strategic survey for israel 2012-2013

7/29/2019 Strategic survey for Israel 2012-2013

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Strategic Survey forIsrael2012

-2013

Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom, Editors


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Strategic Survey for Israel2012-2013Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom, Editors


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Institute for National Security Studies

The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), incorporating the Jaffee

Center for Strategic Studies, was founded in 2006.

The purpose of the Institute for National Security Studies is, rst,

to conduct basic research that meets the highest academic standards on

matters related to Israels national security as well as Middle East regional

and international security affairs. Second, the Instituteaims to contributeto the public debate and governmental deliberation of issues that are or

should be at the top of Israels national security agenda.

INSS seeks to address Israeli decision makers and policymakers, the

defense establishment, public opinion makers, the academic community in

Israel and abroad, and the general public.

INSS publishes research that it deems worthy of public attention, while

it maintains a strict policy of non-partisanship. The opinions expressed in

this publication are the authors alone, and do not necessarily reect the

views of the Institute, its trustees, boards, research staff, or the organizations

and individuals that support its research.


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Strategic Survey for Israel

2013-2012

Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom, Editors

IncorporatIng the Jaffee

center for StrategIc StudIeS

b

the InStItute for natIonal SecurIty StudIeS

cd


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Graphic design: Michal Semo-Kovetz and Yael Bieber

Cover design: Michal Semo-Kovetz

Printing: Elinir

Cover Photo: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the United Nations,

September 27, 2012

Courtesy: Avi Ohayon, Government Press Ofce

Institute for National Security Studies (a public benet company)

40 Haim Levanon Street

POB 39950

Ramat Aviv

Tel Aviv 61398

Israel

Tel. +972-3-640-0400

Fax. +972-3-744-7590

E-mail: [email protected]

http:// www.inss.org.il

2013

All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-965-7425-43-5


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Contents

Introduction 7

Part I: Regional Developments, Global Implications

The United States in the Middle East: The Year in Review

Oded Eran 19

Iran and the International Community, 2012:

New Nuclear Game or More of the Same?

Emily B. Landau and Shimon Stein 33

Toward a Nuclear Middle East?

Yoel Guzansky and Gallia Lindenstrauss 53

Domestic Upheavals and Changes in the Regional

Strategic Balance

Mark A. Heller 69

The Arab Spring and External Military Intervention

Shlomo Brom 87

Part II: Israel and the Middle East

Israel and the Political Dead End: The Need for New Paradigms

Anat Kurz and Udi Dekel 107

Jordanian Spring, Hashemite Winter:

The Weakening of the Regime and the Implications for Israel

Assaf David 131

The Future of the Peace between Israel and Egypt

Ephraim Kam 151

The Crisis in Syria: Threats and Opportunities for Israel

Eyal Zisser 167


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The Arab Awakening and the Rise of Political Islam

Benedetta Berti 187

Al-Qaeda and Global Jihad in Search of Direction

Yoram Schweitzer 209

Part III: Israel: The Domestic Arena

The Israeli Public Debate on Preventing a Nuclear Iran

Yehuda Ben Meir 231

Defense Expenditure and Israels Social Challenges

Shmuel Even 245

Conclusion

Israels National Security Challenges 2012-2013:

The Need for Proactive Policy

Amos Yadlin 263

Contributors 283


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7

Introduction

Strategic Survey for Israel 2012-2013 is the latest volume in the series

published annually by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).

The articles compiled here examine various aspects of the leading securityand policy issues on Israels national agenda, providing a comprehensive

picture of the countrys strategic situation and the challenges the nation

currently faces and may be expected to face in the foreseeable future.

From Israels perspective, a net assessment of developments in the

Middle East and on the international scene in 2012 presents a mixed

balance. While some negative trends intensied, threatening forecasts did

not materialize, and regional changes afford some opportunities for Israel

to improve its strategic position.The most urgent challenge facing Israel is Irans standing at the

forefront of the anti-Israel bloc in the Middle East while progressing

toward military nuclear capability. Nuclear capability will endow Iran

with greater inuence in the Gulf, including over the energy resources in

the region and perhaps also over regimes in the region. For now, Tehran

is showing much resilience in the face of current international pressure,

manifested by economic sanctions that are much harsher than those

leveled in prior years. At the same time, its steady march toward military

nuclear capability incurs the danger of a regional response with its own

set of shockwaves, such as a decision by other nations to embark on the

nuclear route. In the broader picture, the international helplessness vis--

vis Iran attests to the international communitys limited ability to contain

the dangers of escalation in the Middle East, and particularly to the United

States declining ability to inuence regional developments.

The wave of sociopolitical tremors in the Middle East that began two

years ago reects the growing involvement by the civilian populations in

Introduction


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Introduction

8

their respective national political theaters. The upheavals caused the fall

of old dictatorships while threatening to undermine others, and brought

radical Islamic powers to prominence. None of these factors createdfundamentally new threats, but they have nevertheless sharpened the

military challenges Israel faces in its immediate vicinity and therefore also

the political challenges it tackles on the international arena, particularly an

accelerated process of delegitimization.

Direct pressure on Israel to launch concrete negotiations with the

Palestinians has waned, but the relative diplomatic calm is only evidence

of skepticism that such negotiations can lead to a negotiated settlement.

This sense, as well as international criticism of Israel because of the

role attributed to it for the political deadlock, facilitated the Palestinian

Authoritys diplomatic accomplishment in the UN, which granted Palestine

the status of non-member observer state. This implied the possibility that

a Palestinian state could be established without Israeli agreement (and

therefore on terms not compatible with Israels security guidelines); at the

same time, Hamas continued to consolidate its rule in the Gaza Strip. This

process solidied Hamas ability to generate a military confrontation with

Israel and gain center stage on the Palestinian arena.

The military and political challenges that Hamas poses to Israel are

interwoven with Israels increasingly problematic relations with Egypt.

While Egypt has not threatened to abrogate the peace treaty with Israel and

is, like Israel, keenly interested in reining in Hamas power and inuence

in the Gaza Strip and reinstituting law and order in the Sinai Peninsula,

Hamas has the ability to set off a round of ghting that could force Egypt

to side with it and thereby chill relations between Cairo and Jerusalem

even further.

Concurrently, in Lebanon, Hizbollahs military strength continues togrow. This trend, combined with the threat to Bashar al-Assads regime

in Syria posed by a destructive civil war and the entrenchment of radical

Islamic elements there, signals the potential formation of an active front on

Israels northern border. Iraq too is a regional stronghold of radical Islamic

forces. These circumstances, along with the potential continued weakening

of the central government in Jordan due to expanding popular protests

against the Hashemite royal household, present Israel with a signicant


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Introduction

9

military and political challenge. While the overall evolving military

threat is not conventional, the various sub-state factions involved, lacking

inhibiting political restraints, could separately or together resort to useof the long range missiles at their disposal.

Israels experience in asymmetrical conicts and its efforts to establish

deterrence vis--vis sub-state entities and push the ghting far from

Israels population centers have at times cost the state on the international

diplomatic arena because of the inevitable casualties to civilians on enemy

territory during the ghting. The link between extreme Islamic factions

and Iran, whether Sunni (such as Hamas) or Shiite (such as Hizbollah),

only compounds the related challenges that Israel may have to face in the

coming years.

This mix of immediate and long term threats weakens the willingness

of Israels public and its leadership to take security risks: easing the

limitations on movement in and out of the Gaza Strip in order to mitigate

international criticism, and territorial redeployment in the West Bank (i.e., a

military withdrawal and evacuation of settlements) in order to demonstrate

commitment to the two-state solution as the means to resolve the Israeli-

Palestinian conict. At the same time, the political deadlock reduces

the chances few to begin with of including Israel in a regional front

alongside Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt to support the efforts

of the United States and the European Union to delay the nuclearization

of Iran.

Against the background of the challenges emerging from the regional

turmoil and associated international developments, the critical political

and military decisions Israel will have to take in the coming year assume

greater weight given the implications for the countrys internal political

arena. Thus and as implied by the clear trend of recent years any policyadopted by Israels government designed to stabilize its regional and

international status, especially if it entails steps to reduce tensions in the

Palestinian arena, is likely to upset its domestic political stability as well

as to amplify security threats. On the other hand, policies adopted to ease

domestic tension will likely make it difcult to contain security threats and

will incur heavy diplomatic costs.


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Introduction

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These are among the fundamental dilemmas that the Israeli government,

to be formed after the January 2013 parliamentary elections, will face.

They constitute a backdrop for decisions the government will have to takein face of the escalation of regional instability, a process that began two

years ago with the outbreak of the uprisings in the Middle East.

This book is divided into three sections. Part I, Regional Developments,

Global Implications, surveys ve topics. In the rst chapter, Oded Eran

examines the United States involvement in the Middle East over the last

year, particularly in the context of the Iranian nuclear program, the Israeli-

Palestinian issue, and the regional changes generated by the Arab Spring.

The analysis suggests that during President Obamas second term in ofce,

the United States will show increasing involvement in the Middle East in

order to entrench its position, and that a shared US-Israel political agenda

will help protect Israels essential regional and international interests.

In the second chapter, Emily Landau and Shimon Stein debate whether

there have been changes this past year in attitude and approach on the part

of the principal actors in the Iranian nuclear crisis, namely, Iran and the

international community. The authors conclude that the parties involved in

the international effort to stop the nuclearization of Iran are more resolved

than before, but that Iran still clings steadfastly to its intention to achieve

its nuclear goals. If the US administration formulates a clear policy, Iran

may compromise on its nuclear ambitions; such a move would also bolster

American credibility in the Middle East. As for Israel, its postponement

of the deadline for military action against Iran testied to its awareness

of the need to defuse the tension with the American administration on the

issue, and steer international attention away from the possibility of an

Israeli attack to the threat inherent in the Iranian program. In the chapter

dealing with nuclear proliferation in the Middle East that might result fromthe completion of the Iranian nuclear project, Yoel Guzansky and Gallia

Lindenstrauss discuss the moves taken by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey

that might signal an intention to develop nuclear military infrastructures.

The authors contend that Saudi Arabia is the most likely candidate to pursue

the nuclear route and conclude that even if Saudi Arabia alone formulates

a nuclear response to the Iranian threat, the Middle East will nd itself in a

new strategic balance, rife with serious implications for Israel.


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Introduction

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Mark Hellers essay discusses the relationship between intra-national

power shifts and changes in the strategic balance of power in the Middle

East. An examination of the link between regime change in some of theregional states since the start of the Arab Spring and the regional matrix

of forces shows that contrary to expectation early in the upheavals, the

regional balance of power has remained virtually unchanged. Still, the

potential for transformation is there, partly because of the increasing

emphasis on identity politics in the Middle East and partly because of the

danger of collapse of some states, especially Syria.

The lessons learned from external military intervention are discussed

in Shlomo Broms chapter. In deciding on external military intervention,

which by its very denition runs counter to the principle of state sovereignty,

the West weighs humanitarian and strategic concerns against the estimated

cost of intervention. The civil war raging in Syria is a concrete example of

a case in which the international community, led by NATO members, must

decide between the principle of Responsibility to Protect on the one hand,

and on the other, its reluctance to engage in such action due to the risks

inherent in any intervention. A comparison of the military intervention in

Libya with the Syrian case suggests that a decision to intervene in Syria in

order to end the mass slaughter and topple the Assad regime will be made

if there is a coalition of willing NATO nations in which the United States

plays a leading role.

The second section of the volume, Israel and the Middle East, covers

six issues related to Israels immediate surroundings. The essay by Anat

Kurz and Udi Dekel examines the factors inhibiting Israel from resuming

the dialogue with the Palestinians versus the factors that could prompt

Israel to act toward implementation of the two-state solution. Outlining

a new way of thinking about the political process between Israel andthe Palestinian Authority, the analysis focuses on emerging trends in the

Palestinian arena, the regional context, and Israels international status, and

concludes that Israel should formulate an initiative that will demonstrate

a true intention to part from West Bank territories, if not in coordination

with the PA as part of a process aimed at a consensual settlement, then

unilaterally.


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Introduction

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Assaf Davids essay examines the weakening of the Hashemite kingdom

in Jordan, a trend that began with King Abdullahs ascent to the throne

and accelerated with the recent upheavals in the Arab world. The analysisfocuses on the Arab Springs effect on Jordans relations with the United

States, Israel, and the Gulf states, and discusses the regimes approach

to the growing Islamic challenge and the increasing dissatisfaction

of the Transjordanian population. The author contends that Israel, in

coordination with the kingdoms liberal/reformist elite, could reinforce the

regimes prospects to survive. Ephraim Kams essay discusses the future

relationship between Israel and Egypt in the post-Mubarak era of Muslim

Brotherhood rule. While the bilateral relations and the foundations of the

peace treaty, including the security arrangements, have so far remained

intact, due largely to Egypts economic dependence on the United States,

Egypt is still in the midst of a process of change. The Muslim Brotherhoods

ideological hostility to Israel and the deadlock in the Israeli-Palestinian

political process, as well as security breaches in the Sinai Peninsula that

may require Israeli military intervention, are liable to exacerbate tensions

between the two countries.

Eyal Zisser examines the threats and opportunities for Israel inherent in

the Syrian crisis, and argues that while the fall of the Assad regime would

undermine the status of Iran and Hizbollah in the Middle East, the collapse

of the central government in Syria is liable to allow jihadists, inspired

by al-Qaeda, to establish themselves in the no mans land that would

be created on the Israeli-Syrian border. Another threat is the possibility

that advanced weaponry, currently controlled by the Syrian army, will

fall into the hands of various hostile entities. Still, the crisis holds some

opportunities for Israel, including the possibility of entering a dialogue

with Turkey and pragmatic Arab states about Syrias future as well asthe future of bilateral relations with Israel. The balance of threats and

opportunities is also the focus of Benedetta Bertis essay, which discusses

the rise of political Islam in the Middle East. The discussion centers on

the economic, security, and foreign relations changes in various regional

nations since the Arab Spring and the growth of the political inuence

of Islamic elements. The chapter demonstrates that the sharper tone and

attitude toward Israel after the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power


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Introduction

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in Egypt is not a direct or exclusive outcome of the Arab Spring; the

escalating hostility was discernible even before the collapse of Mubaraks

regime. The essay also examines the Israeli discourse on these phenomenaand suggests how Israel should respond to the changes in the political

atmosphere in Egypt and elsewhere in the region. The essay recommends

that Israel pay attention to public opinion in these countries and not focus

exclusively on communicating with the upper echelons of government. The

essay also includes an assessment, shared by other writers in this volume,

that a breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian political process could help

diffuse the tension with the regions nations, especially Egypt.

Yoram Schweitzers essay discusses the effect of the upheaval in the

Arab world on al-Qaeda and global jihad. The popular uprisings in the

Middle East were fundamentally non-violent and expressed a desire to

promote liberal, democratic norms, thereby challenging al-Qaeda both in

terms of the struggles goals and their means of attainment. Al-Qaedas

leadership, however, has managed to adapt the organizations strategy to

changing circumstances. Facing the regional turmoil, al-Qaeda embarked

on an internal jihad in the rebelling societies in order to hasten the day

when religious Islamic regimes might control the countries of the region.

The growing inuence of streams identied with al-Qaedas ideological

directives and operative base represents a concrete danger to Israel, on top

of the weakening of the central governments in these countries and the

possibility that Islamic activists will establish themselves in lawless areas

along Israels borders.

The third section of the volume, Israel: The Domestic Arena,

includes two chapters. Yehuda Ben Meirs essay surveys the Israeli public

discourse on the Iranian nuclear issue and compares the nature of the

debate with previous security-related debates, which tended to be held farfrom the public eye. Advances in technology and communications are a

key factor making it difcult for decision makers to keep the fact of the

related deliberations and their contents behind closed doors. The essay

concludes with the assessment that the public discussion will resume at an

even higher pitch should an Israeli military action against Iranian nuclear

facilities begin to appear as an actual possibility, and public opinion on the


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Introduction

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issue will be affected by the stances of the United States and Israels senior

military echelon.

Defense spending in context of the social challenges facing Israel isthe subject of Shmuel Evens essay. The author contends that when the

public debate focuses on the defense budget, it strays from fundamental

issues of effective use of economic resources in the civilian sector. While

security experts tend to demand increases in the defense budget without

factoring in social needs, economists and societal experts demand cuts

in the defense budget without understanding Israels security challenges

or having to bear responsibility for the cuts they demand. Therefore, the

essay concludes, the discourse must be improved by including experts

from respective disciplines and must focus on balancing the response to

security threats with the response to the no less pressing needs to guarantee

economic stability and address Israels social needs.

The concluding essay of the volume, by Amos Yadlin, analyzes the

signicance of the challenges Israel currently faces, led by Irans progress

toward military nuclear capabilities and the deadlock in the Israeli-

Palestinian political process, against the backdrop of the transformations

taking place in the Middle East and the start of President Barack Obamas

second term in ofce. The essay lists the considerations that ought to guide

Israel as it formulates clear responses to immediate and long term threats,

and concludes that adopting a proactive policy will help Israel turn threats

into opportunities to improve its strategic position. The author contends that

Israel coped well with the challenges posed by the 2011-2012 upheavals in

the Middle East, but in order to preserve its status as an island of stability

in a rapidly changing environment Israel will have to formulate a proactive

policy. This policy should focus on expanding the dialogue with the United

States and helping to promote a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclearcrisis; renewing the political process with the Palestinians; constructing a

stable relationship with the new Egyptian regime; broadening cooperation

with Arab states; and rebuilding the relationship with Turkey. According

to Yadlin, a passive policy does not halt negative processes, and does not

facilitate the creation of new opportunities or the realization of existing

ones.


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Introduction

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We would like to thank the researchers at the Institute for National

Security Studies and guest writers who contributed to this volume. Our

heartfelt thanks also go to Moshe Grundman, director of publicationsat INSS, and Judith Rosen, the editor of INSS English publications. As

in years past, they have made a valuable contribution to the writing and

publication of this volume.

Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom

December 2012


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Part I

Regional Developments,Global Implications

The United States in the Middle East:

The Year in Review

Oded Eran / 19

Iran and the International Community, 2012:

New Nuclear Game or More of the Same?

Emily B. Landau and Shimon Stein / 33

Toward a Nuclear Middle East?

Yoel Guzansky and Gallia Lindenstrauss / 53

Domestic Upheavals and Changes in the

Regional Strategic Balance

Mark A. Heller / 69

The Arab Spring and ExternalMilitary Intervention

Shlomo Brom / 87


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The United States in the Middle East:The Year in Review

Oded Eran

IntroductionAt the dawn of President Obamas second term, the United States faces a

new Middle East, with the old order shattered and no new clear conguration

yet emerging. The paradoxes, conicting forces, and alliances that have

emerged in the context of the Arab uprisings and that engage the US are

best described in the following passage:

Alliances are topsy-turvy, defy logic, are unfamiliar andshifting. Theocratic regimes back secularists; tyrannies

promote democracy; the US forms partnerships with

Islamists; Islamists support Western military intervention.

Arab nationalists side with regimes they have long combated;

liberals side with Islamists with whom they then come to

blows. Saudi Arabia backs secularists against the Muslim

Brothers and Salas against secularists. The US is allied with

Iraq, which is allied with Iran, which supports the Syrianregime, which the US hopes to help topple. The US is also

allied with Qatar, which subsidizes Hamas, and with Saudi

Arabia, which funds the Salas who inspire jihadists who kill

Americans wherever they can.1

In his second term, the United States President will have to chart a

compromise between two major courses of action in the Middle East. In his

rst term, he already steered the US away from Afghanistan and Iraq. In the


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Oded Eran

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efforts to oust the previous Libyan regime, he responded to the initiative of

the French President at the time and led the military effort from behind.

As to Syria, the Russian-Chinese rejection of the United Nations SecurityCouncil for a mandate to use military force is a convenient g leaf for the

US, with Washington exploiting it to justify its military inaction against

the Assad regime. As for the Israeli-Palestinian conict, in the second half

of his rst term, the US President relieved himself of the attempt to reach

a political solution.

There will be much temptation in the US administration to maintain this

course, but it is highly likely that the US will be forced to become more

deeply engaged and involved than some in Washington, and in the Middle

East, would like.

The Iranian Nuclear EffortThe Iranian issue dominated US-Israeli discourse from 2009 to 2012, with

the two sides trying and failing to reach a common strategy to deal with the

Iranian effort to obtain military nuclear capability. While the area of US-

Israeli agreement on this le is wide, there are several key issues on which

disagreement prevailed in the past and may emerge in the near future.

In the presidential debate dedicated to foreign policy matters, PresidentObama asserted emphatically, As long as I am President of the United

States, Iran will not get a nuclear weapon.2 While reassuring, this statement

does not provide clear answers to serious questions, such as what the US or

Israel will do if Iran continues to enrich uranium at the current 20 percent

level without going for a weapon, but approaching a breakout point. These

and other questions sparked an open, shrill argument between the two

candidates.

In the spring of 2012, Israel began sending signals that it could notafford to wait any longer and would strike unilaterally in order to set Irans

program back.3 In response, the Obama administration sent its top military

and diplomatic brass to Jerusalem to convince Israel that the United States

could be counted on to end Irans program even if that required the use

of military force should all else fail. In order to make these promises more

credible and reassure its allies, the US took a range of steps short of war to

enhance its strike capabilities. Over June and July 2012, it moved a second


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aircraft carrier into the Gulf region, added a ship (USS Ponce) in the Persian

Gulf that acts as a platform for helicopters and Special Operations Forces,

and augmented minesweeping capabilities including underwater dronesthat can nd and destroy mines. It also began construction of a missile

defense radar station in Qatar.4 Finally, in late September 2012, the United

States and more than 25 other nations held the largest-ever minesweeping

exercise along with other naval exercises in the Gulf to reinforce their

ability to respond to any Iranian military action in the area.

Whether the President of the United States is willing to use military

power against Iran should all other means fail is another point of potential

friction and distrust between the US and Israel. Israel supports the use

of sanctions and has not objected to diplomacy to reach a solution, and

ofcials have recognized that the sanctions adopted by the international

community, mostly the US and the European Union (EU), have left their

mark on Iran. They have not publicly reacted to the reports that the US and

Iran will have one-on-one negotiations after the US presidential elections.5

It is a fair assumption, though, that Israel will press for a limited and

relatively short time frame for any attempt of this sort; and will request

that the US prevent Iran from exercising its normal pattern of delay tactics,

from removing existing sanctions (or adding new ones), and certainly from

removing the military option from the table.

The very agenda of potential US-Iran talks and the terms of a potential

agreement could also contain bones of contention. These matters should

be discussed and agreed upon between the US and Israel in advance.

Iran achieving nuclear weapons capability has long been seen as a major

threat to American interests. With a nuclear arsenal, Iran could increase

its support of terrorism, expand its regional inuence at the expense of

US allies, and increase its aid to organizations opposed to Israel all withgreater impunity. A nuclear Iran would also call into question the future

of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and could well lead to a deluge of

new proliferators, especially in the Middle East. It is unlikely that the US

will agree to conditions that relate directly to Israel, but the US agreement

to support the 2010 NPT Review Conferences Final Document, heavily

biased against Israel and calling for a conference to discuss a Middle

East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone without regard to Israels


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Oded Eran

22

preconditions for such activities, did ignite much concern in Jerusalem.6

Particular issues that should be dealt with in advance of US-Iran talks

include the uranium enrichment in Iran itself as well as the whole systemof verication, supervision, violations, and prior understandings between

Israel and the US in the event that the arrangements agreed on with Iran

fail.

In spite of the already close cooperation between Israel and the US, there

is a need for further work toward reaching an understanding concerning

both the political and the military options. The two governments should

avoid sliding again into the public, almost acrimonious discussion of the

summer of 2012 and maintain a united front. This in turn will greatly help

the efforts to prevent Iran from pursuing its goals.

The Arab SpringSince the end of World War II, American foreign policy has been torn

between promoting its democratic ideals and promoting its security and

economic interests. The so-called Arab Spring made this dilemma

particularly acute, as the free elections that followed the overthrow

of regimes in Americas traditional allies in the Arab world resulted in

Islamist-led governments. Despite these parties past records of harsh anti-Americanism and criticism of Americas role in the region, Washington felt

it could not openly take issue with the results of these democratic elections.

Against the backdrop of the Islamist victories, Washingtons relations

with countries throughout the region are in a state of ux. This is perhaps

most evident in Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhoods Mohamed Morsi

won the presidency in June 2012. In Tunisia as well, Ennahda, a party

that had been banned in the past, won a plurality of seats in elections last

year, while Islamists gained support in Yemen. In Libya, the sole countrywhere Islamists were defeated by moderates, the attack on the Benghazi

consulate and assassination of the American ambassador gave the US

cause for concern.

Of particular signicance in this context are the triangular Cairo-

Washington-Jerusalem relations. The rise to power of the Muslim

Brotherhood, the oldest and most inuential Islamist party in the region,

posed the biggest challenge for American policy during 2012. As they have


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elsewhere, US ofcials have cautiously engaged in diplomatic relations

with the new Egyptian government, seeking to maintain Egypts general

pro-American orientation and commitment to peace with Israel. BeforeMorsis purge of the militarys leading generals, the Obama administration

also sought to maintain close ties to the military, in the belief that the

military would continue to hold sway over foreign policy.

Bilateral relations hit their rst major crisis in early 2012, even before

Morsis election, when Egyptian security ofcials arrested 43 US citizens

employed by several leading non-governmental organizations that worked

to promote democracy in Egypt. Several months later, in September, when

Egyptian protestors breached the embassy perimeter walls and met only

with a weak Egyptian response while the Muslim Brotherhood called for

more protests, President Obama reacted. He warned Morsi that relations

would be jeopardized if Egyptian authorities failed to protect American

diplomats and act more forcefully against anti-American attacks. In an

interview with Telemundo the following day, Obama said of the evolving

US-Egypt relationship:

I dont think that we would consider them [Egypt] an ally, but

we dont consider them an enemy... I think its still a work inprogress, but certainly in this situation, what were going to

expect is that they are responsive to our insistence that our

embassy is protected, our personnel is protected.7

But the major political issue between Egypt and the US will be the

preservation of the 1979 Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel,

reached and signed under US auspices. The Muslim Brotherhood has

not ofcially threatened to abrogate the agreement with Israel, nor has it

ofcially demanded to revise it. But the winds blowing from Cairo eversince the Muslim Brotherhood took power further lowered the temperature

of the already cold peace that the government inherited from the Mubarak

regime. Relations between Egypt and Gaza under the Hamas government,

however, have warmed. Israels Operation Pillar of Defense in Gaza

demonstrated the fragile state of its relations with Egypt. The US and

Egypt found themselves reacting in two distinctly different ways to the

Israeli operation. While Egypt summoned its ambassador from Tel Aviv


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Oded Eran

24

for consultations and condemned Israels operation in harsh terms, under

pressure from the Egyptian street President Morsi may feel the need for

more visible and extreme reactions against Israel. This pressure wouldbecome especially acute with an Israeli land invasion of Gaza.

Conventional wisdom points to the dire state of Egypts economic

situation since the uprising erupted in January 2011 and its need for US

assistance as factors motivating Egypt to refrain from abrogating the 1979

Treaty of Peace entirely. Egypts ofcial reserve assets, which amounted to

$145 billion at the close of 2010, dwindled to $15.2 billion in September

2011.8 The tourism sector, one of Egypts most important sources of

income, suffered a serious decline in the wake of the uprising, not least due

to fears of terror, and uncertainty whether the Brotherhood would allow

alcohol and freedom of dress on Egypts beaches. Meanwhile, exports fell

by 20 percent in 2011 compared to 2010. With unemployment rising and

exports falling, Egypt cannot afford to lose international and especially

US assistance.9 The US Congress may also be less lenient than President

Obama toward Egypt on issues relating to Israel, terror, or further attacks

on US interests in Egypt. It may even react negatively to a call by Egypt to

review the Treaty of Peace with Israel.

A rupture in US-Egyptian relations does not serve Israels interests,

and may cause further instability in the region. Both Israel and the US

share the hope that Egypt will regain full control of the Sinai Peninsula

and prevent the area from being used by several terrorist organizations as

a base for launching terror operations as well as a corridor for weapons

being smuggled into Gaza. Given the Muslim Brotherhoods inuence

over sister movements in other Arab countries, it is important for both the

US and Israel to maintain open channels of communication with the new

regime in Egypt. This will require a formidable effort and willingness onthe part of the three governments involved. They may be called on for

restraint when dealing with the Palestinian issue, including the possibility

of further violent confrontations between Israel and Gaza, as well as the

Palestinian (i.e., West Bank) moves in international organizations. Above

all, the triangular relationship will be extremely strained in the wake of a

military operation against Irans nuclear installations, if that occurs.


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Nothing better exemplies the shift in the US attitude to the Arab

Spring and the recognition in Washington of the limitations on its power

to inuence events, as its involvement in the Syrian and Libyan uprisings,respectively. There are signicant differences between the two cases. There

was no international objection to using force in Libya, nor any foreseen

ramication elsewhere to the use of force. The Libyan opposition seemed

more united than the Syrian opposition, and the tribal differences do not

amount to the ethnic, religious and political divisiveness of Syria.

Ostensibly, the main obstacle to military intervention in Syria has been

the Russian and Chinese position at the UN. At times, however, American

ofcials have also expressed concern about Syria's air defenses and its

ballistic missile capability. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services

committee on March 7, 2012, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General

Martin E. Dempsey explained the difculties of military action:

The ability to do a single raid-like strike would be accessible to

us. The ability to do a longer-term sustained campaign would

be challenging and would have to be made in the context of

other commitments around the globe. Ill just say this about

their air defenses: They have approximately ve times moresophisticated air defense systems than existed in Libya,

covering one-fth of the terrain. All of their air defenses are

arrayed on their western border, which is their population

center.10

Israel can only hope that such arguments will not be used against attacking

Irans nuclear facilities, should the need arise.

The shipment of munitions to unwanted terror groups is another reason

for the US reluctance to aid the anti-Assad regime opposition. Followingthe experiences of post-Soviet Afghanistan and post-Qadda Libya, the

US is concerned about the supply of advanced weapons that at some point

can be used against allies such as Israel, or even US citizens. A classied

US government report said arms shipments to Syrian rebels, organized

and sent by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, are reaching Muslim extremists

including those linked to al-Qaeda rather than the secular opposition

groups for whom they are intended.11 The ndings from the report call


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into question whether the White House strategy of indirect intervention is

achieving its stated and intended purpose. The President reiterated in the

third presidential debate that the United States will do everything we cando to make sure that we are helping the opposition in Syria, while also

ensuring that were not putting arms in the hands of folks who eventually

could turn them against us or our allies in the region.12

Pursuing a tougher US line of action against the Assad regime will not

necessarily increase the support of the Arab street for the US. Even those

Arab governments that openly call for the end of the regime in Damascus

may criticize the United States for its intervention, if that occurs. In

the absence of clearer and better options, the US will likely cling to its

current pattern of action in the Syrian le, though it can further isolate

the regime diplomatically by recognizing the opposition as Syrias ofcial

representation.

Israels low prole approach to the situation in Syria suits the US

interests. At the same time, the Israeli government and US administration

must look at the possible consequences of regime change in Damascus.

Beyond internal chaos, which may last for several years, other regional

players may become involved as well as several terror organizations. The

control of conventional types of armaments held by the regular Syrian

army as well as stocks of nonconventional weapons is a serious cause for

concern. Both the US and Israel should continue to discuss solutions for

these thorny questions.

A sensitive question relates to Jordans ability to withstand the internal

pressures and the ramications of the failure of the Hashemite monarchy to

handle them. Jordan has been a solid member of the informal pro-US camp

in the Middle East (with the exception of its support of Iraqs invasion

of Kuwait in 1990). The weakening of the current regime could have adramatic impact on the political conguration of the Middle East. The

fact that the leading political opposition in Jordan is led by the Jordanian

branch of the Muslim Brotherhood is cause for deep concern, both for the

US and Israel. The Muslim Brotherhood belt, which includes Egypt, Gaza,

and Jordan, could cause serious problems for Israel. Given the political

instability in Iraq and Syria, the addition of Jordan to that zone of instability

could be detrimental to the future of the region.


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The US has rushed to help the Jordanian government nancially. It

should not only continue to do so, but also put pressure on the Arab oil

producing states to stand by their commitments.

The Peace ProcessEver since Israel captured the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, the future of

these territories has been a source of disagreement and contention between

the US and Israel. The rst Obama administration was no exception

Although to some these years constituted the worst period in the history

of the bilateral relationship, this impression is not necessarily borne out by

the history of the bilateral relations.

The political landscape of the Middle East has undergone dramatic

changes since President Obama entered the White House. What seemed to

be feasible in 2009 is no longer valid or achievable today. Previous attempts

to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conict, and certainly those in which the

United States has been involved, were premised on the notion that the nal

outcome must comprise a comprehensive solution to all core issues, i.e.

Jerusalem, borders, and refugees. This was the premise that guided efforts

during the rst Obama administration. No consideration was given to

any methodological alternative. Following two years of strained personalrelations between the United States and Israel political leaderships over the

issue of a settlement freeze, the entire process was abandoned by all three

principal actors the US, Israel, and the Palestinians. This was prompted

not only by the impasse between the involved parties, but even more

critically by the new regional developments. In light of mounting concerns

over the rise to power of modern fundamentalist regimes in several Arab

countries, it was unlikely that the Prime Minister of Israel would adopt a

decision concerning Israels nal borders with both Jordan and the WestBank, or admission of refugees into Israel, two decisions that will be hard

to make even under the most stable and clear circumstances in the region.

Under these circumstances, the second term Obama administration can

decide to continue to abandon the peace process between Israel and the

Palestinians, hoping to resume the process if and when: the dust sweeping

through the region settles; the question of the leadership in the Palestinian

camp is settled amicably, closing the rift between Gaza and the West Bank;


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and a new, stable government is formed in Israel after the January 22, 2013

elections that is willing and able to take decisions concerning long term

relations with the Palestinians.It is unlikely that the political dust in the region will settle in the next

two years, and therefore the Israeli reluctance to make long term decisions

will presumably continue. And yet, if the option of the two-state solution

is to be maintained, a status quo is an unacceptable alternative, simply

because the status quo is an illusion. Ongoing processes, such as the

increased population in the settlements, especially in areas that are unlikely

to remain under Israels sovereignty in the context of an agreement, or

the growing extremism among the Palestinians, will make the two-state

solution an obsolete alternative.

The new Israeli government that emerges from the January 2013

elections would do well to develop an alternative approach and present

an initiative to the US President, gain his support, and encourage him to

pursue it. The main guiding principle of such an initiative on the Israeli

side is the willingness to proceed toward the two-state solution in a gradual

and incremental manner. This will include Israels partial withdrawal from

parts of Area C, and subsequent transfer of more power to the Palestinians

in Area C, as well as Area B. In addition, Israel must be willing to halt

settlement activities in certain areas, mostly east of the security fence. And

nally, Israel must be willing to revise the economic and water agreements.

For their part, the Palestinians could take steps, for example, toward a

conditional recognition of Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people.

Both sides will commit themselves to the nal outcome of such a process,

i.e., two states. Such an action plan, corresponding to the 2003 Roadmap,

would be endorsed by the Quartet and the Security Council. If accepted,

it could additionally contain an Israeli-US agreement not to block UNmembership for the State of Palestine at a date agreed on by both Israel

and the Palestinian government.

It is imperative that Israel submit this or a similar blueprint to the US

President so as to preempt future haggling and misunderstandings resulting

in new bilateral tensions. The most pressing matter in 2013 will almost

certainly be the Iranian nuclear effort. For a successful effort on this matter,

it is critical that the US and Israel reach the highest degree of coordination.


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They cannot afford the sort of friction witnessed in 2012. An agenda for

progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front will greatly facilitate this effort.

ConclusionThe process of change that engulfed the Middle East from late 2010 is

probably in its early stages. Meanwhile, the international community, with

its different actors, is still groping for answers how best to deal with the

political and economic ramications. Each Arab state poses a different set

of challenges for the US and for Israel, respectively. The Arab uprising

caught the US in the early stages of its gradual withdrawal from the Middle

East and in the midst of recovery from the 2008-10 economic crisis. The

major dilemma for the US has been the need to choose between upholding

the values of democracy, the rule of law, the elimination of corruption,

nepotism, and other problems that beset the Arab societies, and economic

prospects; and the support for traditional allies, which in most cases were

the pillars of the system that came under attack by the Arab masses.

In the most signicant case, Egypt, the US very quickly chose to

abandon President Mubarak, a long time ally and collaborator. However,

the substitute regime in Egypt has joined the US string of disappointments

and dilemmas in the Middle East. In Iraq, the forceful removal of SaddamHussein by the US brought about a regime with a lukewarm attitude toward

the US and a friendly stance toward Iran. In Libya, the US intervention

helped to remove Qaddas regime, but it has yet to be seen how stable

the new regime will be and to what extent it can hold the country together.

In Syria, the US, though involved in the diplomatic efforts and logistical

assistance to the Syrian opposition, is reluctant to become more deeply

involved, especially militarily. The decision is predicated on lessons

learned from the cases cited above, but also on the complexity of Syriaspolitical, ethnic, and religious composition. This kaleidoscopic state was

held together for decades by a brutal central minority-dominated regime

that amassed all the tools of state control in its hands. The removal of this

minority from absolute power almost guarantees several years of chaos

before stability is restored. The US and Israel may prefer to concentrate

more on containment of the Syrian crisis within its political borders rather

than on trying to shape its future political structure and orientation.


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A joint US and Israeli political agenda, especially if it contains a plan

to advance the Israeli-Palestinian political process, will also help stabilize

Israels relations with Egypt and Jordan. This should be a key considerationin Israels strategy in its attempt to weaken the fundamentalist ring emerging

from the Arab uprising. The process that led to the ceasere in Gaza in

November 2012, following the escalation of rocket re from Gaza and

Israels military operation to stop it, could be interpreted as an indication

that a traditionally negative attitude toward Israel notwithstanding, the

Muslim Brotherhood, once in power, can prioritize Egypts needs and

strategic interests. Israel and the US will have to nd a way to live and

perhaps expand this modus operandi, though expectations should not be

inated. Beyond leveraging the possibility for progress on the Israeli-

Palestinian track, the Sinai Peninsula can serve as another platform for

preventing deterioration in relations between Egypt and Israel. Egyptian

willingness to take action against arms smuggling into Sinai, and thence

to Gaza, translated into concrete performance, should in turn be matched

by Israeli readiness to consider reasonable Egyptian proposals to modify

certain articles in the military annex to the 1979 Treaty of Peace. The US,

as a witness to the treaty, and being the leading actor in the multinational

force deployed in the Sinai, could play an important role in mediating

between Israel and Egypt if the latter requests changes to the annex.

The theme of the US shifting its major external affairs focus from

Europe to the Middle East and to the Pacic and East Asia has received

much attention in the public discourse in the US. It may be hasty,

however, to conclude that the US is about to abandon the Middle East.

In spite of repeated disappointments, a lack of prospects for success, and

a rapidly declining dependence on the regions oil, the US has allies and

commitments from which it cannot estrange itself. And yet Israel, to theextent that it deems a true US presence in the region strategically important,

must consider the means of maintaining the US deployment and active

engagement in the Middle East.


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NotesI wish to thank Rachel Beerman and Cameron Brown for their diligent work and

assistance in preparing this chapter.1 Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, This Is Not a Revolution,New York Review

of Books, November 8, 2012.

2 Third presidential debate, Boca Raton, Florida, October 22, 2012.

3 Defense Minister Ehud Barak and other Israeli ofcials warned that once the

Fordow plant became operational, Iran would enter a zone of immunity where

it could produce nuclear fuel without fear of an Israeli strike. See David E. Sanger

and William J. Broad, Iran Said to Nearly Finish Nuclear Enrichment Plant,New

York Times, October 25, 2012; Jonathan Lis and Natasha Mozgobia,Haaretz, March

3, 2012, http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.1659743; Attila Somfalvi, Ynet,

May 31, 2012, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4236395,00.html.

4 Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, Pentagon Bulks Up Defenses in the Gulf,

Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2012; David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, To

Calm Israel, U.S. Offers Ways to Restrain Iran, New York Times, September 2,

2012; Barak Ravid,Haaretz, September 2, 2012, http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/

politics/1.1814612.

5 Helene Cooper and Mark Landler, U.S. Ofcials Say Iran Has Agreed to Nuclear

Talks,New York Times, October 20, 2012. US ofcials denied such an agreement

but expressed willingness to hold the talks.

6 See www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/. The US later explained its participation in

the consensus by which the Final Document had been approved, trying to allay

Israels concerns.

7 President Obamas interview with Jos Daz-Balart, Telemundo, September12,

2012.

8 IMF, Egypt - International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity, November

8, 2012.

9 US annual direct assistance amounts to $1.3 billion in military assistance and

some $250 million in different economic projects. The US is currently considering

a $1 billion debt forgiveness and more than $400 million in loan guarantees to USbusinesses operating in Egypt. The US is supporting the IMF loan of $4.8 billion

to Egypt.

10 US Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing to Receive Testimony on the

Situation in Syria, Statement of General Martin E. Dempsey, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

March 7, 2012.

11 David E. Sanger, Jihadists Receiving Most Arms Sent to Syrian Rebels,New

York Times, October 14, 2012.

12 Third presidential debate, Boca Raton, Florida, October 22, 2012.


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Iran and the International Community,2012: New Nuclear Game or More of

the Same?

Emily B. Landau and Shimon Stein

IntroductionThe latest round of nuclear negotiations with Iran in 2012 with meetings

held in Istanbul, Baghdad, and Moscow from April to June, and two lower

level meetings in July that focused on technical issues ended in failure.

The unavoidable conclusion is that despite expectations to the contrary,

there is as yet nothing concrete to indicate that this years attempt toachieve a breakthrough toward resolving the nuclear crisis was any more

successful than all the previous failed attempts to negotiate with Iran over

the past ten years. Indeed, the gulf between the international community

(currently represented by the P5+1) and Iran in late 2012 looks as wide and

unbridgeable as ever.

But while tangible results are lacking, the latest round of nuclear talks

are embedded in the broader process of the international community vs.

Iran that has been unfolding for close to a decade, and recent developmentsshould be scrutinized in this light. In other words, an assessment of the

talks should be sensitive to any shifts in approach that might indicate a

departure from the course that became entrenched over the years since

2003, even if they have not yet borne the fruit of a successful agreement.

This article will analyze whether there are any signs of a new game with

Iran, or whether what we have witnessed over the past year is basically a


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repeat of what we have seen so many times before, and as such is simply

more of the same.

If the latter option is the case, the question is whether the internationalcommunity and Iran are inevitably locked in a recurrent dynamic whereby

all attempts to negotiate are basically doomed to failure. This assessment

draws on what has been gleaned regarding Irans steadfast determination

to acquire a military nuclear capability and its successful tactical use of

negotiations as a means to gain precious time to push its program forward

while avoiding any decisive compromises, as well as its ability to deter

the international community as far as military action is concerned. The

international community has proven incapable of bringing to bear its

collective strengths in an effective manner when negotiating with Iran, and

yet remains critically dependent on these (as yet ineffective) negotiations

in order to achieve its goal. This dependence on diplomacy, due to an

unwillingness to employ military force, explains why different groups of

states (mainly the EU-3 and P5+1) kept coming back to the table with Iran

even after repeated failures. The option of a new game notwithstanding

the reality of the basic dynamic outlined above proposes that there

may nevertheless be recent indications of a shift in the approach of the

international community, which could potentially render a settlement of

this crisis more achievable.

The article will present and analyze these alternative interpretations of

international efforts to curb Irans nuclear ambitions over the past year,

beginning with the release of the IAEA report on Iran in early November

2011.1 The presentation of two alternative explanations for what has

transpired over the course of 2012 indicates a difference of opinion among

the two authors, but more importantly, it is a reection of the fact that both

authors question the true nature of the story that is unfolding and attributeimportance to presenting alternative approaches. Moreover, the options

are not inherently mutually exclusive, because any possible departure

from the previous course nevertheless remains embedded in a problematic

framework characterized both by a determined nuclear proliferator that

has demonstrated that it will go to great lengths to avoid surrendering its

development of nuclear weapons, and an international community that

remains structurally hampered vis--vis its ability to act with unity of


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purpose and determination, especially over time. Finally, the implications

of the two interpretations will be assessed against the backdrop of Israels

new prominence in the debate, salient regional developments, and theUnited States elections.

Are We Seeing More of the Same?Almost nine years have elapsed since the foreign ministers of Britain,

Germany, and France visited Tehran with the aim of inducing Iran to

suspend its enrichment program. Subsequent efforts to curb Irans nuclear

plans included a string of UN Security Council resolutions on sanctions,

additional attempts on the part of the EU-3 to negotiate and bring the US

into the diplomatic game, Obamas diplomatic outreach, and efforts on

the part of the P5+1 to negotiate. Four reports released by the IAEA in

the period under review here underscore the extent of the failure of all

diplomatic efforts to date in stopping Iran from making signicant progress

on its way to building a military nuclear capability. The mid November

2012 report provides the status of uranium enrichment: the total amount of

LEU enriched up to 5 percent stands at 7611 kg. This amount is enough,

once enriched to weapons-grade material, to produce over ve nuclear

weapons. Since February 2010, Iran has produced approximately 232.8 kgof uranium enriched up to 20 percent at Natanz and Fordow.2 The content

of the annex contained in the November 2011 IAEA report, which detailed

Irans various activities related to nuclear weaponization, was clearly long

overdue.

The main reason for the ongoing diplomatic failure lies in the

asymmetrical interests and objectives of the negotiating parties in

particular regarding their respective commitments to actually reaching a

deal. The Iranian objective is to become self-sufcient in mastering thenuclear fuel cycle process, and subsequently, to produce enough ssile

material to be able to produce nuclear weapons when a political decision

to that effect is taken. From the outset, the Iranian regime has left no doubt

that it will not compromise on what it views as its inalienable right as

a member of the NPT to enrich uranium for (allegedly) peaceful use.3 In

order to achieve its objective, it needs time. As long as the regime has not

achieved this objective, it will not seek to reach a compromise, although


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afterwards it could well be interested in a deal. That, however, does not

prevent Iran from engaging in talks in a not serious manner, especially when

the price of this kind of engagement does not compel it to compromise onits plan, which continues unabated.

The objective of the EU-3, the US, and later the P5+1 has been to

suspend Irans enrichment and prevent it from acquiring a military nuclear

capability. The P5+1 have repeatedly reiterated their position that they

do not deny Irans right to pursue a civil nuclear program. At the same

time, they underscore the need to prove that Irans program is exclusively

for peaceful purposes. Unlike Iran, which is playing for time, the P5+1

reiterate the need for an urgent, swift solution in their statements, but at the

same time, they have only gradually increased the pressure on the Iranians

so far, with no discernible success.

Against the backdrop of conicting interests and timetables, as well as

Irans unwillingness to compromise, it should come as no surprise that the

parties have so far been unable to reach an agreement. One area in which

the conicting parties seem to pursue a common objective is the need to

stay engaged. Even though the US, for example, has stated that it does not

want to engage in talks for talks sake, the US and its negotiating partners

have found themselves doing just that engaged in discussions that, given

Irans recalcitrant position, do not allow for a serious negotiation. And so,

initially when the EU-3, and later the P5+1, presented proposals in order to

sustain the process, the Iranians either rejected them if not immediately,

then after a while or simply ignored them, but never went as far as to

withdraw from the process altogether. Both parties understand that in

terms of their interests, there is nothing to gain from a total breakdown of

the process. Irans interest in upholding a semblance of dialogue is obvious

it enables it to gain precious time to push its program forward. Forinternational actors facing Iran, a recognized breakdown would compel

them to move to new measures such as military force which they are

loath to do.

In an effort to raise the stakes for Iran, a series of sanctions was put into

effect. In addition to the four UN Security Council resolutions, the US and

the EU have passed additional sanctions characterized as crippling


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that have already had a signicant impact on the Iranian economic and

nancial situation, but have not yet led to a political reassessment in Iran.

It is against this backdrop that the latest round of negotiations that beganin mid April 2012 in Istanbul must be assessed. Some experts interpreted

Irans readiness to resume the discussions/negotiations, which were stalled

for almost 15 months, as an encouraging sign that the sanctions and the

discussion regarding a possible Israeli military strike were beginning

to have an effect, prompting a willingness on the part of Iran to engage

constructively. One cannot rule out that the impact of the sanctions will

eventually change the Iranian calculation, and thereby create a symmetry

of interests on the need to reach a deal that will in turn increase the chances

for a diplomatic solution. However, what has transpired during the most

recent meetings does not seem to suggest that a change in Irans attitude

is imminent.

True to its pattern of behavior when under pressure, do not overload

the circuit more than is necessary the Iranian leadership demonstrated a

positive attitude prior to the meeting in Istanbul, expressing the hope that

the crisis would be resolved in a comprehensive manner. Unlike on some

other occasions, no preconditions were set by Iran before the meeting.

Citing thefatwa that describes the possession and use of nuclear weapons

as a cardinal sin, Khamenei reiterated the peaceful nature of the Iranian

nuclear program. The Supreme Leader also praised President Obama.

The US in turn reiterated its preference for a negotiated solution and its

willingness to accept a civilian nuclear program, provided the Supreme

Leader proves his commitment not to make use of nuclear weapons.

United in their need to continue the discussion, both parties described

the outcome of the meeting in Istanbul as constructive and useful, even

though none of the contentious issues were dealt with in a serious fashion.Catherine Ashtons statement that the NPT forms a key basis for what

must be a serious engagement,4 without referring to the UN and the IAEA

resolutions, was seen by Iran as an encouraging sign. One could sum up

the importance of this meeting in that it took place after a hiatus of nearly

15 months, and that the parties agreed to meet again in May in Baghdad.

Irans expressed willingness to conduct discussions with the IAEA

(May 14-15, 2012) in response to the agencys request for access to the


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Parchin military site (following the November 2011 report), and to grant

assurances that no obstacles would stand in the way of the inspectors,

paved the way for IAEA Director General Amanos visit to Iran on May21, 2012. However, an agreement that was slated for signature remained

unsigned, due to some differences.

Against the backdrop of the weeks preceding the Istanbul meeting and the

efforts thereafter on both sides to display optimism, the next two meetings

in Baghdad (May 23-24, 2012) and Moscow (June 18-19, 2012) were

marked by a return to the familiar Iranian mode of behavior. In Baghdad,

Iran chose to disregard the nuclear issue not for the rst time. It submitted

a proposal, and as expected, reiterated its right to enrich uranium. The

P5+1 underscored their determination to seek a swift diplomatic resolution

based on the NPT and the full implementation of UN Security Council and

IAEA Board of Governors resolutions on Iran. In summing up the two-day

talks in Baghdad, a senior US administration ofcial was quoted as stating

that there was agreement to discuss all aspects of 20 percent enrichment.

Referring to this common ground without further elaboration, he also

emphasized that there were signicant differences between the parties.5

These differences continued, hindering the meeting that took place in

Moscow the following month. The P5+1 reiterated what they described as

a balanced proposal, which was the stop (the enrichment of uranium

to 20 percent), shut (the Fordow facility), and ship (the stockpiles of

20 percent enriched uranium outside of Iran) proposal that they offered

in return for moves referred to as rst condence building steps that,

not surprisingly, did not meet Iranian expectations. The only agreement

reached was to continue the discussions at the experts level, hoping that

they would narrow the signicant gap over time, thereby enabling the

resumption of higher level talks.6In conclusion, the mere resumption of the last round of talks was

perceived by some as an encouraging sign that sanctions were beginning

to take their toll. The expectation was that Iran would take a step toward

backing down from its unrelenting positions, paving the way to a more

meaningful diplomatic process that would help defuse the unfolding crisis.

However, the outcome of the talks does not appear to suggest an imminent

breakthrough. Declaring a breakdown of the negotiations at this point in


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time would not serve any of the parties interests, so one can assume that

they will continue for a while. However, a successful diplomatic process can

only be achieved by redressing the current asymmetry of interests, namelyby creating circumstances that will diminish Irans interest in continuing

its current mode of operation. The latest round of EU sanctions, augmented

by additional US sanctions and the looming threat of a military strike (by

Israel and possibly the US) is meant to change Irans calculation. Until that

happens if indeed it does the current pattern of Iranian behavior will

remain more of the same.

Or Perhaps Indications of a New Game?Detecting a possible shift in the ongoing dynamic between the internationalcommunity and Iran puts the focus on the approach of the international

community. It takes two to tango, and the failure so far to resolve the

nuclear crisis with Iran is not solely a function of Irans strong and steadfast

determination to achieve a military capability, and the skillful manner

by which it has repeatedly played the international community and

avoided engaging in serious negotiations. Equally problematic has been

the demonstrated weakness of the international community in its efforts to

have Iran back down.However, there have been shifts in the positions and policies of some

of the strong actors that are facing Iran, rst and foremost the United

States, and to a lesser extent its European allies in the period under review.

The past year has been characterized by a more determined international

stance against Iran, and while this approach has not yet achieved the

desired results, the international community is currently somewhat better

positioned to do so than in the past.

There are a number of reasons why international actors have haddifculty in projecting the necessary degree of resolve in their negotiations

with Iran. Most signicantly, the states that assumed the lead in facing Iran

over the past decade were collectively weakened by the fact that they were

not on the same page in their assessment of the dimensions of the crisis:

namely, how close Iran was to developing a military nuclear capability;

the implications of Iran becoming a nuclear state; and the best means of

confronting it on this issue. Broadly speaking, Russia and China have


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taken a much more lenient approach on these issues, while the US and

its European allies viewed Irans advances more seriously and generally

displayed a tougher attitude. This lack of unity among the differentactors facing Iran in the negotiations setting was coupled with an overall

reluctance to pursue the harshest measures that could have been adopted,

due to the expected negative consequences that they themselves would

likely suffer from as a result of these measures. This became apparent over

the past decade with regard to harsh and crippling sanctions, as well as

possible US and Israeli threats of military action against Irans nuclear

facilities. Complicating matters further was the fact that Iran proved adept

at playing on the weaknesses of the international community and further

eroding its collective resolve, for example, by employing tactics of divide

and conquer.7

The contention that the strong international actors facing Iran have

indeed evinced a different approach which would justify pronouncing a

change in the overall dynamic of the ongoing process draws on changes

that have occurred in these respects for the more concerned P5+1 actors

(the US and its European allies), but rst and foremost for the United States.

Especially since the release of the IAEA report in early November 2011,

there is broad acceptance that Iran is working on a military nuclear option.

International actors fed up with Irans delay tactics are nally willing to

adopt much harsher measures, even at a cost to themselves, while at the

same time working to secure alternative sources of oil to mitigate the

adverse consequences they would suffer from an embargo. Finally, there

seems to be a greater appreciation of the fact that the various players should

at least not highlight their own differences in the negotiations setting.

While the respective members of the P5+1 are still by no means a unied

group, if they continue to negotiate in this framework, they must at leastproject a minimal degree of unity toward Iran around the table, in order to

allow for a more effective negotiations strategy.

The most critical change involves a new appreciation of the essential

role of pressure: biting sanctions and credible threats of military force.

In other words, the United States and its European allies seem to have

nally internalized the essential role that pressure plays in the framework

of diplomatic efforts vis--vis Iran. For the United States, this has included


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stepping up the rhetoric regarding possible military action, and backing it

up with some signicant changes on the ground.

The rst indication of a change in approach is that in late 2011 the USand the EU nally took steps in the direction of the biting and crippling

sanctions that had been threatened by the Obama administration since

early 2010. Within weeks of the release of the severe IAEA report on Iran

in early November 2011, the US adopted sanctions targeting Irans energy

sector and its petro-chemical industry. America identied Irans entire

nancial sector as under the jurisdiction of the primary money laundering

concern under the Patriot Act. Other states joined the US and some went

further: very quickly both France and Britain decided on sanctions that

targeted Irans Central Bank.8

Sanctions became much harsher in early 2012 when on the eve of the

New Year, the Obama administration with considerable pressure from

Congress signed into law US sanctions that would target the Central

Bank in Iran. The EU quickly followed with their own harsh measures:

a full embargo on Iranian oil that went into immediate effect for new

transactions; states were given until July 1 to phase out all ongoing

transactions. Britain added an important sanction with regard to insurance

for oil tankers. As a leader in maritime insurance services, the fact that

Britain stopped providing insurance for Iranian tankers has had signicant

economic implications.

All of these sanctions are important rst and foremost in terms of

substance, but it is also noteworthy that the states that decided upon them

did so very quickly and unilaterally, without even considering the option

of going through the UN Security Council, knowing that Russia and China

would attempt to obstruct them. On the one hand, this reects the continued

differences among the P5+1 states, but on the other hand, it indicates ashift in US and European thinking, underscoring their understanding of

the need for swift and tough action. This stands in stark contrast to the six

months Obama spent in 2010 to enlist Russian and Chinese support for the

fourth UNSC resolution. Indeed, past experience proved that the Security

Council route was a time consuming and cumbersome process that in

the end resulted in signicantly diluted sanctions, in line with the lowest


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common denominator set by Russia and China among the permanent

members of the Security Council.

These steps reected a new appreciation of the essential role thatpressure must play in order to set in motion a more effective bargaining

dynamic with Iran. While many commentators had previously cautioned

against applying too much pressure on Iran, lest it dangerously lash out

and escalate the situation,9 the dire scenario did not transpire. Instead, Iran

came to the negotiating table in April, crediting the new approach that if

Tehran did not experience hardship and tremendous pressure, it had no

rational interest to back down from its nuclear goals. The combined effect

of the strategic gains that Iran expects to achieve with nuclear status, the

amount of energy that it has already invested in the program, and the heavy

price that it has paid to date, as well as the fact that Iran was so close to

its goal, have all made backing down a very unattractive option for this

determined proliferator unless the cost becomes intolerably high. The

international actors began to accept that their job was to generate a very

high price, which entailed applying more pressure.

In addition to the economic sanctions, there were signs albeit only

in the United States of greater appreciation of the need to present Iran

with credible threats of military consequences. This was expressed in a

discernible shift of tone in US ofcial statements that emerged in late

2011.10

With the multitude of statements issued on a regular basis by US

ofcials, any interpretation of the ongoing dynamic can nd supporting

evidence. Nevertheless, the overall trend tilted noticeably in the direction

of increased US determination, which reached a climax in March 2012

with Obamas very precise statements on the issue at the annual AIPAC

convention. Obama stated clearly that US policy is to prevent Iran fromacquiring nuclear weapons, not containment of a nuclear Iran. He added

that this is a global concern and a US national security interest.

There were additional expressions of this determination. In late July,

on the heels of the failure of the second attempt at lower level discussions

of the technical aspects of the two sides proposals (held between Helga

Schmid and Ali Bagheri in Istanbul, July 24, 2012), Haaretzreported on

a meeting held two weeks earlier between US National Security Advisor


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Tom Donilon and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. While the US

claried at the time that it still saw room for diplomacy, Donilon said that

the US had concrete contingency plans for when diplomacy is no longerviewed as a realistic option. In his detailed account of US plans, Donilon

outlined to Netanyahu US military capabilities for dealing with Irans

nuclear facilities, including the underground facility at Fordow. In a parallel

development, at an event in Washington DC in late July, United States

Air Force Secretary Michael Donley announced that the largest bunker

buster the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) was ready for use if

needed. This huge bomb is considered capable of penetrating underground

facilities of up to 60 meters, with an obvious implicit reference to the

Fordow enrichment facility.11

The US has also been steadily beeng up its military presence in the

Gulf. In early January, in a preplanned move, the aircraft carrierUSSJohn

C. Stennis departed the Persian Gulf, passing through the Strait of Hormuz

on its way to the West Pacic. Iran took the opportunity to issue a warning

that the warship should not come back.12 Nevertheless, several weeks

later, the USS Abraham Lincoln anked by British and French warships

passed through the Strait into the Persian Gulf. US Defense Secretary

Leon Panetta claried that the US intends to maintain its military presence

in the Gulf. Three months later, the USS Enterprise joined the Abraham

Lincoln, with the US thereby deploying two aircraft carriers in the region.

The commander of the fth eet, Amy Derrick-Frost, maintained that the

deployment was routine and not directed against any specic threat, but

also noted that it was only the fourth time in the past decade in which two

aircraft carriers were deployed in the Persian Gulf region.13

Since that time, the US has continued to maintain two aircraft carriers

in the region the USS Dwight D. Eisenhowerreplaced the USS Lincoln,and in July it was reported that the USS Stennis would be redeployed to the

Persian Gulf four months earlier than originally planned, and would later

relieve theEnterprise. Signicantly, the US Navy also began a process of

upgrading its overall defensive and offensive capabilities in the Gulf, to

counter Iranian threats to block passage through the Strait of Hormuz.14 In

late August 2012, amid statements undermining Israels military capability

to destroy Irans nuclear facilities, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff


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Martin Dempsey also hinted that one US concern regarding the support of

a no-y zone over Syria was lest it be asked to divert forces from their

preparedness in the Gulf, in the context of efforts to deter Iran.15

The measures outlined above h

strategic survey for israel 2012-2013

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