stochastic target game problems - ceremadestochastic target game problems b.bouchard ceremade -...
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![Page 1: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Stochastic target game problems
B. Bouchard
Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech
Université Pierre et Marie Curie, Mai 2012
Joint work with L. Moreau (Paris-Dauphine) and M. Nutz (Columbia)
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Problem formulation and Motivations
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Problem formulation
Determine the viability sets
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s. t. E[`(Z ν[ϑ],ϑ
t,z (T ))]≥ p ∀ ϑ ∈ V
In which :
• V is a set of admissible adverse controls• U is a set of admissible strategies
• Z ν[ϑ],ϑt,z is an adapted Rd -valued process s.t. Z ν[ϑ],ϑ
t,z (t) = z• ` is a given loss/utility function• p a threshold.
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Examples
2 Z ν[ϑ],ϑt,z = (Xϑ
t,x ,Yν[ϑ],ϑt,x ,y ) where
• X ν[ϑ],ϑt,x models financial assets or factors with dynamics
depending on ϑ
• Y ν[ϑ],ϑt,x ,y models a wealth process
• ϑ is the control of the market : parameter uncertainty (e.g.volatility), adverse players, etc...
• ν[ϑ] is the financial strategy given the past observations of ϑ.
2 Flexible enough to embed constraints, transaction costs, marketimpact, etc...
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Examples
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. E[`(Z ν[ϑ],ϑ
t,z (T ))]≥ p ∀ ϑ ∈ V
2 Almost sure constraint :
Λ(t) := z : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. Z ν[ϑ],ϑt,z (T ) ∈ O P− a.s. ∀ ϑ ∈ V
for `(z) = 1z∈O, p = 1.⇒ Super-hedging in finance for O := y ≥ g(x).
2 Compare with Peng (G -expectations) and Soner, Touzi andZhang (2BSDE).
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Examples
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. E[`(Z ν[ϑ],ϑ
t,z (T ))]≥ p ∀ ϑ ∈ V
2 Almost sure constraint :
Λ(t) := z : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. Z ν[ϑ],ϑt,z (T ) ∈ O P− a.s. ∀ ϑ ∈ V
for `(z) = 1z∈O, p = 1.⇒ Super-hedging in finance for O := y ≥ g(x).
2 Compare with Peng (G -expectations) and Soner, Touzi andZhang (2BSDE).
![Page 7: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
Examples
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. E[`(Z ν[ϑ],ϑ
t,z (T ))]≥ p ∀ ϑ ∈ V
2 Almost sure constraint :
Λ(t) := z : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. Z ν[ϑ],ϑt,z (T ) ∈ O P− a.s. ∀ ϑ ∈ V
for `(z) = 1z∈O, p = 1.⇒ Super-hedging in finance for O := y ≥ g(x).
2 Compare with Peng (G -expectations) and Soner, Touzi andZhang (2BSDE).
![Page 8: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
Examples
2 Constraint in probability :
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. P[Z ν[ϑ],ϑ
t,z (T ) ∈ O]≥ p ∀ ϑ ∈ V
for `(z) = 1z∈O, p ∈ (0, 1).⇒ Quantile-hedging in finance for O := y ≥ g(x).
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Examples
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. E[`(Z ν[ϑ],ϑ
t,z (T ))]≥ p ∀ ϑ ∈ V
2 Expected loss control for `(z) = −[y − g(x)]−
2 Can impose several constraint : B. and Thanh Nam (discreteP&L constraints).
2 Give sense to problems that would be degenerate under P− a.s.constraints : B. and Dang (guaranteed VWAP pricing).
![Page 10: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
Examples
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. E[`(Z ν[ϑ],ϑ
t,z (T ))]≥ p ∀ ϑ ∈ V
2 Expected loss control for `(z) = −[y − g(x)]−
2 Can impose several constraint : B. and Thanh Nam (discreteP&L constraints).
2 Give sense to problems that would be degenerate under P− a.s.constraints : B. and Dang (guaranteed VWAP pricing).
![Page 11: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
Examples
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. E[`(Z ν[ϑ],ϑ
t,z (T ))]≥ p ∀ ϑ ∈ V
2 Expected loss control for `(z) = −[y − g(x)]−
2 Can impose several constraint : B. and Thanh Nam (discreteP&L constraints).
2 Give sense to problems that would be degenerate under P− a.s.constraints : B. and Dang (guaranteed VWAP pricing).
![Page 12: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
Examples
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. E[`(Z ν[ϑ],ϑ
t,z (T ))]≥ p ∀ ϑ ∈ V
2 Expected loss control for `(z) = −[y − g(x)]−
2 Can impose several constraint : B. and Thanh Nam (discreteP&L constraints).
2 Give sense to problems that would be degenerate under P− a.s.constraints : B. and Dang (guaranteed VWAP pricing).
![Page 13: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
Aim
Provide a direct PDE characterization Λ
:this requires a Dynamic Programming Principle.
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Aim
Provide a direct PDE characterization Λ :this requires a Dynamic Programming Principle.
![Page 15: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
Geometric Dynamic Programming Principle I
The case without adverse control
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The GDPP for P− a.s. criteria
2 P− a.s. criteria (Soner and Touzi)
Λ(t) := z : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. Z νt,z(T ) ∈ O
2 GDPP : for all stopping time τ with values in [t,T ]
Λ(t) = z : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. Z νt,z(τ) ∈ Λ(τ)
2 Extended by B. and Thanh Nam to constraints on the wholepath (obstacle version).2 Relies on a measurable selection argument : not very flexible,requires topological properties.2 Is enough to provide a PDE characterization for (t, z) 7→ 1z∈Λ(t).
![Page 17: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
The GDPP for P− a.s. criteria
2 P− a.s. criteria (Soner and Touzi)
Λ(t) := z : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. Z νt,z(T ) ∈ O
2 GDPP : for all stopping time τ with values in [t,T ]
Λ(t) = z : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. Z νt,z(τ) ∈ Λ(τ)
2 Extended by B. and Thanh Nam to constraints on the wholepath (obstacle version).2 Relies on a measurable selection argument : not very flexible,requires topological properties.2 Is enough to provide a PDE characterization for (t, z) 7→ 1z∈Λ(t).
![Page 18: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
The GDPP for P− a.s. criteria
2 P− a.s. criteria (Soner and Touzi)
Λ(t) := z : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. Z νt,z(T ) ∈ O
2 GDPP : for all stopping time τ with values in [t,T ]
Λ(t) = z : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. Z νt,z(τ) ∈ Λ(τ)
2 Extended by B. and Thanh Nam to constraints on the wholepath (obstacle version).
2 Relies on a measurable selection argument : not very flexible,requires topological properties.2 Is enough to provide a PDE characterization for (t, z) 7→ 1z∈Λ(t).
![Page 19: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
The GDPP for P− a.s. criteria
2 P− a.s. criteria (Soner and Touzi)
Λ(t) := z : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. Z νt,z(T ) ∈ O
2 GDPP : for all stopping time τ with values in [t,T ]
Λ(t) = z : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. Z νt,z(τ) ∈ Λ(τ)
2 Extended by B. and Thanh Nam to constraints on the wholepath (obstacle version).2 Relies on a measurable selection argument : not very flexible,requires topological properties.
2 Is enough to provide a PDE characterization for (t, z) 7→ 1z∈Λ(t).
![Page 20: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
The GDPP for P− a.s. criteria
2 P− a.s. criteria (Soner and Touzi)
Λ(t) := z : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. Z νt,z(T ) ∈ O
2 GDPP : for all stopping time τ with values in [t,T ]
Λ(t) = z : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. Z νt,z(τ) ∈ Λ(τ)
2 Extended by B. and Thanh Nam to constraints on the wholepath (obstacle version).2 Relies on a measurable selection argument : not very flexible,requires topological properties.2 Is enough to provide a PDE characterization for (t, z) 7→ 1z∈Λ(t).
![Page 21: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
The GDPP for criteria in expectation2 Controlled loss :
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. E[`(Z ν
t,z(T ))]≥ p
2 GDPP : for all stopping time τ with values in [t,T ]
Λ(t)6=(z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. (Z νt,z(τ), p) ∈ Λ(τ)
since
(Z νt,z(τ), p) ∈ Λ(τ)“⇒′′ Mν(τ) := E
[`(Z ν
t,z(T ))|Fτ]≥ p.
But
Λ(t) = (z , p) : ∃ (ν,M) ∈ U×Mt,p s.t. (Z νt,z(τ),M(τ)) ∈ Λ(τ)
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The GDPP for criteria in expectation2 Controlled loss :
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. E[`(Z ν
t,z(T ))]≥ p
2 GDPP : for all stopping time τ with values in [t,T ]
Λ(t)=(z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. (Z νt,z(τ), p) ∈ Λ(τ)
since
Z νt,z(τ) ∈ V (τ, p)“⇒′′ Mν(τ) := E
[`(Z ν
t,z(T ))|Fτ]≥ p.
But
Λ(t) = (z , p) : ∃ (ν,M) ∈ U×Mt,p s.t. (Z νt,z(τ),M(τ)) ∈ Λ(τ)
![Page 23: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
The GDPP for criteria in expectation2 Controlled loss :
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. E[`(Z ν
t,z(T ))]≥ p
2 GDPP : for all stopping time τ with values in [t,T ]
Λ(t)6=(z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. (Z νt,z(τ), p) ∈ Λ(τ)
since
(Z νt,z(τ), p) ∈ Λ(τ)“⇒′′ Mν(τ) := E
[`(Z ν
t,z(T ))|Fτ]≥ p.
But
Λ(t) = (z , p) : ∃ (ν,M) ∈ U×Mt,p s.t. (Z νt,z(τ),M(τ)) ∈ Λ(τ)
![Page 24: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
The GDPP for criteria in expectation2 Controlled loss :
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. E[`(Z ν
t,z(T ))]≥ p
2 GDPP : for all stopping time τ with values in [t,T ]
Λ(t)6=(z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. (Z νt,z(τ), p) ∈ Λ(τ)
since
(Z νt,z(τ), p) ∈ Λ(τ)“⇒′′ Mν(τ) := E
[`(Z ν
t,z(T ))|Fτ]≥ p.
But
Λ(t) = (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. (Z νt,z(τ),Mν(τ)) ∈ Λ(τ)
![Page 25: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
The GDPP for criteria in expectation2 Controlled loss :
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. E[`(Z ν
t,z(T ))]≥ p
2 GDPP : for all stopping time τ with values in [t,T ]
Λ(t)6=(z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. (Z νt,z(τ), p) ∈ Λ(τ)
since
(Z νt,z(τ), p) ∈ Λ(τ)“⇒′′ Mν(τ) := E
[`(Z ν
t,z(T ))|Fτ]≥ p.
But
Λ(t) = (z , p) : ∃ (ν,M) ∈ U×Mt,p s.t. (Z νt,z(τ),M(τ)) ∈ Λ(τ)
![Page 26: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
The GDPP for criteria in expectation
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. E[`(Z ν
t,z(T ))]≥ p
2 Alternative formulation in terms of the setMt,p of martingalesstarting from p at t :
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ (ν,M) ∈ U×Mt,p s.t. `(Z νt,z(T )) ≥ M(T )
2 In Brownian diffusion settings :
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ (ν, α) ∈ U×A s.t. `(Z νt,z(T )) ≥ Mα
t,p(T )
whereMα
t,p := p +
∫ ·tαsdWs .
2 Back to P− a.s. criteria up to an increase of the controls and thesystem : B., Elie and Touzi.
![Page 27: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
The GDPP for criteria in expectation
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. E[`(Z ν
t,z(T ))]≥ p
2 Alternative formulation in terms of the setMt,p of martingalesstarting from p at t :
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ (ν,M) ∈ U×Mt,p s.t. `(Z νt,z(T )) ≥ M(T )
2 In Brownian diffusion settings :
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ (ν, α) ∈ U×A s.t. `(Z νt,z(T )) ≥ Mα
t,p(T )
whereMα
t,p := p +
∫ ·tαsdWs .
2 Back to P− a.s. criteria up to an increase of the controls and thesystem : B., Elie and Touzi.
![Page 28: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
The GDPP for criteria in expectation
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. E[`(Z ν
t,z(T ))]≥ p
2 Alternative formulation in terms of the setMt,p of martingalesstarting from p at t :
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ (ν,M) ∈ U×Mt,p s.t. `(Z νt,z(T )) ≥ M(T )
2 In Brownian diffusion settings :
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ (ν, α) ∈ U×A s.t. `(Z νt,z(T )) ≥ Mα
t,p(T )
whereMα
t,p := p +
∫ ·tαsdWs .
2 Back to P− a.s. criteria up to an increase of the controls and thesystem : B., Elie and Touzi.
![Page 29: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
Geometric Dynamic Programming Principle II
The game formulation
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The GDPP for games2 Back to the original problem :
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. E[`(Z ν[ϑ],ϑ
t,z (T ))]≥ p ∀ ϑ ∈ V
2 Submartingale property : for ν fixed
Sν,ϑs := ess infϑ∈V
E[`(Z ν[ϑ⊕s ϑ],ϑ⊕s ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fs
]defines a family of submartingales parameterized by ϑ.
2 Doob-Meyer decomposition : ∃ a family of martingales Mν,ϑ, ϑsuch that Sν,ϑ ≥ Mν,ϑ with Mν,ϑ(t) = p.
2 (z , p) ∈ Λ(t) if and only if there exists ν ∈ U and a family ofmartingales Mϑ, ϑ with Mϑ(t) = p such that
`(Z ν[ϑ],ϑt,z (T )) ≥ Mϑ(T ) P− a.s. ∀ ϑ ∈ V.
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The GDPP for games2 Back to the original problem :
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. E[`(Z ν[ϑ],ϑ
t,z (T ))]≥ p ∀ ϑ ∈ V
2 Submartingale property : for ν fixed
Sν,ϑs := ess infϑ∈V
E[`(Z ν[ϑ⊕s ϑ],ϑ⊕s ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fs
]defines a family of submartingales parameterized by ϑ.
2 Doob-Meyer decomposition : ∃ a family of martingales Mν,ϑ, ϑsuch that Sν,ϑ ≥ Mν,ϑ with Mν,ϑ(t) = p.
2 (z , p) ∈ Λ(t) if and only if there exists ν ∈ U and a family ofmartingales Mϑ, ϑ with Mϑ(t) = p such that
`(Z ν[ϑ],ϑt,z (T )) ≥ Mϑ(T ) P− a.s. ∀ ϑ ∈ V.
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The GDPP for games2 Back to the original problem :
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. E[`(Z ν[ϑ],ϑ
t,z (T ))]≥ p ∀ ϑ ∈ V
2 Submartingale property : for ν fixed
Sν,ϑs := ess infϑ∈V
E[`(Z ν[ϑ⊕s ϑ],ϑ⊕s ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fs
]defines a family of submartingales parameterized by ϑ.
2 Doob-Meyer decomposition : ∃ a family of martingales Mν,ϑ, ϑsuch that Sν,ϑ ≥ Mν,ϑ with Mν,ϑ(t) = p.
2 (z , p) ∈ Λ(t) if and only if there exists ν ∈ U and a family ofmartingales Mϑ, ϑ with Mϑ(t) = p such that
`(Z ν[ϑ],ϑt,z (T )) ≥ Mϑ(T ) P− a.s. ∀ ϑ ∈ V.
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The GDPP for games2 Back to the original problem :
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. E[`(Z ν[ϑ],ϑ
t,z (T ))]≥ p ∀ ϑ ∈ V
2 Submartingale property : for ν fixed
Sν,ϑs := ess infϑ∈V
E[`(Z ν[ϑ⊕s ϑ],ϑ⊕s ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fs
]defines a family of submartingales parameterized by ϑ.
2 Doob-Meyer decomposition : ∃ a family of martingales Mν,ϑ, ϑsuch that Sν,ϑ ≥ Mν,ϑ with Mν,ϑ(t) = p.
2 (z , p) ∈ Λ(t) if and only if there exists ν ∈ U and a family ofmartingales Mϑ, ϑ with Mϑ(t) = p such that
`(Z ν[ϑ],ϑt,z (T )) ≥ Mϑ(T ) P− a.s. ∀ ϑ ∈ V.
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The GDPP for games
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. E[`(Z ν[ϑ],ϑ
t,z (T ))]≥ p ∀ ϑ ∈ V
2 (z , p) ∈ Λ(t) if and only if there exists ν ∈ U and a family ofmartingales Mϑ, ϑ with Mϑ(t) = p such that
(Z ν[ϑ],ϑt,z (τ),Mϑ(τ)) ∈ Λ(τ) P− a.s. ∀ ϑ ∈ V.
2 Main difficulty : how to rely on a measurable selection argumentas in the previous cases ?2 Solution : provide a weak formulation, under a suitable continuityassumption.
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The GDPP for games
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. E[`(Z ν[ϑ],ϑ
t,z (T ))]≥ p ∀ ϑ ∈ V
2 (z , p) ∈ Λ(t) if and only if there exists ν ∈ U and a family ofmartingales Mϑ, ϑ with Mϑ(t) = p such that
(Z ν[ϑ],ϑt,z (τ),Mϑ(τ)) ∈ Λ(τ) P− a.s. ∀ ϑ ∈ V.
2 Main difficulty : how to rely on a measurable selection argumentas in the previous cases ?
2 Solution : provide a weak formulation, under a suitable continuityassumption.
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The GDPP for games
Λ(t) := (z , p) : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. E[`(Z ν[ϑ],ϑ
t,z (T ))]≥ p ∀ ϑ ∈ V
2 (z , p) ∈ Λ(t) if and only if there exists ν ∈ U and a family ofmartingales Mϑ, ϑ with Mϑ(t) = p such that
(Z ν[ϑ],ϑt,z (τ),Mϑ(τ)) ∈ Λ(τ) P− a.s. ∀ ϑ ∈ V.
2 Main difficulty : how to rely on a measurable selection argumentas in the previous cases ?2 Solution : provide a weak formulation, under a suitable continuityassumption.
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A Weak version of the Geometric DynamicProgramming Principle for game formulations
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Abstract setting
2 To (ν, ϑ) ∈ U× V associate a Rd -valued càdlàg processZ ν,ϑ
t,z (·) = Z ν[ϑ],ϑt,z (·) with values in Rd such that Z ν,ϑ
t,z (t) = z .
2 Set
I (t, z , ν, ϑ) := E[`(Z ν,ϑ
t,z (T ))|Ft
]and J(t, z , ν) := ess inf
ϑ∈VI (t, z , ν, ϑ).
2 We consider
Λ(t) :=
(z , p) ∈ Rd × R : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. J(t, z , ν) ≥ p P− a.s..
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Abstract setting
2 To (ν, ϑ) ∈ U× V associate a Rd -valued càdlàg processZ ν,ϑ
t,z (·) = Z ν[ϑ],ϑt,z (·) with values in Rd such that Z ν,ϑ
t,z (t) = z .
2 Set
I (t, z , ν, ϑ) := E[`(Z ν,ϑ
t,z (T ))|Ft
]and J(t, z , ν) := ess inf
ϑ∈VI (t, z , ν, ϑ).
2 We consider
Λ(t) :=
(z , p) ∈ Rd × R : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. J(t, z , ν) ≥ p P− a.s..
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Abstract setting
2 To (ν, ϑ) ∈ U× V associate a Rd -valued càdlàg processZ ν,ϑ
t,z (·) = Z ν[ϑ],ϑt,z (·) with values in Rd such that Z ν,ϑ
t,z (t) = z .
2 Set
I (t, z , ν, ϑ) := E[`(Z ν,ϑ
t,z (T ))|Ft
]and J(t, z , ν) := ess inf
ϑ∈VI (t, z , ν, ϑ).
2 We consider
Λ(t) :=
(z , p) ∈ Rd × R : ∃ ν ∈ U s.t. J(t, z , ν) ≥ p P− a.s..
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Concatenation possibilities
2 Adverse controls : ϑ := ϑ0 ⊕t (ϑ11A + ϑ21Ac ) ∈ V,for ϑ0, ϑ1, ϑ2 ∈ V, and A ∈ Ft
2 Non-anticipating strategies :ν : ϑ ∈ V 7→ ν[ϑ] := ν0[ϑ]⊕t
∑j≥1 νj [ϑ]1Aϑ
j∈ U,
for Aϑj , ϑ ∈ Vj≥1 ⊂ Ft such that Aϑj , j ≥ 1 forms a partition ofΩ for each ϑ ∈ V.
2 Non-anticipating event sets : Aϑ, ϑ ∈ V ∈ Ft ifAϑ, ϑ ∈ V ⊂ Ft is such thatAϑ1 ∩ ϑ1 =(0,t] ϑ2 = Aϑ2 ∩ ϑ1 =(0,t] ϑ2 for ϑ1, ϑ2 ∈ V.
2 Non-anticipating stopping times : τϑ ∈ (s1, s2], ϑ ∈ V andτϑ /∈ (s1, s2], ϑ ∈ V belong to Fs2 for τϑ, ϑ ∈ V ⊂ Tt .
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Concatenation possibilities
2 Adverse controls : ϑ := ϑ0 ⊕t (ϑ11A + ϑ21Ac ) ∈ V,for ϑ0, ϑ1, ϑ2 ∈ V, and A ∈ Ft
2 Non-anticipating strategies :ν : ϑ ∈ V 7→ ν[ϑ] := ν0[ϑ]⊕t
∑j≥1 νj [ϑ]1Aϑ
j∈ U,
for Aϑj , ϑ ∈ Vj≥1 ⊂ Ft such that Aϑj , j ≥ 1 forms a partition ofΩ for each ϑ ∈ V.
2 Non-anticipating event sets : Aϑ, ϑ ∈ V ∈ Ft ifAϑ, ϑ ∈ V ⊂ Ft is such thatAϑ1 ∩ ϑ1 =(0,t] ϑ2 = Aϑ2 ∩ ϑ1 =(0,t] ϑ2 for ϑ1, ϑ2 ∈ V.
2 Non-anticipating stopping times : τϑ ∈ (s1, s2], ϑ ∈ V andτϑ /∈ (s1, s2], ϑ ∈ V belong to Fs2 for τϑ, ϑ ∈ V ⊂ Tt .
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Concatenation possibilities
2 Adverse controls : ϑ := ϑ0 ⊕t (ϑ11A + ϑ21Ac ) ∈ V,for ϑ0, ϑ1, ϑ2 ∈ V, and A ∈ Ft
2 Non-anticipating strategies :ν : ϑ ∈ V 7→ ν[ϑ] := ν0[ϑ]⊕t
∑j≥1 νj [ϑ]1Aϑ
j∈ U,
for Aϑj , ϑ ∈ Vj≥1 ⊂ Ft such that Aϑj , j ≥ 1 forms a partition ofΩ for each ϑ ∈ V.
2 Non-anticipating event sets : Aϑ, ϑ ∈ V ∈ Ft ifAϑ, ϑ ∈ V ⊂ Ft is such thatAϑ1 ∩ ϑ1 =(0,t] ϑ2 = Aϑ2 ∩ ϑ1 =(0,t] ϑ2 for ϑ1, ϑ2 ∈ V.
2 Non-anticipating stopping times : τϑ ∈ (s1, s2], ϑ ∈ V andτϑ /∈ (s1, s2], ϑ ∈ V belong to Fs2 for τϑ, ϑ ∈ V ⊂ Tt .
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Concatenation possibilities
2 Adverse controls : ϑ := ϑ0 ⊕t (ϑ11A + ϑ21Ac ) ∈ V,for ϑ0, ϑ1, ϑ2 ∈ V, and A ∈ Ft
2 Non-anticipating strategies :ν : ϑ ∈ V 7→ ν[ϑ] := ν0[ϑ]⊕t
∑j≥1 νj [ϑ]1Aϑ
j∈ U,
for Aϑj , ϑ ∈ Vj≥1 ⊂ Ft such that Aϑj , j ≥ 1 forms a partition ofΩ for each ϑ ∈ V.
2 Non-anticipating event sets : Aϑ, ϑ ∈ V ∈ Ft ifAϑ, ϑ ∈ V ⊂ Ft is such thatAϑ1 ∩ ϑ1 =(0,t] ϑ2 = Aϑ2 ∩ ϑ1 =(0,t] ϑ2 for ϑ1, ϑ2 ∈ V.
2 Non-anticipating stopping times : τϑ ∈ (s1, s2], ϑ ∈ V andτϑ /∈ (s1, s2], ϑ ∈ V belong to Fs2 for τϑ, ϑ ∈ V ⊂ Tt .
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Path dependency
2 Z ν,ϑ1t,z (s)(ω) = Z ν,ϑ2
t,z (s)(ω) for P-a.e. ω ∈ ϑ1 =(0,s] ϑ2, for allν ∈ U and ϑ1, ϑ2 ∈ V.
2 Z ν1,ϑt,z (s)(ω) = Z ν2,ϑ
t,z (s)(ω) for P-a.e. ω ∈ ν1[ϑ] =(t,s] ν2[ϑ],for all ϑ ∈ V and ν1, ν2 ∈ U.
2 There exists a constant K (t, z) ∈ R such that
esssupν∈U
ess infϑ∈V
E[`(Z ν,ϑ
t,z (T ))|Ft
]= K (t, z) P− a.s.
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Path dependency
2 Z ν,ϑ1t,z (s)(ω) = Z ν,ϑ2
t,z (s)(ω) for P-a.e. ω ∈ ϑ1 =(0,s] ϑ2, for allν ∈ U and ϑ1, ϑ2 ∈ V.
2 Z ν1,ϑt,z (s)(ω) = Z ν2,ϑ
t,z (s)(ω) for P-a.e. ω ∈ ν1[ϑ] =(t,s] ν2[ϑ],for all ϑ ∈ V and ν1, ν2 ∈ U.
2 There exists a constant K (t, z) ∈ R such that
esssupν∈U
ess infϑ∈V
E[`(Z ν,ϑ
t,z (T ))|Ft
]= K (t, z) P− a.s.
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Path dependency
2 Z ν,ϑ1t,z (s)(ω) = Z ν,ϑ2
t,z (s)(ω) for P-a.e. ω ∈ ϑ1 =(0,s] ϑ2, for allν ∈ U and ϑ1, ϑ2 ∈ V.
2 Z ν1,ϑt,z (s)(ω) = Z ν2,ϑ
t,z (s)(ω) for P-a.e. ω ∈ ν1[ϑ] =(t,s] ν2[ϑ],for all ϑ ∈ V and ν1, ν2 ∈ U.
2 There exists a constant K (t, z) ∈ R such that
esssupν∈U
ess infϑ∈V
E[`(Z ν,ϑ
t,z (T ))|Ft
]= K (t, z) P− a.s.
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Path regularity and growth conditions
2 There exists C > 0, q ≥ 0, ε > 0 and a continuous map % suchthat
|`(z)| ≤ C (1 + |z |q) , ess sup(ν,ϑ)∈U×V
E[|Z ν,ϑ
t,z (T )|(q∨1)+ε|Ft
]≤ %(z)
and
ess sup(ν,ϑ)∈U×V
E[|Z ν⊕s ν,ϑ⊕s ϑ
t,z (T )− Z ν,ϑ⊕s ϑs,z ′ (T )| |Fs
]≤ C |Z ν,ϑ
t,z (s)− z ′|.
2 As δ → 0
supϑ∈V,τ∈Tt
P
[sup
0≤h≤δ
∣∣∣Z ν,ϑt,z (τ + h)− Z ν,ϑ
t,z (τ)∣∣∣ ≥ ι]→ 0.
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Path regularity and growth conditions
2 There exists C > 0, q ≥ 0, ε > 0 and a continuous map % suchthat
|`(z)| ≤ C (1 + |z |q) , ess sup(ν,ϑ)∈U×V
E[|Z ν,ϑ
t,z (T )|(q∨1)+ε|Ft
]≤ %(z)
and
ess sup(ν,ϑ)∈U×V
E[|Z ν⊕s ν,ϑ⊕s ϑ
t,z (T )− Z ν,ϑ⊕s ϑs,z ′ (T )| |Fs
]≤ C |Z ν,ϑ
t,z (s)− z ′|.
2 As δ → 0
supϑ∈V,τ∈Tt
P
[sup
0≤h≤δ
∣∣∣Z ν,ϑt,z (τ + h)− Z ν,ϑ
t,z (τ)∣∣∣ ≥ ι]→ 0.
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Non-anticipating admissible martingale strategies
2 Mϑ1(s)(ω) = Mϑ2(s)(ω) for P-a.e. ω ∈ ϑ1 =(0,s] ϑ2, for allMϑ, ϑ ∈ V ∈Mt,p and ϑ1, ϑ2 ∈ V.
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Weak formulation
2 We consider relaxed versions of Λ
Λ(t) :=
(z , p) ∈ Rd × R : there exist (tn, zn, pn)→ (t, z , p)
such that (zn, pn) ∈ Λ(tn) and tn ≥ t for all n ≥ 1
and
Λι(t) :=
(z , p) ∈ Rd × R : (t ′, z ′, p′) ∈ Bι(t, z , p)implies (z ′, p′) ∈ Λ(t ′)
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Weak formulation
Theorem(GDP1) : If (z , p + ε) ∈ Λ(t) for some ε > 0, then ∃ ν ∈ U andMϑ, ϑ ∈ V ⊂Mt,p s.t.(
Z ν,ϑt,z (τ) ,Mϑ (τ)
)∈ Λ (τ) P− a.s. ∀ ϑ ∈ V, τ ∈ Tt .
(GDP2) : Let ι > 0, ν ∈ U, Mϑ, ϑ ∈ V ∈Mt,p andτϑ, ϑ ∈ V ∈ Tt be s.t.(
Z ν,ϑt,z (τϑ),Mϑ(τϑ)
)∈ Λι(τ
ϑ) P− a.s. for all ϑ ∈ V.
Assume further that Z ν,ϑt,z(τϑ), ϑ ∈ V is uniformly bounded in
L∞. Then (z , p − ε) ∈ Λ(t) for all ε > 0.
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Weak formulation
Theorem(GDP1) : If (z , p + ε) ∈ Λ(t) for some ε > 0, then ∃ ν ∈ U andMϑ, ϑ ∈ V ⊂Mt,p s.t.(
Z ν,ϑt,z (τ) ,Mϑ (τ)
)∈ Λ (τ) P− a.s. ∀ ϑ ∈ V, τ ∈ Tt .
(GDP2) : Let ι > 0, ν ∈ U, Mϑ, ϑ ∈ V ∈Mt,p andτϑ, ϑ ∈ V ∈ Tt be s.t.(
Z ν,ϑt,z (τϑ),Mϑ(τϑ)
)∈ Λι(τ
ϑ) P− a.s. for all ϑ ∈ V.
Assume further that Z ν,ϑt,z(τϑ), ϑ ∈ V is uniformly bounded in
L∞. Then (z , p − ε) ∈ Λ(t) for all ε > 0.
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More abstract setting
2 Rd replaced by a metric space (Z, dZ)
2 Lipschitz continuity, and growth estimates on Z and ` replacedby :For all s ∈ [t,T ], ε > 0, there exists a partition (Bj)j of Z intoBorel sets and a sequence (zj)j≥1 ⊂ Z such that, for all ν ∈ U,ϑ ∈ V and j ≥ 1 :
• E[`(Z ν,ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fs
]≥ I (s, zj , ν, ϑ)− ε on C ν,ϑ
j := Z ν,ϑt,z (s) ∈
Bj.
• ess infϑ∈V
E[`(Z ν,ϑ⊕s ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fs
]≤ J(s, zj , ν(ϑ⊕s ·)) + ε on C ν,ϑ
j .
• |K (s, zj)− K (s,Z ν,ϑt,z (s))| ≤ ε on C ν,ϑ
j .
2 Plus some additional control on the negative part of I .
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More abstract setting
2 Rd replaced by a metric space (Z, dZ)2 Lipschitz continuity, and growth estimates on Z and ` replacedby :For all s ∈ [t,T ], ε > 0, there exists a partition (Bj)j of Z intoBorel sets and a sequence (zj)j≥1 ⊂ Z such that, for all ν ∈ U,ϑ ∈ V and j ≥ 1 :
• E[`(Z ν,ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fs
]≥ I (s, zj , ν, ϑ)− ε on C ν,ϑ
j := Z ν,ϑt,z (s) ∈
Bj.
• ess infϑ∈V
E[`(Z ν,ϑ⊕s ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fs
]≤ J(s, zj , ν(ϑ⊕s ·)) + ε on C ν,ϑ
j .
• |K (s, zj)− K (s,Z ν,ϑt,z (s))| ≤ ε on C ν,ϑ
j .2 Plus some additional control on the negative part of I .
![Page 56: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/56.jpg)
More abstract setting
2 Rd replaced by a metric space (Z, dZ)2 Lipschitz continuity, and growth estimates on Z and ` replacedby :For all s ∈ [t,T ], ε > 0, there exists a partition (Bj)j of Z intoBorel sets and a sequence (zj)j≥1 ⊂ Z such that, for all ν ∈ U,ϑ ∈ V and j ≥ 1 :
• E[`(Z ν,ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fs
]≥ I (s, zj , ν, ϑ)− ε on C ν,ϑ
j := Z ν,ϑt,z (s) ∈
Bj.
• ess infϑ∈V
E[`(Z ν,ϑ⊕s ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fs
]≤ J(s, zj , ν(ϑ⊕s ·)) + ε on C ν,ϑ
j .
• |K (s, zj)− K (s,Z ν,ϑt,z (s))| ≤ ε on C ν,ϑ
j .2 Plus some additional control on the negative part of I .
![Page 57: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/57.jpg)
More abstract setting
2 Rd replaced by a metric space (Z, dZ)2 Lipschitz continuity, and growth estimates on Z and ` replacedby :For all s ∈ [t,T ], ε > 0, there exists a partition (Bj)j of Z intoBorel sets and a sequence (zj)j≥1 ⊂ Z such that, for all ν ∈ U,ϑ ∈ V and j ≥ 1 :
• E[`(Z ν,ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fs
]≥ I (s, zj , ν, ϑ)− ε on C ν,ϑ
j := Z ν,ϑt,z (s) ∈
Bj.
• ess infϑ∈V
E[`(Z ν,ϑ⊕s ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fs
]≤ J(s, zj , ν(ϑ⊕s ·)) + ε on C ν,ϑ
j .
• |K (s, zj)− K (s,Z ν,ϑt,z (s))| ≤ ε on C ν,ϑ
j .2 Plus some additional control on the negative part of I .
![Page 58: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/58.jpg)
More abstract setting
2 Rd replaced by a metric space (Z, dZ)2 Lipschitz continuity, and growth estimates on Z and ` replacedby :For all s ∈ [t,T ], ε > 0, there exists a partition (Bj)j of Z intoBorel sets and a sequence (zj)j≥1 ⊂ Z such that, for all ν ∈ U,ϑ ∈ V and j ≥ 1 :
• E[`(Z ν,ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fs
]≥ I (s, zj , ν, ϑ)− ε on C ν,ϑ
j := Z ν,ϑt,z (s) ∈
Bj.
• ess infϑ∈V
E[`(Z ν,ϑ⊕s ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fs
]≤ J(s, zj , ν(ϑ⊕s ·)) + ε on C ν,ϑ
j .
• |K (s, zj)− K (s,Z ν,ϑt,z (s))| ≤ ε on C ν,ϑ
j .
2 Plus some additional control on the negative part of I .
![Page 59: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/59.jpg)
More abstract setting
2 Rd replaced by a metric space (Z, dZ)2 Lipschitz continuity, and growth estimates on Z and ` replacedby :For all s ∈ [t,T ], ε > 0, there exists a partition (Bj)j of Z intoBorel sets and a sequence (zj)j≥1 ⊂ Z such that, for all ν ∈ U,ϑ ∈ V and j ≥ 1 :
• E[`(Z ν,ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fs
]≥ I (s, zj , ν, ϑ)− ε on C ν,ϑ
j := Z ν,ϑt,z (s) ∈
Bj.
• ess infϑ∈V
E[`(Z ν,ϑ⊕s ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fs
]≤ J(s, zj , ν(ϑ⊕s ·)) + ε on C ν,ϑ
j .
• |K (s, zj)− K (s,Z ν,ϑt,z (s))| ≤ ε on C ν,ϑ
j .2 Plus some additional control on the negative part of I .
![Page 60: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/60.jpg)
Sketch of proof for GDP12 Assume
Sν,ϑs := ess infϑ∈Vs
E[`(Z ν[ϑ⊕s ϑ],ϑ⊕s ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fs
]is such that Sν,ϑt ≥ p.
2 It admits a càlàg decomposition (up to a modification),+Doob-Meyer-type decomposition : Sν,ϑ ≥ Mν,ϑ a càdlàg martingale.
2
K (τ,Z ν,ϑt,z (τ)) ≥ Mν,ϑ (τ)
which leads to(Z ν,ϑ
t,z (τ) ,Mν,ϑ (τ)− ε)∈ Λ (τ) P− a.s.
2 Ok for stopping times τ with values in a countable set. Pass tothe limit.
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Sketch of proof for GDP12 Assume
Sν,ϑs := ess infϑ∈Vs
E[`(Z ν[ϑ⊕s ϑ],ϑ⊕s ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fs
]is such that Sν,ϑt ≥ p.
2 It admits a càlàg decomposition (up to a modification),+Doob-Meyer-type decomposition : Sν,ϑ ≥ Mν,ϑ a càdlàg martingale.
2
K (τ,Z ν,ϑt,z (τ)) ≥ Mν,ϑ (τ)
which leads to(Z ν,ϑ
t,z (τ) ,Mν,ϑ (τ)− ε)∈ Λ (τ) P− a.s.
2 Ok for stopping times τ with values in a countable set. Pass tothe limit.
![Page 62: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/62.jpg)
Sketch of proof for GDP12 Assume
Sν,ϑs := ess infϑ∈Vs
E[`(Z ν[ϑ⊕s ϑ],ϑ⊕s ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fs
]is such that Sν,ϑt ≥ p.
2 It admits a càlàg decomposition (up to a modification),+Doob-Meyer-type decomposition : Sν,ϑ ≥ Mν,ϑ a càdlàg martingale.
2
K (τ,Z ν,ϑt,z (τ)) ≥ Mν,ϑ (τ)
which leads to(Z ν,ϑ
t,z (τ) ,Mν,ϑ (τ)− ε)∈ Λ (τ) P− a.s.
2 Ok for stopping times τ with values in a countable set. Pass tothe limit.
![Page 63: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/63.jpg)
Sketch of proof for GDP12 Assume
Sν,ϑs := ess infϑ∈Vs
E[`(Z ν[ϑ⊕s ϑ],ϑ⊕s ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fs
]is such that Sν,ϑt ≥ p.
2 It admits a càlàg decomposition (up to a modification),+Doob-Meyer-type decomposition : Sν,ϑ ≥ Mν,ϑ a càdlàg martingale.
2
K (τ,Z ν,ϑt,z (τ)) ≥ Mν,ϑ (τ)
which leads to(Z ν,ϑ
t,z (τ) ,Mν,ϑ (τ)− ε)∈ Λ (τ) P− a.s.
2 Ok for stopping times τ with values in a countable set. Pass tothe limit.
![Page 64: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/64.jpg)
Sketch of proof for GDP12 Assume
Sν,ϑs := ess infϑ∈Vs
E[`(Z ν[ϑ⊕s ϑ],ϑ⊕s ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fs
]is such that Sν,ϑt ≥ p.
2 It admits a càlàg decomposition (up to a modification),+Doob-Meyer-type decomposition : Sν,ϑ ≥ Mν,ϑ a càdlàg martingale.
2
K (τ,Z ν,ϑt,z (τ)) ≥ Mν,ϑ (τ)
which leads to(Z ν,ϑ
t,z (τ) ,Mν,ϑ (τ)− ε)∈ Λ (τ) P− a.s.
2 Ok for stopping times τ with values in a countable set. Pass tothe limit.
![Page 65: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/65.jpg)
Sketch of proof for GDP22 τϑn an approximation of τϑ on a sequence of finite grids πn.
2 If (Z ν,ϑ
t,z
(τϑ),Mϑ
(τϑ))∈ Λι
(τϑ)
P− a.s.
then (Z ν,ϑ
t,z
(τϑn
),Mϑ
(τϑn
))∈ Λ
(τϑn
)on Eϑn for all ϑ ∈ V
with P[Eϑn]→ 1 as n→∞ (uniformly in ϑ).
2 Hence,K (τϑn ,Z
ν,ϑt,z (τϑn )) ≥ Mϑ(τϑn ).
2 Regularity + covering : there exists νε ∈ U such that
E[`(Z νε,ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fτϑn]≥ Mϑ(τϑn )− ε.
which impliesE[`(Z νε,ϑ
t,z (T ))|Ft
]≥ p − ε.
![Page 66: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/66.jpg)
Sketch of proof for GDP22 τϑn an approximation of τϑ on a sequence of finite grids πn.
2 If (Z ν,ϑ
t,z
(τϑ),Mϑ
(τϑ))∈ Λι
(τϑ)
P− a.s.
then (Z ν,ϑ
t,z
(τϑn
),Mϑ
(τϑn
))∈ Λ
(τϑn
)on Eϑn for all ϑ ∈ V
with P[Eϑn]→ 1 as n→∞ (uniformly in ϑ).
2 Hence,K (τϑn ,Z
ν,ϑt,z (τϑn )) ≥ Mϑ(τϑn ).
2 Regularity + covering : there exists νε ∈ U such that
E[`(Z νε,ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fτϑn]≥ Mϑ(τϑn )− ε.
which impliesE[`(Z νε,ϑ
t,z (T ))|Ft
]≥ p − ε.
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Sketch of proof for GDP22 τϑn an approximation of τϑ on a sequence of finite grids πn.
2 If (Z ν,ϑ
t,z
(τϑ),Mϑ
(τϑ))∈ Λι
(τϑ)
P− a.s.
then (Z ν,ϑ
t,z
(τϑn
),Mϑ
(τϑn
))∈ Λ
(τϑn
)on Eϑn for all ϑ ∈ V
with P[Eϑn]→ 1 as n→∞ (uniformly in ϑ).
2 Hence,K (τϑn ,Z
ν,ϑt,z (τϑn )) ≥ Mϑ(τϑn ).
2 Regularity + covering : there exists νε ∈ U such that
E[`(Z νε,ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fτϑn]≥ Mϑ(τϑn )− ε.
which impliesE[`(Z νε,ϑ
t,z (T ))|Ft
]≥ p − ε.
![Page 68: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/68.jpg)
Sketch of proof for GDP22 τϑn an approximation of τϑ on a sequence of finite grids πn.
2 If (Z ν,ϑ
t,z
(τϑ),Mϑ
(τϑ))∈ Λι
(τϑ)
P− a.s.
then (Z ν,ϑ
t,z
(τϑn
),Mϑ
(τϑn
))∈ Λ
(τϑn
)on Eϑn for all ϑ ∈ V
with P[Eϑn]→ 1 as n→∞ (uniformly in ϑ).
2 Hence,K (τϑn ,Z
ν,ϑt,z (τϑn )) ≥ Mϑ(τϑn ).
2 Regularity + covering : there exists νε ∈ U such that
E[`(Z νε,ϑ
t,z (T ))|Fτϑn]≥ Mϑ(τϑn )− ε.
which impliesE[`(Z νε,ϑ
t,z (T ))|Ft
]≥ p − ε.
![Page 69: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/69.jpg)
Application to Brownian controlled SDEs
![Page 70: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/70.jpg)
Framework
2 U is the set of maps ν : V → U such thatϑ1 =(0,τ ] ϑ2 ⊂ ν[ϑ1] =(0,τ ] ν[ϑ2] for all ϑ1, ϑ2 ∈ V and τ ∈ T .
2 Z ν,ϑt,z = (X ν,ϑ
t,x ,Yν,ϑt,x ,y ) is the strong solution of
Z (s) = z +
∫ s
tµ(Z (r), ν[ϑ]r , ϑr )dr +
∫ s
tσ(Z (r), ν[ϑ]r , ϑr )dWr .
2Mt,p is identified to Mαt,p, α ∈ A with
Mαt,p := p +
∫ ·tαsdWs
2 X the set of maps α[·] : V 7→ A such thatϑ1 =(0,τ ] ϑ2 ⊂ α[ϑ1] =(0,τ ] α[ϑ2] for ϑ1, ϑ2 ∈ V and τ ∈ T .
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Framework
2 U is the set of maps ν : V → U such thatϑ1 =(0,τ ] ϑ2 ⊂ ν[ϑ1] =(0,τ ] ν[ϑ2] for all ϑ1, ϑ2 ∈ V and τ ∈ T .
2 Z ν,ϑt,z = (X ν,ϑ
t,x ,Yν,ϑt,x ,y ) is the strong solution of
Z (s) = z +
∫ s
tµ(Z (r), ν[ϑ]r , ϑr )dr +
∫ s
tσ(Z (r), ν[ϑ]r , ϑr )dWr .
2Mt,p is identified to Mαt,p, α ∈ A with
Mαt,p := p +
∫ ·tαsdWs
2 X the set of maps α[·] : V 7→ A such thatϑ1 =(0,τ ] ϑ2 ⊂ α[ϑ1] =(0,τ ] α[ϑ2] for ϑ1, ϑ2 ∈ V and τ ∈ T .
![Page 72: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/72.jpg)
Framework
2 U is the set of maps ν : V → U such thatϑ1 =(0,τ ] ϑ2 ⊂ ν[ϑ1] =(0,τ ] ν[ϑ2] for all ϑ1, ϑ2 ∈ V and τ ∈ T .
2 Z ν,ϑt,z = (X ν,ϑ
t,x ,Yν,ϑt,x ,y ) is the strong solution of
Z (s) = z +
∫ s
tµ(Z (r), ν[ϑ]r , ϑr )dr +
∫ s
tσ(Z (r), ν[ϑ]r , ϑr )dWr .
2Mt,p is identified to Mαt,p, α ∈ A with
Mαt,p := p +
∫ ·tαsdWs
2 X the set of maps α[·] : V 7→ A such thatϑ1 =(0,τ ] ϑ2 ⊂ α[ϑ1] =(0,τ ] α[ϑ2] for ϑ1, ϑ2 ∈ V and τ ∈ T .
![Page 73: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/73.jpg)
Framework
2 U is the set of maps ν : V → U such thatϑ1 =(0,τ ] ϑ2 ⊂ ν[ϑ1] =(0,τ ] ν[ϑ2] for all ϑ1, ϑ2 ∈ V and τ ∈ T .
2 Z ν,ϑt,z = (X ν,ϑ
t,x ,Yν,ϑt,x ,y ) is the strong solution of
Z (s) = z +
∫ s
tµ(Z (r), ν[ϑ]r , ϑr )dr +
∫ s
tσ(Z (r), ν[ϑ]r , ϑr )dWr .
2Mt,p is identified to Mαt,p, α ∈ A with
Mαt,p := p +
∫ ·tαsdWs
2 X the set of maps α[·] : V 7→ A such thatϑ1 =(0,τ ] ϑ2 ⊂ α[ϑ1] =(0,τ ] α[ϑ2] for ϑ1, ϑ2 ∈ V and τ ∈ T .
![Page 74: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/74.jpg)
Framework
2 Assume ` : (x , y) ∈ Rd−1 × R 7→ `(x , y) ∈ R is non-decreasingin its y -variable.
2 This allows to associate to Λ the real valued function :
y(t, x) := infy : (x , y) ∈ Λ(t).
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Framework
2 Assume ` : (x , y) ∈ Rd−1 × R 7→ `(x , y) ∈ R is non-decreasingin its y -variable.
2 This allows to associate to Λ the real valued function :
y(t, x) := infy : (x , y) ∈ Λ(t).
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GDPCorollary(GDP1)y If y > y(t, x , p + ε) with ε > 0, then ∃ ν ∈ U andαϑ, ϑ ∈ V ⊂ A s.t.
Y ν,ϑt,x ,y (τ) ≥ y∗
(τ,X ν,ϑ
t,x (τ),Mαϑ
t,p (τ))
P-a.s.
for all ϑ ∈ V, τ ∈ Tt .
(GDP2)y Fix a bounded open set O 3 (t, x , y , p), (ν, α) ∈ U× X
and let τϑ denote the first exit time of (·,X ν,ϑt,x ,Y
ν,ϑt,x ,y ,M
α[ϑ]t,p ),
ϑ ∈ V. Assume that there exists η > 0 and a continuous functionϕ ≥ y such that
Y ν,ϑt,x ,y (τϑ) ≥ ϕ
(τ,X ν,ϑ
t,x (τϑ),Mα[ϑ]t,p (τϑ)
)+ η P− a.s. for all ϑ ∈ V.
Then, y ≥ y(t, x , p − ε) for all ε > 0.
![Page 77: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/77.jpg)
GDPCorollary(GDP1)y If y > y(t, x , p + ε) with ε > 0, then ∃ ν ∈ U andαϑ, ϑ ∈ V ⊂ A s.t.
Y ν,ϑt,x ,y (τ) ≥ y∗
(τ,X ν,ϑ
t,x (τ),Mαϑ
t,p (τ))
P-a.s.
for all ϑ ∈ V, τ ∈ Tt .
(GDP2)y Fix a bounded open set O 3 (t, x , y , p), (ν, α) ∈ U× X
and let τϑ denote the first exit time of (·,X ν,ϑt,x ,Y
ν,ϑt,x ,y ,M
α[ϑ]t,p ),
ϑ ∈ V. Assume that there exists η > 0 and a continuous functionϕ ≥ y such that
Y ν,ϑt,x ,y (τϑ) ≥ ϕ
(τ,X ν,ϑ
t,x (τϑ),Mα[ϑ]t,p (τϑ)
)+ η P− a.s. for all ϑ ∈ V.
Then, y ≥ y(t, x , p − ε) for all ε > 0.
![Page 78: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/78.jpg)
PDE characterization - “waving hands” version
2 Assuming smoothness, existence of optimal strategies...
2 y = y(t, x , p) impliesY ν[ϑ],ϑ(t+) ≥ y(t+,X ν[ϑ],ϑ(t+),Mα[ϑ](t+)) for all ϑ.
2 This implies dY ν[ϑ],ϑ(t) ≥ dy(t,X ν[ϑ],ϑ(t),Mα[ϑ](t)) for all ϑ
2 Hence, for all ϑ,
µY (x , y , ν[ϑ]t , ϑt) ≥ Lν[ϑ]t ,ϑt ,α[ϑ]tX ,M y(t, x , p)
σY (x , y , ν[ϑ]t , ϑt) = σX (x , ν[ϑ]t , ϑt)Dxy(t, x , p) + α[ϑ]tDpy(t, x , p)
with y = y(t, x , p)
![Page 79: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/79.jpg)
PDE characterization - “waving hands” version
2 Assuming smoothness, existence of optimal strategies...
2 y = y(t, x , p) impliesY ν[ϑ],ϑ(t+) ≥ y(t+,X ν[ϑ],ϑ(t+),Mα[ϑ](t+)) for all ϑ.
2 This implies dY ν[ϑ],ϑ(t) ≥ dy(t,X ν[ϑ],ϑ(t),Mα[ϑ](t)) for all ϑ
2 Hence, for all ϑ,
µY (x , y , ν[ϑ]t , ϑt) ≥ Lν[ϑ]t ,ϑt ,α[ϑ]tX ,M y(t, x , p)
σY (x , y , ν[ϑ]t , ϑt) = σX (x , ν[ϑ]t , ϑt)Dxy(t, x , p) + α[ϑ]tDpy(t, x , p)
with y = y(t, x , p)
![Page 80: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/80.jpg)
PDE characterization - “waving hands” version
2 Assuming smoothness, existence of optimal strategies...
2 y = y(t, x , p) impliesY ν[ϑ],ϑ(t+) ≥ y(t+,X ν[ϑ],ϑ(t+),Mα[ϑ](t+)) for all ϑ.
2 This implies dY ν[ϑ],ϑ(t) ≥ dy(t,X ν[ϑ],ϑ(t),Mα[ϑ](t)) for all ϑ
2 Hence, for all ϑ,
µY (x , y , ν[ϑ]t , ϑt) ≥ Lν[ϑ]t ,ϑt ,α[ϑ]tX ,M y(t, x , p)
σY (x , y , ν[ϑ]t , ϑt) = σX (x , ν[ϑ]t , ϑt)Dxy(t, x , p) + α[ϑ]tDpy(t, x , p)
with y = y(t, x , p)
![Page 81: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/81.jpg)
PDE characterization - “waving hands” version
2 PDE characterization
infv∈V
sup(u,a)∈N vy
(µY (·, y, u, v)− Lu,v ,a
X ,M y)
= 0
where
N vy := (u, a) ∈ U × Rd : σY (·, y, u, v) = σX (·, u, v)Dxy + aDpy.
2 Need to be relaxed...
![Page 82: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/82.jpg)
PDE characterization - “waving hands” version
2 PDE characterization
infv∈V
sup(u,a)∈N vy
(µY (·, y, u, v)− Lu,v ,a
X ,M y)
= 0
where
N vy := (u, a) ∈ U × Rd : σY (·, y, u, v) = σX (·, u, v)Dxy + aDpy.
2 Need to be relaxed...
![Page 83: Stochastic target game problems - CEREMADEStochastic target game problems B.Bouchard Ceremade - Univ. Paris-Dauphine, and, Crest - Ensae-ParisTech UniversitéPierreetMarieCurie,Mai2012](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022042512/5f3c59f0c622340fb522ae3e/html5/thumbnails/83.jpg)
References
2 H.M. Soner and N. Touzi (2002). Dynamic programming forstochastic target problems and geometric flows, JEMS, 4, 201-236.2 B. , R. Elie and N. Touzi (2009). Stochastic Target problems withcontrolled loss, SIAM SICON, 48 (5), 3123-3150.2 L. Moreau (2011), Stochastic target problems with controlled loss in ajump diffusion model, SIAM SICON, 49, 2577-2607, 2011.2 B. and N. M. Dang (2010). Generalized stochastic target problems forpricing and partial hedging under loss constraints - Application in optimalbook liquidation, to appear in F&S.2 B. and V. Thanh Nam (2011). A stochastic target approach for P&Lmatching problems, to appear in MOR.2 R. Buckdahn and J. Li. Stochastic differential games and viscositysolutions of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equations. SIAM SICON,47(1) :444-475, 2008.