Strategic Challenges in the Arctic

By

Ina Nyås Moe

A dissertation submitted to the School of Social Science, University of

Aberdeen, as partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MSc

Strategic Studies.

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Abstract During the Cold War the Arctic was strategically important as nuclear submarines from both

sides hid under the ice. As it was discovered that the ice started melting in the Arctic in the

21st century at the same time as natural resources were found in the region, new challenges

came to light. This article focuses on Norwegian, Canadian and Russian strategic challenges

in the Arctic. New waterways in the Arctic could be beneficial for shipping as it would be

cheaper while ships would avoid sailing through piracy-affected oceans. At the same time

there is a fear that pirates and terrorist could invade the Arctic. The new waterways also cause

challenges because the Arctic states disagree to whether they are to be considered

international or domestic. The potential for finding oil and gas has led to a renewed focus on

sovereignty issues in the region. Energy security has also became more important, both for the

Arctic states, the EU and NATO. As a result of the aforementioned challenges, the Arctic

states built up their militaries, which have increased tensions in the area. Norway, Canada and

Russia have accused each other of militarising the Arctic at the same time as they have used

this as an excuse to build up their own armed forces. However, there is a potential for solving

the challenges, as the Arctic countries are cooperating in some areas.

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Table of Contents Abstract ................................................................................................................ 2  

Table of Contents ................................................................................................. 3  

Introduction: ......................................................................................................... 5  

Chapter 1. Strategic Assessment of Arctic Importance ................................. 6  

Cold War strategy................................................................................................. 6  

Nuclear weapons and surveillance ....................................................................... 6  

Military build-up .................................................................................................. 7  

Energy Security .................................................................................................... 8  

The EU ............................................................................................................... 10  

Sovereignty issues .............................................................................................. 10  

New transit-passages .......................................................................................... 12  

Chapter 2: Russia- Arctic Bully or Insecure Giant? ..................................... 14  

Energy security................................................................................................... 14  

Territorial Claims ............................................................................................... 14  

Military build-up ................................................................................................ 15  

Strategic waterways............................................................................................ 21  

Chapter 3: Canada’s concerns and policies ................................................... 23  

Canada’s Arctic Strategies ................................................................................. 23  

Response to Russian Aggression........................................................................ 24  

The Northwest Passage ...................................................................................... 27  

Hans Island ......................................................................................................... 29  

Other Issues ........................................................................................................ 30  

Chapter 4. Is Norway being left out?.............................................................. 32  

Military build-up ................................................................................................ 33  

Arctic Strategies ................................................................................................. 35  

Disputed areas .................................................................................................... 37  

Conclusion.......................................................................................................... 40  

Bibliography...................................................................................................... 42  

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Introduction:

Even though academics have discussed challenges in the Arctic region for years, most people

have not been aware of these until recently. This article aims to inform the readers about the

main issues and challenges in the Arctic. It will also discuss whether these issues can be

solved. Fairhall’s definition of Arctic region is: “that part of the globe enclosed by the

parallel of latitude 66 degrees, 33 minutes N – the Arctic circle” 1 According to this

definition there are eight Arctic states, which include Norway, Denmark (through Greenland),

Canada, the United States, Russia, Sweden, Finland and Iceland. This article will focus on

Canada, Russia and Norway’s challenges as the Arctic is of great importance to these

countries. What happens in the Arctic can have global impact, and other actors such as the

EU, NATO and China will therefore be mentioned. The article will be focusing on defence

issues, energy security and military build-up. There are other issues in the region such as

environmental issues, fear of accidents and indigenous people’s rights, but these issues will

only be mentioned briefly.

The first chapter will give an overview of why the Arctic has become so important in recent

years. It also aims to give an overview over the main challenges in this region. It will briefly

touch on Arctic’s strategic importance during the Cold War, but it will mainly focus on the

Arctic’s strategic importance today. The second chapter will focus on what policies Russia

has towards the Arctic and what kind of activities Russia has been performing in the Arctic.

As Russia has regained some of its strength after the Cold War, the Arctic has become an

important region for Russia. Is Russia aiming to be an Arctic bully aiming to control the

Arctic or is it acting this way because it feels insecure? Chapter three will focus on Canada’s

main challenges in the Arctic and Canada’s response to these challenges. Since Canada is

geographically squeezed between Russia and the United States, this chapter will focus mostly

on Canada’s Arctic challenges towards these countries. In the last chapter Norway’s concerns

and challenges in the Arctic will be discussed. How has Norway reacted in meeting these

challenges? Norway is mostly focusing on the High North, the European part of the Arctic. In

this context Russia, Norway’s neighbour is an important actor. Therefore it is natural that this

chapter will describe Norway’s relationship with Russia.

1 David Fairhall, Cold Front, (London: I.B Taurus & Co.Ltd, 2010) 2

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Chapter 1. Strategic Assessment of Arctic Importance

Cold War strategy

During the Cold War the Arctic region increased its strategic importance as ballistic missile

submarines hid under the ice in order to secure nuclear second-strike capabilities. In addition,

surveillance systems were installed in the region. As a response to the Soviet Union’s building

of naval bases on the Kola Peninsula, the United States and its allies upgraded its military

capabilities in the north, which lead to a militarization of the Scandinavian part of the Arctic

where tensions ran high. 2 The Arctic Ocean functioned as an operating area where naval

forces from both NATO countries and the Soviet Union were patrolling the waters. The

region was also strategic important because of its transport routes between the United States

and Europe.3

After the Cold War the Arctic lost some of its strategic interests. As scientists discovered that

the ice started to melt in the Arctic Ocean in the 21st century the region regained its strategic

importance. According to Borgerson the geopolitics of the Arctic region is rapidly

transforming due to the melting of the ice, which between 2001 and 2007 was thinned by half

in the Arctic Ocean. An ice-free Arctic Ocean can open up for both access to resources such

as gas and oil and new transit-passages, and combined with sovereignty issues between the

Arctic coastal states Borgerson suggests that a Great Game is developing in the north where

the next few years will tell whether the outcome will turn the region to either harmony or

chaos. 4

Nuclear weapons and surveillance

According to a strategic survey the Arctic might increase its strategic importance because of

nuclear weapons:

2 “Strategic Survey 2010- The Annual Review of World Affairs”, Strategic Policy Issues, Vol. 108, No 1,

2008:59 3 Kjetil Skogrand, “The Arctic in a Geo-Strategic Perspective”, ed. Kjetil Skogrand, Emerging From the Frost-

Security in the 21st century Arctic, (Oslo:Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies,2008) 9-15

4 Scott Borgerson, “The Great Game Moves North”, Foreign Affairs, 24 Mar. 2009, 15 Jun. 2011,

<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64905/scott-g-borgerson/the-great-game-moves-north?page=show# >

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“The Arctic will remain important, and perhaps even increase in importance, on the nuclear-

strategic level, due to technological advances in early-warning systems and missile defence

and the increasing role of Russia’s Northern Fleet for Moscow’s nuclear forces.” 5

The survey also states that the Arctic would be used as a route for United States Inter-

Continental Ballistic Missiles aimed at Asia as well as Russian and Chinese missiles aimed at

North America. There is also a chance that North Korea and the Middle East could use the

Arctic as a transit area for missiles. According to the survey the Arctic still remains an

important patrolling area for American, British and French nuclear-powered ballistic missile

submarines. According to Murgatroyd the Arctic has the highest number of nuclear-powered

vessels in the world. 6 Skogrand argues that surveillance is still as important as it was during

the Cold War, though in addition to using radar stations and submarines to keep an eye on an

enemy, surveillance is now also needed to deal with the increased civilian activities in the

region, such as illegal fishing. Illegal fishing has become a huge problem in the north, and

according to Skogrand 100.000 tons of fish are illegally caught in the Barents Sea alone

annually.7 Surveillance could also be used to deal with search and rescue operations and

detect ships in trouble. Blunden argues that the upgrading of the early-warning radar at Thule

in Greenland to become a part of a missile defence station has contributed to the re-

militarization of the Arctic. 8However, Skogrand believes that military-build up does not

necessarily lead to conflicts as “military forces can also serve as a tool for confidence

building and cooperation through visits, common exercises and joint patrolling”9

Military build-up

After a Russian scientist planted a flag in the seabed of the North Pole in 2007 and declared

that the Arctic was Russian10, many suggested that sovereignty issues could lead to a new

cold or even a hot war. Especially the Canadian prime minister was sceptical towards the

Russian intentions and talked about rising threats to Canadian security as a result of other

5 Strategic Policy Issues, 70 6 Clive Murgatroyd: “Defence and the Arctic- Go with the Floe?”, The RUSI Journal, Vol.154,No 4, 2009:84

7 Skogrand, 9-11

8 Margaret Blunden, “The New Problem of Arctic Stability”, Survival, Vol. 51, No 5, 2009 9 Skogrand, 15 10 Fairhall, 38

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nations activities in the Arctic. 11 However, it is argued that this scaremongering rhetoric was

directed towards Canada’s domestic audience rather than the other Arctic countries. 12 On the

other hand a number of experts warn that the Arctic might turn into a conflict zone. Blunden

argues that due to climate change, enormous economic stakes and boundary disputes in the

Arctic, military conflict, while unlikely, in the future cannot be ruled out. As Blunden puts it:

“Growing military activity, closer security coordination among the Western states and

inflammatory rhetoric could set off a vicious circle, jeopardizing the wide-ranging

collaboration put in place since the end of the Cold War”. 13 Blunden points out that all the

five coastal states have increased their military presence in the northern areas. While NATO is

active in the Arctic with fighters and surveillance flights, the former neutral states Sweden

and Finland have been participating in the European Union’s initiative Nordic Battle group.

According to Blunden, Moscow does not like to be excluded and is anxious about the growing

activity and proximity of these neighbouring military groupings. Gupta argues that if the

disputes over territory, resources and transportation are not solved between the five Arctic

countries, there is a potential for tensions and even armed conflicts.14

Energy Security

Fairhall does not believe that there will be a new Cold War in the Arctic and points out that

even though there are conflicts of interests that have led to some sabre rattling, it is more

likely that lawyers rather than soldiers will solve the issues. In Fairhall’s view the economic

benefits that comes from gas, oil and rare minerals in the Arctic are more important,

especially for Russia, than starting a new Cold War. According to a geological survey 13

percent of the world’s total of undiscovered oil reserves, 30 percent of undiscovered gas

reserves and 20 percent of the worlds undiscovered natural gas liquids reserves might be

found in the Arctic. 15 In order to be able to extract and sell these resources the Arctic

countries will have to cooperate and agree on sovereignty issues since international oil

companies need to know which country they should pay their taxes to. Fairhall points out that

11 “Diplomatic Shifts in the Warming Arctic”, Strategic Comments, Vol. 16, Comment 50, Dec. 2010:2 12 Strategic Comments, 2 13 Blunden, 121 14Gupta, Arvind, “Geopolitical Implications of Arctic Meltdown”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 33 No 2, 2009:174-

177 15 The numbers are from US Geological Survey's “World Energy Assessment”, quoted in Fairhall 2010:20-21

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the United States would be less dependent on unstable oil suppliers in the Middle East if more

oil and gas were pumped up from Alaska.16 Though it could be argued that the United States

would still need to have a heavy military presence in the Middle East in order to keep the oil

prices stable, as, according to Kemp, the stability of oil prices is more important than where

the oil comes from, since the whole market will be affected if something happens to one of

the suppliers. 17Nevertheless, the United States would benefit from easier access to oil. Hong

agrees that the Arctic has gained its strategic importance due to the discovery of oil and gas,

and suggests that concerns about energy security might lead to conflicts. Though the author

does to a point agree with Fairhall in that energy resources could be an opportunity for

cooperation between the Arctic countries, as he argues that the Arctic states would prefer joint

management of resources rather than risking loosing a claim in an international court.

Even though most of the Arctic countries are members of NATO, the Arctic is not mentioned

in NATO’s strategic concept 2010. Though, the concept states that it will “develop the

capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of vital energy infrastructure

and transit areas and lines”18, which shows that energy security is important to the alliance.

Holtsmark and Smith-Windsor argue that NATO consider the fragile ecosystem in the Arctic

and accidents at sea related to energy extraction, shipping and tourism as the greatest risks in

the Arctic, though the alliance is also worried about the expansion of economic activity as it is

both increasing the region’s strategic significance and could create challenges. 19According to

Holtsmark and Smith-Windsor most of the oil and gas resources can be found within the

undisputed Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), and not in the disputed areas, which takes

away the potential for conflict. Besides, the authors point out that while NATO wants to be

active in the Arctic it also aims to cooperate with Russia, amongst other through the NATO-

Russia Council.

16 Fairhall, 24

17 Geoffrey Kemp, “The Persian Gulf Remains the Strategic Prize”, Survival, Vol 40, Issue 4, 1998:136 18 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence”, 19. Nov, 2010

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm 19 Sven G. Holtsmark, and Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, “Introduction”, Security Prospects in the High North:

Geostrategic Thaw or Freeze, ed. Sven G. Holtsmark, and Brooke A. Smith-Windsor Rome: NATO Defence

College Forum Paper, May 2009:24-25 <http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/fp_07.pdf>

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The EU

The EU has access to the Arctic region through its members Sweden, Denmark and Finland.

Denmark (through Greenland) is the only EU state that has access to Arctic sea. Even though

Greenland is self-governed and not a member of the EU, Denmark is economically

responsible for its security. The EU considers itself to be linked to the Arctic region through

history, geography, economy and scientific achievements. In 2008 the European Commission

published an Arctic strategy that says that climate change is a “threat multiplier” and that

“the geo-strategic dynamics of the Arctic” could have “consequences for international and

European security interests”.20 According to this document the EU’s main interests in the

Arctic are to support the indigenous people in the region, mitigate the negative impact of

climate change and maintain the Arctic as a priority for research. The EU is concerned about

unregulated fishing in the Arctic as the EU considers itself to be one of the most important

consumers of Arctic fish. The EU is also interested in commercial navigation in the Arctic.

Energy security is also important as the document states that Arctic resources could

“contribute to enhancing EU’s security of supply” of hydrocarbons. Nowadays Russia

supplies a quarter of the EU’s gas and oil, and if the EU had access to the Arctic hydrocarbons

it would reduce its dependence on these resources from Russia. 21As the gas conflicts between

Russia and the Ukraine and Belarus showed, Russia is using energy resources in a political

game. Murgatroyd points out that there was some irritation among some of the Arctic Council

members due to the EU’s arctic strategy document, as the EU never consulted the council

before the document was published. In addition, the document aimed to ban seal trade, which

would have consequences for Canada. This led the Arctic Council to postpone the EU from

seeking observer status in the Arctic Council.22

Sovereignty issues

Norway, the United States, Russia, Denmark and Canada are involved in sovereignty issues

over territories as well as the continental shelf of the Arctic Ocean. The United Nations

20 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council-

The European Union and the Arctic Region”, 20 Nov 2008, 20 Jun 2011, http://eur-

lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:DKEY=483680:EN:NOT 21 Fairhall, 24-25 22 Murgatroyd, 82-86

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Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) from 1982 state that coastal states have a right

to have a 200 nautical mile wide EEZ beyond their coastal lines. The territories can be

extended further if the continental land mass extends out under the ocean. A costal state has to

submit its claims to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS)

within a ten-year period following its ratification of the convention. The problem is that some

of the claims in the Arctic overlap. Denmark, Canada and Russia have all claimed the North

Pole itself. Besides, when it comes to calculating how to divide the continental shelf between

the neighbouring countries there are two conflicting ways in how to do the measuring. 23

There are also other sovereignty issues in the region, which will be explained in the next

chapters. The five disputing countries, as well as the other Arctic nations Sweden, Iceland and

Finland are members of the Arctic Council, a intergovernmental forum established in 1996,

that aims to promote “cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states”24

However, it mainly focuses on development and environmental protection, as the United

States banned the organisations from working with security issues.25 Thus it can be

questioned whether the organisation is able to solve the region’s main challenges. In 2008 the

five Arctic coastal states agreed upon the Ilulissat Declaration, which commit the five nations

to resolve their issues through negotiations by working together using existing framework of

international law, such as UNCLOS. However, Blunden criticises the declaration for lacking

enforcement mechanisms for environmental protection and the fact that it relies on voluntary

guidelines.26 The declaration is also criticised because the three other Arctic states were

excluded from the agreement. 27 One can also question how the countries can use the

UNCLOS as an instrument when the United States has still not signed the law. Nevertheless,

the agreement shows that the five countries are willing to work peacefully together. It is

argued that environmental, economic and energy security will be of greater importance than

starting an Arctic arms race, as the five Arctic coastal states are following international laws

and are cooperating on exploration and Arctic research. 28However we have already seen that

23 Fairhall, 35 24 The Arctic Council, “About Arctic Council”, 22.Oct 2007, 23 Jun 2011, <http://arctic-

council.org/article/about> 25 Scott G. Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown-The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming”,

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 2, March/April 2008:72 26 Blunden, 121 27 Murgatroyd, 82-86

28 Strategic Comments, 3

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energy security also can lead to conflicts.

New transit-passages

For centuries there have been numerous attempts to find a sea route from Europe to Asia via

the Arctic. If the ice continues to melt rapidly there will most likely be three new sea-lanes of

communication free of ice in a few decades: The North Polar route (which runs through the

North pole), the Northwest Passage (which runs from Greenland via the Canadian coast line

and Alaska, to the Pacific) and the North-East Passage (from the Barents Sea, via the Russian

coast to the Pacific). Byers argues that one of the advantages of ice-free sea-routes is that the

North-West Passage would offer ships a sea-lane between Asia and the Atlantic that would be

7000 km shorter for ships than using the route through the Panama Canal. By using shorter

routes ships save fuel and thereby making the trip cheaper.29 In 2009 a fully commercial ship

for the first time successfully sailed through North-East Passage, saving the shipping

company a lot of money. 30 The new passages could also be a replacement for the Suez Canal

and the Malacca Strait, which would mean that ships would have the chance to avoid piracy

and open conflicts at sea. 31 On the other hand, there is a chance that pirates could take

advantage of an ice-free Arctic Ocean. Holmes compares the Arctic to the Wild West as he

argues that oceans in general are a place where anarchy reigns, of which piracy in Somalia is

an example. 32 The defence analyst does not rule out that there might be pirate attacks in the

Arctic, though he states that the extreme weather conditions will keep the number of pirate

attacks low. Since there are a number of sovereignty issues in the Arctic region there are no

clear agreements on who is responsible of patrolling the sea area. Holmes therefore argues

that it is vital that the Arctic countries solve their issues, not just to avoid piracy, but also to

avoid clashes between themselves. According to Holmes a Chinese commentator claimed that

the Arctic is no ones property since there is no state that holds sovereignty in the Arctic

region, which lead Holmes to question whether China want a piece of the Arctic itself, since

China as a sea nation would benefit from new polar shipping routes. McLeary believes that

29 Byers, Michael, Who Owns The Arctic? (Vancouver:Douglas and McIntyre, 2009) 11-12 30 Fairhall,171-174 31 Strategic Policy Issues, 60 32 James R. Holmes, “The Arctic Sea - A New Wild West, The Diplomat April 20 2011, 21.June 2011,

<http://the-diplomat.com/2011/04/20/the-arctic-sea%E2%80%94a-new-wild-west/>

13

China is building a new strategic front in the Arctic. 33He points out that China has built the

world’s largest non-nuclear icebreaker and is now building another one, which he argues is an

evidence of China building a new strategic front. McLeary adds that China has done a lot of

investments in Iceland in addition to having built a monitoring station on a Norwegian island.

Though, this might just mean that China is interested in trade and scientific research, or

simply wants to benefit from new oil and gas discoveries in the region. Besides, Japan, South

Korea and India that also have research bases in the Arctic due to their interest in oil and

gas34. Either way, it is uncertain what these states goals are in the Arctic.

In Byers opinion it is more likely that security threats in the Arctic would come from non-

state actors, as he believes the Arctic countries are working peacefully together to resolve

their disputes. Byers claims that there is a fear that terrorist groups and rogue states will use

the Northwest Passage to transport weapons of mass destructions, equipment for enriching

nuclear isotopes and missiles, a fear that grew after the terrorist attacks on World Trade

Centre in 2001.35 Byers also points out that drug smugglers, gunrunners and illegal

immigrants could use an ice-free Northwest passage. However, as we have seen, not all agree

that the non-state actors are the biggest threat.

33 Paul McLeary, “The Arctic: China Opens A New Strategic Front”, World Politics Review, 19.May 2010,

24.Jun, 2011 <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/5558/the-arctic-china-opens-a-new-strategic-front>

34 Nong Hong “Arctic Energy:Pathway to Conflict or Cooperation in the High North?”, Journal of Energy

Security, 31.May 2011, 24. Jun, 2011,

<http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=310:arctic-energy-pathway-to-

conflict-or-cooperation-in-the-high-north&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375>

35 Byers, 60

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Chapter 2: Russia- Arctic Bully or Insecure Giant? Energy security

In 2008 the newly elected President Dmitry Medvedev declared “Our first and main task is to

turn the Arctic into a resource base for Russia in the 21st century.” He added that the

resources would “guarantee energy security for Russia as a whole”, something that would

help "resolving long-term tasks of developing the state, and its competitiveness on the global

market36. Russia needs to improve its economy in order to create better conditions for its

population as a consequence of demographic problems. However, energy is not only

important for Russia in terms of economical and developmental reasons. Haas argues that

energy became important to Russia as it was used both as a threat, since Moscow feared that

actors that lacked energy resources could forcefully try to obtain this from Russia, and as a

power tool. With the latter Haas meant the cutting off of energy supplies to Belarus and the

Ukraine for economic and political purposes. 37 Kozhokin, on the other hand, does not agree

that Russia used energy as a power instrument towards Minsk and Kiev as he points out that

the gas prices were so low that Russia was “dumping its gas”, and that the gas cutting was a

result of Russia choosing to focus in its economy rather than politics. 38However, Russia did

cut its gas deliveries to the Czech republic in half as a response to the Czech government’s

signing of an agreement with the United States to place a radar there as a part of a missile

shield, which shows that Russia has been using gas as a weapon. 39 Moscow was, and still is,

strongly against the missile shield, as it fears that it could be used against Russia. Russia’s

ambassador to NATO, Dmitrij Rogozin, even warned that a missile shield could lead to a

militarization of the Arctic, as he feared that the United States could place a part of the missile

defence shield in Norwegian waters. 40

Territorial Claims

The Arctic is not only important to Russia in terms of access to resources, but also

36 Bloomberg, “Arctic Called Crucial to Energy Security”, Moscow Times, 18 Sept. 2008.

37 Marcel de Haas, Russia´s Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century, (London;New York, Routledge

2010)24, 165 38 Evgeniy Kozhokin, “Energy Security in the Arctic Region”, ed. Kjetil Skogrand, Emerging From the Frost-

Security in the 21st century Arctic, (Oslo:Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2008) 70 39 Haas,124 40 Kristian Skårdalsmo “Advarer mot opptrapping”, Dagsavisen, 9.Aug 2011.

15

psychologically, as Russian policy-makers see the Arctic territory as compensation for

territories lost after the Soviet Union was dissolved as well as a basis for strengthening great

power mentality and “to mobilise domestic constituencies”.41 In Howard’s view Russia’s

main concern is that if Moscow cannot claim the region for itself, another state, most likely

the United States, might step in to fill the gap.42 Russia considers large parts of the Arctic to

be situated in its “natural sphere of influence”. 43 In 2001 Russia handed in its Arctic

territorial claims to the CLCS. Moscow argued that 45 percent of the Arctic belonged to

Russia’s EEZ since this area lies between the Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges, which

Russia claim is an extension of the Siberian shelf. 44 A part of Russia’s claim is competing

with other Arctic nations claims. Russia’s scientific finding was not approved due to

insufficient scientific data. After that, Russia intensified its geological data research. In order

to increase its operational scope in the Arctic, Russia increased its funding for nuclear

icebreakers, which led Kefferpütz to argue that Russia has a strategic advantage towards the

other Arctic actors when it comes to achieving its claims. 45

Military build-up

As well as improving its scientific equipment, Russia also increased military capabilities and

mixed it with an aggressive tone. In 2007, the same year as a Russian scientist planted a flag

at the seabed of the North Pole, Moscow withdrew from the Conventional Forces in Europe

Treaty. 46 Putin increased the funding of the Long-Range Aviation Force based in the Arctic,

and in 2007 military air planes from this force started to fly over the Pacific, the Atlantic and

the Black Sea for the first time since 1991. Putin said that this came as a response to other

states patrol flights, which according to the president had caused problems for Russia. 47

However, it is not clear which countries Putin were referring to. Baev argues that although the

Russian High Command emphasized that these flights are important in order to secure

Russia’s interests in the Arctic, they have no particular value in naval operations as their long- 41 Rodererick Kefferpütz, “On Thin Ice? (Mis)interpreting Russian Policy in the High North”, CEPS Policy

Brief, No. 205, Feb. 2010:6, 15. June 2011 <www.ceps.be/ceps/download/2927> 42 Roger Howard, “Russia’s New Front Line”, Survival,Vol 52, No 2, 2010:142 43 Howard, 147 44 Kefferpütz, 3

45 Kefferpütz, 7 46 Haas, 64 47 Haas, 44

16

range cruise missiles could only be used against targets on land. 48 He also points out that

while Putin called the patrols “strategic”, the bombers are not carrying nuclear weapons.

Neither have they violated national airspace. Therefore Baev argues that the biggest threat

from these flights is the high potential of accidents caused by technical failure.49 However,

the flights have been seen as controversial amongst Western experts, especially as some of the

flights supposedly were involved in a mock bombing against Norway’s northern command

centre at Bodø.50 Russian military aircrafts also flew close to Norway’s oil and gas platforms

in the North Sea, which grounded all offshore helicopter flights. 51 In 2008 Russia’s Northern

Fleet started patrolling Arctic waters. Amongst others one of its warships patrolled an area

that belongs to Norway, apparently because Russia did not agree to Norway’s right to an EEZ

around Svalbard.52 Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov declared that the Northern Fleet’s

submarines had increased their operational radius, and that Russia’s military strategy had to

be renewed in order to meet Arctic threats, especially regarding its continental shelf. 53

In addition to patrolling the Arctic, Russia has held a number of military exercises in the

region. Zysk argues that Russia’s increased military activity in the Arctic is “a result of the

normalization of Russian military training after a long period of stagnation”. 54This goes

hand in hand with the old Roman saying that in order to keep the peace it is necessary to

prepare for war, which means that an aggressor would be deterred from attacking a country

that had a great military force. Though at the same time Zysk points out that Moscow has

been using hostile rhetoric and that it does not rule out the possibility of using military power

48 Baev, Pavel K. “Troublemaking and risk-taking: The North in Russian Military Activities”, Russia and the

North, ed.Elana Wilson Rowe (Ottawa:Ottawa Press, 2009) 22-23

49 Baev, 23 50 Kefferpütz, 7 51 “The Arctic contest heats up”, The Economist, 9.Oct 2008, 24.Jun 2011,

<http://www.economist.com/node/12381767> 52 Ariel Cohen, “Russia in the Arctic: Challenges to U.S. Energy and Geopolitics in the High North”, Russia in

the Arctic, ed. Stephen J. Blank (Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, July 2011) 22

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1073> 53 Cohen, 21-22

54 Katarzyna Zysk, "Russia's Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Constraints", Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 57, 2nd

quarter 2010:108, <www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-57/zysk.pdf>

17

if competition for resources led to small-scale tensions. 55 However, Howard claims that

Moscow’s tough rhetoric is only meant to hit Russia’s domestic audience, as Russia is

dependent on Western expertise and technology in order to extract oil and gas in the harsh

weather conditions in the Arctic. Howard therefore argues that if Moscow continues to

threaten to use force in the Arctic, it could scare away foreign investors and even cause the

United States to impose economic sanctions on Russia. 56 Russia’s military exercises might

be a response to NATO’s military exercise “Cold Response” held in the north of Norway in

2009 where more than 7000 soldiers from 13 nations participated. According to Kefferpütz

this exercise was not well received in Russia, while Russian military experts claimed that

NATO had been using assertions of Russian aggression as an excuse to justify its own

military ambitions in the Arctic.57 Even though the Cold War is over, Russia considers NATO

to be a threat. A Russian military doctrine from as late as 2010 considers the moving of

infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to its borders as well as expanding the bloc

as military dangers to Russia. 58 Zysk points out that one of Russia’s major foreign policy

objectives has been to limit the presence of NATO in the proximity of Russia’s borders,

including in the Arctic. But, Moscow’s belligerent rhetoric and muscle flexing has led to the

opposite effect, as NATO has actually become more interested in the Arctic. 59Amongst

others, NATO’s Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, said that he wanted to increase

the alliance’s role in the Arctic. 60Though, besides from a few military exercises in Norway

and some extra patrols it does not seem like NATO has increased its role in the Arctic much

in practice.

However, Russia’s assertiveness has encouraged its Arctic coastal neighbours, all members of

NATO, to increase their presence in the region. As an example, Denmark is planning to

establish “ an Arctic military command structure and a task force ready to operate all over

the Arctic region”. 61 One could ask oneself which one came first of the egg or the chicken, or

55Howard, 150 56 Zysk, 108 57 Kefferpütz, 8 58 “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”, 5 Feb 2010, 15 June 2011

<http://www.sras.org/military_doctrine_russian_federation_2010> 59 Zysk, 109 60 Kefferpütz, 2 61 Kefferpütz, 8

18

in this case, whether Russia started the military build-up of the Arctic or if this was a response

to its neighbours military build-up. As an example Russia is planning to establish a special

brigade equipped for military warfare for Arctic conditions 10 kilometres from the Norwegian

border. The new brigade is considered to be a response to Canada’s and Denmark’s

establishment of similar troops and is being put in place to balance the situation. 62 Kefferpütz

argues that Moscow’s Arctic approach is often “demonised” and does not differ much from

its Arctic neighbours approaches. 63The fact that other states are increasing their military

capabilities in the Arctic as well shows that this argument is valid. Russia also has a

traditional security view of considering itself to be surrounded by enemies 64. As Russia is

surrounded by NATO members in the North, it might explain why Russia has increased its

military presence in the area. It also suggests that Russia is acting more like an insecure giant

rather than an Arctic bully.

Though in 2009 Medvedev published an Arctic Strategy that aimed to help Russia to

“maintain the role of a leading Arctic power”65, which shows Russia’s great-power

ambitions. The paper states that it will create “groupings of armies” in the Arctic region that

will be able to “provide security under various conditions of a military-political situation”.

Furthermore the strategy says that Russia will deploy coast guard units in the Arctic. Though

the document claims that the coast guard will cooperate with Russia’s neighbouring coast

guards in fighting terrorism, illicit activity and illegal immigration. Furthermore the document

emphasizes that Arctic will continue to be a zone of peace and cooperation, as Russia intends

to work with the other Arctic countries on the basis of international treaties. However,

Russia’s willingness to follow international laws has been put in doubt. As Haas points out,

Russia broke international laws when it invaded Georgia in 2008. 66 It could also be

62 Pettersen, Trude, “Russia to establish Polar Spetsnaz on border to Norway”, The Barents Observer, 16th of

March 2011,16.July 2011, http://www.barentsobserver.com/russia-to-establish-polar-spetsnaz-on-border-to-

norway.4898509-16149.html

63 Kefferpütz, 2 64 Haas, 3 65“Basics of the State Policy Of The Russian Federation in the Arctic For The Period Till 2020 And For A

Further Perspective”, 30 Mar 2009, 15 June 2011 <http://arcticgovernance.custompublish.com/russia-basics-of-

the-state-policy-of-the-russian-federation-in-the-arctic-for-the-period-till-2020-and-for-a-further-

perspective.4651232-142902.html> 66Haas, 153

19

questioned whether Russia would follow international laws if the CLCS decided that a large

part of Russian claims in the Arctic belonged to Canada.

The deployment of forces in the Arctic, together with statements from military personnel that

they will not exclude military confrontations in the Arctic led Golts to suggest that Russia is

seriously preparing to fight for a large part of the Arctic. 67However, Kefferpütz argues that

Russian defence personnel often focuses on new threats in the Arctic because of their own

interests in expanding their operational scope, responsibilities and defence budgets.68

Leading politicians, on the other hand, have signalled that they want to cooperate. For

example, in 2010 Prime Minister Putin held a speech that focused on cooperation among the

other Arctic countries.69 In 2009 Russian and Canadian diplomats held a meeting where they

discussed the possibility of making a joint submission to the CLCS together with Denmark on

maritime claims in the Arctic, which has led Bochkarev to suggests that even though the

Arctic countries have differences, the speculations about a new Cold War in the Arctic are

overblown.70 Putin increased its cooperation with the West after the terrorist attack in 2001.

However, according to Godzimirski the reason behind this was that Russia had an interest in

outplaying Saudi Arabia as the United States energy partner, since the Russian state budget

depended on high global oil prices. As Godzimirski points out, “securing high oil prices and

strategic shares in the global energy market have therefore become one of the top priorities of

Russian foreign, security and defence policy”.71

Even though there might be a possibility that Russia is preparing for aggression in the Arctic,

Golts argues Russian forces do not have enough capacity to go ahead with military

confrontation towards NATO. 72Even though the defence budget grew under Putin, Russia’s

67 Aleksandr´ Golts, “The Arctic, A Clash of Interest or a Clash of Ambitions”, Russia in the Arctic, ed. Stephen

J. Blank, Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, July 2011, 45-47

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1073>

68 Kefferpütz, 8 69 Danila Bochkarev “Diplomatic Offensive on Arctic Is a Success“ The Moscow Times, 28 Sept. 2008 70 Bochkarev 71 Jakub M. Godzimirski, “The New Geopolitics of the North”, Security Policy Library, No 2 2005: 17

<http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/Publikasjoner/Sikkerhetspolitisk_bibliotek/Arkiv/2005/SPB%202-

2005.pdf>

72 Golts, 57

20

combat readiness was not changed. According to Haas there was a view in Russia among

Putin, parliamentarians and academics that there was a need for modernization of the armed

forces in order to face modern day warfare and contemporary threats. 73 But, instead of

strengthening the conventional forces to meet modern threats such as terrorism, Russia

invested in nuclear weapons.74 A large part of Russia’s nuclear triad, as well as the Northern

fleet, an important part of the Russian navy, are situated in the Arctic, which also makes this

area strategic important for Moscow. 75 Weitz points out that the Russian navy fleet is

declining because most of the vessels are outdated or are undergoing major repairs. 76 The

Northern fleet’s main task is to secure Russia’s maritime interests, but Baev argues that it is

not able to perform this task, as the conventional naval forces are struggling with

underfunding and logistical problems as a consequence of the priority of modernizing the

ballistic missile submarine squadrons in the Northern and the Pacific fleet.77 A new type of

submarine-launched ballistic Bulava missiles failed a number tests, and are not yet ready to be

used. The missiles were supposed to be used in a newly built ballistic submarine, but this

submarine is now unarmed since no other missiles fit. 78

Weitz suggests that Russia’s military patrols is a way of showing off its military equipment

because Moscow is afraid that the West would dismiss Russian capabilities, which would be

contrary to Russia’s great power ambitions. Weitz also suggests that Russia is showing off its

military capabilities in order to boost arms sale to foreign markets.79 Naval vessels have also

been used in the fight against piracy in Somalia, which is a sign that Russia is cooperating

with the west. In addition, the Navy’s submarines are collecting data crucial for Russia’s

maritime claims. Cohen argues that the Russian naval presence in the Arctic is a way for

Moscow to increase its influence regarding territorial claims, as the Kremlin believes that

73 Haas, 35-39 74 Haas, 44 75 Zysk, 108 76 Richard Weitz “Global Insights: Russian Sub Patrols Cannot Conceal Fleet’s Decline”, World Politics

Review, 11.Aug. 2009, 24. June 2011, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/4185/global-insights-

russian-sub-patrols-cannot-conceal-fleets-decline> 77 Baev, 23-24 78 Baev, 24

79 Weitz 2009

21

“credible displays of power will settle the conflicting claims”.80 Cohen also suggests that

Russia is building up its military in order to secure its northern borders and the Northern Sea

Route.

Strategic waterways

A Russian Maritime Doctrine from 2001 said that the Northern Sea Route was of “increasing

importance” for “sustainable development of the Russian Federation”81 Some of the

doctrine’s long-term objectives included protecting Russia’s sovereignty and restriction of

foreign naval activities. Antrim explains that the Northern Sea Route is important for Russia

because it connects the country to the global economy, as it connects Russia’s rivers to the

Arctic Ocean, which again is connected to the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean. 82

Antrim argues that the Northern Sea Route could become as important for Russia as the

Panama Canal was to the United States in the 20th century. Even though Antrim mentions that

it will be more difficult for other countries to contain Russia because of its new access to

important waterways, she is first and foremost underlining the economic potential of the

Northern Sea Route. Zysk on the other hand argues that the Northern Sea Route could cause

problems. Russia considers the Northern sea route to be under Russian jurisdiction, which

means that foreign ships that enter the sea route must notify the Russian authorities and pay a

fee in order to use the route. The United States, on the other hand, insists that the straits of this

route are considered international water, which gives ships the right to transit passage.83 This

is contrary to Russia’s objective of restricting foreign naval activities.

Russian strategists fear that aggressors could use the new ice-free waterways to attack Russia,

and that belligerent states could attack Russia from several directions from what Howard call

Russia’s fourth front. In the past Russia has been attacked by Hitler and Napoleon from the

west, by the Mongols in the 13th century from the east, whereas the Ottoman Empire earlier

posed a threat from Caucasus and Central Asia. At the same time access to ice-free waterways 80 Cohen, 22-23 81 “The Marine Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2020, 27. July 2001, 5.July 2011,

available at <http://www.idsa.in/eurasia/resources> 82 Caitlyn Antrim, “Russia and the Changing Geopolitics of the Arctic”, World Politics Review, 2.Mar. 2009,

24. Jun 2011,<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/3380/russia-and-the-changing-geopolitics-of-the-

arctic> 83 Zysk, 106-107

22

would make it easier for Russia to protect the Russian Far East as navy vessels could navigate

through the ice-free waterways. Howard argues that the Northern Sea Route is more important

to Moscow because China has gained strength. 84 It is also suggested that Moscow fears that

Western states could create an operational control line in the north beyond which Russia

would be unable to use its naval and air forces. 85

84 Howard 2010: 147-148 (For more information on Russia’s relationship to China see Haas 2010). 85“Strategic Survey 2010- The Annual Review of World Affairs” 2008

23

Chapter 3: Canada’s concerns and policies Canada’s Arctic Strategies

Canada’s First Defence Strategy, a document from 2008 which looks 20 years ahead states

says: “the military will play an increasingly vital role in demonstrating a visible Canadian

presence in this potentially resource- rich region”,86 while the Canadian government’s

Northern Strategy from 2009 states: “The Government of Canada is firmly asserting its

presence in the North, ensuring we have the capability and capacity to protect and patrol the

land, sea and sky in our sovereign Arctic territory. We are putting more boots on the Arctic

tundra, more ships in the icy water and a better eye-in-the-sky”. 87However, Balasevicius

find it difficult to operate effectively in the Arctic in practice as the Canadian Forces lack

equipment, infrastructure, network and training, due to the fact that the Government has

prioritised international peace and security operations in amongst others Bosnia and

Afghanistan rather than the Arctic. Coates, Lackenbauer, Morrison and Poelzer, the authors of

the book “Arctic Frontiers”, agree that Canada has neglected the Arctic for decades, and that

most governments have been practising a policy of symbolic sovereignty rather than concrete

sovereignty in the region, which means that their military presence in the north has been

limited. The authors are criticising previous governments for promising more than they could

fulfil. As the authors put it:

“If it takes Canada as long to develop a military presence in the North as it has to replace its

Sea King helicopters, there will be no ice at all, and perhaps even palm trees, in the High

Arctic before any troops arrive at their new base”.88

Though they claim that the Harper government’s military strategy is going in the right

direction as it has been focusing on “strengthening practical capabilities without militarising

the North”89 as the authors argue that Russia is not a threat to Canada. However, others have

86 Government of Canada, “Canada First Defence Strategy”, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2008) 8

<http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/June18_0910_CFDS_english_low-res.pdf > 87 The Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and the Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-

Status Indians Government of Canada, “Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future”,

Ottawa 2009, <http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/cns/cns-eng.asp> 88Ken S. Coates, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, William Morrison, and Greg Poelzer, Greg, Arctic Front: Defending

Canada in the Far North (Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers) 2008:174 89Coates et al, 202

24

actually criticised the Canadian government of militarising the Arctic. Broadhead argues that

the Canadian government has been “representing a major post-Cold War wave of

militarization”. 90Broadhead also argues that the Canadian government has used the Arctic

indigenous people in order to gain support for their sovereignty claims while they at the same

has been “assaulted their lifestyle”. As an example Broadhead points out that the indigenous

people were left out when the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lawrence Cannon, held an Arctic

summit in 2010. The author believes that military threats to Canada are imaginary. 91

According to the Canadian government’s paper “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign

Policy” from 2010 Canada does not expect any military challenges in the Arctic. However,

the document concludes that Canada will respond if “positions or actions are taken by others

that affect our national interests, undermine the cooperative relationships we have built, or

demonstrate a lack of sensitivity to the interests or perspectives of Arctic peoples or states”.

While the document promotes following international laws, it also informs that Canada will

“not waver” in its commitment to protect its North.92 This shows that Canada feels

threatened, though as Smith points out, the document is not clear about exactly who and what

is threatening Canada93. As the Canadian government previously have suggested that future

threats to the Arctic could consist of environmental emergencies, terrorists, criminals and

illegal migrants, Smith claims that the government has created a future “other”, which it uses

to justify increased military commitments in the Arctic.

Response to Russian Aggression After the Russian flag planting episode at the North Pole in 2007 the Canadian Foreign

Minister Peter MacKey said: “ Look, this isn’t the 15th century. You can’t go around the world

and just plant flags and say: We’re claiming this territory”. Our claims over our Arctic are

very well established94 The flag-planting coincided with a Russian claim of the Lomonsov 90 Lee-Anne Broadhead, “Canadian Sovereignty Versus Northern Security: The Case for Updating Our Mental

Map of the Arctic”, International Journal, Canadian International Council, Volume 65, No 4, Autumn 2010:81 91 Broadhead, 85 92 The Canadian Government, “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy”, August 2010: 26-27

http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/assets/pdfs/CAFP_booklet-PECA_livret-eng.pdf 93 Heather Smith, “Choosing not to see: Canada, climate change and the Arctic”, International Journal, Canadian

International Council, Volume 65, No 4, Autumn 2010: 91 94 The Minister of Foreign Affairs was quoted in Byers, 88

25

Ridge, an underwater mountain ridge that Denmark and Canada also are claiming since they

believe that the underwater mountain is linked to the American/Greenland land mass. If this is

correct, it could give the countries the right to an extended continental shelf that can go all the

way to the North Pole. The claims are overlapping, and according to Huebert this would be

the first time Canada and Russia would be engaged in a territorial dispute since 1825. Huebert

does not believe that this would end in a conflict, but at the same time argues that Russia

could be assertive, even aggressively in its claim, and that Canada should remember Russia’s

gas cut-offs.95 Balasevicius argues that a renewal of the boundary issues is one of Canada’s

most urgent issues in the Arctic from a defence perspective. The author also suggests that the

Canadian Forces should be prepared for increasing military activity, and transit trafficking

from shipping and aircraft.96

An example of increased military activity in the Arctic was when two Russian military

aircrafts flew close to Canadian airspace just before the American president Barack Obama

visited Canada in 2009.97 Canada responded by sending two fighters to intercept the Russian

aircrafts. The episode led Canada’s Prime Minister Stephen Harper to say that the Russians

were acting aggressively and that they intruded Canadian airspace. Though Russian

spokespersons disagreed that this was an intrusion since the Russian airplanes were kept

inside the Russian border. Besides, the Russian government had warned Canada about the

flights in advance. Lackenbauer finds it ironic that Canadian politicians are accusing Russia

for Arctic militarization as, in her opinion, Canada has contributed to the militarization.

Lackenbauer argues that Russia and Canada are mirroring each other in using belligerent

rhetoric while the Canadian government has “adopted a sovereignty-security framework as a

pretext to invest in Canadian forces capabilities and extend jurisdictional controls.” 98According to Lackenbauer the belligerent rhetoric stems from Russian and Canadian fears

of loosing their rights in the Arctic. Defence Minister Peter MacKay said that Canada

95Rob Huebert, “Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Transforming Circumpolar World”, Foreign

Policy for Canada’s Tomorrow No 4, July 2009:23 96 Tony Balasevicius, “Towards A Canadian Forces Arctic Operating Concept”, Canadian Military Journal, Vol.

11, No 2, Spring 2011:22-24, <www.journal.dnd.ca/vo11/no2/doc/05-balasevicius-eng.pdf> 97 P.Whitney Lackenbauer “Mirror Images? Canada, Russia and the Circumpolar World, International Journal,

Canadian International Council, Volume 65, No 4, Autumn 2010:64 98Lackenbauer, 58

26

increased its military presence in its northern borders largely in response to Russian air patrols

close to its border. 99

When Stephen Harper came to power in 2006 he said: “the first principle of Arctic

sovereignty is to “use it or loose it”. As Canada intended to use it rather than loosing it,

Harper promised funding for a polar icebreaker, an Arctic military training centre, 6-8 Arctic

patrol ships and a deep-water naval base in Nanisvik. 100 In 2006 Operation Nunalivut, where

46 military personnel were patrolling Canada’s northern areas, took place. Coates et al states

that this operation was seen as “pathetic” and “a pitiful reminder of Canada’s limited capacity

to operate in the Far North”101. However, since then the military exercises have expanded,

and in 2010 Denmark and the United States participated in a joint military exercise in Canada

called Operation Nanook. Huebert questioned why the three countries were participating in an

exercise, which included some of the most powerful frigates and destroyers the navies own,

when their defence officials informed that there was no military threat in the region. 102In

Huebert’s opinion, Russia might be what they fear. Byers claims that Prime Minister Harpers

initiative to acquire the new navy patrol ships came as a response to Russia’s flag-planting at

the North Pole and the media’s stories about potential conflicts in the Arctic. While the

Department of National Defence’s idea was to use the naval vessels to stand up to foreign

states, Byers insists that Canada’s new types of security threats come from non-state actors

such as drug-smugglers and illegal immigrants rather than foreign states.103 In 2009 the plans

for the new patrol ships were indefinitely delayed since they were considered too costly. In

2010 the Harper government re-started the project, but the ships have recently once again

been delayed.104 Sloan argues that new patrol vessels cannot take a leading security role in the

99 Michel Comte, “PM's Arctic stand 'frosty rhetoric' ”, AFP, 13.May 2011, 9.June 2010,

<http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iQbu7MNA-WYu-

5xHErG5CVxxubgA?docId=CNG.df1eb6fae932d5dcc99a27e528667e85.6b1> 100 Fairhall, 135 101 Coates et al, 173

102 Rob Huebert, “Welcome to a New Era of Arctic Security”, 24.Aug 2010, 29.June 2011, Globe and Mail,

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/welcome-to-a-new-era-of-arctic-security/article1682704/, 103 Byers, 62-64 104 Carl Meyer, “Arctic Patrol Ships Delayed One More Time”, Embassy, 6.July 2011,10.July 20111,

<http://embassymag.ca/page/view/ships-07-06-2011>

27

Arctic, as they are only able to sail through thin ice.105 Sloan therefore suggests that the

Canadian government should arm the Coast Guard vessels since these vessels have experience

from patrolling Canada’s Arctic parts. At the moment the coast guard vessels are unarmed and

are not, in Sloane’s opinion, guarding Canada’s coasts. Byers criticises the Harper’s initiative

to build a deep-water port intended for navy vessels in Baffin Island. According to Byers a

wharf used by the Coast Guard is already placed in the area, which would mean that in reality

the only change would be that the Navy, instead of the Coast Guard, would use the port.

Neither does Byers see the point in the Harper government’s initiative to build a new

Canadian Forces Arctic Training Centre, since a similar centre already exists. Byers is,

however, positive to the Harper government’s acquisition of RADARSAT-2, a surveillance

system that can track ships and possibly submarines, in addition to mapping the sea-ice.106

The Northwest Passage

It is argued that Canada increased its presence in the Arctic as a way of asserting its claim

over the Northwest Passage. 107 The United States and Canada have for decades disagreed

about its status. The United States claims that the Passage is an international strait. It also

views the strait as a potential commercial route between the Atlantic and the Pacific that its

naval and commercial ships need full access to. The United States also worries that if it

accepts Canada’s claim, this could set a precedent for more strategically valuable straits in

other places in the world, such as Iran’s Straits of Hormuz108 which could affect shipping,

naval mobility and increase the potential for international conflict. 109 Canada, on the other

hand, claims that the strait is a part of Canadian internal waters, which gives it the right to

control ships that enter the Passage. If the passage had been an international strait, foreign

submarines would have the right to transit the Passage submerged and foreign states the right

to overfly the strait. This would allow the Russians to come closer to North-American

105 Elinor Sloan, “An Empowered Coast Guard Is Needed”, 22.June 2011, 6.July 2011,

http://www.embassymag.ca/page/view/sloan-06-22-2011

106 Byers, 62-66 107Simon, Bernard, “Canada Boosts Claim to Northwest Passage”, Financial Times, 11.May 2011, 6.July

<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/9dbd8244-7b35-11e0-9b06-00144feabdc0,dwp_uuid=b491af84-d311-11db-829f-

000b5df10621,print=yes.html> 108 Coates et al, 82-83 109 Coates et al, 100

28

airspace, which Huebert claims would escalate tensions in the region. 110 However, Coates et

al insist that while the Harper government has turned its focus on Russia, the United States

have traditionally been seen as the biggest threat to Canada’s sovereignty for decades. The

authors point out that Canada considered the United States a threat when an American ice-

strengthened oil tanker sailed through the Northwest Passage in 1969 without asking Canada

for permission, and an American Coast Guard icebreaker repeated the incident in 1985. As a

response to the first incident Canada introduced the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act in

1970, which aimed to create a pollution-prevention zone 100 miles from Canada’s

archipelago in which Canada was allowed to control tanker traffic. 111This act was extended to

include 200 nautical miles from Canada’s archipelago in 2009. 112 Canada also made an

agreement with the United States that they agreed to disagree on the Northwest Passage issue,

and made a deal that the United States has to ask Canada for permission if one of its

icebreakers is planning to enter the Passage. Though, this agreement only includes

icebreakers. If the passage turns ice-free other types of vessels from other, more belligerent

countries such as North Korea could enter the Passage. According to a Chatham House paper

there have been an increase of un-notified submarines sailing through the Canadian

Arctic.113 The possibility of terrorists and North-Korean ships seems to have increased the

United States interests in the Arctic. Huebert argues that the Bush administration decreased

Canada’s chance of winning control over the passage, as it published a document that

reconfirmed its view on the Northwest Passage as an international strait, which the EU and

Russia supported.114 Since the Bush administrations document didn’t mention its traditional

relationship of security cooperation with Canada such as North American Aerospace Defence

Command (NORAD), a Canadian-US joint command that is cooperating on maritime

surveillance in North America, Huebert came to the conclusion that the United States was not

being sensitive to Canada’s interests. Though, this seemed to have changed when President

Barack Obama came to power. The 2010 Quadrennial Defence Review says that the United

States will work with Canada “in the context of regional security” and “increased interaction 110 Huebert, 34 111 Coates et al 2008 112 The Canadian Government, “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy”, Aug. 2010,

<http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/assets/pdfs/CAFP_booklet-PECA_livret-eng.pdf>

113 Chatham House, “The Arctic and Climate Change”, International Law Discussion Group Summary, Feb.

2008, <http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/598/> 114 Huebert, 33-34

29

in the Arctic”. 115Furthermore, the document says that the United States will enhance its

coordination with Canada when it comes to defending North America. The defence review

also says that the opening of the waters in the Arctic could lead to an opportunity for

cooperation, which would lead to an improvement in human and environmental security in the

Arctic. Besides, the US Defence Strategy 2010 describes Canada as its “closest trading

partner, a steadfast security ally, and an important partner in regional and global efforts”. 116

The document briefly mentioned the Arctic, and only referred to soft policies such as the

United States need to protect its Arctic environment and support scientific research. However,

the need for protecting the Arctic from environmental harm by regulating emissions and

special fuel have led voices from the United States to suggest that the Northwest Passage

should be Canadian, as the Canadian Coast Guard would be able to search all vessels. 117 The

document’s focus on soft issues might also mean that the United States is trying to decrease

some of the tension caused by the Northwest Passage issue. However, this does not

necessarily mean that the two countries will agree on the status of the passage any time soon.

Hans Island

Canada and Denmark disagree to whom a tiny 1,3 square-kilometre island called The Hans

Island belongs to. In 1983 Danish military airplanes were circling the island as a reaction to

Canadian government allowing a Canadian petroleum company to establish a scientific camp

on the island without discussing it with Denmark. A year later a Danish minister for

Greenland planted a flag on the island. After that both Canada and Denmark have been

involved in flag planting on the island a number of times up until 2005. Byers states that the

flag plantings were done in a friendly manner, but at the same time points out that even “the

smallest point of friction has the potential to flare into something more significant”118. The

Danish government called it “occupation” when the then Canadian defence Minister, Bill

Graham visited the island in 2005. The same year Canada sent naval vessels to the area as a

part of mission that aimed to increase its sovereignty in the Arctic. Even though the island is

so small that some refer to it as a “rock” and scientists have said that there is not a great 115Department of Defence, United States of America, “Quadrennial Defence Review Report” (Washington: Feb.

2010) 85, <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf > 116The White House, “National Security Strategy”, (Washington: May 2010) 42,

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf> 117 Chatham House 118 Byers, 26-27

30

chance of finding oil or other resources there119, the island is important for Canada. If Canada

looses the island, it is argued that it could weaken its case in the Northwest Passage and other

claims. 120 In 2005 Canada and Denmark in a joint statement promised to work to solve the

issue, and to inform each other about all activity on the island. Now it looks like the countries

are even closer to a solution, as negotiators have said that they believe that they will solve this

issue soon. 121

Other Issues

Canada also has maritime border issues with Denmark in the Lincoln Sea, while Canada and

the United States disagree to where the maritime border should be between Alaska and

Yukon. In addition, Canada and the United States disagree over ownership in parts of the

Beaufort Sea. Surveys have showed that the seabed contains huge amounts of oil and gas.122

Though according to the “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Policy” these issues are well

managed and do not pose any challenges for Canada.123 Besides, the three countries’

participation in the previously mentioned operation Nanook, shows that they are cooperating.

The Danish Navy and the Canadian Coast Guard have also participated in a search-and-rescue

operation together. 124. However, Conley and Kraut argue that Russian and American

territorial claims towards Canada create significant threats to its economic and sovereign

119Lee Carter “Canada Sends Navy to Arctic North”, BBC News, 23.Aug. 2005, 29.June

2011,<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4175446.stm> 120Anne Mcllroy “Hans Off My Island”, The Guardian, 30.Aug 2005, 11.July 2011

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/aug/30/arctic> 121 Jill Mahoney “In the Arctic, Canada willing to fight to keep the true north free” The Globe and Mail, 25.Jan

2011, 29.June 2011, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/in-the-arctic-canada-willing-to-fight-to-

keep-the-true-north-free/article1881683/ 122 Byers 2009:98 123 “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy” 2010: 124Heather Conley and Jamie Kraut, “U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic. An Assessment of Current

Challenges and New Opportunities for Cooperation”, Report of the CSIS Europe Program, (Centre for Strategic

And International Studies, Apr. 2010)

11,http://csis.org/files/publication/100426_Conley_USStrategicInterests_Web.pdf The Arctic Council recently

agreed on a search and rescue treaty. See Patricia Bell, “Arctic Council leaders sign rescue treaty”, CBC News

12. May 2011, 30. July 2011, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2011/05/12/arctic-council-

greenland.html>

31

interests. They point out that Canada has spent $109 million on scientific research in order to

prove its claims. Though they also argue that Canada’s “dual-track strategy of diplomacy and

defence”, has “eased concerns of armed conflict125

125Heather and Conley, 18

32

Chapter 4. Is Norway being left out?

During the Cold War the northern part of Norway was considered strategic important because

of its proximity to Russia. Tensions were especially high on the border between Russia and

Norway where soldiers from both sides of the borders feared a hot war. As Lindeman put it:

“Military and political presence was motivated by the strategic importance of sea lines of

communications and of the North as a staging area for nuclear weapons”.126 As a great

power and Norway’s next-door neighbour, Russia has always been important to Norway. As

late as 1997 Russia’s military capacity in the north was considered to be a danger to

Norway.127 According to a Norwegian Intelligence report released in 2011 Russian military

force is not considered to be a threat to Norway anymore, as the two countries are cooperating

in different areas at the same time as Russia is prioritizing international cooperation. Though

at the same time the document states, that “Russian foreign policy will be characterized by

uncertainty as a result of its great power ambitions, closed decision-making structure and

vulnerable economy.”128 According to Godzimirski, Norway considered Russia to be a

“constant albeit rather unstable and unpredictable element of the Norwegian security

element”. 129Though in Godzimirski’s view Russia has been seen more as a security risk

than a military threat. He explains that environmental issues caused by nuclear waste in the

north, overlapping sovereignty claims and the interpretation of the Svalbard Treaty

characterized the Russian- Norwegian agenda in the 1990s. In recent time energy has been

added to the agenda. Norway is the third largest exporter of oil worldwide and the second

largest exporter of gas to the European market130. As Norway and Russia are both energy

exporters some competition could occur. Due to the United States and the EU’s growing

dependence on Russia as well as their economic considerations Godzimirski believes that

these two actors could “value their relationship to Russia higher than their relations with

126 Ole Andreas Lindeman, “Norwegian Foreign Policy in the High North”, (Oslo:Norwegian Institute for

Defence Studies, 2009) 55 127Ander Kjølberg, “Norges forhold til Russland og Øst-Europa”, Norges Utenrikspolitikk, ed.Torbjørn L.

Knutsen, Gunnar Sørbø and Svein Gjerdåker (Oslo:Cappelen Akademisk Forlag, 1997) 361 128Norwegian Intelligence Service, “Fokus 2011- Etterretningstjenestens vurdering”,

<http://forsvaret.no/Documents/FOKUS 2011.pdf > 129 Godzimirski, 32 130 Lindeman, 48

33

their traditional Northern ally” and thus “leave Norway alone exposing it to pressures” from

Russia.131

Military build-up

As the Arctic areas lost most of its strategic importance after the Cold War, Norway

experienced a fear of being marginalized. Græger points out that United States has neglected

NATO, and instead chose to focus more on the EU, an organisation that Norway is not a

member of. 132Græger therefore argues that Norway risks being sidelined by the United

States, one of its closest allies. The Norwegian armed forces have since the beginning of the

millennium been through a period of transformation from a mobilization based territorial

force to expeditionary forces. According to Larsen one of the reasons for this change was

NATO and other allies’ lack of strategic interest to the High North.133Therefore Norway had

to transform its forces and participate in out-of-area operations in order to buy interest and

solidarity from its allies. NATO is still considered to be “the cornerstone of Norway’s

security and defence policy.” 134 As we saw in the chapter about Russia, the large country is

still considering NATO to be a challenge. Græger argues that the deterioration of Western-

Russian relations potentially has negative implications for Norway. As Græger points out:

“The fact that Russia has interests and claims in a region marked by not only a lack of

international rules and regulations but also marked by territorial claims and border disputes

between countries represents a major challenge to Norway”.135

Græger states that the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008 proves that Russia is willing to use

military force in order to achieve its political goals. Though at the same time Græger argues

that Russia’s intensified military activity in the north is not directed towards Norway.136 On

the other hand Blunden points out that Norway was the first Arctic country to move its

military command leadership in the Arctic region in 2009. 137 Bjerga states that since

131 Godzimirski, 19 132 Nina Græger, “Inside NATO, outside the EU- Norwegian Security and Defence Policy in the High North”,

(Helsinki, Finnish Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies: 2009)8 133 Leif Larsen, “En ny sikkerhetspolitisk virkelighet”, Nytt Landskap- nytt Forsvar:Norsk Militærmakt 1990-

2010, ed. Tormod Heier (Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag, 2011) 24 134 Græger, 2 135 Græger, 6

136 Græger, 6 137 Blunden, 126

34

Russia’s military ambitions in the High North is likely to persist, it will be important from a

political security dimension that the headquarter is situated in the north. 138Though Bjerga

also argues that the location is important due to increased commercial activities in the area in

which surveillance, search and rescue capabilities and authority would be needed, as well as a

way of showing NATO that the High North is important to Norway. 139 Recently Norway

bought five new frigates as well as new helicopters that aim to make the frigates more flexible

and powerful. Some of the frigates tasks include waving the flag, asserting sovereignty and air

surveillance. The frigates have special-designed anti-submarine capability, and are able to

protect targets under the sea, at land and in the air. In 1959 the Norwegian government

decided that at least once a year, a Norwegian warship should visit Svalbard, a task that the

frigates are still performing.140 Huebert argues that governments that buy these types of

frigates expect them to be involved in a dangerous environment. As Hubert puts it: “These

vessels have clearly been designed to fight against an advanced enemy; they are not simply

for fisheries and resource patrols.” Huebert argues that Norway is building a small, but

modern fighting force since Norway, in addition to the frigates, invested in American Joint

Strike Fighter aircraft, announced that air assets will be moved to the north and increased the

defence budget. According to Lindeman, Russia believes that Norway is involved in a

militarisation in the north. However, Lindeman describes Norway’s enforcement capabilities

“small” and “hardly more than necessary for credible control of an ocean area about six

times greater than that of mainland Norway”.141 Hønneland and Rowe argue that Norway

should find the right balance between reassurance and deterrence towards Russia, and in their

view deterrence consists of military presence in the north and alliance affiliation.142 Jensen,

Jensen and Rottem argue that the Norwegian government is following a dual approach in its

defence and security policies in the Arctic. They point out that the government is stressing

that the Arctic should be demilitarized while at the same time using traditional security

138 Kjell Inge Bjerga, “Forsvarets Operative ledelse i brennpunktet”, Nytt Landskap- nytt Forsvar:Norsk

Militærmakt 1990-2010, ed. Tormod Heier (Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag, 2011) 138-160 139Larsen, 156 140Ole M. Rapp “Topp moderne- og svært dyre i drift”,Aftenposten, 9.Dec 2010, 20.June 2011,

<http://www.aftenposten.no/fakta/innsikt/article3940483.ece>

141 Lindeman, 56 142 Hønneland, Geir and Rowe, Lars, “Hva er nordområdepolitikk? Utfordringer innenrikspolitisk, i

nærområdene og globalt” Plan, Nr 2, 2010: 10-15, <www.fni.no/doc&pdf/GEH-LAR-PLAN-2010.pdf>

35

objectives related to hard power where military presence is emphasized. 143According to

Lindeman the dual approach has led other countries to describe it as blurry, and has also led

both Russia and other countries to believe that Norway is pursuing its interests in the north

more intensively. 144

Arctic Strategies

In 2003 the Arctic gradually started to gain importance in Norway due to an increasing

international interest in the potential for finding energy resources in the North. The Bondevik

Government appointed a High North commission that concluded that Norway could risk

loosing interests in its Arctic areas. The Norwegian Armed Forces Strategic Concept from

2005 published by the Bondevik government, informed that a key interest was to protect gas

and oil installations.145 The document was clearly affected by the terrorist attacks on the

World Trade Centre 11th of September 2001 and the war on terror, as the document is

permeated by how the Norwegian Armed Forces could fight terrorism. Amongst others, it

stated that there was a possibility that terrorist could attack oil and gas installations. The High

North itself is mentioned only a few times. The document states that a regular presence of

Norwegian and Allied military units in the region, surveillance, exercise of sovereignty and

exercise of authority in the Arctic is needed to promote a “positive, stable and safe

development in the Arctic Europe”. It also claims that developments in the north will have

implications for the Norwegian Armed forces because of Russia’s major concentration of

nuclear weapons in the region and Russia’s large emphasize on its nuclear weapons. The

document was criticised for neglecting the High North, especially since it aimed to reduce the

defence infrastructure and military presence in this area. 146 When a new government coalition

came to power in 2005 the High North became a great part of Norway’s foreign policy. In

2005 Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg declared that the High North was “Norway’s most

important strategic target in the years to come”147 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs published

143 Leif C. Jensen, Øystein Jensen and Svein V. Rottem, “Norwegian Foreign Policy in the High North: Energy,

International Law and Security”, Atlantisch Perpectief, Vol 35, No 3, 2011:15-19 144Lindeman, 53 145Norwegian Ministry of Defence, “Relevant Force”, Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces,

2005, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/documents/Handbooks-and-brochures/2005/Relevant-

force.html?id=419505 146 Lindeman, 32-33 147 Lindeman, 5

36

a High North Strategy in 2006 where one of its main aims was for Norway to maintain its

presence in the High North through the armed forces, the police and the prosecuting authority.

The strategy also focused on strengthening cooperation with Russia, amongst others with

creating an industrial cooperation zone. Development, research and environmental protection

were also considered to be important.148 Rowe and Hønneland argue that the strategy has been

focusing too much on research, technology and domestic polities rather then foreign policy.

Though they find it positive that the High North budget was increased.

The Strategic Concept from 2009 focuses more on the Arctic than the strategy from 2005.

It states that the challenges in the north include the exploitation and management of resources

and fisheries, and that Norway’s fundamental interests consist of “maintaining Norway’s

sovereignty, territorial integrity and political freedom of action”. 149With regards to Russia,

the document states:

“Russia’s revitalised role as a great power may have consequences for our relationship in the

High North. We can expect a more persistent Russian foreign and security policy, where

national interests are pursued more vigorously”. 150

At the same time the document informs that Russia is not considered a threat to Norway, as

Russia’s military activities should be seen as return to normality as Russia in 90s had a lower

military activity than usual. However, the document also stated that it could not be excluded

that Norway’s security could be threatened in the High North, and that there was a chance that

the political freedom could be restricted in this area. Regular military patrols would be

performed as it had a stabilising effect.

Rowe and Hønneland claim that Norway’s overall High North policies since the Cold War

has helped reduce the potential for conflicts as they have led to an increased cooperation in

the areas of politics, bureaucracy and business, which again makes misinterpretations less

148 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs “The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy”, 2006: 7

<http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/rapporter_planer/rapporter/2006/The-Norwegian-Governments-

High-North-Strategy.html?id=440285>

149 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, “Capable Force – Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces”,

2009:25 http://www.regjeringen.no/nn/dep/fd/aktuelt/nyheter/2009/new-strategic-concept-for-the-norwegian-

.html?id=586698

150 “Capable Force-Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces”, 39

37

likely to occur. 151 However, Rowe and Hønneland as well as Lindeman criticise the

government’s focus on getting more attention to the High North. While Lindeman claims that

this has actually contributed to the race for resources and other states more assertive strategies

for the area, 152 Hønneland and Rowe argue the increased attention has led other countries to

create a “unified front” against Norway regarding the Svalbard Treaty issue. 153

Disputed areas

The interpretation of the Svalbard Treaty from 1920 is another Arctic challenge for Norway.

Norway’s sovereignty to the island is recognised by all the 10 countries that signed the treaty.

However, no country supports Norway’s claim that there is a 200 nautical miles of an EEZ

outside Svalbard that belongs to Norway, which would give Norway exclusive rights to

resources in these waters. The treaty says that all the signatories to the treaty have the same

right to explore and exploit natural resources on the island and in its territorial waters.

Norway insists that this only counts for a 12 nautical miles zone outside the island. 154Great

Britain is increasingly interested in gaining access to resources at Svalbard due to a shift from

being self-reliant to becoming a net importer of energy.155 In 2006 Great Britain invited

Russia, the United States and some EU-members to a meeting about Svalbard without inviting

Norway, which led some employees at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to

speculate that Norwegian diplomacy had suffered a defeat, while the Minister of Foreign

Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre was “not happy”. 156 Even the United States, considered to be one

of Norway’s closest allies, refuses to back Norway’s claim. According to Pedersen the United

States had both economic and strategic interests at Svalbard, economically because it was

interested in the energy resources in the area, and strategically because of the area’s

geography. Svalbard is also important to Russia because it gives the country an opportunity to

have a foothold in the western part of the Arctic.157

151 Hønneland og Rowe, 2 152 Lindeman, 98

153 Hønneland and Rowe, 4 154 Pedersen, Torbjørn, “International Law and Politics in U.S. Policymaking: The United States and the

Svalbard Dispute”, Ocean Development and International Law , 42:1-2, 2011:120-135 155 Lindeman, 65 156 Morten Fyhn, “Støre gikk i taket”, Aftenposten, 13.Apr. 2007,20.June 2011,

<http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article1733532.ece> 157 Lindeman, 58

38

In order to avoid a rush for oil and gas resources Norway created a 200 nautical miles Fishery

Protecting Zone around the island, which the United States agreed upon. Russia, on the other

hand, argues that Norway is breaking both international laws and the Svalbard Treaty with its

policies of upholding the Fishery Protection Zone and claiming a Norwegian EEZ. It is also a

common Russian view that Norway’s ambitions are a part of the West’s plan to keep the

Russians out of the area. 158Nevertheless, Russia accepts Norway’s right to control Russian

fishery vessels. However, Moscow insists that if a vehicle is caught overfishing in the waters

close to Svalbard, Russian courts should decide the outcome, while Norway argues that

Norwegian courts should decide it. In 2005 a captain at the Russian trawler “Elektron”

refused to follow the Norwegian coastguard’s instructions of sailing to a Norwegian harbour

after being caught overfishing. Instead the trawler fled to Russian water while having two

Norwegian fishing inspectors on board.159 The episode shows that disagreements on Svalbard

could lead to tensions. In contrast to the Canadian Coast Guard, the Norwegian Coast Guard

is armed. In the 1990s the Coast Guard fired warning shots against foreign vessels, as the

Norwegian government had issued the Coast Guard to use all means necessary to prevent

illegal fishing in the fisheries protecting zone.160 However the Elektron episode didn’t escalate

since neither Russia nor Norway used military force, which shows that the potential for

conflicts between Norway and Russia might be exaggerated. Russia’s Minister of Foreign

Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, even apologized for the Russian captains behaviour on behalf of

Russia.161 According to Pedersen, Russia did not protest against later arrests of Russian

trawlers by the Norwegian coast guard.162 However this does not rule out that there might be

a conflict in the region between the other states involved. Like the other Arctic coastal states

Norway handed in maritime claims to the CLCS, and in 2009 Norway was given the right to

extend its continental shelf with 10 percent. 163 In addition to the Svalbard Treaty Norway and

Russia disagreed on how to demarcate the maritime border in the Barents Sea. In 2010

Norway and Russia surprisingly agreed on a demarcation line in the Barents Sea. The area 158 Lindeman, 60 159 Jonas Gahr Støre, “Å gjøre en forskjell- refleksjoner fra en norsk utenriksminister” (Cappelen Damm: 2008)

294-298 160 Pedersen, 130 161 Støre, 298

162 Pedersen 2011 163 Daniel B. Fjaertoft, “Norwegian Grand Strategy and the Arctic”, Global Brief, 27.June 2011, 10.July 2011,

<http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2011/06/27/norwegian-grand-strategy-and-the-arctic/#>

39

had been disputed for 40 years as the two countries disagreed on whether the border should

follow a median line or a sector principle. With the new agreement, which was recently

ratified, the two countries split the disputed 175.000 square miles in two equal parts. 164 At the

same time the two countries laid the groundwork for how to cooperate if cross-border oil and

gas field were to be find there. It has been suggested that one of the reasons why Russia

agreed to a compromise regarding the treaty was that Russia had an interest in following

international laws in order to prevent the potential for other states, such as the United States,

China and other Asian states to express power in the area. 165 There might also be an

economical reason for the agreement. As Henriksen and Ulfstein points out, “the agreement

on the boundary may have the important effect of opening formerly disputed areas for

petroleum exploration and exploitation”. 166 They also argue that there is a need for coastal

states to agree on jurisdiction over international shipping as a result of new maritime transport

opportunities in the region. Henriksen and Ulfstein believe that the agreement will “add to

orderly governance of the Arctic region”, but are uncertain to whether the delimitation

agreement will have implications for other disputes in the Arctic, as the treaty is not giving

enough information about the process and the circumstances around the agreement.

As we have seen, the Russian flag-planting episode at the North Pole led Canadian politicians

to respond with assertive language. The Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr

Støre, on the other hand, called the flag-planting episode a “publicity stunt”167. Often

Norwegian politicians talk of Russia in positive terms and point out that Russia and Norway

have not been involved in wars against each other the last 1000 years. There are also some

signs that show that the Norwegian- Russian relationship is softening. Last year Russia and

Norway signed an agreement that says that people that live up to 30 kilometres from the

Russian-Norwegian border (approximately 40.000 Russians and 10.000 Norwegians) can

travel across the border without a visa. 168 164 Fjaertoft 165Nils M. Udgaard, En milepæl for Norge”, Aftenposten, 7.July 2011, 15.July 2011,

<http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/article4167101.ece> 166 Tore Henriksen and Geir Ulfsten, “Maritime Delimitation in the Arctic: The Barents Sea Treaty”, Ocean

Development and International Law, 42:1-2, 2011:9. 167 Kjetil Elsebutangen, “Til kamp mot vill-vest-tilstander i Arktis”, Dagsavisen, 28.May 2008, 20.July 2011,

<http://www.dagsavisen.no/utenriks/article351354.ece> 168 Ole M. Rapp, “Russere gir Kirkenes ny giv”, Aftenposten, 9.No 2010, 20.June 2011,

40

Conclusion The main challenges in the Arctic seem to be overlapping claims and the fight over access to

natural resources as well as sea-routes. This has led to a militarization of the Arctic. However,

the militarization are also seen as a reaction of other actor’s, such as China, Japan, Korea, the

EU and NATO, increased interest in the region. The Arctic states also fears non-state actors

such as pirates and illegal immigrants.

Is Russia aiming to be an Arctic bully aiming to control the Arctic or is it acting this way

because it feels insecure? As we have seen, Russia has great power ambitions at the same time

as it has been acting aggressively and built up its armed forces. However, Canada, Norway

and Russia have all accused each other of being responsible for militarising the north, and

have used this as an excuse to build up their own armed forces. The three states have also sent

mixed signals. At the same time as they have pointed out that they aim to protect their

sovereignty with more presence, they have also emphasized cooperation. All the three states

have increased their military presence in the Arctic (though the Canadian government has

exaggerated its achievements) and participated in military exercises in the region. Thus,

Russia does not seem to pursue policies that are different from Norwegian and Canadian

policies. This shows that it is acting more like an insecure giant than an Arctic bully. While

Canadian and Russia officials have used an aggressive tone, Norwegian officials have mostly

focused on cooperation with Russia. This seems to be a result of Norway’s fear of being left

alone as its allies have not considered the Arctic to be important. As the Svalbard issue

shows, Norway’s most important allies turned their back on Norway when they found it

economical beneficial. As Norway is a small country with an assertive Russia as a neighbour,

it does not have a choice but to pursue cooperation with Russia. On the other hand, this

cooperation has been beneficial to Norway as the two countries agreed on the demarcation

line in the Barents Sea, and to an extent opened up their common border in the north.

Can the Arctic challenges be solved? As we have seen, the experts disagree on whether the

Arctic challenges could cause war or lead to a peaceful solution. The Arctic is psychologically

and strategically important for Canada, Norway and Russia. The United States policies go

contrary to Canada and Russia’s views as it considers the Northwest Passage and the Northern

<http://www.aftenposten.no/fakta/innsikt/article3893857.ece >

41

Sea Route to be international straits. This article shows that unsolved sovereignty claims and

divergent interests makes it difficult to solve the challenges. However, the challenges can be

overcome, as the countries are cooperating through the Arctic Council, NATO and the EU as

well bilaterally. The Arctic countries would benefit from solving their sovereignty claims and

working together on oil and gas extraction, as this would keep other actors out from the area.

But, in order to achieve a solution Canada and Russia need to tone down their belligerent

rhetoric.

42

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