch regulations concerning the economy in the budgetary unit of the military.

The considerable possibilities in this field may bring about the planned legal act on

public-private partnership.

Nowadays, accomplishment of new tasks of the Polish Armed Forces,

including logistics, imposes organisational and functional changes as well as also

generating the necessity of improving the processes of logistic support. When

improving these processes the priority is to gain predominance in access to

information that must be gathered, stored and shared in a proper time at an

appropriate level of decision while guaranteeing the required security level. It can

be done when building and implementing the integrated, multilevel information

system.

Despite the fact that what is to be done is known, the existing organisational-

functional conditionings, habits, restructuring of tasks and competences and lack of

long-term prognoses obstruct the creation of a finally integrated, multilevel

information solution. The creation of such solutions requires a holistic strategy

covering description of particular processes of management at all organisational

levels of logistics.

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The application of modern technologies from tele-informatics in the

department of national defence requires the analysis of state investigating density

of information networks. In particular, it concerns the coordination of basic

information ventures: the sector of main accountant and logistics. Right here The

coherence between sectors must be maintained right here; financial, material,

technical, medical, transport, movement of military troops and the infrastructure.

In the logistics, finances or personnel departments of national defence, there is

not any information system functioning to support all organisational levels, in

particular the branches (sectors] from the economic sector in the budgetary unit of

the military thorough regional bases for materials, military districts, kinds of

military forces to the central level.

The current lack of stability and transparency of logistical components at all

organisational levels of national defence badly influenced the projecting and

implementing of information systems. A lack of information structures or their

inefficient remainders in logistics, financial assets dispersed in departments, a lack

of prospective programs and plans for financing the information science

development obstructs the implementation of modern information solutions.

The currently functioning logistic systems of information should be adjusted to

the new requirements or remade. Depending on the level or sector, the particular

information systems are not mutually correlated and integrated so their utility does

not fit the present needs.

It is suggested that the ventures in the range of logistics of the national defence

branch would cover all organisational levels of military branches and include the

logistic systems: material, technical, medical, transport and troop movements as

well as infrastructure to integrate them also with the finance and employment

sectors.

The basic trends in development of the military logistics with the information

nets should cover the latest technologies (software, applications, equipment,

computer networks) and tele-information security. Moreover, it is necessary to

accelerate the development of a system of identifying the defence devices as the

basis for the creation of databases enabling the computerisation of the entire

property of the military. In the final effect the Integrated Multilevel Information

System Supporting the Logistic Activity should be established. The system would

work during peacetime, crisis and war to enable the exchanging of information

with similar systems functioning in the national economies of NATO and EU

states.

Conducting a uniform registry in terms of quantity, quality and value and

material-financial planning, based on an integrated informational system, requires

a credible system of identification and classification of resources remaining in the

department of national defence and the new ones implemented to be used. The

implementation of such a system will enable the functioning of all planning,

registering reporting systems in the national defence department. The biggest


159

obstacle in effectively introducing the modern solutions in tele-information has

been the lack of a uniform basis to identify all defence products.

In taking into account the need of interoperability[IO] in the range of the

Alliance in the area of logistic processes, it is necessary to perceive also the

necessity of the common implementation of the NCS NATO Codification System

in the department of national defence. Due to the complexity of identification and

codification processes, as well as the magnitude of engaged forces and assets, in

the initial stage the Uniform Index of Material (UIM) will function in the

department of national defence. The UIM is created, maintained and distributed by

the competent entities and administrated by the logistics department. It will be the

solution that improves the management of the military resources in the national

system by the identification and classification of all products (resources) as

a matter of material-financial turnover in the department of national defence.

Identification and classification by UIM will enable a stocktaking of defence

products and point at the products that due to their qualities of “NATO importance

of supply” will be the first things proposed by competent experts to be codified

according to the NCS.

Both identification of defence products and their integration require a rapid

building and rebuilding of the coherent tele-information structure. An appropriate

development of tele-information systems ought to make possible the connection of

all Regional Logistic Bases with their material stocks and economic sections to the

NIL-WAN and INTER-MON nets. A creation of these nets in the units of local

nets should also be possible.

Development of computer nets is an expensive venture so it should be

performed in the logistic units when the dislocation and magnitude of logistic,

financial and the personal potential is determined.

Cooperation with the NATO systems, EU and national economy should also be

provided. In particular it concerns the Multilevel System of ADAMS, Multi-aspect

Software Model ACROSS (Allied Europe ACE Optimisation Software System)

and the System of Logistic Modelling (LOGREP).

The new challenges in the XXI century are connected with the implementation

of modern tele-information solutions: they require new concepts, well prepared

people and the implementation of accurate motivational systems. Logistics,

finances and the employment sector in the armed forces are most susceptible to

computerisation but simultaneously the results of the information science are not

easy to be popularised by the media compared to, for instance, a purchase of

multitask aircraft, combat vehicle etc. The implementation of tele-information nets

into logistics, finances and employment procedures at particular levels of

organisation ought to ensure a quicker achievement of purposes and an optimal

accomplishment of tasks.

WOJCIECH NYSZK

160

Conclusions

It is reasonable to expect that the accomplishment of task areas specified in the

elaboration, according to the stages and deadlines of task performance, will make it

possible to achieve the assumed organisational-functional and qualitative-

quantitative changes in the logistics of national defence department including the

operational-logistic, technical and technological capacities. They are determined by

the Minister of National Defence and the Chief of General Staff and they also

result from the Objectives of NATO Armed Forces, long-term requirements for

Poland and its Commitments for the Defence Capacity.

The result of implemented changes will be an improvement of support from the

host state for the Polish Armed Forces and its functional connection with the

national system of support in the civil departments.

It is possible to state with satisfaction that during recent years it has been

possible to implement a series of changes in the logistic system. They considerably

improved its functioning and capacity of task performance in the national and

allied system. The extremely advantageous effects are:

− an increase in effectiveness and efficacy of logistic tasks accomplishment for

the Polish Armed Forces during peacetime, crisis and war,

− the rationalisation of logistic structures at particular levels of organisation in

the PAF as well as competence of planning and executive organs,

− an improvement of abilities for cooperation in the multinational system and

providence of support for the allied forces of reinforcement,

− the improvement of efficiency in managing the logistic resources of the

military and a better use of resources of the national economy,

− the beginning of works on systemic solutions in a framework of PMG with

the identification of the PMG task area, and the schedule of task performance was

elaborated,

− the creation of a section in the Operational Command for performance of

tasks connected with the organisation and coordination of logistic support for

contingents abroad,

− the continuity of works on the creation of the Uniform Material Index and

implementation of logistic systems; in the Military Economic Sections,

− the joining of the allied planning of stocks and displacement of military

troops with the use of tele-information supportive systems of NATO,

− the determination of areas susceptible for the application of outsourcing in

the Polish Armed forces as one of numerous forms of military support.

Bibliography

Land Forces Logistic Doctrine ALP-4.2, Finale draft October 2002.

Logistic Doctrine of the Polish Armed Forces DD/4. SG/2004.

NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, NATO military agency for standardisation

AAP-6 (T).

THE ESSENCE OF SECURITY ECONOMICS AS A SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE

161

THE ESSENCE OF SECURITY

ECONOMICS AS A SCIENTIFIC

DISCIPLINE

Lt. Col. Sylwester T. KUREK, D.Sc. Prof. Janusz PŁACZEK, Ph.D. National Defence University Wyższa Szkoła Informatyki, Zarządzania i Administracji

w Warszawie

Abstract

The objective of this article is to present the essence of security economics as part of a

modern scientific discipline in the methodological context of reflection. We present the

evolutionary nature of security economics, its specific field of inquiry and attributes such

as: language, research methods and science streams. This article also included information

about connections with other disciplines, functions and usability (pragmatics) of security

economics. We briefly highlight research and academic centres which are engaged with

economics and defence inquiries. All presented information can be treated as an outline of

these problems, which have methodical characteristics and knowledge ordering.

Key words – security economics, usability

The evolutionary nature of security economics Security economics has its evolutionary origin in historical knowledge. It

appeared as a result of economics science of wars and the fundamental economics of national security. Political consciousness of economy during battles and wars grew in line with war measures and their development. Years ago tribal wars were not prepared, together with the preparation of food, clothes and armaments. As the nation grows along with production power, it lead to wars. This lead to supply needs for certain products. Governments and commanders noticed the connection between military power and economy. Experienced leaders understood that the greatness of an army in the field depends not only on the size of the nation but also on the economic potential. Financial support was always a very important key. For ages this was a problem for rulers. During mercantile times, trade exchange was identified with the power of a nation. During classical times the production role was emphasised, which is the main source of a nation's wealth along with with military power. During physiocratism times the most important thing was self-sufficiency in food production – an important factor during an economic blockade. It is known that the level of military techniques determined the method of fighting, and always enforced new requirements for back-ups, which are the dynamics and


SYLWESTER T. KUREK, JANUSZ PŁACZEK

162

structures of societal reproduction processes. The war economy system was established during the First World War and became a new science discipline – war

economics. War economics between the First and Second World Wars put a great

contribution in economic preparations for the new World War. Especially the role of industry and technical progress of battle equipment. At those times the obligatory rule was “economy works for the front line needs, for the army”. Then the new effect of the arms race between the two opposed economy-political systems appeared which was projected on economy growth. Even if there was a peace between the two blocks, the level of budgets of the nation did not allow for them to resign from typical war economy actions. Economic-Defence studies are important now, especially during times of peace. That is why war economics is called now defence economics.

They focused on connections between space planning and defence system, on creating economy mobilisation plans, energy and food system, as well as economy calculation of the role of the economy-defence system. Both names (war

economics & defence economics) have traditionally a historical meaning tied between national defence and national economy.

There are an essential number of premises indicating the way of defence

economics' evolution towards the new science discipline – security economics. The most important premise is political changes in Europe during the 1980’s and 1990’s. At that time the Warsaw Pact and Berlin Wall was demolished. The nations of central Europe moved on towards a democratic system and its economy towards a free market model. These nations limited their defence budgets and size of armed forces. In the literature of those times it was noticed that there were changes in analysing the national economy in order to strengthen security in a crisis, not military but terrorist crisis, natural disaster or lack of food, energy and water supplies. Another very important issue is that Poland is a member of NATO (since 1999) and European Union (since 2004). The complete opening of Poland meant also that information penetrated from the Western countries.

The real military threat cannot be excluded, which causes the necessity of a permanent capability of military standard levels. There is always a possibility of local outbreaks or the necessity to participate in alliance operations. It is important to define the strategic challenges and potential sources of menace for the country (alliance) as well as operation prevention actions.

Prevention strategy in the modern world has greater and greater meaning and is more efficient. That is why it should be developing, its methods should be modernising, people should be informed better. The extra military menace and its meaning grow more and more. The number of threats is growing nowadays: organised crime, terrorism, atomic weapons, economic wars, information’s blockade, financial dependence or technology espionage. We are constantly bombarded by media with the effects of natural disasters or damages to the


163

ecology. To resist against all these threats we need to employ the organised, well trained forces with mobile equipment. On one side there is the army (national and alliances) on the other side there is the whole governmental machinery (extra military). However, this system (crisis and security reaction system) is not ideal and requires much effort to improve. The war economy in the army is far away from the analysis as well as the economy in the army.

The action field moved for the peaceful forming of economy security basis which means the economy resistant to modern, extra military threats. The clear stream has been aroused connected with the crisis reaction during peace times. We should consider the macro and micro scale of the researched effect. This issue concerns local needs of certain economy or industry brunches as well as groups of countries, alliances, continents or even the whole globe. Summarising it means the need of extending present defence economics research of the new elements. The new matters of extra military field should be included into new discipline - security

economics. The range of this discipline has been evolving constantly, that is why the

identity accents in its name as well as the relations between and the merits connections (figure 1).

Figure 1. The range of present economic-defence disciplines

The field of inquiry To correctly define security economics we should define two basic concepts.

Security, according to general principles, is understood as a lack of threats or protection against threats. To understand it on a political basis (nation) we can say it is a result of organised protection and defence against all military and extra military, foreign and domestic threats, employing all governmental forces. In fact

EW < EO < EB

EW ⊂ EO ⊂ EB

Security Economics “SE”

Defense Economics “DE”

Military Economics

“ME”


164

there is a symbiosis of the security threats elements, in the first place – extra military characters. Economics has been defined as a part of economy which researches economic activity in a certain field of national economy. Its objective is to define by scientific methods the effective instruments of economic policy and the economic rules in this field. Both definitions corresponds with each other very well. They indicate how to manage, in what form, and by what instruments. All of this is to efficiently manage economics against all threats. That is why economics connects two groups of science – security/defence and economy; as well as being connected with political science. In general it can be stated that security economics

is a particular scientific discipline, which researches essentials, forms and

methods of national economy functions, which are ready to fulfil the national

security task and it analyses and evaluate the economic security level of the

country. It concerns the effectiveness of economic resources during peace, crisis and war.

The objective of economics is to help create a rational security policy. So, the main task is to look for a way for the efficient management of the national reserves to create national security. The subject of security economics is the correctness of the building economy process system, which is focused on the three different states of the nation: peace, crisis and war. Nowadays the research program of security economics is more complex than a few years ago, and include such issues as: dividing of the burden of defence within a framework of alliances, managing security and defence systems in crisis, civil-military cooperation, economic-technical possibility for support in times of natural disasters, social-economic costs of armament conversion, reconversion of army personnel and economical terrorist’s premises.

The research object of this discipline (specialty) are the economic basis of

security and defence of the nation (EBoSaD – figure 2, table 1), particularly defence economy in different types. The research includes the connections of economic process to create a rational security policy. Defence economy which is the EBoSaD core is a fundamental part of any nation, and every nation must utilise part of the nation’s economy for its own defence policies. This part has been always variable and grows during a military crisis. There were situations in history during world power wars where the role of defence economy was very slight. In the Middle East there is a paradoxical situation where in peace time, the nations finance the security needs as in war.

There are four types of defence economy (table 2): – peaceful defence economy – when the burden of gross domestic product is

less then 7-8%, – war readiness economy (sometimes crisis) – when it/s over 8%, – war economy – it’s over 14-16%, – demobilisation economy – when the burden of gross domestic product is

diminishing in a short time.


165

Figure 2. Economy basis of security and defence

ECONOMY BASIS OF SECURITY AND

DEFENSE

(EBoSaD = B + C)

NATIONAL ECONOMY

A Space not useful for security and defense

matters

B “Double usage” space

C Space used only

for security and defense matters

Defense

Economy

System

Defense

Logistic

System

Defense

economy

managing

Adjustment

of defense

needs

capabilities

of economy

Economic

mobilization

Defense

(military)

industry

Economic-

defense

infrastructure

Economic-

defense

reserves

Scientific

and technical

progress

International

economic-defense

cooperation

Services

for defense

system

Host nation

support

(HNS)

Economy Basis of

Security and Defense

Management System

Defense

needs

fulfilling

CONSUMPTION AND DEVELOPMENT

SECURITY ECONOMICS

REAL SPHERE REGULATION SPHERE


166

T a b l e 1 Interpretation of the content of economy fields with the view point of different needs

fulfillments

Space Economy Security economics

A Meet the basic needs Space not useful for security and defence matters

B Meet the consumption; Needs of higher type and development; Rational transformation space

“Double usage” space

C Optional cost of security comparing to other needs

Space used only for security and defence matters

A + B Economy basis of consumption and development

B + C Economy basis of security and defence

Commentary: The certain spaces are created by:

A - Indispensable reserves for civilians surviving, governmental functioning (taking care of children, sick people, minimum of administration).

B - During peaceful times the reserves are used for consumption and development, but during times of threat may be used to counteract (communication and transportation, after conversion production). It is also the space of rational transformation of the reserves.

C - Reserves used for security needs only (military industry, reserves and stocks in case of war, supporting the alternative supply sources).

T a b l e 2

The characteristics of defence economy types

Peaceful defence

economy

War readiness

economy War economy

Demobilisation

economy

Defence expenditures < 7-8% GDP

Defence expenditures > 8% GDP

Defence expenditures > 14-16%

Burden of GDP is diminishing in a short

time

The above factors are relatively general and have to be compared over a period

of several years. For some countries as increase means “hot war” while for others it means nothing more than just doubling the defence expenses. Besides that these factors must be observed, because they indicate the based relativeness of connections between economy and defence.

The ability of defence a state economy (majority in EBoSaD) to achieve the next stages of readiness (or decreasing) means that a defence state economy is very flexible. The more flexible it is, the faster and more able able it is to fulfil its defence functions. For sure it is a fundamental characteristic of modern defence economy. This flexibility is defined as the ability to change, even for a huge organisation, with a negligible loss of time or resources. It depends mostly on management skills, moral readiness of the nation to meet new challenges and on the economy function. It is said the economy is more flexible if it has more reserves at its disposal (production, transportation). Also the mobility of labour


167

force, and technological ability means that the key role is taken by managers, engineers and scientists.

Defence economy is a real core EBoSaD of the country and it has its own role to play. The basic goal is to create premises to build the financial basis of security and defence and to ensure the survival of civilians during crisis or war. Its aim is to effectively exploit the existing economical potential for the sake of the security. The typical examples of the peaceful defence economy tasks are:

– to prepare and constantly update the economy mobilisation plan in case of threat or war;

– to maintain, support, train, and equip the army, as well as its building and military facilities;

– to adjust technological infrastructure to defence and security state requirements;

– to create conditions for the survival of civilians in extreme situations, e.g. preparing civil defence;

– to gather state reserves; – to prepare production and technical (repair) bases in the industrial branch

during times of threat and during war; – to run the science and research studies in defence and security fields; – to participate in the task and operations for the alliance’s armies and in

realising defence investments. The basic economy elements of security and defence which speaks of its

readiness for the action are among others (figure 2.): defence industry, strategic reserves of the state, economy-defence infrastructure, science-research centres, international economy-defence cooperation and defence logistic.

The key role is state economy organisations who manage the security and defence of the state.

The important premise that defines EBoSaD is considering the conditions of economy functions. The main conditions of this type are: geographical position of the state; economic and military alliances; level of economic growth; level of reserves (manpower, materials and assets (cash, gold reserves etc); location of defence-economic potential; volume of defence expenditures.

To characterise security economics among nationwide knowledge we may separate three attitudes:

– considering security economics in security and defence sciences taking into account that it appeared together with war science, we can learn from military conflicts;

– including security economics in political science as an inquiry of the internal and international political relations, because war is a political act;

– including security economics as a part of general economy science as one of detailed economics. The object of its interest is the state economy but in a defence function.


168

At the same time we reject the thesis that security economics can be a separate science discipline. We are sure that security economics lies in the middle of these sciences. It also depends on the place of lectures and science centres. In Poland for years defence economics was a specialty of economy sciences. Currently security economics is included in security or defence sciences as a result of stereotypical premise, that if it is security, it must be connected with military uniforms. It should not be connected this way. We understand that the government is responsible for national security, but individually businessmen and consumers create economic systems and have bigger roles to play, about which A. Smith in XVII century had written.

Language, sciences streams and research methods Each science discipline has its own specific language. There are different

categories which describe the current state. These categories are historically based, they are changing all the time as well as conditions of functioning and surroundings. In security economics there are specific descriptions connected with the functioning of security and defence of the economy of a certain nation. Some of the categories are brought from other science disciplines, but there are some new ones that describe certain processes better. Most often categories are: potential, reserves, expenditure, cost, analysis, evaluation, value, parameters, factors, mobilisation, methods, model, allocation. These categories are narrowed to specify the field e.g.:

– reserves – to manpower, objects, financial and information; – potential – to economy, defence or military; – mobilisation – to economy, technical infrastructure, economy subject; – expenses – to defence, military, armaments, or extra military. To explain the specifics of this language we should also explain and highlight

the isolation from the other sciences, which are sometimes even close to these sciences. We need to specify the following categories:

– economic-defence potential, which roots are in general economy category and has its roots also in exact and military sciences (security and defence science in present);

– economic mobilisation, which moved some mobilisation rules of the armies to economy ground;

– strategic raw materials – their roots are in the word “raw materials” but it shows exact group necessary for security and defence needs;

– war economy – expresses clearly the impact on a different country with the economic tools to force the beneficial behaviour;

– intensity of economy – which means the ability of the economy to resist against bad conditions due to military actions of the enemy;


169

In the extra military category we can specify the following: – compensation of defence purchasing; – crisis management (reaction); – trans-frontier migrations; – action supporting the host state; – double-use equipment (goods); – economic espionage; – civil-military cooperation. In consequences there are three parallel main streams of the science of modern

security economics: – first is a continuation of a present stream of war economics with the matters

of: manpower in war economy, war distribution etc.; – the second has roots in defence economics, widening of disarmament

economics, crisis management etc.; – the third one regards extra military threats as an organisation and functioning

of the state organs, assortments, state reserves. All of the above science streams should serve the national security policy in the alliances as well as between continents.

Considering science’s methods there are analysis and synthesis used in many different science disciplines. Also there are certain statistics methods used such as induction and deduction. Sometimes the interviews enrich the analysis. The science method depends on the task character and source of information. History’s wars and economies give comprehensive materials for research and study. Also it is important to make comparisons to today’s conflicts. It is very important to study this kind of historic material to observe the proper connections which demonstrate the basic war-economy processes. At the same time the anticipation of discovered trends and rules can help with the future planning and predicting of conflicts.

Connections with other disciplines, functions and usability of security

economics

Security economics, as with each science discipline, has connections to a number of sciences and disciplines. It takes full advantage of their achievements. The strongest connections are with different economy branches like industrial, agricultural, transport and trade economics. Is has also connections with international affairs economics, geographical economy and the finances of the state. Defence and security sciences also play a significant role, as well as political and military alliances. This analysis considers periods of both war and peace. The military equipment, manpower etc – all of these are keys to the technological progress. The administration, law, exact sciences give the type of research methods and knowledge. Summarising there are clear connections between economy,


170

security and political sciences. And we cannot forget about these discipline's surroundings, especially about the technological, social and political sciences (figure 3).

Legend: 1. Defence-Economic thought 5. Economic-Defence planning and programming 2. Military-economic history 6. Economic-Defence simulation 3. War economics 7. Economic-Defence policy 4. Military economics 8. Economic security

Figure 3. The closer and further surroundings of security economics

We can say that the functions of security economics are different from other

science disciplines. There are three main functions: cognitive, creative and practical application. The first means information acquiring and their selection. In this area there is a huge amount of information which should be found, ordered and grouped. Nowadays the inflow of the economic, security/defence and political information is so great that we have to use special filters to choose the information needed for future research. The next function is a result of analyses, evaluation and formulating a hypothesis which need further verification. We can easily say it is a “specific laboratory” where all the products are put to test. The third function is realised in the process of postulations and conclusions. Based on this generalisation

8

7

6 4

3

2 1

5


171

we can form the statements, which enrich the theoretic thought of the researched discipline.

We need to consider also the usability of this science discipline. We can strongly recommend the thesis that economics is extremely useful for state security. It is expected to give the answers and solutions, methods and instruments. Also it has to warn and stimulate, offering different questions. There is a need for this kind of research world-wide to create an efficient security system for people and nations.

Security economics research programs and the researches centres

It is difficult to describe the most important science problems of security economics. It depends on two premises: the first is the institution needs for this kind of research; the second one is a result of research scientists. There are eight following standard topics (figure 3):

1. The field of defence-economic thought: – origin; – connections and dependences; – forming the opinions; – theories. 2. Military-economic history: – role of war loot in the ancient countries power; – economic basis of Middle-Ages wars; – growth of the navy during Mercantilism times; – industrial revolution in England and war technology development; – economy bases influence on massive conflicts increase. 3. War economics: – war resources mobilisation; – war catering; – war economic effect; – war finances; – war resources allocation; – war production; – war costs. 4. Military economics: – finance army planning; – resources efficiency; – standing army economics’ dilemma; – civil-military cooperation (CIMIC); – alliances’ role in economic supporting; – military costs.


172

5. Economic-Defence planning and programming: – tools; – economy mobilising planning; – technological infrastructure utilisation for the SBiOP need; – economic conditions of the stabilising missions; – economic-social effect of disarmament; – management of defence-economic resource system; – economic-defence analyses related to cost-effect; – modern economic mobilisation. 6. Economic-Defence simulation: – economic-defence potential measurement; – economic-defence condition vaulting; – diagnoses methods and techniques; – modelling of the connections. 7. Economic-Defence policy: – army role in the economic-defence potential; – defence direction; – methods of economic-defence policy creating; – alliances; – decision-making; – arms traffic; – analyses and evaluation of the resources; – role of resources and strategic reserves; – role of the domestic industry; – international cooperation; – security and defence costs; – terrorists premises and cost of the terrorists control. 8. Economic security: – modern economy intelligence; – economic security of sectors (energy, raw, finance, food, ecological etc); – economic security threats of the country; – methods and resources of the economic security. The above subjects may be of different shades. In the effect we wanted to show

the connections between theory and practice. We hope, presented problems may be a present program of security economics research.

It is important to point out the research sciences centres and the scientist. There are seven main centres:

– British centre at the Defence Study University Centre in York (K. Hartley, D. Greenwood, M. Kalder, G. Kenedy, J. Lovering) and scientists in other centres (N. Cox, J. Thompson or R.P. Smith).

– American centre at The University of Texas in Dallas (T. Sandler, D. Arce), Harvard University (E.B. Kapstein, L.D. Olvey, J.R. Gulden, R.C. Kelley),


173

California University (J. Hirshleifer, M. Interiligator, M. McGuire) and also people working at other centres (A.L. Ross, G. Kennedy, N. Hooper, D. Braddon, P. Dowdall, M. Kaldor).

– Swedish centre at the International Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and Peace and Conflict Research Division at Uppsali University (M. Sollenberg, P. Wallensteen, I. Anthony, E.M. Loose-Weintraub, E. Skons, S. Deger, W. Omitoogun, C. Perdomo, D. Fruchard, S.T. Wezeman, P. Satalenheim, M. Ward).

– Russian centre at the Russian Science Academy, Russian Natural Reserves Academy, National Economy Academy (W.K. Senczagow, W. Chaczaturow).

– German centre at the Budesrepublic Academy in Hamburg and Koblence University (J. Gerber, G. Kirchhoff, G. Werner, O. Hahn, H. Einhorn and G. Kozianka) and also the representatives of Military Economy Dachau Association (J. Blackert, E. Kuhn, M. Ebig, J. Saalbaum, P. Neuhaus).

– Czech centre at the Defence University in Bern (M. Krc, J. Nedbal, J. Selesovsky, V. Sefcik, L. Odehnal, L. Stancl).

– Polish center connected at the National Defence University (Z. Stachowiak, M. Sułek, J. Płaczek, L. Kościelecki, S. Kurinia, J. Wróbel, J. Olszewski, K. Stańczyk, S.T. Kurek).

In other European countries (France – J. Aben, J. Fontanel and Italy – Jean Caro) these problems are also mentioned, but in very limited research. In every country all these problems are being analysed even if there is no specialists in this field of research. There is also a periodical magazine edited “Defence and Peace Economics”. This bi-monthly magazine was first edited in 1990 as “Defence Economics”. It is concerned with subjects like: economical aspects of defence, disarmament, conversions and peace. The readership of this magazine consists of international scientists and authors. The analyses and researches in the articles speaks of mathematical aspects of the research.

Summary

Summarising we can say that there is an authentic need for this kind of security economics analysis in Poland and in the wider world. Security economics is written for a positive impact in the scientific process and to help the economy and political sciences. There is research and scientific works as well as monographies and manuals and articles being published. This subject is lectured on at many academic centres. There are a number of great research teams of specialists and experts. The scientific thought is creating and research methodology is creating and verifying. All of these mean that we, as this article's authors, being at the same time the representative of this thought, are assured of the great prognosis of this thought for the future. It will find an important place among modern science.


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Warszawa 2001. Stachowiak Z., Kurek St., Kurek S.T., Bezpieczeństwo ekonomiczne RP, AON, Warszawa

2004. Sułek M., Programowanie gospodarczo-obronne, Bellona, Warszawa 2008. Wybrane problemy ekonomiki bezpieczeństwa, red. Z. Stachowiak i J. Płaczek, AON,

Warszawa 2002. Zarys ekonomiki bezpieczeństwa, red. J. Płaczek, AON, Warszawa 2009.

THE OPTIMIZATION OF LOGISTICS COSTS IN COMPUTER ASSISTED COMMAND POST EXERCISES

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Lt. Col. Sławomir BYŁEŃ, Ph.D. National Defence University

Abstract

The War Game and Simulation Centre (WG&SC) is able to support different kind of

Computer Assisted Exercises (CAX’s), also it has the ability to conduct geographically distrib-

uted exercises. This article is an attempt to present the problems of logistics costs in CAX’s. The

objects of research were the real logistics support of CAX’s, conducted at various locations. In

comparison with other types of exercises, the use of computer simulation significantly reduces

logistics costs. However, differences in the costs of logistics are also found in the Command

Post CAX exercises. It depends on where they are carried out. Information contained in this

paper shows the way to optimise and rationalise logistics costs.

Key words – logistics, cost, the optimization

Introduction Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, commands and staffs of leading

armies of the World have developed the use of computer simulation for training in order to replace the practical deployment of troops. Nowadays, in this area an increased share of distributed computer simulation is assumed. Similar trends can be observed also in the training of the Polish Armed Forces. Awareness of the direction of the focus of leading the armed forces of NATO countries, led to the establishment in the Polish Armed Forces of a dedicated organisation of cells controlling computer-aided exercises1 CAX (Computer Assisted Exercise).

Based on the decision of the Minister of National Defence2 in 2002 work began on creating a War Games and Simulation Centre (WG&SC), which operates in

1 Instructions for preparing and conducting exercises with headquarters and staffs in the Polish Armed Forces. DD/7.1.1 (A). MoD, Warsaw 2010, p. 8.

2 The basic documents that define the tasks, subordination and structure WG&SC were “Regulation No. 54/MoD of the Minister of National Defence, dated 21/08/2001 in the matter of the creation of WG&SC at National Defence University” and “Regulation No. 51/MoD of the Minister of National Defence, dated 08/26/2002 ordinance amending the years on the creation of the War Games and Simulation Centre in the National Defence University”, (Journal of Laws No. 16, MoD, September 17, 2002).


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conjunction with the American simulation systems, designed for the modelling and simulation of join operation ¬ JTLS (Joint Theatre Level Simulation).

The WG&SC, in order to meet the global trends in the organisation of CAX exercises, and most of all to try to meet the demands Ministry of Defence, General Staff and Type of Armed Forces leaders in the rationalisation of expenditure on training, has set it self the objective of optimising the cost of computer-aided training, with particular emphasis on logistics costs.

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the economic benefits of the organisation of CAX exercises, carried out in a dispersed form.

Keywords: the command post exercise, computer assisted exercises, distributed exercises, optimisation of costs, logistics costs.

Systematic approach to the costs of military logistics Between 2008 and 2012, due to the economic situation actions were taken by

the state at all levels of the Polish Armed Forces aimed at reducing the cost of military operations, especially the promotion of solutions according to the rationalisation of the use of funds allocated for defence.

The basis for the functioning of the Polish Armed Forces is the defence budget for the calendar year, which consists of property and personal expenses and expenses related to the operation of armaments and military equipment, as well as expenses associated with the training of commands, staffs and troops3. It is in the rationalisation of expenditure on training, including CAX exercises in WG&SC, that measures have been taken to ensure its optimisation.

Issues of logistics costs4 are among the most difficult and complex problems of modern logistics. The problem involves even the definition, separation and isolation. In the literature, there is the concept of logistics costs in different sections according to different classification criteria, and experts point to the different sources and types of costs and how to identify their structure5. Information on costs, their height, where the formation, deviations, etc., are the basis for conducting economic analysis, and thus economic decisions boil down to

3 Generally, the defence budget is divided into: defence expenditure (expenditure incurred for the

functioning of the defence system of the country), military expenditure (costs money spent on the functioning of the armed forces and military expenditures (purchase of armaments and military equipment, and military construction.). See.: J. Płaczek, Economics of defence, NDU, Warsaw 1994, p. 80.

4 In terms of logistics, instead of the commonly used term "logistics costs" the correct name should be the term "logistics costs", a concept that does not affect the formal principles of cost accounting. See.: K. Ficon, Economic Logistics, BEL Studio, Warsaw, 2008, p. 254 and P. Blaik, The

concept of an integrated logistics management, PWE, Warsaw 2010, p 373. 5 See eg: K. Ficon, op. cit, pp. 261-296 and P. Blaik, op. cit, pp. 370-410.


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optimising costs. On the other hand, a well-functioning system of information on costs of logistics processes is necessary to determine the size of the actual costs6.

Logistics costs are one of the main criteria for assessing the effectiveness of any system of logistics7, and the minimisation should be a basic requirement of logistics processes. Logistics costs, through the impact on the overall economic results are the primary quantitative measure of the effectiveness and efficiency of these processes8. Civilian logistics divides the most commonly used criteria for the allocation of the costs of logistics into the following groups9:

− logistics costs in cross-generic (generic division); − logistics costs by phase of movement and places of formation (split phase); − logistics costs logistics segment / component logistics processes (the residue

division process); − cost by volatility distribution. The military is increasingly placing the emphasis on economic factors, where

an important determinant of the training plan is to rationalise the cost of training10. Therefore, training in planning projects includes the principle of economic calculation in terms of 'cost – effect. In this regard, action is taken:

− to reduce activities with the use of military equipment by introducing a wider range of process training school and training devices and simulators;

− to equip military units with equipment to assist the training process; − to ensure the widespread use by the leadership and staffs of the centres of

computer simulation and war games; − to combine various levels of command exercise in all types of armed forces; − to organise and conduct combat training in an integrated way, the after-ligo

¬ nach and training sites. In the army costs of logistics include many elements (components), mainly

investment: financial, property, and personal time11, and the realization of logistics processes causing the cost of logistics. The most common cost-sharing is a generic cross-section, based on the criterion of economic content. The generic includes costs such as:

6 T. Kaminski, Logistics economic branch, NDU, Warsaw 1996, p 120. 7 Efficiency (Latin Effectus - effect) is evaluated on the basis of efficiency and effectiveness. At

the same time efficiency means "doing things the right way", and the effectiveness of "doing things right". See.: P. Drucker, [in:] J. Stoner and Ch. Wankel, Directing, PWE, Warsaw 1992, p. 29.

8 Performance by Pszczołowski, the effectiveness is defined as: 1) "positively evaluated compliance effort to", 2) "is effective in terms of efficiency and versatile in the sense of the primary component synthetic ...". T. Pszczołowski, Small encyclopedia of praxeology and organization

theory, Ossolineum, Wroclaw 1978, p. 219. The effectiveness according to P. Sienkiewicz is seen as an essential criterion in the evaluation of the operational effectiveness of the system expressed as "... the ability of the system to the act, leading to the desired effect as the goal of this action". P. Sienkiewicz, Theory of systems efficiency, Ossolineum, Wroclaw 1987, p. 57. In terms of military efficiency, effectiveness and efficiency are used interchangeably because of the lack of clear measures (indicators) classification.

9 See.: M. Nowicka-Skowron, Effectiveness of logistic systems, PWE, Warsaw 2000, p. 93. 10 Training Doctrine of the Polish Armed Forces, DD / 7 (A), MoD, Warsaw 2010, p. 24. 11 K. Ficon, op. cit, p. 255.

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a) material costs: − depreciation; − use of materials, fuel and energy; − material services; b) intangible costs: − salaries of soldiers and army personnel; − other personal debts soldiers and military employees fail to pay; − intangible services; − cash outflow of premiums, taxes, fees and insurance; c) other costs. Undoubtedly, the cost of the military operations budget unit (MBU) occupies a

significant place in logistics costs, including: – the costs of supply and field services: – organisation of food provision; – organisation of uniform provision; – organisation of supplies, fuels, and lubricants; – organisation of munition supply; – the costs of maintenance support: – maintenance of armaments in technical performance status; – repairs of weapons and combat equipment; – the costs of transport support; – the costs of accommodation; – the costs of health service support. In general, the allocation of logistics costs corresponds to the division of the

military logistics system (CSSS)12, contained in the doctrine of logistics. Types of logistics costs are show Figure 1.

Fig. 1. Types of costs of logistics in the budget of the military unit activity Study

The most important positions in the logistics costs of the CAX exercises are the

costs of feeding, accommodating and transporting participants.

12 The „Military logistics system „… is an ordered set of elements of the organizational

structure and the functional areas which purpose, interconnection and relationships ensure the smooth functioning of the Polish Armed Forces in peace, crisis and war”. See: Logistic Doctrine of The

Polish Armed Forces, DD/4, MoD, Warsaw 2004, p. 21.


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Variants of Computer Assisted Exercises According to the latest classification of military operations there are three types

of simulation: Real, Virtual and Constructive13. This classification is related to the division of the two variables, namely the factor of personal and work environment. Schematic division of the criteria adopted by the simulation show in Figure 2.

Fig. 2. Types of simulation in computer assisted exercises Study

From the point of view of the most useful CAX exercises it is a constructive

simulation, carried out in a dispersed form. In countries with long-standing traditions of using simulation systems, and above all, in the U.S. and Germany, among exercises in the classic sense, are distributed CAX exercises, which use at least two simulation systems. Constructive simulation is primarily useful in training commands and staffs where as the virtual and real simulations are for training crews and improving the individual skills of soldiers.

In practice, the concept of distributed organisations for CAX exercises results in different jobs being done by different components14:

13 Simulation of the real (Live Simulation) – of real soldiers using actual combat equipment that

is connected to the simulated environment. Simulation of the virtual (Virtual Simulation) – a real person operating the device simulation (simulators) modeling individual equipment, vehicles, aircrafts, etc. Simulation of the constructive (Constructive Simulation) is the computer models that represent the processes carried out by the actions of people and equipment. This category includes simulation systems to conduct „war games” that model the military in real time. See: E. Cayirci, Computer Assisted Exercise Process, 5th NATO Joint CAX Forum, Ottobrunn, 30/08/2010. Available on line: iabg.de/verteidigung/.../CAXProcess.pdf.

14 See: P. Boryn, “Distributed exercises CAX as a modern form of training commands and staffs”. [Accessed: 02/07/2012]. Available on the Internet: www.csikgw.aon.edu.pl/.

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− JTLS operation system is based on a central computer (server), located in WG&SC;

− JTLS system management is performed centrally by the administrator of the operating system WG&SC;

− computer network management, which carries out CAX exercises is done using network administrators, such as the classified Defence network (MIL-WAN);

− administering workstations is done by IT security teams, separated from the units participating in the exercises.

Due to the criterion (geographic location) of the following options, exercises are of the following types of CAX exercises15:

− Variant A – deployment all elements of the exercise in WG&SC; − Variant B – deployment the authority of the exercise in WG&SC and

commands post in places of permanent dislocation (PPD) or in the field; − Variant C – deployment all elements of the exercise in places of permanent

dislocation. Variants of CAX exercises in the various configurations are shown in Figure 3.

Source: own study based on archival materials WG&SC [Accessed: 07/07/2012]. Available on the Internet:

http://csikgw.aon.edu.pl/.

Fig. 3. Schematic diagram of the variants of command-post computer assisted exercises according to their place of conduct

Variant A. Deployment of all elements of the exercise in WG&SC Variant A is a classic way of organising the CAX exercise. It results from

WG&SC past experiences which show that this organisational structure and form

15 In the Polish Armed Forces because of the place conducting exercises, there are two types of

exercises: a) in the field and b) stationary facilities, including: the place of permanent dislocation, the backup job, and simulation centers. See: Instructions for the preparation of …, op. cit., p. 37.


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of preparing and conducting the exercise presents the least problems. In this variant both the course in JTLS system operators, and the exercise itself is conducted in WG&SC rooms. The deployment of functional DISTAFF cells of the exercise and the exercising of command facilities and equipment occur in WG&SC. The advantage of this variant is a developed (stationary) logistic infrastructure and Information Technology (IT) stores which ensures that the WG&SC facility is treated as the basic place for organising computer assisted exercises. Over the last six years of active use, the WG&SC was the most often applied variant for organising CAX exercises. The first test of this form of exercise was CAX with 2. Mechanised Corps, covername "Beskidy 06".

Variant B. Deployment of the exercise authorities in WG&SC and commands post in PPD

The second option of the organisation of the CAX exercise assumes arranging particular elements of the exercise in different locations (garrisons). We are talking then about conducting distributed CAX exercises. This variant is based on the distribution of the DISTAFF part, including leadership, exercise directors and OPFOR in the WG&SC, while exercising command in their command stations or in the field. In the activity of our Centre the first exercise conducted in a distributed form was training connected with different systems of command, organised in 2007 by the General Staff of the Polish Army, covername "Stokrotka 07".

Variant C. Deployment of all elements of the exercise in PPD Another example of the organisation is an exercise in the form of a distributed

CAX. This variant deploys elements of the exercise outside of the complex distribution of WG&SC. In this case, both the training of JTLS system operators as well as CAX exercise takes place in the permanent deployment units participating in the exercise. Such a solution was used for the first time in the full range of uses in January 2012 in a CAX exercise with 10. Armoured Bde, covername “Bóbr 12”.

The methodology for calculating the costs of logistics in CAX exercises A. INPUT Analysis and assessment of the real logistical systems in command-staff

computer assisted exercises (CAX), organised in 2012, comparable due to the organisational level, including:

a. 11th Armoured Div. Exercise with 10th Armoured Cavalry Bde, covername “BÓBR-12”, conducted in military facilities of Żagań and Świętoszów (distributed system).

b. 12th Mechanised Div. Exercise with 7th Costal Defence Bde, covername “WILK-12”, conducted in a facilities of WG&SC (stationary system).

The size of the forces and resources involved in preparing and carrying out the exercise are shown in Table 1.

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T a b l e 1 FORCES AND RESOURCES DEDICATED TO SUPPORT CAX EXERCISES

Quantity of transportation Name exercises

Participant exercises

Number of soldiers Bus Minibus Car

Period of exercise preparation 11th Arm Cav Div 42 1 2 - WG&SC 16 - 1 - Period of exercise duration 11th Arm Cav Div 150 3 1 2

BÓBR-12

WG&SC 6 - 1 - Period of exercise preparation 12th Mech Div 42 1 1 - WG&SC 16 - - - Period of exercise duration 12th Mech Div 240 8 2 3

WILK-12

WG&SC 32 - - -

Source: own study on the basis of the documentation of exercises covername: “Bóbr-12” and “Wilk-12”.

B. THE LEGAL BASIS The basis for the organisation of real logistic support for CAX exercises are: a) in the organisation of feeding: − Regulation of the Minister of National Defence on boarding soldiers

16; − The decision of the Minister of National Defence in determining the

monetary value of Standards Board17.

b) as regards the organisation of accommodation: − General Regulations of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, MoD,

Warsaw 2009. − Legal act on accommodation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of

Poland18

. − The order of the Rector-Commander National Defence Academy No 18 of

22 April 2009 on the principles of drawing up cost paid for teaching and other

educational services and a price list for the rental of premises. c) for the organisation of the transport support: − Orders of the Chief of General Staff No. 444/Log/IWsp the Armed Forces of

29 May 2008 on the indicators of the operating costs of the selected equipment

tanks-automotive.

16 See: Regulation of the Minister of National Defence, No 327 of 04 March 2011 on board

troops active duty military, (Official Journal of the MoD, 2011 No. 63, item. 327). 17 See: Decision of the Minister of National Defence, No. 55/MoD with 23 February 2011 in

determining the monetary value of Standards Board (Official Journal of the MoD No. 5, item. 61 of 24 March 2011).

18 Legal act of 22. June 1995 on the accommodation of the Armed Forces, (Official Journal 2005, No. 41 item. 398).


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− Annex to the orders of the Chief of General Staff No. 444/Log/IWsp the Armed Forces of 29 May 2008 on the unit operation costs indicators for selected

equipment service tanks-automotive. − Letter from the Head of the Inspectorate Support for the Armed Forces from

21 March 2011 on upgrade unit indicators operating costs of equipment for 2011. Organisation of the feeding of the participants of a CAX exercise The feeding of participants of a CAX exercise is done by the food standards

basic school 020 and additional standards: total 110 and 160 beverages. These standards according to the provisions of the food service industry are for the soldiers both participating in exercises outside the garrison, and participating in training or exercises in garrison19. Current cash values on the Board on the activities of the individual Regional Logistics Bases is shown in Table 2.

T a b l e 2

THE CASH VALUE OF THE STANDARDS BOARD

Essential standards Board [PLN] Additional standards Board

[PLN] Lp. Regional Logistics

Base a soldier's 010

a schol's 020

specjal 030

operational 040

general 110

bread 111 drinks

160

1. 1 RLB Wałcz

13.60 14.59 19.65 21.49 6.21 1.40 1.10

2. 2 RLB Warsaw

14.67 15.69 21.11 22.79 5.88 1.40 1.10

3. 3 RLB Kraków

13.95 14.92 19.61 21.56 5.79 1.40 1.10

4. 4 RLB Wrocław

13.17 14.12 18.63 20.38 5.38 1.40 1.10

Source: own study on the basis of Decision No. 55/MoD of 23 February 2011 in determining the monetary value of Standards Board (Official Journal of the MoD, No. 5, item. 61 of 24 March 2011).

It should be noted that, in comparison with the provisions in force until 2011,

when the whole Armed Forces applied a standardised rate, currently, these values vary depending on the area of responsibility of the individual Regional Logistics Base.

Variant A. Stationary exercise conducted in WG&SC facilities. In accordance with the summary presented in Table 1, participants in the period

of preparation of CAX exercises (conferences, courses, reconnaissances, workshops), and at the time of exercise is entitled to basic standards board by school board 020 and by additional food standards: 40% of the total 110 and drinks 16020. Moreover,

19 Ibidem, § 8. 1. 20 See: Decision of the National Defence Minister No. 55/MoD, op. cit.

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in relation to the feeding of participants on exercise using the National Defence University (NDU) canteen, according to the commissioned system, one should increase costs of the food by costs posed by raw materials (mark-up of 150%). The daily rate of overall costs of maintaining soldiers in the National Defence University per capita is shown in Table 3.

T a b l e 3

DAILY RATE OF COSTS OF MAINTAINING SOLDIERS IN THE NDU

Norm foods Monetary value

[PLN]

+ 150% of bedspread/s prime

costs [PLN] Remarks

Fundamental school 020 15.69 39.22 15.69 x 2.5 Additional general 40% 110 2.35 5.88 2.35 x 2.5 Additional of drinks 160 1.10 1.10 Total − 46.20

Source: own study on the basis of Decision No. 55/MoD, op. cit.

Variant B. Distributed exercise conducting in WG&SC and PPD Feeding participants of a mixed exercise involves both the provision of food in

NDU canteens and the feeding of participants of the exercise in the parent unit canteens. The cash value of food standards is shown in Table 4.

T a b l e 4

DAILY RATE OF FEEDING COSTS OF A MIXED SYSTEM

Monetary value [PLN] Standard board 1st RLB

Wałcz 2nd RLB Warsaw

3rd RLB Kraków

4th RLB Wrocław

NDU Warsaw

The basic school 020

14.59 15.69 14.92 14.12 39.225

An additional 40% of the total 110

2.484 2.352 2.316 2.152 5.88

An additional beverages 160

1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10

Total 18.17 19.14 18.34 17.37 46.20

Source: own study on the basis of Decision No. 55/MoD, op. cit.

Note: Adopted to calculate the monetary value of RLB Wałcz, as appropriate for the 12th Armored Div and NDU.

Variant C. Distributed exercise conducting in PPD Depending on the area of responsibility of various alimentation members RLB

exercises carried out using the school principal food standards 020 and by additional food standards: 40% of the total standard drinks 110 and 16021. The cash value of Board presents in table 4. Note: for the calculation of the monetary values, RLB Wroclaw figures were adopted, as appropriate for 11st Armoured Cavalry Division.

21 Ibidem, (Official Journal of the MoD No. 5, item. 61 of 24 March 2011).


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Organisation of accommodation for participants of CAX exercises Variant A. Stationary exercise carried out at the premises of the WG&SC This option implies free accommodation in the unit in Zegrze, Białobrzegi and

Wesoła. Accommodation in civilian hotels is approximately 150 zł per person / day. Accommodation in NDU hotels is from 50 to 100 zł per person / day (using the calculation of 50 zł).

Variant B. Distributed exercise conducted in WG&SC and PPD This option implies accommodation of participants in mixed exercises. For

participants in WG&SC, accommodation in units in Zegrze, Białobrzegi and Wesoła is free. For other participants in G&SC civil hotel accommodation about 150 zł per person / day. For exercises participants at PPD units, accommodation is free.

Variant C. Distributed exercise conducting in PPD Accommodation of participants is free in facilities based on home barracks.

Organisation of transport CAX exercise participants According to the Annex to the orders of the Chief of General Staff No.

444/Log/IWsp the Armed Forces of 29 May 2008 on the unit operation costs

indicators of selected equipment service tanks-automotive22

for the transport of each unit corresponds to its own. The number of people and means of transport involved in the exercise is contained in Table 1.

Adapted to calculate the distance between two locations and the number of journeys:

a) The distance between Świętoszów – Rembertów – Świętoszów = about 1100 km.

b) The distance between Szczecin – Rembertów – Szczecin = about 1200 km. c) The distance between Rembertów – Zegrze – Rembertów (x 2 trips – 120

km) = 3 x bus x 120 km x 8 days = about 2900 km. d) Odległość Rembertów – Zegrze – Rembertów (x 2 trips – 120 km) = 8 x bus

x 120 km x 8 days = about 8900 km. Indicator unit operating costs of equipment adapted to the values indicated in

Table 523. Examples: − 1 x bus averaged: 7.25 zł + 8% TAX = 7.83 zł; − 1 x minibus averaged: 3.35 zł + 8% TAX = 3.62 zł; − 1 x personal car averaged: 2.12 zł + 8% TAX = 2.29 zł.

22 Letter from the Head of the Inspectorate Support the Armed Forces from 21 March 2011 on

upgrade unit indicators operating costs of equipment for 2011. 23 As an indicator of operating costs counted 8% TAX.

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T a b l e 5 UNIT OPERATING COSTS OF SELECTED INDICATORS OF THE TRANSPORTATION

ASSETS

Source: The Annex to the order of Chief of General Staff No 444/Log/IWsp SZ of 29 May 2008, op. cit.

The results of the cost of logistics in the computer assisted exercises

T a b l e 6

Our study.


187

T a b l e 7

Our study.

T a b l e 8

Our study.

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Conclusions from the results of the logistics costs of computer assisted exercises

Our study.

Fig. 4. The costs of feeding in computer assisted exercises

Our study.

Fig. 5. The costs of accommodation in the computer assisted exercises


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Our study.

Fig. 6. The costs of transport in the computer assisted exercises

Our study.

Fig. 7. The total costs of logistics in the computer assisted exercises 1. The study shows that the highest total logistics costs arise in the computer

assisted exercises conducted using a stationary system in WG&SC (variant A). 2. The lowest total cost of logistics are in exercises carried out in the places of

the permanent dislocation headquarters (variant C).

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3. The difference in the amount of logistics costs is approximately 180 thousand, which is 3.5 times less. Assuming that during the year there are two or three classes at this level, it's a serious saving.

4. From the point of view of WG&SC, the situation is the opposite. The highest costs occur in the exercises conducted a distributed system, due to the costs of accommodation and transport of representatives of WG&SC, aiming to secure the operational needs and ICT CAX in PPD practicing commands, both in the preparation (training of simulation system operators) and running exercises (part of the composition of the management exercises).

5. A shortcoming of option C is the need of human potential distraction WG&SC. This is sufficient to protect the exercise of DIV in one location for the local inputs, while in the case of exercises at the operational or strategic level such a solution cannot be considered.

Advantages and disadvantages of options to organise computer assisted exercises

1. Variant A. The main disadvantages of this option includes the high cost of

logistics, especially in view of the costs of accommodation, feeding and transport. 2. Variant B. In organisational terms the most optimal solution, in terms of

logistics costs less favourable than option C. 3. Variant C. The advantage of this option are reduced logistics costs in all

areas of domain (accommodation, feeding and transport), as exercising leadership, using their own logistic infrastructure does not generate additional costs of logistics. The disadvantages include the need for the potential distribution of WG&SC exercises necessary to protect distributed in different locations.

Conclusion The increasing role of CAX exercises in the training of commands and staffs in

the Armed Forces resulted in the creation of WG&SC. The trend towards the use of simulation systems in computer assisted exercise illustrates the obvious economic benefits of conducting this type of exercise. It is expected that in the future they will provide an important link in the process of training commands and staffs.

On the other hand, conducting distributed CAX seems to be the perfect solution at a time when financial considerations have forced terminology to abandon the traditional practice of CAX. In addition to cost savings related to the fact that both the exercising staffs and teams, most notably playing the opponent and subordinates, carry out their tasks in places of permanent dislocation, including the operator training simulation system, the preparation of the script in a database can


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be done through the use of Internet technology and technology education can be carried out at distance (e-learning).

The adoption of such solutions implies lower training costs, which in the global settlement should bring tangible economic benefits. At the same time you have to have in mind that the actions taken to optimise the cost of training cannot reduce its effectiveness. In any case, it must be ensured that the objectives of training are achieved.

The analysis of CAX exercises conducted in 2006-2012 shows that the cost of logistics, without a doubt, the key items are personnel costs which, in order of size include: the cost of accommodation and food for participants of the exercises, followed by operating costs of equipment dedicated to transport participants during the exercise. Based on experience with CAX exercises conducted in the WG&SC we are able to conclude that logistical tasks carried out in the framework of a real security exercise (Real Support Exercise) are the most financially consuming aspects of the cost of the exercise.

The action taken in terms of rationalisation of training may not reduce its efficiency. In any case, they must ensure the achievement of the objectives of the training. Commonly, however, it is also known that not every reduction of costs is rational and reasonable. When implemented processes are irrational, there are training losses, which in the terminology of the economic costs are lost benefits24. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between rational expenditure incurring unreasonable costs and incurring losses.

Bibliography

Decision No. 55/MoD of the Minister of National Defence of 23 February 2011 in determining the monetary value of Standards Board (Official Journal of the MoD, No. 55, item. 61).

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Instructions for preparing and conducting exercises with headquarters and staffs in the

Polish Armed Forces. DD/7.1.1 (A). MoD, Warsaw 2010. Płaczek J., Economics of defence, NDU, Warsaw 1994. Orders of the Chief of General Staff No. 444/Log/IWsp the Armed Forces of 29 May 2008

on the indicators of the operating costs of the selected equipment tanks-automotive. Regulation No. 327/MoD of the Minister of National Defence, dated 04/03/2011 on board

troops active duty military, (Official Journal of the MoD, 2011, No. 63, item. 327). Annex to the orders of the Chief of General Staff No. 444/Log/IWsp the Armed Forces of

29 May 2008 on the unit operation costs indicators selected equipment service tanks-

24 K. Grzybowska, Podstawy logistyki, Difin, Warsaw 2009, p. 351.

SŁAWOMIR BYŁEŃ

192

automotive. Letter from the Head of the Inspectorate Support the Armed Forces from 21 March 2011 on upgrade unit indicators operating costs of equipment for 2011.

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matter of the creation of the War Games and Simulation Centre at National Defence

University. Regulation No. 51/MoD of the Minister of National Defence, dated 26/08/2002 in the

matter of change on the creation of the War Games and Simulation Centre at National

Defence University. The order of the Rector-Commander National Defence Academy No 18 of 22 April 2009

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and price list for the rental of premises.

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE…

193

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE FIRST

DECADE OF 21ST CENTURY IN POLAND

Aleksandra KARCZMAREK, PhD student National Defence University

Abstract

It has been over twenty years since the events which set in motion radical social and

systemic changes in Poland took place. As a result, the conditions of business operation

have changed completely. The changes influenced also ideas, methods and ways of

management. Many new problems and challenges have appeared. One of them is corporate

social responsibility. The author describes the changes in the perception of corporate

social responsibility by Polish society based on research conducted by specialised research

facilities. She also presents the trends of improving corporate social responsibility resulting

from implementation of the ISO 26000 standard.

Key words – business organizations, management, Corporate Social Responsibility, ISO 26000 standard

After World War II Poland was taken into the sphere of influence of the former Soviet Union (as a result of the settlement made by the great world powers). This fact has affected many aspects of Polish society, including the generally-understood economy. During that period the "socialist" centrally managed economy had a dominant role in Poland. The political authorities decided what is to be manufactured, for whom and how. Even the prices of particular items were set at the top level. The goal of this economy was a fair and just distribution of goods, as opposed to profits made by capital owners in capitalist countries.

There were two significant characteristics of the centrally managed economy: the domination of the state-owned means of production and the allocation of economic resources with a disregard for the market. The state-owned means of production included mostly capital facilities, to a lesser degree land and least of all the labor. Key decisions concerning allocation of economic resources were made by the central party and state bureaucracy, which included central planners. The economy was regulated not by the market, but by the central plan. This economic system affected also the management processes which focused mostly on completion of plans. During that period companies operated in a specific way, as they had to fulfill a number of social functions as decreed by political authorities. Therefore the issue of what we call today corporate social responsibility did not even emerged.


ALEKSANDRA KACZMAREK

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The social and political transformation which took place in Poland after 1989 brought about a change of the economic system: to that of a market economy. Companies began to operate in a new way as their roles and functions changed. Also the methods of corporate management evolved, based on the principles, methods and cases tested in other countries. However, a host of new issues appeared, related not only to the companies and their management, but also to the society for whom the companies are working. One of those issues which went unnoticed before was corporate social responsibility (pertaining to an organisation or a company). Therefore the goal of my paper is to show the changes which have occurred in the first decade of the twenty first century in respect to that area.

In order to present the problems of corporate social responsibility more clearly it is necessary to define some notions which are essential to this analysis. What is social responsibility of an organisation? The simplest answer is that it is a number of obligations for organisation in order to protect and empower the society it operates in. In other words it is a concept in which the company at the strategy building stage voluntarily considers social interests and environmental protection, as well as proper relations with various groups of stakeholders.

The relevant literature contains many definitions of that concept. One of them points out that it is management's duty to select such decisions and actions which contribute both to the organisation's own interest (increasing its profits) and to the protection and enhancement of well wellbeing of the society.1 This definition highlights two aspects of social responsibility. As far as protection is concerned, the focus is on refraining from actions which are socially harmful, even if they are profitable to the company. On the other hand, companies should take actions which will be directed toward prevention and elimination of various negative social phenomena. As far as welfare is concerned, the focus is on the creative role of business in attaining social wellbeing.

Corporate social responsibility is one of the most dynamic, complex and challenging issues which face business leaders today. Nowadays private companies feel the increasing pressure to play a more active role in creating conditions for a better life. CSR means the involvement of business in ethical conduct and the promotion of economic development while demonstrating respect for people, local communities, nations and the environment. CSR integrates the concept of global citizenship with concern for the environment and sustained development.

The practice of Polish companies shows that corporate social responsibility may appear as one of four attitudes: resistance, social obligation, social reaction and social contribution.

If a company does not get involved in solving social problems or even, in some cases, refuses to accept that responsibility or decides to cover it up, this means the company's attitude is that of resistance. In the strategy of social obligation the

1 Rybak M., Społeczna odpowiedzialność biznesu – idea i rzeczywistość (Corporate social

responsibility – concept and reality), Warsaw 2001, page 28.


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company tries to legitimise its operation by the application of economic and legal criteria. In such cases the company assumes it is responsible only to its shareholders, which practically means that it accepts only obligations designated by law. Social reaction implies that a company accepts its legal and ethical duties and, in some cases, gets involved in charity work. The strategy of social contribution is the top level of social responsibility. The fundamental principle of this strategy is to be a good citizen who proactively seeks opportunities to provide individual contribution to the welfare of the whole society.2 Social responsibility should affect any decision, whether it pertains to employees, products, quality or operations. It is a way of thinking and acting and not a separate program or campaign.

As far as management theory and practice are concerned, social responsibility of an organisation is based on five domains:

The domain of economic responsibility, which pertains to executive supervision, consistency of actions related to economic development of the organisation and of the society, tax contributions, cooperation with local suppliers and local work force etc.

The domain of social responsibility, which pertains to work safety, health, amenities, fair remuneration, avoidance of child labor and discrimination, cooperation with community organisations, professional organisations and local authorities; in other words, it relates to human rights, labor rights and development of local communities.

The domain of environmental responsibility, which pertains to preventing or minimising harmful influences on the environment, the reduction of the consumption of natural resources, support of initiatives which promote responsibility toward the environment, and the development and implementation of systems, processes, technologies and innovations which are friendly to the environment.

The domain of knowledge responsibility, which pertains to learning, knowledge creation, management and sharing of knowledge, creating community access to knowledge (e.g. scholarships for outstanding students), helping to promote the education of local communities.

The domain of ethics responsibility, which pertains to abiding by laws and ethical standards in all aspects of the organisation's operation, promoting ethical standards, preventing corruption and other social abuses.

The concept of corporate social responsibility is very broad and complex, therefore it is difficult to establish a standard or a system which would cover all aspects of CSR. But there are some emerging tools to compare actions related to CSR:

2 Rybak M., Społeczna odpowiedzialność biznesu – idea i rzeczywistość (Corporate social

responsibility – concept and reality), Warsaw 2001, page 37.


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– The Keidanren Charter for Good Corporate Behaviour – ten principles established by the Japanese Federation of Economic Organisations, defining business activities;

– Principles for Business – seven principles drafted by the international network of business leaders – Caux Round Table. The purpose of establishing those principles is to define a world standard of social responsibility which could be used to measure the performance of organisations;

– Principles for Global Corporate Responsibility – a universal tool for comparative assessment prepared by the Interfaith Centre on Corporate Responsibility, which helps to ensure the responsibility of companies in line with the best standards specified by international conventions on human rights and labor;

– Social Accountability 8000 – a standard developed to enable organisations to develop voluntary standards of social responsibility and their authorisation;

– Sustainability Reporting Guidelines – a platform for the creation of reports on related aspects of sustainable development from the economic, environmental and social perspective;

– Sustainability Through the Market – seven chief principles developed by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development that allow companies to implement practices of sustainable development and to benefit from them.3

Today the sphere of social responsibility of organisations is governed by ISO 26000, adopted on 1 November 2010. It contains the answers to key questions:

– How do you define social responsibility and what are its basic principles? – What are the key areas of social responsibility? – What issues and actions are important to each area? – How to implement the principles of social responsibility in accordance with

ISO 26 000? – What are the benefits of implementing the principles of social responsibility? The provisions contained in ISO 26000 show that social responsibility of an

organisation means that the impact of its decisions and actions on society and the environment: (through transparent and ethical behaviour):

– contributes to sustainable development, including health and welfare of the society,

– takes into account the expectations of stakeholders (individuals or groups who are interested in decisions or actions of the organisation),

– is compliant with applicable laws and consistent with international standards of conduct,

– is implemented throughout the organisation and enforced in its activities within its sphere of influence.

3 Gustafson J., Czym jest społeczna odpowiedzialność biznesu? (What is social responsibility of

business?) [in:] Biznes vol. 1. Zarządzanie firmą, Warsaw 2007, p.192.


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Analysis of the standard indicates that it contains guidelines for social responsibility, which may be applied voluntarily by all organisations; at the same time, it does not contain requirements and is not meant to be used for certification.

A key problem related to the issues discussed is the answer to the question: how does society understand and interpret corporate social responsibility. Research conducted in Poland indicates that as the economic situation improved and market economy principles took hold, attitude toward corporate social responsibility began visibly to change.

In the beginning of the 21st century Poles assessed companies primarily on the basis of the quality of their products and ways in which they treated their employees and subcontractors. Quality of service was also an important factor in the evaluation. Involvement into communal and charity activities and the issues of environmental protection were perceived as much less important. It might be said that companies were seen from the perspective of a customer who wants to buy a good product and be well served and from the perspective of an employee who needs proper treatment and a fair wage.

Research conducted at that time indicated that in the opinion of the respondents the role of large companies in society is to generate profit, pay taxes and provide workplaces; in other words, to observe the law. Hence it can be concluded that the issue of corporate social responsibility was almost nonexistent in the respondents' perception and needs. It was identified mostly with the issue of the proper treatment of workers, obeying workplace health and safety rules and timely payment of wages.4

Today those attitudes are clearly changing. Increasingly corporate social responsibility is assessed by the Polish public in terms of new values. These include the attitude toward the natural environment, support for charity organisations and local communities, as well as ethical conduct. However, the promotion of principles and goals of corporate social responsibility in society is still a challenge. It may be seen that the media is more interested in showing the negative impact of companies' actions than their commitment toward initiatives benefiting society and the environment.

Summary. In recent years there has been a drive to develop a common model of promotion of corporate social responsibility. Various groups of stakeholders were invited to the discussion, so that the policy will be developed from a wide perspective. The list of possible actions is long. The authorities face an important task of encouraging companies to include the policy of corporate social responsibility in their practice, especially the small and medium enterprises, which have taken modest attempts to commit to social actions on a larger scale. The following years will show how deeply the idea of social responsibility has become

4 The presented findings are based on research conducted by IPSOS Polska in 2003, as published

in „Postawy wobec społecznej odpowiedzialności biznesu” (Attitudes towards corporate social responsibility), www.ipsos.pl/3_2_009a.pdf.


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rooted in the awareness of Polish entrepreneurs and what will be actually accomplished due to the strategic thinking of benefits for all stakeholders.5 It shall also be seen how the issue will be understood and assessed by the society as a whole.

5 Rudnicka A, Wpływ strategii społecznej odpowiedzialności na rozwój regionu (Influence of the

corporate social responsibility strategy on the regional development), [in] Społeczna odpowiedzialność biznesu a struktury lokalne, Poznań 2009.

THE PLATFORM OF HETEROGENIC SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT

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Prof. Józef JANCZAK, Ph.D. Maj. Grzegorz PILARSKI, M.A. National Defence University National Defence University

Abstract

A simulator platform of a heterogenic simulation environment is a solution which

enables the conduction of a decision making process on the contemporary battlefield as

part of the achievement of a network centric capability. Decisions made in this process,

owing to the application of modern simulation solutions are burdened with a relatively low

level of risk for the operations’ success, which is directly expressed by the reduction of

losses in people and equipment. The armed forces are now involved in a wide scope of

activities (military and peaceful) which results in a serious demand for the support of the

activities with the use of simulation platforms. Thanks to the application of the heterogenic

simulator, the army planning process can use different, complicated and expensive

simulation systems, installed in a safe place, without the necessity of their installation in the

region of operations where they could be destroyed as a result of operations.

Key words – NCW, simulator, DMP, ACS.

Introduction The simulation of the operations performed by the elements of the Armed

Forces in a heterogenic environment is becoming a prerequisite in the preparation process of the command and staff units as well as a complementary element of ‘forecast’ situation awareness.

Simulation, as an element of the command process, conditions the effectiveness of the undertaken operations. The aim hidden behind the creation of the simulator of heterogenic simulation environment is to assure the functioning of the simulator platform resulting in a simulation based on a model which describes various combat operations of different types of armed forces with the use of the simulation platforms which already exist, as well as the systems supporting decision making processes.

VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND PREPARATION


VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND PREPARATION

JÓZEF JANCZAK, GRZEGORZ PILARSKI

200

The application of the simulator While creating the simulator platforms it is advised to take into consideration

the following environmental factors: • the character of staff trainings using computer simulators, • the necessity to take into consideration the simulation scattering, • assuring the variability of picture definition presenting the combat units of

different levels, • taking into consideration the character of the information exchange route in

the structure entailing different levels of command – the structure of information domains,

• the depiction of terrain conditions with certain details. The simulator of heterogenic simulation environment should provide the

following possibilities: • to support the trainings of command posts from the level of battalion and

above in accordance with the training requirements of particular armed forces, • to implement procedures of trainings’ conduct being in force in NATO, • to support the planning process on particular levels of command

(identification of decision making situation, generating the decision options alongside with their assessment as well as the choice of the best decision),

• to conduct trainings in the scope of crisis and peace time operations, • to ‘feed’ the simulator with information from the data bases of the existing

decision making support systems of different armed forces, • to hold trainings in the regions of training units dislocation, • to be used in combat operations during the missions performed abroad, • to be used in the operation planning process as well as in the process of

command in international operations, • to assess the results of the trainings or certain operations.

Basic functions of the simulator The armed forces are presently involved in a wide scope of operations (military

and peaceful). Such a broad competence scope requires certain preparation of the personnel. The simulation platform can be the element supporting the preparation and conduct of operations in a given scope. The simulator should be used, depending on the needs, in the following areas:

• conducting trainings, most of all, with the use of dispersed simulation, • supporting units in the process of decision making especially those which

use the automated command system of particular types of armed forces, • supporting the combat units (elements) during external (out of country)

operations,


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• preparing missions, including: – determination of task structure adequate for the planned combined

operations in the international environment, – simulation of the possible operations’ scenarios, – preparation of standard operation procedures depending on the possible

existing operation plans, • running crisis and peace time operations. During a mission (crisis and peaceful) the simulation platform, through using

the dispersed simulation, can perform the supporting function in the decision making process in situations which were not anticipated in the mission preparation process (lack of adequate standard operation procedures). A vital characteristic of the simulation platform to be applied can be the creation of ‘a virtual scenario’ of the operation course. The scenario would present the description of situations possible to take place alongside the indication of their logical and coherent outcome based on environmental conditions and the decision to run the operation.

The virtual scenario determines cause-effect relations between the occurrences (the ensuing decisions of the parties and their outcomes), the counteraction between objects (the trainees – simulated units) and the surrounding (the opponent, the area of operations, meteorological conditions, the time of the year or of the day, etc.); moreover, it allows for the depiction of the given situation from different points of view. The above leads to a conclusion that the operation scenario generated by the simulation platform should include information of a dual type:

• determination of possible situations presented step by step, • indication of possible options for each occurrence, at each step which can

prevent, diversify or enable the situations to take place.

Architecture of the simulator While setting the architecture of the simulation platform it is advised to, first of all,

follow the function of the simulator of a heterogenic simulation environment, namely the integration of different simulation platforms with the use of dispersed simulation. Such attitude to the system architecture will result in the following traits:

• flexibility of solution, • trainings’ cost-effectiveness, • the training elements will be dispersed, • adaptive qualities of the analyst group depending on a certain option of

activity to be taken, • making the operations realistic during trainings, • integration of tools: simulation platform and decision support systems, • streamlining the automation of activities connected with the situation’s

options in the process of command – application of simulation platform,


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• the flow of information based on the ICT infrastructure which is allocated or generally accessible with the guarantee of a proper level of transmission security,

• safe simulation layer of the critical simulation infrastructure. The main assumption of simulation functioning in a heterogenic environment is

the usage of a proper information transfer platform – ICT networks. In case of national applications it is possible to use the allocated ICT networks which already function in the armed forces. While, in a case when it is impossible to use such networks e.g. abroad, the global Internet network can be used as a transport layer. Such a solution is possible under the condition that certain security mechanisms are implemented, which allows for the transmission of secret information in accordance with the required security level.

The examples below present the options of system configuration depending on the purpose and the way of data transmission to the simulator.

1. System architecture based on the simulation centre with the use of a dispersed simulation of the elements taking part in a training – implementation of data or its acquisition from the decision support systems.

This option can be realised in a country and abroad. The whole group responsible for the simulator operation is gathered in one place in the so called Simulation Centre, while the participants of a training are present in the regions of the training or the permanent dislocation spots (Figure 1).

Fig. 1. Architecture of simulation system – area of operation: abroad – data implementation


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The elements taking part in a training can use different simulation platforms, which can exchange data through the integrator, which is the key element of the simulator. The implementation of data to the simulation platforms is realised by the operators of certain simulation systems, which are the integral part of the structure of the elements taking part in a training. The operators, equipped with proper web access and interfacing with the system, can implement data about the situation of the elements of a training. The simulation product is received in the simulation centre from where it is transferred by the training management or directly to the training elements. The dispersed elements make the operations more realistic without the need of financial outlays in case of trainings conducted in one location. Moreover, the simulator's critical infrastructure is placed in one certain location (the safe one) operated by a group of specialists.

The key assumption of the system architecture presented in Figure 2 is the fact that the data for the simulation platform is gained directly from the databases of decision support systems without the necessity to involve operators.

Fig. 2. Architecture of simulation system – area of operations: abroad – data implementation

Usage of the dispersed simulation allows for supporting the elements realising

tasks outside the country by implementing data to the simulation system by operators or transmitting the data automatically from the decision support systems. When the tasks are realised abroad it is possible to assure the safety of the simulation platform, since the whole critical infrastructure and the group of operators is located in a safe place far away from the region of combat operations.


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2. System of architecture with the use of dispersed simulation of the elements taking part in a training – data implementation.

In this solution the structure of the simulation centre is dispersed into regions of training elements. The simulator infrastructure (Integrator) is located in a separate place and is maintained by the necessary team of experts. While, the data for the simulator platform can be delivered as in the previous examples through operators or is taken directly from the decision support systems.

Fig. 3. System architecture with the use of dispersed simulation – administrative division into

the region of operations and the region of the simulation platform infrastructure deployment – data implementation

In the above solutions used abroad particular command posts use certain simulation platforms connected with one another through the platform of a heterogenic simulator, being located in a safe place far away from the region of operations.


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Fig. 4. System architecture with the use of dispersed simulation – administrative division into

the region of operations and the region of the simulation platform infrastructure deployment – data taken from the automated command system

Summary The platform of a heterogenic simulation environment is a modern solution

facilitating the decision making process during combat operations both in a national and international dimension. Activities aiming at the achievement of a network centric capability by NATO member states exert the need to create tools and systems supporting the decision making process. Decisions made in the process should be burdened with the lowest level of risk for the operations’ success, which directly leads to the limitation of losses in people and equipment. The platform of a heterogenic simulator allows the army to use different complicated and expensive simulation systems, installed in a safe place, without the need to install them in the operations region where they are exposed to the danger of being destroyed. Bibliography

Coleman J., Network Centric Warfare w: Directions Magazine, (2004). Kręcikij J., Wołejszo J., Podstawy dowodzenia, AON, Warszawa (2007). Wołejszo J., Metodyka przygotowania i prowadzenia ćwiczeń z dowództwami, AON,

Warszawa (2005). Posobiec J., Krakowski K., Wymagania operacyjne dla symulatorów heterogenicznego środowiska symulacyjnego, AON Warszawa (2009).

JUSTYNA LIPIŃSKA

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PUBLIC INFORMATION OF THE POLISH

ARMED FORCES

Justyna LIPIŃSKA, Ph.D. National Defence University

Abstract

Polish MoD information policy is to build up the public understanding of military

affairs, national defense and support all the activities of the Armed Forces and prevention

and mitigation of information discrediting achievements. The implementation of

information policy adopted is based on the provisions of the laws, regulations and

decisions of the Minister of Defence. The article presents the assumptions described in

these documents.

Key words – Polish MoD information policy, press service, press officer

Introduction

It is an obligation for each charitable organisation to provide the public with

information, except such information which content violates the protection of

rights and freedoms of other persons or entities. In addition, information cannot be

provided in an open way if it significantly disturbs public order, security or

important economic interests of the state. The right to public information may be

also limited due to other regulations relating to the principles of the protection of

classified information. In the other cases, the organisation is required to publish

any information related to its mission.

Action taken by the Ministry of Defence is intended to build up the public

understanding of military affairs, national defence and support all the activities of

the Armed Forces, as well as promote acceptance of their mission, operating

principles, objectives and capabilities. On the other hand, it aims at the prevention

and mitigation of information discrediting the achievements and position of the

North Atlantic Alliance and the Polish Armed Forces. Also the commanders and

department heads of the Polish Ministry of Defence are obliged to stick to the

official NATO policy in this matter which regulates media access to knowledge

about the tasks carried out by the Armed Forces, including those which are

conducted during combined operations.


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Normative acts obliging the armed force institution for information

policy

The implementation of the constitutional right of citizens to information is one

of the most important principles in the overall information policy of the National

Defence Department. It means that each person has the right to demand

information concerning the ministry of defence's issues, both positive and negative,

and it is the defence department obligation to make it available, directly or through

the media. Awareness of these duties makes the defence ministry realise the need

to have an active information policy.

The mass media play a decisive role in shaping social attitudes and public

opinion in regard to the military and defence issues.

Information policy in the Polish Armed Forces is governed by the following

normative acts:

1. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland;

The Republic of Poland shall offer its citizens the right to obtain information

on the activities of public authorities and persons exercising public functions1.

Article 14 of the constitution provides freedom of the press and other mass

media2, and art. 54 stipulates that everyone shall have the freedom to express

opinions, to acquire and disseminate information3.

2. The Act of 6 September 2001 on access to public information

According to the Act of 6 September 2001 on access to public information

(Journal of Laws No. 112 Pos. 1198), every citizen of the Republic of Poland has

the right to get any information about the activities, competencies, legal status, and

rules of the decisions taken by public authorities. These bodies are required to

make available non-confidential information about their business to be published in

the Public Information Bulletin and without any delay (within 14 days) to provide

such information at the request of the individual.

3. The Act of 26 January 1984 "Press Law"

Moreover, the Act of 26 January 1984 "Press Law" (Dz.U.84. No. 5 pos. 24)

Article. 2 and 4 states that the state authorities, in accordance with the Constitution

of the Republic of Poland, must provide the press with conditions suitable for the

carrying out of its functions and responsibilities, including enabling commercial

newspapers and magazines editors, diversified in terms of the program, with a full

presentation of the subjects and attitudes4.

1 Act 61 Polish Constitution of 2 April 1997 (Journal of Laws No. 78, item. 483 with

amendments). 2 Act 14 Polish Constitution of 2 April 1997 (Journal of Laws No. 78, item. 483 with

amendments). 3 Act 54 Polish Constitution of 2 April 1997 (Journal of Laws No. 78, item. 483 with

amendments). 4 Article 2 and 4 Press Law of 26 January 1984 (Dz.U.84. No. 5 pos. 24)

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4. Act with NATO alliance (MC457)

In the NATO document (MC457) regulating the issue of communication with

the public on military matters, the parent category is Public Information. In the

Polish reality it was called "Press and Public Information Activities." It consists of

activities involving the use of various forms and methods of public relations with

regards to communication on military and defence issues.

5. Acts of States in the EU

By becoming a member of NATO and the EU, we have adopted not only the

obligations associated with the modernisation of command, communication and

military technology, but also standards for public information distribution

appropriate for the institutions of a democratic state. The NATO standardisation

documents also define the rules for informing the public body and define how to

work with the media in combined allied operations (NATO AJP 01 / B). The Polish

national equivalent of this document is “Joint Operations”

(Szt.Gen.Wewn.3/20/2001) which provides the information about how to give fair,

accurate and fast information to the public through the media. It was defined as one

of the most important tasks during the joint operation run by the operational

command.

6. Act of 5 January 2010 on the protection of classified information.

When the safety of the mission and the soldiers involved in the operation is

threatened, there is a natural refusal to create the conditions for the implementation

of journalistic activity. Access to the classified information may be limited. This

process is regulated according to applicable legislation in line with the Republic of

Poland Constitution, paragraph 61. 3. That issue was detailed in the Act concerning

the protection of classified information dated on 5 January, 2010 (Journal of Laws

No. 182, item 2010. 1228).

These documents are compatible with:

7. National Security Strategy of the Polish Republic.

and

8. Development program of the Polish Armed Forces in the years 2008-

2018.

In addition, civilian staff and employees of the military press are obliged to

abide by international law, ratified by the Republic of Poland, such as:

– The 1948 UN Human Rights Declaration;

– The 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms;

– The 1966 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights;

– The 1982 Declaration on freedom of expression and information, also known

as the European Charter for Media.

The basic document regulating the information policy of the Ministry of Polish

National Defence and the Armed Forces are:


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1. Information management strategy of the Ministry of National Defense and

the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic for 2009-2018;

2. The Polish Armed Forces development program for 2009-2018;

3. The concept of promotion of the Polish Armed Forces for 2012-2015.

Objectives of Informational policy

The strategic goal of the information policy department of the Polish National

Defence is to get the support and understanding of the public for the purpose, tasks

and activities undertaken by this department.

According to the NATO normative documents, the responsibility for the

implementation of the public information policy lies with commanders and heads

of organisational units and their subordinate officers, including press officers, who

play the role of the experts and advisors. The main pillar in the construction of an

efficient system is to inform national and international public opinion. The officer

mentioned above must be aware of theirs mission in this field.

Information policy objectives should be implemented by all military personnel

and military employees in their daily business activities. It must also be accepted

that the main principle is that every soldier involved in the potential operations or

serving in the military unit may be a part of the notification process. In this case the

soldier who is recommend as a statement provider to the media should receive

prior methodological support from professional press tutors.

The Polish Armed Forces information policy directs its activities to the:

– internal environment: professional military staff, students of the military

academies, soldiers, military employees, military personnel, MoD civil servants

and soldiers with the allocation of mobilisation. The internal environment in this

matter consists of the management of the of MoD, commanders at all levels of

command and control, as well as military experts;

– proximal external environment: military families, former professional

soldiers, veterans, combatants, candidates for professional military service and

members of non-governmental organisations which have signed an agreement with

the Minister of National Defence;

– further external environment: the members of the general public of the

local community, school and academic potential recruits and foreign customers;

– influential environment: national and international media, the government,

Parliament (both lower and upper houses), local authorities, universities and

schools, political parties, groups, social initiatives, NGOs, churches and religious

and moral authorities.

The Ministry of Defence, in the light of the information management strategy

of the MoD and the Polish Armed Forces in the period 2009-2018 carries out the

tasks of information propagation by use of:

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210

– Information Centre of Defence (MoD CI), which manages, implements

and coordinates the information in the National Defence Department;

– The MoD Department of Education and the Promotion, which manages,

carries out and coordinates the image of the defence resort.

Information policy assumptions assume that the information policy of the

Ministry of National Defence is an integral part of the government's information

policy and only Ministry of National Defence rules the implementation of national

defence information policy of the national defence specifies.

For analysis of such an organisation, which is a military service, the public

information may relate to the functioning military unit, its equipment, the impact

on the environment and methods of dealing with crisis situations such as natural

disasters. The military in order to communicate with the environment has a specific

communication strategy that is defined by a decision of the Minister of National

Defence dated. 04.07.2009 on the principles of information policy in the Ministry

of Defence.

The information policy department of national defence, the whole of the

activities and decisions of the Ministry how to inform the public about matters of

the Polish Armed Forces and defence and the formation of a positive image of the

Armed Forces using available communication means, including through the mass

media (the media)5.

Press service tasks

The main objective of an information policy department of National Defence is

to meet the information needs of the public and gain public understanding and

acceptance. The Director of the Public Information Department of the MoD is

responsible for information policy in Polish Armed Forces. He performs tasks in

the area of the information policy department by providing accurate and objective

information to the public, soldiers and employees of the department at all levels of

command and management of the Armed Forces. Its tasks include planning and

running close cooperation with the media. Particular emphasis is placed here on the

dissemination of information via e-mail or of placing it in the Public Information

Office (PIO) website. One of the Director’s responsibilities is to serve as the

Administrator of the National Defence Ministry PIO while supervising ministry

websites with the ability to intervene in their substantive content. In addition, his

office coordinates the work relating to the conduct of information campaigns and is

responsible for organising training in communication for soldiers, experts and staff

of the department. He is also responsible for the collection and sharing of

information which is issued in various formants like promotional brochures and

5 The decision of the Minister of National Defence dated. 7 April 2009 on the principles of

information policy in the Ministry of National Defence (OJ. MON No.7, pos. 82).


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videos relating to the operations of the Armed Forces carried out by Poland. The

diagram below shows the structure of the Department of the Press - Information of

the Ministry of National Defence.

Figure 1. Organizational Chart of the Department of the Press - Information of the Ministry of

the National Defence

The Ministry of Defence is the only institution standing at the top of various

types of forces and entities associated with military service. Each organisation

subordinated to the Ministry of Defence, or any military unit, has its own

spokesman who is responsible for contacts with the media. Specific regulations on

information policy in the Ministry and its subordinate units is regulated by the

document entitled “The decision of the Minister of National Defence dated. 31

May 2011 on the press service of the Ministry of National Defence”.

The main duty of the Press Service of the Armed Forces includes primarily

implementation of the ministry's information policy in peacetime, crisis and war.

The purpose of the Press Service of the Armed Forces is to organise contacts with

the media and to inform the public about matters of national defence and actions

taken by the MoD. Currently, the main purpose of the information is to broaden

public knowledge in terms of:

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1. Operations abroad.

Armed Forces engagement in operations outside the country is associated with

a high interest from the public and the media. This is primarily due to the high risk

and possibility of a loss of personnel. Therefore, it is necessary to undertake

integrated measures of Public Relations to boost public understanding of both the

mission and the purpose for which these activities are carried out.

2. Professionalization of the Polish Armed Forces.

This process requires the preparation of relevant information and promotion

campaigns to encourage people to join the army. These activities support the

recruitment process and must be addressed to different audiences. The activities

related to the professionalization of the army consists of all activities intended to

promote elitism and the prestige of the military profession.

3. Technical modernisation of the Armed Forces.

This is an area having significant potential for image development. It provides

information on the process of obtaining new weapons and military equipment and

can have a very positive impact on the perception of the military service in society.

Therefore, it requires a long-term strategy for the preparation of information and

promotion activities, including projects both on the national and local level.

4. Organisational and structural reforms.

Carrying out these particular changes and with their deep adherence to public

opinion and preferences ensures that the National Defence Ministry and all military

institutions are seen as fit managers of public money.

5. The construction of a professional press service in the Defence Ministry.

6. The introduction of modern, efficient information systems, with the

particular emphasis on electronic media.

Having in mind the fact that the Internet is becoming more and more common

for people searching for information, the PIO panel or MoD websites are also

becoming more popular. It is therefore necessary to develop appropriate solutions

to the resort and military units for the use of military telecommunication networks.

7. Providing military contingents press service equipment and technical

capabilities necessary to provide the public with information about the tasks

of the soldiers involved on operations.

8 The creation of the coherent and flexible emergency response system in

the Ministry of National Defence.

An emergency situation requires the making of properly planned and

coordinated activities of the Armed Forces. This applies not only in response to

emergency situations but also to the proper management of information and

communication with the media and local communities affected by the problem. It

is both an opportunity to demonstrate professionalism and responsibility, and, at

the same time, the possibility of serious damage to the military's reputation through

chaotic and uncoordinated project running. Therefore the creation of the


213

appropriate system is extremely important to build up a positive image of the

military organisation.

It is worth noting that the goals of information policy should be implemented

by all military personnel and military employees in their daily business activities. It

should be noted that each soldier of the Polish Army may be in some way a

participant in the process of providing information. In the event that there is a need

to provide statements to the media, each individual should have received

substantive and methodological support from the press professionals beforehand.

Military communication tools for contacting the external environment do not

differ so much from the tools used in other charitable institutions and commercial

enterprises. In addition to being a subject of military law and having access to

public information the service has the constitutional obligation to publish them by

PIO, the ways and means which the military service uses in communication with

the environment are the same as in most ordinary companies. Therefore, The

Promotion of the Polish Army Concept for 2012-2015 prepared by the Ministry of

Defence lists four main instruments of policy information:

– public information – the informing of the public, including the issuance of

the Public Information Bulletin in the electronic form;

– media relations – actions aimed at the media, building relationships with the

media, allowing for effective interaction through them to the public;

– Public Affairs – actions aimed at building mutually beneficial relationships

with institutions of public life;

– e-public relations – activities in the field of communication, implemented

via the Internet (web portal, email, multimedia presentations) and intranet. The

most important tool of e-public relations is the web portal of the Ministry of

National Defence: www.mon.gov.pl, consisting of two parts – firstly, the CI

administered by the Defence Information section and secondly, the part

administered by the Education and Promotion Department of Defence

www.wojsko-polskie.pl.

The role of press officer in the armed forces

According to the statement of the Council of Ministers, dated on 8 January

2002, on the organisation and tasks of the spokespersons in the offices of

government (issued under that Act, OJ 2002 no. 4 poz. 36) press officers perform

tasks related to government information policy in conjunction with the heads of

organisational units of the office.

The person who is responsible for coordinating the work of the Press Service of

the OU is the press officer. This particular person must have a predisposition to

work in the field of interpersonal communication and the ability to communicate

freely and directly both orally and in a written way. It is also important to have

JUSTYNA LIPIŃSKA

214

specialist knowledge of public relations, journalism and social sciences. Press and

media officers are mostly professional soldiers, graduates of upper officers schools

or have civilian higher education and postgraduate studies. They report directly to

the commander of their military unit. Cpt. Szczepan Głuszczak who is a Press

Section Chief of 11Lubuska Armoured Division in the article "Press-Military

Officer of PR-sheep" so characterised his work:

The most difficult step is to get the attention of all people who may be

interested in this business. This is the biggest challenge for anyone who begins his

journey as spokesperson. [...] We need to be very creative in our actions6.

He points out that at this stage, his work does not differ too much from the

work of fellow PR person from a private company. Just as he has to look for

current topics of interest to a wider audience, prepare and shoot footage for what

happened in his unit.

Workplace is the same as in a company or a large corporation7.

However, not everything is the same. The most sensitive part of the job is to

keep calm in a crisis, and while staying outside the country such as on an

operation. Such situations require a very high concentration and the ability to work

with leaders and provide reliable and consistent information.

The main tasks of the press and the press officer overlap in most of the tasks of

the Press Service of the Armed Forces in the organisations described above. A

detailed list of tasks given the decision in the structures of the Press Service of the

Armed Forces.

Analyzing the work of the Press Officer of the unit, it should be noted that the

scope of its responsibilities is not only to inform journalists and the wider

community about current affairs. It is also conducting ongoing and periodic

analysis of the media for commanders and the formation of conclusions and

proposals for the perception of the military in the media. As the spokesman of each

organisation, the military press officer must keep track of what the media say about

this organisation. In the case of meetings with representatives of the media, press

officer takes care of the preparation of these conferences, looking after the leaders

of meetings and the overall setting of the event. As a military unit is a specific

organisation to which no unauthorised person has access the officer must ensure

that the organisation of journalists getting into the units has the proper clearance

and that he provides them assistance. If a journalist has any questions the press

officer is obliged to respond to them, of course, in so far as they are authorised to

do so. The Press Officer in a specific unit is also responsible for preparing material

for training, and military exercises, and creating a database of photographic or film

material of the unit.

Spokespersons and press officers and officers in general are obliged to prepare

monthly plans of undertakings, along with reports on working with the media and

6 http://www.proto.pl/PR/Pdf/Oficer_prasowy_wojskowy_PR-owiec.pdf. 7 Ibidem.


215

public interest areas. These plans contain information about projects for the coming

month and the issues which the media are interested in. Reports are a source of

information about the effects of actions taken by the press service regarding the

quantity and nature of media coverage. They are described by the controversy way

about the published reports, the number of conducted press conferences and other

meetings with citizens having information and promotional nature.

Conclusion

Polish MoD and Armed Forces information policy will create a need to prepare

more and more new concepts and promotional campaigns to support the

recruitment process, addressed to different groups (also in terms of territorial),

which provide candidates for service. A key area of action is to pass on information

about military transformation which image has a significant positive potential.

Therefore, the construction of the professional press service of the MoD requires

building up a coherent information system, especially at the level of military units

and commands, based on staff full-time release. In addition to external information

focusing on the media, it should be focused on improving internal information

system on matters influencing the conditions of service and discipline of the

military service. This allows to fulfil the existing gap between the ability to

respond to the central government institutions and capabilities and equipment of

staff performing the tasks in this area at the level of military units and garrisons or

commands. Currently, outside of the Information Centre of Ministry of Defence

and some of the organisational units of the Polish Armed Forces (General Staff,

Headquarters RSZ), there is no full time press service position.

The introduction of modern, efficient information systems, with particular

emphasis on electronic media creates a growing necessity to provide Internet

accessibility for citizens and additionally the need to improve the situation of

internal information accessibility. It is therefore necessary to develop appropriate

solutions for the use of military telecommunication networks. In addition, the

construction of the optimal functioning of the military press should lead to

rationalise the cost of publishing in the military and "open up" the military press to

the external market.

Another important direction of improvement for military defence information

policy is to provide military contingents with press service equipment and technical

capabilities which are necessary to provide the public with information about the tasks

of the soldiers involved in operations. It is all about increasing the opportunities to

develop and record press releases, using television and broadcasting systems, by

providing these services in the frame of a "combat camera", prepared for the

implementation of film and photographic materials outside the country, while allied

and coalition operations are going on.

All of this requires a long-term strategy for the preparation of information and

promotion activities, including projects on a national and local scale.

JUSTYNA LIPIŃSKA

216

Bibliography

The decision of the Minister of National Defence dated. 7 April 2009 on the principles of

information policy in the Ministry of National Defence (OJ. MON No.7, pos. 82).

http://www.proto.pl/PR/Pdf/Oficer_prasowy_wojskowy_PR-owiec.pdf.

Polish Constitution of 2 April 1997 (Journal of Laws No. 78, item. 483 with amendments).

Information and promotion strategy MON, www.wp.mil.pl / files / File /

strategia_informowania_i_promocji.doc.

Press Law of 26 January 1984 (Dz.U.84. No. 5 pos. 24).

A „CULTURAL TURN” IN THE STUDY AND CONDUCT OF WARFARE…

217

A „CULTURAL TURN” IN THE STUDY AND

CONDUCT OF WARFARE – A NEW

ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE

Elżbieta OLZACKA, M.A. Jagiellonian Uniwersity in Krakow

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to acquaint the reader with “cultural turn” which in re-

cent years has been becoming visible not only on the level of thought about war and its

analysis, but also on the level of practical change in the tactics and methods of implementa-

tion of the military action. The failure of coalition forces in asymmetric conflicts in Iraq

and Afghanistan led after 2006 to a change in strategy to the one granting a greater role to

the cultural knowledge and skills. At the same time, on the level of theoretical reflection,

the analysis through the lens of technological development of the means of war conduct, as

well as the popularity of the RMA category (revolution in military affairs) gradually gives

way to a culturally oriented studies. It is caused mainly due to the fact that the 21st century

wars depend increasingly on immaterial factors - knowledge, information, culture and

values; rather than exclusively on the fire power. The article describes the most important

concepts of Western analysts (R.M. Cassidy, J.W. Jandora, D. Adamsky), but also the Rus-

sian anthropology of war (W. Bażukow, W. Grebienkow), as well as the practical implica-

tions of the cultural approach to war (e.g. Human Terrain System).

Key words – anthropology of war, cultural turn, military culture, Human Terrain Sys-tem, counterinsurgency

Introduction In recent decades, the view on war held by military historians and analysts has

been dominated by analysis from the perspective of the technological development of the means of war. Until 2006, the Western strategy and tactics were mainly based on the use of more and more technologically advanced and precise weapons with the greatest firepower. Hence the popularity of RMA (revolution in military affairs) in the military discourse1. The Western (primarily American) specialists

1 Most known works include: T. Benbow, The Magic Bullet? Understanding the Revolution in

Military Affairs, Brassey’s . London 2004; M. Knox, W. Murray (ed.), The dynamics of military

revolution 1300-2050, Cambridge University Press, 2001; A.F. Krepinevich, Cavalry to computer;

the pattern of military revolutions, “The National Interest” 37, Fall 1994, pp. 30-34; W.S. Lind, Un-


ELŻBIETA OLZACKA

218

expected technological supremacy to ensure a definite dominance over the less developed armies of enemies. The asymmetric wars in Iraq and Afghanistan con-tradicted these expectations. Neither technological superiority nor greater fire-power ensured success in these wars conducted under new rules. During the inva-sion of Iraq in 2003, the Americans, assuming that the opponent agrees with their concept of war, expected that the war would end with the defeat of the ground forces of the enemy. They were not prepared for a so-called "low-intensity" con-flict that is difficult to win by means of technological superiority only.

Therefore, in recent years, among researchers dealing with military issues, we can observe a significant increase in interest in the cultural side of conflicts and in the development of strategies and tactics that would take into account the cultural differences between the warring parties. Studies on the different war cultures, seek-ing to understand and explain non-Western ways of warfare and the different views on war and the role of violence in social life are very important these days. Their conclusions should therefore be presented to the Polish reader. In this paper we examine the most important concepts of Western analysts, but also the concepts of anthropology of war developed to the east of Poland, as well as the practical impli-cations of the "cultural" approach to war.

War as a cultural phenomenon War can be seen as a cultural phenomenon, immersed in the culture of a society

that understands and conducts it in its own special way. War is shaped by the cul-tural system, e.g. through the prevailing views on it, concepts on the use of vio-lence, values, ideals, "ethical horizon" and the concept of power dominant in so-called "official culture". The methods of warfare are determined not only by practi-cal considerations, technology and efficiency, but often also by cultural considera-tions. History provides numerous examples of this2. We can repeat after Philippe Contamine that “war is a cultural phenomenon. The concepts of war prevailing in a given era or society influence, in a more or less visible way, its outbreak, course and conduct"3. The perception of war as not only a military, political and social, but also cultural phenomenon finds more and more supporters. An influential Brit-ish historian, John Keegan is one of the pioneers of this approach. In his A History

of Warfare he proves that war is a cultural phenomenon, and it is this culture that has the greatest impact on its course, and the methods of conducting it. He writes:

derstanding Fourth Generation War, “Military Review”, September-October 2004, No. 5, 12-16; B. D. Watts, The Maturing Revolution in Military Affairs, CSBA, Washington 2011. As far as Polish literature is concerned, a book by Łukasz Kamiński, Technologia i wojna przyszłości. Wokół nuklear-

nej i informacyjnej rewolucji w sprawach wojskowych, WUJ, Kraków 2009 is worth a mention. 2 I write about this in more detail in my article Kulturowy wymiar zjawiska wojny – zakres badań

i doniosłość, „Kultura i Historia” nr 22/2001. 3 P. Contamine, Wojna w średniowieczu, Marabut, Warszawa 1999, p. 269.


219

“War is more than just an extension of policy. War is an expression of the culture of a given society; (...) it is often a determinant of culture, and sometimes of the society itself”4. The impact of culture on warfare has long been recognised and analysed by anthropologists, a prime example of which is Ruth Benedict. In the second chapter of her famous The chrysanthemum and the Sword she connects the methods of warfare, as well as the ways of thinking about the phenomenon of war in a given society with a specific cultural pattern5.

In the past few years, the "cultural perspective" in the analysis of the methods of warfare has also penetrated military circles. The relationship between war and culture is more often noticed and examined in the course of strategic and military studies6. As Patrick Porter notes, we deal with a "cultural turn" in studying war; and strategists increasingly refer to the knowledge of anthropologists and sociolo-gists. The failure of American strategy based primarily on technological supremacy meant that a growing number of military analysts began to see a need to understand "the relationship between how people fight and their traditions, identity, religion, collective memory, preconceptions and sheer force of habit"7. This resulted in new theoretical concepts, emphasizing the anthropological approach to the problem of war and the need to understand the cultural differences between the various meth-ods of warfare8. The relationship between war and culture has also been perceived as more important in the practical dimension. Cultural competence is a central value in the new American counterinsurgency field manual9. As Patrick Porter calculated, it mentions “culture” 88 times and “cultural” 90 times in 282 pages. The need to equip military personnel with language skills and in-depth cultural and social knowledge of the region is today noticed both by politicians, as evidenced by the speech of the Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld in 200410, as well as by the military personnel themselves, as evidenced by the article of the retired U.S.

4 J. Keegan, Historia wojen, Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa 1998, p. 25. 5 R. Benedict, Chryzantema i miecz. Wzory kultury japońskiej, PIW, Warszawa 2003. 6 J. W. Jandora, War and Culture: A Neglected Relation, “Armed Forces & Society”, Vol. 25,

No. 4, Summer 1999, pp. 541-556. 7 P. Porter, Good Anthropology, Bad History: The Cultural Turn in Studying War, “Parame-

ters”, Vol. 32 (2/2007), p. 47. 8 The researchers who see a need for a new theoretical approach include: T. Corn, Clausewitz in

Wonderland, “Policy Review” September 2006, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/4268401.html; M. McFate, Anthropology and

Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of Their Curious Relationship, “Military Review”, 85 March-April 2005, pp. 24-38.; G. Packer, Knowing the Enemy: Can Social Scientists Redefine the ‘War on

Terror?’, “New Yorker”, 18 December 2006, pp. 60-69. 9 The term counterinsurgency used in Western literature is translated in this paper as „wojna

partyzancka”. It should however be noted that it is associated with such concepts as "small wars", "low intensity conflict", "fourth generation warfare" or the "war on terror" and relates generally to an asymmetric conflict, irregular warfare, with no clearly defined front line, scope or even the sides of the conflict. See H. Münkler, Wojny naszych czasów, Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków 2004; M. van Creveld, The Changing Face of War: Combat from the Marne to Iraq, Ballantine, New York 2008.

10 P. Porter, op.cit., p. 48.

ELŻBIETA OLZACKA

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Army General Robert H. Scales, who argues that the Iraq crisis "requires an excep-tional ability to understand people, their culture and motivation", and proposes a new model of culture-centric warfare11. Let us now examine the most distinctive theoretical concepts that approach the issue of war from a cultural perspective.

A "Cultural turn" in the analysis of war - a theoretical approach To analyse the relationship between war and culture, researchers are looking

for relevant terms that can facilitate this task. Western science on strategy has, since 1977, used the term "strategic culture"12, which is based on the quite natural assumption that "there is a connection between the wider culture of a nation / soci-ety and its strategy, in other words, culture affects the behaviour and strategic deci-sions”13. Alistair I. Johnston in Thinking about Strategic Culture proposed a defini-tion of this concept consisting of two parts. “The first part, broader, covers basic assumptions related to the structure of strategic environment, the role of war in the life of society, including on the international stage (necessity or aberration?), the nature of threats and their sources, the adequacy of military force in face of these threats and conditions under which it can be used. These issues are discussed and resolved in a broader institutional framework, represented by the state. The second, narrower part of the concept of strategic culture relates to the operational level, i.e. explains how the military force can be used in an actual armed conflict”14. Accord-ing to Roman Kuźniar, strategic culture not only provides ideas and norms for strategists and politicians, giving strategists specific goals and objectives, but is a kind of "lens" through which the overview and assessment of the international situation is performed15. This is important as such issues as collective beliefs re-garding the image of the state, its mission and place in the international order, the role and vision of foreign policy are important for understanding the causes and nature of wars waged by the state and vary depending on the historical, geopoliti-cal, political, social, and, last but not least, cultural context.

In recent years, however, the term "military culture", has been gaining much more popularity, as evidenced by such works as: A Military Culture. A Paradigm

Shift? by Karen O. Dunivin16, Military culture and transformation by Michael B.

11 R.H. Scales Jr., Culture-CentricWarfare, “Proceedings” 130, October 2004, pp. 32-36. 12 It was introduced by an American theorist of international relations Jack Snyder in his work

about Soviet nuclear strategy. See: J. Snyder, The Soviet Stategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear

Options, RAND, Santa Monica 1977. 13 R. Kuźniar, Polityka i siła. Studia strategiczne – zarys problematyki, Wydawnictwo Scholar,

Warszawa 2005, p. 186. 14 Quoted in: R. Kuźniar, op.cit., p. 187. 15 R. Kuźniar, op.cit., p. 189. 16 K. O. Dunivin, A Military Culture. A Paradigm Shift?, Air War College, Maxwell Paper № 10,

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 1997.


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Siegl17, The Military Culture and The Strategic Art by Eugen Bădălan18 or a more detailed Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the

Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict by Robert M. Cassidy19. Despite the absence of a clear definition, these researchers refer the term "military culture" to a military institution. Michael B. Siegl writes about relations, values, goals and beliefs char-acteristic of an army, rooted in traditions, customs and practices, and influencing the models of leadership. The army, like other organizations, has a culture that determines the patterns of responding to various challenges20. Similarly, Eugen Bădălan understands "military culture" as a military system of values, without which "a soldier would simply be a robot”21. Soldiers, regardless of the position they occupy inside the hierarchy, are firmly rooted “in the national, European, Euro-Atlantic and universal system of values”22. These values affect their views, opinions and behaviour.

Robert M. Cassidy, in turn, emphasises the strategic aspect of the military cul-ture and defines it as a set of beliefs, relationships, and values that affect the deci-sion on how and when to use military force to achieve strategic objectives. Culture, understood in this way, is conditioned by, and develops as a result of, historical experience, geography and political culture. Relationships between the "military culture" and the strategic culture are also noticed by other researchers. Fritz W. Ermarth in his Russia’s Strategic Culture: Past, Present and... In Transition

23?

argues that the strategic culture (in Russia) can not be considered as a simple result of the "military culture", i.e. of "deep convictions about how military power should be developed and used". The influence of political, economic and foreign policy culture is as equally important as the influence of military culture. Furthermore, influences between these areas are bi-directional and not always easy to grasp.

In addition to the function of theoretical generalisations, most Western works that deal with military culture are very practical. The patterns of changes within the American military culture are of interest, and especially the shift in the nature of conflicts from conventional war to low-intensity conflict. According to James Ca-rafano, the modern armed forces of the United States are inadequately prepared for the new type of operations, so-called "peacekeeping" or stabilisation missions, which represent a growing percentage of all military missions in the twenty-first century. In his article Post-Conflict and Culture: Changing America's Military for

21st Century Missions he notes that in order to better prepare the armed forces for

17 M. B. Siegl, Military culture and transformation, w: “Joint Force Quarterly”, No. 49, April, 2008, pp. 103-106.

18 E. Bădălan, The Military Culture and The Strategic Art, “Strategic Impact” No. 3/2005, pp. 5-9. 19 R.M. Cassidy, Russia In Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the Para-

doxes of Asymmetric Conflict, U.S. Army War College, 2003. 20 M. B. Siegl, op.cit., p. 103. 21 E. Bădălan, op.cit., p. 6. 22 Above. 23 F. W. Ermarth, Russia’s Strategic Culture: Past, Present, and… in transition?, SAIC Reports

2006, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/russia.pdf.

ELŻBIETA OLZACKA

222

such tasks (post-conflict operations) a change within the military culture is neces-sary. Knowledge, skills and values that foster understanding of other peoples and cultures, as well as enable cooperation in a multinational environment should play a bigger role within this culture24. Similar arguments are also put forward by other researchers who deal with "new wars" - Robert M. Cassidy in Counterinsurgency

and the Global War On Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War25 and Hugh

Gusterson in his article The Cultural Turn in the War on Terror26.

Karen O. Dunivin is also interested in changes in the American military cul-ture. In her articles Military Culture: Change and Continuity

27 and A Military Cul-

ture. A Paradigm Shift? she examines the evolution of the traditional paradigm on which the American military culture is based (FMA Paradigm: Masculine Warrior Combat and Paradigm). The old and, according to the author, outgoing paradigm is characterised by "exclusion" of women and men who do not fit into traditional gender roles, closure, homogeneity and relations based on hierarchy and mutual hostility. The military culture is dominated by the "cult of masculinity" (dominance of male values, norms and lifestyles) and the need to fight and win wars as the primary objective of the armed forces. According to the author, the requirements of the new, rapidly changing world force changes within this model of military cul-ture. The new paradigm is characterised by heterogeneity, egalitarianism, and rela-tionships based on tolerance. The military no longer rely on outdated gender cate-gories and open to new social categories: women and homosexuals. This makes it better suited to the new roles required by the logic of new conflicts.

Sheila Miyoshi Jager from the American Strategic Studies Institute has carried out a comprehensive and extremely interesting analysis. In her work On the Uses of

Cultural Knowledge she examined the role of cultural knowledge in the course of new wars, distinguishing several levels on which this knowledge had been used. Starting from the tactical level, i.e. the knowledge of cultural customs, traditions, learned behaviours and norms (e.g., "do not spit in public places", "do not stare at women"), through the operational level, to the development of strategies and poli-cies. The author argues that it is precisely at these highest levels that cultural knowledge is not sufficiently used, which reflects negatively in the conduct of mili-tary operations in low-intensity conflicts28.

Dima Adamsky in his The Culture of Military Innovation chose a very interest-ing topic29, by examining the issue of the impact of cultural factors on the rate and

24 J. J. Carafano, Post-Conflict and Culture: Changing America’s Military for 21st Century Mis-

sions; Heritage Lectures, no. 810, 2003, http://www.heritage.org. 25 R. M. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Ir-

regular War, Stanford Security Studies, Stanford 2008. 26 H. Gusterson, The Cultural Turn in the War on Terror, in: John Kelly (ed.), Anthropology and

Global Counterinsurgency, Universitety of Chicago Press, pp. 279-298. 27 K. O. Dunivin, Military Culture: Change and Continuity, “Armed Forces and Society” 20,

no. 4, Summer 1994, pp. 531-547. 28 S. M. Jager, On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge, Strategic Studies Institute, Washington 2007. 29 D. Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation, Stanford Security Studies, Stanford 2010.


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quality of changes during revolutions in the military. With the examples of Russia, United States and Israel he demonstrated that different strategic and military cul-tures adapt and use new technologies in different ways, which translates into dif-ferent ways of conducting war.

Anthropology of War - Russian researchers' theoretical proposal Equally interesting theoretical proposals concerning the cultural aspects of war

are formulated to the east of Poland. The concept of “anthropology of war”, devel-oped by Vladimir I. Bazhukov, is certainly worth noticing30. The new sub-discipline, by being "a comprehensive study of man in the military sphere"31, is supposed to combine elements of such sciences as cultural studies, sociology, psy-chology, history, ethnology and, of course, anthropology. The subject of anthro-pology of war has been defined as "human beings, culture and society in the condi-tions of war and military conflict, as well as in the process of preparing for them and overcoming their consequences"32.

The most important prerequisite for the formation of this new discipline was the adoption of an anthropological approach to the study of war culture. What does this approach propose? The researcher lists five main directions of interest for the anthropology of war. The first one, natural and historical, examines the impact of environmental conditions on war, the armed forces and all military activities, as well as the manifestations of human nature in war culture (the impact of human instincts on behaviour in war conditions; study of the aggressive instinct). The purpose of the sociological direction is to study the culture and social structure of different social groups, military organisation and culture in times of peace and war. The third direction, psychological, deals with issues of war-time socialisation and the enculturation of the young generation, military and patriotic consciousness of society, the society's attitude to the armed forces, military aspects of the national character and mentality, the examination of human thinking in combat circum-stances, determination of war-time values, customs and traditions, and examination of war-time mythology and rituals. The symbolic direction primarily consists of an analysis of semiotic and symbolic aspects of war culture, such as military flags, uniforms, ranks, medals and awards; with weapons and technology having specific signs and symbols. Military posters, paintings of battle scenes, military marches

30 Vladimir Bazhukov has developed his concept in the following works: Методологические

проблемы военной антропологии, „Вопросы культурологии” № 5/2007, pp. 24-27; Военная антропология: объект, предмет, направления, методология, „Вестник Военного университета”, № 3/2008, pp. 37-45; Эвристические возможности антропологического

подхода к исследованию военной культуры, Автореферат диссертации на соискание ученой

степени доктора культурологии, Москва 2009. 31 В.И. Бажуков, Эвристические возможности… op.cit., p. 3. 32 Above.

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and songs, military rituals and rites are of a semiotic and symbolic nature. The last direction, historical, examines man during wars of various historical eras, starting from the pre-class and ending with the modern, post-industrial society.

The central concept allowing for an analysis of cultural foundations of warfare is the concept of "war culture" (военная культура). Bazhukov understands it as a "complex, multi-level phenomenon that includes axiological, normative, spiritual, ideological, symbolic and material elements”33. War culture can be viewed in a broad or a narrow sense - both these approaches are complementary. In the broad sense the war culture covers everything created by man during military operations, and thus includes political, economic and social, but also spiritual spheres. It there-fore includes war-time: ideology, politics, economics, technology, science, art, doctrines, policies, traditions, and armed forces and weapons, as well as artistic culture dedicated to the issues of war. In a narrow sense, the war culture is a com-plex of constant, historically formed, states of consciousness and models of human behaviour in the military sphere. The war culture, understood in this way, can be expressed in military customs and traditions, military ceremonies and rituals, as well as various signs and symbols.

Although Vladimir Bazhukov's concept stands out with its detailed research and vigour, the researcher is neither the first nor the only one to be interested in this phenomenon. Russian researchers have been trying to define precisely this concept and turn it into a set of concepts for the social and historical sciences. The interest and research effort of Russian specialists dealing with this issue can be divided into two directions. The first one focuses on the theoretical analysis of the war culture viewed as a whole system, which is a subsystem of the overall culture of the society. Researchers are interested in such issues as: mutual relations be-tween war culture and the natural environment, and on the other hand - human personality; manifestations of war culture in times of war and peace, the typology of war culture, analysis of the structure and functions of war culture, the study of specific aspects of war culture: normative, axiological, symbolic, semiotic, linguis-tic etc.34. Finally, they study the war culture of particular countries and societies (especially the domestic one) and their mutual interactions35. In the analysis of war culture the researchers also take into account the processes of its formation and how they are affected by material, socio-economic, and political conditions. The second direction is of a practical nature. Specific issues that may interest an an-

33 Above, p. 3,4. 34 See: В.Д. Грачев, В. Н. Гребеньков, Особенности языка военной культуры, „Волгоград:

Известия ВГПУ”, №2 (15), 2006, pp. 24-29; В. Н. Гребеньков, Феноменологический подход

квоенной культуре общества и ее нравственные основания, „Вестник ВГУ” № 3, 2008, pp. 268-273; В. Н. Гребеньков, Рациональность в контексте формирования диалога военной культуры

и религии, “Вестник Башкирского университета” Т. 14. №2, 2009, pp. 564-568. 35 С.Н. Ермоченко, Патриотизм как базовая ценность российской воинской культуры,

“Вестник Toмского ГУ”, № 314, pp. 65-67; А. Е. Мусин, Milites Christi Древней Руси. Воинская

культура русского Средневековья в контексте религиозного менталитета, СПб.: Петер-бургское востоковедение, 2005.


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thropologist of war include: the military socialisation of youth and how it is af-fected by various social institutions such as family, school, university or media; how ideas about war, army and military service of various social groups, including military and political elite are shaped, how the organisational culture of the armed forces is shaped; peculiarities of thinking and behaviour of soldiers in military con-flicts of the beginning of the twenty-first century36.

As evidenced above, the works of Western researchers, dealing with the issue of "military culture", are primarily focused on the institution of the armed forces and are usually of a practical nature. They analyse modern military cultures, and provide guidance on how to change them and adapt them to new kinds of conflicts. These concepts deal with the important issue of the role of knowledge of the cul-ture of the enemy, and in general - "cultural competence" - in wars conducted in a foreign cultural environment, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Russian researchers, in turn, emphasize that the most effective approach to studying cultural aspects of military activity is an anthropological approach, which treats war culture as part of the overall culture of the society. War culture under-stood in this way is related to not only the institution of the armed forces, but in general - to a human being - and determines his/her image of war and the military, which in turn affects his/her behaviour under conditions of war and in times of peace. Russian works contain a rich theoretical aspect, which can be a great start-ing point for historical and comparative studies.

Practical application - A "cultural turn" in strategy and tactics

Including culture in military thought has far-reaching consequences in the prac-tice of warfare. In 2006, Tony Corn, the author of a prestigious and very popular blog devoted to the problems of "small wars", and conflicts of a new type - Small

Wars Journal, called for the "anthropologisation" of the strategy and tactics of the U.S. military, as only anthropology can explain the logic of new tribal conflicts, and may enable the adaptation of American military culture to the task of fighting a new enemy37. Discussions on the subject were held not only in the journalistic and academic discourses but also in military circles, as evidenced by the article of the commander of coalition forces in Iraq, General David Petraeus (from 2010 a com-mander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan), who drew attention to the need for an analysis of the cultural norms of the conquered societies, and for understanding the

36 В.И. Бажуков, Военная культура и национальная безопасность, „Вестник Военного

университета”, № 2/2007, pp. 94-99; E.Н. Романова, Военная культура и ее основные характ

ристики, “ВестникСамГУ” № 1 (60), 2008, pp. 213-218; В. Н. Гребеньков, Региональные спекты военной культуры и некоторые характеристики образа военной службы в сознании

молодых россиян, „Вестник Башкирского университета” Т. 14. №3, 2009, pp. 933-937. 37 T. Corn, op.cit.

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network of informal relationships between tribal institutions38. Under his guidance, a new Iraq strategy was developed, taking into account the postulates of "cultural awareness" of commanders and soldiers.

One of the courses of action is to equip soldiers and commanders with the ap-propriate cultural competence. John W. Jandora, an analyst working for the U.S. Army, notes the importance of "cultural awareness" of the area in which military operations are conducted. Knowledge of the language, but also culture - legal and moral norms, customs and traditions - seems to be a necessary skill for any soldier working in a foreign cultural environment39. Manuals and training are supposed to serve the same purpose40. However, since equipping all soldiers with such special-ised knowledge seems to be impossible, the Human Terrain System project has been developed, engaging social scientists - anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, linguists and cultural theorists - in warfare. And thus Human Terrain

Teams were born, i.e. small units which included academic experts with knowledge of the local communities and who were able to engage with them. The project, in operation since 2007, gives such results that the Ministry of Defence has decided to assign anthropologists to each brigade operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite the negative opinion of the American Anthropological Association, which in 2007 condemned the idea of enlisting anthropologists, there are still scientists eager to do such work41. Montgomery McFate, an anthropologist who helped in the creation of the Human Terrain System has the following to say on the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan: "We can not build democracy, education and the banking system without the knowledge of the society in which we want to work"42.

38 D.H. Petraeus, Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations From Soldiering in Iraq, “Mili-

tary Review”, January-February 2006. 39 J. W. Jandora, Military Cultural Awareness: From Anthropology to Application, “Landpower

Essay” No. 06-3 November 2006. 40 Such training in the U.S. armed forces is to be carried out, among others, in the Foreign Mili-

tary Studies Office (FMSO). Another project envisages carrying out specialised courses (Regional

Studies), whose main purpose is to inform future soldiers of the significance of cultural awareness and understanding of how other regions, nations and societies see themselves. See. S.M. Jager, op.cit., p. 6, 10.

41 More can be learned about the project from the article of Vanessa M. Gezari, who is writing a book on the functioning of Human Terrain Teams in Afghanistan: idem, Rough Terrain: The Human Terrain Program Embeds Anthropologists With the U.S. Military in Afghanistan, „The Washington Post”, August 30, 2009.

Other interesting publications on this topic, reflecting how much the idea of hiring anthropolo-gists in the U.S. Army has proved to be controversial and widely discussed in the American press, include: D. Rohde, Army Enlists Anthropology in War Zones, “The New York Times”, October 5, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/world/asia/05afghan.html; Ch. Shay, Should Anthropolo-gists Go to War?, “Time U.S.”, December 13, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1947095,00.html#ixzz23EZOqYSU; D. Price, Hu-man Terrain Systems, Anthropologists and the War in Afghanistan, “CounterPunch” 2009, http://www.counterpunch.org/2009/12/01/human-terrain-systems-anthropologists-and-the-war-in-afghanistan/.

42 V. M. Gezari, op.cit.


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The new U.S. Army manual, FM 3-24, on counterinsurgency is an important document aimed at facilitating the use of cultural knowledge in military operations. It reads: “Cultural knowledge is essential to waging a successful counterinsur-gency. American ideas of what is «normal» or «rational» are not universal. To the contrary, members of other societies often have different notions of rationality, appropriate behavior, level of religious devotion, and norms concerning gender. Thus, what may appear abnormal or strange to an external observer may appear as self-evidently normal to a group member. For this reason, counterinsurgents—especially commanders, planners, and small-unit leaders—should strive to avoid imposing their ideals of normalcy on a foreign cultural problem”43

The strategy based on the use of cultural knowledge gives good results. It turned out that problems could be solved not only by combat action, but also through negotiations, or, for example, by providing vocational training to Afghan villages, which resulted in the reduction of the incentive for young men to join the Taliban44. Another project envisages the creation of Afghan tribal militias that would bear the brunt of fighting the Taliban45.

Also in Europe - mainly in the Balkans - NATO has developed cooperation be-tween the armed forces and the civilian population in the areas of military opera-tions, i.e. the CIMIC (Civil-Military Co-operation), in operation since 200646. Ef-forts aimed at improving cooperation between universities and the armed forces in the field of scientific research and education are also significant47.

Conclusions As evidenced by concepts described in this article, a "cultural turn" occurred

not only at the level of thinking about war and its analysis, but also at the level of practical changes in the tactics and methods of implementation of military opera-tions. Contact with the enemy, but also with new allies, motivated by different values, whose understanding of the concept of war and warfare is completely dif-ferent than ours, made it necessary to deepen our cultural knowledge in this field. In addition to new practical solutions implemented with increasing success in the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as the Human Terrain System described in this article, it has become necessary to introduce new theoretical categories, in

43 Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2007, p. 1-15.

44 V. M. Gezari, op.cit. 45 R. L. Holt, Afghan Village Militia: A People-Centric Strategy to Win,

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/afghan-village-militia-a-people-centric-strategy-to-win. 46 AJP-9 Nato Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, June 2003,

http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/ajp-9.pdf. 47 Uniwersystet podpisał umowę naukowo-militarną z wojskiem, 11 kwietnia 2012,

http://www.uj.edu.pl/uniwersytet/aktualnosci/video-foto/-/journal_content/56_INSTANCE_7Cwe/10172/5669027.

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order to develop a "grand strategy" and to implement effective policy in these cam-paigns.

Culture, influencing the way people think and behave, should be taken into ac-count as an important dimension of strategy and policies. Not only language, ideas, beliefs, customs, symbols, values, perceptions, and awareness, should be analysed, but also the role of history and historical memory in their creation. Culture is not a collection of constant, unchanging elements that allow us to predict behaviours, but a process that we must learn to understand. The use of the term "war culture" and the ‘anthropology of war’ approach proposed by Vladimir Bazhukov and Vasily Grebenkov allow extensive comparative and historical research that can help cap-ture the characteristics of the war culture of different societies, which is important in understanding how these societies conduct wars. This, in turn, seems necessary for the development of efficient strategies.

These days changes in culture, and thus in war, occur faster than ever before. New problems arise, not only social, but also ethical, related to new methods of conducting wars. Third wave wars described by Heidi and Alvin Toffler increas-ingly depend on intangible factors - knowledge, information, culture, and values48. The conduct of military operations is increasingly determined by profound social and cultural change, such as media coverage of all areas of modern life. This new element of culture is successfully used by terrorist organisations that, with the use of modern media, spread panic among Western democratic societies and indirectly influence the decisions of the political elites. Modern technology, such as the use of unmanned aircraft, changed the traditional perception of ethical issues, and thus affected the so-called ethics of war49. For these reasons, it seems to me that the study of the cultural aspects of the phenomenon of war in the theoretical and his-torical dimension should be a research challenge for both military analysts, as well as for cultural theorists and sociologists.

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TYPOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF SINGLE ISSUE

TERRORISM

Elżbieta POSŁUSZNA, Ph.D. Warsaw Uniwersity of Life Sciences – SGGW

Abstract

In the second half of the 20th

century in the United States of America and Western

Europe there appeared a new kind of worldview-driven violence defined as “single issue

terrorism.” This type of terrorism has progressively gained importance. Hence, a closer

look at the phenomenon becomes a necessary condition for its understanding and, in

consequence, fighting it down. The author sets in the paper several goals – to look at single

issue terrorism through the prism of specific typologies; to evaluate to what extent the

accepted definitions of single issue terrorism are justified; to find and explain the

distinctive criteria between single issue terrorism and “many issues terrorism”; to show

the difficulties of any kind of classification endeavours regarding the groups, which

according to common opinion engage in single issue terrorism. The paper is closed with

a postulate to give up, while creating typologies, so called essential thinking in favour of

Wittgensteinian thinking in the categories of family resemblances.

Key words – terrorism, security The phenomenon of single issue terrorism has not been, as yet, highly popular

among the researchers working on terrorism and security. So far, not one complex theoretical work addressing that issue has been written. Yet, single issue terrorism is not a marginal or atrophic phenomenon. The constant increase of this kind of offence, its growing radicalisation, multiplicity of its forms and its manifestations, as well as a permanent evolution of methods and tactics of individuals and groups who commit it is a reason to perceive this type of terrorism as a phenomenon of high danger potential; dynamic, liable to change in time and space, and thus needed to be included in the broad security perspective.

There have been a few attempts to define single issue terrorism1 during the last three decades. Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf were among the first ones who

1 In the subject literature the term “special interest terrorism” is used interchangeably with the

term “single issue terrorism” (terrorisme à cause unique czy terrorisme lié à une cause particulière, Terrorismus für Einzelstreitfragen, terrorismo de causa única). Apart from these two the most common denominations there are various variations of the two, e.g. single-issue group terrorism,


TYPOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF SINGLE ISSUE TERRORISM

233

put it forward a definition. At the beginning of the 1980s they defined single issue terrorism as “terrorism by an individual or small group pressuring authorities to grant some privilege to a larger group with which the terrorists sympathise”2. Somewhat different is the approach of G. Davidson Smith (from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service): “The term ‘Single Issue Terrorism’ is broadly accepted as extremist militancy on the part of groups or individuals protesting a perceived grievance or wrong usually attributed to governmental action or inaction”3. Later authors did not use in their definitions these too general and thus imprecise characterisations and considered “single issue terrorism” as different from other forms of terrorism due to its focus on resolving one particular issue4. In such a manner this kind of terrorism is defined by for example David Veness (from the Metropolitan Police Service) in his article “Single Issue Terrorism”: “Single issue terrorism may be defined as the adoption of the full arsenal of political violence towards the promotion of one political subject. This issue need not be strictly aligned to any political or religious ideology. Hence, supporters are narrow in their focus on the single issue but broad as regards the delivery of their message”5. Quite similarly it is defined by the analytics from the Federal Bureau of Investigation – probably the most experienced institution in counteracting the development of this type of terrorism (mainly due to the fact that the majority of ideological violence acts classified as single issue terrorism takes place on the U.S. territory). In various FBI publications one can find the following elucidation of that phenomenon: “Special interest terrorism differs from traditional right-wing and left-wing terrorism in that extremist special interest groups seek to influence specific issues, rather than effect widespread political change. Special interest extremists conduct acts of politically motivated violence to force segments of society, including the general public, to change attitudes about issues considered

focused-issue based terrorism, special-issue terrorism; respectably: International Encyclopedia of

Terrorism, London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers 1997, p. 209, Maxwell Taylor, John Horgan (eds.), The Future of Terrorism, London/Portland: Routledge 2000, p. 84, Aref M. Al-Khattar, Religion and

Terrorism: An Interfaith Perspective, Westport, London: Praeger 2003, pp. 21-22. There are also attempts of going beyond this terminological paradigm – for example “reducted conflict range terrorism” (terroryzm zredukowanego pola konfliktu), see: patrz: Bartosz Bolechow, Terroryzm

w świecie podwubiegunowym, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2002, pp. 25, 55. 2 Alex P. Schmid, Janny de Graaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the

Western News Media, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications 1982, p. 56. 3 G. Davidson Smith, „Single Issue Terrorism“, Commentary (A Canadian Security Intelligence

Service Publication), 1998, No 74, p. 1; and G. Davidson Smith, Combating Terrorism, London, New York: Routlege 1990, p. 7.

4 Of course, terrorist or extremist groups focused on one single issue are in many instances a part of broader movements (fighting for example for a moral restoration or new socio-political order). However, as often emphasised, the aim of their activities is not to evoke a larger political change but rather to ‘resolve’ one particular issue.

5 David Veness, „Single Issue Terrorism”, in: Barbara Szamota-Saeki, Dobrochna Wójcik (eds.), Impact of Political, Economic and Social Change on Crime and its Image in Society, Warszawa: Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN 1996, p. 190.


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important to their causes”6. At the end, it is worth quoting William Dyson’s definition, who in respect to the discussed phenomenon uses two terms – special-interest terrorism and single issue terrorism: “Special-interest/single issue terrorism involves the use of extreme force and violence for the purpose of coercing a government and/or population to modify its behaviour with respect to a specific area of concern. These extremists do not have an overall political agenda. More often than not, special-interest/single issue extremists do not seek the overthrow of a government or even a major alteration in the manner in which it operates or in the manner in which the people live. Instead, their intention is to force the government and population to change its direction in line with the philosophy of the extremist with respect to a specific subject. In many instances, the overall philosophical cause of the special-interest/single issue terrorist is fairly popular with the citizens. Therefore, rather than attempting to “educate” the public about the topic, the clandestine terrorist’s emphasis is more towards coercing and forcing the people to take a desired action. The terrorist seeks immediate change, and refuses to wait for a legislative process to bring about the desired end”7.

Two of the above quoted definitions – the FBI’s and Dyson’s itemise the following distinctive features of the discussed phenomenon: (1) the focus on “solving a single issue” and (2) non-revolutionariness (no will for wide-ranged changes) in regard to the existing system (the state, society) in its entirety. In the subject literature, what should be mentioned, is that the two features are usually being accepted as the basis for classification, i.e., the criterion to differentiate between single issue terrorism and other types of terrorism. Naturally it is always an author’s terminological decision that determines the definition (the decision is usually limited by the scientific utility of the term that is being defined). The author decides on how he or she understands and characterises the analysed phenomenon. Such a definition should not be disputed with. One may (or even should) argue against an erroneous classification (ordering) of particular phenomena under such a constructed definition. Let us move then to the classification.

Right at the beginning it should be noted that just a few authors tried to come up with such a classification. Kai Hirschmann was one of them. He used the number of taken up issues as the criterion and on that account divided the entirety of the phenomena labelled as terrorism into two categories: multiple-issue-terrorism (Streiffragenbuendel Terrorismus) and single-issue-terrorism (Terrorismus fuer Einzelstreitfragen). In the first category Hirschmann lists the following kinds of terrorism: ideological, political, nation-orientated, supported by the state, based on faith (religious and world-view-orientated), of the ‘chosen ones’; whereas in the second one he places terrorism “fighting” for animal rights, the environment and

6 Terrorism in the United States: 1999, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of

Investigation, Washington 1999, p. 20. 7 William Dyson, „The Emergence of Special-Interest/Single-Issue Terrorism”, presented by IIR

Institute for Intergovernmental Research, Tallahassee, Florida, 2001, p. 1.


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against abortion. According to Hirschmann the anti-globalists and gene technology opponents are also on the path towards single issue terrorism8.

Another terrorism researcher, Guenter Loeckinger, considers single issue terrorism in the framework of a slightly different typology. By employing the motivation criterion he divides terrorism into: religious, drugs-related and political. The latter he then breaks down into left-wing terrorism, right-wing terrorism and single issue terrorism (streitfragen-spezifischer Terrorismus). Following Hirschmann, Loeckinger counts animal rights terrorism, environmental-protection terrorism, and “pro-life” terrorism in the single issue terrorism category (after Hirschmann he also believes that anti-globalists and gene technology opponents gravitate towards single issue terrorism)9.

Whereas Alex Schmid having divided political terrorism into regime/state terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, vigilante terrorism, and insurgent terrorism distinguished single issue terrorism in the frames of the latter; next to such phenomena like social revolutionary terrorism, right-wing terrorism, religious terrorism, nationalist and separatist terrorism. As above mentioned researchers Schmid places animal rights terrorism, environmental protection terrorism, and anti-abortion terrorism under the single issue terrorism category10.

In their single issue terrorism classification considerations all authors quoted above have (practically exclusively) taken into account the extremist activities of animal rights defenders (animal rights terrorism), environment defenders (environmental protection terrorism), and “pro-life” activists (identified in the subject literature as “anti-abortion terrorism”). However, it is worth mentioning that there are authors who set the range of the term “single issue terrorism” rather differently. Raymond Corrado, for instance, divides anti-state terrorism into three categories: ideological terrorism (religious or secular), ethnic-national terrorism and so called issue terrorism; the latter is further divided into environmental terrorism, animal rights terrorism, anti-abortion terrorism and anti-tax terrorism11. Another broadening of the range of the term is made by the already mentioned William E. Dyson who distinguishes the following primary causes of single issue terrorism: animal rights, environmental or “eco” issues, anti-abortion, and anti-genetic engineering12.

One should remember, of course, that classification endeavours comprise of far-reaching generalisations. In particular cases these generalisations may obscure the issue, not clarify it. Contrasting that remark with the typologies given above it

8 See: Kai Hirschman, “Terrorismus in neuen Dimensionen. Hintergruende und Schlussfolgerungen”,

Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, v. 51, 2001, p. 8. 9 Georg Loeckinger, Terrorismus, Terrorismusabwehr Terrorismusbekaempfung, Vienna:

Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 29. 10 Alex P. Schmid (ed), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, New York: Routledge,

2011, pp. 688, 171. 11 Raymond Corrado, Irwin Cohen, Terrorism, Burnaby: Simon Fraser University, 2000, Quoted

in Jesse L. Cale, Issue Terrorism: An Analysis of Trends in North America, Simon Fraser University, November 2003, summit.sfu.ca/system/files/.../b34734508.pdf, s. 19, (12 April 2012).

12 William E. Dyson, Terrorism: The Investigator’s Handbook, Elsevier: Anderson Publishing, 2012, p. 28.


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would be difficult not to agree with the claim that in the case of anti-abortion terrorism or animal rights terrorism we deal with a classical example of a terrorism (or extremism) aiming at resolving one particular goal (single issue). In the case of anti-abortion terrorism the goal is obviously to place a full ban on abortion; in the case of animal rights terrorism the goal is to appoint animals with the right to life and development, which would be comparable with the ones humans possess. The instance of environmental protection terrorism is somewhat different. In my opinion, not all organisations employing this kind of terrorism focus, in their activities, on one particular issue. After a closer analysis of the tasks of some radical pro-environmental organisations, one may get the impression that although their fundamental goal is protection of the natural environment (in this very general sense they focus on a “single issue”), for many of them this goal can be achieved only if certain socio-political (often quite radical) changes are carried out; in other words, when many various “particular issues” are realised. A good example of such an organisation is, I believe, Earth First! – one of the largest, oldest and at the same time the most recognised extremist environmental group. In spite the fact that from the worldview perspective this group is of a pro-environmental character, it does not limit itself to carrying out a single, narrow-ranged task. On the contrary, in the area of its goals there are multifarious issues, i.e.: a ban on natural environment devastation, reconstruction of social awareness, decrease of population growth, thorough reconstruction of society, or the eradication of technological infrastructure. Due to the multiplicity of the goals and the fact that they are pertinent to the whole socio-political reality, not only its selected fragments, Earth First! (as well as many other extremist pro-environmental groups) may be classified as rather one of the extremist organisations of the revolutionary (transformational) type, which aim at a total change of the world, than as an organisation of the single issue type, which accordingly to the accepted definition, focus on resolving one particular issue.

Another remark refers to too the narrow definition of single issue terrorism. It is not entirely clear why authors of the quoted single issue terrorism typologies do not take into account phenomena, which by virtue of explicit or implicit definitions accepted by them should almost for certainly have been placed there. As it seems, among such phenomena there are: racist terrorism (aiming at social exclusion of people ethnically different), wise use terrorism (aiming at repeal of pro-environmental restrictions), or, already belonging to previous categories, feminist terrorism (aiming at overthrowing patriarchy and “women's liberation”). All the mentioned types of terrorism do not aim at reconstruction of the existing social order but at carrying out one particular issue. Nationalist-liberation terrorism may raise a few classification doubts. On the one hand, it seems to be focused on carrying out a single issue – the liberation of the nation from foreign occupation, and on the other, that carrying out a single issue is related with (it is however not its goal, at least not as the basis for action) complex, wide-ranging transformations in the functioning of the state and society.


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The above cases should, as it seems, induce an attempt of an interpretative specification of the definition of single issue terrorism (which would imply a decision concerning whether pro-environmental terrorism and nationalist-liberation terrorism may be recognised as not aiming at “evoking broad political changes”) or setting the range of the defined term somewhat differently (by assigning to it a different set of designations).

Such a definition specification, which would allow to include pro-environmental groups and nationalist-liberation groups in the single issue terrorism category is, in my opinion, an extremely difficult task, if ever possible. The majority of those groups strives for a fundamental, broadly understood social reconstruction that consists in the abolition of the state, eradication of technological infrastructure, changing the lifestyle of people (pro-environmental groups) and the eradication of oppressive, foreign forms of domination (nationalist-liberation groups). It can be argued however that for those groups the changes are not the goal in itself (it is not the ultimate goal of their activities). In this case, socio-political changes are merely a means enabling them to reach another goal, i.e. natural environment protection or liberation of their own nation. This goal can be reached, at least theoretically, without introducing larger structural changes in the functioning of the state and society. Let us notice however that in the case of those groups environmental and liberation goals are closely interlinked with the political objectives (and they cannot be separated from one another), and secondly, relying on the same principles as other kinds of terrorism (almost all of them) they can be included in the single issue terrorism category, e.g. ultra-left-wing terrorism, which revolutionary (transformational) goals may be interpreted as tools enabling the introduction of social justice or religious terrorism, which attack at a certain way of governing or lifestyle can be explained as a means for reconstructing the bond between humans and God. In this notionally difficult situation, the only solution, as it seems, is to get to terms with “interpretative failure” and acknowledge that probably just a part of environmental protection terrorist groups (the one that does not aim at social and political changes) can be qualified, on the account of the analysis of their activities, to the single issue terrorism category, and the other part should be excluded from it. However, nationalist-liberation terrorism on the whole should be rather qualified as non-single issue. For, it seems not likely, that there would be a case of nationalist-liberation terrorism, which aims at the realisation of its liberation aspirations (carrying out a single issue) without simultaneous attempts to introduce socio-political changes. The above mentioned classification difficulties compel the discerning researcher to reject a simple “notional framework” and to decide “in the moment” whether a given group (at a certain of stage of its development) focuses on single issue, or whether it aims at wide-ranging (revolutionary) social changes.

The goals of single issue terrorism (narrow-ranged) and revolutionary terrorism (wide-ranged) are different. This difference among the goals gives hope for more efficient counteraction and prevention of this kind of phenomena. The distinction among the goals of the two types of terrorism suggests their different motivations, and


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hence possibly various determinations. This is the reason for looking at the violence acts and trying to find there the difference of the sources. There are many psychological theories regarding the sources of terrorism. The majority of these theories search for them in internal conflict as the effects of a maladjustment to reality and stemming from it a rampageous rebellion against it, based on violence. My interpretation goes in line with that conception. I regard that behind the willingness for radical actions there is usually a complex system of defence mechanisms, which are most commonly a reaction to experiencing the feeling of resentment13.

Resentment theory has been employed many times, both, in psychological and social analyses. From the very beginning of examining this phenomenon, it has been believed that the resentment conception is characterised by a high explanatory potential, both in the psychological and social research areas. It was also used for elucidation of the key issues for this study, namely extremism and terrorism14. Resentment is a complex of hateful emotions. It arises on the basis of the feeling of inferiority stemming from the inability to reach the desired values15. Resentment, as noted by Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Scheler and Max Weber is an experience shared by the oppressed, rejected and depreciated; those, who feel they lose in the existing value order. How can one deal with a painful, overwhelming inferiority feeling? A human being with resentment will not achieve the desired values with an activity directed outwards (he or she is too weak for such an action). They will not satisfy their second paramount want as well – the need to destroy those who are the bearers and at the same time the object of their unfading hatred. However, the conflict between the desire and helplessness is staved off. Durability of situations generating negative emotions and their constant suppression lead finally to the point where the consciousness begins to pursue towards overcoming the tension between the aspiration and inability, which results in a re-evaluation of values. The essence of the “re-evaluation” is the depreciation of the unreachable (but still

13 Ressentiment is not, obviously, the only one predicate of radicalism. It seems, cultural and

political processes, like globalisation and informationisatio play here equally essential role. As rightly stated by Castells, these processes endanger the areas which have been, till now, common identity generators. Due to their characteristics (aiming at unlimited cooperation with unlimited number of individuals accompanied by the lack of value-creating preferences) they cannot be identity providers. It results in the necessity of building one’s own identity on the basis of new, individualised sense sources (such that escape value annihilation processes). Of course, not all these newly formed identities must inevitably gravitate towards extremism. However, the necessity of rivalry in the scope of mutually competing justifications makes this path highly probable. Both, Nietzschean ressentiment theory and Castells’ conception of “common identity expression” shed new light on the issue of the future of single issue terrorism suggesting the conclusion that it may be practically impossible to eliminate this kind of terrorism because it is impossible to eliminate the internal impulses behind it.

14 See for example: Lauren Langman, Douglas Morris, „Islamic Terrorism: From Retrenchment to Ressentiment and Beyond”, in: Harvey Kushner (ed.), Essential Readings on Political Terrorism: Analyses

of Problems and Prospects for the 21 Century, New York: Richard Altschuler&Associates, 2002. 15 Such a feeling of inferiority is not experienced by all the people but only those who due to their

various psychological or physical defects suffer long lasting depreciation or incapability to create or confirm by themselves their own value, and who have limited possibilities to deal with challenges brought by reality – the reality that is “made to measure” the people who are free of such defects.


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desired by the subject), the re-ordering of values and establishing in their place a new order; such an order, where his or her values (perceived before as the reason for their life failures; generating suffering and inferiority complex) are being identified with that what is positive, good, and valuable. The re-evaluation gives energy and the will to act – it gives the power to tear down the old resentment generating orders of values (breaking the old game rules). It induces acts of a terrorist character.

Resentment seems to be a psychic power that forces individuals and groups to overcome, in the name of maintaining identity and a positive self-image, a conformist anxiety and become what they want to become – the sole and true creators of values and communal sense. In their case, reaching for violence becomes a way of dealing with both arising doubts and the resistance of the reluctant towards these world values. Due to the fact that the essence of resentment is a pursuit towards re-evaluating the vales (depreciation of the existing values and establishing the new, resentment inspired ones), it has to lay at the foundation of the acts, which aim at total social transformations. Resentment as such does not aim at a change of some part of reality but at a transformation of the world in its entirety. It is impossible to control terrorism based on resentment by concession and negotiations because it is not interested in them. Resentment terrorism aims at total (uncompromising) changes. It aims also at the destruction of all old order residua (symbols of unattained values) which, on the account of resentment, it feels connected to. Where there is a black and white reality, there is no place for attempts to come to an agreement or any kind of actions based on the idea of compromise. Therefore, it probably occurs more often in terrorism of the revolutionary type, than in single issue terrorism.

The latter, contrary to the former one, makes no total, transformational claims because it is focused on carrying out a single issue – on dealing with merely one particular fragment of reality (unless it is allied with a “transformational” ideology). Hence, it must be non-fundamentalist in its essence (i.e. resentment plays, if any, a marginal role in its forming). If the above conception is right, then, there is a high probability that after carrying out that issue (or at least after introducing a number of compromise solutions) the terrorism would be extinguished or at least largely reduced. Such a perspective seems impossible in the case of revolutionary terrorism (wide-ranged, resentment based) that aims at total social transformation. For revolutionary terrorism these issues are only a pretext for the articulation of internal transformational claims stimulated by inferiority instinct. The need behind it (the need to devaluate the world that depreciates the “I”) is indeed unchangeable and always stays current – that is why fulfilling the articulated claims is not able to satisfy it. In the fight against resentment terrorism there are only possible, as it seems, preventive actions, but they should be undertaken much earlier – before resentment enters the phase of re-evaluation of values.

At first sight, this state of affairs may lead to a claim that single issue terrorism is easy to resolve by complying with these few demands, which are the cause of the conflict. The reality however seems to contradict that claim, at least in the case of


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environmental protection terrorism and animal rights terrorism. In spite of the progress that has occurred in the area of animals and nature protection (in spite of successive satisfying of the ecological demands, i.e. the single issues the ecological radicals fight for), the violence of the single issue type groups has, thus far, escalated and the number of their followers in on a constant increase.

It can bring about many doubts, one of which (the most interesting in this context) must be pertinent to the fact, of whether we deal here with a single issue extremism. It is not so in all of the cases. For instance, not all radical ecological organisations are focused on resolving a single, particular issue. Some of them (e.g. the previously mentioned Earth First!) want revolutionary changes, which aim is to transform the whole society, and not only a part of reality. It is also worth mentioning that many ecological organisations adopt revolutionary slogans and ideologies from other movements (the fight against globalisation or social injustice). More and more often the groups that used to be ideologically homogeneous ally with other, often revolutionary or transformational, groups and form a kind of ideological front based on the common definition of the foe and similar methods of acting (mainly sabotage). Particularly, examples can be seen with ecological (animal rights and pro-environmental) organisations, which do not limit themselves any more to attacking the deforestation companies, ski resorts, high voltage lines or laboratories, where experiments on animals are conducted. More and more often big corporations, private houses, SUVs, and also (that is a relatively new trend) various symbols of capitalism are becoming the target of their attacks. Anti-capitalist ideas occurred in ecological ideology and in the natural environment protection movement already at the countercultural beginning of its strongest wave. However, explicit pronouncing against capitalism and globalisation by the groups that have come into being on account of the latter, had a place not until the late 1990s, when the people professing the ideas of collectivistic anarchism and connected to the alter globalist movement started to gain influence in those groups. Earth liberation, for them, has become closely linked with the abolition of capitalism and social liberation. The path leading to that goal was not slow reforms but a revolutionary spurt proceeded by concentrated attacks on elements of the capitalist system. It does not mean that there should be an equals sign between the old and new ideas. Ecological ideas (pro-environmental or on animal rights) are still treated by those organisations as the priority. However, it is not any more justified to categorise them as “pure single issue extremism.”

It should be also noted that from the mid-1980s the majority of secret groups (including terrorist ones) due to safety reasons started to resign from hierarchic and centrally governed structures in favour of looser structures, possibly the least centralised, quite often truly horizontal ones, without clear governance or control centres. Many single issue organisations followed that way as well, giving up stable organisational structures and exchanging them for a network structure – a loose configuration of small, autonomous cells (individuals or small groups) that are not managed by any governing or activity-inspiring decision centre. Sometimes, they have totally resigned from any form of governance and have


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introduced so called leaderless resistance. Nowadays, we do not really deal with organisations in the traditional sense of the word but rather with egalitarian-orientated groups of activists (which often meet extemporaneously in order to carry out a particular action) or independent individuals, acting alone, and not communicating with other proponents of the cause. It does hinder any classification attempts and the examination of the phenomenon of single issue terrorism.

There is no doubt that the transformations of the last twenty years resulting in a significant “organisational blur” and “intermingling of ideas” are the cause for less frequent occurrences of the “pure” type of single issue organisations. We deal, more and more, with a mosaic (or network) of loosely interconnected individuals and groups devoid of clear structure, which operate on the basis of a few ideologies (mutually influencing one another) and often extemporaneously defined goals. It is impossible to precisely establish what the organisational frames of a given terrorist group are, and what its current goals and motivations are. In consequence, it should not be expected that “carrying out the issues” would lead to the “appeasement of the movement” and, in effect, to a decrease of illegal acts. Such a state of affairs makes the examining of those groups an extremely difficult task. Even thinking about them in “essential” categories seems anachronic, at most. It is time to get rid of them in favour of more elastic thinking, which might be somewhat more fluid but in spite of that it reflects the character (not the essence) of the given phenomenon in a better way. A postulate of that kind refers to Wittgensteinian thinking in the sense of “family resemblance” categories – to think in these categories, is to be convinced that the notions do not always refer to the universals. It happens that the scope of the notion is established by a set of designations that do not have any common feature but still are similar. (That type of notions, according to Wittgenstein, resembles a rope woven of many strands, with none of them stretching the whole length of the rope.) In the context of our considerations one should remember that all typologies are, first of all, tools in service of ordering and explaining the examined reality. They mould and simplify at the same time – they are ideal models, which at the same time explain and falsify the reality image by often arbitrary assimilation of various, although in some respects related, phenomena. The researcher’s task is to avoid, if possible, simplifying analyses and to be attentive in regard to the multi-aspect character of the described phenomena, as well as, to “mixed phenomena,” which do not entirely fit into the idealising model. Excessive schematisation (not taking nuances into consideration) of reality leads directly to improper evaluations, on the basis of which we are prone to take actions. Relating the above remarks to the study of single issue terrorism, it should be noted that special attention is needed while employing any kind of abstractions, especially in going “from general to specific” – carrying out intellectual operations on general terms, and then transposing the conclusions drawn from them to a particular phenomena (e.g. the activity of the particular groups). For, it may turn out that the abstractions diverge too much from the empirical reality, and thus they do not only describe it inadequately but represent them falsely.

ILONA POLITOWICZ, PIOTR MAKOWSKI, AGATA NIEDZIÓŁKA

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Assoc. Prof. Ilona POLITOWICZ, Ph.D. Assoc. Prof. Piotr MAKOWSKI, Ph.D. Uniwersity of Zielona Góra National Defence University

SPACE MARKETING – INNOVATIVE IDEAS PRODUCE CREATIVE TECHNOLOGIES

Agata NIEDZIÓŁKA, M.A. Uniwersity of Zielona Góra

Abstract

Due to our accession to the European Space Agency, Poland gains the position of a full

member state of ESA, instead of the previous cooperating role. Our membership in ESA should

be considered in a much wider context. It should include European space policy (prepared and

implemented together by the EU and ESA), as well as our country's methods of extensive

communication in the area of product information, and space technology including its

applications and benefits. The main aim of this article is to introduce particular problems

connected with the improvement of form and methods of communication in the areas of needs

and possibilities among space technology’s transfer. Space technologies are here the common

good of ESA organisation. Moreover, the article will focus on the general potential directions of

solving problems, which concentrate on the development of a communication model’s needs in

the context of the communication of new possibilities, technology transfer and space services.

Space technology products are worldwide innovations, which stimulate new technology’s

development and are conducive to the transfer of them to other fields of economy. They also

require new forms of marketing, human resources management and quality control. We can

notice the emergence of a new market for space services, which is the driving force of innovative

solutions in many economic areas (communication, transport, environment, agriculture, safety)

and administration. Poland cannot be only the client of solutions delivered from abroad. Poland

has to actively participate in the creation of new technologies, and to establish its own

promotion system for that matter.

Key words – space, marketing, digital technologies



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Introduction By being a full member of ESA, our country is taking the challenge of creating

better conditions for the development of science and economy. Membership will also help to upgrade the level of safety and access to modern technologies. The accessibility of the newest solutions created for the space industry will certainly improve the innovation of many areas in our lives.

This generates plenty of problems, which solutions demand a country’s interference using special institutions, as well as the creation of supporting methods for research and implementation projects.

This article has the aim of introducing particular problems connected with the improvement of form and methods of communication in the areas of needs and possibilities among space technology’s transfer. Space technologies are here the common good of ESA organisation. Moreover, the article will focus on the general potential directions of solving problems. This is the equivalent accessibility rule to the described products, generating a new quality of mutual communication. There appears new questions: how to improve the communication methods of new possibilities in the area of technology transfer of space services and how to define target groups, improve signalising needs, as well as how to educate society about new forms and methods of communication. Is there a requirement for putting that form of cooperation with ESA in an institutional pattern of safety or only of defence.

It can be assumed that in the process of preparing new, and improving existing, methods and forms of communication, the theory of marketing and innovation implementation will be useful. It should be then modified with the suggestions from the dynamics and innovation researches of space and digital technologies development. The main success in that field can be introduced in the concept of electronic – mobile – marketing. During research examples of very important criteria can be: society level of living or the effectiveness of industry and administration activities on the particular areas, which use innovative and space solutions. Apart from the implementation methods of marketing products, typical for informative society, it can be assumed that the knowledge given to the potential customers and producers can be more effective through youth education in the field of space marketing specialisation. Those effects can be already observed.

There are no doubts, that the problems mentioned above, should be solved jointly by theoreticians and practitioners of management and marketing fields.

Satellite technology sector. Regional context Created in the last decades of the twentieth century satellite infrastructure

fulfils the needs of communication, navigation and Earth observation. It made possible, beside the development of the space technology hardware, development


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of a brand new sector of this industry – services. The diagram below illustrates the structure of the space sector. This rising new industry – modern satellite services industry – is becoming a driving force of innovative solutions in many branches of the global economy (i.e. communication, transport, environment, agriculture, security) and administration. Simultaneously, these sectors create market for highly specialised services. Innovative satellite applications become a strong transforming force for new methods of marketing communication and create new marketing systems by increasing the productivity of the new and strong relations with customers in the open space of time. In last 30 years, Poland has been developing its own space section. It already gained huge experience and can prove real achievements among firms from the sectors of technology, information, telecommunication and informatics. These companies are ready to become any stage in the chain of production and satellite services, starting with the production of components, satellite platforms, through downstream segments (data stations, satellite signal receivers etc.), to the services using satellite technologies.

The scientific and technology potential of the Polish space sector is proven by the effects of cooperation with ESA as part of the PECS Cooperation Agreement, signed in 2007 for 5 years. Over 135 motions had been put forward in three competitions that had already been offered by PECS. Nowadays, lasting projects are related to observation, navigation and satellite communication, and transfer of technologies. They are contracted by Centrum Badań Kosmicznych PAN, Geosystems Sp. z o.o., Instytut Geodezji i Kartografii, Politechnika Wrocławska, Akademia Marynarki Wojennej, Instytut Lotnictwa, Astri Sp. z o.o., Politechnika Warszawska, Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski, WASAT Sp. z o.o.

Technologies used in creating newer or highly improved goods are based on the practical use of a combination of knowledge and experience. Usually, even the process as such, is unique and new, so it requires creative promotion. Human beings create new solutions and tools when they want to accomplish a task or solve nurturing problem.

From that point of view, the main driving force of invention is human curiosity or problems encountered during new tasks and projects. On one side, inventions bring freshness, curiosity and open new possibilities for discovering and creating new services, pushing forward progress and stimulating innovations. On the other side, there are situations in which projects or new activities are forcing the creation of the new tools, techniques or technologies, in some way pulling behind them development and innovations. Both are illustrated on the picture no. 1 below:


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Source: own work.

Picture no 1. Innovation development Technological needs and potential that is hidden in new technologies, both

affect one another, stimulate the development of newer and newer technologies and spur innovative solutions for marketing communicators. Looking into consumer needs, we cannot close one's eyes to factors like the growing requirements of the education sector, life style changes (that are more often than before), or consumer preference changes. Marketing specialist should acquire knowledge that not only applies the functioning of modern technologies but also should be prepared to train the sender and recipient, which are potential customers of satellite services or direct users of these services.

The process of marketing technics requires the receiver to go into marketing techniques and products' specifications, which consider:

– the space services market, – the principles of the products' choice in space services market, – effectiveness of products manufacturing, – spin-off techniques, – prices in the market of space technologies,


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– principles of determining prices in non-profit sectors, – cost estimation, – cost designing for a particular manufacturing cycle, – supervision and risk management, – costs of insurance, – distribution and promotion. In the space technology industry, receivers are the most important source of

information. Interviews with technology users show the need for development that are very often implied by manufacturing limits and technology imperfections. Projects executed within ecosystems of innovations, widely supported by social campaigns, could be the example of the development of modern technologies. Those arguments confirm the main thesis for the need for specialist trainings. The efforts made by the whole authoring teem on the space marketing specialisation at the Economy Management Faculty of Zielona Góra University, will be shortly born out in practice. The specific character of the national security knowledge, especially defence, allows us to formulate a thesis about the need for education on space marketing at the main polish universities.

From invention to innovation in modern technologies These two notions, often used alternatively, play a huge role in technological

development. Invention is a new, promising concept, an idea. It may expand and take the features of an innovative solution, that is standing out due to its mature and highly advanced progress, or even implementing of the solution. The world's research indicates that innovations are now the only source of permanent economic growth, and therefore are posing as a strategy foundation for the competitiveness strategies of companies on the international market.

The OECD indicates that 2/3 of the total economic growth in Developed Countries should be connected with implementing innovations in their markets. Price domination, so efficiently conducted by the Asian markets, makes the rest of the countries compete on the international markets with innovation only, that means new solutions and technologies. The Innovation Union Scoreboard1 ranks Poland as a moderately innovative country. The goal of the Innovation and the effectiveness strategy of the polish economy is to introduce Poland to the group of the leading countries by 20202. Innovations are crucial to the industry and management policy. As Shumpeter says, innovations cannot be treated as a universal good, but as a complex, destructive force, that is creating new possibilities and challenges for a particular economical system.

1 Innovation index, Global Competitiveness Report. 2 Rising from the 22nd to 15th place , Innovation and effectiveness strategy of polish economy,

Ministry of Economy.


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In short perspective, this means a division for winners and losers. In the longer period, innovations become the driving force of economic growth, better quality of life of particular social groups and technological progress.3 This quality of life should be researched with the aim of the creation of effective communication methods, on the bases of the needs and possibilities of space technology transfer.

To increase the innovation of economy it is important to back it up with modern services and industry branches with the highest growth potential, as with the hi-tech industry. The base of the success in this case are technological innovations, which at the beginning require expenditure, but at the end they bring calculable profits through the high efficiency of resources involved and the advanced research backup.

One of the most innovative sectors is the space sector. It belongs to the group of sectors with the highest level of added value. Statistics shows, that for every €1 invested, ca. € 10 of pay off. The average growth of this sector is constantly increasing. In 2010 it was estimated as 7,7%. The Polish industry structure is dominated by the production of low-manufactured, material-consuming products, which requires a lot of energy and expanded labor structure in the production process. Changing of this situation is possible with the use of the hi-tech industry and communication-related modern solutions and services. Chances for development is given to us by, among others, digital space technologies. Research made for the European Space Agency concerning the Polish economy in relation to the development of the space sector 4, shows that many Polish companies have a great potential of knowledge, experience and organisation culture, allowing the development of informative, telecommunication and electronic technologies.

Defining target groups and the scope of information dedicated to them, we can speak about the new technology implementation, firm differentiation etc. Those conditions are created on their situation and market maturity, as well as on the character of its innovations. Innovations can be divided into supportive and destructive. Supportive innovations mean planned evolution or revolution of the existing and developed market, which in most cases applies to big and developed enterprises. Destructive innovations create new markets, often destroying or marginalising older technologies, they are unpredictable, and mostly occur in immature companies, that are in the early stages of growth, and while entering markets are more willing to take a risk and compete.

Differences between the basic characteristics of developed companies and start-ups (see picture 2) show that big and mature organisations, with sufficient resources, a variety of experts and a professional management style, are leaders of technologies that are planned and developed on regular basis.

3 „Space and the Processes of Innovation”, ESPI Report, July 2012. 4 “Industry Assessment of Poland for Space Activities”, Bertin Technologies, polish space sector

analysis before signing the PECS agreement (Plan for European Cooperating States), 2004 r.


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Source: “Model of Innovation: Start-Ups and Mature Corporations.” Jerome S Engel., Presentation. Inside Innovation, Conference. University of California, Berkeley. November 2007.

Picture no. 2. Model of features of young and mature organisation Small enterprises are willing to take a risk of sudden, interesting and significant

inventions, that can be the source of innovations, which in the end can be the way to the top, but with the risk of losing everything. Innovations are essential to the concept stage of every project life cycle.

The closer to the end of the project schedule, the more difficult it is to accept any revolutionary changes or solutions. That is mostly because of the high accomplishment cost or high level of risk, that could lead to the project failure. The exception in such a situation can be technological gaps, that have to be filled to run the project, otherwise the project itself would not stand a chance. Taking a risk and bearing the costs related to this new solution is then necessary.

Specific target groups of communication can be created form many different criteria. As an example, those are subjects participating in the external and internal


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national safety assurance (administration, institutions, research and development centres, industry etc.). Such a target group, closed to the general information transfer, and important due to national interests and missions, require separate, institutional forms and methods of communication with ESA. The additional argument for such a solution is the creation of European military forces. The implementation of the concept of European combat groups, allows us to think that they will be the first users of space technology. Needs of unifications require organised international work.

The process of modern technologies development In the process of the working out and improving of the new technologies,

companies are creating their own methods of management, using schemes and patterns. The model of Technology Readiness Levels, created by NASA, is an example of such a pattern. It looks as like this:

Picture no. 3. Technology Readiness Levels – TRL in space sector, NASA


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If we interpret this model for the other segments of the market, in many companies it could look as follows:

Picture no. 4. Technology maturity model, Source: own work on the bases of Technology Readiness Levels NASA

The presented model is also based on the methodology of project management,

which creates unique solutions and products. We can observe the clear outlining of the stages of planning, analyses, projecting of the solution, testing and implementations.


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Source: own work.

Picture no. 5. The process of need management and project starting The need, that is the main driving force to creating these new solutions, has an

influence on decisions about investment in research, new ideas, converting the scheme into the real, working devices or technology. In this way, companies are able to accomplish their strategic goals and effectively compete on the market.

Unfortunately, it's extremely rare for scientific findings and discoveries to be directly implemented or used in the economy. Satellite techniques are not the exception here. In this case however, the results of scientific research and experiments are most often the effect of planned development, strategies and goals, and they go through a long process from the idea, through testing and experiments, to the final implementation and testing during the space mission. The information flow between the parties creating and using innovative solutions is very important. It should be optimised according to arising needs. EISC distinguished 4 different models of cooperation for innovative projects:

1. Closed inside – closed outside. This term means focused, geographically separated work of a multitask team of young professionals in a hermetic environment. Results of scientific research are protected and kept in secret.

2. Closed inside – open outside. That means work in a specialised team, most often in government institutions, institutes, universities, that gather scholars and other scientific workers. The results are introduced to the public.

3. Open inside – closed outside. This type can be described as one that is using knowledge, experience and ideas rising in the macro – environment of the company, to achieve solutions to problems and issues in the project. Mostly it is crowd-sourcing. Using crowd-sourcing


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platforms can cut costs, diversify the list of possible solutions, and multiply the intellectual property of the company.

4. Open inside – open outside. This model is based on open cooperation and taking the role of the macro-environment of the company in creating brand new solutions, also allowing for the free and unlimited use of the results of the research in the future. This last scheme of partnership creates innovative solutions in a large part based on solutions that are open for general use, or simply called “open source” solutions.

The market of space technologies, in general, prefers a partnership with companies5. Cooperating, these institutions use their resources in the most efficient way, and more often are successful in the process of technology creation.

According to the Ministry of Economy, only half of Polish companies benefit from research and development agencies in the process of creating solutions, technologies and management theory. The Internet, including communication platforms and information exchange markets etc., is the main source of information about possible cooperation with external experts for around 30% of enterprises. The other 20% of companies draw information about partnerships with scientist from the press and media.

Yet an economy based on knowledge needs cooperation skills and information transfer between companies, scientific centres and customers. Such actions support a better distribution of resources, responsible leadership, and help create knowledge and information. Innovations arise and spread as a result of partnership and cooperation between organisations. This model determines the innovation of the whole economy and affects it's development.

Implementation of innovative solutions Innovative solutions can contribute to the global challenges concerning climate

changes, security, the ageing of societies or curing new diseases. Innovations can be implemented in many areas of social and economic life, even those seen as traditional and not innovative, such as agriculture.

Space and digital technologies are nowadays strategic services, with high economic and social value.

There are a lot of innovations that developed as a result of preparations for space missions. Some examples of these inventions in various areas are:

• Medicine: blood dialyzer, CT scanner, telemedicine, new methods of manufacturing drugs.

• Sport and recreation: better sports shoes, breathable materials such as Gore-tex, Velcro.

5 „Space and the Processes of Innovation”, ESPI Report, July 2012.


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• Food manufacturing: products suitable for long term food storage, instant soups, nutritious products for infants.

• Safety: new isolating materials e.g. polymer used in fire suits, innovative products that enable water treatment (including blood dialyzer), toxic gas sensors (including smoke, chemicals and pollution), communication in case of natural disasters, meteorology.

• Agriculture: monitoring of ground quality, precise valuation of the crop, precise determination of the need for fertilising.

• Technique and industry: battery powered tools (cordless drills, vacuum cleaners, screwdrivers), winter tires, composite materials in brake pads, carbon-hardened blades, metalized foil, oil free bearings, telecommunication, satellite communication, digital television, internet television, GPS, Galileo, new tools for digital photography processing, digital photography.

Most of the technologies mentioned above, are already rooted in our everyday lives and we can be unaware that the genesis for all these inventions were space missions. As a consequence of the growing role of the space sector in the world economy, in the late 1990s the process of shaping space marketing policy began in the European Union. This policy is supposed to encourage the growth of innovations and economic progress, and to function as a simplifying tool for EU sector policy execution in many areas like:

• the development and use for space solutions that serve EU policies and the needs of European enterprises and citizens, including the natural environment, balanced development and global climate changes,

• the fulfilment of European needs in security and defence areas regarding cosmic space,

• building a strong and competitive space industry, that supports innovations, economic growth, and expansion, as well as gives balanced, reasonably priced services at a high level,

• supporting a society based on knowledge, by pulling significant investments in researches connected with cosmic space, and also ensuring Europe plays a significant role in the international ventures of exploration,

• Providing unlimited access to new and innovative technologies, systems and potential for ensuring the independence of European space applications.

The main pillar of this policy is the construction and exploration of the GMES and Galileo systems. It also means development in four areas of priorities:

1. research in climate changes, 2. innovations and accomplishment of Europe 2020 Strategy, 3. security, 4. and exploration of cosmic space. To successfully compete on the market, the majority of business lines are

creating brand new solutions, technologies and innovating ideas and secure them until they are published. They are developing new projects in privacy, dominating


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over competing parties during the implementation of research results and introducing products to the market. The space technologies sector is based on quite different rules. One can say: “Space shares technologies”. Governments are greatly involved in the development of this sphere and the wide globalization of its products and services. The majority of these technologies, except those related to security and defence, are transferred in a very short time to the open market in order to be developed and adapted for the use of customers on the whole Earth.

E-m-marketing / space marketing / info-editing in e-media The modern information technologies market is driving at the ready-made

product. Not only partial services and products are crucial and most desirable now, but complex approaches that combine the knowledge and solutions of the different fields and technologies. Due to the development of new technologies, marketing is changing. Today the marketing of digital and satellite technologies is a result of many cultural, social and technological changes. It uses social media, mobile solutions, complex digital multimedia devices and natural user's interface. This process has changed and still is creating new ways and places for content distribution to particular users, customers or business partners. Digital marketing became one of the most important ways of communicating with clients. Despite the need of fast and continuous reaction and adaptation, it is now more and more popular. The most important is to invest in innovative solutions, and to be in real contact with customers and partners, to personalise news up to the style and needs of clients and integrate all communication forms with the specific target.

This new model generates challenges and costs as well. Investments in new technologies and innovative solutions require suitable expenditure. The methods of deepening partnership and an integrated approach to the information directed to customers are also challenging. Perfect solutions of digital communication should meet the fundamental needs of:

– providing uninterrupted contact with the customer, also on demand, – including every target group, – defining target groups in a proper way, and directing our information more

precisely, – directing our information through many channels, – being available in every convenient form (computer, mobile phone, iPad,

interactive television etc.), – increasing demand on our services and product, – increasing efficiency of our marketing strategies, – allowing for the full valuation of our strategies efficiency and achieved goals, – a long-term lifecycle with the opportunity for development and further

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Nowadays, in the time of economic crisis, recipients are looking for free-of-charge content and information on the Internet. Development of content accessibility by the use of mobile sources and the lower cost of obtaining it, is the factor that inspires customers to gain knowledge this way and choosing this type of communication. We are approaching the phenomenon of the commercialisation of the internet content. Recipients are willing to pay for digital information more often. This channel is becoming profitable and widens our knowledge about the efficiency of marketing actions.

Digital technologies allow for marketing management integration. They improve contact with the customer due to personalisation and higher interactivity, allowing for the interesting graphic exposition of the brand, and give more possibilities of marketing analyses. New technologies exert on companies a need for innovations requiring flexibility and adaptation. This integrated marketing management, is a combination of all accessible and usable methods, tools and resources used in marketing communication, in order to gain a more powerful impact on customers and deepen the customer's awareness about our brand. Nowadays, not only the commercial content, but also information is an element of the imagery and communication with the customer.

Space marketing tools use effectively the Internet, digital advertisements or social media. The adaptability and interactive character of these tools make communication with the client easier compared to using traditional methods. Besides, mechanisms of website analysis, system of managing the relationship with the customer (CMR) and planning the resources of the company (ERP), allow the gaining of valuable information about a client's behaviour and the efficiency of running marketing campaigns.

The biggest advantages of digital marketing are: • the possibility of communication with the customer by the use of various

media, brands and places, • the suitable and efficient directing of the marketing transmission; • widening the circle of the recipients of our information; • a significant growth of sale, including indirect services - more expensive and

luxurious; • an efficient method for the initiation of new technologies and tools; • cost cutting; • the shortening of the time needed for new products and services to be put on

the market; • the growing customer activity; • better flexibility; • the enrichment of graphic content of our transmission. Development of the new technologies and innovative solutions increasing the

mobility of the communication between producers and customers. That is why the


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concept of e-m-marketing6, that is: electronic-mobile-marketing, is considered more often.

Space technologies, world digitization, development of broadband and high-speed Internet, direct us to the use of artificial intelligence, semantic intelligence and 3D graphics. Usage of space technology affects the changes of directions and possibilities of marketing communication. Most of the tools and services that require integration of the facts and deduction, are based on human intelligence and activity using a particular product in a particular moment. We are, however, closer to the moment, when our computer, phone or other device armed with a suitable application, will be able to answer complex questions, choosing for us interesting elements in the jungle of data. Just imagine, that going for holidays we command our car autopilot to pick the road with the most interesting, historical places with beautiful viewpoints. And this way, we can have a pleasurable journey to our destination.

Or when we are looking for a new TV set, we can type into the searcher “find the cheaper model of the TV with such and such parameters”. Nowadays we need to use our knowledge to make such a search successful and satisfying. In a short time our computer will analyse information gathered on the internet databases for us and will show the best options for buying our desired TV.

Successful and efficient marketing in the circumstances of the progress of virtualization and mobility, involves using new technologies, including satellite ones. As Kotler says: “The Internet will create new winners and bury the laggards”. The catalog of communication tools is getting wider, and what is most important, the majority of them are being built with the possibility of the efficient measurement of their use, which was not common till now. Enterprises are investing into information systems, that play key roles in cost cutting and gaining advantage over companies. They are organising their activities around the customer7 and to strengthen the impact on the recipient, they are integrating marketing communication. Contents, forms and media, gathered from various sources, are integrated in one place.8 So that is how a complete database, that enables the even more efficient planning of marketing activities and allowing the designing of new products, perfectly fitted to the users' needs, is being created. The Internet, along with electronic and mobile marketing, is the foundation of competition and innovation of organisation. This marketing manages a client's attention, engages him in using the particular product, makes our customer communicate to us strategic and important information about the process of sale.

6 „E-marketing” Liliana Nowak, from the monograph „Marketing – zagadnienia współczesne”,

under scientific redaction of prof. dr. hab. Henryka Mruka, Forum Naukowe, Poznań 2008. 7 „Marketing”, Philip Kotler, 11th edition, Rebis, 2005. 8 „Komunikacja marketingowa – kierunki zmian” (Marketing communication – changes ‘

directions) Henryk Mruk, from the monograph „Marketing – zagadnienia współczesne” (Marketing – modern definition), under scientific redaction of prof. dr. hab. Henryka Mruka, Forum Naukowe, Poznań 2008.


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Nowadays, it is efficiency that counts the most, not only a new, different, broadcast. In the EU, the meaning of communication policy, that is the basic tool in the development of an innovative and competitive economy, is growing all the time.9

The use of the satellite techniques, and services based upon them, is oriented towards fulfilling the needs for fast and correct information for European citizens, and also as a tool that is enabling the better realisation of many policy sectors in the EU. This is why in the 2014-2020 period, the EU is planning to spend a total of €15,475 billion for space activities (3 times more than in the current financial perspective), Poland's contribution is valued at around €495 billion.

Summarising, the most important goal of all processes and actions is the change of invention and ideas into innovations. It really does not matter if they will be done by planned and systematic actions, or if they will be done by taking risk and staking on a brand new solution, not proven on any grounds. Communication of the new solutions to the selected markets and potential recipients is crucial. It can highly increase the possibility of success.

Nowadays, innovations should now be seen as a tool that is soothing the results of the current economic breakdown, and as solutions to the problems we are facing. Standard resources of growth are not that profitable anymore, so we should focus on problem solving and social challenges. The main goal of Polish strategy is a highly competitive economy (innovative and efficient) based on knowledge and cooperation.10. The most important element of companies' innovative activities and modern trades, is the necessity of creating an efficient system promoting relationship support, cooperation and communication between scientific-researching sectors, and companies and customers. To rise up, it needs deepened research on the effectiveness of communication methods and forms. It confirms the need for highly specialised education for human resources, to cope with the challenge of new forms and methods of space marketing. In the case of national safety, there is a need to work on the institutional forms of cooperation with ESA.

Bibliography

An economic analysis of the sector and the role of Policy, The Space Economy in the UK: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, February 2010.

Klaus Schwab, The Global Competitiveness Report. 2011-2012, World Economic Forum, Geneva 2011.

Henryk Mruk, Komunikacja marketingowa – kierunki zmian, red. Nauk Henryk Mruk Marketing – zagadnienia współczesne, , Wyd. Forum Naukowe, Poznań 2008 r.

9 Due to the British statistics, the average productivity for one employee of the space sector

stands for 142 thousand pounds per year, what means 4 times more than average in the country of U.K. (“The Space Economy in the UK: An economic analysis of the sector and the role of policy”, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, February 2010).

10 Innovation and effectiveness strategy of polish economy, Ministry of Economy.


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Industry Assessment of Poland for Space Activities, Bertin Technologies, 2004 r. Jerome S Engel., Model of Innovation: Start-Ups and Mature Corporations.” Presentation.

Inside Innovation, Conference. University of California, Berkeley. November 2007. Liliana Nowak, E-marketing, red nauk. Henryk Mruk, Marketing – zagadnienia

współczesne, Wyd. Forum Naukowe, Poznań 2008 r Philip Kotler, Marketing, wydanie 11, Wyd. Rebis, 2005 r. Program działań na rzecz rozwoju technologii kosmicznych i wykorzystywania systemów

satelitarnych w Polsce, Ministerstwo Gospodarki, 2012 r. Space and the Processes of Innovation”, ESPI Report, July 2012. .Strategia Innowacyjności i Efektywności Gospodarki Polsk na lata 2011-2020,

Dynamiczna Polska, Ministerstwo Gospodarki, 2012.

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A BEHAVIORAL MODEL DETERMINING THE

IMPACT OF USA MILITARY ACTIVITY ON

THE GLOBAL NUMBER OF WARS

Marcin KRUPA, M.A. Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Krakowie

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to examine the relationship occurring between U.S.

foreign policy, understood in terms of the military, with global processes, which is defined

in terms of polemology (the phenomenon of war). The distinguishing feature of the research

process is its methodology, which by its structure refers to the number of ideas positivist

philosophy of science. This appeal reflected an attempt to clarify the research process,

which is implemented using mathematical tools, which are used at the level of abstraction.

The same methodology is an important factor distinguishing this research process, giving it

the status of originality. The results of the research process as carried out the results,

which show the correlation that exists between the processes marked.

Key words – War, USA, Foreign Policy, Globalization, Methodology.

Introduction The following scientific article has the nature of the original research process,

which through its methodological structure refers to the behavioral tradition; its aim is, as the title suggests, to find a precise answer to the following question: how U.S. foreign policy affects the global number of wars?

The article consists of three sections: the first defines behavioral research, and the tradition of this type of research process against the background of the historical development of the scientific discipline of international relations as a whole; the second determines the object of the study; the last, third, chapter describes the course of the research process realized and presents its results.

Behaviourism in the history of international relations theory The organised research process of international relations emerged only after

World War I, earlier this issue was dealt with in a loose way by thinkers of all types, especially philosophers, lawyers and practitioners of the public life. The


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need for an organised research process was triggered by wars getting out of control, becoming more and more destructive in nature.

The scientific development of the independent scientific discipline called International Relations takes place on the basis of the so-called "great debates", the final result of which are paradigms, the construction of which are determined by the victorious theories. The first debate took place during the 1930s and 1940s; the second began in the fifties and lasted until the early seventies; the third began in the eighties; when it comes to the last, fourth, there is a significant dispute in this respect as to whether it is an extension of the third debate.

The first school of international relations was established before World War I and based its theoretical structure on the scientific dimension of liberal thought. In a nutshell: international liberalism assumes that people are good by nature, so the source of war is not to be found in human nature, but in bad organisation of the system or in educational shortcomings. Thus, the phenomenon of war can be eliminated through efficient international organisations, the aim of which are to improve cooperation, not only between countries, but also between other state entities; therefore the entire system of international relations was to be based on the eurocentric culture, liberal-democratic principles and Christian morals.1

In practice, the liberal assumptions were not effective. In 1939, a famous work of the British historian Edward Carr: The Twenty Years Crisis was published, in which the author stressed the assumptions of the liberal school and questions them, and the validity of his argument was borne out by history with great precision.2 Since that time, the liberal school of that time has been referred to as idealist or utopian. The conservative thinking called classical realism began to be heard again. In 1948, a famous work was published entitled Politics Among Nations by Hans Joachim Morgenthau, in which all the principles of realism were codified and modified giving rise to neoclassical realism, which became the most important theory in the history of international relations (some scientists proclaim that only the work of Morgenthau brought International Relations into existence as an independent scientific discipline). Realism refers to human nature in a pessimistic way, focusing mainly on forcible and state centric elements, stating that the best and natural tool to ensure peace is the balance of powers.3

Morgenthau’s theory was exceptional in many respects; one of the distinctive elements of the neoclassical realism theory was the following statement: "Political

1 A. Gałganek, Geneza stosunków międzynarodowych i ich teoria, [w:] W. Malendowski,

Cz. Mojsiewicz (red.), Stosunki międzynarodowe, Wydawnictwo Alta2, Wrocław 2000, p. 16-17. R. Jackson, G. Sorensen, Wprowadzenie do teorii stosunków międzynarodowych: Teorie i kierunki

badawcze, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2006, p. 36-42. S. Burchill, R. Devetak, A. Linklater, M. Paterson, Ch. Reus-Smit, J. True, Teorie Stosunków Międzynarodowych, Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa 2006, p. 50-79.

2 E. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939, Perennial, New York 2001, passim. 3 R. Jackson, G. Sorensen, op. cit., p. 42-46.

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realism believes that politics, like society, is governed by objective laws (…)”.4 This statement is related to the earlier war philosophy studies realised by Quincy Wight, Pitrim Sorokin, Lewis Fre Richardson which state that social phenomena are causal, and thus repeatable, so that it is possible to recognise the objective laws and on the basis of them to ensure greater control over the course of social processes and in an identical manner to make their predictions. Thus, the work of Morgenthau, consolidating the position of realism, heralded the beginning of a new debate in which traditionalists versus behaviourists competed with each other.

Researchers connected with the traditional approach in international relations draw attention to the differences separating the humanities and social sciences from exact sciences, stating that these differences require a different research methodology based on normative elements. However, the representatives of behaviourism not recognising these differences, proclaim the need to eliminate the normative element from social science, which they believe is the source of the lack of scientific progress. Thereby, traditionalism propagates the need to implement studies of a perceptual and intuitive deduction type based on the inference characteristic for philosophy combined with a free interpretation of historical processes.5 Whereas, behaviourism, which is associated with positivism and scientism, states that knowledge, even on the human and social basis, should be gained through rigorous and quantitative and inductive analysis methods based on mathematical mechanisms of empirical data processes; data should be acquired through taskonomization and quantification of history, on this basis bold hypotheses should be made and subject them to constant verification in order to develop precise definitions, of which the ultimate goal is to find universal laws governing the behaviour of states.6 Ultimately, the debate finished as suddenly as it began and ended without a conclusion, but in a sense, relatively and not unanimously behaviourism can be regarded as the winner of the debate; why? Because, since the seventies, most of the research carried out on the basis of international relations includes behavioural elements, or possibly refers to the results of this type of research. It is worth mentioning here that International Relations is an Anglo-Saxon science, and Polish research relating to international issues is scarce, and those of a behavioural methodology structure type are almost none, thereby, one of the purposes of this article is to fill this gap.

The most important researchers conducting international issue research using behavioural methodology elements include: Marton Kaplan, David Easton, Stanley

4 H. J. Morgenthau, Polityka między narodami: Walka o potęgę i pokój, Difin, Warszawa 2010, s. 20. 5 R. Jackson, G. Sorensen, op. cit., ss. 46, 54-58, 248-252, 269-282. H. Bull, International

Theory: the Case for a Clasical Approach [w:] K. Knorr, J. Rosenau (red.), Contending Approaches

to international Politics, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1969, p. 20-38. A. Gałganek, Geneza

stosunków międzynarodowych i ich teoria, [w:] op. cit., p. 21. R. Zenderowski, op. cit., p. 56-59. 6 R. Jackson, G. Sorensen, op. cit., p. 47-49, 61-63, 243-248, 250, 253-260, 264-269, 279-282.

J. E. Dougherty, R. L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, Lippincott, New York 1971, p. 36-37. R. Zenderowski, op. cit., p. 56-59.


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H. Hoffman, Karl Deutsch, David J. Singer, Dawid E. Spiro, George Modelsky, Richard Rosencrance, John W. Burton, Kenneth Waltz, Rudolf Rummel, Melvin Small, Jack Levy, Roger Burrows, Brian Spector, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and John Galtung. The third debate, which should be mentioned in a few words at the end of this section, finished without any conclusion; however, the research parties involved in it gave a synchronised answer on the whole structure of international issue. Nowadays, in order to better understand international relations in terms of safety, competition and war a theory of neorealism and structural realism is being used; to better understand the relationships emerging in communities, especially in the European Union, or, alternatively, the process of globalisation and peace, a number of liberal theories with neoliberalism at the forefront are used; whereas, to better understand disproportions in world development the theories of dependency are used, of which Marxism is the main foundation; moreover, for better understanding of processes ideological and cultural in character, the constructivist theories are used.

The subject of the research The research process, which will be carried out below, is based on several

stages. In the first stage the variables will be distinguished, the analysis of which is able to give an answer to the research question put in the introduction of the article. The variables will be distinguished basing on the realisation processes of quantification and taskonomization of data. The obtained data in the second stage, transformed to chart form showing the course of the cycle, will be juxtaposed. Already at the beginning it should be noted that the obtained data can be analyzed In several dozen ways using a number of methods of mathematical induction, but at this point these methods will not be used; the knowledge taken from the charts will be acquired freely with the help of methods closer to a traditional school. In the third stage, the acquired knowledge will be abstractly interpreted and expressed in the graphical and mathematical form. What variables are we dealing with? The first two variables are the variables of the global number of wars, and the third variable is a variable that specifies the level of the U.S. military activity. Two variables are the variables of the Correlates of War project, which have been modified from the point of view of the research question. The first variable is: "the number of new wars." The course of this variable is shown by a graph in Figure 1:

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The source: Own work, made on the basis of statistical data taken from The New COW War Data 1816 – 2007, Correlates of War, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/> (29.09.2011). Extra - State War, Correlates of War, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/> (29.09.2011).

Fig. 1. The number of “new wars” in the years 1962 – 2007.

The graph is a measurement that shows precisely the number of newly created

wars. The second variable is: „the number of wars being waged”. The shape of this variable shows a graph in Figure 2:

The source: Own work, made on the basis of statistical data taken from: The New COW War Data 1816 – 2007, <Correlates of War, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/> (29.09.2011). Extra - State War, Correlates of War, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/> (29.09.2011).

Fig. 2. The number of „Wars being waged” in the years 1962 – 2007


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The graph shows the general number of wars in progress. The graphs’ differences can be presented using the following example. The Vietnamese-Cambodian War lasted three years, i.e. 1977-1979. In case of variation: "the number of new wars" the Vietnamese-Cambodian war is recorded in the statistics only once, it takes place in 1977. However, in case of variation: "the number of wars being waged" the Vietnamese-Cambodian war is recorded in the statistics three times each year from 1977 to 1979.

The last variable is:

The source: Own work made on the basis of quantification of the U.S. history.

Fig. 3. The military activity of the USA in the years 1962 – 2007

The chart above (Fig. 3) was developed as follows: The U.S. military activity

(WUS) was divided into several types, and for each of them, basing on relative, yet logical thinking, a specific value was assigned. The individualisation takes place in a definitively distinct way as opposed to in the case of Correlates of War project and is presented as follows:

CW – cold war = 1

LW – limited war = 1

FCW – full-scale war = 2

CC – „Cuban crisis” = 1

D – detente (times of positive trends in the U.S.A. - Soviet Union relations) = - 0,5

A – accumulation of the arms race under President Ronald Reagan = 0,5

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The general formula in the arithmetic form is as follows: Formula 1:

However, the general stochastic formula in the functional form can be presented as follows:

Formula 2:

Commenting on the above formulas some facts are noteworthy: The cold war (CW) was characterised by tension variation, which has been presented as a constant numerical base (1), as well as a number of variables distinguishing specific time periods, such as: the cuban crisis (CC = 1), detente times (D = - 0.5) and the accumulation of the arms race (A = 0.5), which determine the evolution or the fluctuation of the phenomenon. As for the first variable: the cuban crisis was the event which constituted the essential accumulation of the cold war tension, therefore it became essential to assign values (1) to the event, so that in combination with the cold war value, the sum of the cold war in the period of the year 1962 is (2). Another variable: detente, determines the times of reduction of the cold war tension. Some historians state that this process began in 1963, right after the cuban crisis had finished, however it is possible also to divide this period into specific time sequences (certainly the years 1972- 1973 are the most stable times in the discussed period). For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that the time of detente was not until 1969, when the U.S.A. under the leadership of Richard Nixon joined the talks with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic arms: Strategic

Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), the treaty was signed in 1972. The detente period certainly ends in the last month of 1979 when the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan. In case of the last variable, namely in the accumulation of arms issue, since 1962 the process took place only at a time when US foreign policy was managed by the administration of Ronald Reagan. This value can also be assigned to the events of the announcement of the Truman Doctrine (1947), until the death of Joseph Stalin and the end of the Korean War (1953), however, this period is not the subject of this scientific research (the variable CC is equivalent to the variable A, yet, it takes a higher value due to the historical status of the event). A few words in terms of the remaining variables: Limited war (LW), is a war in which the U.S.A. in a direct way used their armed forces at a relatively low level, which is not included in a definition of war in the Correlates of War project (the wars not included in this definition are classified as conflicts). These wars are the interventions of small range. This category includes interventions in the following countries: Dominican Republic 1965, Grenada 1983, Lebanon 1985,7 Panama

7 Taking Lebanon into account is mainly due to heavy casualties (241) incurred by the U.S. in

this mission, which was the result of a terrorist attack.


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1989, Somalia 1993, Haiti 1994, Bosnia i Herzegovina 1995, Iraq 1998, Sudan 1998, Yugoslavia 1999. All the cases mentioned above have an assigned value (1).8 The last group of variables is a full-scale war (FSW). In the years 1962-2007, there have been three such wars, one of them currently continues in Afghanistan (estimated time of completion of the mission is 2014), and the second was concluded less than two years ago (2010 is the official date of completion of military operation in Iraq). Apart from them, the United States since 1962 on such a large military and political scale were only involved in the Vietnam war (1965-1973). Wars of this type, with regard to the involvement scale, has been assigned the number 2. The last issue that should be raised is the one of American involvement in Vietnam in the years 1962-1964. In this period of time, in Vietnam, the U.S.A. were engaged with two kinds of battle groups, the military advisers were the first and the units of special forces so-called "green berets" were the second battle group. Moreover, with the help of citizens of other Asian countries, with the CIA’s money, the U.S.A. conducted subversive warfare on limited scale in the North Vietnam, which is why this period of time is considered as a period of limited war (LW).

The analysis

Fig. 4. Comparison of variables relating to the U.S. military activities (WUS), new wars (WR)

and ongoing wars (WT). The yellow line on the graph determines the level of five wars; the

black lines that are undersigned, identify major historical events on the timeline

8 For greater precision and clarification it should be noted that the U.S. intervention in Somalia began in the late 1992 and finished in early 1994. In this case, the widening and statistical formulation of intervention in Somalia in the years 1992-1994, when the essence of the operation was completed in 1993.

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The above chart compares all of the variables in order to analyse them. What strikes the eye in the first place, is the fact that during the war in Vietnam the number of new wars (NW) was no more than five and begins to increase only after the U.S. withdrawal from the country. At this point, the number of ongoing wars (WT) is also stable, the two variables begin to increase rapidly only when the U.S.

Army withdraws Vietnam completely; so that in 1968, when the U.S. was most militarily involved, the number of new wars was 2, and those ongoing 13; however, in 1975, when the U.S.A. suffered a clear defeat in its Vietnam policy, the number of new wars was 8, and ongoing 19!

Another fact worth mentioning is the so-called period of "little cold war", i.e. the ultimate end of detente between the blocs in the Cold War relations and the strengthening of mutual competition which started with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The period of accumulation of new Cold War struggles fell between the years 1980-1985, after which it began to diminish, and finally, what is not evident in length of the black line, but is demonstrated by the first black vertical line, led to the defeat of the USSR. Before the start of a new race of arms, in 1978, the number of new wars was 9, and those ongoing 21; in 1985, in the moment of accumulation, the number of new wars was 1, and ongoing18!

Another fact worth mentioning is the existence of two vertical black lines determining the changes in the international system, which automatically transformed from a bipolar to unipolar world. The transformations taking place in the structure of the international system manifest themselves in the form of a significant increase in the number of wars: in 1989 the number of new wars is 9, and those ongoing as many as 24! In 1991, the situation is even worse, the number of wars which began in this year is 11, and those ongoing is close to the magic number of 27! At this point, a positive effect of the U.S. involvement in Iraq is very apparent - or, alternatively, it is possible to construct a hypothesis stating that the unipolar system is more stable – after which the number of wars falls at a very fast pace. In 1995, the number of new wars was 2, and the ongoing a year later only 15.

The final element worth attention is the increased, and unnoticed so far, very high level of U.S. military activity, which was initiated by terrorist attacks on the main buildings of world finance taking place on 11 September, 2001. In the same time, the Americans intervened in Afghanistan, and less than two years later in Iraq. In the last year of the research period (2007) the number of wars fell to its lowest level in history, with only one outbreak of a new war, and only two taking place. There is still one last noteworthy fact: in 1973, when the U.S.A. withdrew from Vietnam, systematically the number of ongoing wars was growing, which could be interpreted In the form of two hypotheses: the first one - the wars underwent extension due to an increase of participation in them of powers (balancing of military capabilities, unwillingness to compromise) - this hypothesis can be confirmed on the basis of detailed studies of political science; the second one - an increase in the number of wars was the result of the decrease of U.S. military involvement, which will be confirmed by two facts: the first one, that the


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war in the Persian Gulf, after the end of which after five years the number of wars decreased by nearly 50%; the second one is the fact that Americans in the research period of 1962-2007 were involved at a very high level only twice, during the Vietnam War and during the currently still ongoing global war on terrorism, and in those periods the level of the number of ongoing wars is very low.

Thus, one can put the following research hypothesis: At a time when the

United States conduct an offensive foreign policy (they are more active militarily),

the number of wars in the global sense decreases; however, if the United States

conduct a defensive foreign policy (military activity level decreases), the number of

wars in the global sense increases.9 Thereby, the induction phase of the research was completed, the aim of which

was to gather relevant knowledge. The second phase will consist in the deductive attempt to arrange the acquired knowledge.

It is possible to present the principle of the remarked processes in the following mathematical-graphical way:

Formula 3:

Fig. 5. The above graphic-mathematical model is a reflection of the hypothesis course summarising

the course of the inductive research process. The n1 value corresponds to the equilibrium. The U.S.

military activity (WUS) is a dominant variable, which determines the course of the process, when this

variable increases, the global number of wars (GW) decreases (n2), and vice versa (n3)

9 The above hypothesis is even more apparent when from the global number of wars one will

subtract the war with the participation of the U.S.A. (GW – WUS).

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The above process is far more complex, because the level of U.S. military activity is not determined by the usual "will", but as Morgenthau would state, it is determined by the objective laws. Thus, the above model should include another variable, which is the self-shaping stability of the international system structure, which affects the global number of wars and the level of U.S. military involvement, which is accurately presented by the models below.

Formula 4:

Fig. 6. The above graphic-mathematical model constitutes an a-priori element, which enforces

the need to incorporate elements that go beyond the scope of bilateral relations occurring

between the level of U.S. military activity (WUS), and the level of the global number of wars

(GW). An additional element is necessary to take into account the spontaneously emerging

international system instability level (PNSM). In the model, it is assumed that the level of U.S.

military activity is rigid and thus the level of the international instability has a tendency to rise

spontaneously, which is proportionally related to the increase in the global number of wars


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Formula 5:

Fig. 7. This model is a continuation of the above (Fig. 6), except that it assumes a-priori that the

U.S. military activity (WUS) is flexible and reacts in direct proportion to changes in the level of

international stability (PNSM). Therefore, an increase in the international instability (R2)

automatically forces an increase of American interventionism, and vice versa. This means that

WUS is no longer a variable determining the course of systemic processes, however still plays an

important role, which is clearly shown in details of drawings below

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Formula 6:

Fig. 8. The chart above is a continuation of the model contained in Figure 6, assuming an

additional change in the level of rigidity of the U.S. commitment to restore equilibrium


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Formula 7:

Fig. 9. The chart above is a continuation of the model contained in Figure 6, taking into account

the additional increase in U.S. military involvement in order to restore the equilibrium level

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Formula 8:

Fig. 10. The drawing along with the above formula summarises the structure of the whole

model, showing in general terms what level of U.S. military involvement (WUS) is necessary in

order to maintain the number of wars (GW) on the level of equilibrium, with the changing

circumstances of the international system stability (PNSM)

Conclusion The empirical analysis presented in the introduction of the third section of this

scientific paper highlighted three facts: 1) An increase in U.S. military activity precedes a reduction in the number of

global wars. 2) A decline in U.S. military activity precedes an increase in the global number

of wars. 3) The gradual collapse of the Soviet Union happens steadily along with the

increase in the proportion of the global number of wars. On the basis of the observed regularity a formalisation of the acquired

knowledge was made. Figure 5 presents the first two points of the research


275

conclusions, and the other figures take into account the elements of the naturally emerging international system stability (Fig. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10). The same general model, which has been formed on the basis of the basic tendencies observed, gradually takes the form of a model presenting the multifactoriality of mutually overlapping processes interacting with each other in a constant process of dynamic interaction.

The inductive research sphere can be expanded in a meaningful way using a number of methods of arithmetic mathematics (statistics, econometrics, calculus of probability [probabilistic analysis], etc.); the deductive research sphere can also be expanded using a number of methods of formal mathematics (algebra, logic, geometry, differential calculus, etc.). Many elements of the research process outlined above require the use of detailed political sciences analysis. To synchronise and expand, the whole research process is able to bring into existence a new quality of international relations theories (there are many behavioural theories of international relations, such as "the field theory" or "the systems theory").

Referring the results of this research process to individual conclusions coming from a number of currently existing theories, at this stage of the study one should be somewhat careful; although it is possible to argue that the presented statistics challenge the neo-realism thesis that the bipolar system was far more stable,10 it is simply on the contrary, since 1991 there has been a continuous decline in the global number of wars (the arithmetic mean: 1962 – 1991 WT = 16,5 / 1992 – 2007 WT = 15,1; 1962 – 1991 WR = 4,2 / 1992 – 2007 WR = 3,9).

The theoretical construction of conclusions coming from the conducted research process is as follows: If the United States increase their level of military activity and thus begin to conduct a more active foreign policy, it causes the reduction of the global number of wars; whereas, if the U.S.A. reduce their level of military activity and thus their foreign policy becomes more regressive, the global number of war begins to rise (model fig. 5). Referring to the theory of neo-classical realism, which says that the United States conduct a particular foreign policy, the above statistics can not distinguish whether the increase in the level of international instability causes an increased U.S. military activity, this element would have to undergo some detailed political science analysis; in terms of modelling, it is evenly assumed that an increase of international instability contributes to the autonomic growth of U.S. military activity (Fig. 7,9), and apathy is also assumed in this respect (Fig. 6,8). The overall conclusion of the model is such that U.S. military activity reduces the level of instability in the structure of the international system, but there are circumstances in which there may occur an increase of U.S. military activity and global instability of the system (an assumption that with the increase of instability of the international system there has been an increase of the level of

10 K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Mass 1979,

p. 161-193, 195, 204.

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threats to the U.S. priority interests at the point of which the country responds with military means), for to restore the previous state of equilibrium in such a situation (ie, the pre-growth state) the U.S.A. must increase the level of its military activity above the level already state during the period of equilibrium. In a Real dimension the course of these processes may be present as follows: if the attack of Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi troops on Kuwait in 1990 resulted from the collapse of the weakening position of the USSR (Iraq was an ally of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union had instruments of influence on the behaviour of its allies), then the level of system stability was restored by the decisive U.S. military response. The analysis of political science have no direct connections that would link those events with the weakening position of the Soviet Union, so this example has only a theoretical dimension, however, this example shows great possibilities of behavioural analysis that can help in noticing numerous regularities, schemes and tendencies in international relations, which a humanistic historical analysis is not able to make. Therefore, in order to increase the scientific progress on the ground of international relations, it is worth combining the traditional and behavioural research methods.

FUNCTION AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CIMIC IN OPERATIONS ON BALKANS

277

FUNCTION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

OF CIMIC IN OPERATIONS ON BALKANS

Anna MILER, Ph.D. Akademia Marynarki Wojennej

Abstract

Civil-Military Cooperation was a new experience for NATO militaries. It functioned as

a part of a peace mission for allied military forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. CIMIC is

operated as part of the international military powers under the command of NATO, as well

as among civil international and non-governmental organisations and miscellaneous

military powers who are part of the conflict.

The main goal and responsibility of CIMIC was placing statements for common

cooperation in order to expand and sustain full cooperation between civil population and

institutions. It was also responsible for creating suitable cooperation conditions between

civil and army institutions on each level. It was achieved through assistance of civil

representatives of humanitarian organisation in the area of a mission. A wide range of

tasks was realised by around 350 highly skilled, civil and military staff members. Thanks to

their work CIMIC was established.

In order to form a positive image of soldiers CIMIC created Civil-Military

Cooperation units, that were responsible for law advisory and support within humanitarian

and economic projects.

The efficiency of CIMIC in Bosnia and Herzegovina appeared to be very good, this was

confirmed by the army which reported a stable situation. Good results of CIMIC are shown

also by a successfully cooperation with international organisations, that were represented

by a well qualified personnel, as well as good relations with local governments and the

wider population.

Key words – Civil-Military Cooperation – CIMIC, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Implementation Force – IFOR, Stabilisation Force – SFOR, CIMIC House

When military force face problems concerning the political, social, moral or

legal, economic and humanitarian aspects of operations the army must count on civil help. Circumstances force military forces and the civilian sides to start

EXPERIENCE


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cooperation. Such a situation took place in the peace operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina led under the supervision of NATO.

It was possible to notice negative effects of the civil war in former Yugoslavia directly after the truce; above all by the infringement of the structure of civilian authorities, the fall of the economy, ethnic riot, many homeless and refugees, as well as a common breaking of human rights. It has involved many civilian international and non-governmental organisations bringing humanitarian aid and help in the political and social reconstruction of the economic infrastructure. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the experience of three ethnic groups complicated the structure of the cooperation (Muslims, Serbs, Croats). However, Civil-Military Cooperation is a tool, which appropriately used, might in certain situations help with achieving military success without using military forces.

CIMIC is based on two groups of principles, seen from the side: 1. Military action including: precedence of military purposes of the mission,

direct commanding (the commander is answering for directing and carrying out

CIMIC action) and responsibility of the commander for the civil effects of military

action, economics of using own human resources and material.

2. Civil-military relations among which we point out: civil benefits, common

objectives, consenting to working on the part of civilian organisations,

humanisation of taken action, their transparency and understanding cooperating

with civilian organisations1.

In order to understand well the usage of the Civil-Military Cooperation involved in the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina we should present the definition which evolved and changed over several decades.

The project of NATO CIMIC doctrine (AJP-9), which came into effect in 2003, defines CIMIC in the following manner: the coordination and the cooperation of

the commander of NATO with the civilian population, international and local

authorities and organisations and international, domestic and non-governmental agencies, led as support for the completion of the allotted task

2. On the other hand in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation the Civil-Military

Cooperation is defined as a set of means and arrangements supporting cooperation between commanders of military forces and local military and civil authorities (regional and local) and local people in areas where NATO forces can be found or are planned to be deployed3.

The CIMIC abbreviation which means Civil-Military Cooperation is not only recognisable in the military environment, but also amongst civilians, and defines

1 S. Olszewski, Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa, w Bośni i Hercegowinie, Wojsko i Wychowanie,

nr 5, Warszawa 2002, s. 109-110. 2 Doktryna Współpracy cywilno-wojskowej (CIMIC) NATO AJP-9 [w: Zbiór Dokumentów

Normatywnych NATO w Zakresie CIMIC], Dowództwo Wojsk Lotniczych i Obrony Powietrznej, Warszawa 2003, s. 45.

3 M. Wojciszko, Uwarunkowania organizacyjno-prawne związane z kierowaniem obronnością

państwa w ramach Współpracy cywilno-wojskowej, Wiedza Obronna, nr 3, Warszawa 2007, s. 38.


279

the new speciality in the army. Understanding CIMIC as a function, rather than as a specific type of military is very important. The widely understood cooperation with international and non-governmental organisations, as well as civilian authorities means that it has a long tradition. It has been in its current form from the 1990s. The schemata of CIMIC is illustrated in figure 1.1.

Źródło: J. Gołębiewski, Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa, Myśl Wojskowa, nr 5, Warszawa 2005

Fig. 1.1. Schematic illustrate of Civil-Military Cooperation

The concept of Civil-Military Cooperation which was approved by NATO, was

built on the basis of experience of the assembled company in the result of actions of

American individuals to civil cases, in addition the functioning of French, British

and Dutch units considerably elaborated this concept and improved it.4.

Establishing and keeping the full cooperation of the civilian population and

acting institutions in the area where operations are conducted is a crucial

objective of Civil-Military Cooperation. The cooperation is aimed at ensuring

conditions for taking back the greatest moral, financial and tactical benefits

possible, both for civilians as well as servicemen5.

In the stated time it is possible to divide CIMIC action into two kinds of purposes: short and long-term. Freeing the local infrastructure from military-civil conflicts and sustaining cooperation among armies of NATO can be a short-term purpose, with the civilian population, as well as organisations and institutions. Checking needs as part of basic services and the humanitarian aid for civilians. Creating and keeping conditions which are a base, is a long-term objective of durable solutions and agreements of cooperation in contingencies.

4 S. Olszewski, Współpraca …, s. 109. 5 W. Wójtowicz, Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa w operacji pokojowej w Bośni, MON,

Warszawa 1998, s. 16-17.

STREFA WSPÓŁPRACYCIVIL MILITARY

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

COMPETENCE

COOPERATION

ZONE

STREFA WSPÓŁPRACYCIVIL MILITARY

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

COMPETENCE

COOPERATION

ZONE

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280

Civil-Military Cooperation in institutionalised way was used for the first time in Bosnia-Herzegovina by armies of NATO. In this area CIMIC mattered greatly in operations conducted through IFOR – Implementation Force of NATO and SFOR – Stabilisation Force of NATO, being an integral element of activity on all rungs of commanding, as well as with subject of planning and training.

Civil-Military Cooperation conducted during the IFOR operation required cooperation between political and military activity. Help and assistance given to commanders of NATO is a base for CIMIC operation. The effectiveness of those kinds of undertakings was ensured by arranging the factor dealing with CIMIC on individual rungs in the command structure. On the central level J-9 and appropriately into the G-5 hole and S-5. CIMIC supports the activity of remaining organisational units through:

– coordinating official announcements having a primary importance for public

affairs;

– supporting the information campaign;

– providing consultation for the legal chapter in matters of legal aspects of

agreements, memoranda or investigating complaints;

– coordinating preparations of expert analyses and studies for the purposes of

commands in political issues and the Civil-Military Cooperation;

– transmitting data for making plans for the next stages of the operation;

– ensuring contacts between the local government;

– providing important information from a point of view of security and protection6.

The Civil-Military Cooperation during the peace enforcement/keeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was established in 14th of December 1995 in the Paris Agreements on military aspects of establishing the peace on areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement). This agreement contains the plan of international intervention by others in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It divides operations in this country into two sections:

– military, carried out by a coalition of states under the direction of USA,

exploiting the NATO structure (IFOR/SFOR);

– civil carried out by OBWE7.

In the mandate of the mission they determined: a legal bases of activity, the

objective of the mission, the duration, tasks and contractors8. The document from

Dayton became a main aspect of undertaking activity in this area in view of military forces as well as civilian international organisations. The civil part of the

6 W. Sąsiadek, Doświadczenia w zakresie CIMIC na przykładzie Bośni i Hercegowiny [w:

Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa, materiały z konferencji naukowej zorganizowanej w Departamencie Społeczno – Wychowawczym MON w dniu 23 marca 1999], MON, Warszawa 1999, s. 15.

7 L. Bagiński, C. Marcinkowski, Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa w operacjach pokojowych,

AON, Warszawa 2000, s. 45. 8 Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa Polska – NATO, cz. 1 – studium analityczne, red. M. Drost,

AON, Warszawa 1999, s. 76


281

agreement governed the cooperation among military forces, the civilian community of parties to the conflict and the relation with the international community.

The Implementation Force – IFOR acted by virtue of the UN Security Council Resolution No. 1031, 15th of December 1995 based, on the provisions included in decisions of chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations. On the 16th of December NATO started, along with multinational forces (IFOR), the operation under the code name "Joint Endeavour".

Further to this, the Stabilisation Force – SFOR was a multinational force mandated by UN Security Council Resolution No. 1088 on the 12th of December 1996. Both IFOR and SFOR forces were authorised to apply the military aspects of the Dayton peace agreement. SFOR Forces, as well as IFOR, acted according to chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

IFOR forces were organised on the basic of NATO’s command structure. It

was a practical test of the organisation concept and made use of the Combined

Joint Task Force (CJTF) structure. These forces consisted of separate naval and

air forces components as well as a land forces component. The Land forces

component included three multinational divisions and the Rapid Reaction Force

brigade along with fighting support and force protection units. Individual Member

States were assigned to make-up these forces, partner states participating in the

program also included states from the NATO Partnership for Peace, as well as

other states from outside this program. The whole of IFOR amounted to about 60

thousand soldiers9.

On the other hand, SFOR forces, allotted to the purpose of the execution of tasks, made up about 30 thousand soldiers, which constituted about half of IFOR forces. On this basis the Dayton agreement was guaranteed by parties to the conflict, but enforced by the action of IFOR forces. The numerical strength of SFOR was lower and it concentrated on implementing decisions put in force in the annexe to the Dayton peace agreement through:

– stabilisation of the agreement between parties to the conflict and the

creation of an environment for safety, in which national and the local government

and international organisations were able to perform their tasks without obstacles;

– providing support for other organisations (as part of the Civil-Military

Cooperation, considering the criterion of the reduction in forces in the area of the

operation)10.

In the IFOR combined joint task force, according to principles of conducting

the operation of supporting the peace, a unified chain of command was introduced,

as well as planning and organising action according to procedures NATO. The

General military forces were in the hands of the Supreme Allied Commander in

9 F. Gągor, K. Paszkowski, Międzynarodowe operacje pokojowe w Doktrynie Obronnej RP,

MON, Warszawa 1998, s. 163. 10 Zgrupowania taktyczne wojsk lądowych w operacjach wsparcia pokoju, red. A. Bujak, AON,

Warszawa 2004, s. 60-61.

ANNA MILER

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Europe (SACEUR): General George Joulvan. Admiral Leighton Smith was appointed

to the position of the first IFOR commander (COMIFOR). The commander-in-chief of

allied powers in South Europe (CINCSOUTH), and MSC AFSOUTH became a parent

command for the command of multiethnic connected powers. In July 1996 to the

COMIFOR position admiral Joseph Lopez was appointed, however, in November,

when the command of IFOR forces was subordinated to the Allied ground forces of

Centre LANDCENT Europe Gen William Crouch became a commander, who was

replaced in July 1997 by Gen Eric K. Shinseki11.

For Forces of the Alliance a realisation of the civilian side of the plan, consisting of implementing the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was a new experience. IFOR forces enabled the strong support of civil tasks in the area of restrictions, which was an effect of the mandate and the available resources. During the execution of tasks IFOR forces closely cooperated with:

– Office of the High Representative (OHR);

– International Police Task Force (IPTF);

– International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC);

– World Health Organisation (WHO);

– World Food Programme (WFP);

– United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR);

– European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM);

– Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE);

– International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY);

– and many other organisations, including over 400 non-governmental

organisations12

. Tasks of IFOR forces consisted of protecting these organisation by providing: – temporary accommodation;

– medical evacuation;

– repair and evacuation of equipment;

– transport services;

– information about the safety state;

– consultation and many other logistic services13

. As part of the Civil-Military Cooperation a wide range of tasks were carried

out by 350 persons of the civilian and military staff. Amongst all the things carried out by IFOR forces in the command on the tactical and operating level there ranked among them:

– the command of multinational connected powers; – the command of individual components; – the command of individuals included in their composition.

11 Tamże, s. 57-58. 12 J. Knetki, B. Panek, J. Trembecki, Operacje wsparcia pokoju w teorii i praktyce sztuki

operacyjnej „Pokój”, AON, Warszawa 2002, s. 129. 13 Tamże, s. 130.


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The Group consisted of qualified staff in different fields, among others teachers, lawyers, specialists from public transport, economists, farming specialists, and engineers. They were a CIMIC part of a team which provided the consultation, as well as the technical support and the coordination of tasks undertaken by a lot of working parties and the committee, as well as non-governmental organisations and civil and local authorities with the IFOR build-up. Multilateral education of the civilian CIMIC staff and them experience, as well as the acquaintance of organisational structures of armies affects work in the area of reconstruction, repatriation and the extension of democracy in the area of action.

The commander of NATO and IFOR has set duties for CIMIC, but one of the main tasks in the beginning of the operation was keeping a wide spectrum of forces concerned with clarifying assumptions of the organisation.

Preventive work associated with de-mining the area was also an important task. Being afraid of mines, parties to the conflict communicated to CIMIC units descriptions of locations where there were unfired rounds, explosives, mine traps, minefields, wire-wound entanglements which can expose to danger the civilian population staying in this area as well as NATO forces.

IFOR forces were established in order to provide assistance to parties of the conflict while implementing a peace agreement. According to this document, in the IFOR military task were:

– guaranteeing the continued following of the cease-fire agreement;

– guaranteeing the withdrawal of fighting armies from the agreed area of

separation to their appropriate territories and making a division of fighting

armies;

– creating conditions for the safe, efficient and fast withdrawal of armies of

the UN which weren't subordinated to the NATO operation14

. as well as: – ensuring the defence and the freedom of movement for IFOR branches in the

mandated area;

– supervising the borders and separation zones between parties of the conflict;

– creating airspace control above Bosnia-Herzegovina and of migration of

branches of servicemen in principal areas of communications trails;

– appointing a joint military committee to work as the main IFOR

representatives in contacts with the sides of the peace treaty15

. According to the peace treaty they entrusted the Implementation Forces also

with setting up the protective conditions for the functioning of humanitarian organisations and of the realisation of non-military aspects of the peace treaty:

14 Umiędzynarodowiony konflikt wewnętrzny, red. J. Pawłowski, A. Ciupiński, AON, Warszawa

2001, s. 69. 15 P. Piątkowski, Operacja IFOR „Wspólny wysiłek” w Bośni i Hercegowinie, MON, Warszawa

1996, s. 9.

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– to provide assistance to ensure safety in order to accomplish non – military

aspects of a peace treaty, including conducting free and democratic elections in

Bosnia-Herzegovina;

– support the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other

international institutions, also in performing their humanitarian missions by

providing them with freedom of movement;

– to give help with supervision and the law enforcement, for free movement of

the civilian population, refugees and migrants;

– to supervise clearing the area of mines in Bosnia-Herzegovina16

. In view of various projects and after just enough progress in the peace process

they created, Coordination Centre for Civil-Military Cooperation, which tasks were based on:

– monitoring civilians’ humanitarian needs;

– establishing and keeping in touch with the civilian, military local

government and local and international police (IPTF);

– checking the compliance of political-military and social events with regards

to the spirit of the “Dayton Agreement”;

– of coordinating, government and non-governmental meetings of international

organisations17

. The effectiveness of CIMIC undertakings was guaranteed thanks to the

inclusion of all of the operational commands dealing with the coordination of activities connected with the military specificity, into a structure of everyone concerned with actions of a civil meaning. The performed tasks of with organisational units included:

– ensuring permanent contact among the local government and civilian

organisations in the realisation of concluded agreements;

– passing an information for security and protection to the interested parties;

– coordination of public announcements in issues having a primary

importance for public affairs;

– supporting the information campaign and creating a positive image of the

armed forces being involved in a mission;

– ensuring the technical help in investigating legal aspects of agreements,

memoranda, and complaints;

– coordination of preparations of expert opinions, analyses and studies for

needs of the command in the Civil-Military Cooperation and political areas;

– participation in the data preparation for making plans for next stages of the

peace support operation18

.

16 Tamże, s. 9. 17 A. Jóźwiak, C. Marcinkowski, Wybrane problemy współczesnych operacji pokojowych, AON,

Warszawa 2002, s. 91. 18 Tamże, s. 93-94.


285

In order to provide the ability to execute tasks which were a consequence of Civil-Military Cooperation, SFOR developed operational procedures which in detail showed the duties and obligations of all participants of the peace process.

They were: – keeping impartiality in every situation and every place;

– a prohibition of having weapons and ammunition;

– a prohibition of having hidden filming and tracking;

– right to use emblems of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent;

– right to use the protection of SFOR;

– possibility of getting arrested by SFOR for everyone who is committing an

offence, crime or is preventing forces from performing their tasks19

. The knowledge of procedures is a condition of the effective action of civil

employees. What is very important, form safety point of view and the possibility of completing tasks as part of CIMIC is having and carrying a weapon. Depriving the civilian staff of humanitarian and non-governmental organisations of the right to carry weapon in the area of Bosnia was very advantageous. In such situation it isn't possible to treat them with hostility, because they are perceived as unarmed people.

The usage of military forces in a peace support operation needed the wide cooperation of military authorities and civilian communities, that were building the quota of peacekeeping forces including representatives of the local authority. It was also important that SFOR had the right to stop everyone who was preventing peacekeeping forces from accomplishing their mission20.

The Stabilisation Forces of NATO was based on the same principles of using

force (ROE)21 as IFOR. Its essential responsibility was strengthening peace and

safety. Its detailed tasks were:

– stopping and preventing a renewing of hostilities shares by parties to the

conflict;

– continuing the achieved results of IFOR forces, and creating the climate in

which the continuation of the peace process would be possible;

– providing support for civilian organisations, in the framework of Civil-

Military Cooperation22.

Civil-Military Cooperation is carried out by the military and civilian staff

performing their tasks in established full-time structures which are found at the

operational and tactical level23

. In this aspect coordinated arrangement of the staff is important, above all volunteers: representatives of various organisations that can

19 C. Marcinkowski, L. Bagiński, CIMIC w wybranych misjach humanitarnych i pokojowych,

Przegląd Wojsk Lądowych, nr 1, Warszawa 2001, s. 91. 20 W. Wójtowicz, Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa na przykładzie operacji pokojowej w Bośni [w:

Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa – konferencja], AON, Warszawa 1999, s. 14. 21 Rules of Engagement, 22 Operacje wsparcia pokoju w teorii współczesnej sztuki operacyjnej „Wsparcie pokoju”, red.

W. Kaczmarek, AON, Warszawa 2002, s. 23 W. Sąsiadek, Doświadczenia w zakresie CIMIC …, s. 12.

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be useful in excluding many incompatibilities of arrangements which may occur in the initial period of a mission, as well as, prevent the doubling of manpower tasks. Forming conditions for effective action for completely unarmed people can be a significant element affecting their successes.

It has a great impact on the effectiveness of the staff involved in a cooperation. They also have cultural differences in civil-military relations, from which most noticeable are:

– fundamental values are a base of motivation for bringing help to (…);

– the organisational structure of military forces and non-governmental

organisations is naturally different, in addition the structure of the second one is

always unique (…);

– as a consequence of structural differences the decision making and the

execution of tasks are also burdened (…)24

.

At the beginning, especially on the central rank, Americans were CIMIC

employees, representatives of other states constituted 45%. As a result of trainings

conducted by SHAPE NATO was able to send more staff into the specific area of

action. With the purpose of accomplishing the trainings, they have set up a group

of international instructors who started training candidates (officers) to positions

in the CIMIC structure in Bosnia. Trainings that were carried out were based in

facilities at a Training Centre belonging to the 7 the Army of USA in Germany. 25

Obtaining the approval of local authorities to arrange the group of people to become representatives was the next important factor for the organisation. It was about helping the local community. The approval to start operations in the area of operations is essential regardless of the mandate of international forces. One should obtain permission for each individual or, in case of its lack, to show the readiness for action as a member of an official operating organisation.

In the middle of 1997 a need to specify areas of common functioning of the civilian and military division arose. CIMIC worked accurately to fulfil the needs of the army, performing mainly objectives of military powers which fulfilled important tasks of the support and the peacekeeping mission. Orders given by the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe – SACEUR – for the purposes of the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina presented areas of functioning of the armed forces. Tasks were performed with respect to the coordination of efforts of civilian and military forces, functioning in the common space of a peacekeeping mission. In this way they achieved the function of widely protecting CIMIC in conflict, which is described in the 1.2 picture.

24 W. Wójtowicz, Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa …, s. 9-10. 25 W. Sąsiadek, Doświadczenia w zakresie CIMIC …, s. 16.


287

Źródło: Międzynarodowe operacje pokojowe, red. D. Kozerawski, AON, Warszawa 2003

Fig. 1.2. Areas of Civil-Military Cooperation within the framework of a peacekeeping mission

This is why the fundamental meaning for peacekeeping in the area of conflict is: – establishing and sustaining good relations with civilians, institutions and

organisations in order to demonstrate legal aspects of mission, supporting the

freedom of movement, minimising threats to the staff of the mission;

– coordinating, helping and supporting, and also providing technical

assistance in restoring democratic government institutions, in the reconstruction of

the necessary infrastructure, the judicial system and activity of police. Also

providing populations with agencies, organisations and international institutions

of employment and the essential economic activity;

– assisting the high representative and other international institutions,

agencies and organisations in creating essential conditions to enable civilian

authorities to continue the implementation of the agreement after the reassignment

of SFOR from the mission26

.

26 W. Wójtowicz, Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa na przykładzie operacji pokojowej w Bośni [w:

Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa – konferencja], AON, Warszawa 1999, s. 29-30.

CivilianPopulation

Non-GovernmentalOrganisation

InternationalOrganisation

StateAdministration

CIMIC

Politicians

MilitarySubbranchCivilDefence

TerritorialDefence

JoinForce

CivilianPopulation

Non-GovernmentalOrganisation

InternationalOrganisation

StateAdministration

CIMIC

Politicians

MilitarySubbranchCivilDefence

TerritorialDefence

JoinForce

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There was a possibility of specifying three phases in the preparation process in such a system of cooperation:

– preparatory – where as part of preparing the contingent of forces, potential

undertakings of the cooperation are being planned. They effect the preliminary

training, they acquaint the staff with the premises of the mission, also they are seek

specialists from determined fields;

– implementation of the mission – establishing contact, the starting point and

the development of cooperation, coordination of undertakings, keeping in touch,

the transmission of information;

– transitional – ensuring conditions for the gradual withdrawal of stabilisation

forces and handing over to the local community the full liability for completing the

peace process27.

The military power presented by SFOR forced parties of the conflict to find

peaceful solutions. At the same time it showed the need for mutual cooperation,

also the local Civil-Military Cooperation. Moreover, it created conditions for the

gradual withdrawal of international military forces from the area of conflict and

the handing over to the local authorities the responsibility for peacekeeping28

. An advantage of being bart of an international funded operation was that the

Civil-Military Cooperation units in Bosnia-Herzegovina were able to use so-called CIMIC House (houses of the Civil-Military Cooperation) and information-press service. The duty of both structural and organisational factors was highlighted while creating the positive image of the mission, soldiers of SFOR and the meaning of the political-military transformations which were occurring.

The idea of creating the CIMIC House appeared in the second half of 1997 as an element of changes to the mission. SFOR was changed from a military to a more civil focus, also there was a wider opening for the cooperation with the local government and the population. The first CIMIC House was opened on 1st of April 1998 in Doboju in Nordic-Polish zone of the brigade.

Their main duties were: – creating positive image of SFOR soldiers;

– being seen as an information centre working in two directions;

– supporting the economic assistance in drawing up the proposal for plans of

humanitarian projects;

– running the bank of ‘to do’ matters;

– support and legal consulting for the local government29

. At the end of year 1998, 12 organisations were operating in Bosnia-

Herzegovina, 14 international organisations, 14 governmental organisations, 136 international non-governmental organisations and 284 national non-governmental

27 Tamże, s. 30. 28 W. Wójtowicz, Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa …, s. 8. 29 C. Marcinkowski, L. Bagiński, CIMIC w…, s. 92.


289

organisations. General efforts of the mentioned organisations and groups were focused on the following parts of action:

– supporting the legal law and order;

– synchronisation of civil-military effort;

– infrastructure and economics;

– the matter of the return of refugees;

– introducing democracy in the life;

– public safety30

. The role of international organisations within CIMIC duties in Bosnia-

Herzegovina rested on 1B Annexe of the peace agreement, Agreement from Vienna and Agreement from Florence, are files placed in the document of SFOR Standard Operational Procedures. SOP SFOR established cooperation with key institutions responsible for the safety in Europe and with many humanitarian organisations.

International organisations in possession of forces and means, funds for appointed action, are a principal ally of military forces in peace support operations. They establish one of the most important components of the CIMIC cooperation.

One of the most important institutions involved in Bosnia is OSCE31. Its main role is to supervise elections. Also an important matter was the establishing of the OHR bureau – Office of the High Representative. The high representative was appointed by the UN Security Council at the request of signatories to the agreement, in order to supervise the applying of the civil dimensions of the agreement, as well as coordinating the functioning of all organisations and agencies participating in this process. Also in the process of CIMIC cooperation are civilian international governmental organisations. According to ROE rules, members of international organisations are regarded by SFOR as persons with a special status. It means that soldiers of SFOR can use force, in critical situation they can use power. Examples of these organisations are: OHR, OSCE, ECMM, ICRC, WHO, WFP, ICTY, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, the UNESCO.

As far as non-governmental organisations operating in Bosnia are concerned, there are mainly organisations of volunteers which directly are not being financed by the government. Their functioning is based mainly on carrying out the humanitarian actions. Common task of NGO's and SFOR is to help suffering people, to improve people’s standard of living, as well as supporting efforts towards the reconstruction and development of the country. Members of non-governmental organisations cannot carry any weapon. All private and non-governmental voluntary organisations have their bank account, steering cell and in some situations their own department.

The development of conflict in Bosnia showed the possibility of using NGOs, in a position of total independence in the initial period, before NATO and other

30 S. Olszewski, Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa …, s. 110. 31 The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

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European countries sent IFOR forces in December 1995. Deployed to military forces and civil representatives of participating countries, non-governmental organisations were able to achieve higher levels of functioning than in previous conflicts.

NGOs have limited logistics possibilities and therefore are willing to help, but only in one assignment. In other situations they must join international organisations as just one of many members. Some of them are financed by independent international institutions functioning in the country, other organisations are functioning directly, or by the use of different organisations. The majority of NGOs carrying out their projects, as a result of the invitation of local partners, are dependent in their actions on foreign help. Agencies and organisations responsible for bringing civil aspects of the agreement into effect claim that NGO's are the only option until now, and only with them they can sustain working. Preparing local organisations and their employees for autonomous functioning is an important aim for foreign institutions.

Civil international organisations and international organisation can form a proper basis and ensure favourable terms for achieving peace. Despite that, without the help of people living there SFOR, CIMIC and NGO wouldn't have been able to ensure peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A commitment of political leaders is necessary, leaders, who were responsible for actions taken to stabilise the peace. Agreements of different types were very often broken by people who earlier signed them.

The IFOR mission, and later the SFOR mission the fulfilled assigned tasks. They formed appropriate conditions deciding on the success of administration, political and economic reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. IFOR forces (operation “Joint Endeavour”) have created and strengthened the peace. However, SFOR forces (operation “Joint Guard”) were supposed to ensure the stability of the peace processes.

The NATO operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the code name Joint Endeavour was the first land operation implemented by multinational forces connected with the function of supporting the peace. From this moment, the Alliance collected great experience in operations of this type. As evidence we can observe NATO leading the next operations in former Yugoslavia.

On the 20th of December 1996 IFOR completed its assignments and achieved its objective. Military forces were divided and transferred to the designated place, hostility was stopped. At the beginning of the operation it was already known that the civil unit would have more tasks to do. However, military forces could only create appropriate conditions for the performance – of building the peace, by creating conditions of the peaceful existence of parties. A particular situation and formed aim of operations led the mission to the intentional effect, of reducing the presence of the army. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and members of NATO stated that military forces should be reduced in the area in order to lead to


291

stabilization. For that purpose they reorganised the Implementation Force – IFOR into the Stabilisation Force – SFOR.

Conducted examinations are showing that creating CIMIC in the future cannot be based only on experience. Every conflict has a different dimension. Agreements do not apply on the same principles, although they have shared objectives, which are to lead to implementation of peace agreements. We need flexible structures and arrangements within CIMIC which can be changed depending on the needs of peace operation.

Focusing on the effective cooperation of CIMIC can influence the economical

and social improvement of the standard of living among local communities. It can

stimulate the return of refugees and migrants in order to a rebuild better Bosnia.

CIMIC can, and is making many Bosnians more happy and better prosperous32

. Experience gathered on several dozen missions shows regularities determining

CIMIC activity. They include: – a distinct specifying of essential objectives of the mission, as well as a clear

division of tasks for the military and civilian organisations which are facilitating

cooperation;

– the real military force presented by the military component imposes peaceful

solutions upon parties to the conflict and at the same time points out explicitly the

need for mutual cooperation;

– the military component supports institutions, organisations and international

agencies and the local government in the civil realisation of the agreement;

– the military component creates conditions for the gradual withdrawal of

international military forces from the area of conflict and the handing over to local

authorities of the responsibility for peacekeeping;

– the civilian staff puts the peace arrangements into practice – authority,

volunteers, representatives of various civilian organisations – they are arranged in

a coordinated way, that prevents duplicating some undertakings, especially

humanitarian;

– the structure of civilian humanitarian organisations is unique and it gives

them the elasticity of action, but the lack of specifically assigned organisational

dependence creates determined problems in the coordination of the cooperation;

– necessary approval of local authorities to arrange groups of people

representing civilian organisations, ready to bring help to the local population;

– successfully performing tasks, along with civilian organisations supporting

the military forces that are involved in a specific mission, creating a positive image

of the military component along with helping others in their action33

. Effects of CIMIC activity are the most visible in the middle management level

of command, that is at the level of the brigade. In this way we are watching practical actions with which the Civil-Military Cooperation must usually struggle.

32 W. Wójtowicz, Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa …, s. 34. 33 C. Marcinkowski, L. Bagiński, Wybrane elementy …, s. 208-209.

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However, we should observe the difference in functioning of elements of CIMIC organisation in individual divisions. They are very big and are give the possibility of general conclusions. E.g. in the Multinational Division 'North' apart from battle groups, brigades and other individuals, also an American CIMIC battalion operated. Its functioning, especially in the area of carrying out humanitarian help, was based on detailed guidelines of the Department of Defence in USA.

Picturing all tasks run by the Civil-Military Cooperation would need an extensive review, therefore describing the most important stages of action is significant.

An important aspect aspiring to the success is the issue of the return of refugees to their homes from times before the armed conflict. It is a relevant problem for stabilising the situation, not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also in the entire area of the Balkans. Next to the refugees, that are outside the country, internal refugees also appear. They are people, who being in their own country, aren't able to go back to their houses for various reasons. The importance of this problem meant, that the entire activity of the Civil-Military Cooperation was subordinated to matters connected with the return of refugees.

The next element is a unit responsible for introducing democracy. It was focused on supporting permanent contacts with the organisations responsible for the monitoring of law. Contacts concerned the cooperation with OSCE and UNBIH mainly (with Mission of the UN in Bosnia-Herzegovina) to which the International Police Force belongs.

The next element was a team coordinating projects which were responsible for the process of the selection and supervision of projects in the area of reconstruction of the infrastructure. It is carried out with funds from the American Agency of International Development and the European Union, but also with countries which were involved in the mission. Its main aims were: repair of schools, doctor's surgeries, repair of bridges and roads and power lines.

A team dealing with exploring the area is the last element of the mission. The aim of this team consisted of the accumulation of information about all kinds of political problems, socioeconomic issues and infrastructure and political parties and politicians. Information about this unit is very important for a proper CIMIC operation.

CIMIC also carried out the plan for the evacuation of persons having so-called special status. It was reasonable for ensuring the safety of all representatives of international organisations and UN departments UN in danger.

CIMIC success is based on the unity of the cooperation of staff units: operating, reconnaissance and logistic, but also its based on cooperation with legal units and psychological operations. Cooperation with the press unit can also give positive effects on the part of promoting CIMIC achievements, as well as obtaining necessary information.


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Experience shows, that commanders of the alliance need CIMIC. The Civil-Military Cooperation became a main part of planning, training and actions of NATO. For the proper functioning of multinational teams, there are special trainings and courses prepared.

It is necessary that CIMIC is an important part of future NATO peace operations of NATO. Above all, it is important to carry out all kinds of different analyses and plans that are significant in this sector.

Bibliography

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Bujak A. red., Zgrupowania taktyczne wojsk lądowych w operacjach wsparcia pokoju, AON, Warszawa 2004.

Cieślarczyk M., Szafran H., CIMIC – cywilno-wojskowa płaszczyzna współpracy sojuszniczej, Zeszyty Naukowe AON, nr 3, Warszawa 2006.

Doktryna Współpracy cywilno-wojskowej (CIMIC) NATO AJP-9 [w: Zbiór Dokumentów Normatywnych NATO w Zakresie CIMIC], Dowództwo Wojsk Lotniczych i Obrony Powietrznej, Warszawa 2003.

Drost M. red., Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa Polska – NATO, cz. 1 – studium analityczne, AON, Warszawa 1999.

Gągor F., Paszkowski K., Międzynarodowe operacje pokojowe w Doktrynie Obronnej RP, MON, Warszawa 1998.

Gołębiewski J., Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa, Myśl Wojskowa, nr 5, Warszawa 2005. Jóźwiak A., Marcinkowski C., Wybrane problemy współczesnych operacji pokojowych,

AON, Warszawa 2002. Kaczmarek W. red., Operacje wsparcia pokoju w teorii współczesnej sztuki operacyjnej

„Wsparcie pokoju”, AON, Warszawa 2002. Knetki J., Panek B., Trembecki J., Operacje wsparcia pokoju w teorii i praktyce sztuki

operacyjnej „Pokój”, AON, Warszawa 2002. Kozerawski D. red., Międzynarodowe operacje pokojowe, AON, Warszawa 2003. Olszewski S., Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa w Bośni i Hercegowinie, Wojsko

i Wychowanie, nr 5, Warszawa 2002. Pawłowski J., Ciupiński A. red., Umiędzynarodowiony konflikt wewnętrzny, AON,

Warszawa 2001. Piątkowski P., Operacja IFOR „Wspólny wysiłek” w Bośni i Hercegowinie, MON,

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[w: Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa, materiały z konferencji naukowej zorganizowanej w Departamencie Społeczno – Wychowawczym MON w dniu 23 marca 1999], MON, Warszawa 1999.

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Wojciszko M., Uwarunkowania organizacyjno-prawne związane z kierowaniem obronnością państwa w ramach Współpracy cywilno-wojskowej, Wiedza Obronna, nr 3, Warszawa 2007.

Wójtowicz W., Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa w operacji pokojowej w Bośni, MON, Warszawa 1998.

Wójtowicz W., Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa na przykładzie operacji pokojowej w Bośni [w:] Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa – konferencja], AON, Warszawa 1999.

COMMENTS, REVIEWS AND REPORTS

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Review of the book: Bartosz Bolechów, Terroryzm, aktorzy,

statyści, widzowie, PWN, Warsaw 2010, pp. 399

Aneta NOWAKOWSKA-KRYSTMAN, Ph.D. National Defence University

When analyzing bookshops’ offers, it is difficult to find publications dealing

with the problem of terrorism. Those which are on offer include translations of foreign authors. (A good example is W. Dietl, K. Hirschmann, R. Tophoven, Terroryzm, PWN.) Polish publications in this field, generally speaking, do not play a significant role. In the search for materials concerning research into terrorism one can encounter different attitudes to the topic. Some of them look at the problem from the perspective of the psychology of terrorism. A good example of such a book is „Terroryzm aktorzy, statyści, widzowie” (Terrorism actors, extras,

audience*) by Bartosz Bolechów published by PWN publishing house. Such attitude required from the author to make the assumption that terrorism is a fear evoking method of repeated acts of violence, which is politically motivated, used against non-fighting targets where, unlike in the case of other forms of political violence, the direct target of the attack is not the key target. (translation of quotation p. 9) The author wants to say that the victims are intermediaries between the terrorists and audience, on the stipulation that the audience can also be the target of an attack.

Because of such an attitude to the topic Bolechów divides the book into two parts. Thus, the structure of the book is as follows: part one: Terroryści

i terroryzm (Terrorists and terrorism*) includes 11 chapters, where on over 180 pages the author deliberates on the psychological genesis of terrorists and terrorism; part two: Audytoria, ofiary, decydenci (Audience, victims, ruling

bodies*), consists of 8 chapters where on over 150 pages the author presents psychological aspects connected with the beneficiaries of terrorism. The first part is preceded by an extensive Wprowadzenie (Introduction*), where the author describes among other things: research problems, goals , methods and the structure of the book. It finishes with Zakończenie (The ending). Moreover, it includes the



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following: index of abbreviations (Wykaz skrótów), index of names (Indeks nazwisk), subject index (Indeks rzeczowy) and bibliography (Bibliografia).

Let us now move to a short presentation of the subject matter of the first chapter. Chapter 1 Psychopatologia, racjonalność i problem „osobowości

terrorystycznej” (Psychopathology, rational thinking and the issue of the

terrorist personality*) provides explanation for terrorist behaviour. It shows biological theories which were first introduced in the initial wave of terrorism (pp. 25 – 31). The recapitulation of the achievements in this field is expressed in the following words: among terrorists there is no trace of an overrepresentation of

people with psychopathic features – it refers both to psychiatric illnesses as well as

personality disorders (translation of quotation p. 31). Moreover, Bolechów presents terrorists as rational players (pp 32 – 38). The theory finds its best place in the description of a personality typology called – political strategist (p. 43). Since they govern organisations, it seems that the latter ones should be analyzed from this point of view. The argument, which is against this theory, saying that not everyone chooses terrorist activities as rational ones, seems to be groundless. For not everyone opts for work in a big corporation, or starts their own business activity. Thus, in accordance with the author’s suggestion, rationalism of the choice of way of life is an individual case. The two remaining types of personality mentioned by B.B. are: radical theorist and aggressive activist. In chapter 2 Teorie

psychodynamiczne (Psychodynamic theories*) the author explains psychodynamic reasons for terrorism, including e.g. malicious personality mutation* „złośliwe mutacje osobowości” (p. 48), narcissism (p. 51), paranoia (p. 55), identity crisis (p. 56), aggression and frustration (p. 61). According to BB the usefulness of the provided theories seems to be limited unless one applies stricter criteria and research methods, such as: clearly structured interviews, quantitative methods, sample methods (p. 64). Chapter 3 Czynniki społeczne i kulturowe (Social and

cultural factors*), as the title indicates, focuses on the influence of factors on terrorism with reference to an individual as well as to a group. Moreover, it seems that group, organisational and social psychology, with particular emphasis on the

issue of group identity provides a more constructive basis to understand terrorist

psychology and behaviour (translation of quotation p. 97). It is worth paying particular attention to the subchapter concerning the memetics of terrorism, where particular waves of terrorism are described through the perspective of memes. Chapter 4 Geneza, radykalizacja i eskalacja (Genesis, radicalisation and

escalation*) shows that the reasons for terrorism are differentiated and

comprehensively connected with one another…starting with the social conditions,

through the process of group formation, up to the achievement and maintenance of

the group’s operational ability (translation of quotation pp. 103-104). It seems that the reasons for terrorism quoted from different experts in the subject field should be grouped, e.g. with the use of methods of strategic analysis. Then the chapter would become more interdisciplinary. Chapter 5 Neutralizacja psychospołecznych


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inhibitorów agresji (Neutralisation of psychosocial aggression inhibitors*) describes psychological processes which can be used to deactivate moral standards. This chapter does not finish with a conclusion, as in the case of most chapters in the first part. (It also includes chapters 10 and 11). Chapter 6 Dynamika grupy

terrorystycznej (Dynamics of a terrorist group*) focuses on terrorism as a group

activity and therefore the product of an internal group’s dynamics (translation of quotation p. 126) and it is not only about an attempt to convince an individual to

certify an untruth but to change the perception of truth (translation of quotation p. 129). Chapter 7 Psychospołeczny model procesualny (Psychosocial processual

model*) is dedicated to the explanation of J. Horgan’s theory which integrates psychological and social perspectives in a dynamic way by overlapping the aspects of terrorism and the following stages: entering a group, being in the group and leaving the group. The subsequent statement deserves particular attention: terrorism is rather a thing that the members of an extremist group do along with

many different things (translation of quotation p. 142). Chapter 8 Psychologia

terroryzmu religijnego (Psychology of religious terrorism*) describes the theories of e.g. K. Armstrong, A.A. Dol, J.S. Piven, D.J. Feeney which explain the phenomenon of religious terrorism making their critical review at the same time. Chapter 9 Psychologiczne aspekty terroryzmu samobójczego (Psychological

aspects of suicide terrorism*) provides explanation of different aspects of terrorist attacks where the death of the terrorist is a must and not the side effect of a given

attack (translation of quotation p. 171). One of the explanations why this type of weapon is so widespread is its effectiveness and efficiency. Chapter 10

Psychologia superterroryzmu (Psychology of super-terrorism*) refers to the possibility of using weapons of mass destruction in terrorist attacks. The author, by reference to different theories, calms down the readers by explaining that in spite of strong strategic, political and tactical reasons for using weapon of mass

destruction, along with the technological possibilities, it is common to have

psychological aversion to deploying them (translation of quotation p. 196), thus there is hope that this kind of weapon will not be used. In chapter 11 Rola kobiet –

terroryzm w kontekście płci społecznej (The role of women – terrorism in the

context of social gender*) the author conducts an analysis of the participation of women in acts of terrorism through the perspective of terrorism waves. Moreover, he talks about the necessity to provide different explanations of the engagement of women in terrorism than is done in case of men.

Part two starts with chapter 1 Terroryzm jako proces komunikacji i wpływu

społecznego (Terrorism as a process of communication and social influence*) which presents a kind of symbiosis of present terrorism and mass media. For terrorism is a theatre … terrorist attacks are often well calculated and planned in

order to draw the attention of electronic media and press (p. 212) and terrorist

campaigns can be examined by using the analogy of advertising campaigns (p. 218 translation of quotations). Chapter 2 Psychologiczne aspekty sytuacji

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zakładniczych (Psychological aspects of hostage situations*) presents three types of terrorist activities where hostages are taken i.e. kidnapping: taking over means of transport together with passengers and crew, barricade situation. The latter one is broadly described here. This chapter as well as the next one does not include a part entitled Conclusions. In chapter 3 Ofiary terroryzmu (Victims of terrorism*) the author tackles such topics as e.g. 1) victimization which stems from: the wish to draw attention, symbolic aspects and instrumental character; 2) category of victims e.g. direct victims, family and relatives of the direct victims, negotiators. Chapter 4 Strach, lęk i percepcja ryzyka (Dread, fear and risk perception*) presents critical elements of terrorist strategy where rational dread and irrational fear exert influence on the perception of risk (p.252). Chapter 5 Trauma i zaburzenia

posttraumatyczne jako skutek działań terrorystycznych (Psychological trauma

and post-traumatic disorders as the result of terrorist activities*) presents numerically: the traits of traumatic situations, possible reaction to the situations, and categorisations of post-traumatic disorders. The author compares terrorism to other occurrences and proves that in many aspects there is an analogy with natural

disasters and catastrophes caused by man (p. 277). However, we should be a little bit critical as far as their implementation in research on the results of terrorist incidences is concerned. Chapter 6 Psychologiczne konsekwencje działań

terrorystycznych w wybranych grupach szczególnych (Psychological consequences

of terrorist activities in the chosen special groups*) touches on the reaction of the following groups to incidents and terrorist campaigns: 1) children, 2) the elderly, 3) members of intervention groups, in order to build an effective, comprehensive system of minimisation of psychological effects of terrorist activities, which was broadly described (p. 29) in chapter 7 Minimalizowanie psychologicznych skutków

działań terrorystycznych (Minimisation of psychological effects of terrorist

activities*). The author puts here emphasis on education, information, communication, and discussion in the neutralisation of the negative psychological influence exerted by terrorists. Chapter 8 Elementy psychologii antyterroryzmu

(The elements of antiterrorism psychology*) draws particular attention to the fact that terrorism is first of all a psychological weapon (translation of quotation p. 336). The author in the ending writes that psychosocial analysis of terrorism

mechanisms leads to the noticing of numerous paradoxes and research problems

(p.355) and it should be said that BB managed to illustrate it clearly in his book. An unquestionable plus of this publication is the fact that the presented theories and models are exposed to critical assessment.

It is difficult to indicate the recipients of the book. It can be anyone who wants to understand why there are terrorist attacks in the world. Thus, it can become the basis of society’s education, as we all should realise the complicated psychosocial aspects connected with the problem of terrorism. This book can also be recommended as an introduction to the comprehension of the problem for those who are beginning their research into terrorism (p. 18). The author writes that this


299

is an interdisciplinary attitude to the problem, and I partly agree with him. As an economist, theorist and practitioner of management I lack here the continuation of the presented attitudes’ implementation in the problem of terrorism. Such curiosity was awoken in me by chapter 1 of part I. Moreover, the structure of the book is not well balanced, i.e. we can find here chapters with 5 as well as 32 pages. Some of them lack conclusions (chapter 7 and 19). In spite of the structural shortcomings, as well as the fact that my scientific hunger has not been satisfied, the book can be (and even has to be) recommended to everyone, and in particular students of not only psychology but also security and defence.

* free interpretation of the translator

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