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“Strategic EnvironmentalAssessment for Further Onshore
Oil and Gas Licensing”
A response to DECC's publicconsultation on the
14th On-shore Oil and GasLicensing Round's Strategic
Environmental Appraisal
Paul Mobbs, Mobbs' Environmental Investigations,3 Grosvenor Road, Banbury OX16 5HN.
March 2014
© 2014 Paul Mobbs/Mobbs' Environmental Investigations
This report is made available under the The Creative Commons Attribution Non-
Commercial Share-Alike 2.0 Licence (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 UK) – England & Wales. For a
copy of this licence go to the Free Range Activism Website (FRAW) –
http://www.fraw.org.uk/files/fraw/by_nc_sa-uk-2.html
Correspondence related to this report should be addressed to:
Paul Mobbs,
Mobbs' Environmental Investigations and Research,
3 Grosvenor Road,
Banbury OX16 5HN.
Email – [email protected]
For further information on Paul Mobbs/ Mobbs' Environmental Investigations and Research
go to – http://www.fraw.org.uk/mei/
“Strategic Environmental Assessment for
Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing”
A response to DECC's public consultation on the
14th On-shore Oil and Gas Licensing Round's
Strategic Environmental Appraisal
Paul Mobbs, Mobbs' Environmental Investigations,
3 Grosvenor Road, Banbury OX16 5HN.
March 2014
Report Contents
Introduction....................................................................................................3
1. Summary and general observations on the SEA report..........................5
2. Significant omissions from the SEA report............................................14
2A. The impact of pipeline networks linking to drill pads...................................14
2B. The omission of gas processing and compressor stations from the SEA.. .16
2C. The status of underground coal gasification................................................19
2D. The failure to model coalbed methane as a distinct processing..................19
2E. The assumed depth of unconventional gas drilling.....................................22
2F. The interaction of planning policy guidance and the SEA............................23
3. General themes/issues across the SEA study.......................................26
3A. BGS gas resource estimates ......................................................................26
3B. Well lifetime, leakage and integrity..............................................................28
3C. Fugitive gas emissions and the MacKay-Stone report................................29
3D. The Public Health England report................................................................31
4. Over-riding legal and procedural flaws in the SEA analysis.................35
4A. The assessment of alternatives...................................................................35
4B. The precautionary principle.........................................................................35
4C. Decision-making bias and likely malfeasance in public office.....................37
5. Conclusions and recommended actions................................................41
6. Background reports/references..............................................................42
© March 2014 Paul Mobbs/Mobbs' Environmental Investigations – http://www.fraw.org.uk/mei/ page 1
Introduction
This report provides a comprehensive review of the Department of Energy and Climate Change's
(DECC) Strategic Environmental Appraisal (SEA) of the 14th On-shore Oil and Gas Licensing Round1.
It has been produced as part of the public consultation on the SEA, and is intended to provide a
technical evaluation of the SEA in the light of the latest global evidence on the impacts of
unconventional gas developments.
The report has been produced in support of various individuals and small groups around Britain
who are concerned by the Government's push to develop various types of extreme energy
developments. The specific purpose behind the drafting of this report has been to highlight the areas
where the Government's viewpoint/data departs from the growing body of evidence regarding the
impacts of unconventional gas technologies.
Rather than focus on the narrow detail of DECC's SEA report, this review takes a number of broad
themes, examines how each of these themes is addressed within the SEA report, and then contrasts
the Government's approach/data with some of the latest research from around the globe.
Those assessing this response to the DECC consultation should note that specific
points/observations on the SEA report are shown in bold brown type. Each point is discussed, and
relevant references to background material cited, in the preceding text. Significant reports/studies are
listed in section 6, and are identified in the text/footnotes in [square brackets].
Note that references to research papers and reports are intended to be read alongside the text of
this report. In fact, one of the specific observations of this study is that the Government's SEA report
has failed to properly consider the available body of knowledge on unconventional gas developments.
About Paul Mobbs
Paul Mobbs has worked as an independent environmental consultant, author and lecturer for over
20 years. His first career was in the engineering industry. Since 1992 he has worked in many fields
within environmental policy and law – from planning/development and waste management to
environmental pollution and land contamination. He occasionally works as an information and
communications technology consultant, primarily for non-governmental/community groups.
Since 2002 he has spent a large amount of time carrying out research, writing and lecturing on the
issue of energy and the environment – and in particular the issue of the ecological limits to human
development and economic growth. Over this period has lectured at universities and written
journal/news articles on various aspects of this subject. His book on 'peak energy' in Britain, Energy
Beyond Oil, was published in 2005.
In 2009 he began research work on the proposals for unconventional gas development – initially
focussing on shale gas and underground coal gasification. In 2010 this expanded to include coalbed
methane proposals. This makes him one of the earliest 'community-based' researchers on this topic in
Britain.
From 2010 he has organised education/lecture tours of different regions where unconventional gas
development is likely to take place (2010/11 in Lancashire, 2012 in South Wales/the Midlands, 2013
in The Marches, South Wales and the Midlands) to disseminate information on unconventional gas
development. In 2013 he was appointed as an adviser to the University of London School of
1 Environmental report for further onshore oil and gas licensing [DECC 2013A]
page 2 “SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation
Advanced Study's Extreme Energy Initiative2. He is currently working on a book on extreme energy in
the UK (to be published later in 2014/early 2015), as well as continuing his work assisting
communities around Britain which are likely to be affected by unconventional gas development.
2 Extreme Energy Initiative – http://extremeenergy.org/
“SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation page 3
1. Summary and general observations on the SEA report
This first section is intended to set the framework for the specific observations which follow in the
following sections. It also summarises the content of the report.
To begin, let's take the main conclusion of DECC's SEA report3:
The assessment did not identify any likely significant environmental effects for conventional oil and gas
exploration and production, virgin coalbed methane or underground gas storage.
After studying the main report and its appendices, it is my view that the greatest errors and
inconsistencies within the SEA report relate to the fact that:
it is based upon a highly selective sample of data and sources – and does not attempt to
address the wider body of research and environmental data which has emerged over the last
few years which demonstrates the ecological impacts of unconventional gas development;
in contrast to the superseded 2010 SEA report which contained wholly unrealistic assessment
parameters, this new report has been drafted to reflect a policy position rather than address
the extant body of knowledge on the ecological impacts of on-shore oil and gas developments;
and finally,
it does not attempt, in defence of current government policy objectives, to defend the details of
the proposed development programme against criticism based in real-world experience from
elsewhere around the globe – principally the USA, Canada and Australia.
As a general summary, it is my view that the SEA report fails to adequately assess the
impacts of the proposed oil and gas development proposals – both due to errors of fact, and a
failure to consider the evidential uncertainties within the impacts of on-shore oil and gas
exploration and production. In turn, if the Government proceeds with its policy, it would open
itself to legal action from those aggrieved by this policy.
The impact of pipeline networks linking to drill pads
SEA requires an assessment of all “significant effects on the environment”. The SEA report has
clearly failed to do that because it omits a specific analysis of the pipeline networks linking well pads.
In fact, the SEA considers these impacts to be “minor” when demonstrably they are not.
Pipelines works have a direct impact upon soils and hedgerows. Where they cross watercourses
the disturbance can lead to silting and run-off which can damage the ecological value of
watercourses. Where trenching operations disrupt the hydrogeological conditions in the subsoil, this
can lead to changes in local hydrology which can have an on-going impact upon agriculture and local
ecology.
If we look at the first major field development planning applications, near Falkirk in Scotland, then
the impact of pipelines is a major component of the overall development area. A recent USGS study
of the impacts on unconventional gas developments in the USA found the impacts of the totality of
landscape changes to be, “often dramatic”.
The failure to model and analyse the impact of pipeline corridors on the environment is a
serious flaw in the SEA. Arguably the pipeline component of the proposed policy has an
impact upon a larger land area than the well pads; it will cross hedgerows, and watercourses,
and may disrupt soil hydrology, leading to longer-term ecological impacts. Without an analysis
of the pipeline impact, the SEA cannot be considered a fair and adequate examination of the
3Page 121, 'Environmental Report', SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing [DECC 2013A]
page 4 “SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation
totality of foreseeable policy impacts.
The omission gas processing and compressor stations from the SEA
The SEA contains a serious error in its model for gas field production, and hence for pollution and
risks impacts. At no point is there any discussion of gas treatment and compressor stations. This
intermediate stage between the gas pad and the supply grid also gives rise to some of the most
significant sources of solid, liquid and gaseous pollutants during the production phase.
Compressor stations concentrate and treat the gas from many wells before supply – to produce
gaseous, liquid and solid waste materials. When a treatment process “cleans” something it inevitably
produces a waste by-product. For gaseous pollutants, these are most often dumped into the
atmosphere. The method of treatment chosen for the raw gas stream will also influence whether non-
gaseous wastes are produced as a liquids, sludge or solid materials. And as these processes
concentrate the pollutants contained within the raw gas, the materials they produce can be highly
toxic – and/or radioactive.
Compressor stations therefore represent a major source of both toxic air pollutants, and solid/liquid
hazardous wastes. In addition, the storage of natural gas liquids (NGL) at the compressor stations
represents a significant risk from spillage and serious explosions/fires. The level and type of pollutants
potentially emitted at compressor stations also raises the possibility that, on the edge and within
urban areas, the additional inputs from the gas production might lead to an infringement of European
air quality standards. That AMEC neglected to include these details in the preparation of the SEA, and
that DECC did not pick-up on this omission during final approval, casts doubt as to the quality and
efficacy of this report as part of this quasi-judicial decision-making process.
The omission of gas treatment/compressor stations from the assessment methodology of
the SEA represents a serious flaw in the report. Failure to consider this easily identifiable and
quantifiable risk to environmental quality represents a severe deficiency in the case presented
by the Government. Without a proper characterisation of the impacts of gas treatment, and the
gaseous and solid/sludge waste streams this creates, the SEA cannot be considered to have
met the information requirements under Annex I of the SEA Directive.
The status of underground coal gasification
DECC is currently proposing, as part of regulatory reforms to make shale gas authorisation simpler,
to reform/simplify the process for UCG authorisation. Given that the need for SEA of unconventional
oil and gas policy has been established in law, it is difficult to see how DECC can proceed with their
policy proposals on UCG without first subjecting them to SEA.
The failure to include underground coal gasification in this SEA means that DECC's policies
in relation to underground coal gasification, enacted via the Coal Authority, are arguably
unlawful. There needs to be a clarification within DECC's policies as to whether UCG is to be
lumped together with other types of “native hydrocarbon” development, or whether it will be
subject to a separate SEA process.
The failure to model coalbed methane as a distinct process
The statements in the SEA – that coalbed methane (CBM) is similar to shale gas, and that CBM
doesn't normally involve hydraulic fracturing – are demonstrably incorrect based on recent
experience. Recent experience in Australia suggests that hydraulic fracturing is routinely used in CBM
operations, and that in future this will increase as more margin regions are tapped. In terms of their
ecological footprint – for example the propensity for CBM de-watering to affect sensitive aquatic
“SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation page 5
habitats by lowering groundwater levels, or the differing discharge profile and contaminant load of
each technology – they are not the same. Given these significant differences, it cannot be said that
the processes of shale gas and coalbed methane production are equivalent. Therefore SEA should
have assessed CBM as a distinct process to shale gas – and the SEA should have modelled its
impacts as a distinct process.
The greatest documented experience in relation to coalbed methane is in the states of Queensland
and New South Wales in Australia. This month, the New South Wales Government suspended all its
operational Petroleum Exploration Licences pending a review of the environmental impacts of past
CBM operations. In Queensland CBM development has been on-going for a slightly longer period. In
2013, leaks by a whistle-blower revealed evidence of corruption within the Queensland State
Government environmental department – where political pressure was used to force regulators to
speed up approvals of the licensing process, and to ignore the lack of environmental evidence to
support licence applications.
The longest history of CBM operations is in the USA. From the 1960s to the 2000s, particularly in
states such as Wyoming, there was extensive working of coal seams for gas. However, due to poor
historic regulation of the industry by individual US states, the bonds provided as part of those historic
permitting processes are no longer sufficient to pay for the plugging/clean-up of well sites – meaning
State governments must now step in to meet the cost as the companies involved declare themselves
insolvent.
The CBM industry in Australia, like shale gas in the USA, has developed over the last decade or so.
Therefore it is only recently that environmental scientists and health professionals have been able to
catch-up with the impacts of development to date. There have been local assessments impacts, and
more recently studies by medical community. Recent sampling by universities has discovered high
fugitive emissions rates within CBM fields
The SEA states that the levels of CBM activity in Britain remain broadly comparable with those for
conventional oil and gas. From my recent experiences working with communities around Britain, this
is not the case. Within many PEDLs issued under the 13th On-Shore Oil and Gas Licensing Round,
recent exploration activities have been centred around the potential for CBM. We have also seen
recent reports from the British Geological Survey looking at the CBM potential of the UK.
CBM, as shown by the last decade or so of experience in Australia, has definable impacts
upon the natural environment and human health. Likewise the regions where CBM potential
exists – predominantly former coalfield areas – have a distinct local geology and landscape
character compared to those areas being targeted for shale gas extraction. Not modelling the
distinct processes of coalbed methane operations – in particular the differing
qualities/quantities of produced water and the propensity to impact upon hydrogeology that
this creates – represents a significant failure within the method of the SEA report.
The assumed depth of unconventional gas drilling
The SEA gives differing figures for the depth of unconventional gas working. It is a simple process
to discover the depths of potential conventional/unconventional gas resources in the areas it is
proposed to licence under the 14th Round.
For example, the small box straddling the border of Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire has been
drilled twice in the last century. The deepest bore drilled was just short of 100 metres below Ordnance
datum. Therefore the depth from the surface to gas-bearing strata is slightly less than 200 metres.
This is broadly similar to the depth of drilling/hydraulic fracturing at two sites in the USA where
page 6 “SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation
significant groundwater pollution has affected local communities.
As the area identified here was missed it raises the question as to whether, in order to
provide a higher degree of safety, AMEC/DECC have adequately assessed the depth of gas-
bearing rocks across Britain. Given that this data is readily available from the British
Geological Survey's mapping system, it would be a relatively simple matter to assess the
depth the likely gas-bearing strata. Given the shallow depth in this area on the border of
Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire, this block must be withdrawn from the 14th Round.
The interaction of planning policy guidance and the SEA
At various points during the discussion with the SEA report, potential problems picked up by the
assessment are dismissed because – it is stated – the details can be dealt with at the planning
application stage. The assessment of such impacts requires that the planning authority which
receives an application to develop a well pad site(s) assess the impacts of emissions, or the proximity
of polluting processes, upon public health. This is something which, in the Department for
Communities and Local Government's National Planning Policy Framework, local planning authorities
are expressly instructed not to do.
This position was reiterated in the specific planning guidance on on-shore oil and gas. Again, in the
context in which they are described in the SEA report, the planning authorities would not be permitted
within a strict interpretation of the guidelines to apply the type of control specified in the SEA.
It is disingenuous to suggest in the manner described, as is done at various points within
the SEA report, that planning authorities have the freedom to consider the environmental and
health impacts of on-shore oil and gas developments. Therefore, unless the Department of
Energy and Climate Change significantly modify their policies, or unless DCLG withdraws
their prohibitions, the policy outlined in the SEA report cannot be enacted by local planning
authorities. This prevents DECC from achieving the environmental protection objectives
outlined in the SEA.
BGS gas resource estimates
Within the SEA a highly misleading statistic is quoted in order to support the policy objectives which
the report is seeking to justify – the British Geological Survey “1,300 trillion cubic feet” figure.
“1,300 tcf”, or 36.8 trillion cubic metres (tcm), represents a value for “gas in place”. This figure is
considered too unreliable by many financial institutions and stock exchanges, who instead use the
'P90' or “90% probability” figure – 23.3tcm, 37% lower than the headline BGS figure.
Current technology cannot recover all the gas within the rock strata. Various estimates suggest at
best it is 10%, and often as little as 2%. As the best locations in US shale gas plays are drilled,
average daily shale gas production per well is falling. Next we have to divide this figure by the
production period in order to produce an annualised figure. The SEA suggests as little as 20 years,
whilst a figure of 30 to 40 years might be more realistic. At the 'realistic' 2% recovery factor, that
produces between 23bcm/year (20 years) to 12bcm/year (40 years).
In 2012 the UK economy demanded 14.8bcm of natural gas. However, we are also losing North
Sea oil production, and we now import much of our coal. Expressed as natural gas, the UK's total
primary energy demand in 2012 was 43bcm. That figure itself is 10% lower than the peak of energy
consumption before the recent economic recession in 2005, 48bcm.
Just as 40 years ago Britain celebrated the commissioning of the North Sea, and now today we are
now try desperately to find another supply of energy, so what will we do 40 years from now? It is not a
“SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation page 7
new source of gas which Britain needs, but rather a new economic model.
The focus on producing more finite energy resources is deflecting the political capital
required to find a truly long-term solution to human sustainability. Not only does producing
more fossil fuels exacerbate current ecological difficulties, but it merely shifts an even greater
crisis onto the next generation. The whole approach of the Government's policy objectives,
based upon the short-term depletion of finite resources, does not meet any valid
“sustainability” criteria.
Well lifetime, leakage and integrity
The SEA report states that there is a risk of hydraulic fracturing causing groundwater
contamination, but the risk of contamination from fracturing activities is exceptionally low. That
position is not supported by other research studies.
Some oil and gas industry quote high failure rates, from 5% on the first day of installation to 60%
after 25 years. The most recent large-scale study covers a variety of conventional and unconventional
oil and gas wells. In relation to unconventional gas projects in Pennsylvania it quotes failure rates of
6%. The paper also notes that in the UK, where disused well sites are cleared and restored, the true
level of leakage is likely to be higher as these wells are not subject to on-going monitoring/after-care.
The problem with the debate over well leakage is that the discussion always focusses on
guaranteeing well integrity at the time of installation. Other assumptions based on installation-time
testing, such the likelihood of fugitive emissions increasing with time, are also invalidated by these
studies. Basing long-term projections/guarantees of environmental protection on the integrity tests
conducted at the time of installation has little relevance to real-world evidence on how oil and gas
wells fail.
By underplaying the role of well leakage, the SEA's position on well leakage does not
concur with currently available evidence. Oil and gas well leakage is a statistically quantifiable
phenomena. Thus the possibility groundwater contamination and gas migration arising from
the Government's oil and gas drilling proposals is a calculable value. Taking the range of well
numbers outlined in the SEA (180 to 2880), the number of wells we might expect to fail would
be at least 11 to 181 – although, as outlined in recent research, the problematic reporting and
lack of monitoring of past well bores is likely to make this an underestimate.
Fugitive gas emissions and the MacKay-Stone report
The Mackay-Stone report is a good example of how selective quoting of certain studies, and
directly misleading statements, are currently being used to mislead public opinion. It is representative
of an disturbingly close relationship between gas companies and the Government in order to manage
the public's view of unconventional gas.
The Mackay-Stone report was published in September 2013. Previous studies claimed that the
fugitive emissions on methane meant unconventional gas had a carbon footprint far higher than
conventional natural gas, one of the key claims in the Mackay-Stone report was that shale gas in
Britain would have an equivalent footprint to existing natural gas production.
The version published by DECC in September 2013 was incomplete – missing three vital
appendices. I requested the full version from DECC, which did not arrive for almost six weeks. The
critical appendix with regard to the comparison of unconventional shale gas and conventional natural
gas, Appendix B, stated, “In the absence of information about the quality of the UK’s shale gas we
have assumed that shale gas would produce similar emissions to those in the production and
processing of conventional gas.”
page 8 “SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation
The report referenced a forthcoming report from the University of Texas – published shortly after the
DECC report. This new study claimed that methane/carbon emissions from unconventional oil and/or
gas wells were within the low range specified by the Mackay-Stone report. However, the University of
Texas study is a non-randomised sample of 190 natural gas sites in the United States, and therefore
cannot be directly related to unconventional oil/gas production as a whole.
As a result of this effort at media management, when we examine the detail the Mackay-
Stone report it does not demonstrate that unconventional gas development in Britain will be
equivalent in its climate change impacts to conventional gas; or better than other fossil fuels
such as coal. Likewise the University of Texas study, which DECC hoped would allay
criticisms from recent studies of fugitive emissions from unconventional gas sites, did not do
so because of its poor statistical construction.
The Public Health England report
Public Health England (PHE) published a report on the health impacts of unconventional gas
production in October 2013. Again, the purpose of the PHE report was to demonstrate an equivalence
between the health impacts of conventional gas production and unconventional gas.
The PHE's report was subtitled “draft for comment”. Arguably it is premature for DECC's SEA report
to quote or cite the PHE study before a final/authoritative version is produced.
When I first read the PHE report my immediate action was to check the PHE web site for details of
the consultation exercise – there were none. Then I checked the archived Health Protection Agency
site – again, no information. A month after contacting PHE I received an email which offered to extend
the comment period for myself, but did not answer the question as to the absence of a formal, publicly
advertised consultation exercise on the content of the report. No major media outlet noted the “draft
for comment” label, and all appeared to describe it as if it were a final statement on the issue of shale
gas and health.
The report itself contains no explicit instructions with regard to any consultation process; except
that is for the statement, “PHE has continued to assess the scientific evidence on the potential public
health impacts of exposures to chemical and radiological pollutants associated with shale gas
extraction, the references below have been reviewed and are not considered to affect the conclusions
of the draft report.”
The rest of section 13 then lists many of the latest research papers in the field of public health and
unconventional gas production which existed in journals at that time. To argue that these 50 papers –
without any detailed explanation or analysis – did not have a bearing on the outcome of PHE's study
offends the transparency principles which they are required to adopt in formulating public policy.
PHE's central claim is that, “Although shale gas extraction and related activities have the potential
to cause pollution to air, land and water, the currently available evidence indicates that the potential
risks to public health from exposure to the emissions associated with shale gas extraction are low if
the operations are properly run and regulated.” This cannot be substantiated given the available
evidence on the many issues related to unconventional gas development. In that respect, it is worth
laying the conclusions of the PHE study alongside the work of many recently published papers on
unconventional gas and health, in addition to the papers listed in PHE's “none of the below” list in
their report.
Note that not all the papers cited are “against” shale gas – some cast doubt, or do not find a
conclusive result. But that's critical the point; currently the evidence does not exist to provide an all-
conclusive statement either way: that “potential risks are low”, as PHE state; or that “shale gas is
“SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation page 9
inherently harmful”, which many opponents state. With regard to that, the Chief Medical Officer of
New Brunswick's report is far more balanced that the report provided by PHE.
PHE's report on the health impacts of unconventional gas is arguably biased, and is not
transparent between its assessment/collection of information and the inferences/conclusions
which it draws. Their unpublicised consultation exercise on the report was also highly suspect
– given it was merely a call for papers rather than analysis. Looking at the body of evidence
which exists art present, not enough information exists to support PHE's claim of “potential
risks are low” – nor to demonstrate the opposite conclusion either. Without the kinds of
extensive sampling/health monitoring identified by many of the recent reports cited here, and
rejected by PHE's report, such a categorical conclusion cannot be made.
The assessment of alternatives
The SEA report outlines a series of alternative proposals in order to mitigate impacts from on-shore
oil and gas production. However, these “alternatives” represent alternative strategies for awarding oil
and gas licences – not alternative methods of oil or gas production.
The assessment of alternatives within the SEA is questionable because it represents an
iteration of the same process – the issuing of oil and gas licences – rather than a true
exploration of alternative options – exploring differing methods/technologies which meet the
same objectives with a different impact upon the environment. Arguably the SEA report fails to
meet the terms of the SEA Directive.
The precautionary principle
The first paragraph of the preamble to the SEA Directive requires that protection of the environment
and human health, and the prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources, be based on the
precautionary principle. Article 191 of the Treaty of Lisbon modifies these objectives slightly –
additionally requiring action on the principle that preventive action should be taken, that environmental
damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.
The first stage in the application of the precautionary principle is the acceptance that uncertainty
exists; the characterisation of uncertainty then follows on from this acceptance. In my view the SEA
report seeks to deny that any uncertainty exists, and therefore blindly adopts measures which fit that
viewpoint rather than opening up the analysis to decide the scope and impact of those uncertain
outcomes. As I outline in relation to a number of points, this flaw can be seen in many aspects of the
SEA's analysis of policy impacts.
There are a number of grounds upon which the SEA report could be claimed to breach or
inadequately enact the requirements of Community law to apply the precautionary principle. In
that respect the whole SEA process is void – and should be restarted from the beginning. As
part of that review the SEA framework must properly be applied, so that environmental
protection flows from the policy, rather than the need to meet environmental objectives being
retroactively applied to policy afterwards.
Decision-making bias and potential malfeasance/misconduct in a public office
For me, this issue come to a head with the issue of oil and gas development – because so many
elements of our political processes are directly influenced by the fossil fuel lobby. There is, arguably, a
legal term which I believe encompasses the nature of these relationships... malfeasance or
misconduct in a public office.
These offences are based around the making of irrational decisions due to inducements or
page 10 “SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation
deference whilst in a public position which, objectively on the basis of available evidence, could not be
made by the “average person”.
This is a serious matter, but in my view this has little to do with the alleged “corrupt practices” often
seen in the media. As I see it this is solely a matter of whether or not the decisions of ministers, due to
the influences upon them, are unreasonable to a degree which might be considered unlawful. But
over and above this, we must question whether the high-level access to decision-makers given to the
energy lobby by the present Government literally obstructs – as part of the strategic environmental
appraisal process – more generally obstructs our general rights to a fair and impartial tribunal.
The reason this issue has come to a head with the SEA process is because of the role this
mechanism has in European law. The SEA Directive, alongside recent revisions to the guiding
legislation of the European Union, enacts the Aarhus Convention on the rights to information and
access to decision-making on environmental matters through the SEA process. That is why the
Government are required to consult, and demonstrate that they have done so, from the beginning of
the process.
The over-bearing influence of the fossil fuel energy lobby within the UK Government raises
the question as to whether ministers, in discharging their quasi-judicial functions as part of
the SEA process, can fairly and impartially decide upon the evidence provided by the SEA
report, and any criticisms of that case supplied as part of the SEA consultation process. As a
specific objection, I raise this question as a criticism of the SEA report, and of the processes
which gave rise to that report, including the preparation of other related reports such as those
from PHE or Mackay & Stone. Therefore, in determining the outcome of this consultation
process, I raise specific questions as to whether:
The influence of the energy lobby upon ministers will lead to a perverse interpretation
of the requirements of SEA law, and therefore to a flawed and unreasonable decision on
the substance of the SEA's information report;
The flawed nature of this decision-making process might be considered so
unreasonable that it represents, to a potentially criminal level, malfeasance or
misconduct in a public office by those involved in the recent evolution of the UK's
policy on unconventional gas; and
Over and above any UK national legal statutes on unreasonableness, whether the
undue influence of energy interests within the UK Government obstructs the ability of
responsible minister to provide, in accordance with EU law on strategic environmental
appraisal –
• a fair and impartial assessment of the impact of UK Government policy upon the
environment;
• the means to work towards sustainable development, apply the precautionary
principle in decision-making, and to ensure that the environment and human health
are protected, both under the SEA Directive and the over-arching framework of
European law.
The above failings challenge the competency of UK ministers to make decisions over critical
environmental policy matters, and whether the EU must take action against the UK
government to secure guarantees of appropriate action in order to fairly and impartially enact
EU environmental law.
Due to the nature of the complaints raise in this report, I am doubtful as to whether the responsible
“SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation page 11
ministers are capable of making an objectively informed and impartial decision upon the content of the
SEA report, and the objections of the public to that report.
If we follow UK tradition, then I would envisage that the only way we might arrive at a balanced
outcome would be to suspend all further oil and gas activities on-shore, and then hold a Royal
Commission, where all representative groups (for and against) might put their case in front of a
demonstrably fair and impartial tribunal.
There are many recent research studies which highlight the issue of our ecological
sustainability. In this report I have outlined why I view the Government's current energy policy
for on-shore oil and gas is flawed, and why moves to expand on-shore oil and gas
development will exacerbate this situation. If members of the Government proceed with these
policies after having conducted this consultation – given the information provided by this
review and the many other similar studies on other topic over the years – then in my view that
would constitute criminal malfeasance; and I believe that those responsible should be made
personally liable for their actions in the promotion of this policy initiative.
page 12 “SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation
2. Significant omissions from the SEA report
This section covers specific topics which are wholly missing from the SEA report, or which have
been inadequately assessed within the methodology of the SEA study.
2A. The impact of pipeline networks linking to drill pads
The objective of strategic environmental appraisal is4,
...to provide for a high level of protection of the environment and to contribute to the integration
of environmental considerations into the preparation and adoption of plans and programmes
with a view to promoting sustainable development, by ensuring that, in accordance with this
Directive, an environmental assessment is carried out of certain plans and programmes which
are likely to have significant effects on the environment.
The key to that process is the assessment of all “significant effects on the environment”. The SEA
report has clearly failed to do that with regard to one such impact – the development of pipeline
networks linking well pads, to gas treatment/compressor stations, and then on to connect with the
national gas grid.
The view given in the SEA report is that these pipelines have no significance when compared to the
central project of the policy under analysis – the extraction of natural gas. For example:
The scale and type of activities under Stage 3 (production development) are expected to be
largely similar to under Stage 2, with additional activities of provision of pipelines and facilities.
Given the small scale of this additional work, the assessment of effects for the majority of
objectives remains the same as Stage 2.5
Pad preparation and provision of associated infrastructure such as pipelines and road
connections during Stage 2 (exploration drilling) and Stage 3 (production development) are
likely to require the clearance of vegetation and loss of soil layers and compaction. Associated
adverse effects in terms of soil function and processes are likely to minor...6
Construction activity associated with pad preparation, road access, well construction and
(during Stage 3) pipeline works would have temporary, short-term effects on visual amenity and
landscapes.7
Additional landtake may also be required for road connections and the installation of pipelines
required to collect natural gas for transfer to the existing natural gas pipeline infrastructure.
Works are likely to require further clearance of vegetation and loss of soil layers and compaction
which may have a negative effect in terms of soil function and processes. However, it is
anticipated that sites would be restored following decommissioning such that effects would be
reduced in longer term.8
4 Article 1, [Directive 2001/42/EC]
5 Page 78, 'Environmental Report', SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing [DECC 2013A]
6 Page 92, ibid.
7 Page 97, ibid.
8 Page B4.48, Appendix B, ibid.
“SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation page 13
While it is not possible to look at specific examples of pipeline impacts, when we average the
footprint of development over large areas we can arrive at a common measure of impacts. If we look
at the spacing of well pads, whilst individual pad spacing may vary it tends towards an average across
the field. In turn, as a function of spacing, the distance spanned by the pipelines connecting individual
pads will, on average, increase as a function of well pad spacing.
For example, the current planning application by Dart Energy to develop a coalbed methane field
near Falkirk in Scotland9 comprises 16 sites (2 pre-existing) and up to 20 kilometres of pipelines.
That's around 1.25km of pipeline per site. The largest drilling sites cover 4,000 square metres, or 0.4
hectares – much smaller than the 1 hectare specified in the SEA report10. The size of the corridor
required for pipeline installation varies according to the type of land being crossed – on very hard or
very soft land the additional plant required would require a wider corridor. For the purpose of this
analysis let's assume a 15 metre wide development corridor for pipeline installation. Therefore: the
land take for the 16 sites, at 0.4 hectares per site, would be 6.4 hectares; in contrast the land take for
20 kilometres of pipeline would be 30 hectares – 4½ times greater than the pad area.
Extending this principle to the SEA methodology is a little more difficult. The assumption of a 5
kilometre pad spacing – reflecting the minimum spacing of pads in urban areas – is a large distance
compared to experience in the USA (shale gas) and Australia (coalbed methane). Assuming that the
pipeline distance is directly equivalent to the pipeline spacing, for the 30 to 120 sites identified in the
SEA (arguably, from experience elsewhere, another significant under-estimate), that's a total of 150 to
600 kilometres of pipeline. Again assuming a 15 metre pipeline corridor, that's a total of 225 to 900
hectares of land affected by pipeline development – or between 2½ to 3¾ times the size of the area
affected by pad development.
That figure is undoubtedly an underestimate – the SEA's use of a large area for individual pads,
and a large spacing between pads, leads to an underestimate of the total number of pads and thus of
the distance of pipelines between those pads.
The assumption in the SEA is that pipeline development is largely a temporary disturbance to the
environment. That again is not supported by experience. The recent United States Geological Survey
study of landscape impacts from shale gas and coalbed methane development in Pennsylvania
demonstrates this point11:
With the accompanying areas of disturbance, well pads, new roads, and pipelines from both types
of natural gas wells, the effect on the landscape is often dramatic. Figure 2 shows a pattern of
landscape change from forest to forest, interspersed with gas extraction infrastructure. These
landscape effects have consequences for the ecosystems, wildlife, and human populations that
are colocated with natural gas extraction activities.
Pipelines have a direct impact upon soils and hedgerows. Where they cross watercourses the
disturbance can lead to silting and run-off which can damage the ecological value of watercourses.
9 This development comprises two applications, straddling local authority areas: Development For Coal Bed Methane Production, Including Drilling, Well Site Establishment at 14 Locations, Inter-
Site Connection Services, Site Access Tracks, a Gas Delivery and Water Treatment Facility, Ancillary Facilities, Infrastructure and Associated Water Outfall Point – Falkirk planning authority reference P/12/0521/FUL, August 2012.
Development for coal bed methane production, including drilling, well site establishment at 14 locations (only Sites D, E and G within Stirling Council area), inter-site connection services, site access tracks, a gas delivery and water treatment facility, ancillary facilities, infrastructure and associated water outfall point near Letham – Stirling planning authority 12/00576/FUL, August 2012.
10 Table 2.7, page 29, 'Environmental Report', SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing [DECC 2013A]
11 Page 3, Landscape Consequences of Natural Gas Extraction in Bradford and Washington Counties [USGS 2012]
page 14 “SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation
Where trenching operations disrupt the hydrogeological conditions in the subsoil, this can lead to
changes in local hydrology which can have an on-going impact upon agriculture and local ecology
due to: increased water-logging of soils, where trenching works decrease permeability in the soil; or
excess draining and a lowering of the water table due to the increase of permeability along the trench.
The failure to model and analyse the impact of pipeline corridors on the environment is a
serious flaw in the SEA. Arguably the pipeline component of the proposed policy has an
impact upon a larger land area than the well pads; will cross hedgerows, and watercourses,
and may disrupt soil hydrology, leading to longer-term ecological impacts. Without an analysis
of the pipeline impact, the SEA cannot be considered a fair and adequate examination of the
totality of foreseeable policy impacts.
2B. The omission of gas processing and compressor stations from the SEA
The SEA contains a serious error in its model for gas field production, and hence for pollution and
risks impacts.
If we summarise the SEA's logical structure for the gas field production phase it would be –
Well pad → Pipeline → National gas grid
This structure is implicit in the way that both conventional12 and unconventional13 gas production
has been assessed in the SEA. The assumption appears to be that the production phase requires the
creation of more well pads, and a series of pipelines which connect to the national gas grid. In relation
to both conventional and unconventional gas the SEA states –
This stage would require additional infrastructure including storage tanks, road connections and
the installation of pipelines required to collect natural gas for transfer to the existing natural gas
pipeline infrastructure.
At no point is there any discussion of gas treatment and compressor stations. This intermediate
stage between the gas pad and the supply grid gives rise to some of the most significant sources of
solid, liquid and gaseous pollutants during the production phase. That AMEC neglected to include
these details in the preparation of the SEA, and that DECC did not pick-up on this omission during
final approval, casts doubt as to the quality and efficacy of this report as part of this quasi-judicial
decision-making process.
If we summarise the logical structure of an on-shore gas production field, what we actually find is –
Well pad → Pipeline network → Compressor station → Pipeline → National gas grid↓ ↓
Road transport NGL Waste solids/effluents← → Disposal ↓ ↓
Fire/spill hazard Concentrated airborne emissions
The gas produced from geological formations is of varying quality, containing a variety of toxic and
problematic pollutants, and comprises a liquid hydrocarbon component which condensates out at the
well head and must be stored/collected and transported away. If we look at experience in the USA
and Australia, for every 80 to 120 gas wells there is a gas treatment and compressor station, where
12 Page B7.31/32, 'Environmental Report', SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing [DECC 2013A]
13 Page B7.48/49, ibid.
“SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation page 15
the gas is cleaned before it is supplied to the gas grid.
However, the the operation of compressor stations, and the risk to the environment and human
health from their operation14, has been omitted from the methodology of the SEA. Instead, the
principal environmental impacts are limited to on-site plant emissions and gas flaring. For example –
The assessment has identified negative effects in respect of the air quality... This principally
reflects emissions to air from on-site machinery, HGV movements, drilling and hydraulic
fracturing which could result in air quality impacts on sensitive receptors including residents and
biodiversity. Additionally, there would also be emissions from flaring...15
We might assume from the SEA that once gas production begins, following pad installation, then
the majority of impacts cease. This appears to be the case, as outlined in the SEA report –
Whilst it is assumed that there would be a 5km distance between well pad sites (as per the
assumptions set out in Table 2.5) and activities would not be undertaken simultaneously (my
emphasis), which may reduce the potential for localised impacts on air quality arising from
multiple well pad sites...16
In fact, compressor stations operate 24 hours a day/365 days per year whilst gas production is
under way. Consequently the minimisation of air pollution impacts as a result of phased operation –
as intimated in the above quote from the SEA – does not represent a realistic analysis of the sources
of air pollution. Therefore the inference that air pollution impacts in any one location are transitory,
and largely cease after the exploration/pad installation phase, is clearly in error.
By combining the raw gas from many well sites, then concentrating the trace pollutants of that gas
into a single point source emission, the function of the compressor station increases the potential
harm of the airborne discharges from gas production17. For gaseous pollutants, these are most often
dumped into the atmosphere via a flare stack; which, even discounting occasional flare failure events
releasing unabated emissions, routinely lead to the formation of secondary pollutants from
combustion (e.g., nitrogen oxides).
Furthermore, the SEA fails to note, beyond the impacts of the drilling process and the production of
flowback water, that the gas production phase creates solid/sludge waste streams. As noted in the
SEA report, the assumption is that waste generation is part of drilling and site construction operations,
not production –
It is assumed that some hazardous wastes would be produced on exploratory drilling sites.18
Drilling operations at this stage would generate similar waste streams to those expected at Stage
2 but the scale of activity would increase substantially through the use of multiple well pads. This
would result in additional volumes of waste than expected under Stage 2.19
When a treatment process “cleans” something it inevitably produces a waste by-product.
Compressor stations concentrate and treat the gas from many wells before supply – to produce
gaseous, liquid and solid, often hazardous (in terms of the environmental toxicity/low flash point
14 Potential Public Health Hazards, Exposures and Health Effects from Unconventional Natural Gas [Adgate 2014]
15 Page 96, 'Environmental Report', SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing [DECC 2013A]
16 Page 96, ibid.
17 An Exploratory Study of Air Quality near Natural Gas Operations [Colborn 2014]
18 In relation to conventional gas, page B8.40, 'Environmental Report', SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing [DECC 2013A]
19 In relation to unconventional gas, page B8.53, ibid.
page 16 “SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation
definition20), waste materials. The method of treatment chosen for the raw gas stream will also
influence whether non-gaseous wastes are produced as a liquids, sludges or solid materials. And as
these processes concentrate the pollutants contained within the raw gas, the materials they produce
can be highly toxic – and/or radioactive.
Compressor stations therefore represent a major source of both toxic air pollutants, and solid/liquid
hazardous wastes. In addition, the storage of natural gas liquids21 (NGL) at the compressor stations
represents a significant risk from spillage and, as often seen in the USA, serious explosions/fires22.
The pollution from shale gas operations, and the health and environmental impacts this creates,
represents a quantifiable level of both environmental and economic impacts23 – and these impacts
should have been properly quantified as part of the SEA methodology.
Especially around urban areas, compressor stations represent a concentrated point source of
pollutants which would exacerbate existing air quality in the area24. Although the Government has to
date been dismissive of the environmental impacts of gas developments, recent research
demonstrates that the failure to adequately quantify impacts is largely down to a failure to provide
adequate monitoring of gas developments to date25 – and the approach of the SEA typifies the
systemic flaws in why regulators are failing the public in the identification and monitoring of
environmental hazards.
The level and type of pollutants potentially emitted at compressor stations also raises the possibility
that, on the edge and within urban areas, the additional inputs from the gas production might lead to
an infringement of European air quality standards26. The European Commission is already bringing a
prosecution against the UK27 for failure to meet air pollution reduction standards by the required date.
Arguably more intense natural gas development would exacerbate this problem because it would
make it harder to reach the required standard within the time frame required. In addition the nature of
these pollutants, especially the volatile organics component, are precursors in the formation of
secondary air pollutants such as ground level ozone – which again, is a serious issue in urban areas
during the summer time28.
The omission of gas treatment/compressor stations from the assessment methodology of
the SEAs represents a serious flaw in the report. Failure to consider this easily identifiable and
quantifiable risk to environmental quality represents a severe deficiency in the case presented
by the Government. Without a proper characterisation of the impacts of gas treatment, and the
gaseous and solid/sludge waste streams this creates, the SEA cannot be considered to have
met the information requirements under Annex I of the SEA Directive.
20 National Policy Statement for Hazardous Waste [DEFRA 2013]
21 NGL: 'natural gas liquids'. For information see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural-gas_processing
22 Explosion rocks natural gas compressor station, Laura Legere, Times-Tribune (Pennsylvania), 30th March 2012 http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/explosion-rocks-natural-gas-compressor-station-1.1292502
23 Estimation of regional air-quality damages from Marcellus Shale natural gas extraction in Pennsylvania [Litovitz 2013]
24 Evaluation of impact of shale gas operations in the Barnett Shale region on volatile organic compounds in air and potential human health risks [Bunch 2014]
25 Air Impacts of Increased Natural Gas Acquisition, Processing, and Use: A Critical Review [Moore 2014]
26 Protecting and enhancing our urban and natural environment to improve public health and wellbeing, DEFRA, updated March 2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/protecting-and-enhancing-our-urban-and-natural-environment-to-improve-public-health-and-wellbeing/supporting-pages/international-european-and-national-standards-for-air-quality
27 Commission takes action against UK for persistent air pollution problems, European Commission press release, 20th February 2014. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-154_en.htm
28 Air pollution by ozone across Europe during summer 2013 [EEA 2014]
“SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation page 17
2C. The status of underground coal gasification
Over the last few years the Coal Authority has issued a number of licences for underground coal
gasification29 (UCG) around the coast of Britain – and there is currently an application for the first on-
shore UCG site in Warwickshire. This policy has not yet been subject to a strategic environmental
appraisal, despite the fact that developers are currently engaged in bringing forward proposals for
test/exploratory plants around Britain.
DECC is currently proposing, as part of regulatory reforms to make shale gas authorisation simpler,
to reform/simplify the process for UCG authorisation30. Given that the need for SEA of unconventional
oil and gas policy has been established in law, it is difficult to see how DECC can proceed with their
policy proposals on UCG without first subjecting them to SEA.
UCG has a poor history. It was trialled in Britain in the 1950s and abandoned. The most recent trials
in Queensland, Australia, have led to pollution of the local environment31. Two of the three companies
involved have subsequently left Australia to develop plants elsewhere.
The failure to include underground coal gasification in this SEA means that DECC's policies
in relation to underground coal gasification, enacted via the Coal Authority, are arguably
unlawful. There needs to be a clarification within DECC's policies as to whether UCG is to be
lumped together with other types of “native hydrocarbon” development, or whether it will be
subject to a separate SEA process.
2D. The failure to model coalbed methane as a distinct processing
According to the position stated in the SEA32 –
The effects of exploration and production activities associated with virgin coalbed methane
(VCBM) are similar to those described in the assessment of effects of unconventional oil and gas
(Stages 1 to 6) above, although hydraulic fracturing is not normally required.
Both statements – that coalbed methane (CBM) is similar to shale gas, and that CBM doesn't
normally involve hydraulic fracturing – are demonstrably incorrect based on recent experience.
The greatest documented experience in relation to coalbed methane is in the states of Queensland
and New South Wales in Australia (note, CBM in Australia is called 'coal seam gas', or CSG).
CBM/CSG began to expand across the east of Australian a little over a decade ago (Western
Australia tends to concentrate on shale gas). As a result, Australia today has a mass public movement
which seeks to oppose CBM that, arguably, is better organised and has been far more effective than
their shale gas counterparts in the USA.
This month, the New South Wales Government's Minister for Resources and Energy suspended all
its operational Petroleum Exploration Licences (PELs), and halted the consideration of new/in process
applications. All regulatory activities have been halted pending a review of the environmental impacts
29 Underground Coal Gasification in the UK, Coal Authority. http://coal.decc.gov.uk/en/coal/cms/publications/mining/gasification/gasification.aspx
30 Seventh Statement of New Regulation – January-June 2014, DECC, December 2013.https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/266300/DECC_SNR7_V0_3.pdf
31 Independent Scientific Panel Report On Underground Coal Gasification Pilot Trials, Independent Scientific Panel on Underground Coal Gasification, Queensland Department of Environment and Resource Management, June 2013.http://www.fraw.org.uk/files/extreme/derm_2013.pdf
32 Page 98, 'Environmental Report', SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing [DECC 2013A]
page 18 “SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation
of past CBM operations, and the perceived need to introduce a tighter regulatory regime33. This
change in policy has been driven by rising public and professional concerns about the impacts of
CBM/CSG. In Queensland CBM development has been on-going for a slightly longer period, and
there too significant public opposition exists. Following leaks by a whistle-blower, in 2013 ABC News
revealed evidence of corruption within the Queensland State Government environmental
department34 – where political pressure was used to force regulators to speed up approvals of the
licensing process, and to ignore the lack of environmental evidence to support licence applications.
The longest history of CBM operations is in the USA. The difficulty with the situation in the USA is
that the impacts to date, certainly in comparison to recent studies in Australia, are largely
undocumented.
From the 1960s to the 2000s, particularly in states such as Wyoming, there was extensive working
of coal seams for gas – although large parts of these fields are today being run down as investment
has shifted towards the shale gas industry. However, due to poor historic regulation of the industry by
individual US states, there is growing concern about “orphaned” CBM wells35. Until very recently the
scale of pollution from CBM wells was unforeseen when permits to develop CBM fields were issued.
Today the bonds provided as part of those historic permitting processes are no longer sufficient to pay
for the plugging/clean-up of well sites – meaning State governments must now step in to meet the
cost as the companies involved declare themselves insolvent.
Recent experience in Australia suggests that hydraulic fracturing is routinely used in CBM
operations36, and that in future this will increase as more margin regions are tapped – with perhaps up
to 80% of CBM wells being fractured. In practice the necessity to 'frack' is largely determined on an
economic analysis of the area concerned, rather than by policy. The gas resource properties of coal
seams vary across the field. As more marginal areas of fields are being exploited, so the economic
case to frack to initiate or to maintain production volumes improves.
In relation to environmental impacts the SEA report further states37 –
Scale and duration of activities: VCBM exploration drilling and production sites are usually
smaller than unconventional oil and gas drilling sites whilst commercially viable VCBM
containing formations tend to be shallower (200-1,500m depth) and drilling times may also be
relatively shorter. In consequence, it is likely that negative effects on SEA objectives relating to,
for example, biodiversity, health, land use, geology and soils, air quality, waste and climate
change due to emissions to air, waste generation and noise arising from construction activities
and drilling would be less.
Again, the practical evidence on CBM extraction does not corroborate this view. This is especially
true of the recent history of CBM working in Australia.
The CBM industry in Australia, like shale gas in the USA, has developed over the last decade or so.
Therefore it is only recently that environmental scientists and health professionals have been able to
33 NSW Government Freezes Petroleum Exploration Licence Applications, New South Wales State Government, 26th March 2014. http://www.csg.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/41834/rel_roberts_20140326_petroleum_exploration_licence_applications.pdf
34 GAS LEAK! [ABC 2013]
35 Coalbed methane bust leaves thousands of orphaned gas wells in Wyoming, High Country News, 23rd December 2013. https://www.hcn.org/issues/45.22/the-coalbed-methane-bust-has-left-orphaned-gas-wells-across-wyoming
36 Hydraulic Fracturing in Coal Seam Gas Mining [NTN 2011]
37 Page 99, 'Environmental Report', SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing [DECC 2013A]
“SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation page 19
catch-up with the impacts of development to date. There have been local assessments of
environmental38 and health impacts39 in CBM field areas, and more recently debate has been growing
in the medical community40. Recent sampling by universities has also discovered – as with similar
studies of shale gas operations in the USA – high fugitive emissions rates within CBM fields41. Also,
due to the high levels of salt which CBM operations deposit in rivers in the areas affected42, and the
hydrogeological impacts of CBM de-watering operations on an already drought-stressed region, CBM
development is increasingly causing conflicts with the agricultural community too43.
One of the key differences in the production of CBM and shale gas is the amount of
produced/flowback water – as outlined briefly in the SEA44. With shale gas, a large proportion of the
flowback water is the result of the high volumes of water injection during the hydraulic fracturing
process. With CBM the coal seam are actually de-watered – pumping water from the seams in order
to force the gas from the rock. Unlike shale gas, which is trapped in pore spaces, the gas trapped in
coal seams is released by the change in pressure and saturation created by de-watering; causing gas
trapped in the 'cleats' (the bedding planes of the coal seam) to be liberated. Hydraulic fracturing can
assist this process by creating pathways for migration within less permeable seams, speeding the
movement of gas and thus increasing production volumes within a shorter time span.
The result is that whilst the rate of flowback water exponentially decreases with shale gas
production, to maintain gas flow in CBM operations the volume of pumped water must be maintained
– or even increased – over time. Even where fracturing is not used to initiate gas flow, at a later date
there many be an economic case to undertake hydraulic fracturing to maintain gas flow as the field
depletes.
The large quantities of produced water from coal seams, due to their differing geological history
compared to shale and the presence of high levels of organic carbon, contain differing levels of trace
contaminants. This gives rise to a differing pollution load within the produced water, and given that
water volumes must be maintained, this pollution load is maintained for a longer period. This
translates to a higher volume of wastes resulting from water treatment, and the potential for a higher
pollution load being discharged into aquatic ecosystems.
Given these significant differences, it cannot be said that the processes of shale gas and coalbed
methane production are equivalent. In terms of their ecological footprint – for example the propensity
for CBM de-watering to affect sensitive aquatic habitats by lowering groundwater levels, or the
differing discharge profile and contaminant load of each technology – they are not the same.
Therefore SEA should have assessed CBM as a distinct process to shale gas – and the SEA should
have modelled its impacts as a distinct process.
Finally, the SEA states that45 –
38 Submission to the NSW Chief Scientist and Engineer – Review of coal seam gas activities in NSW [CHA 2013]
39 Symptomatology of a gas field [McCarron 2013]
40 Harms unknown: health uncertainties cast doubt on the role of unconventional gas [Coram 2014]
41 Enrichment of Radon and Carbon Dioxide in the Open Atmosphere of an Australian Coal Seam Gas Field [Tait 2013]
42 Assessing the salinity impacts of coal seam gas water on landscapes and surface streams, Australian/Queensland StateGovernment, February 2013. htt://www.dnrm.q p ld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/106093/csg-irrigation-salinity-risk-assessment.pdf Coal Seam Gas: Produced Water and Solids, Office of the NSW Chief Scientist and Engineer, New South Wales State Government, 22nd November 2013. http://www.chiefscientist.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/ pdf_file/0006/38157/OCSE-Final-Report-Stuart-Khan-Final.pdf
43 The Agri-Gas Fields of Australia: Black Soil, Food, and Unconventional Gas [de Rijke 2013]
44 Page 99, 'Environmental Report', SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing [DECC 2013A]
45 Page 98, 'Environmental Report', SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing [DECC 2013A]
page 20 “SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation
Unlike shale gas or oil, for which exploration in the UK has only just begun, VCBM in the UK
has been the subject of active exploration for over a decade, and a number of small-scale
production projects already exist. The levels of activity however remain broadly comparable with
those for conventional oil and gas. There seems no reason to expect any substantial change in
outlook, and no attempt has been made in the assessment to provide a separate indication of low
and high levels of activity for VCBM.
Again, from my recent experiences working with communities around Britain, this is not the case.
Also we must differentiate between the very different process of Coal Mine Methane (CMM), of which
a number of projects exists across Britain (usually tied to pre-existing disused conventional coal mine
workings), and CBM, for which only a few exist. Arguably CBM has not seen major developments in
the UK for many of the same reasons that shale gas did not take-off here when it did in the USA
around 1999/2000 – until the peak and decline of North Sea gas production, and the higher prices this
created within Europe, the economics of unconventional gas were not viable in the European market.
Many of the PEDLs issued under the 13th On-Shore Oil and Gas Licensing Round in 2008 –
especially in South Wales, the Marches, the East Midlands and Scotland – are targeting coal seams.
Deeper shale deposits may also be tapped, but, to take Dart Energy as an example (an Australian
company with a history of CBM/CSG working, and who left Australia in 201346 to concentrate its
activities in markets where they considered the regulatory regime to be less demanding), their recent
exploration activities have been centred around the potential for CBM.
We have also seen recent reports from the British Geological Survey, following on from the interest
created by the PEDL licences granted under the 13th Round, describing the CBM potential of the
UK47, and of individual regions such as the East Midlands48. Therefore to assume that the present low
uptake of CBM will continue in the future is not borne-out by current exploration trends, or the studies
currently being carried out into the future potential for CBM as a result of the 14th Round.
CBM, as shown by the last decade or so of experience in Australia, has definable impacts
upon the natural environment and human health. Likewise the regions where CBM potential
exists – predominantly former coalfield areas – have a distinct local geology and landscape
character compared to those areas being targeted for shale gas extraction. Not modelling the
distinct processes of coalbed methane operations – in particular the differing
qualities/quantities of produced water and the propensity to impact upon hydrogeology that
this creates – represents a significant failure within the method of the SEA report.
2E. The assumed depth of unconventional gas drilling
The SEA gives differing figures for the depth of unconventional gas working:
Quantification of Activity Scenarios for Unconventional Oil and Gas Exploration and Production
Exploration drilling and hydraulic fracturing: Depth of well – Variable, 500m to 3000m or
more.49
46 Dart Energy slashes costs amid CSG changes, Sydney Morning Herald, 2nd April 2013. http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-business/dart-energy-slashes-costs-amid-csg-changes-20130402-2h3wj.html
47 The Unconventional Hydrocarbon Resources Of Britain's Onshore Basins – Coalbed Methane [BGS 2012A]
48 Can New Technologies be Used to Exploit the Coal Resources in the Yorkshire-Nottinghamshire Coalfield? [BGS 2013]
49 Table 2.7, page 29, 'Environmental Report', SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing [DECC 2013A]
“SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation page 21
...the geological context of shale gas or oil in the UK is one of considerable distances between
the target strata to be fractured and likely sources of groundwater (likely to be in excess of
1,000m).50
The use of these figures, given the depth of gas-bearing rocks at at least one of the locations it is
proposed to licence, raises the question as to whether AMEC have actually assessed the likely depths
of shale gas working in all the areas identified in the SEA study.
Map NTS151 shows the areas assessed as part of the SEA. It is a simple process to discover the
depths of potential conventional/unconventional gas resources in these area. For example, let's
examine the small box which straddles the boundaries of Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire. The
knowledge of gas deposits is based on early drilling carried out before World War I, and more
intensive drilling carried out by BP in the early 1960s – both instances produced large gas flows52.
As part of these historic drilling operations, the deepest bore drilled was just short of 100 metres
below Ordnance datum. Therefore the depth from the surface to gas-bearing strata, given the
average height of the local landscape, is slightly less than 200 metres. This is broadly similar to the
depth of drilling/hydraulic fracturing at two sites in the USA – Pavillion in Wyoming and Dimock in
Pennsylvania – where significant groundwater pollution has affected local communities.
If the primary safety feature of shale gas is that it lies beneath a great depth of the rock, then it
should be a simple matter to exclude those areas which have a short distance to the gas-bearing
strata. At just under 200 metres, the search area allocated on the border of Oxfordshire and
Buckinghamshire is less than half the depth of the minimum figure suggested in the SEA report. This
should have been picked up in the assessment of the areas proposed for licensing under the 14th
Round.
As the area identified here was missed it raises the question as to whether, in order to
provide a higher degree of safety, AMEC/DECC have adequately assessed the depth of gas-
bearing rocks across Britain. Given that this data is readily available from the British
Geological Survey's mapping system, it would be a relatively simple matter to assess the
depth of the likely gas-bearing strata. Given the shallow depth in this area on the border of
Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire, this block must be withdrawn from the 14th Round.
2F. The interaction of planning policy guidance and the SEA
At various points during the discussion with the SEA report, potential problems picked up by the
assessment are dismissed because – it is stated – the details can be dealt with at the planning
application stage. For example:
There is the potential for activities associated with unconventional oil and gas exploration and
production to have negative effects on the population objective through disturbance to local
community, particularly during well site construction, exploration drilling and production
development stages (Stages 2-3) arising from an increase in vehicle movements. However, any
50 Page 96, ibid.
51 Page 6, ibid.
52 Mineral Resource Information in Support of National, Regional and Local Planning Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes,British Geological Survey (ref. CR/03/77N), 2004. http://www.bgs.ac.uk/downloads/start.cfm?id=2591 The Unconventional Hydrocarbon Resources of Britain's Onshore Basins – Shale Gas [BGS 2012B]
page 22 “SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation
such effects can be expected to be mitigated through planning controls.53
There is the potential for activities associated with unconventional oil and gas exploration and
production to have negative effects on human health, particularly during the more intensive and
intrusive stages (Stages 2-5). However, any such effects can be expected to be mitigated through
planning controls.54
Whilst it is assumed that there would be a 5km distance between well pad sites... and activities
would not be undertaken simultaneously, which may reduce the potential for localised impacts on
air quality arising from multiple well pad sites, effects could be significant where sites are
located within or in close proximity to areas where there are existing air quality issues (such as
Air Quality Management Areas) and/or sensitive receptors. However, it can be anticipated that
regulatory controls through the Town and Country planning system and subsequent
environmental permitting will ensure that these effects are not unacceptable.55
The assessment of impacts above requires that the planning authority which receives an
application to develop a well pad site(s) assess the impacts of emissions, or the proximity of polluting
processes, upon public health. This is something which, in the Department of Communities and Local
Government's (DCLG) National Planning Policy Framework, local planning authorities are expressly
instructed not to do56 –
...local planning authorities should focus on whether the development itself is an acceptable use
of the land, and the impact of the use, rather than the control of processes or emissions
themselves where these are subject to approval under pollution control regimes. Local planning
authorities should assume that these regimes will operate effectively. Equally, where a planning
decision has been made on a particular development, the planning issues should not be revisited
through the permitting regimes operated by pollution control authorities.
This position was reiterated in the DCLG's specific planning guidance on on-shore oil and gas57 –
The planning system controls the development and use of land in the public interest and, as
stated in paragraphs 120 and 122 of the National Planning Policy Framework, this includes
ensuring that new development is appropriate for its location taking account of the effects
(including cumulative effects) of pollution on health, the natural environment or general amenity,
and the potential sensitivity of the area or proposed development to adverse effects from
pollution. In doing so the focus of the planning system should be on whether the development
itself is an acceptable use of the land, and the impacts of those uses, rather than any control
processes, health and safety issues or emissions themselves where these are subject to approval
under other regimes. Minerals planning authorities should assume that these non-planning
regimes will operate effectively.
The guidance on on-shore oil and gas – in paragraphs 30-32 – then lists various criteria which local
53 Page 90, 'Environmental Report', SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing [DECC 2013A]
54 Page 90, ibid.
55 Page 96, ibid.
56 Paragraph 122, National Planning Policy Framework, Department for Communities and Local Government, March 2012.https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6077/2116950.pdf
57 Paragraph 29, Planning practice guidance for onshore oil and gas, Department for Communities and Local Government,July 2013. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 224238/Planning_practice_guidance_for_onshore_oil_and_gas.pdf
“SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation page 23
planning authorities either can or cannot consider when determining planning applications. Again, in
the context in which they are described in the SEA report, the planning authorities would not be
permitted within a strict interpretation of the guidelines to apply the type of control specified in the
SEA.
It should be noted that the planning guidance on on-shore oil and gas was not consulted upon –
despite the fact that it has significant implications for the environment and public participation. It was
imposed without public consultation. It is arguable therefore that these guidelines may violate the
consultation requirements of the Aarhus Convention58, and therefore may arguably be unlawful and
hence unenforceable. In any case, large parts of European Law – for example on waste or
air/groundwater pollution – have direct effect upon local authorities. Therefore, given that in law
permitting oil and gas development may violate these laws, and because evidence from other nations
where these processes have been carried out suggest that regulation cannot guarantee to protect the
environment, it would be open to local authorities to challenge the reasonableness of these
guidelines.
It is disingenuous to suggest in the manner described, as is done at various points within
the SEA report, that planning authorities have the freedom to consider the environmental and
health impacts of on-shore oil and gas developments. Such consideration has been expressly
prohibited by recent DCLG guidance. Therefore, unless the Department of Energy and Climate
Change significantly modify their policies, or unless DCLG withdraws their prohibitions, the
policy outlined in the SEA report cannot be enacted by local planning authorities. This
prevents DECC from achieving the environmental protection objectives outlined in the SEA.
58 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide (Second Edition), United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, April 2013. http://www.fraw.org.uk/files/ukgov/unece_2013.pdf
page 24 “SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation
3. General themes/issues across the SEA study
Rather than examining specific flaws in the report, this section outlines wider deficiencies within the
SEA. With reference to other studies and research papers, the observations in this sections show how
the latest research and evidence/observations invalidate elements of the SEA, and by extension the
policies being pursued by DECC.
3A. BGS gas resource estimates
Within the SEA a highly misleading statistic is quoted in order to support policy objectives59 –
A recent report by the British Geological Survey, while estimating the gas in place within the
Bowland Shale of northern England to be substantial (mid-point estimate 36.8 trillion cubic
metres/1,300 trillion cubic feet), noted that the assessment of shale gas resources in the UK is as
yet still in its infancy. DECC has subsequently stated that while shale gas has potential in the
UK, little drilling or testing has taken place and therefore it is not possible to make meaningful
estimates of how much shale gas may be practically and commercially recoverable, which is to
say that it is not yet possible to estimate the size of the reserves.
During July 2013, following the publications of the British Geological Survey's Bowland Shale Gas
Study60, this “1,300 trillion cubic feet” figure was repeated regularly. Unfortunately it was never
adequately stated exactly what this figure meant – not even in DECC's publication designed to
explain what the figure meant61.
The “1,300 trillion cubic feet” figure – from now on expressed using the metric 36.8 trillion cubic
metre (tcm) figure – represents a value for “gas in place”. That is an estimate of the gas physically
present in the rock. However, this is what's known as the 'P50' or “50% probability” figure. This means
that there's an evens chance that this amount of gas exists in the rock.
This figure is considered too unreliable by many financial institutions and stock exchanges, who
instead use the 'P90' or “90% probability” figure. This figure expresses that there's a 90% chance that
the figure is at or below that stated value, and is used by stock markets for reserves reporting
because it is considered a far more reliable estimate of the gas likely to be produced by a certain
geological unit. The P90 figure from the BGS study is 23.3tcm – 37% lower than the figure which was
used across the media in July 2013.
This figure is still for “gas in place”. Current technology cannot recover all the gas within the rock
strata. Various estimates from the US suggest that the figure may be, within the best locations, 10%,
and often as little as 2%. In fact, as the best locations in US shale gas plays, and more marginal
locations are drilled, average daily shale gas production per well has been falling62. Therefore
assuming that the figure were to lie between 2% and 10%, the amount of gas produced would be
between 0.446 to 2.33tcm – or 466 billion cubic metres (bcm) to 2,330bcm.
59 Page 85, 'Environmental Report', SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing [DECC 2013A]
60 Bowland Shale Gas Study, BGS/DECC, July 2013. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/bowland-shale-gas-study
61 Resources vs Reserves: What do estimates of shale gas mean?, DECC, 27th July 2013. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/256358/Publication_Resources_vs_Reserves_June13.pdf
62 A reality check on the shale revolution [Hughes 2013]
“SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation page 25
This is the total production. Next we have to divide this figure by the production period in order to
produce an annualised figure. The SEA suggests as little as 20 years, whilst a figure of 30 to 40 years
might be more realistic given the lower financial returns likely within the European market. Calculating
the annualised figure for each period, between the 2% (typical) and 10% (exceptional) recover factor:
20 years – 23.3 to 117 bcm/year; 30 years – 16 to 78 bcm/year; 40 years – 12 to 58 bcm/year.
It should be noted that in 2012 (the last full year of official statistics63) the UK produced around
7.8bcm/year of gas, but in that same year the economy demanded 14.8bcm – the deficit of 7bcm
being imported from abroad. However, we are also losing North Sea oil production, we now import
much of our coal, and there are no viable uranium resources in Britain. Expressed as a value of
natural gas, the UK's total primary energy demand in 2012 was 43bcm. That figure itself is 10% lower
than the peak of energy consumption before the recent economic recession in 2005, 48bcm.
Therefore there are great uncertainties within the Government's policies on unconventional gas.
Using a realistic projection (P90 'gas-in-place' figure and 2% recovery factor), if it takes longer than 40
years to produce the Bowland formation – or the BGS study turns out to be an over-estimate – then
we will not maintain natural gas production. More importantly, given that natural gas accounts for less
than two-fifths of the UK energy economy, whilst we may address the “gas issue”, there are other
energy and non-energy resources facing production bottle-necks due to resource depletion64.
Just as 40 years ago Britain celebrated the commissioning of the North Sea, today we are trying
desperately to find another supply of energy; what will we in 40 years from now? Government policy,
based upon the consumption of finite energy resources, cannot solve Britain's long-term energy and
economic problems65. More importantly, whilst gas is quite important to the UK economy, in terms of
the global economy of which Britain is a part, petroleum is a far more important component66 – and
current global trends indicate that conventional crude oil production has been on a long-term plateau
since 2004/567, and production may begin to decline over the next two years or so.
It is not a new source of gas which Britain needs, but rather a new economic model68. The current
proposals for unconventional gas production simply shift the problems of energy supply into the next
generation, whilst at the same time creating a more damaged and toxic global environment69 – which
by no sense of the definitions of “sustainable development” called for under the SEA Directive, and
other community legislation, can be described as a environmentally sustainable option.
The focus on producing more finite energy resources is deflecting the political capital
required to find a truly long-term solution to human sustainability. Not only does producing
more fossil fuels exacerbate current ecological difficulties, but it shifts an even greater crisis
onto the next generation. The whole approach of the Government's policy objectives, based
upon the short-term depletion of finite resources, does not meet any valid “sustainability”
criteria.
63 Digest of UK Energy Statistics (DUKES) 2013, DECC. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/digest-of-uk-energy-statistics-dukes
64 A Comparison Of The Limits To Growth With Thirty Years Of Reality [CSIRO 2008]
65 The Second Law of Economics: Energy, Entropy, and the Origins of Wealth, Reiner Kümmel, Springer, June 2011. ISBN9781-4419-9364-9. See also Ecological Economics Comes of Age [Czech 2013]
66 Economic vulnerability to Peak Oil [Kerschner 2013]
67 Oil's Tipping Point has Passed [Murray-King 2013]
68 The Need for a New, Biophysical-Based Paradigm in Economics for the Second Half of the Age of Oil [Hall 2006]
69 State of the Planet Declaration [UNCED 2013]
page 26 “SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation
3B. Well lifetime, leakage and integrity
The SEA report states –
There is a risk of hydraulic fracturing causing groundwater contamination, principally due to
leakages of methane as a result of inadequacies in well cementing... Taking into account the
requirements for discharge consents/permits and EA/SEPA policy in respect of groundwater
protection, it is considered reasonable to suggest that any risk of contamination from fracturing
activities is exceptionally low.70
That position is not supported by a variety of other research studies. For example, of the oft-quoted
paper71 from the oil and gas industry's own journal Oilfield Review, which used data from a wide
range of conventional oil and gas wells to show that 1 in 20 (5%) of wells fail (i.e., show gas leakage)
on the first day; and that failure rate increases to 3 in 5 (60%) after 25 years. Other studies from that
period begin to characterise one of the principal flaws of well bores – the cement job which is
intended to prevent contaminant migration72. This is an issue which has been revisited in recent
papers looking at well leakage in shale gas fields in Pennsylvania73.
The most recent large-scale study, released this month, and which examines a variety of
conventional and unconventional wells, states in relation to recent US gas projects in Pennsylvania –
Of the 8030 wells targeting the Marcellus shale inspected in Pennsylvania between 2005 and
2013, 6.3% of these have been reported to the authorities for infringements related to well
barrier or integrity failure. In a separate study of 3533 Pennsylvanian wells monitored between
2008 and 2011, there were 85 examples of cement or casing failures, 4 blowouts and 2 examples
of gas venting.
The paper concludes –
Well barrier and integrity failure is a reasonably well-documented problem for conventional
hydrocarbon extraction and the data we report show that it is an important issue for
unconventional gas wells as well.
The paper also noted that in the UK – where disused well bores are usually plugged, removed
below surface level and then the site is restored – the true level of leakage over the installed lifetime
of the well is likely to be higher, because these wells are not subject to on-going monitoring/after-care.
The problem with the debate over well leakage is that the discussion focusses on guaranteeing well
integrity at the time of installation – when in fact the evidence suggests that failure rates, and hence
the likelihood of pollutant migration, increases with time. Therefore a well which performs adequately
for a few years may, some years later, fail and allow the vertical migration of pollutants.
Other assumptions based on installation-time testing, such the likelihood of fugitive emissions
increasing with time, are also invalidated by these studies – and help to explain the gap between the
official industry/regulator position on leakage, and recent studies of high levels of contaminants found
in the atmosphere around gas fields74. Basing long-term projections/guarantees of environmental
protection on the integrity tests conducted at the time of installation therefore has little relevance to
70 Page 95/6, 'Environmental Report', SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing [DECC 2013A]
71 From Mud to Cement – Building Gas Wells [Brufatto 2003]
72 Why Oilwells Leak: Cement Behavior and Long-Term Consequences [SPE 2000]
73 Fluid Migration Mechanisms Due To Faulty Well Design And/Or Construction [Ingraffea 2013]
74 Fugitive Emissions from Coal Seam Gas [Santos 2012]Enrichment of Radon and Carbon Dioxide in the Open Atmosphere of an Australian CSG Field [Tait 2013]
“SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation page 27
real-world evidence on how oil and gas wells fail. Neither the SEA report, nor DECC's oil and gas
policies more generally, specify conditions for the long-term after-care of well sites.
By underplaying the role of well leakage, the SEA's position on well leakage does not
concur with currently available evidence. Oil and gas well failure and leakage is a statistically
quantifiable phenomena. Thus the possible impacts of groundwater contamination and gas
migration arising from the Government's oil and gas drilling proposals is calculable. For
example, taking the range of well numbers outlined in the SEA (180 to 2880), the number of
wells we might expect to fail would be at least 11 to 181 – although, as outlined in recent
research, the problematic reporting and lack of monitoring of past well bores is likely to make
this an underestimate.
3C. Fugitive gas emissions and the MacKay-Stone report
Recent disclosures75 relating to communications between DECC officials and the staff of gas
companies demonstrate the close media management. For example, one email from the Department
of Energy to Centrica in September 2013 stated76 –
Our polling shows that academics are the most trusted sources of information to the public so we
are looking at ways to work with the academic community to present the scientific facts around
shale.
Given that DECC put such emphasis on “academic” information in order to sway public opinion, it
was not surprising that the shale gas public relations agenda was dominated by three academic
reports during 2013:
the BGS' Bowland study in July (covered in 3A above);
the Mackay-Stone report (dealt with below); and
the Public Health England study (dealt with in section 3D which follows).
The difficulty with all these studies is that – as they are intended to provides a “positive spin” on the
unconventional gas issue – the scientific uncertainties over unconventional gas production, and
omissions/partial emphasis within the case made within each study, do not provide a balanced view of
the issue to the public.
The Mackay-Stone report is one such example of how selective quoting of certain studies, and
directly misleading statements, have been used to mislead public opinion. According to the
statements made in the SEA report77 –
It is estimated that GHG emissions associated with Stage 2 and Stage 3 could be up to 0.96M
tCO2eq per annum... This estimate is based on the median values of GHG emissions from a range
of source data, as detailed in a recent report by MacKay and Stone (2013) concerning potential
GHG emissions associated with shale gas extraction and use... In this respect, a recent study by
75 Emails reveal UK helped shale gas industry manage fracking opposition, Damian Carrington, The Guardian, Friday 17th January 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jan/17/emails-uk-shale-gas-fracking-opposition
76 File 'EMAIL DECC TO CENTRICA 19.09.13.pdf', available as part of a ZIP archive from FOI release: Correspondence and meetings between the Office of Unconventional Gas and Oil, UKOOG, Centrica and Igas, DECC, 15th January 2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/correspondence-and-meetings-between-the-office-of-unconventional-gas-and-oil-ukoog-centrica-and-igas
77 Page 86, 'Environmental Report', SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing [DECC 2013A]
page 28 “SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation
Allen et al (2013) concerning methane emissions at natural gas production sites in the United
States concludes that the application of current good practice is more successful in reducing well
completion emissions than previously estimated...
The Mackay-Stone report was published on 9th September 201378. Previous studies had claimed
that fugitive emissions of methane meant unconventional gas had a carbon footprint far higher than
conventional natural gas79. One of the key claims in the Mackay-Stone report was that shale gas in
Britain would have an equivalent footprint to existing natural gas production. As Energy Minister Ed
Davey said at the launch of the report80 –
This report shows that the continued use of gas is perfectly consistent with our carbon budgets
over the next couple of decades... It should help reassure environmentalists like myself, that we
can safely pursue UK shale gas production and meet our national emissions reductions targets
designed to help tackle climate change.
The version published by DECC at the launch in September 2013 was incomplete – missing three
vital appendices (B, C and D) which defined the methodology under which the “headline” results of
the report had been constructed. A few days later, after reading the report, I requested the full version
from DECC. This did not arrive for almost six weeks. The critical appendix with regard to the
comparison of unconventional shale gas and conventional natural gas, Appendix B, stated –
In the absence of information about the quality of the UK’s shale gas we have assumed (my
emphasis) that shale gas would produce similar emissions to those in the production and
processing of conventional gas.
Therefore the claims in the report, reiterated by the Energy Minister, are based upon an assumption
rather than real-world data analysis. Of course, due to the prolonged delay by DECC in sending a
copy of the complete report, six weeks after the event this was no longer a live media issue which I
could comment upon.
There was one further twist in the impression of the “science” given at the launch of the Mackay-
Stone report. The report referenced a forthcoming report from the University of Texas – which was
published81 shortly after their report. This new study claimed that methane/carbon emissions from
unconventional oil and/or gas wells were within the low range specified by the Mackay-Stone report.
However, there is a critical factor not stated within the DECC report – the University of Texas study is
a non-randomised sample of 190 natural gas sites in the United States.
In other words, of the the 8000 or so wells drilled in the USA that year the study team were told
which 190 sites they were to monitor. Furthermore, the failure to define precisely what type of wells
were being monitored (either tight oil/gas, shale, coalbed methane, and in which geological formation
these were located) means that a comparison with the values given in other studies is difficult to carry
out. The fact that the study is based upon a non-randomised sample also means that – in
contradiction to the assertions of DECC and the Energy Minister – its results cannot be directly
78 Potential Greenhouse Gas Emissions Associated with Shale Gas Extraction and Use [DECC 2013B]
79 Methane and the greenhouse-gas footprint of natural gas from shale formations [Howarth 2011]Venting and Leaking of Methane from Shale Gas Development [Howarth 2012]Increased stray gas abundance in a subset of drinking water wells near Marcellus shale gas extraction [Jackson 2013]Methane emissions estimate from airborne measurements over a western United States natural gas field [Karion 2013]
80 Davey: UK shale gas development will not be at expense of climate change targets, Department for Energy & Climate Change, 9th September 2013. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/davey-uk-shale-gas-development-will-not-be-at-expense-of-climate-change-targets
81 Measurements of methane emissions at natural gas production sites in the United States [Allen 2013]
“SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation page 29
related to unconventional oil/gas wells as a whole82.
As outlined in the email conversations between gas companies and DECC, the unconventional gas
project in Britain is increasing an issue of media management rather than objective fact. That's a
problem because it means that politics, and thus the media, are no longer relating a transparent case
which will enable the public to objectively consider the potential risks and benefits of the
Government's unconventional gas project.
As a result of this effort at media management rather than objective reporting, when we
examine the detail in the Mackay-Stone report it does not demonstrate that unconventional
gas development in Britain will be equivalent in its climate change impacts to conventional
gas; or better than other fossil fuels such as coal. Likewise the University of Texas study,
which DECC hoped would allay criticisms from recent studies of fugitive emissions from
unconventional gas sites, did not do so because of its poor statistical construction.
3D. The Public Health England report
A month after the Mackay-Stone report, Public Health England (PHE) published a report on the
health impacts of unconventional gas production83. As with the report by Mackay & Stone, the PHE
study was a largely theoretical exercise, based upon a partial examination of the evidence available
on the links between unconventional gas exploration/production and health. Again, the purpose of the
PHE report was to demonstrate an equivalence between the health impacts of conventional gas
production and unconventional gas. As stated in the SEA report84 –
Effects on health are likely to be similar to those identified in respect of conventional oil and gas,
although the scale, duration and magnitude of effects would be greater (commensurate with the
number of wells, average well depth and also the requirement hydraulic fracturing) and could
include air quality, noise and vibration impacts from construction works, HGV movements,
drilling, fracturing and flaring. Taking into account expected regulatory controls, the temporary
nature of individual activities and the implementation of appropriate management procedures, it
is generally anticipated that adverse effects on either public or worker health would be minor. In
this respect, Public Health England has recently published a review of the available evidence on
potential public health impacts. While noting that caution is required in extrapolating evidence
from overseas into the UK context, they consider that the potential risks to public health are low
if the operations are properly run and regulated.
Whilst the main text presents the position of PHE as apparently certain, the PHE report contains a
significant qualification of its status on the front cover – “draft for comment”. Arguably it is premature
for DECC's SEA report to quote or cite the PHE study before a final/authoritative version is produced.
However, apart from the “draft for comment” label in the footnote on page 91, the SEA report provides
no qualification to the status of the PHE report, or how that affects its standing.
Public Health England is a new body, created out of the former Health Protection Agency, and with
different powers and responsibilities as a result of the new structure for public health services created
by the Health and Social Care Act 2012. According the recent review of PHE by the Commons Health
82 New Gas Industry Methane Emission Study Is Not Representative Of US Natural Gas Development [Shonkoff 2013]
83 Review of the Potential Public Health Impacts of Exposures to Chemical and Radioactive Pollutants as a Result of Shale Gas Extraction [PHE 2013]
84 Page 90/91, 'Environmental Report', SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing [DECC 2013A]
page 30 “SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation
Select Committee85, the work on PHE's unconventional gas study began in 2012 under the banner of
the former Health Protection Agency. As a result of that Committee's investigation, it appears that this
report was given undue priority over other pressing health concerns by the senior management of
PHE86 –
The Committee is concerned that the responses to Committee questions on shale gas extraction
suggest that PHE has not yet established prioritised programmes of work which reflect the
objectives of the organisation and have been endorsed by the Board. We believe it was unwise for
PHE to follow through the work on shale gas extraction which had been initiated by the HPA
without first taking care to satisfy itself that this work reflected both the public health priorities of
PHE, and the research quality criteria embraced by the new organisation. The resulting report
did nothing to build public confidence in PHE as the premier guardian of public health in
England.
When I first read the PHE report my immediate action was to check the PHE web site for details of
the consultation exercise – there were none. Then I checked the archived Health Protection Agency
site – again, no information. On 8th November I sent an email to PHE's Chief Executive, querying the
status of the report, its ownership, and asking for details of the consultation exercise. I received a
response to that email on the 6th December stating –
Please note that in light of our delayed response to your enquiry, we would be happy to extend
the comment period (detailed below) to receive any additional peer reviewed or published
reports in the scientific literature that are relevant to the scope, findings and recommendations of
the report... This report was published as a draft ‘for comment’ for one month, from the 31
October to 29 November 2013.
Although it was helpful to extend the period for comment, the email did not answer the question as
to the absence of a formal, publicly advertised consultation exercise on the content of the report. In
fact, neither Reuters87, the Telegraph88, the BBC89 nor New Scientist90 noted the “draft for comment”
aspect as part of their coverage of the report (the BBC called it a “new official report”), and all
appeared to describe it as if it were a final statement on the issue of shale gas and health.
That the report was passed off as an authoritative statement is one thing. The greater problem here
is that the consultation exercise carried out by PHE was itself a paper exercise. What the “comment”
aspect of the “draft” required was examples of further research into unconventional gas and public
health. The report itself contains no explicit instructions with regard to any consultation process;
except that is for the text at the top of section 13 ('Addendum') which stated –
PHE has continued to assess the scientific evidence on the potential public health impacts of
exposures to chemical and radiological pollutants associated with shale gas extraction, the
85 Health Select Committee: Eighth Report, 2013/14 – Public Health England, HC840, 4th February 2014. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmhealth/840/840.pdf
86 Paragraph 30, page 16, ibid.
87 Shale gas fracking a low risk to public health - UK review, Kate Kelland, Reuters London, Thu 31st October 2013. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/31/uk-britain-health-fracking-idUKBRE99U0KK20131031
88 Fracking 'low' threat to public health, Nick Collins, Telegraph On-line, 31st October 2013. http://www.telegraph. co.uk/health/healthnews/10418199/Fracking-low-threat-to-public-health.html
89 'Low health risk' from fracking, says UK agency, David Shukman, BBC News, 31st October 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-24761980
90 UK fracking should not threaten public health, Michael Marshall, New Scientist, 5th November 2013. http://www. newscientist.com/article/dn24527-uk-fracking-should-not-threaten-public-health.html
“SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation page 31
references below have been reviewed and are not considered to affect the conclusions of the draft
report. PHE invites submission of additional relevant articles from the scientific literature for
consideration if these have not been considered in the report or identified below.
The rest of section 13 then lists many of the latest research papers in the field of public health and
unconventional gas production which existed in journals at that time. To argue that these 50 papers –
without any detailed explanation or analysis – did not have a bearing on the outcome of PHE's study
not only offends the transparency principles which they are required to adopt in formulating public
policy. It also casts doubt (together with the facts of the 'undue priority' highlighted by the Health
Committee's investigation) upon the objectives of their review, and its purposes.
The PHE reports central claim91 –
Although shale gas extraction and related activities have the potential to cause pollution to air,
land and water, the currently available evidence indicates that the potential risks to public health
from exposure to the emissions associated with shale gas extraction are low if the operations are
properly run and regulated. Most evidence suggests that contamination of groundwater as a
result of borehole leakage is an area of concern, but that contamination of groundwater from the
underground fracking process itself is unlikely.
– cannot be substantiated given the available evidence on the many issues related to
unconventional gas development; from well leakage and fugitive emissions, to the observed
concentrations of airborne pollutants and health impacts noted within many studies. In that respect, it
is worth laying the conclusions of the PHE study alongside the work of:
• the 2012 report of the Chief Medical Officer of Health, New Brunswick Department of Health92;
• the 2013 report by the Department of Health, Queensland Government93;
• the 2013 article by McDermott-Levy in the American Journal of Nursing94;
• the 2014 paper by Colborn published in Human and Ecological Risk Assessment95;
• the 2014 paper by Adgate published in Science of the Total Environment96;
• the 2014 article by Coram in the Medical Journal of Australia97;
• the 2014 paper by Litovitz in Environmental Research Letters98;
• the 2014 paper by Moore in Science of the Total Environment99;
• the 2014 paper by Tait published in Environmental Science and Technology100;
• the 2014 paper by Bunch published in Science of the Total Environment101; and
• in addition to the above updates, see the papers listed in PHE's “none of the below” list in section13 of their report – many of which are available from the Free Range On-line Library.102.
91 Summary, page 32, Review of the Potential Public Health Impacts of Exposures as a Result of Shale Gas [PHE 2013]
92 CMO of Health's Recommendations Concerning Shale Gas Development in New Brunswick [New Brunswick 2012]
93 Coal seam gas in the Tara region: Summary risk assessment of health complaints [Queensland 2013]
94 Fracking, the Environment, and Health: New energy practices may threaten public health [AJN 2013]
95 An Exploratory Study of Air Quality near Natural Gas Operations [Colborn 2014]
96 Potential Public Health Hazards, Exposures and Health Effects from Unconventional NG Development [Adgate 2014]
97 Harms unknown: health uncertainties cast doubt on the role of UG in Australia's energy future [Coram 2014]
98 Estimation of regional air-quality damages from Marcellus Shale natural gas extraction in Pennsylvania [Litovitz 2013]
99 Air Impacts of Increased Natural Gas Acquisition, Processing, and Use: A Critical Review [Moore 2014]
100 Enrichment of Radon and Carbon Dioxide in the Open Atmosphere of an Australian Coal Seam Gas Field [Tait 2014]
101 Evaluation of impact of shale gas operations in the Barnett Shale region on volatile organic compounds in air and potential human health risks [Bunch 2014]
102 Free Range On-line Library: 'Extreme Energy'. http://www.fraw.org.uk/library/extreme.html
page 32 “SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation
Note that not all the above papers are “against” shale gas – some cast doubt, or do not find a
conclusive result. But that's the critical point; currently the evidence does not exist to provide an all-
conclusive statement either way: that “potential risks are low”, as PHE state; or that “shale gas is
inherently harmful”, which many opponents state. With regard to that continuum of uncertainty, the
Chief Medical Officer of New Brunswick's report is far more balanced that the report by PHE.
At the same time, without the kind of additional monitoring/sampling which many of the above
papers call for in order to better define the parameters of such a conclusion, there is not sufficient
evidence to demonstrate an unequivocal link to health impacts. In that context the approach of the
Mackay-Stone report – that they clearly state an “assumption” of equivalence between conventional
and unconventional gas production – is a more honest appraisal than the opaque dismissal of
hazards within PHE's report.
PHE's report on the health impacts of unconventional gas is arguably biased, and is not
transparent between its assessment/collection of information and the inferences/conclusions
which it draws. Their unpublicised consultation exercise on the report is also highly suspect –
given it was merely a call for papers rather than analysis. Looking at the body of evidence
which exists at present, not enough information exists to support PHE's claim that “potential
risks are low” – nor to demonstrate the opposite conclusion either. Without the kinds of
extensive sampling/health monitoring identified by many of the recent reports cited here, and
rejected by PHE's report, such a categorical conclusion cannot be made.
“SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation page 33
4. Over-riding legal and procedural flaws in the SEA analysis
In this final section I make what can best be viewed as “matters of submission” – observations on
the legal and procedural conduct of the compilation of the SEA report, and the consultation exercise.
4A. The assessment of alternatives
The SEA report outlines a series of alternative proposals in order to mitigate impacts from on-shore
oil and gas production103. However, these “alternatives” represent alternative strategies for awarding
oil and gas licences – not alternative methods of oil or gas production.
Article 5(1) of the SEA Directive states104 –
Where an environmental assessment is required under Article 3(1), an environmental report shall
be prepared in which the likely significant effects on the environment of implementing the plan or
programme, and reasonable alternatives taking into account the objectives and the geographical
scope of the plan or programme, are identified, described and evaluated.
The operative term in this paragraph is, “likely significant effects on the environment” – and
therefore the assessment of alternatives must also consider differing environmental effects. What the
SEA advocates is varying methods of the same operation – allocating PEDL licences. Whilst this will
cause differing environmental effects, it does not represent an “alternative”, merely a gradation of
impacts from the same process.
In formulating policy under SEA, it is necessary to consider alternatives which meet the same ends.
The purpose of the Government's policy is not the issuing of “paper licences”, it is the production of oil
and gas energy sources. Therefore the assessment of alternatives should have considered alternative
sources of oil and gas, not differing levels of licence allocation. For example, the production of
fossil/unconventional oil and gas could be assessed alongside the production of biofuels or biogas,
the off-setting of the demand for oil/gaseous fuels using conservation measures to reduce demand, or
transitioning demand into electricity.
The assessment of alternatives within the SEA is questionable because it represents an
iteration of the same process – the issuing of oil and gas licences – rather than a true
exploration of alternative options – exploring differing methods/technologies which meet the
same objectives with a different impact upon the environment. Arguably the SEA report fails to
meet the terms of the SEA Directive.
4B. The precautionary principle
The first paragraph of the preamble to the SEA Directive specifies –
...the Treaty provides that Community policy on the environment is to contribute to, inter alia, the
preservation, protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, the protection of
human health and the prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources and that it is to be
based on the precautionary principle.
103 Section 2.6, page 31, 'Environmental Report', SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing [DECC 2013A]
104 Article 5, [Directive 2001/42/EC]
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For some time it has been arguable as to the exercisability of the precautionary principle directly
within UK law. However, in this case the Directive mandates the application of the precautionary
principle in the preamble. Furthermore, as part of the harmonisation of European environmental and
planning policy, Article 191 of the Treaty of Lisbon/the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (which post-dates the introduction of the Directive) modifies these objectives slightly –
Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the
diversity of situations in the various regions of the Union. It shall be based on the precautionary
principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental
damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.
For a working definition of the precautionary principle we could take the definitions outlined in the
UK Sustainable Development Strategy105 –
In dealing with outputs of human activity which may have an impact on natural resources (e.g.
emissions, waste, chemicals, GMOs), we are... integrating the precautionary principle –
minimising the risk of harmful releases to the environment through better knowledge of potential
impacts and better management.
In this case, the policy expressed later in that report is also applicable106 –
There are, however, still instances where decisions on managing natural resources will have to be
taken on the basis of partial information. In these instances, and where, firstly, there is a risk of
significant adverse environmental effects occurring and secondly, any possible mitigation
measures seem unlikely to safeguard against these effects, the precautionary principle will be
adopted.
The first stage in the application of the precautionary principle is the acceptance that uncertainty
exists; the characterisation of uncertainty – which is arguably a more practical aspect of “science”
than the statement of what is certain – then follows on from this acceptance. In my view the SEA
report seeks to deny that any uncertainty exists, and therefore blindly adopts measures which fit that
viewpoint rather than opening up the analysis to decide the scope and impact of those uncertain
outcomes.
In this case of the 14th On-shore Oil and Gas Licensing round SEA, it is arguable that:
The SEA report does not apply the precautionary principle effectively, because it fails to identify
the uncertain with regard to the exploration and production of oil and gas, and identify criteria
which enable the risks involved to be assessed. For example, the statements that certain details
over environmental impacts might be left to the planning system, when arguably local planning
authorities are procedurally barred to considering them (see section 2F), represents an
inadequate attempt to satisfy the precautionary principle because it increases uncertainty.
There are great uncertainties as to the availability, and future economic viability of finite
resources – both in terms of liquid fossil fuels but also non-renewable resources generally – as
we arguably move towards 'the ecological limits to growth' (see section 3A). This could arguably
have catastrophic consequences in the near-term for the global economy. Therefore, the current
105 Developing our vision for natural resources, page 99, Securing The Future: Delivering UK Sustainable Development Strategy, Cm6467, March 2005. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69412/pb10589-securing-the-future-050307.pdf
106 Page 101, ibid.
“SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation page 35
government policy of seeking the ongoing maintenance and growth in fossil fuel supply, while at
the same time rolling back measures which might move us towards lowering consumption and
securing renewable energy sources – in the context of the SEA process for this policy objective
of producing more oil and gas – represents a failure to enact the precautionary principle.
The growing body of evidence of the existence of known/quantifiable flaws in oil and gas
production wells (see section 3B) represents another example where the approach of the SEA
report derogates from, and thus fails to enact the precautionary principle.
The use of the Mackay & Stone report to make certain arguments in relation to climate change
and fugitive emissions is another example of failure to consider uncertainty (see section 3C) –
since the arguments used in that report are based upon assumptions which fit the requirements
of policy, not objectively quantified risks. Furthermore, the reliance of that report upon
unrepresentative studies, to argue the case for the equivalence of conventional and
unconventional gas production, represents a spurious argument – since it seeks to advance
certainty where no such certainty can be demonstrated. Note also that the general mitigation
point made in the Mackay & Stone report107 – that “the potential increase in cumulative
emissions could be counteracted if equivalent and additional emissions-reduction measures are
made somewhere in the world” – could be interpreted as contrary to the position expressed in
Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – “that environmental damage
should as a priority be rectified at source”.
Finally, the Public Health England report on unconventional gas advocates a position108 that the
“potential risks are low”, when in fact there is currently a very high degree of uncertainty as to the
nature and extent of the health impacts from unconventional oil and gas production. At the same
time it seeks to dismiss a large body of evidence on the existence of uncertainties by listing a
large number of these studies as being irrelevant to the conclusions of the report. Therefore it
makes absolutely no attempt to consider the precautionary approach in defiance – in the context
of its application within the SEA process – of Community law on the precautionary principle.
There are a number of grounds upon which the SEA report could be claimed to breach or
inadequately enact the requirements of Community law to apply the precautionary principle. In
that respect the whole SEA process is void – and should be restarted from the beginning. As
part of that review the SEA framework must properly be applied, so that environmental
protection flows from the policy, rather than the need to meet environmental objectives being
retroactively applied to policy afterwards.
4C. Decision-making bias and likely malfeasance in public office
The human species is arguably approaching a tipping point. Not just in relations to the “headline”
environmental issues such as climate change – but across a number of less well publicised ecological
and economic factors which are combining to make the future survival of human society as we know it
untenable. If we look at the evidence which exists today – from agriculture, to economics, to energy
policy, to ecotoxicology, and overarching all of these the ecological overshoot of the human system –
107 Page 89, 'Environmental Report', SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing [DECC 2013A]
108 Summary, page 32, Review of the Potential Public Health Impacts of Exposures as a Result of Shale Gas [PHE 2013]
page 36 “SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation
we have sufficient knowledge of the factors involved, if not total certainty, to question the rationality of
many currently totemic policies with the contemporary conception of the “Western lifestyle”.
This in turn raises a question in the mind of many who are aware of these trends – why is the
political system incapable of action?
There comes a point where, as citizens, we have to ask whether our political system has the
capacity to adapt and change, and to address itself to these foreseeable challenges; or whether this
inaction is self-perpetuating because our political process has become so compromised by interests
which seek to enact policies which exacerbate our objective ecological situation.
This issue comes to a head with the issue of oil and gas development – because so many elements
of our political processes are directly influenced by the fossil fuel lobby. For example:
Consider the Prime Minister's special adviser (SPAD) on energy –
• David Cameron's first energy SPAD was Ben Moxham, who had been a vice president
of Riverstone, the energy finance company which bought out a large potion of Cuadrilla,
Britain's leading “fracking” company.
• In May 2013, Ben Moxham was succeeded by Tara Singh, a lobbyist with Centrica,
who, shortly after her appointment, in addition to their other unconventional gas
interests, also took a financial stake in Cuadrilla.
• Therefore must we assume that one of the requirements of being the Prime Ministers
special adviser on energy requires that the person's corporate alma mater must have a
stake in Britain's leading fracking company?
We might also consider Lynton Crosby, the Prime Minister's principal special adviser –
• Lynton Crosby was a founding member of the Australian public relations agency Crosby
Textor.
• Crosby Textor represent various fossil fuel interests, including the Australian Petroleum
Production and Exploration Association, APPEA.
• An APPEA member with interests in unconventional gas in Britain is Dart Energy,
Britain's “no.2” fracking company.
Next let us consider The Chancellor –
• George Osborne's father-in-law is Lord Howell, former energy minister in the Thatcher
government, recently retired minister at the Foreign Office where he promoted British
energy interests around the globe and wrote William Hague's speeches, but more
importantly, has extensive links to all sectors of the energy industry through his
presidency of the British Institute for Energy Economics and connections with other
energy policy interests.
• Over the course of this Parliament the Chancellor has become more directly involved in
energy policy, giving greater tax breaks to fossil fuel companies while trying to reduce
support for other competing sources of energy or energy efficiency programmes.
• In April 2011, renewable energy minister Nick Boles was removed from his position
because his brother had a job with Siemens, a large multinational engineering and
construction company who have interests in wind farm contracts, and this was
perceived to be a conflict of interest.
• Therefore are we to assume that, when you are Chancellor, your links to the largest
“SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation page 37
fossil fuel interests in the energy sector via your father-in-law, and to whom you are
giving major financial assistance through tax reliefs and regulatory reforms, and upon
whose behalf you are lobbying for changes in law and policy, are above reproach; but
that a connection via your brother to minor group within a much larger engineering and
construction corporation is not acceptable?
Next let's consider Lord Browne, non-executive minister at the Cabinet Office –
• Lord Browne is a managing director at Riverstone, Ben Moxham's former employer,
who still have a major stake in Cuadrilla as well as other global energy interests.
• Lord Browne is also the Chairman of Cuadrilla.
• It was recently revealed that environment minister Owen Paterson organised meeting
between Lord Browne, chair of the Environment Agency Chris Smith, and other fracking
interests in order to set up new regulatory agreements relating to the future roll-out of
unconventional gas developments in England.
• Therefore are we to assume, even where a direct conflict of interest is vested in a single
person who can magically change his identity within the corridors of power, that this
does not represent an unacceptable conflict of interest?
To demonstrate that this trend extends outside of the core of politics, I could also note that my
own local MP, Tony Baldry, is deputy chair of an oil investment company, Woburn Energy.
Finally, so as not to be party political about this, it should be pointed out that all three major
parties receive funding from leading energy interests, LibDem business minister Vince Cable
was once the senior economist at Shell (and has reputedly been called the contact minister
for Shell).
There is, arguably, a legal term which I believe encompasses the natire of these relationships...
malfeasance or misconduct in a public office.
These offences are based around the making of irrational decisions due to inducements or
deference whilst in a public position which, objectively on the basis of available evidence, could not be
made by the “average person”.
There is a fundamental principle of international law – enacted through the European Convention
on Human Rights, the various Treaties of the European Union, but in large part already running
through the British legal tradition since we were histrionically involved in the drafting many of the
world's international laws and treaties – which underpins all justice procedures; the right to a fair and
impartial tribunal. Due to the levels of corporate influence across all political parties, and increasingly
across major parts of out media and culture, it is arguable that the public's access to a fair and
impartial tribunal in relation to the Government's quasi-judicial responsibilities for policy-making are
being diminished by these conflicts of interests, and by the larger system of corporate inducements to
political parties.
This is a serious matter, but in my view this has little to do with the alleged “corrupt practices” of the
political class which are often trawled through the media. As I see it this is solely a matter of whether
or not the decisions of ministers, due to the influences upon them, are unreasonable to a degree
which might be considered unlawful. But over and above this, we must question whether the high-
level access to decision-makers given to the energy lobby by the present Government literally
obstructs – as part of the strategic environmental appraisal process – our general rights to a fair and
page 38 “SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation
impartial tribunal.
The reason this issue has come to a head with the SEA process is because of the role this
mechanism has in European law. The SEA Directive, alongside recent revisions to the guiding
legislation of the European Union, enacts the Aarhus Convention on the rights to information and
access to decision-making on environmental matters through the SEA process. That is why the
Government are required to consult, and demonstrate that they have done so, from the beginning of
the process.
The current deference of ministers to energy interests over the unconventional gas issue –
demonstrated through both their behind-closed-doors links and by the woefully inadequate way in
which the SEA report deals with the impacts of oil and gas development – arguably infringes our right
to due process, and to a fair and impartial hearing, via the SEA Directive and European law.
The over-bearing influence of the fossil fuel energy lobby within the UK Government raises
the question as to whether ministers, in discharging their quasi-judicial functions as part of
the SEA process, can fairly and impartially decide upon the evidence provided by the SEA
report, and any criticisms of that case supplied as part of the SEA consultation process. As a
specific objection, I raise this question as a criticism of the SEA report, and of the processes
which gave rise to that report, including the preparation of other related reports such as those
from PHE or Mackay & Stone. Therefore, in determining the outcome of this consultation
process, I raise specific questions as to whether:
The influence of the energy lobby upon ministers will lead to a perverse interpretation
of the requirements of SEA law, and therefore to a flawed and unreasonable decision on
the substance of the SEA's information report;
The flawed nature of this decision-making process might be considered so
unreasonable that it represents, to a potentially criminal level, malfeasance or
misconduct in a public office by those involved in the recent evolution of the UK's
policy on unconventional gas; and
Over and above any UK national legal statutes on unreasonableness, whether the
undue influence of energy interests within the UK Government obstructs the ability of
responsible minister to provide, in accordance with EU law on strategic environmental
appraisal –
• a fair and impartial assessment of the impact of UK Government policy upon the
environment;
• the means to work towards sustainable development, apply the precautionary
principle in decision-making, and to ensure that the environment and human
health are protected, both under the SEA Directive and the over-arching
framework of European law.
The above failings challenge the competency of UK ministers to make decisions over critical
environmental policy matters, and whether the EU must take action against the UK
government to secure guarantees of appropriate action in order to fairly and impartially enact
EU environmental law.
“SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation page 39
5. Conclusions and recommended actions
Due to the nature of the complaints raise in this report, I am doubtful as to whether the responsible
ministers are capable of making an objectively informed and impartial decision upon the content of the
SEA report, and the objections of the public to that report.
If we follow UK tradition, then I would envisage that the only way we might arrive at a balanced
outcome would be to suspend all further oil and gas licensing activities on-shore, and then hold a
Royal Commission – with appropriate technical assessors to advise the chair, and where all
representative groups (for and against) might put their case in front of a demonstrably fair and
impartial tribunal.
That is my only straightforward, consensus-based suggestion for resolving this issue. The
alternative, as I see it, would be for the EU to take action for an arguable breach of EU law.
Taking all these points together, it is my view that the Government's policies on energy and the
environment are based upon an ideologically-driven view, given expression through a set of flawed
political and economic objectives. That ideological viewpoint is influenced and materially supported by
those who have a vested interest in it.
If we take a more objective and rational view of the available research data – not just on oil and gas
development but on the wider issue of human ecological viability – it is clear that these policies not
only fail to shift development towards a more sustainable basis, but also hasten the acceleration
towards an ecological collapse. That is not a certain outcome; there are large uncertainties. But it is
these very uncertainties that policies such as the precautionary principle have been devised so that
we might work towards a higher probability of achieving long-term sustainability.
There are many recent research studies which highlight the issue of our ecological
sustainability. In this report I have outlined why I view the Government's current energy policy
for on-shore oil and gas as flawed. If members of the Government proceed with these policies
after having conducted this consultation – without any attempt to address the deficiencies
within the SEA information report and its associated documents – then in my view that would
constitute criminal malfeasance; and I believe that those responsible should be made
personally liable for their actions in the promotion of this policy initiative.
page 40 “SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation
6. Background reports/references
ABC 2013 GAS LEAK!, Matthew Carney and Connie Agius, 'Four Corners', ABC TV
(Australia), 1st April 2013. http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/2013/04/01/3725150.htm
Adgate 2014 Potential Public Health Hazards, Exposures and Health Effects from
Unconventional Natural Gas Development, John L. Adgate, Bernard D. Goldstein,
Lisa M. McKenzie, Science of the Total Environment (undated preprint), March
2014http://www.fraw.org.uk/files/extreme/adgate_2014.pdf
AJN 2013 Fracking, the Environment, and Health: New energy practices may threaten public
health, Ruth McDermott-Levy, Nina Kaktins, Barbara Sattler, American Journal of
Nursing, vol.113 no.6 pp.45-51, June 2013. http://www.fraw.org.uk/files/extreme/ajn_2013.pdf
Allen 2013 Measurements of methane emissions at natural gas production sites in the United
States, David T. Allen, Vincent M. Torres, James Thomas, David W. Sullivan,
Matthew Harrison, Al Hendler, Scott C. Herndon, Charles E. Kolb, Matthew P.
Fraser, A. Daniel Hill, Brian K. Lamb, Jennifer Miskimins, Robert F. Sawyer, John
H. Seinfeld, PNAS, 16th September 2013. http://www.fraw.org.uk/files/extreme/allen_2013.pdf
BGS 2012A The Unconventional Hydrocarbon Resources Of Britain's Onshore Basins –
Coalbed Methane (CBM), BGS/Department for Energy and Climate Change,
December 2012.http://www.fraw.org.uk/files/extreme/decc_cbm_2012.pdf
BGS 2012B The Unconventional Hydrocarbon Resources of Britain's Onshore Basins – Shale
Gas, BGS/Department for Energy and Climate Change, December 2012. http://www.fraw.org.uk/files/extreme/decc_shale_2012.pdf
BGS 2013 Can New Technologies be Used to Exploit the Coal Resources in the Yorkshire-
Nottinghamshire Coalfield?, S. Holloway, N.S. Jones, D.P. Creedy, K. Garner,
British Geological Survey/Wardell Armstrong, April 2013.http://www.fraw.org.uk/files/extreme/holloway_2013.pdf
Brufatto 2003 From Mud to Cement – Building Gas Wells, Claudio Brufatto et. al., Oilfield Review,
vol.15 no.3 pp.62-76, 2003. http://www.fraw.org.uk/files/extreme/brufatto_2003.pdf
Bunch 2014 Evaluation of impact of shale gas operations in the Barnett Shale region on volatile
organic compounds in air and potential human health risks, A.G. Bunch, C.S. Perry,
L. Abraham, D.S. Wikoff, J.A. Tachovsky, J.G. Hixon, J.D. Urban, M.A. Harris, L.C.
Haws, Science of the Total Environment, 468-469 pp.832–842, January 2014http://www.fraw.org.uk/files/extreme/bunch_perry_2014.pdf
CHA 2013 Submission to the NSW Chief Scientist and Engineer – Review of coal seam gas
activities in NSW, Climate and Health Alliance, April 2013.http://www.fraw.org.uk/files/extreme/cha_2013.pdf
Colborn 2014 An Exploratory Study of Air Quality near Natural Gas Operations, Theo Colborn,
Kim Schultz, Lucille Herrick, Carol Kwiatkowski, Human and Ecological Risk
Assessment, vol.20 no.1 pp.86-105, January 2014http://www.fraw.org.uk/files/extreme/colborn_2014.pdf
“SEA for Further Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing” – A response to DECC's 14th Round SEA public consultation page 41
Coram 2014 Harms unknown: health uncertainties cast doubt on the role of unconventional gas
in Australia's energy future, Alicia Coram, Jeremy Moss, Grant Blashki, Medical
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