Strategy and Tactics of (Naval) Warfighting

• The origins/genesis

• The title

• The literature

• Why “naval”?

• Is it economics …

• “strategy is for flag officers only”

• “Strategie ist politischer Wille”

DoD Dictionary • strategy — A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the

instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives

• theater — The geographical area for which a commander of a geographic combatant command has been assigned responsibility.

• tactics — The employment and ordered arrangement of forces in

relation to each other. See also procedures; techniques. • procedures — Standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to

perform specific tasks. See also tactics; techniques. • techniques — Non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform

missions, functions, or tasks. See also procedures; tactics.

Oxford Dictionary strategy from stratēgia ‘generalship’; from stratēgēma; from stratēgein ‘be a general’; from stratēgos; from stratos ‘army’ + agein ‘to lead’. tactics from tactica from tactos ‘ordered, arranged’.

What a Navy Is For?

A navy’s purposes deal with the movement and delivery of goods and services at sea;

in contrast, an army’s purpose is to purchase and possess real estate.

Thus, a navy is in the links business, while an army is in the nodes business.

Seen that way, a navy performs one or more of four functions and no others:

At sea, it (1) assures that our own goods and services are safe;

(2) that an enemy’s are not.

From the sea, it (3) guarantees safe delivery of goods and services ashore;

(4) prevents delivery ashore by an enemy navy.

… the seat of purpose is on the land!

“Why study tactics? It is the sum of the art and

science if the actual application of combat

power. It is the soul of our profession.”

Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski

“No naval policy can be wise unless it takes

into very careful account the tactics that ought

to be used in war.”

Commander Bradley A. Fiske, 1905

First “results”

• “A ship’s a fool to fight a fort.” (Lord Nelson)

• “Fire effectively first!”

Fast-attack missile boats: α = 2 a3 = 1 a1 = 1 Missile corvettes: α = 4 a3 = 2 a1 = 1 Modern missile frigate α = 12 a3 = 4 a1 = 1.5 or α = 8 a3 = 6 a1 = 1.5 . . . Ticonderoga/Aegis class (CA) α = 24 a3 = 16 2 ≤ a1 ≤ 4 …?

Operation “Lion‘s Den“, Haiphong Harbor approaches, August 27, 1972 Order of Battle North Vietnam 3 P-6 (Soviet built) torpedo boats US Newport News (CA-148) Providence (CLG-6) Rowan (DD-782) Robison (DDG-12) plus Seventh Fleet aircraft on stand-by

“This is Blackbeard on board Newport News with a shore bombardment force in Haiphong Harbor. We are engaged with several enemy surface units and need illumination to sort things out. Any aircraft in the area give me a call on guard. What we really need are high-powered flares. Blackbeard out.” Vice Admiral James L. Holloway III Operation “Lion’s Den” August 27, 1972

Strategy and Tactics, Trying a Definition

roughly following CDR Frank A. Andrews (1958): “Tactical deployment”, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1958, 65-73: Strategy is about which hardware and troops you want to have Tactics is about what you want to do with your hardware and troops or: Strategy is about what you want to achieve ... Tactics is about what you can achieve, subject to an enemy’s options

A Cooperative Strategy for

21st Century Seapower

MARCH 2015

http://www.navy.mil/StrategicDocs.asp

http://www.navy.mil/StrategicDocs.asphttp://www.navy.mil/StrategicDocs.asphttp://www.navy.mil/StrategicDocs.asphttp://www.navy.mil/StrategicDocs.asphttp://www.navy.mil/StrategicDocs.asphttp://www.navy.mil/StrategicDocs.asp

Snippets and excerpts ”Strategic mobility“ “Strategic attendance“ “Strategic importance“ “Strategic significance” “Strategic nuclear deterrence” “Strategic sealift” “Strategic laydown of our bases and facilities” “Strategically employing the Selected Reserve“ ”Cultivate strategic thought and intellectual capital” “Strategically minded institutions“ “Strategic thinkers“ “Credible sea-based strategic deterrent”

“The Sea Services operate in the world’s oceans to protect the homeland, build security globally, project power, and win decisively. This ability to maneuver globally on the seas and to prevent others from using the sea against our interests constitutes a strategic advantage for the United States.“

“All domain access is the ability to project military force in contested areas with sufficient freedom of action to operate effectively. In today’s security environment, that access is increasingly contested by state and non-state actors that can hold even our most advanced forces and weapon systems at risk with their own sophisticated anti-access/area denial strategies.“

“In this time of fiscal austerity, our force is sized to support defeating one regional adversary in a large, multi-phased campaign, while denying the objectives of, or imposing unacceptable costs on, another aggressor in a different region. This force-sizing construct also ensures our capability and capacity to support global presence requirements. To accomplish this, the Navy and Marine Corps must maintain a fleet of more than 300 ships, including 11 aircraft carriers, 14 ballistic missile submarines (replaced by 12 Ohio Replacement Program SSBN(X)), and 33 amphibious ships, while the Coast Guard must maintain a fleet of 91 National Security, Offshore Patrol, and Fast Response Cutters. A smaller force, driven by additional budget cuts or sequestration, would require us to make hard choices. We would be forced to execute this maritime strategy at increased levels of risk for some missions and functions, decrease forward presence, and reduce our footprint in some geographic regions.“

“The United States will increasingly leverage its Sea Services in the pursuit of its national security objectives. In this turbulent world, the Sea Services provide the Nation with credible, flexible, and scalable options to sustain freedom of the seas, rapidly respond to crises, and deter and defeat aggression. This strategy identifies a series of geopolitical, military, and fiscal challenges, as well as opportunities for naval forces to shape or overcome them.”

“Our foremost priority remains the security and prosperity of our Nation, the American people, and our way of life. This strategy ensures that the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard continue protecting American citizens and advancing U.S. interests, as we have done for more than two centuries. American seapower – forward, engaged, and ready.”

“Missions of the U.S. Navy“ (VADM Stansfield Turner (1974), U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1974, 19-25) Warfighting missions Sea Control Projecting Power Ashore Deterrence Presence Strategic Deterrence

Sea Control Four different tactical approaches Sortie Control Choke Point Control Open Area Operations Local Passive techniques Deception Intimidation

Power Projection Ashore Amphibious Warfare Naval bombardment Four basic tactical air tactics Deep interdiction Battlefield interdiction Close air support Counter-air/Anti-air Passive techniques Deception Intimidation

Presence Preventive deployment Reactive deployment Passive techniques Deception Intimidation

Strategic Deterrence Assured second strike capability Flexible response Deter third parties

“21 SEP – Rumours are flying; things are happening JFK is on her way to join Sara[toga] and us. King Hussein has no uncertain terms asked for Americans air strikes immediately as well as subsequent troop intervention – this stemming from the fact that Syria has entered the conflict with an armoured invasion. G DIV had a major load again – this time we loaded anti-tank weapons. (THE PLOT THICKENS). The ordnance is at this moment (2130) hanging on the aircraft (mostly A-4s with some A-6s). I have a strong feeling that an air strike is coming soon.” (“The Log”, unnamed Ensign, Assistant G-Division Officer, on board CV Interdependence, Sixth Fleet. The Mediterranean, Fall 1970)

“ ... We are only going to be a presence in this situations and are not going to do anything.” (“The Log”, unnamed Ensign ...) “The surprise art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” (Sun Tzu) “While nodding off during sea power lectures at officer candidate school, this neophyte had apparently missed the part explaining that an effective navy does so much more than engage in combat. He apparently was awake was during the part about power projecting power ashore but failed to appreciate the importance of the Navy’s other vital missions – much less tangible, but every bit as important – of sea control, deterrence, and forward presence.” (Thomas J. Cutler (2014), “Lest we forget – Presence”, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 2014, 93.)

Operation “BOLO”, January 2, 1967, North Vietnam

F-105 “Thunderbird”

MiG-21

... 325 Thuds lost by the end of 1967

F-4 “Phantom”

Colonel Robin Olds, “Ace” (12 kills WW2, 24 kills Vietnam War) Commander of Eighth Tactical Fighter Wing „Wolfpack“, Ubon Air Base, Thailand

Operation “BOLO”, January 2, 1967, North Vietnam Idea: make F-4s “look like” F-105s including the ECM pod ...

Operation “BOLO”, January 2, 1967, North Vietnam Order of Battle USAF 7 flights of F-4 Phantoms (28 planes), 8th TFW “Wolfpack”, Ubon Air Base, Thailand (plus KC-135s, EB-66, EC-121, CSAR ...) Call names: Ford, Rambler, Lincoln, Tempest, Plymouth, Vespa and ... Olds NVAF unknown number of MiG-21 (maximum 16) unknown number of MiG-17 from Phuc Yen (“Frisco”) Gia Lam (“Los Angeles”)

Operation “BOLO”, January 2, 1967, North Vietnam ... and the result? seven MiG-21 kills, no USAF losses . . ... and on January 6, 1967, a simplied version: 2 F-4s in close formation (single radar blip) with RF-4s (reconnaissance) ... another two MiG-21 kills, no USAF losses NVAF lost 9 out of a total of 16 MiG-21s within just five day

“The Third Fleet was under my command. My superior was Admiral Nimitz. My mission was offensive. When I received orders to cover the Leyte landings my mission did not change. It was still offensive. The tasks assigned my force were to gain air supremacy over the Philippines, to protect the landings and to maintain unremitting pressure against Japan, and to apply maximum attrition by all possible means in all areas. Finally, should opportunity for destruction of a major portion of the enemy fleet offer, such destruction would become the primary task of my forces.” (Admiral William “Bull” Halsey)

“The Third Fleet was under my command. My superior was Admiral Nimitz. My mission was offensive. When I received orders to cover the Leyte landings my mission did not change. It was still offensive. The tasks assigned my force were to gain air supremacy over the Philippines, to protect the landings and to maintain unremitting pressure against Japan, and to apply maximum attrition by all possible means in all areas. Finally, should opportunity for destruction of a major portion of the enemy fleet offer, such destruction would become the primary task of my forces.” (Admiral William “Bull” Halsey) “Where Is, Repeat, Where Is, Task Force 34, The World Wonders!” (Admiral Chester Nimitz) “The gentleman who failed to keep his appointment last October.” (Rear Admiral Clifton “Ziggy” Sprague on Halsey)

“Don’t ever make assumptions. I made an assumption, and that’s how Samar happened.” (Admiral Chester Nimitz, when asked by then Ensign Peter Deutermann about Samar in 1964) “One bad general would be better than two good ones.” (Napoleon Bonaparte)

Soviet “Foxtrot“ submarine B-59

October 2, 1967 President Lyndon B. Johnson: “... Colonel, you just tell ‘em we’re preventing the North Vietnamese from interferin’ with the South Vietnamese so those good people can exercise their own democracy.” Colonel Robin Olds: “Sir, I can’t say that.” LBJ: “Why not, Colonel?” Olds: “Sir, if that’s the reason we’re over there I don’t want to be the one to spread the word.” LBJ: “Well, what do you think we should be doin’?”

Colonel Robin Olds: “Sir, it takes three things for a country like North Vietnam to wage war: manpower, willpower, and industrial power. They possess the first two in abundance, but they have little if any industrial capacity and must rely totally on others for their materiel needs. The bulk of those needs arrive in ships at Haiphong and several minor ports. Our bombing pressure keeps very little from coming by rail out of China. Let us attack those ports, sifle their will, bottle up their manpower, and the job will be done. In other words, mine the harbors, drop the road and rail bridges on the Chinese border, get the supply dumps in Cambodia, and most important, totally destroy the seat of government in Hanoi. It’s simple, sir, and with all due respect, the way to end this war is just to win the damned thing.”

1975 Fall of Saigon 1976 Jimmy Carter elected as President of the United States new administration “heavily” staffed by anti-defense activism veterans” new Naval policy: # U.S. Navy ships: 450 (1969: 950) # U.S. carriers: planned reduction to 6 (from 12) defense of Norway would have become impossible US Navy operations restricted to south of Greenland-Iceland-UK-line “maritime superiority” to be dropped from documents (CNO ADM Holloway refused to take orders from “gofers” ) . . . Soviet navy still pursuing a 1,700-ship goal ...

1981 Thatcher government announces commitment to Trident missile and submarine strategic deterrent ... BUT, in order to pay for this, a reduction in conventional forces: elimination of the Royal Marines 20 percent reduction of surface ships sale of VTOL carriers Invincible and Hermes The First Lord of the Admiralty, Keith Speed, publicly opposed the cuts ... was fired ... and the office abolished “Shorn of all aircraft, the Royal Navy was to become a coast guard.” (John Lehman) 1982 On April 2, Argentina invades the Falklands ...

1981 Thatcher government announces commitment to Trident missile and submarine strategic deterrent ... BUT, in order to pay for this, a reduction in conventional forces: elimination of the Royal Marines 20 percent reduction of surface ships sale of VTOL carriers Invincible and Hermes The First Lord of the Admiralty, Keith Speed, publicly opposed the cuts ... was fired ... and the office abolished “Shorn of all aircraft, the Royal Navy was to become a coast guard.” (John Lehman) 1982 On April 2, Argentina invades the Falklands ... ... luckily the selling and carrier scrapping order not carried out, but still, in order to move the troops to the South Atlantic, 58 privately-owned ships, including the Queen Elizabeth II, had to be pressed into service ...

The UK 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review HMS Ark Royal to be decommissioned (2011) HMS Illustrious to be decommissioned (2014) (leaving the UK with just one helicopter carrier) Joint Force Harrier fleet to be decommissioned (2010) (72 Harriers sold to USMC as spares) surface fleet of frigates and destroyers to be reduced to 19 ships Nimrod (maritime surveillance aircraft) to be scrapped (2010) to be substituted by HMS Queen Elizabeth, commissioned 2017, operational 2020 F-35C Lightning (carrier version) ... too expensive ... to be substituted by F-35B Lightning (SVTOL) ... and no maritime surveillance replacement in sight ...