STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONATTY. REFUGIO

NOTES AND ASSIGNMENTSJUNE 21, 2014

PP VS. PALMA G.R. NO. L-44113 (1977)

SUMMARY OF FACTS:

On February 10, 1976, Romulo Intia y Morada, 17 years of age, was charged by the Naga City fiscal's office with vagrancy (Article 202, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code) in respondent judge's court. The case was dismissed on the ground that her court "has no jurisdiction to continue to take further cognizance of this case" without prejudice to the refiling thereof in the Juvenile Court.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE:

The sole issue to be resolved is whether the City Court of Naga or the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts for Camarines and Cities of Naga and Iriga should properly exercise jurisdiction over the accused.

SUPREME COURT’S RULING:

It was very clear that the accused cannot be tried under R.A 6591 because he was, at the time the case was filed, 17 years old thus, not within the purview of such Act. Even Article 189 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which took effect on June 11, 1975 that defines a youthful offender as "one who is over nine years but under twenty-one years of age at the time of the commission of the offense" cannot support the respondent’s Judge’ contention. Such definition did not mean a transfer of jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who are 16 years and below 21 years of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court.

As a general law, P.D. 603 cannot repeal a special law like R.A. 6591 by mere implication. The repeal must be express and specific.

vagrancy (vay-gran-see), n. (l7c) 1. ]b. a state or conditionof wandering from place to place without a home, job,or means of support. •

The Child and Youth Welfare Code (P.D. 603) concerning the welfare of the child and youth throughout the country is a general law

R.A. 6591 which defined and confer jurisdiction on the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for

Camarines Sur is a special law 3 classifying expressly that it can try in criminal cases involving

offenders below the age of majority only those accused who are under 16 years of age at the time of the filing of the case.

Jurisdiction is conferred by law and there is nothing in either R.A. 6591 or P.D. 603 that would sustain respondent judge's ruling on reconsideration that "together, these two laws, the latter amending the former confer jurisdiction on youthful offenders who are above 16 years but under 21 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime upon the JDRC of Camarines Sur and remove the same from the City Court."

A general law cannot repeal a special law by mere implication. The repeal must be express and specific. Furthermore, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Camarines Sur is a court of special and limited jurisdiction and the enlargement or conferment of additional jurisdiction on said court to include accused persons who are 16 years and under 21 years of age must positively appear in express terms.

fiat (fee-aht or fee-at or fI-at or fI-at), n. [Latin "let it bedone") 07c) 1. An order or decree, esp. an arbitrary one<judicial fiat>. 2. A court decree, esp. one relating to aroutine matter such as scheduling <the court requiresall motions to contain a fiat - to be filled in by thecourt - setting the hearing date>.

PREMECIAS VS. MUNICIPALITY OF URDANETA G.R. NO. L-26702

SUMMARY OF FACTS:JUAN AUGUSTO B. PRIMICIAS was criminally charged before the Municipal Court of Urdaneta for violating Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964 for over speeding. Due to the charge, Primicias thereafter initiated a legal action for the annulment of the aforesaid ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction for the purpose of restraining defendants Municipality of Urdaneta.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE:

The lone issue to be resolved in this appeal is the validity of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, enacted on March 13, 1964

SUPREME COURT’S RULING:

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court because Ordinance No. 3 Series of 1964 was replete with legal infirmities. For one, the Revised Motor Vehicle law which the Ordinance was patterned after have been superseded by R.A. No. 4136 and such repeal was expressly spelled out in Section 63 of Republic Act No. 4136. Perfunctorily, the ordinance was within the purview of such Act and its validity must be assessed in conjunction with R.A. No. 4136 not with Act No. 3992. By its very nature, the ordinance in question is, however, inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the State.

Furthermore, the Municipal Council of Urdaneta did not make any classification of its thoroughfares, contrary to the explicit requirement laid down by Section 38, Republic Act No. 4136.

Corollary the ordinance relied upon was held invalid, the issuance of the writ of injunction was thus in order.

Appellants contend that the Ordinance is valid, being "patterned after and based on Section 53, 5 par. 4 of Act No. 3992, as amended (Revised Motor Vehicle Law)." In so arguing, appellants fail to note that Act No. 3992 has been superseded by Republic Act No. 4136, the Land Transportation and 'Traffic Code, which became effective on June 20, 1964, about three months after the questioned ordinance was approved by Urdaneta's Municipal Council. The explicit repeal of the aforesaid Act is embodied in Section 63, Republic Act No. 4136, to wit:

Act Numbered thirty-nine hundred ninety-two (3992) as amended, and all laws, executive orders, ordinance, resolutions, regulations or paints thereof in conflict with the provisions of this Act are repealed.

General rule that a later law prevails over an earlier law

Pursuant to Section 63, Republic Act No. 4136, the ordinance at bar is thus placed within the ambit of Republic Act No. 4136, and not Act No. 3992The validity of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, must therefore be determined vis-a-vis Republic Act No. 4136, the "mother statute" so to speak, which was in force at the time the criminal case was brought against Primicias for the violation of the said ordinance.

vis-a-vis (veez-<l-vee). [French "face to face"] (ISc) Inrelation to; opposite to <the creditor established a preferredposition vis-a-vis the other creditors>.

injunction (in-j3ngk-sh.m), n. (16c) A court ordercommanding or preventing an action. - To get aninjunction, the complainant must show that there isno plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law andthat an irreparable injury will result unless the relief isgranted.

An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among others, that is "must not contravene . . . the statute," 7 for it is a "fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state." 8 Following this general rule, whenever there is a conflict between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance "must give way. Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness, definiteness and certainty are all the more important so that "an average man should be able, with due care, after reading it,, to understand and ascertain whether he will incur a penalty for particular acts or courses of conduct. The general rule is that "ordinarily, criminal prosecution may not be blocked by court prohibition or injunction." 17 Exceptions however are allowed in the following instances:

1. for the orderly administration of justice;

2. to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner;

3. to avoid multiplicity of actions;

4. to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights;

5. in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was held invalid.

PP VS. PURISIMA G.R. NO. L-42050—66

SUMMARY OF FACTS:Information were filed in equal level jurisdictional venues against several accused with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of PD No. 9. Thereafter the Judge issued an Order granting the subsequent motion to quash filed by the accused on the ground that there was no allegation that such facts constitutes the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9.

inter alia (in-tJr ay-Iee-J or ah-Iee-J), adv. [Latin] (l7c)Among other things.

Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.

one (1) carving knife with a blade of 6-½ inches and a wooden handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of 11-¾ inches, which the said accused carried outside of his residence, the said weapon not being used as a tool or implement necessary to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.

an ice pick with an overall length of about 8½ inches, the same not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.

On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the Judges issued the Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.

unlawfully and feloniously carried with him outside of his residence a deadly weapon called socyatan, an instrument which from its very nature is no such as could be used as a necessary tool or instrument to earn a livelihood

Judge Purisima:

The information must specifically allege that the possession of bladed weapon charged was for the purpose of abetting, or in furtherance of the conditions of rampant criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are contemplated and recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor. Devoid of this specific allegation, not necessarily in the same words, the information is not complete, as it does not allege sufficient facts to constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The information in these cases under consideration suffer from this defect.

Judge Maceren:

Paragraph 3 of PD 1081:3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as "fan knife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.

Judge Polo:And in order to restore the tranquillity and stability of the country and to secure the people from violence anti loss of lives in the quickest possible manner and time, carrying firearms, explosives and deadly weapons without a permit unless the same would fall under the exception is prohibited. This conclusion becomes more compelling when we consider the penalty imposable, which is from five years to ten years. A strict enforcement of the provision of the said law would mean the imposition of the Draconian penalty upon the accused.

viz. (viz). abbr. [Latin videlicet] (16c) Namely; that is tosay <the defendant engaged in fraudulent activities,viz., misrepresenting his gross income, misrepresentingthe value of his assets, and forging his wife's signature>.See VIDELICET.

malum prohibitum (mal-am proh-hib-i-tam), n. [Latin"prohibited evil"] (I8c) An act that is a crime merelybecause it is prohibited by statute, although the act itselfis not necessarily immoraL - Misdemeanors such asjaywalking and running a stoplight are mala prohibita,as are many regulatory violations.

Abet = help somebody: to assist somebody to do something, especially something illegal

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE:

Whether or not those Informations filed by the People are sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9.

SUPREME COURT’S RULING:

In handing down the decision, the Supreme Court basically took bearing from Art. IV, Sec. 19, 1973 Constitution. It further stated that the questioned Information did not comply with fundamental requirements enunciated therein. Moreover, it was the second element among the two in paragraph 3, P.D. 9 that removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon outside the mantle of the statute or the city ordinance mentioned therein since the simple act of carrying any of the weapons described does not necessitate criminal liability. It is the motivation why should the accused bring such a weapon outside his dwelling that should control.

Aside from these there were conflicting views which was revealed during its implementation and so the judicial task of interpreting it becomes a task to construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure would naturally follow as was done by the Highest Tribunal.

Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly requires that for a complaint or information to be sufficient it must, inter alia state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.

it is imperative for the specific statute violated to be designated or mentioned in the charge. In fact, another compelling reason exists why a specification of the statute violated is essential in these cases.

Consequently, it is necessary that the particular law violated be specified as there exists a substantial difference between the statute and city ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the circumstances of the commission of the crime and the penalty imposed for the offense.

We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the city ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3) does not contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not favored. 6 This principle holds true with greater force with regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. 7 In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non- observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the offense treated in the presidential decree in question?We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to

abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.

That there is ambiguity in the presidential decree is manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the state.In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure — a presidential decree in these cases — the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions.

A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the makers as to the mischiefs which are to be remedied, and objects which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute." (West Norman Timber v. State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble"; emphasis supplied)

While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when the statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult of interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty which otherwise does not exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble")

Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated.

CASCO PHILS VS. JIMENEZ G.R. NO. L-17931

SUMMARY OF FACTS:

Petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers. Respondents Hon. Pedro Gimenez and Hon. Ismael Mathay is Auditor General of the Philippines and Auditor of the Central Bank respectively. In accordance with the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued its Circular No. 95 fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. As supplementary to the circular the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee. Petitioner, believing that it is entitled to a refund according to the exemptions - relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary

Board of said Bank - claimed for the refund. It further asseverated among others that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. conformably, the Auditor of the Bank refused to grant refund upon the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2609

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE:

Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee is the issue to be resolved in the case.

SUPREME COURT’S RULING:

Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. But, said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives

If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

ASTORGA VS. VILLEGAS G.R. NO. L-23475

SUMMARY OF FACTS:A bill of local application was filed in the House of Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence then it was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas who suggested that instead of the City Engineer it will be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE:

SUPREME COURT’S RULING:

When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964, substantial amendments to Section 1 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.

hermeneutics (h<lr-m;J-n[y]oo-tiks), n. (I8c) The art ofinterpreting texts, esp. as a technique used in criticallegal studies.

rider. An attachment to some document, such as a legislativebill or an insurance policy, that amends or supplementsthe document.• A rider to a legislative billoften addresses subject matter unrelated to the mainpurpose ofthe bill.

Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate.

The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor.

The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in by Justices Manuel V. Moran, Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M. Hontiveros, held that the case involved a political question which was not within the province of the judiciary in view of the principle of separation of powers in our government. The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon merely to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional question, the reasoning being that "if a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect."

Obiter dictum (ob-i-tar dik-tam). [Latin "something saidin passing"] (18c) A judicial comment made while deliveringa judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary tothe decision in the case and therefore not precedential(although it may be considered persuasive).

in pari materia (in par-I m,,-teer-ee-d). [Latin "in thesame matter"] 1. adj. On the same subject; relating tothe same matter .• It is a canon of construction thatstatutes that are in pari materia may be construedtogether, so that inconsistencies in one statute maybe resolved by looking at another statute on the same