STATUS, CONFLICT, AND WAR: THE

MAJOR POWERS, 1820-1970

by

Char les Samuel Gochman

A d i s s e r t a t i o n submit ted i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l l m e n t of the requirements f o r the degree of

Doctor of P h i l o s o p h y ( P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e )

i n The U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n 1975

Doctoral Committee:

P r o f e s s o r J . David S i n g e r , Chairman A s s i s t a n t P r o f e s s o r S t u a r t A. Bremer P r o f e s s o r Harold K. Jacobson A s s o c i a t e P r o f e s s o r C a t h e r i n e M. K e l l e h e r P r o f e s s o r John W. Shy

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many i n d i v i d u a l s have c o n t r i b u t e d to the development

and complet ion of t h i s t h e s i s . As w i t h any r e s e a r c h endeavor,

i t i s not p o s s i b l e to acknowledge a l l of them. There a r e ,

however, two groups of people t h a t loom very p r o m i n e n t l y in

my mind. F i r s t , there are the members of my d i s s e r t a t i o n

c o m m i t t e e — S t u a r t Bremer, Harold J a c o b s o n , C a t h e r i n e K e l l e h e r ,

John Shy, and J . David S i n g e r — t o whom I wish to express my

a p p r e c i a t i o n . Second, there are the members of the C o r r e l a t e s

of War P r o j e c t at the U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n — J . David S i n g e r ,

M e l v i n S m a l l , S t u a r t Bremer, John S t u c k e y , Hugh Wheeler, Lar ry

A r n o l d , and a number of younger c o l l e a g u e s — w h o have c o n t i n u a l l y

been a f o n t of i n t e l l e c t u a l s t i m u l a t i o n . To a l l these p e o p l e ,

I express my g r a t i t u d e .

Two n a m e s — t h o s e o f J . David S i n g e r and S t u a r t B r e m e r —

appear i n both these groups, and m e r i t s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n .

J . David S i n g e r has undoubtedly had a g r e a t e r i n f l u e n c e than

any o t h e r person on my academic development. He has been

— a n d cont inues to b e — a c r e a t i v e t e a c h e r , a d e d i c a t e d a d v i s o r ,

and, e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t l y , an e v e r - e n c o u r a g i n g and always h e l p f u l

f r i e n d . I am a l s o f o r t u n a t e to count among my f r i e n d s ,

S t u a r t Bremer. Over the past s e v e r a l y e a r s , he has been an

i n d e f a t i g a b l e source of i m a g i n a t i v e i d e a s , from whom I have

l e a r n e d much, and have much more to l e a r n . To both these

men, I owe a s p e c i a l debt of thanks.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION i i i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv

LIST OF TABLES ix

LIST OF FIGURES x i i i

LIST OF APPENDICES x i v

CHAPTER

I. THE THEORETICAL ARGUMENT 1

Toward War: D i s s a t i s f a c t i o n as a Source of Aggressive Behavior 5

The F r u s t r a t i o n - A g g r e s s i o n Hypothesis i n Psychology

The Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y Debate i n S o c i o l o g y

The R e l a t i v e D e p r i v a t i o n Hypothesis i n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e

A N a t i o n - S t a t e Analogy Away from War: C o n s t r a i n t s on N a t i o n - S t a t e

Behavior 16 The L i m i t s of C a p a b i l i t y Learning from Exper ience The S t r u c t u r e o f the System

Summarizing the P r o p o s i t i o n s and P o s i t i n g a Model 28

I I . THE RESEARCH DESIGN 34

The Referent World 34 S p a t i a l Domain Temporal Domain

C o n s t r u c t i n g the I n d i c a t o r s 38 The P r e d i c t o r V a r i a b l e : S t a t u s

I n c o n s i s t e n c y The Int er v ening V a r i a b l e s : P h y s i c a l ,

P s y c h o l o g i c a l , and S t r u c t u r a l The Outcome V a r i a b l e : I n t e r s t a t e

M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t A n a l y z i n g the Data 68

v i

CHAPTER

I I I . FROM STATUS INCONSISTENCY TO MILITARY CONFRONTATION: THE BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIP . . . . 73

Assuming Homogeneity among the Major Powers . 73 M a n i p u l a t i n g the Time F a c t o r A l t e r i n g the Level of Measurement

Examining the I n d i v i d u a l S t a t e s 83 Summarizing the F i n d i n g s 94

IV. FROM STATUS INCONSISTENCY TO MILITARY CONFRONTATION: INTRODUCING THE INTERVENING VARIABLES 95

The Nineteenth Century 104 A n a l y z i n g the Data I n t e r p r e t i n g the R e s u l t s Examining the " R e s i d u a l s " Summarizing the N i n e t e e n t h - C e n t u r y

F indings The Twentieth Century 125

A n a l y z i n g the Data I n t e r p r e t i n g the R e s u l t s Examining the " R e s i d u a l s " Summarizing the T w e n t i e t h - C e n t u r y

F indings

V. FROM MILITARY CONFRONTATION TO INTERSTATE WAR . . 152

The Nineteenth Century 157 The I n d i c a t o r s of R e a c h a b i l i t y The I n d i c a t o r of War Exper ience The I n d i c a t o r s of S t r u c t u r a l

R e l a t i o n s h i p s The M u l t i v a r i a t e R e l a t i o n s h i p

The Twentieth Century 168 The I n d i c a t o r s of R e a c h a b i l i t y The I n d i c a t o r of War Exper ience The I n d i c a t o r s of S t r u c t u r a l

R e l a t i o n s h i p s The M u l t i v a r i a t e R e l a t i o n s h i p

The Major Power/Major Power C o n f l i c t Dyads . 184 Summarizing the R e s u l t s of the Second Stage . 189

vi i

CHAPTER

VI . STATUS, CONFLICT, AND WAR 191

Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y and M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t . 191 U n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n and C o n f r o n t a t i o n U n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n and War

The Intervening V a r i a b l e s and M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t . 200

P h y s i c a l A t t r i b u t e s The P s y c h o l o g i c a l F a c t o r S t r u c t u r a l R e l a t i o n s h i p s

General Observat ions f o r Peace Research . . . 209

APPENDICES 215

BIBLIOGRAPHY 254

SPECIAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CONFLICT DATA SOURCES 271

v i i i

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1. S t a t u s I n c o n s i s t e n c y vs Involvement i n I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s , 1820-1970 74

2 . Q-scores from Contingency Table A n a l y s i s of Major Power Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y vs. Involvement i n I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s , 1820-1970 (One- to F i v e - y e a r Time Lags) 76

3. S t a t u s I n c o n s i s t e n c y v s . Involvement in I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s , by Century 77

4. Q-scores from Contingency Table A n a l y s i s of Major Power Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y vs. Involvement i n I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s , by Century (One- to F i v e - y e a r Time Lags) 78

5. Observed and Expected Frequency of Major Power P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s at D i f f e r e n t Ranks of S t a t u s I n c o n s i s t e n c y , f o r 1820-1970 and by Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 81

6. Observed and Expected Frequency of Major Power I n i t i a t i o n of I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s a t D i f f e r e n t Ranks of S t a t u s I n c o n s i s t e n c y , f o r 1820-1970 and by Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 81

7. Analyses of Var iance and B i s e r i a l C o r r e l a t i o n s of Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y v s . I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s , f o r 1820-1970 and by Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 82

8. American and German S t a t u s I n c o n s i s t e n c y v s . Involvement i n I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s . 84

i x

Table Page

9. Q-scores from Contingency Table A n a l y s i s of Each Major Power's Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y vs . Involvement i n I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s , f o r 1820-1970 Per iod and by Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 85

10. Analyses of Variance and B i s e r i a l C o r r e l a t i o n s of Each Major Power's S t a t u s I n c o n s i s t e n c y vs . I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s , by Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 90

1 1 . B i s e r i a l C o r r e l a t i o n s between Each Major Power's Involvement i n M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s and the Three Intervening V a r i a b l e s , f o r the 19th Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 105

12. S t a n d a r d i z e d P r o b i t C o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the Three I n t e r v e n i n g V a r i a b l e s when P r e d i c t i n g Each Major Power's Involvement i n M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s , f o r the 19th Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 109

13. P o i n t B i s e r i a l C o r r e l a t i o n s between Each Major Power's Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y Scores and the Three Intervening V a r i a b l e s , f o r the 19th Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 113

14. Number of C o n f l i c t - y e a r s I n v o l v i n g Major Powers and the P r o p o r t i o n of these C o n f l i c t - y e a r s t h a t Is C o r r e c t l y P r e d i c t e d by the P r o b i t E q u a t i o n , f o r the 19th Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 121

15. B i s e r i a l C o r r e l a t i o n s between Each Major Power's Involvement i n M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s and the Four Intervening V a r i a b l e s , f o r the 20th Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 126

16. S t a n d a r d i z e d P r o b i t C o e f f i c i e n t s and the I n t e r -c o r r e l a t i o n M a t r i x f o r the Four I n t e r v e n i n g V a r i a b l e s when P r e d i c t i n g Each Major Power's P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s , f o r the 20th Century (Subset of Underrecognized Cases, Three-year Time Lag) 132

x

Table Page

17. Standardized P r o b i t C o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the Four Intervening V a r i a b l e s when P r e d i c t i n g Each Major Power's Involvement i n M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s , f o r the 20th Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 135

18. Number of C o n f l i c t - y e a r s I n v o l v i n g Major Powers and the P r o p o r t i o n of these C o n f l i c t - y e a r s t h a t Is C o r r e c t l y P r e d i c t e d by the P r o b i t E q u a t i o n , f o r the 20th Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 149

19. Cramer's Phi-square between Each Major Power's War Involvement and the Two I n d i c a t o r s of R e a c h a b i l i t y , f o r 19th Century C o n f l i c t Dyads . . . 159

20. B i s e r i a l C o r r e l a t i o n s between Each Major Power's War Involvement and P r i o r War E x p e r i e n c e , f o r 19th Century C o n f l i c t Dyads 162

2 1 . B i s e r i a l C o r r e l a t i o n s between Each Major Power's War Involvement and System P o l a r i t y , f o r 19th Century C o n f l i c t Dyads 164

2 2 . C o r r e l a t i o n and S t a n d a r d i z e d Probit. C o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the Four Intervening V a r i a b l e s when P r e d i c t i n g to Pooled Major Power War Involvements, f o r 19th Century C o n f l i c t Dyads 166

2 3 . Cramer's P h i - s q u a r e between Each Major Power's War Involvement and the Two I n d i c a t o r s of R e a c h a b i l i t y , f o r 20th Century C o n f l i c t Dyads . . . 169

24. B i s e r i a l C o r r e l a t i o n s between Each Major Power's War Involvement and P r i o r War E x p e r i e n c e , f o r 20th Century C o n f l i c t Dyads 172

2 5 . B i s e r i a l C o r r e l a t i o n s and Cramer P h i - s q u a r e s between Each Major Power's War Involvement and Two I n d i c a t o r s of S t r u c t u r a l R e l a t i o n s h i p s , f o r 20th Century C o n f l i c t Dyads 175

26. C o r r e l a t i o n and S t a n d a r d i z e d P r o b i t C o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the Five I n t e r v e n i n g V a r i a b l e s when P r e d i c t i n g to Pooled Major Power War Involvements, f o r 20th Century C o n f l i c t Dyads 180

xi

Table Page

27. T o t a l Number of Major Power/Major Power and Major Power/Minor Power C o n f l i c t Dyads t h a t Terminate i n War and the P r o p o r t i o n of Each Type that Is C o r r e c t l y P r e d i c t e d by the P r o b i t E q u a t i o n , f o r the 20th Century 184

28. C o r r e l a t i o n and Standardized P r o b i t C o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the Intervening V a r i a b l e s when P r e d i c t i n g to Pooled Major Power War Involvements, f o r A l l 19th and 20th Century Major/Major C o n f l i c t Dyads 186

29. General Summary of F i n d i n g s from Chapters Three through F i v e 210

30. Number of Years as Major Power d u r i n g the 1820-1899 and 1900-1970 Time P e r i o d s 252

31. N a t i o n a l Involvements i n M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t s per N a t i o n - Y e a r 253

32. P r o p o r t i o n of N a t i o n a l Involvements i n M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t s R e s u l t i n g i n War 253

xi i

LIST OF FIGURES

F i g u r e Page

1. Number of M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t s per 10-Year P e r i o d . . 247

2. Number of M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t s (at Var ious L e v e l s of V i o l e n c e ) per 10-Year P e r i o d 248

3. D i s t r i b u t i o n of the Occurrence of M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t s w i t h i n 5-Year P e r i o d s 250

4 . D i s t r i b u t i o n of the Occurrence of M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t s (at Var ious L e v e l s of V i o l e n c e ) w i t h i n 5-Year Per iods 251

x i i i

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix Page

A. Data Sources 215

B. I n t e r s t a t e System Members 216

C. I d e n t i f y i n g I n t e r s t a t e C o n f l i c t s 222

D. Summary P r e s e n t a t i o n of M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t Data . . . 245

x i v

CHAPTER I

THE THEORETICAL ARGUMENT

N a t i o n a l p o l i c y makers . . . can always be r e l i e d upon . . . to ignore t h e i r commitments to r e f r a i n from aggress ion whenever they b e l i e v e t h a t r e s o r t to f o r c e w i l l serve t h e i r purposes.

Schuman, 1968, p. 176

S o c i a l c o n f l i c t can be d e f i n e d as "a s t r u g g l e over values

or c l a i m s to s t a t u s , power, and s c a r c e r e s o u r c e s , i n which the aims

of the c o n f l i c t i n g p a r t i e s are not only to g a i n the d e s i r e d values

but a l s o to n e u t r a l i z e , i n j u r e , or e l i m i n a t e t h e i r r i v a l s " (Coser,

1968, p. 232). A p a r t i c u l a r l y b r u t a l form of such c o n f l i c t i s the

o r g a n i z e d group v i o l e n c e known as war; i t i s one of the most

d e s t r u c t i v e types of human b e h a v i o r , y e t i t i s a l s o one of the

most p o o r l y understood. This dearth of knowledge about the causes

of war has d i r e i m p l i c a t i o n s i f our hope i s f o r w o r l d peace,

because an understanding of why wars occur i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e to

the development of e f f e c t i v e measures f o r p r e v e n t i n g them.

Despite the importance of such knowledge, the s y s t e m a t i c

study of war i s a r a t h e r recent phenomenon. P r i o r to 1914, there

were o n l y i s o l a t e d examples of r i g o r o u s i n v e s t i g a t i o n , e . g . ,

Bloch's The Future of War (1899). C a r r (1964, p. 1) notes t h a t

1

2

"war was s t i l l regarded mainly as the business of s o l d i e r s ; and

the c o r o l l a r y of t h i s was t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s were the

b u s i n e s s of d i p l o m a t s . " The F i r s t World War d i s s i p a t e d these

i l l u s i o n s . In the post-war y e a r s there were attempts at

c o l l e c t i n g and a n a l y z i n g data by such s c h o l a r s as Richardson

(1960a, 1960b) and Sorokin (1937). And, of c o u r s e , there was

W r i g h t ' s massive volume, A Study of War (1942). However, i t has

o n l y been i n the l a s t f i f t e e n to twenty years t h a t war has become

a r e s p e c t a b l e research t o p i c f o r s i g n i f i c a n t numbers of s o c i a l

s c i e n t i s t s ( P r u i t t and Snyder, 1 9 6 9 ) , and we have w i t n e s s e d the

r i s e o f peace-research i n s t i t u t e s and p r o j e c t s , and a m u l t i t u d e

of new j o u r n a l s . 1

Over the past two decades, the l i t e r a t u r e on war has

become voluminous, encompassing t h e o r e t i c a l e s s a y s , s c i e n t i f i c

2 r e s e a r c h , s t r a t e g i c a n a l y s e s , and c o n f l i c t - r e s o l u t i o n p r o p o s a l s ,

There are i n s t i t u t e s l o c a t e d , f o r example, i n B e r l i n , B o u l d e r ( C o l o r a d o ) , H e l l e r u p (Denmark), P h i l a d e l p h i a , C l a r k s o n ( O n t a r i o ) , O s l o , S t . L o u i s , S t o c k h o l m , Tampere, and Tokyo. Major q u a n t i t a t i v e p r o j e c t s are M c C l e l l a n d ' s World Event I n t e r a c t i o n Survey ( 1 9 7 1 ) , North's S t u d i e s i n C o n f l i c t and I n t e g r a t i o n ( f o r t h ­c o m i n g ) , Rummel's D i m e n s i o n a l i t y of N a t i o n s (Rummel, 1972; H i l t o n , 1973), and S i n g e r ' s C o r r e l a t e s o_f War ( S i n g e r , 1 972; S i n g e r and S m a l l , 1972). Leading j o u r n a l s are Peace Science S o c i e t y Papers ( f o r m e r l y , Peace Research S o c i e t y P a p e r s ) , Journal of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , and Journal of Peace Research.

2 For r e p r e s e n t a t i v e works of the t h e o r i s t s , see Aron

(1958, 1966), Boulding (1962) , Knorr ( 1 9 6 6 ) , Rapoport (1960, 1964), Waltz ( 1 9 5 9 ) , and Wolfers ( 1 9 6 2 ) ; o f the s t r a t e g i s t s , B r o d i e (1958, 1959, 1966), Kahn (1961, 1962, 1 9 6 5 ) , K i s s i n g e r ( 1 9 5 7 ) , S c h e l l i n g (1959, 1963, 1966), and Snyder (1959, 1 9 6 1 ) ; and f o r r e s o l u t i o n p r o p o s a l s , Melman (1962), M i t r a n y ( 1 9 6 6 ) , Osgood ( 1 9 6 2 ) , R u s s e l l ( 1 9 5 9 ) , S i n g e r (1962) , and St rachey (1962).

3

but a s i d e from a consensus t h a t u n i c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n s are

i n a d e q u a t e , there i s l i t t l e agreement on e x a c t l y why n a t i o n s

become i n v o l v e d i n war. N e v e r t h e l e s s , the e x p l a n a t i o n s t h a t

have been o f f e r e d can be d i v i d e d i n t o two broad c a t e g o r i e s .

Some s c h o l a r s emphasize the f o r c e s t h a t d r i v e s t a t e s i n t o c o n f l i c t ;

o t h e r s s t r e s s the c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t bar the paths of war-prone

s t a t e s .

According to Organski (1968) , the major d r i v i n g f o r c e i s

d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n 1 w i t h the e x i s t i n g i n t e r s t a t e o r d e r , and a

pr imary cause of d i s c o n t e n t i s the f r u s t r a t i o n of being unable to

reach valued g o a l s . A n a l o g i e s to t h i s can be found in s i s t e r

s o c i a l s c i e n c e s . P s y c h o l o g i s t s , f o r example, have shown t h a t there

is good reason to expect t h a t f r u s t r a t e d i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l behave

a g g r e s s i v e l y . And s o c i o l o g i s t s have found t h a t i n s t r a t i f i e d

s o c i a l systems there are groups whose members f e e l r e l a t i v e l y

d e p r i v e d , and they s p e c u l a t e t h a t the members of these groups

are prone to a g g r e s s i v e b e h a v i o r .

I t i s q u i t e e v i d e n t , however, t h a t all d i s s a t i s f i e d a c t o r s

do not behave a g g r e s s i v e l y . Thus, i f we are to account f o r

a g g r e s s i v e b e h a v i o r , we must look not o n l y at d r i v i n g f o r c e s ,

but a l s o at those f a c t o r s t h a t may serve to c o n s t r a i n b e h a v i o r .

1 D i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i s a p s y c h o l o g i c a l concept and, t h u s , i t w o u l d be most a c c u r a t e to say t h a t " d e c i s i o n makers of the s t a t e " a r e d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h the b e n e f i t s t h e i r s t a t e d e r i v e s given the extant. i n t e r s t a t e o r d e r . For reasons of s t y l e and c l a r i t y , h o w e v e r , I w i l l , i n the remainder of t h i s paper, r e f e r to the state's d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , but anthropomorphism i s not i n t e n d e d .

4

One such f a c t o r i s p r i o r e x p e r i e n c e . That i s to s a y , the behavior

of a person (or a s t a t e ) i s l i k e l y to be m o d i f i e d i f p r i o r

e x p e r i e n c e s have been unrewarding. Another c o n s t r a i n i n g f a c t o r

is a l a c k of c a p a b i l i t y . Regardless of t h e i r f r u s t r a t i o n or

e x p e r i e n c e , a c t o r s (whether they be p e r s o n s , groups, or n a t i o n -

s t a t e s ) cannot s t r i k e out unless they have s u f f i c i e n t resources

to do s o . Thus, Organski argues t h a t i t i s not merely the

d i s s a t i s f i e d s t a t e s , but the d i s s a t i s f i e d and r e l a t i v e l y p o w e r f u l ,

that are l i k e l y to become i n v o l v e d i n m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s .

In a d d i t i o n to these p s y c h o l o g i c a l and p h y s i c a l a t t r i b u t e s ,

there are s t r u c t u r a l f e a t u r e s t h a t r e s t r a i n b e h a v i o r , the most

important of which are the bonds t h a t u n i t e s t a t e s and weave a

network of commitments. We may again t u r n to our s i s t e r s c i e n c e s

f o r a n a l o g i e s . P s y c h o l o g i s t s b e l i e v e t h a t people who have

competing commitments attempt to a v o i d open c o n f l i c t s which might

c r e a t e c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e . S o c i o l o g i s t s h y p o t h e s i z e t h a t

people who have many competing a f f i l i a t i o n s f e e l c r o s s - p r e s s u r e d ,

find t h a t these c r o s s - p r e s s u r e s serve to m i t i g a t e c o n f l i c t s among

these p e o p l e . Thus, a complementary premise to the Organski

argument i s t h a t s t a t e s d r i v e n toward war may be c o n s t r a i n e d by

the s t r u c t u r a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n of i n t e r s t a t e r e l a t i o n s .

I t should be s t r e s s e d t h a t , i n the set of ideas sketched

in t h e paragraphs above, I have t r i e d to capture o n l y one of a

number of i m p l i c i t models t h a t permeate the l i t e r a t u r e on war,

but one t h a t I and others f i n d extremely p l a u s i b l e . I t i s my

5

b e l i e f t h a t by making these models e x p l i c i t and s u b j e c t i n g them

to s y s t e m a t i c e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s , we can s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n c r e a s e

our understanding of why n a t i o n s become i n v o l v e d i n m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s and, u l t i m a t e l y , wars.

With these few p r e l i m i n a r y thoughts o u t l i n e d , l e t me

now:

(1) Present some l i t e r a t u r e to i l l u m i n a t e the p r e c e d i n g

d i s c u s s i o n ;

(2) Develop and o p e r a t i o n a l i z e s e v e r a l hypotheses on the

d r i v i n g f o r c e s t h a t lead t o , and the c o n s t r a i n i n g f o r c e s t h a t

l e a d away from, war; and

(3) Test these hypotheses i n a r e f e r e n t w o r l d .

Toward War: Dissatisfaction as a Source of Aggressive Behavior

I begin w i t h an extremely b r i e f review o f some of the

hypotheses and research f i n d i n g s i n the s o c i a l s c i e n c e l i t e r a t u r e

concerned w i t h i n d i v i d u a l and group responses to d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n ,

and then d i s c u s s i n more d e t a i l a few of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n s t h a t

have been undertaken in the area of peace r e s e a r c h . Let us turn

f i r s t to work being done i n the f i e l d o f psychology.

The F r u s t r a t i o n - A g g r e s s i o n Hypothesis i n Psychology

D o l l a r d et a l . (1939) argue t h a t f r u s t r a t e d people may

become a g g r e s s i v e and t h a t t h e i r h o s t i l i t y w i l l be d i r e c t e d

p r i m a r i l y toward the p e r c e i v e d source of t h e i r f r u s t r a t i o n .

6

S i m i l a r l y , Feshbach (1964) p o s i t s t h a t f r u s t r a t i o n t h r e a t e n s an

i n d i v i d u a l ' s s e l f - e s t e e m , and P e p i t o n e (1964) suggests t h a t a

r e a l or imagined t h r e a t of l o s s of s t a t u s or s e c u r i t y may l e a d to

h o s t i l i t y and a g g r e s s i o n . An o u t p o u r i n g of l a b o r a t o r y and f i e l d

experiments has, to a large e x t e n t , supported these p r o p o s i t i o n s

( A l l i s o n and Hunt, 1 959; B e r k o w i t z , 1960; Geen, 1968; Worchel ,

I960) .

Researchers have found, however, t h a t the intensity of

a person's f r u s t r a t i o n i s not r e l a t e d to the a g g r e s s i v e n e s s of

h i s or her behavior (Buss, 1966; C u t t e r , 1963; Jegard and W a l t e r s ,

I960) . They a l s o maintain t h a t o n l y p a r t i c u l a r types of

f r u s t r a t i o n breed h o s t i l i t y , and t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e a c t i o n to

annoying events depends upon how he or she i n t e r p r e t s the

s i t u a t i o n (Maslow, 1943; P a s t o r e , 1952; Rosenzweig, 1944). One

l e a d i n g a u t h o r i t y ( B e r k o w i t z , 1962) h y p o t h e s i z e s t h a t f r u s t r a t i o n

merely i n c r e a s e s the p o t e n t i a l f o r a g g r e s s i o n ; whether t h i s

p o t e n t i a l becomes mani fest depends upon s e v e r a l f a c t o r s , among

which are c a p a b i l i t y , l e a r n i n g , and the p e r c e p t i o n of s o c i e t a l

constraints. The r e s u l t s of experiments by B e r k o w i t z and Geen

give credence to the importance of these i n t e r v e n i n g f a c t o r s

( B e r k o w i t z , 1965; Berkowitz and Geen, 1966; Geen and B e r k o w i t z ,

1966; Geen and O'Neal, 1969).

In s h o r t , p s y c h o l o g i s t s have demonstrated t h a t f r u s t r a t e d

people may become a g g r e s s i v e . But f r u s t r a t i o n i s not the o n l y

cause o f a g g r e s s i v e behavior a n d , when people are f r u s t r a t e d ,

7

t h e i r behavior may be i n h i b i t e d by o t h e r f a c t o r s .

The S t a t u s Inconsistency Debate i n S o c i o l o g y

S i m i l a r l y , there i s a concern i n the s o c i o l o g i c a l

l i t e r a t u r e w i t h human responses to one type of s o c i a l f r u s t r a t i o n ,

t h a t a s s o c i a t e d with s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y . S o c i o l o g i s t s assume

t h a t s t r a t i f i c a t i o n i n complex s o c i e t i e s i s m u l t i - d i m e n s i o n a l and

t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l ' s rank i n one s t a t u s h i e r a r c h y does not

n e c e s s a r i l y c o i n c i d e with h i s or her p o s i t i o n i n another ( S o r o k i n ,

1927; Weber, 1968). Lenski (1966) and o t h e r s h y p o t h e s i z e t h a t

t h i s s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s a source of s t r e s s , and support f o r

t h i s i s found i n Jackson (1962) , who a d d i t i o n a l l y argues t h a t such

i n c o n s i s t e n c y leads to f r u s t r a t i o n . The c l a s s i c example from

American s o c i e t y i s the c o n f r o n t a t i o n between a b lack d o c t o r and

a w h i t e l a b o r e r . The former wishes to be t r e a t e d i n accordance

w i t h h i s or her p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a n d i n g , the l a t t e r i n s i s t s on

r a c i a l comparisons.

A number of r e s e a r c h e r s have examined the r e l a t i o n s h i p

between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y , on the one hand, and support f o r

p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l reform on the o t h e r . The r e s u l t s have been

ambiguous; some f i n d i n g l i t t l e or no support (Brandmeyer, 1965;

K e l l y and C h a m b l i s s , 1966; K e n k e l , 1956; Laumann and S e g a l , 1971;

Olsen and T u l l y , 1972), and o t h e r s uncover ing a t l e a s t l i m i t e d

support (Goffman, 1957; Jackson and B u r k e , 1965; L e n s k i , 1954,

1956, 1967). I t has been argued t h a t the d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n these

8

f i n d i n g s c a n , to a l a r g e e x t e n t , be a t t r i b u t e d to the i m p r e c i s i o n

of the d e f i n i t i o n and the i n c o m p a r a b i l i t y of the dimensions and

s c a l e s used to t e s t the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y concept (Hartman,

1974). Three general c o n c l u s i o n s may, however, be drawn from

the s o c i o l o g i c a l l i t e r a t u r e :

(1) Only people w i t h c e r t a i n types of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y

seek p o l i t i c a l change. The r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s p r i m a r i l y when

there are sharp d i s c r e p a n c i e s between i n d i v i d u a l s ' a s c r i b e d and

t h e i r achieved s t a t u s e s , i . e . , between s t a t u s e s to which people

are a s s i g n e d on the b a s i s o f i n a l t e r a b l e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ( e . g . ,

race or n a t i o n a l o r i g i n ) and those which they a t t a i n on the b a s i s

of achievement ( e . g . , e d u c a t i o n or income) ( J a c k s o n , 1962; L e n s k i ,

1964; Segal and Knoke, 1968; Treiman, 1966). To e x p l a i n t h i s ,

s o c i o l o g i s t s p o i n t out t h a t achieved s t a t u s can be r a i s e d (or

lowered) through i n d i v i d u a l e f f o r t , but changes i n ascribed s t a t u s

n e c e s s i t a t e a l t e r a t i o n s i n the c u l t u r e and s t r u c t u r e of the s o c i o ­

p o l i t i c a l system.

(2) A person's response to s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y v a r i e s

w i t h the d i r e c t i o n of the i n c o n s i s t e n c y ( J a c k s o n , 1962; Treiman,

1966). I n d i v i d u a l s who have high a s c r i b e d but low achieved s t a t u s e s

respond i n t r a - p u n i t i v e l y , o f t e n a v o i d i n g i n t e r p e r s o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n .

People w i t h high achieved but low a s c r i b e d s t a t u s e s respond i n an

a g g r e s s i v e , e x t r a - p u n i t i v e manner.

(3) People are l i k e l y to become a g g r e s s i v e o n l y when t h e i r

l o w a s c r i p t i v e s t a t u s i s s o c i a l l y v i s i b l e (Box and F o r d , 1969;

9

M a l e w s k i , 1963; S e g a l , 1969). Thus, s o c i o l o g i s t s suggest t h a t

the e f f e c t s of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y are g r e a t e s t i n s o c i a l systems

where p r e s t i g e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are very important and where the

a v a i l a b i l i t y of s t r e s s - r e d u c i n g mechanisms i s minimal (Broom and

J o n e s , 1970; Jackson and C u r t i s , 1972).

The R e l a t i v e D e p r i v a t i o n Hypothesis i n P o l i t i c a l Science

In s t u d i e s on r e v o l u t i o n , p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s have

drawn upon the f i n d i n g s of p s y c h o l o g i s t s and s o c i o l o g i s t s , and

have hypothesized that a vast d i s c r e p a n c y between expected

achievement and e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s causes people to become

d i s c o n t e n t and motivates v i o l e n t b e h a v i o r . Davies (1962, p. 8)

w r i t e s : "A r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t a t e of mind r e q u i r e s the . . .

e x p e c t a t i o n of g r e a t e r o p p o r t u n i t y to s a t i s f y b a s i c needs, which

may range from merely p h y s i c a l . . . to the need f o r equal

d i g n i t y and j u s t i c e . But the necessary a d d i t i o n a l i n g r e d i e n t i s

a p e r s i s t e n t , u n r e l e n t i n g t h r e a t to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of these

needs." Tanter and M i d l a r s k y (1967) p o s i t t h a t the d i s t a n c e

between a people's a s p i r a t i o n s , based on l o n g - t e r m performance,

and t h e i r e x p e c t a t i o n s , based on immediate c o n d i t i o n s , i s a

measure of the p o t e n t i a l f o r v i o l e n t r e v o l u t i o n . And Gurr (1970,

p. 13) s t a t e s t h a t " d i s c o n t e n t a r i s i n g from the p e r c e p t i o n of

r e l a t i v e d e p r i v a t i o n i s the b a s i c , i n s t i g a t i n g c o n d i t i o n f o r

p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e . "

10

In sum, the r e l a t i v e d e p r i v a t i o n h y p o t h e s i s p o s t u l a t e s

t h a t , from experience or through example, people develop

e x p e c t a t i o n s of what they b e l i e v e to be t h e i r " f a i r s h a r e . "

And, i f they perceive that they are not a c c r u i n g the b e n e f i t s

to which they are " e n t i t l e d , " d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i s aroused and

a b a s i s f o r v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t i s e s t a b l i s h e d .

A N a t i o n - S t a t e Analogy

These i d e a s , c u l l e d from l i t e r a t u r e on i n d i v i d u a l and

group b e h a v i o r , can be a n a l o g i z e d to account f o r n a t i o n - s t a t e

b e h a v i o r . F o l l o w i n g Galtung ( 1 9 6 4 ) , the i n t e r s t a t e system can

be e n v i s i o n e d as a set of i n t e r a c t i n g u n i t s s t r a t i f i e d i n m u l t i ­

d i m e n s i o n a l space. A s t a t e i s "status i n c o n s i s t e n t " when i t s

rank on one dimension does not c o r r e l a t e s t r o n g l y w i t h i t s

p o s i t i o n on other dimensions. I t i s reasoned t h a t d i f f e r e n t i a l

t r e a t m e n t , r e s u l t i n g from s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y , leads to

f r u s t r a t i o n . "States which f e e l h u m i l i a t e d , hampered, and

oppressed by the s t a t u s quo seek . . . to modify i t " (Schuman,

1948, p. 378). I f a s t a t e i s high on power c a p a b i l i t y i t may

possess the wherewithal to improve i t s low rank on o t h e r

d i m e n s i o n s . In p a r t i c u l a r , a s t a t e w i t h low " s o c i a l s t a t u s " in

the i n t e r s t a t e system may t r y to r a i s e i t s s t a t u s by demonstrat ing

i t s p h y s i c a l prowess. Thus, Organski (1968, p. 371) p o s t u l a t e s

t h a t the l i k e l i h o o d of major war i s g r e a t e s t "when a d i s s a t i s f i e d

c h a l l e n g e r achieves an approximate balance of power w i t h the

dominant s t a t e . " Drawing upon the s o c i o l o g i c a l argument,

11

i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e s which rank h i g h e r on c a p a b i l i t y than on s t a t u s

may be prone to e x t r a - p u n i t i v e , v i o l e n t b e h a v i o r , i . e . , i n t e r s t a t e

m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n . 1 On the o t h e r hand, s t a t e s which rank

h i g h e r on s t a t u s than on c a p a b i l i t y are l i k e l y to a v o i d

demonstrat ing t h e i r p h y s i c a l weakness, and w i l l attempt to

i n c r e a s e c a p a b i l i t y through i n t e r n a l development or c o l o n i a l

e x p a n s i o n .

System-Level Analyses

Several p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s have, i n one form or a n o t h e r ,

i n v e s t i g a t e d "status i n c o n s i s t e n c y leads to war" p r o p o s i t i o n s .

East (1972) generates data f o r 130 s t a t e s f o r the y e a r s 1946-1964

and c o n s t r u c t s a t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n model of

p r e s t i g e , economic p o s i t i o n , and p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y .

Many h i s t o r i c a l accounts have a t t r i b u t e d involvement i n i n t e r s t a t e c o n f l i c t to the p e r c e i v e d need of powerful s t a t e s to m a i n t a i n t h e i r n a t i o n a l p r e s t i g e . T a y l o r (1954, p. 4 3 3 ) , d i s c u s s i n g the F i r s t Moroccan C r i s i s , c i t e s Bulow o v e r r u l i n g H o l s t e i n : " A l l t h a t matters i s to get out of t h i s muddle over Morocco so as to preserve our p r e s t i g e in the world . . . " A l b r e c h t - C a r r i e (1959, p. 148) accounts f o r the T r i p o l i t a n War by s t a t i n g t h a t " T r i p o l i had no economic v a l u e , but to have i t f a l l to any o t h e r power would c e r t a i n l y have been a s e r i o u s blow to I t a l i a n p r e s t i g e . " T a y l o r (1954, p. 494) r e l a t e s t h a t Franz Ferdinand t o l d W i l l i a m II c o n c e r n i n g the Balkan s i t u a t i o n i n 1913: "As soon as our p r e s t i g e demands, we must intervene in S e r b i a w i t h v i g o u r . " W o h l s t e t t e r (1962, p. 355) remarks on Japanese motives f o r the Pear l Harbor a t t a c k : "War w i t h the United S t a t e s was not chosen. The d e c i s i o n f o r war was r a t h e r f o r c e d by the d e s i r e to a v o i d the more t e r r i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e of l o s i n g s t a t u s or abandoning the n a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s . " And a g a i n , a few pages l a t e r : "The r i s k of doing n o t h i n g about the U n i t e d S t a t e s , w h i l e a t t a c k i n g the B r i t i s h and Dutch, and, s t i l l more, the r i s k of not a t t a c k i n g the B r i t i s h and Dutch, seemed overwhelming and u n t h i n k a b l e — the acceptance of s t a t u s as a t e n t h - r a t e power" (p. 357).

12

Using Pearson product-moment c o e f f i c i e n t s , he f i n d s t h a t the

amount o f s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n the system i s p o s i t i v e l y

r e l a t e d to the number of v i o l e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t s i n the

system, and that the a s s o c i a t i o n becomes s t r o n g e r w i t h time lags

of one and two y e a r s .

Wallace (1973b) s e l e c t s the s t a t e s of a E u r o - c e n t r i c

subsystem from 1825 to 1964 as h i s s p a t i a l - t e m p o r a l domain and

aggregates h i s measures at f i v e - y e a r i n t e r v a l s f o r the subsystem

as a whole. He d e f i n e s s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y as the d i s p a r i t y

between the rank order of s t a t e s on the dimensions of power

c a p a b i l i t y and d i p l o m a t i c importance. Using s imple b i v a r i a t e

c o r r e l a t i o n s , stepwise m u l t i p l e r e g r e s s i o n , and a form of

dependence a n a l y s i s , Wallace concludes t h a t (1) i n c o n s i s t e n c y has

a d i r e c t and s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l

war, (2) the r e l a t i o n s h i p grows s t r o n g e r w i t h i n c r e a s e d time l a g s ,

and (3) more v a r i a n c e can be accounted f o r when the 140-year

temporal domain i s broken i n t o s m a l l e r s u b - p e r i o d s .

Both East and Wallace aggregate n a t i o n - s t a t e - l e v e l data

i n o r d e r to avoid a methodological d i f f i c u l t y t h a t would a r i s e

i f the d e r i v e d s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y measure i s l i n e a r l y dependent

upon the measures f o r a s c r i b e d and a c h i e v e d s t a t u s ( B l a l o c k , 1966a,

1966b, 1967a, 1967b; Hyman, 1966; M i t c h e l l , 1964). As a r e s u l t ,

t h e i r f i n d i n g s permit no i n f e r e n c e s to be drawn c o n c e r n i n g the

r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and war at the n a t i o n -

s t a t e l e v e l (Ray, f o r t h c o m i n g ; S i n g e r , 1961). C o n s i d e r , f o r example,

13

a system comprised of four s t a t e s , each having an i n c o n s i s t e n c y

and a war involvement s c o r e . I f we observe the system members at

three p o i n t s i n t i m e , we may f i n d t h e i r p r o f i l e s to be as f o l l o w s :

PEARSON INCONSISTENCY WAR INVOLVEMENT r

Tau1 Tau2 Tau3 Tau1 Tau2 Tau3

STATE A 20.00 40.00 20.00 35.00 15.00 35 .00 - i .00

STATE P. 5.00 30.00 55.00 20.00 15.00 10 .00 -1 .00

STATE C 20.00 15.00 10.00 5.00 30.00 55 .00 -1 .00

STATE D 35.00 15.00 35.00 20.00 40.00 20 .00. -1 .00

SYSTEM TOTAL

80.00 100.00 120.00 8 0 . 0 0 100.00 120 .00 +1 .00

C o r r e l a t i n g the i n c o n s i s t e n c y w i t h the war involvement scores f o r

each s t a t e , we uncover a p e r f e c t n e g a t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n , i . e . , when

t h e i r i n c o n s i s t e n c y scores go up, t h e i r war scores go down, and

v i c e v e r s a . For the e n t i r e system, on the o t h e r hand, the r e l a t i o n

i s p o s i t i v e . Thus, w h i l e East and Wal lace f i n d a r e l a t i o n s h i p

between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and war involvement at the system and

subsystem l e v e l , we cannot d i s c e r n from t h e i r a n a l y s e s whether i t

is the most i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e s t h a t are most war prone. Only when

a l l s t a t e s i n the p o p u l a t i o n have, c o n c u r r e n t l y , the same p r o f i l e

as one another can a s y s t e m - l e v e l a n a l y s i s r e s u l t i n p r e c i s e l y the

same f i n d i n g s as a n a t i o n - s t a t e - l e v e l a n a l y s i s . 1

1 In the l i m i t e d c a s e , we c o u l d t h i n k of a l l s t a t e s having the same scores as one another at each p o i n t in t i m e ; more g e n e r a l l y ,

since t o t a l c o v a r i a n c e i s the sum of between- and w i t h i n - g r o u p

14

N a t i o n - S t a t e - L e v e l Analyses

M i d l a r s k y (1969) examines the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y

h y p o t h e s i s at the n a t i o n - s t a t e l e v e l f o r the years 1870-1945

and uncovers a s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p . His

measure of i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s b a s i c a l l y the mean d i f f e r e n c e between

a s t a t e ' s score f o r n a t i o n a l power c a p a b i l i t y and i t s score f o r

d i p l o m a t i c importance. M i d l a r s k y ' s a n a l y t i c technique i s not

l o n g i t u d i n a l time s e r i e s , but c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l "time exposure."

Rather than measure the rank i n c o n s i s t e n c y of each s t a t e at

d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s w i t h i n the temporal domain, he c a l c u l a t e s the

s t a t e ' s mean score f o r the e n t i r e 75-year p e r i o d . An attempt

to i n f e r from h i s f i n d i n g s to the behavior of i n c o n s i s t e n t a c t o r s

r a i s e s t i m e - s p e c i f i c d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t are somewhat analogous to

those which r e s u l t i f one attempts to draw s t a t e - s p e c i f i c

i n f e r e n c e s from the East and Wallace a n a l y s e s . Because M i d l a r s k y ' s

study i s c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l , i t i s i m p o s s i b l e to a s c e r t a i n whether

s t a t e s are most war prone at that p o i n t in time when they are,

t h e m s e l v e s , most i n c o n s i s t e n t . To i l l u s t r a t e t h i s , assume that

we have observed the same i n t e r s t a t e system as b e f o r e , but at

d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s i n time than we had e a r l i e r . We might d i s c o v e r

the f o l l o w i n g :

c o v a r i a n c e , we are saying t h a t between-group c o v a r i a n c e i s z e r o . An i n t r o d u c t i o n to the problems a s s o c i a t e d w i t h c r o s s - l e v e l i n f e r e n c e can be found in A l k e r (1965, pp. 1 0 1 - 0 6 ; 1969), Goodman (1953, 1959), Robinson ( 1 9 5 0 ) , and S h i v e l y (1969) .

15

PEARSON INCONSISTENCY WAR INVOLVEMENT r

tau1 tau2 tau3 tau1 tau2 tau3

Time S e r i e s

STATE A 10.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 10.00 -1 .00

STATE Beta 15.00 10.00 5.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 -1 .00

STATE C 30.00 20.00 10.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 -1 .00

STATE D 40.00 30.00

Mean

20.00 20.00 30.00

Mean

40.00 - 1 . 0 0

Time Exposure

STATE A 5.00 5.00

STATE

STATE

B

C

10.00

20.00

10.00

20.00 + 1 .00

STATE D 30.00 30.00

C o r r e l a t i n g the i n c o n s i s t e n c y w i t h the war involvement score f o r

each s t a t e at each p o i n t i n t i m e , there i s a p e r f e c t n e g a t i v e

a s s o c i a t i o n ; but f o r the mean score of a l l s t a t e s over the e n t i r e

time p e r i o d , the r e l a t i o n i s p o s i t i v e . Thus, we are l e f t wi thout

t i m e - s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the a s s o c i a t i o n of a s t a t e ' s

s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and i t s war i n v o l v e m e n t .

Ray (1974) has a l s o undertaken an examinat ion of the s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s s u e at the n a t i o n - s t a t e l e v e l . He, however, employs

a l o n g i t u d i n a l design and, t h e r e b y , a v o i d s the d i f f i c u l t i e s

a s s o c i a t e d with "time exposure" a n a l y s i s . Using data from 1816 to

1970 f o r ten major European s t a t e s , Ray measures i n c o n s i s t e n c y as

a f u n c t i o n of the d i f f e r e n c e between the s t a t e s ' power c a p a b i l i t i e s

and t h e i r d i p l o m a t i c importance s c o r e s . B i v a r i a t e c o r r e l a t i o n s ,

16

m u l t i p l e r e g r e s s i o n , and d i s c r i m i n a n t f u n c t i o n a n a l y s i s are

employed as wel l as c o n t r o l s f o r s e v e r a l i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s .

Ray uncovers no p a t t e r n o f s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p

between the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y of these s t a t e s and the number,

magnitude, and s e v e r i t y of t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l wars, nor does he

f i n d any between i n c o n s i s t e n c y and the initiation of wars.

In l i g h t of Ray's f i n d i n g s , one f u r t h e r e m p i r i c a l

i n v e s t i g a t i o n should be mentioned. Von R i e k h o f f (1973) completed

a p a r a l l e l study to Ray's, f o c u s i n g on major powers from 1815 to

1965. He develops several a l t e r n a t i v e i n d i c a t o r s of s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y , a l l based upon d i p l o m a t i c importance and power

c a p a b i l i t y . Von R i e k h o f f uses r e g r e s s i o n and c a n o n i c a l a n a l y s i s

to p r e d i c t the number, magnitude, and s e v e r i t y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l

wars. He does not d i s c o v e r any r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t are s t r o n g e r

than those uncovered by Ray, but s i n c e they are g e n e r a l l y i n the

p r e d i c t e d d i r e c t i o n , von R i e k h o f f concludes t h a t some t e n t a t i v e

ev idence e x i s t s f o r an a s s o c i a t i o n between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y

and war.

Away from War: C o n s t r a i n t s on N a t i o n - S t a t e Behavior

A l l the peace research t h a t we have thus f a r reviewed

f o c u s e s on only a p o r t i o n of the "status i n c o n s i s t e n c y l e a d s to

war" q u e s t i o n . The r e s e a r c h e r s have l o o k e d , f o r the most p a r t ,

a t the f o r c e s t h a t d r i v e s t a t e s i n t o war. Y e t , as the p s y c h o l o g i c a l

and s o c i o l o g i c a l l i t e r a t u r e s u g g e s t s , there are a l s o f a c t o r s that

17

i n h i b i t o r , at l e a s t , p lace l i m i t s on a g g r e s s i v e b e h a v i o r . I t

may w e l l be that s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n c l i n e s s t a t e s toward

behaving a g g r e s s i v e l y , but whether t h a t behavior becomes m a n i f e s t

and subsequently e s c a l a t e s i n t o war may depend on a d d i t i o n a l

f a c t o r s . I f t h i s i s so. our research needs to be t w o - s t a g e .

We must f i r s t i n v e s t i g a t e whether s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s

a s s o c i a t e d w i t h , l e t us s a y , m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . Then

we must ask "under what c o n d i t i o n s are these c o n f r o n t a t i o n s

l i k e l y to r e s u l t i n wars?" I t i s to the c o n s t r a i n t s on a g g r e s s i v e

b e h a v i o r (both m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n and war) t h a t we now t u r n .

The L i m i t s of C a p a b i l i t y

Berkowitz (1962) h y p o t h e s i z e s t h a t f r u s t r a t e d i n d i v i d u a l s ,

who are r e l a t i v e l y p o w e r l e s s , f e e l v u l n e r a b l e . I f they are

unable to c o n t r o l or punish t h e i r t o r m e n t o r s , they become f e a r f u l

and a v o i d c o n f r o n t a t i o n . D o l l a r d et a l . (1939) p o i n t out t h a t

the g r e a t e r the a n t i c i p a t e d punishment, the l e s s a g g r e s s i v e l y

people w i l l behave. And Coser (1968, p. 233) notes t h a t

" p o t e n t i a l c l a i m a n t s f o r g r e a t e r income, s t a t u s , d e f e r e n c e , or

power may be d e t e r r e d from c o n f l i c t because of f e a r of consequences."

L a b o r a t o r y experiments support these c o n t e n t i o n s (Graham et a l . ,

1951; Hokanson, 1961).

A s i m i l a r p r o p o s i t i o n may be made about n a t i o n - s t a t e s , i . e . ,

whether a d i s s a t i s f i e d s t a t e w i l l r e s o r t to the use of m i l i t a r y

f o r c e depends, i n p a r t , upon i t s r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t y . The complete

underdog, n e a r l y i n c a p a b l e of a c t i n g , i s not l i k e l y to i n i t i a t e a

18

m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n ; i t i s the d i s c o n t e n t e d s t a t e which has

a v a i l a b l e resources that i s most a g g r e s s i v e ( G a l t u n g , 1964).

Organski (1968, p. 371) comments: "World peace i s guaranteed

when the nat ions s a t i s f i e d w i t h the e x i s t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l order

enjoy an unchallenged supremacy of power." And North (1968,

p. 231) presents p r e c i s e l y t h i s argument when d i s c u s s i n g the

v i a b i l i t y of i n t e g r a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s : "Reduced to s i m p l e s t

terms, the d u r a b i l i t y of a given compact or o t h e r i n t e g r a t i v e

r e l a t i o n s h i p w i l l depend upon two main v a r i a b l e s : (1) the

r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t y of each p a r t y , . . . and (2) the amount of

d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n evoked, or p e n a l t y demanded, by the r e l a t i o n s h i p . "

The a s s o c i a t i o n between r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t y and the use

of m i l i t a r y f o r c e has been examined by F e r r i s and by S i n g e r and

h i s c o l l e a g u e s . T h e i r analyses have produced mixed r e s u l t s .

F e r r i s (1973) f i n d s that the power d i s p a r i t y between s t a t e s ,

and changes i n t h a t d i s p a r i t y , are not good p r e d i c t o r s of

whether i n t e r s t a t e d i s p u t e s w i l l i n v o l v e military hostilities.

But he does uncover moderate support f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t

these p r e d i c t o r s are p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to intense conflicts.

S i n g e r and Small (1974) f i n d t h a t major powers experience war

more o f t e n when t h e i r c a p a b i l i t y i s below the mean f o r a l l major

powers, and t h a t major power wars are o f t e n i n i t i a t e d by s t a t e s

t h a t are r e l a t i v e l y i n f e r i o r but g a i n i n g i n c a p a b i l i t y . However,

i n a r e l a t e d study t h a t i n c l u d e d non-major s t a t e s , Stuckey and

S i n g e r (1973) show t h a t the more powerful s t a t e s ( i n terms of

19

demographic, i n d u s t r i a l , and m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h ) are i n v o l v e d in

a g r e a t e r number and more severe wars than the l e s s powerful ones,

and t h a t powerful s t a t e s are a l s o more l i k e l y to i n i t i a t e wars.

The f i n d i n g s of t h i s l a t t e r study have been supported by

subsequent analyses (Bremer, f o r t h c o m i n g ) .

M i n d f u l of the l i t e r a t u r e review i n the preceding s e c t i o n ,

I h y p o t h e s i z e t h a t s tatus i n c o n s i s t e n t 1 s t a t e s are d i s s a t i s f i e d

w i t h the e x i s t i n g i n t e r s t a t e order and are prone to involvement i n

i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . I f t h e i r power c a p a b i l i t i e s

are i n c r e a s i n g , then c o n f r o n t a t i o n s become even more p r o b a b l e .

But whether these c o n f r o n t a t i o n s e r u p t i n t o war depends upon

a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r s , one of which i s r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t y .

F o l l o w i n g Organski (1968), i f the opposing s t a t e s are r e l a t i v e l y

equal i n power c a p a b i l i t i e s , the l i k e l i h o o d of war i s g r e a t ; i f

u n e q u a l , the l i k e l i h o o d i s s m a l l e r because the more powerful s t a t e

i s more l i k e l y to be able to o b t a i n i t s ends w i t h o u t r e s o r t i n g to

s u b s t a n t i a l m i l i t a r y f o r c e , w h i l e the l e s s powerful country i s

l e s s l i k e l y to be able to defend i t s i n t e r e s t s .

However, another f a c t o r needs to be c o n s i d e r e d — n a m e l y ,

t h a t the c a p a c i t y to employ armed f o r c e tends to d i m i n i s h w i t h

d i s t a n c e from the t a r g e t ( B o u l d i n g , 1962). Thus, G l e d i t s c h and

S i n g e r (1975) f i n d that w h i l e the average geographic d i s t a n c e

between opponents i n i n t e r s t a t e wars i n c r e a s e s between 1816 and

For the remainder of t h i s s t u d y , "status i n c o n s i s t e n t " w i l l r e f e r only to those s i t u a t i o n s i n which a s t a t e i s a t t r i b u t e d l e s s importance than would be e x p e c t e d , g iven i t s power c a p a b i l i t y .

20

1965, t h a t d i s t a n c e i s c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s than the average i n t e r -

c a p i t a l d i s t a n c e between a l l c o u n t r i e s i n the i n t e r s t a t e system.

Pearson (1974), l o o k i n g a t only post-WW II d a t a , notes t h a t there

are few h o s t i l e m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n s when the d i s t a n c e between

i n t e r v e n e r and t a r g e t country i s g r e a t (> 1500 m i l e s ) . Russett

(1967, p. 198) d i s c o v e r s t h a t n e a r l y t w o - t h i r d s of the s t a t e s

i n m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1946-1965 are

g e o g r a p h i c a l l y proximate to one a n o t h e r . And Richardson (1960b,

p. 297) demonstrates t h a t , from 1820 to 1945, s i x t y - f i v e percent

of a l l deadly q u a r r e l s k i l l i n g 317 or more people are between

n e i g h b o r i n g opponents. None of these r e s e a r c h e r s would argue

t h a t s t a t e s become i n v o l v e d i n m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s because they

are prox imate. Rather , geographic nearness makes s t a t e s s a l i e n t

to one another and o f f e r s them the o p p o r t u n i t y to e f f e c t i v e l y

u t i l i z e t h e i r m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s . In l i g h t of t h i s e v i d e n c e ,

i t i s a d d i t i o n a l l y hypothesized t h a t wars are more l i k e l y to

o c c u r i f the p a r t i e s to the c o n f r o n t a t i o n s are cont iguous than

i f they are d i s t a n t .

L e a r n i n g from Experience

Another i n t e r v e n i n g f a c t o r between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y

and war involvement i s l e a r n i n g . Exper ience serves as a source

of e x p e c t a t i o n concerning the consequences of f u t u r e b e h a v i o r .

B e r k o w i t z (1962) s t r e s s e s t h a t people's r e a c t i o n s to f r u s t r a t i o n

can be a l t e r e d by t r a i n i n g , and t h a t t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of an

event and t h e i r responses to i t can be moderated or a m p l i f i e d .

21

P s y c h o l o g i c a l experiments have shown t h a t unrewarded a g g r e s s i v e

b e h a v i o r as w e l l as rewarded ami c a b l e behavior produce non-

a g g r e s s i v e responses (Brown and E l l i o t t , 1965; H o r t o n , 1970).

In c o n t r a s t , w i t n e s s i n g unpunished or rewarded a g g r e s s i v e

b e h a v i o r can reduce people's i n h i b i t i o n s a g a i n s t o v e r t v i o l e n c e

(Bandura, Ross, and Ross, 1961, 1963) . Indeed, Bandura (1965)

f i n d s t h a t rewarded b e l l i g e r e n c e serves as an i n c e n t i v e f o r

f u t u r e a c t s of v i o l e n c e , and o t h e r s t u d i e s conclude t h a t such

r e i n f o r c e m e n t not only i n c r e a s e s the i n c i d e n c e , but a l s o the

i n t e n s i t y of a g g r e s s i v e behavior (Geen and P i g g , 1970; Geen

and S t o n n e r , 1971).

At the n a t i o n - s t a t e l e v e l , North (1968, p. 231) suggests

t h a t "the d u r a b i l i t y of an i n t e g r a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i l l depend

. . . upon the p r e c e d e n t s , t h a t i s , upon whether or not prev ious

agreements have worked to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of the p a r t i e s . " And

Raser (1965, p. 2 2 5 ) , in a s p e c u l a t i v e essay on the i m p l i c a t i o n

f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s of Mowrer's two f a c t o r l e a r n i n g t h e o r y ,

c o n c l u d e s t h a t "behavior can be a l t e r e d by the c o n s c i o u s m a n i p u l a t i o n

o f reward and punishment." But S i n g e r and Small (1974) d i s c o v e r

t h a t n a t i o n - s t a t e s do not l e a r n from the war e x p e r i e n c e of o t h e r

s t a t e s . For example, they f i n d t h a t p u n i s h i n g a war i n i t i a t o r

by d e f e a t i n g i t does not reduce the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t another s t a t e

w i l l i n i t i a t e a war w i t h i n the same or subsequent y e a r . I t

should however be noted t h a t S i n g e r and Small are not examining

the q u e s t i o n of whether a s t a t e l e a r n s from i t s own e x p e r i e n c e .

22

T h e i r f i n d i n g s do not c h a l l e n g e the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t a s t a t e

which wages a s e r i e s of d i s a s t r o u s wars i s not l i k e l y to soon

resume i t s a g g r e s s i v e behavior (Shy, 1971). Indeed, r e s e a r c h

on major powers, c u r r e n t l y underway at the C o r r e l a t e s of War

P r o j e c t , shows t h a t , s i n c e 1816, the g r e a t e r the number of

b a t t l e f i e l d f a t a l i t i e s s u s t a i n e d by a major power i n war,

the l o n g e r the time i n t e r v a l before i t becomes i n v o l v e d i n

another war.

Every war i s a p u n i s h i n g e x p e r i e n c e , some more c o s t l y

than o t h e r s . I would surmise t h a t d e c i s i o n makers c o n s i d e r

t h e i r l o s s e s i n p r i o r wars before p l u n g i n g i n t o a n o t h e r . And

I p o s i t that the more c o s t l y these p r i o r wars, the l e s s l i k e l y

are d e c i s i o n makers to press f o r subsequent c o n f r o n t a t i o n s and

the s m a l l e r the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t such c o n f r o n t a t i o n s w i l l s p i l l

over i n t o war.

The Structure of the System

A f i n a l set of i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s can be found among

the s t r u c t u r a l p r o p e r t i e s of the i n t e r s t a t e system. As every

b e g i n n i n g student i n wor ld p o l i t i c s l e a r n s , i n t e r - s t a t e r e l a t i o n s

d i f f e r fundamental ly from i n t r a - s t a t e r e l a t i o n s i n t h a t the

former has — inter a l i a — n o e f f e c t i v e c e n t r a l i z e d government

(Herz , 1 959; P u c h a l a , 1971; Ranney, 1966). Rousseau ( c i r c a 1756)

t e l l s us that wars occur because there i s n o t h i n g to prevent them.

H o l s t i (1967, p. 348) w r i t e s : "A more general reason f o r the use

o f v i o l e n c e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s i s the absence of systemic

23

c o n s t r a i n t s on i t s use." And Waltz (1959, p. 234) concludes

t h a t i f war r e s u l t s because s t a t e A has something t h a t s t a t e B

wants, "the e f f i c i e n t cause of war i s the d e s i r e of s t a t e B [, but]

the p e r m i s s i v e cause i s the f a c t t h a t there i s n o t h i n g to prevent

s t a t e B from undertaking the r i s k s of war."

However, a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s have found t h a t v i a b l e and

s t a b l e s o c i e t i e s e x i s t which l a c k both c e n t r a l government and

s p e c i a l i z e d p o l i t i c a l r o l e s . Colson (1953) d e s c r i b e s one

p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t y in which the p e o p l e ' s l o y a l t i e s are d i v i d e d

between t e r r i t o r i a l and k i n s h i p groups. Each i n d i v i d u a l i s

i n t e g r a t e d i n t o a system of o v e r l a p p i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s . When

a person a c t s to f u l f i l l an o b l i g a t i o n to one group, he or she

i s faced by c o u n t e r c l a i m s from o t h e r groups. "In a s o c i e t y of

t h i s t y p e , i t i s i m p o s s i b l e to have the development of the feud

and the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of repeated a c t s of vengeance,

f o r each a c t of vengeance, l i k e each o r i g i n a l i n c i d e n t , m o b i l i z e s

d i f f e r e n t groups whose i n t e r e s t s are concerned i n the p a r t i c u l a r

case and t h a t alone" (p. 2 1 0 ) .

Although the " i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f the feud" i s perhaps over­

emphasized, Colson's study accords w e l l w i t h the p s y c h o l o g i s t s '

f i n d i n g s that people who f e a r t h a t t h e i r a c t i o n s may i n c u r s o c i a l

d i s a p p r o v a l are o f t e n i n h i b i t e d from behaving a g g r e s s i v e l y or

are l i k e l y to d i s p l a c e t h e i r h o s t i l i t y onto s u b s t i t u t e t a r g e t s

(Rule and P e r c i v a l , 1971; Worchel , 1966). S i m i l a r l y , C o l s o n ' s

e x p l a n a t i o n f i n d s support in the s o c i o l o g i c a l l i t e r a t u r e . Indeed,

24

the e x p l a n a t i o n i s e q u i v a l e n t to the " c r o s s - c u t t i n g c l e a v a g e s "

p r o p o s i t i o n (Coser, 1956, 1968) . Simply s t a t e d , i n a s o c i e t y

i n which there are many c r o s s - c u t t i n g a s s o c i a t i o n s , c r o s s -

p r e s s u r e s on the i n d i v i d u a l a l o n g a p l u r a l i t y of f r o n t s l e s s e n

the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t any s i n g l e c o n f l i c t might become o v e r l y

i n t e n s e . (The term " c r o s s - c u t t i n g " r e f e r s to the " p h y s i c a l "

e x i s t e n c e of competing commitments; the term " c r o s s - p r e s s u r e "

r e f e r s to the " p s y c h o l o g i c a l " e f f e c t s of these commitments.)

Gal tung (1968, p. 490) a p p l i e s t h i s " c r o s s - c u t t i n g c l e a v a g e s "

p r o p o s i t i o n to the behavior of n a t i o n - s t a t e s : "If two n a t i o n s

are a l l i e s i n one c o n f l i c t ( f o r i n s t a n c e , between East and

West, i n the language of the c o l d w a r ) , they may n e v e r t h e l e s s

be a n t a g o n i s t s i n another c o n f l i c t ( f o r i n s t a n c e , between r i c h

and poor n a t i o n s ) , and t h i s s u b j e c t s them to c r o s s p r e s s u r e s . "

He reasons t h a t c r o s s - c u t t i n g a s s o c i a t i o n s prevent complete

i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and involvement i n any c o n f l i c t , and t h a t c r o s s -

p r e s s u r e d s t a t e s tend to serve as mediators between s t a t e s t h a t

are not c r o s s - p r e s s u r e d .

There has been very l i t t l e e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h on the

r e l a t i o n of c r o s s - c u t t i n g to war and, to my knowledge, none

a t the n a t i o n - s t a t e l e v e l . The most prominent s y s t e m - l e v e l

a n a l y s i s has been done by Wal lace (1973a). He examines data f o r

a l l members of the i n t e r s t a t e system ( S i n g e r and S m a l l , 1972)

d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1815-1964, and uses s m a l l e s t space a n a l y s i s

to c l u s t e r s t a t e s , at f i v e - y e a r i n t e r v a l s , on m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e ,

25

i n t e r n a t i o n a l governmental o r g a n i z a t i o n , and d i p l o m a t i c

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n dimensions. Al though the e x p l a n a t o r y power

of the v a r i a b l e i s s m a l l , Wal lace f i n d s t h a t a g r e a t e r amount

of war i n the system i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h both very low and very

high l e v e l s of c r o s s - c u t t i n g i n the system, and r e l a t i v e l y

l e s s war w i t h moderate c r o s s - c u t t i n g . He s p e c u l a t e s t h a t ,

at the one extreme, a h e a v i l y c r o s s - c u t i n t e r s t a t e system

generates c o n f u s i o n as to the i d e n t i t y of a l l i e s and a d v e r s a r i e s

and t h a t t h i s , in t u r n , leads to l e s s p r e d i c t a b l e c o n f l i c t

b e h a v i o r ; and t h a t , at the o t h e r extreme, a system which i s not

c r o s s - c u t l a c k s the c o u n t e r v a i l i n g l i n k s t h a t serve to temper

b e h a v i o r .

Although Wal lace's f i n d i n g s at the system l e v e l may tempt

us to p o s i t the same c u r v i l i n e a r i t y at the n a t i o n - s t a t e l e v e l ,

I need o n l y c a u t i o n the reader about the dangers of c r o s s - l e v e l

i n f e r e n c e . The important q u e s t i o n i s whether W a l l a c e ' s

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p , i . e . , t h a t high l e v e l s of

c r o s s - c u t t i n g i n the system lead to c o n f u s i o n and i n c r e a s e d war

i n the system, suggests a p a r a l l e l h y p o t h e s i s concerning the

behavior of h e a v i l y " c r o s s - p r e s s u r e d " s t a t e s . I t h i n k t h a t ,

at the n a t i o n - s t a t e l e v e l , the c u r v i l i n e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p i s

somewhat l e s s p l a u s i b l e than the s i m p l e r l i n e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p

t h a t accords w i t h the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l and s o c i o l o g i c a l l i t e r a t u r e .

Thus, I p o s t u l a t e that the more c r o s s - c u t a s t a t e ' s bonds, the

more c o n s t r a i n e d i t i s and the l e s s l i k e l y i t i s to become i n v o l v e d

26

i n a m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n . And i f such a c o n f r o n t a t i o n does

o c c u r , the p r o b a b i l i t y that i t w i l l r e s u l t in war w i l l be reduced

i f the opposing s t a t e s have bonds wi th one a n o t h e r .

The " c r o s s - c u t t i n g " l i t e r a t u r e , w i t h i t s emphasis upon

the moderating i n f l u e n c e of m u l t i p l e a f f i l i a t i o n s , suggests to

me t h a t the mere opportunity to have m u l t i p l e a f f i l i a t i o n s may

have a s i m i l a r e f f e c t . And t h i s leads me to s p e c u l a t e about a

second s t r u c t u r a l v a r i a b l e , one t h a t i s concerned w i t h the

o p p o r t u n i t y f o r new al ignments w i t h i n the system. This second

v a r i a b l e i s polarity. The l i t e r a t u r e u s u s a l l y c o n t r a s t s

b i - p o l a r i t y , a s i t u a t i o n i n which two opposing camps leave l i t t l e

room f o r r e - a l i g n m e n t , wi th more f l e x i b l e m u l t i - p o l a r systems.

There i s , however, no consensus in the t h e o r e t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e

on whether b i - p o l a r i t y (Waltz , 1964, 1 9 6 7 ) , m u l t i - p o l a r i t y (Deutsch

and S i n g e r , 1964), or some mixture of the two (Rosecrance, 1966)

i s most conducive to peace, a l though the advocates of m u l t i -

p o l a r i t y a r e , perhaps, more numerous.

To d a t e , e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n has not served to i n c r e a s e

the l i k e l i h o o d of consensus. S i n g e r and Small (1968) f i n d p o s i t i v e

c o r r e l a t i o n s between b i - p o l a r i t y and the number, magnitude, and

s e v e r i t y of wars in the i n t e r s t a t e system d u r i n g the 19th c e n t u r y ,

but m a i n l y negat ive r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the 2 0 t h . Haas (1970) looks

a t twenty-one h i s t o r i c a l systems i n Europe, A s i a , and Hawaii f o r

the y e a r s 1649-1963 and concludes t h a t the number of poles i n the

system i s n e g a t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the number, magnitude, and

27

s e v e r i t y of wars in the system. And Wallace (1973a) examines

the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system from 1815 to 1964 and f i n d s a c u r v i ­

l i n e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p in which the amount of war i n the system i s

g r e a t e s t when b i - p o l a r i t y i s very pronounced or not d i s c e r n i b l e

and, c o n v e r s e l y , i s l e a s t i n a moderately p o l a r i z e d system.

I t should be noted t h a t these l a t t e r e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s

i n v e s t i g a t e the amount of war i n the system. To my knowledge,

there has been no systematic e m p i r i c a l research examining the

e f f e c t s o f b i - p o l a r i t y on n a t i o n a l b e h a v i o r . I f , f o r example,

we found that b i - p o l a r i t y was a s s o c i a t e d w i t h more war i n the

system, we s t i l l would not know whether all n a t i o n s become more

war p r o n e , only p a r t i c u l a r types of n a t i o n s ( e . g . , major powers),

or o n l y n a t i o n s i n p a r t i c u l a r p o s i t i o n s ( e . g . , the most p e r i p h e r a l

n a t i o n s ) . In a d d i t i o n , the research to date has tended to focus

on whether wars are l i k e l y to be l o n g e r or s h o r t e r , b l o o d i e r or

l e s s d e a d l y , given that the system i s b i - p o l a r , r a t h e r than on

whether or not a war w i l l o c c u r . 1

While being s e n s i t i v e to the p o s s i b i l i t y of a c u r v i l i n e a r

r e l a t i o n s h i p between b i - p o l a r i t y and the i n c i d e n c e of war, I s h a l l

n e v e r t h e l e s s hypothesize a l i n e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t complements

1One f u r t h e r point might be made. I f one i s i n v e s t i g a t i n g q u e s t i o n s concerned wi th the amount of war r a t h e r than the o c c u r r e n c e of war, one's u n i t of a n a l y s i s would more p r o p e r l y be the war than the y e a r . That i s , i f one were i n t e r e s t e d i n d i s c o v e r i n g what v a r i a b l e s best account f o r the s i z e of a war, i t would be best to look at only those s i t u a t i o n s i n which wars occur and then determine what v a r i a b l e s account f o r the s i z e of those wars' ( D u v a l l , 1974; Z i n n e s , 1967).

28

t h a t p o s t u l a t e d f o r c r o s s - c u t t i n g . I p o s i t t h a t the l e s s b i - p o l a r

the system, the g r e a t e r the o p p o r t u n i t y f o r m u l t i p l e competing

a f f i l i a t i o n s and the l e s s the l i k e l i h o o d of s e r i o u s m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . I f such c o n f r o n t a t i o n s do a r i s e , the l e s s b i - p o l a r

the system, the s m a l l e r the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t they w i l l erupt, i n t o

war.

Summarizing the P r o p o s i t i o n s and Positing a Model

Before becoming more deeply committed to t h i s r e s e a r c h ,

we s h o u l d c o n f r o n t one l i n g e r i n g doubt c o n c e r n i n g i t s p r o f i t a b i l i t y .

The reader probably has noted t h a t , i n the e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s we

have r e v i e w e d , there i s o f t e n a l a c k of agreement from one set of

r e s u l t s to the next. Depending on the l e v e l of a n a l y s i s , the

methodology, or the o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the v a r i a b l e s , some of

the s t u d i e s support the p r o p o s i t i o n s under i n v e s t i g a t i o n w h i l e

o t h e r s do not . W a l l a c e , E a s t , M i d l a r s k y , and von R i e k h o f f uncover

a r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and war; Ray does not.

Stuckey and S i n g e r f i n d a r e l a t i o n s h i p between c a p a b i l i t y and war;

F e r r i s , f o r the most p a r t , does not . And so f o r t h . Can i t be

p r o f i t a b l e t o , a g a i n , examine these same v a r i a b l e s ? I would say

"yes." In a d d i t i o n to the usual arguments t h a t v a r i a b l e s were not

a d e q u a t e l y o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d and that b e t t e r data i s now a v a i l a b l e ,

t h e r e are more s u b t l e and i n t r i g u i n g r e a s o n s . F i r s t , the analyses

to date have r e s t e d mainly upon the search f o r cont inuous l i n e a r

f u n c t i o n s . Yet , the u n d e r l y i n g a s s o c i a t i o n may be c u r v i l i n e a r or

29

show t h r e s h o l d p r o p e r t i e s which would not be captured by a l i n e a r

r e g r e s s i o n or a product-moment c o e f f i c i e n t . Second, the absence

of s t r o n g evidence s u p p o r t i n g a r e l a t i o n s h i p , f o r example,

between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y or r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t y , on the one

hand, and war involvement on the o t h e r does not negate the

p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t i n c o n s i s t e n c y and r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t y are

s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h war. I f we t h i n k about s t a t i s t i c a l

s i g n i f i c a n c e i n terms of "necessary" and " s u f f i c i e n t " c o n d i t i o n s ,

i t becomes c l e a r that an i n s i g n i f i c a n t b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p does

not imply that a v a r i a b l e i s w i t h o u t e x p l a n a t o r y power when placed

i n a m u l t i v a r i a t e c o n t e x t . As an example, suppose t h a t a

dependent v a r i a b l e i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h r e e p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e s ,

t h a t are d i s t r i b u t e d as f o l l o w s : 1

OBS # PRED 1 PRED 2 PRED 3 DEP VAR

1 25. 00 24. 00 23.00 4. 00

2 2 23. 00 22. 00 21 .00 5. 00

3 21. 00 20. 00 19.00 10. 00

4 19. 00 18. 00 17.00 15. 00

5 17. 00 16. 00 15.00 20. 00

6 15. 00 14. 00 13.00 24. 00

7 99. 00 98. 00 97.00 75. 00

8 99. 00 10. 00 9.00 75. 00

I am i l l u s t r a t i o n of

indebted to John Stuckey f o r s u g g e s t i n g a s i m i l a r t h i s p r i n c i p l e .

30

OBS # PRED 1 PRED 2 PRED 3 DEP VAR

9 98.00 10.00 97. 00 76, .00

10 9.00 95.00 8. 00 77 .00

11 8.00 7.00 92. 00 78, .00

12 7.00 92.00 90. 00 79, .00

13 93.00 90.00 7. 00 80. .00

14 6.00 6.00 8 8 . 00 85. ,00

15 87.00 5.00 6. 00 89. ,00

16 5.00 83.00 4. 00 91. ,00

17 4.00 79.00 3 . 00 94. 00

18 3.00 2. 00 76. 00 96. 00

19 75.00 1.00 2 . 00 99. 00

INTERCORRELATION MATRIX

PRED 1 1.00

PRED 2 - . 0 3 1.00

PRED 3 - . 0 0 - . 0 3 1. 00

DEP VAR .24 .26 • 24 1. 00

PRED 1 PRED 2 PRED 3 DEP VAR

I f we examine the b i v a r i a t e c o r r e l a t i o n s , we would probably

conclude that the r e l a t i o n s h i p s are not p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t ,

s i n c e no s i n g l e p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e accounts f o r more than seven

percent of the v a r i a n c e i n the dependent v a r i a b l e . However,

a s imple cont ingency t a b l e or a s c a t t e r p l o t of each p r e d i c t o r

v a r i a b l e a g a i n s t the dependent v a r i a b l e , and a comparison of the

31

t h r e e t a b l e s or p l o t s with one another would reveal a s t r i k i n g

r e l a t i o n s h i p : a high score ( > 5 0 . ) on any p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e

appears to be a s u f f i c i e n t , and may be even a n e c e s s a r y , c o n d i t i o n

f o r a high score on the dependent v a r i a b l e . This can be shown

s t a t i s t i c a l l y by combining the three p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e s i n t o a

new v a r i a b l e that i s given a score of "one" whenever any of the

t h r e e p r e d i c t o r s i s h i g h , and a score of "zero" o t h e r w i s e . A

one-way a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e , w i t h the dependent v a r i a b l e

s t r a t i f i e d by t h i s new dichotomous p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e , i s

s i g n i f i c a n t at the .00 l e v e l ; and a r e g r e s s i o n , w i t h the new

dichotomous v a r i a b l e as the p r e d i c t o r , accounts f o r almost

n i n e t y - f i v e percent of the v a r i a n c e i n the dependent v a r i a b l e .

A s i m p l e b i v a r i a t e a n a l y s i s , t h a t focused on the s e p a r a t e e f f e c t s

of the o r i g i n a l p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e s , would have f a i l e d to reveal

t h i s m u l t i - v a r i a b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p . Thus, the i n c l u s i o n of several

f a c t o r s i n an a n a l y s i s may demonstrate an a s s o c i a t i o n where fewer

v a r i a b l e s prove i n s u f f i c i e n t . The number and the i d e n t i t y o f

v a r i a b l e s to i n c l u d e , and the manner i n which they are to be

combined, of c o u r s e , must d e r i v e from one's t h e o r y , model, or

hypotheses.

Our t h e o r e t i c a l argument i s t h a t s t a t e s t h a t are

a t t r i b u t e d l e s s importance ( i . e . , have lower a s c r i b e d s t a t u s )

than would be expected on the b a s i s of t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s

are more prone to m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t than s t a t e s t h a t have the

o p p o s i t e p r o f i l e or are s t a t u s - c o n g r u e n t . Whether these s t a t e s

32

r e s o r t to a g g r e s s i v e b e h a v i o r , however, depends upon a d d i t i o n a l

f a c t o r s — some p h y s i c a l ( c a p a b i l i t y and c o n t i g u i t y ) , some

p s y c h o l o g i c a l ( p r i o r e x p e r i e n c e ) , and some s t r u c t u r a l ( c r o s s -

c u t t i n g and p o l a r i t y ) . We can p o r t r a y t h i s as a two-stage model

the f i r s t l e a d i n g from s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y to m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n , the second from c o n f r o n t a t i o n to war.

STAGE 1: NATIONAL

Intervening variables

1) change in power

2) p r i o r war experience

3) cross-cutting bonds

4) p o l a r i t y

STAGE 2: DYADIC

i n t e r v e n i n g variables 1) d i f f e r e n c e

in power 2) c o n t i g u i t y 3) p r i o r war

e x p e r i e n c e 4) r e c i p r o c a l

bonds 5) p o l a r i t y

s t a t u s inconsistent

s t a t e s

l n t e r s t a t e military

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s

i n t e r s t a t e wars

In the f i r s t s t a g e , our u n i t of a n a l y s i s i s the year and

we undertake a n a t i o n - s t a t e - l e v e l a n a l y s i s . That i s to s a y , we

f i r s t i n v e s t i g a t e whether, g iven the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s

hypothesized above, s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t n a t i o n - s t a t e s are

u n u s u a l l y a g g r e s s i v e . N a t u r a l l y , I do not expect all s t a t e s

engaged i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s to be s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t ,

but r a t h e r t h a t s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e s w i l l be i n v o l v e d i n

m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s much more f r e q u e n t l y than would be expected

33

by chance. And, i f i t has not been e v i d e n t from what I have s a i d

p r e v i o u s l y , 1 would expect s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e s to initiate

a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e number of m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s .

In the second s t a g e , our u n i t of a n a l y s i s becomes the

c o n f l i c t . We now w i l l have a s e t of m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s and

w i l l have i d e n t i f i e d the dyads i n v o l v e d i n each of them. We w i l l

determine whether the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s s p e c i f i e d above are

s u f f i c i e n t to d i s t i n g u i s h between those c o n f r o n t a t i o n s t h a t r e s u l t

i n war and those that do not . U n l i k e prev ious i n v e s t i g a t i o n s

t h a t sought a d i r e c t l i n k between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and

war i n v o l v e m e n t , no such c o n n e c t i o n i s p o s i t e d here. S t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s hypothesized to make s t a t e s prone to m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n ; but once such a c o n f r o n t a t i o n o c c u r s , a d i f f e r e n t

s e t of dynamics i s i n v o l v e d and the l i k e l i h o o d of war depends

upon the p h y s i c a l , p s y c h o l o g i c a l , and s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s

of the p a r t i e s to the c o n f l i c t .

In c o n c l u d i n g t h i s c h a p t e r , I again emphasize t h a t the

model presented in the preceding pages i s o n l y one o f a number of

c o n t e n d i n g e x p l a n a t i o n s i m p l i c i t i n the l i t e r a t u r e . Having s a i d

t h i s , l e t us turn to the r e s e a r c h design w i t h which I hope to

t e s t the model.

CHAPTER II

THE RESEARCH DESIGN

The Referent World

Spatial Domain

To t e s t the p r o p o s i t i o n s p o s i t e d i n Chapter One, I have

s e l e c t e d the set of s t a t e s t h a t comprise the major power subsystem

from 1820 to 1970. Several f a c t o r s have guided t h i s c h o i c e .

There are those that might be l a b e l e d c o n c e p t u a l . "Status" i s

l i k e l y to be s a l i e n t to major powers, i n t h a t they have the

c a p a c i t y to gather and process i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t would make them

aware of t h e i r p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s o t h e r s t a t e s and t h a t they are

s u f f i c i e n t l y near the top of the "pecking order" to have a

prominent benchmark a g a i n s t which to compare t h e i r gains and

l o s s e s . In a d d i t i o n , the major powers i n t e r a c t amongst themselves

w i t h s u f f i c i e n t r e g u l a r i t y t h a t we can c o n s i d e r them members of

an i n t e r n a t i o n a l "system." S t r u c t u r a l concepts such as " c r o s s -

c u t t i n g " and " p o l a r i t y " are most l i k e l y to be meaningful under

such c o n d i t i o n s .

There i s a l s o a very p r a c t i c a l reason f o r s e l e c t i n g the

major power subsystem, namely, the a v a i l a b i l i t y of high q u a l i t y

34

35

d a t a . At l e a s t f o r the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , the most r e l i a b l e data

t h a t have been generated on n a t i o n a l a t t r i b u t e s and b e h a v i o r e x i s t

f o r the major powers.

F i n a l l y , there i s the q u e s t i o n of r e l e v a n c e : the need to

s e l e c t the set of s t a t e s t h a t accounts f o r most of the behavior

under i n v e s t i g a t i o n . As has been p o i n t e d out by many s c h o l a r s ,

war i s b a s i c a l l y a great power a c t i v i t y . Indeed, major powers

have a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e d i n s i x t y percent of the i n t e r s t a t e

wars s i n c e the Congress of V i e n n a . These s t a t e s have the a b i l i t y

to undertake independent a c t i o n and, i f s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s

a source of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h e x i s t i n g arrangements, major

powers are more l i k e l y than o t h e r s t a t e s to b e l i e v e t h a t they

are capable of a l t e r i n g the i n t e r n a t i o n a l order by means of

armed c o n f l i c t . To quote Model s k i (1 972, p. 4 8 ) : "War i s the

p r i n c i p l e j u s t i f y i n g and l e g i t i m i z i n g the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s

system at whose summit are the Great Powers; t h a t s t a t u s system

i n t u r n v a l i d a t e s war as the means of p r e s e r v i n g the s t a t u s

system." These c o n f l a g r a t i o n s are a t h r e a t to the e n t i r e i n t e r ­

s t a t e system and, to a l a r g e e x t e n t , wor ld peace depends upon

the e l i m i n a t i o n of major power involvement i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l war.

I used two c r i t e r i a to i d e n t i f y the t e s t p o p u l a t i o n .

F i r s t , the p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y had to be a member of the i n t e r s t a t e

system, i . e . , i t had to be a n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y t h a t

i n d e p e n d e n t l y c o n t r o l l e d i t s own armed f o r c e s and r e c e i v e d

d i p l o m a t i c r e c o g n i t i o n from any two s t a t e s t h a t f u l f i l l e d the

36

same requirements ( c f . S inger and S m a l l , 1966). A l i s t of system

members i s presented in Appendix C. Second, there had to be

h i s t o r i c a l consensus that the s t a t e was a major power. Whether

a s t a t e meets the f i r s t c r i t e r i o n i s r e l a t i v e l y s imple to

d e t e r m i n e ; the second i s more d i f f i c u l t . Even though we each

have a " f e e l " f o r which s t a t e s are major powers, there i s no

agreement on o b j e c t i v e i n d i c a t o r s . I t h e r e f o r e asked a number

of d i p l o m a t i c and m i l i t a r y h i s t o r i a n s to complete a q u e s t i o n n a i r e

aimed a t i d e n t i f y i n g the major powers and the a p p r o p r i a t e years

f o r membership i n t h i s e x c l u s i v e c l u b . Of twenty- four American

s c h o l a r s p o l l e d , twenty responded. The concensus of these

h i s t o r i a n s ( d e f i n e d as agreement among more than h a l f of the

respondents) f o l l o w s . With the e x c e p t i o n of Japan's " r e - i n c l u s i o n "

1960-1970, the consensus was n e a r l y unanimous.

State I n c l u s i v e Years

Aust r ia-Hungary 1820- 1918

Prussia/Germany 1820- 1918, 1 925- 1945

Russia/USSR 1820- 1917, 1 922- 1970

France 1820- 1940, 1 945-1970

United Kingdom 1820- 1970

I t a l y 1860- 1943

Japan 1895- 1 945, 1960- 1970

United States 1899- 1970

China 1950- 1970

37

For the remainder of t h i s s t u d y , the term "major power" w i l l

r e f e r to these s t a t e s f o r the d e s i g n a t e d y e a r s . P a r e n t h e t i c a l l y ,

i t may be pointed out that the h i s t o r i a n s ' judgment c o i n c i d e s

( e x c e p t i n g only Japan, 1960-1970) w i t h the c o u n t r i e s and dates

suggested by S i n g e r and Small (1972).

Temporal Domain

The temporal domain f o r t h i s study begins i n 1820,

s h o r t l y a f t e r the c l o s e of the Napoleonic Wars and the c o n c l u s i o n

of the Congress of Vienna. This was a time of important changes

i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . The c i t i z e n army had been c a s t upon

the s t a g e , a l t e r i n g the means of m i l i t a r y r e c r u i t m e n t f o r f u t u r e

wars and i n c r e a s i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y of massive i n t e r n a t i o n a l

c o n f l a g r a t i o n s . The major powers of Europe had j o i n e d t o g e t h e r

to d e f e a t Napoleon and to r e s t r u c t u r e the p o l i t i c a l face of the

c o n t i n e n t . A s o - c a l l e d "century of peace" was c o n s t r u c t e d ,

shaken to i t s roots by the r e v o l u t i o n s of 1848, j a r r e d i n 1853

by the Crimean War and in 1870 by the F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n , and f i n a l l y

s h a t t e r e d i n 1914. The turn of the t w e n t i e t h century saw a new

wave of s o c i a l r e v o l u t i o n s and the ascendancy of new major powers.

In the course of the t w e n t i e t h century have come f o u r of the f i v e

b l o o d i e s t i n t e r s t a t e wars i n recorded h i s t o r y and, i n i t s wake,

l i e the remnants of s e v e r a l major powers and t h e i r e m p i r e s . The

century and a h a l f s i n c e 1820 has been t r u l y e v e n t f u l , and an

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of today's c o n f l i c t s may be informed by an

understanding of these h i s t o r i c a l o c c u r r e n c e s .

38

There a r e , however, some who suggest t h a t h i s t o r i c a l events

and system t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s d u r i n g the past 151 years have so

permanently a l t e r e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s among p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l

v a r i a b l e s that f i n d i n g s from the past can have no r e l e v a n c e f o r

the p r e s e n t . The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of temporal d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s and

a t t e n d a n t changes in the i n t e r - v a r i a b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p s i s , of

c o u r s e , an e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n ; and, s i n c e r e l i a b l e data on the

major powers are a v a i l a b l e , i t i s a q u e s t i o n t h a t we s h a l l

i n v e s t i g a t e in t h i s study.

C o n s t r u c t i n g the I n d i c a t o r s

The P r e d i c t o r V a r i a b l e : S t a t u s Inconsistency

Before we can t e s t the hypotheses t h a t are p o s i t e d in

Chapter One, we w i l l have to c o n s t r u c t o p e r a t i o n a l i n d i c a t o r s

f o r the key concepts c o n t a i n e d in these hypotheses. A number

of the concepts ( e . g . , s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and c r o s s - c u t t i n g )

have been borrowed from s i s t e r s o c i a l s c i e n c e s , i n which they

have been t r a d i t i o n a l l y a p p l i e d to i n d i v i d u a l s . I t w i l l be no

easy f e a t to c o n s t r u c t ( f o r these concepts) i n d i c a t o r s t h a t can

be a p p r o p r i a t e l y a p p l i e d to n a t i o n - s t a t e s .

F i t t i n g l y , we begin wi th the most d i f f i c u l t c o n c e p t :

s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y . The reader w i l l r e c a l l from Chapter One

t h a t a n a t i o n i s s a i d to be s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t when i t f a i l s

to r e c e i v e a t t r i b u t e d importance commensurate w i t h i t s power

c a p a b i l i t i e s . Hence, s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y has two components:

39

power c a p a b i l i t y and a t t r i b u t e d importance. In the pages t h a t

f o l l o w , I w i l l f i r s t c o n s t r u c t an i n d i c a t o r of power c a p a b i l i t y ,

then one of a t t r i b u t e d importance, and, f i n a l l y , I w i l l combine

the two i n t o a s i n g l e index of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y .

Measur ing Power C a p a b i l i t y

Although p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s have never concurred on

how power c a p a b i l i t y should be measured, i t i s agreed t h a t the

concept i s m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l . For the c u r r e n t i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,

I tap three of these dimensions ( c f . Small and B e n n e t t ,

f o r t h c o m i n g ) . F i r s t , there i s the demographic. The sheer

number of people p o p u l a t i n g a country i s one i n d i c a t o r of a

n a t i o n ' s power because people are f u e l f o r i n d u s t r i a l f i r e s

and fodder f o r m i l i t a r y cannons, and as s u c h , they p r o v i d e

the b a s i c "raw m a t e r i a l " f o r n a t i o n a l m i g h t . But w h i l e l a r g e

numbers of people are an a s s e t to the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a

powerful n a t i o n , they are so o n l y to the extent t h a t they can

be e f f e c t i v e l y m o b i l i z e d . The i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n brought

people i n t o the c i t i e s and these urban d w e l l e r s came to comprise

the s e c t o r of s o c i e t y t h a t was best educated and most f a m i l i a r

w i t h t e c h n o l o g i c a l advances. In s h o r t , these urban c i t i z e n s

became the most m o b i l i z a b l e s e c t o r of modern i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y .

T h e r e f o r e , I use two i n d i c a t o r s of the demographic dimension

of power: one i s t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n and the o t h e r i s urban

p o p u l a t i o n .

40

A second dimension of n a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s i s economic.

Here too I use m u l t i p l e i n d i c a t o r s : f u e l consumption 2 and

2

i r o n and steel p r o d u c t i o n . These are probably the most

comparable c r o s s - n a t i o n a l i n d i c a t o r s a v a i l a b l e to measure

the i n d u s t r i a l base of s t a t e s a c r o s s the span of the n i n e t e e n t h

and t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s . Without f u e l and i r o n / s t e e l , i n d u s t r y

cannot f u n c t i o n and n e i t h e r machines of war nor those of peace

can be produced.

F i n a l l y , no measure of n a t i o n a l power i n the "modern"

i n t e r s t a t e system would be complete w i t h o u t a m i l i t a r y component,

f o r m i l i t a r y might serves as the u l t i m a t e a r b i t e r . The b a s i c

i n d i c a t o r s of t h i s dimension are the number of m i l i t a r y personnel

and the amount of money i n v e s t e d i n military expenditure.

Having s e l e c t e d these s i x i n d i c a t o r s , we are faced w i t h

q u e s t i o n s of t h e i r c o m p a r a b i l i t y and t h e i r l e v e l of measurement.

Do the r e l a t i o n s h i p s among the i n d i c a t o r s remain c o n s t a n t a c r o s s

the century and a h a l f under i n v e s t i g a t i o n and should each

i n d i c a t o r c o n t r i b u t e e q u a l l y i n d e t e r m i n i n g n a t i o n a l power?

Is there an i n t e r v a l - s c a l e isomorphism between the i n d i c a t o r s

and the c o n c e p t , e . g . , i s the i n c r e a s e i n power p r o p o r t i o n a t e

to i n c r e a s e s on the i n d i c a t o r s and do u n i t i n c r e a s e s on the

1 Coal consumption i s used p r i o r to 1860; c o a l , o i l , h y d r o e l e c t r i c , s o l a r , and n u c l e a r e n e r g i e s are i n c l u d e d i n subsequent r e a d i n g s .

2 P i g - i r o n p r o d u c t i o n i s used p r i o r to 1900; s t e e l

p o d u c t i o n i s i n c l u d e d f o r the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y .

41

i n d i c a t o r s correspond to u n i t i n c r e a s e s i n power r e g a r d l e s s of

the e x i s t i n g l e v e l of power?

The answer to the above q u e s t i o n s i s "probably n o t . "

C e r t a i n l y , we make a h e r o i c assumption i f we s i m p l y accept

premises of i n t e r - v a r i a b l e c o m p a r a b i l i t y and i n t e r v a l - s c a l e

isomorphism. We should be a b l e to do b e t t e r .

Let us make two "not very h e r o i c " assumpt ions. F i r s t ,

we w i l l p o s i t that the s i x i n d i c a t o r s do indeed tap the concept

we wish to measure. Second, we w i l l p o s i t t h a t the i n d i c a t o r s

are at l e a s t o r d i n a l l y - s c a l e d and have d i r e c t i o n a l i t y ; t h a t ,

f o r example, spending more money on defense i n c r e a s e s , c e t e r i s

p a r i b u s , a n a t i o n ' s power c a p a b i l i t y , a l though not n e c e s s a r i l y

p r o p o r t i o n a t e to the i n c r e a s e d c o s t . S i n c e a l l o f the i n d i c a t o r s

are supposed to tap some f a c e t o f "power," we c o u l d r e s c a l e the

i n d i c a t o r s so as to maximize t h e i r i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n . I f the

o r i g i n a l scores on the i n d i c a t o r s were h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d , we

would not expect the transformed scores to be very d i f f e r e n t ;

i f the o r i g i n a l scores were more weakly c o r r e l a t e d , the t ransformed

scores would be a b e t t e r i n t e r v a l a p p r o x i m a t i o n . We may t h i n k of

t h i s procedure as r e g r e s s i n g power (the outcome v a r i a b l e ) on i t s

six i n d i c a t o r s (the p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e s ) so as to maximize the

f i t ( R 2 ) .

I subjec ted a l l c a p a b i l i t y data to t h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n

on an annual b a s i s using Guttman-Lingoes' CM-III ( L i n g o e s , 1972,

42

1973). This c o n j o i n t measurement a l g o r i t h m r e s c a l e s v a r i a b l e s

so t h a t the average i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n among them i s maximized,

s u b j e c t to the r e s t r i c t i o n t h a t rank o r d e r be p r e s e r v e d . In the

p r o c e s s , m i l d n o n - l i n e a r i t i e s are minimized or e l i m i n a t e d ,

thereby producing transformed scores t h a t can be more a p p r o p r i a t e l y

used w i t h l i n e a r a n a l y t i c techniques such as o r d i n a r y l e a s t -

squares (OLS) r e g r e s s i o n .

The a p p l i c a b i l i t y of Guttman-Lingoes' CM-III to r e s c a l i n g c a p a b i l i t y data was p o i n t e d out to me by Michael M i h a l k a .

2 The Guttman-Lingoes' CM-III a l g o r i t h m permits v a r i a b l e s

to be " r e f l e c t e d , " i . e . , m u l t i p l i e d by - 1 , i n order to maximize the average i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t . While t h i s i s r e a s o n a b l e f o r some types of p s y c h o l o g i c a l t e s t s ( e . g . , most p r e f e r a b l e <—> l e a s t p r e f e r a b l e ) where d i r e c t i o n a l i t y i s an e m p i r i c a l phenomenon best determined by i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n s , i t i s not b e n e f i c i a l when d i r e c t i o n a l i t y i s known a p r i o r i . In 20 of the 139 years submitted to CM-III t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s , the m i l i t a r y personnel v e c t o r was r e f l e c t e d (and, i n f i v e of these i n s t a n c e s , t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n was a l s o r e f l e c t e d ) . F i f t e e n of these years occurred between the two wor ld wars, when i t seems unreasonable to assume that g r e a t e r numbers of personnel d e t r a c t e d from a n a t i o n ' s c a p a b i l i t y . I, t h e r e f o r e , wrote a o n e - i t e r a t i o n a l g o r i t h m analogous to GL/CM-III and r e s u b m i t t e d the o r i g i n a l data f o r the twenty years that had had v a r i a b l e s r e f l e c t e d . For s i x t e e n o f these years (1854, 1 9 1 9 - 1 9 3 3 ) , no s i g n i f i c a n t improvement over the i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n s produced by the o r i g i n a l data scores was achieved by r e s c a l i n g w i t h o u t r e f l e c t i n g , and so the standard scores of the o r i g i n a l data values were used in subsequent a n a l y s e s . In f o u r years (1823, 1826, 1843, 1871), the t ransformed scores from my CM-III analogue were used f o r subsequent a n a l y s e s . Due to the small number of s t a t e s i n my p o p u l a t i o n , the data f o r f i v e a d d i t i o n a l years had s u f f i c i e n t l y p e c u l i a r rank p r o f i l e s that GL/CM-III s c o r e s v i o l a t e d s t r i c t m o n o t o n i c i t y (1947-1949) or produced an average i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s i g n i f i c a n t l y lower than t h a t f o r the o r i g i n a l data values (1868, 1935). In the former c a s e , my one i t e r a t i o n CM-III scores ( m a i n t a i n i n g s t r i c t m o n o t o n i c i t y ) were used, and, in the l a t t e r , standard scores o f the o r i g i n a l values were used d u r i n g subsequent a n a l y s e s .

43

While the use of CM-III t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s addresses i t s e l f

d i r e c t l y to the l e v e l of measurement q u e s t i o n , i t o n l y p a r t l y

answers the q u e s t i o n of c o m p a r a b i l i t y among i n d i c a t o r s . The

i n d i c a t o r s are comparable to the extent t h a t t h e i r average

i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n i s maximized, but CM-III does not a s s i g n

a p p r o p r i a t e weights to each i n d i c a t o r . Although the output

from t h i s a l g o r i t h m does i n c l u d e a " s i n g l e best s c o r e , " t h i s

i s s i m p l y the mean transformed score f o r a given n a t i o n , i . e . ,

equal weights are assigned to each v a r i a b l e . The problem of

w e i g h t i n g i n d i c a t o r s w i l l be addressed i n subsequent s e c t i o n s .

Measuring A t t r i b u t e d Importance

Having thus s e l e c t e d and r e s c a l e d i n d i c a t o r s of power

c a p a b i l i t y , we turn to the second component of s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y : a t t r i b u t e d importance. We need to determine

each s t a t e ' s " s o c i a l s t a t u s " as a s s i g n e d by o t h e r s t a t e s i n

the system. The i n d i c a t o r of s t a t u s t h a t I have s e l e c t e d i s

d i p l o m a t i c importance, based on the number of permanent m i s s i o n s

a t the rank of d i p l o m a t i c agent or h i g h e r r e c e i v e d by each s t a t e

i n my s t u d y . Before d i s c u s s i n g the manner i n which the i n d i c a t o r

i s c o n s t r u c t e d , l e t me b r i e f l y o f f e r some of the reasons t h a t led

to t h i s s e l e c t i o n .

F i r s t , i n t e r n a t i o n a l diplomacy p l a y s a c e n t r a l r o l e i n

major power i n t e r a c t i o n . I t i s not s i m p l y a means of

communication; i t i s an arena f o r p o l i t i c a l power. Diplomacy

44

i s the cornerstone of a g l o b a l p o l i t i c a l network, the primary

nodes o f which are l o c a t e d i n the c a p i t a l s of the major powers.

Because the Powers s i t a s t r i d e these channels of communication,

wor ld diplomacy becomes an instrument s u b j e c t to t h e i r

m a n i p u l a t i o n .

Second, the sending o f d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n s may be

thought of as a system-wide p l e b i s c i t e on a t t r i b u t e d importance

(Small and S i n g e r , 1973). The c r e a t i o n and maintenance of such

m i s s i o n s e n t a i l both economic and p o l i t i c a l c o s t s and b e n e f i t s ,

and as a r e s u l t are f a r from u n i v e r s a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d . Between

1817 and 1970, f o r example, the number of m i s s i o n s r e c e i v e d by

the average s t a t e was only o n e - t h i r d of the t o t a l p o s s i b l e .

Thus, i n sending d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n s , a s t a t e c o n f e r s a degree

of importance on the r e c i p i e n t and thereby enhances the

r e c i p i e n t ' s s t a t u r e . The degree to which the r e c e i p t of a

m i s s i o n enhances a s t a t e ' s s t a t u r e depends, i n t u r n , on the

importance of the sender. The more c e n t r a l the sender's

p o s i t i o n i n the d i p l o m a t i c network, the g r e a t e r i s the import

of i t s m i s s i o n s .

F i n a l l y , the elemental nature of t h i s s e l e c t i o n process

has been recognized by a number of p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s ; every

study of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n the i n t e r s t a t e system c i t e d in

Chapter One uses as an i n d i c a t o r of a t t r i b u t e d importance some

v a r i a n t of a d i p l o m a t i c exchange i n d e x . But t h i s cumulat iveness

a l s o has a negat ive a s p e c t . N e i t h e r I nor any of my c o l l e a g u e s

45

have been able to o f f e r another o b j e c t i v e measure of a t t r i b u t e d

importance that e conomical ly permits r e g u l a r ( i n d e e d , annual)

o b s e r v a t i o n s throughout the n i n e t e e n t h and t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s .

To t h i s e x t e n t , we are "stuck" w i t h t h i s i n d i c a t o r , for which

data i s both a v a i l a b l e and r e l i a b l e .

What we thus have i s "choice d a t a " : i n f o r m a t i o n as to

which s t a t e s s e l e c t which o t h e r s t a t e s because they are

d i p l o m a t i c a l l y important to the s e l e c t i n g s t a t e s . There i s

a c o n s i d e r a b l e body of s o c i o m e t r i c and psychometr ic l i t e r a t u r e

t h a t d e a l s with j u s t such data. 1 I w i l l use a s o c i o m e t r i c

t e c h n i q u e (as opposed to a psychometr ic one) to compute

d i p l o m a t i c importance scores f o r the major powers because the

s o c i o m e t r i c technique produces a unique s o l u t i o n , i t i s

c o m p u t a t i o n a l l y l e s s e x p e n s i v e , and i t s mathematical r e a s o n i n g

more d i r e c t l y p a r a l l e l s t h a t o f the s t a t u s argument. D i p l o m a t i c

importance scores w i l l be d e r i v e d by s i m p l y summing the d i p l o m a t i c

m i s s i o n s (at the rank of d i p l o m a t i c agent or h i g h e r ) t h a t each

major power r e c e i v e s , where each m i s s i o n i s weighted i n

accordance wi th the " c e n t r a l i t y " of the sending s t a t e . I t i s

assumed that the more c e n t r a l the sending s t a t e ' s p o s i t i o n i n

the d i p l o m a t i c network, the g r e a t e r i s the import o f i t s m i s s i o n s .

For an i n t r o d u c t i o n to the s o c i o m e t r i c l i t e r a t u r e see Coleman (1964), Hol land and Steuer ( 1 9 7 0 ) , Moreno (1960) , and the m a t e r i a l c i t e d below. For an i n t r o d u c t i o n to the psychometr ic l i t e r a t u r e see Bloombaum ( 1 9 7 0 ) , Coombs (1964), Green and Carmone (1970), Guttman ( 1 9 6 8 ) , Kruskal (1964a, 1964b), Shepard (1962, 1 9 7 4 ) , and Shepard et a l . (1972).

46

Thus, I f i r s t compute (on the b a s i s o f d i r e c t and

i n d i r e c t d i p l o m a t i c l i n k s ) c e n t r a l i t y scores f o r a l l s t a t e s

i n the i n t e r s t a t e system. This i s done by d e p i c t i n g the

(asymmetric) d i p l o m a t i c bonds by " d i r e c t e d graphs"

(Harary, Norman, and C a r t w i g h t , 1965), which a r e , i n t u r n ,

d i s p l a y e d in matr ix form, where the c e l l e n t r i e s (zero or

one) of the r e s u l t i n g matr ix i n d i c a t e the direct links

between the s t a t e s represented by the c o r r e s p o n d i n g rows

and columns (Forsyth and K a t z , 1946). The number of

i n d i r e c t l i n k s ( s o - c a l l e d h i g h e r - o r d e r c h a i n s ) between any

two s t a t e s i s determined by r a i s i n g the m a t r i x to higher

powers ( F e s t i n g e r , 1949)."' The h i g h e r the power, the more

i n d i r e c t are the l i n k s .

Let us t a k e , as an example, the f o l l o w i n g d i r e c t e d

graph:

W --> X

which can be represented by the c h o i c e m a t r i x C:

A review of matr ix a l g e b r a can be found i n Johnston (1972) and in Kemeny, S n e l l , and Thompson (1966).

47

Sender

Receiver W X Y Z

W 0 0 0 1

X 1 0 0 1

c Y 0 1 0 0

Z 1 0 1 0

By m u l t i p l y i n g the matr ix C by i t s e l f , we o b t a i n the squared

2 2 matix C .2 This m a t r i x , C2, g i v e s the number and l o c a t i o n of

a l l 2 - c h a i n s ( i . e . , 2 - l i n k c h a i n s ) between s t a t e s W, X, Y, and Z,

Sender

Receiver W X Y Z

W 1 0 1 0

X 1 0 1 1

c Y 1 0 0 1

Z 0 1 0 1

From the matr ix C2 (presented above) , we see t h a t there i s one

2 - c h a i n l e a d i n g from W to i t s e l f (W — > Z —> W), one 2 - c h a i n

from Y to W (Y —> Z —> W), and so f o r t h . I f there are n

2 - c h a i n s between two s t a t e s , then the c o r r e s p o n d i n g c e l l entry

would c o n t a i n the number n. R a i s i n g the m a t r i x to the t h i r d

power, C 3, enables one to determine the number and l o c a t i o n of

3 - c h a i n s ; in g e n e r a l , the m a t r i x Ck has as elements the number

o f k - c h a i n s between each p a i r of s t a t e s . In o r d e r to prevent

48

s e l f - c h o i c e , we need only p l a c e zeroes along the p r i n c i p a l

d i a g o n a l .

This r a t h e r simple s o c i o m e t r i c a l g o r i t h m can be used

to measure the d i p l o m a t i c c e n t r a l i t y of a s t a t e , where c e n t r a l i t y

i s computed as an inverse f u n c t i o n of each s t a t e ' s d i s t a n c e from

a l l o t h e r s t a t e s . 1 In other words, i f I i s " c l o s e r " than J to

a l l o t h e r s t a t e s , then I r e c e i v e s a h i g h e r c e n t r a l i t y score

than J . To carry out these c o m p u t a t i o n s , a l l that need be found

i s the s h o r t e s t path between every p a i r o f s t a t e s . And we know,

from the d i s c u s s i o n i n the p r e c e d i n g two paragraphs, t h a t the

s h o r t e s t path between the s t a t e s I and J i s p i i , the power to

which the matr ix C (the m a t r i x of d i p l o m a t i c c h o i c e data) must

be r a i s e d in order f o r c e l l cij ( c o r r e s p o n d i n g to s t a t e s I and J)

to be n o n - z e r o . Since higher powers correspond to l o n g e r ( l e s s

d i r e c t ) p a t h s , an a t t e n u a t i o n f a c t o r , a , i s i n t r o d u c e d so t h a t

these longer paths c o n t r i b u t e l e s s to a s t a t e ' s c e n t r a l i t y score

than do s h o r t e r p a t h s . I f a i s a c o n s t a n t between 0 and 1,

where the former corresponds to complete a t t e n u a t i o n and the

l a t t e r to the absence of any a t t e n u a t i o n , then the d i p l o m a t i c n pii

a , where n i s the number j = l

of s t a t e s in the system. To b r i e f l y r e i t e r a t e , the c e n t r a l i t y

of each s t a t e i s i n v e r s e l y r e l a t e d to i t s d i s t a n c e from a l l

1 This measure of c e n t r a l i t y i s s i m i l a r to i n d i c a t o r s of s t a t u s suggested by Arney (1973) , Coleman (1964, pp. 4 4 4 - 5 5 ) , and Katz (1953).

49

o t h e r s t a t e s , so that the one t h a t i s most c l o s e l y t i e d

d i p l o m a t i c a l l y to a l l others i s most c e n t r a l .

C e n t r a l i t y scores were computed (with the a t t e n u a t i o n

f a c t o r set to .5) f o r the p e r i o d 1817-1970 f o r a l l s t a t e s

r e c e i v i n g two or more d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n s i n the g iven y e a r .

D i p l o m a t i c importance scores were then d e r i v e d f o r the major

powers by w e i g h t i n g each m i s s i o n t h a t they r e c e i v e d by the

c e n t r a l i t y of the sending s t a t e , and then summing these

weighted m i s s i o n s . 1 The importance scores were n o r m a l i z e d

as a p r o p o r t i o n of the maximum p o s s i b l e score t h a t c o u l d be

a t t a i n e d . C a l c u l a t i o n s were done a p p r o x i m a t e l y every f i f t h

y e a r , other years being i n t e r p o l a t e d . The v a r i a n c e i n the

q u i n q u e n n i a l data was s u f f i c i e n t l y low to a s s u r e t h a t l i t t l e

d i s t o r t i o n was int roduced by i n t e r p o l a t i n g the annual s c o r e s .

M u l t i p l e m i s s i o n s to major powers were removed from the m a t r i x before computing d i p l o m a t i c importance s c o r e s . I f a s i n g l e emissary was sent by one s t a t e to s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t major powers, each major power was c r e d i t e d w i t h 1/N p o r t i o n of the m i s s i o n , where N i s the number of r e c i p i e n t s . C o n v e r s e l y , i f a j o i n t m i s s i o n from s e v e r a l s t a t e s was sent to a s i n g l e s t a t e , the r e c i p i e n t was c r e d i t e d w i t h one m i s s i o n from the most c e n t r a l sender r a t h e r than a m i s s i o n from each of the j o i n t s e n d e r s . E m i s s a r i e s from a contiguous minor power to i t s n e i g h b o r i n g major power were a l s o d i s c o u n t e d . I t was f e l t t h a t such s t a t e s had l i t t l e c h o i c e i n sending m i s s i o n s and thereby i n f l a t e d the scores of the n e i g h b o r i n g major power, w h i l e s i g n i f i c a n t l y d e f l a t i n g the scores of other major powers. For the p e r i o d 1817-1970, minor powers sent m i s s i o n s to t h e i r bordering major powers n inety- two percent of the t i m e — a c o n s i d e r a b l e d e v i a t i o n from t h e i r behavior wi th other major powers. This would not have been a s e r i o u s problem i f each major power had an a p p r o x i m a t e l y equal number of small n e i g h b o r s , but u n f o r t u n a t e l y t h i s was not the case (witness P r u s s i a as opposed to B r i t a i n ) .

50

Below are l i s t e d the normal ized importance scores f o r the major

powers f o r approximately every t e n t h y e a r .

1817 1824 1833 1844 2854 1864 1874 _1_884

UK .34 .31 .2? .19 .25 .23 .43 .46

FRN .29 .30 .25 .22 .29 .27 .44 .48

GMY .25 .27 .22 .18 .19 .18 .35 .43

A-H .29 .31 .23 .21 .26 .22 .32 .33

ITA .17 .32 .36

USR .28 .28 .21 .13 .16 .16 .23 .25

1894 1904 1914 1925 1935 1950 1960 1970

USA .48 .54 .58 .62 .48 .51 .61

UK .47 .48 .52 .62 .62 .49 .49 .59

FRN .43 .45 .49 .58 .63 .45 .45 .55

GMY .43 .41 .41 .47 .49

A-H .28 .31 .40

ITA .35 .41 .48 .52 .58

USR .25 .27 .32 .18 .24 .25 .28 .49

CHN .05 .16 .20

JPN .26 .33 .36 .40 .40 .48

The q u e s t i o n a r i s e s as to whether these "complex"

d i p l o m a t i c importance scores are any d i f f e r e n t than those

we would o b t a i n i f we merely summed (without w e i g h t i n g ) the

number of m i s s i o n s r e c e i v e d by each major power. In an e a r l i e r

51

paper , Small and Singer (1973) r e p o r t t h a t , f o r the i n t e r s t a t e

system as a whole, the mean rank order c o r r e l a t i o n between the

number of m i s s i o n s each s t a t e r e c e i v e s and an index t h a t weights

these m i s s i o n s by the importance of the sending s t a t e i s . 9 4 .

I computed a K e n d a l l ' s tau-b between the number of m i s s i o n s

r e c e i v e d by the major powers and the q u i n q u e n n i a l "weighted"

scores d e r i v e d from the s o c i o m e t r i c m a t r i x t e c h n i q u e . The

rank order c o r r e l a t i o n f o r t h i s s m a l l e r subset was o n l y . 5 9 .

Thus, to the extent that i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the " c e n t r a l i t y "

o f the sending s t a t e s c o n t r i b u t e s to the v a l i d i t y of the

d i p l o m a t i c importance scores f o r the major powers, the weighted

i n d i c a t o r i s worth i t s added c o m p l e x i t y .

The Index of Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y

We now have s i x i n t e r v a l - s e a l e d i n d i c a t o r s of power

c a p a b i l i t y and a s i n g l e i n d i c a t o r of d i p l o m a t i c importance.

We seek to combine these i n d i c a t o r s i n t o an index of s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y . I have argued t h a t s t a t e s expect to be a t t r i b u t e d

importance commensurate w i t h t h e i r power c a p a b i l i t i e s and,

to the extent that they are a t t r i b u t e d l e s s importance, they

are s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t . Nowhere in the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y

l i t e r a t u r e , however, i s the form of the f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p

between c a p a b i l i t y and a t t r i b u t e d importance s p e c i f i e d . E a r l y

s t u d i e s s imply o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y as the

a r i t h m e t i c d i f f e r e n c e between the achieved and a s c r i b e d s t a t u s

52

i n d i c a t o r s . T h i s , however, produced p e r f e c t l i n e a r dependence

and the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of u n t a n g l i n g the i n f l u e n c e of i n c o n s i s t e n c y

from the two elements that comprised i t . L a t e r s t u d i e s ( e . g . ,

Ray, 1974) have o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y as a

n o n - l i n e a r , but " a r b i t r a r i l y " s p e c i f i e d , f u n c t i o n .

Let us t ry to do b e t t e r . 1 We expect c a p a b i l i t y and

a t t r i b u t e d importance to be h i g h l y r e l a t e d to one another and

t h a t there w i l l be a f u n c t i o n to d e s c r i b e t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p .

By s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y we mean d e v i a t i o n s from the scores

p r e d i c t e d by that f u n c t i o n . This immediately suggests a

r e g r e s s i o n s t r a t e g y where the r e s i d u a l s r e p r e s e n t these

d e v i a t i o n s . Thus, we s imply r e g r e s s d i p l o m a t i c importance

on the s i x n o n - l i n e a r l y t ransformed (CM-II I ) c a p a b i l i t y s c o r e s .

The r e s u l t i n g equat ion w i l l g i v e us the p r e d i c t e d "importance

s c o r e " f o r a s t a t e , given i t s c a p a b i l i t y scores and the

c a p a b i l i t y / i m p o r t a n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r a l l the s t a t e s i n the

subsystem. A s t a t e ' s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s the d i f f e r e n c e (the

r e s i d u a l ) between the score we would p r e d i c t and the one we observe

f o r i t .

A f u r t h e r i s s u e needs to be r e s o l v e d before we employ t h i s

r e g r e s s i o n s t r a t e g y . To my knowledge, a l l p r e v i o u s s t u d i e s of

s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y assumed t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between

importance and c a p a b i l i t y remained c o n s t a n t both a c r o s s time and

a c r o s s space. While I accept the l a t t e r as i n h e r e n t in the

1 I would l i k e to thank S t u a r t Bremer f o r s u g g e s t i n g the f o l l o w i n g index c o n s t r u c t i o n procedure.

53

r e l a t i v e nature of the c o n c e p t , I do not a p r i o r i accept the

former s u p p o s i t i o n . That i s , at a g iven p o i n t i n t i m e , a s t a t e ' s

d e c i s i o n makers p e r c e i v e t h a t t h e i r country i s s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t

because they expect i t to be a t t r i b u t e d a degree of importance

commensurate wi th i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s and to be t r e a t e d j u s t as

o t h e r s t a t e s a r e ; however, the c o n t r i b u t i o n to power of the

v a r i o u s c a p a b i l i t y i n d i c a t o r s i s l i k e l y to vary over time as

some dimensions ( e . g . , t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n ) become l e s s important

and o t h e r s ( e . g . , f u e l consumption) more. Thus, I would not

expect a constant w e i g h t i n g scheme to e x i s t f o r the e n t i r e century

and a h a l f ; or put another way, I would expect t h a t a s i n g l e

r e g r e s s i o n equation f o r the e n t i r e p e r i o d would produce l a r g e

r e s i d u a l s .

A n a l y s i s of c o v a r i a n c e was used to t e s t whether a s i n g l e

w e i g h t i n g scheme was a p p r o p r i a t e . D i p l o m a t i c importance was the

outcome v a r i a b l e , the s i x c a p a b i l i t y scores were the c o v a r i a t e s ,

and time i d e n t i f i e d the c a t e g o r i e s w i t h i n which the r e g r e s s i o n s

were performed. Since f o r any given y e a r , the number of

c o v a r i a t e s might be l a r g e r than the number of o b s e r v a t i o n s

( n a t i o n s ) , approximate t e n - y e a r time s l i c e s were used. This

produced, on the average, s i x t y o b s e r v a t i o n s per p e r i o d and

a f f o r d e d s u f f i c i e n t degrees of freedom. F - t e s t s showed t h a t ,

f o r any combination of s e q u e n t i a l t e n - y e a r time s l i c e s , w i t h i n

c a t e g o r y r e g r e s s i o n s were s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from an o v e r ­

a l l c a t e g o r y r e g r e s s i o n . This should be i n t e r p r e t e d as s a y i n g

54

t h a t the c o n t r i b u t i o n of the s i x c a p a b i l i t y i n d i c a t o r s v a r i e s

s u f f i c i e n t l y across ten-year time s l i c e s to make any s i n g l e

r e g r e s s i o n equation f o r the e n t i r e 151-year p e r i o d i n a p p r o p r i a t e .

The mean within category m u l t i p l e R was .9 ( i . e . , c a p a b i l i t y i s

an e x c e l l e n t p r e d i c t o r of importance w i t h i n each of the time

s l i c e s ) and, as would be e x p e c t e d , l a b o r - i n t e n s i v e i n d i c a t o r s

c o n t r i b u t e d l e s s and c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e i n d i c a t o r s more as time

p r o g r e s s e d . Ordinary l e a s t - s q u a r e s (OLS) r e g r e s s i o n , w i t h i n

each of the time s l i c e s , proved a p p r o p r i a t e , as the r e s i d u a l s

were homogeneously d i s t r i b u t e d . Regressions were performed

on s t a n d a r d s c o r e s , thus producing r e s i d u a l s t h a t are comparable

a c r o s s t i m e .

To again r e i t e r a t e what we have done. We have r e g r e s s e d ,

w i t h i n approximate ten-year time s l i c e s , the d i p l o m a t i c

importance scores ( that we d e r i v e d i n the p r e c e d i n g s e c t i o n )

on the c a p a b i l i t y scores t h a t we had e a r l i e r d e v e l o p e d . The

r e s i d u a l s from these r e g r e s s i o n s , i . e . , the d i f f e r e n c e between

the d i p l o m a t i c importance scores ( t h a t we d e r i v e d i n the

p r e c e d i n g s e c t i o n ) and the scores t h a t we now p r e d i c t upon the

b a s i s of these r e g r e s s i o n s , are the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y scores

for the s t a t e s . Below are found the i n c o n s i s t e n c y scores f o r

the major powers, approx imately every t e n t h y e a r . Negat ive

values denote u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n , and p o s i t i v e va lues i n d i c a t e

o v o r r e c o g n i t i o n .

55

1824 lj 833 1844 1854 1864 l j 374 1884 1894

UK 0. 62 - 0 . 3 8 0. .03 - 0 . ,36 - 0 . ,68 - 0 .29 - 0 . 1 0 0.10

FRN - 0 . 69 0 .36 - 0 . .15 1 . .25 0. 60 0 .80 0.41 0.04

GMY - 0 . 33 - 0 .02 0. .15 0. 57 - 0 . 36 - 0 .13 0.83 0.46

A-H 0 . 50 - 0 .13 0. .19 0. 10 0. 76 0, . 18 0.17 - 0 . 2 9

ITA 0. 18 0 .05 - 0 . 6 8 - 0 . 2 1

USR - 0 . 09 0 .18 - 0 . ,22 - 1 . 55 - 0 . 50 - 0 .62 - 0 . 6 3 - 0 . 1 0

1904 1913 1925 1935 1950 I960 1970

USA 0 . 17 0 .15 - 0 . 23 0. 10 - 0 . 08 - 0 , .06 0.24

UK - 0 . 03 - 0 .31 - 0 . 06 0. 24 0. 52 0, .05 0.28

FRN - 0 . 08 0 .19 - 0 . 05 0. 31 - 0 . 51 0. .07 - 0 . 0 1

GMY 0 . 17 - 0 , .17 0. 12 - 0 . 39

A-H - 0 . 10 0, .60

ITA - 0 . 00 0, .20 0. 34 0. 19

USR - 0 . 44 - 0 , .36 0. 15 0. 10 0. 37 - 0 . .30 0.38

CHN - 0 . 30 0. .09 - 0 . 5 7

JPN 0 . 31 - 0 . .29 - 0 . 26 - 0 . 56 0. .15 - 0 . 3 2

Some p a t t e r n s i n the data are r e v e a l e d by the s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y s c o r e s . The Uni ted S t a t e s , which i s as o f t e n

under- as o v e r r e c o g n i z e d , i s most underrecognized d u r i n g her

p e r i o d o f s e l f - i m p o s e d i s o l a t i o n i s m f o l l o w i n g World War One;

B r i t a i n i s more o f t e n than not underrecognized p r i o r to 1935,

b u t , as would be expected, i s o v e r r e c o g n i z e d f o l l o w i n g the

Second World War; and France, which tends to be o v e r r e c o g n i z e d ,

56

i s j u s t that preceding both world wars. As the h i s t o r i a n s t e l l

u s , Prussia/Germany i s underrecognized d u r i n g her p e r i o d of

u n i f i c a t i o n (1864-1870) and preceding the two wor ld wars;

whereas both Austr ia-Hungary and I t a l y tend to be o v e r r e c o g n i z e d ,

e s p e c i a l l y before the world wars. R u s s i a / S o v i e t Union i s

p r i m a r i l y an underrecognized s t a t e , her p e r i o d s of maximum

o v e r r e c o g n i t i o n o c c u r r i n g a f t e r the Second World War; and

a l t h o u g h somewhat, concealed i n the t a b l e above, China i s

underrecognized dur ing only about h a l f of her major power y e a r s .

F i n a l l y , as we would e x p e c t , Japan i s by and l a r g e u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d ,

being most s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t j u s t p r i o r to World War Two.

The I n t e r v e n i n g V a r i a b l e s : P h y s i c a l , P s y c h o l o g i c a l , and S t r u c t u r a l

Having c o n s t r u c t e d an index of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and

d e r i v e d a p p r o p r i a t e s c o r e s , we t u r n next to the i n t e r v e n i n g

v a r i a b l e s . In Chapter One I p o s i t e d t h a t s e v e r a l f a c t o r s might

serve to c o n s t r a i n s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e s from becoming

i n v o l v e d i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s and, s u b s e q u e n t l y , wars.

These were c o n t i g u i t y , power c a p a b i l i t y , p r i o r war e x p e r i e n c e ,

c r o s s - c u t t i n g bonds, and p o l a r i t y .

" R e a c h a b i l i t y "

The f i r s t two of these f a c t o r s concern whether a

d i s s a t i s f i e d s t a t e can "reach" another s t a t e m i l i t a r i l y . The

i n d i c a t o r of c o n t i g u i t y i s the e a s i e r of the two to d e s c r i b e .

I have determined the c o n t i g u i t i e s f o r a l l s t a t e s s i n c e 1816

57

and, f o r the purpose of t h i s s t u d y , w i l l say that two s t a t e s are

c o n t i g u o u s to one another i f t h e i r land f r o n t i e r s i n t e r s e c t at

any p o i n t or they are separated by not more than s i x n a u t i c a l

m i l e s of water. S i x n a u t i c a l m i l e s was s e l e c t e d because i t

i s the maximum d i s t a n c e between s t a t e s t h a t s t i l l permits the

i n t e r s e c t i o n of t e r r i t o r i a l w a t e r s , given the t h r e e - m i l e l i m i t

t h a t (at l e a s t u n t i l very r e c e n t l y ) has been g e n e r a l l y accepted

i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. Thus, the i n d i c a t o r of c o n t i g u i t y i s a

s i m p l e dichotomy; s t a t e s e i t h e r share common land or water

f r o n t i e r s , or they do not.

The second " r e a c h a b i l i t y " f a c t o r i s power c a p a b i l i t y .

The procedure f o r c o n s t r u c t i n g an index f o r t h i s v a r i a b l e i s a

b i t more complex than the one employed i n the p r e c e d i n g

p a r a g r a p h . The reader w i l l r e c a l l that we have a l r e a d y d e r i v e d

s i x t ransformed i n d i c a t o r s of power, but have no a p r i o r i

w e i g h t i n g scheme f o r combining them. With no i n f o r m a t i o n ,

the best s i n g l e index of a s t a t e ' s power would be i t s mean on

the s i x i n d i c a t o r s , i . e . , equal weight f o r each. But as I have

mentioned p r e v i o u s l y , I would suspect t h a t the i n d i c a t o r s do not

c o n t r i b u t e e q u a l l y to the f o r m a t i o n of n a t i o n a l power and t h a t

the c o n t r i b u t i o n from each i n d i c a t o r v a r i e s a c r o s s t i m e . This

suggests a f a c t o r a n a l y t i c approach 1 to index c o n s t r u c t i o n

s i m i l a r to F e r r i s ' (1973).

1 For an i n t r o d u c t i o n to f a c t o r a n a l y s i s see Cooley and Lohnes ( 1 9 6 2 ) , Harman (1967), O v e r a l l and K l e t t ( 1 9 7 2 ) , and Rummel (1967, 1970).

58

I f our s i x c a p a b i l i t y i n d i c a t o r s a l l tap some f a c e t of

power, then the degree to which they are i n t e r c o r r e l a t e d

i d e n t i f i e s a common l a t e n t s t r u c t u r e . A o n e - i t e r a t i o n

p r i n c i p a l - a x i s f a c t o r a n a l y s i s ( i n t h i s c a s e , u s i n g the

c o r r e l a t i o n matr ix of the i n d i c a t o r s w i t h 1.0 a long the main

d i a g o n a l ) produces a p r i n c i p a l component s o l u t i o n . This

s o l u t i o n maximizes the amount of v a r i a n c e i n the l a t e n t s t r u c t u r e

accounted f o r by each independent f a c t o r , where each f a c t o r

accounts f o r l e s s v a r i a n c e than the one t h a t precedes i t . Thus,

the f i r s t f a c t o r accounts f o r the most v a r i a n c e i n the i n t e r -

c o r r e l a t i o n (or v a r i a n c e - c o v a r i a n c e ) m a t r i x of the c a p a b i l i t y

i n d i c a t o r s . This f i r s t f a c t o r i s , i n a s e n s e , what we mean

by "power" s i n c e i t p u l l s from the c o r r e l a t i o n m a t r i x the

maximum v a r i a n c e t h a t our i n d i c a t o r s have i n common.

I t i s not the more f r e q u e n t l y r e p o r t e d f a c t o r l o a d i n g s

(the squares of which are the amounts o f v a r i a n c e in the v a r i a b l e s

t h a t are accounted f o r by the f a c t o r s ) t h a t now i n t e r e s t u s ,

but r a t h e r the f a c t o r s c o r e s . Each f a c t o r i s a l i n e a r

combinat ion of the v a r i a b l e s a n a l y z e d . F a c t o r score c o e f f i c i e n t s

are weights that represent the r e l a t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n of each

v a r i a b l e to the c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h a t f a c t o r . F a c t o r scores are

no more than the o r i g i n a l data f o r the v a r i a b l e s , weighted by the

a p p r o p r i a t e c o e f f i c i e n t s . The f a c t o r scores from the f i r s t f a c t o r

of the p r i n c i p a l component s o l u t i o n are the "best" l i n e a r

combinat ion of each s t a t e ' s s i x c a p a b i l i t y i n d i c a t o r s .

59

1 subjected each s t a t e ' s CM-III t ransformed c a p a b i l i t y

indicators"' to a p r i n c i p a l component a n a l y s i s , employing the

same t h i r t e e n time s l i c e s used when computing s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y .

The mean v a r i a n c e accounted f o r by the f i r s t f a c t o r was 64.1

p e r c e n t . Factor score c o e f f i c i e n t s showed t h a t , a c r o s s t i m e ,

l a b o r - i n t e n s i v e v a r i a b l e s c o n t r i b u t e d l e s s and c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e

v a r i a b l e s more to the composi t ion of the n a t i o n a l power i n d e x .

The f a c t o r scores c o r r e l a t e d .97 (Pearson r) w i t h the mean CM-III

t ransformed s c o r e s , d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t f a c t o r score c o e f f i c i e n t s

were d i f f e r e n t f o r each v a r i a b l e and changed over t i m e , i n d i c a t i n g

t h a t the major powers are h i g h l y ordered on a c a p a b i l i t y d imension.

P r i o r War Experience

A second category of i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s i s p r i o r war

e x p e r i e n c e . Here we are i n t e r e s t e d i n whether p a r t i c i p a t i o n in

a p r e v i o u s war may c o n s t r a i n a s t a t e ' s behavior i n subsequent

c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s .

1 The e f f e c t of using the t ransformed scores i s to produce a maximal non-metr ic p r i n c i p a l component a n a l y s i s f o r the o r i g i n a l capability s c o r e s .

2 The r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s from d i p l o m a t i c importance

on c a p a b i l i t y were not the same as the f a c t o r score c o e f f i c i e n t s . Indeed, a r e g r e s s i o n of d i p l o m a t i c importance on the p r i n c i p a l component f a c t o r scores d i d not produce a p a r t i c u l a r l y high R . Thus, the l i n e a r combination of c a p a b i l i t y scores that maximizes the amount of t o t a l v a r i a n c e among these scores t h a t can be accounted f o r by a s i n g l e dimension i s not the same as the c o m b i n a t i o n that best p r e d i c t s d i p l o m a t i c importance.

60

P s y c h o l o g i s t s i n t e r e s t e d i n l e a r n i n g behavior have

c o n c e n t r a t e d mainly on s h o r t - t e r m memory processes ( K i n t s c h , 1970;

McGeoch, 1952; M e l t o n , 1964). What l i t e r a t u r e does e x i s t on

l o n g - t e r m memory decay ( W i c k e l g r e n , 1972) a p p e a r s , i n g e n e r a l ,

to support J o s t ' s (1897, p. 472) second law: "Given two

a s s o c i a t i o n s of the same s t r e n g t h , but of d i f f e r e n t ages, the

o l d e r f a l l s o f f l e s s r a p i d l y i n a g iven l e n g t h of t i m e . "

Hovland (1951), however, r e p o r t s t h a t there i s evidence that

r e t e n t i o n remains high f o r a s h o r t p e r i o d before d e c a y i n g .

T h i s s u g g e s t s , to me, the S-shaped l o g i s t i c curve t h a t has been

found to a c c u r a t e l y d e p i c t scores of b i o l o g i c a l , economic,

s o c i o l o g i c a l , and h i s t o r i c a l phenomena ( B a i l e y , 1967, pp. 1 6 - 1 8 ;

Coleman, 1964, pp. 4 1 - 4 6 ; H a r t , 1945; L o t k a , 1956, pp. 6 4 - 7 6 ;

Taagepera, 1968). Lotka p o s i t s t h a t these l o g i s t i c r e g u l a r i t i e s

may be a s s o c i a t e d w i t h processes i n which the substance o r

s t r u c t u r e i t s e l f acts as the nucleus f o r i t s own growth or

d e c o m p o s i t i o n , e . g . , c e l l r e p r o d u c t i o n and decay. The decay of

l o n g - t e r m memory would seem to be such a p r o c e s s .

There i s l i t t l e l i t e r a t u r e i n p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e or h i s t o r y

to help us decide what l e n g t h of time would be necessary f o r a

people to "forget" a war e x p e r i e n c e , but most h i s t o r i a n s would

suggest about ten to twenty years 1 — t h e l e n g t h of time a s s o c i a t e d

1 This est imate d e r i v e s from s e v e r a l i n f o r m a t i v e c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h M e l v i n S m a l l . He suggested t h a t an i n d i c a t o r of the length of time necessary f o r f o r g e t t i n g may be the number of y e a r s that must pass before one's enemies i n the l a s t war can

61

w i t h the r i s e of new " p o l i t i c a l g e n e r a t i o n s . " I f , f o r our

p u r p o s e s , we view "nat ional f o r g e t t i n g " as the e r o s i o n of memory

concerned w i t h the s a c r i f i c e s of war, we can see t h a t t h i s

i n v o l v e s more than the f a d i n g of images held by o l d e r n a t i o n a l

l e a d e r s ; i t a l s o i n v o l v e s the e v o l u t i o n of a new " p o l i t i c a l

g e n e r a t i o n " which views the past wars as h i s t o r y , not personal

e x p e r i e n c e . Taking t h i s i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n , I have c o n s t r u c t e d

a f i f t e e n - y e a r decay f u n c t i o n based on a s imple l o g i s t i c

f o r g e t t i n g model. I assume t h a t the g r e a t e r the b a t t l e deaths

p r o p o r t i o n a t e to p o p u l a t i o n s u f f e r e d by n a t i o n s a t war, the more

p u n i s h i n g i s the exper ience ( c f . R i c h a r d s o n , 1960b, p. 298; Rosen,

1971, 1972). With the p a s s i n g of t i m e , b a t t l e deaths per m i l l i o n

p o p u l a t i o n are d iscounted a c c o r d i n g to the ( i n v e r s e ) l o g i s t i c

f u n c t i o n pt= ^3(t 7.5) , where pt is punishment as p e r c e i v e d

t y e a r s a f t e r the war's end and max i s the upper l i m i t o f the

l o g i s t i c curve."' There i s an i n f l e c t i o n p o i n t a t 7.5 y e a r s , and

the curve approaches zero a f t e r f i f t e e n y e a r s .

The decay f u n c t i o n i s assumed to be the same f o r a l l wars,

a l l p e r i o d s , and a l l n a t i o n s . This i s o b v i o u s l y an o v e r ­

s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , but i t i s not u n r e a l i s t i c . Using a u n i v e r s a l

be viewed as comic, r a t h e r than s i n i s t e r , f i g u r e s — t h e fourteen y e a r s before the p r o d u c t i o n of the t e l e v i s i o n program "Hogan's Heroes" perhaps being a case i n p o i n t .

1 In order f o r punishment at time zero (p0) to equal b a t t l e deaths per m i l l i o n p o p u l a t i o n a t a war's end, max i s s e t to ^ , - 3 . 7 5 ) .

p n (1 + e

62

decay f u n c t i o n f o r a l l wars does not mean t h a t the punishment

brought about by l a r g e wars i s the "same" as t h a t caused by

s m a l l e r wars. I t i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e (and, i n f a c t , occurs on

numerous o c c a s i o n s ) that the punishment score from a s i z a b l e

war i s g r e a t e r , even a f t e r f i f t e e n y e a r s o f d e c a y i n g , than

t h a t f o r a small war before decay. Nor i s i t an unreasonable

s t r a t e g y to use a u n i v e r s a l decay f u n c t i o n f o r a l l time p e r i o d s ,

d e s p i t e the p o s s i b i l i t y that the f o r g e t t i n g f u n c t i o n might have

been d i f f e r e n t when the means of communication were l e s s developed

and the d i s s e m i n a t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n l e s s w i d e s p r e a d , because

weapons technology was a l s o l e s s s o p h i s t i c a t e d and major power

wars g e n e r a l l y l e s s deadly. And f o r l e s s deadly wars, the form

of the decay f u n c t i o n i s not of as great importance, s i n c e the

punishment scores are a l r e a d y nearer to z e r o . F i n a l l y , u s i n g a

u n i v e r s a l decay f u n c t i o n f o r a l l n a t i o n s i s not u n t e n a b l e ; the

assumption of s i g n i f i c a n t n a t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n f o r g e t t i n g has

no more support than the assumption of n a t i o n a l s i m i l a r i t i e s ,

and the l a t t e r has, at l e a s t , the m e r i t of parsimony.

I n t e r - s t a t e S t r u c t u r e

The t h i r d set of i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s concerns the

c r o s s - p r e s s u r e s that r e s u l t from the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s among

the s t a t e s . One v a r i a b l e t h a t i s purported to produce c r o s s -

pressure i s l a b e l e d c r o s s - c u t t i n g bonds. Here we determine

whether a s t a t e i s bonded to the same or to d i f f e r e n t s t a t e s

63

on r e l e v a n t dimensions. I have s e l e c t e d two important dimensions

of n a t i o n a l interdependence: the m i l i t a r y and the economic. These

two dimensions are h i g h l y v i s i b l e , they l i e at the heart of

i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n s , and they are major f a c e t s i n the

c r e d i b i l i t y of n a t i o n a l commitments ( R u s s e t t , 1963). For each

major power, I c o n s t r u c t an annual "trade x a l l i a n c e " cont ingency

t a b l e , r e p r e s e n t i n g i t s p r i n c i p a l t rade partnerships'' and formal

m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s w i t h the o t h e r major powers,

formal alliance partner

p r i n c i p a l t rade p a r t n e r

yes no

yes

no

and compute a K e n d a l l ' s tau-b s t a t i s t i c . The r e s u l t i n g tau-b

P r i n c i p a l t rade p a r t n e r s are those t h a t account f o r a minimum of f i v e percent of the t o t a l value of a s t a t e ' s imports and exports ( c f . W a l l e n s t e e n , 1973, p. 6 7 ) . Trade data c o u l d not be o b t a i n e d f o r the f i r s t s i x t y years o f t h i s s t u d y ; the c r o s s -c u t t i n g index i s , t h u s , c o n s t r u c t e d f o r o n l y the 1879-1970 p e r i o d . And, because of the immensity and c o n d i t i o n of the t rade data s e t , the index was computed every f i f t h y e a r , o t h e r y e a r s being i n t e r p o l a t e d . The r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y o f both a l l i a n c e and trade p a r t n e r s h i p s , however, suggests t h a t l i t t l e i n f o r m a t i o n i s l o s t when i n t e r p o l a t i n g .

2 K e n d a l l ' s t a u - b , when a p p l i e d to f o u r - f o l d t a b l e s , i s

e q u i v a l e n t to a 0 or a Pearson r. I t can be viewed as a measure o f the independence of c e l l s , r e a c h i n g i t s maximum o n l y under c o n d i t i o n s of s t rong m o n o t o n i c i t y . The s t a t i s t i c i s undef ined i f a row or column of the 2 x 2 t a b l e i s empty, t h a t i s , i f a s t a t e does not have a major power a l l y or t rade p a r t n e r . In order

64

(with i t s s i g n reversed) i s the measure of c r o s s - c u t t i n g . A

c o m p l e t e l y "cross-cut" s t a t e would be one t h a t i s "bonded" to

a l l s t a t e s i n the subsystem, but i s n e i t h e r a l l i e d to any of

i t s p r i n c i p a l t r a d i n g partners nor t rades p r i n c i p a l l y w i t h any

of i t s a l l i e s . I t s "trade x a l l i a n c e " m a t r i x would have empty

c e l l s a l o n g the major d i a g o n a l , i . e . , i n the u p p e r - l e f t (a)

and l o w e r - r i g h t (d) c o r n e r s . This would produce a score of +1.0.

A s t a t e t h a t i s not at a l l c r o s s - c u t would be one t h a t i s not

a l l i e d to a l l subsystem members, but has a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e w i t h

a l l o f i t s p r i n c i p a l t rade p a r t n e r s . Such a s t a t e would have

empty c e l l s along the minor d i a g o n a l ( i . e . , c e l l s b and c) of i t s

"trade x a l l i a n c e " m a t r i x , producing a score of - 1 . 0 .

The second i n t e r v e n i n g s t r u c t u r a l v a r i a b l e i s bi-polarity,

f o r which I adopt a measure proposed by S i n g e r and Small (1968).

The measure i s computed s o l e l y on the b a s i s of those m i l i t a r y

defense pacts among major powers t h a t are aimed a g a i n s t o t h e r

major powers. 1 The r e s u l t i n g index r e f l e c t s the degree of freedom

t h a t major powers have to form new, l o g i c a l l y - c o n s i s t e n t a l l i a n c e s

i n a g i v e n y e a r . Let us take an example. Assume t h a t t h e r e are

f i v e s t a t e s i n a system, d i v i d e d i n t o two opposing dyads (A-B and

to compute t a u - b , 0.01 was added to each of the f o u r c e l l s of the m a t r i x whenever such a s i t u a t i o n a r o s e . For the r a t i o n a l e behind the s e l e c t i o n of "measures of a s s o c i a t i o n " f o r 2 x 2 c o n t i n g e n c y t a b l e s , see Weisberg (1974).

1 I have used Melv in S m a l l ' s ( C o r r e l a t e s of War P r o j e c t ) coding o f the t a r g e t s of a l l i a n c e s ( S i n g e r and S m a l l , 1 9 6 8 ) .

65

C-D) and one unal igned s t a t e ( E ) . How much freedom e x i s t s i n t h i s

system to form new, l o g i c a l l y - c o n s i s t e n t a l l i a n c e dyads? D i s

a l r e a d y a l l i e d to C and cannot l o g i c a l l y a l l y w i t h i t s enemies

A and B. The same reasoning holds f o r A, B, and C. Only E i s

f r e e to form a l l i a n c e s , and i t can form the dyads A-E and B-E

or C-E and D-E, but no o t h e r s . Hence, of the maximum number of

ten dyads ( N(N-1 )/2 dyads ) t h a t might be formed i n a system of

f i v e s t a t e s , only two a l l i a n c e c h o i c e s remain unmade. The system

i s , t h u s , n e a r l y b i - p o l a r — 8 / 1 0 of i t s p o s s i b l e dyads having been

used u p — a n d we a s s i g n t h i s c o n f i g u r a t i o n a score of 0 . 8 . The

index ranges from 1.0 f o r p e r f e c t b i - p o l a r i t y to 0 . 0 f o r t o t a l

non-al ignment i n the system."'

The Outcome V a r i a b l e : I n t e r s t a t e Military Conflict

We turn now to the outcome v a r i a b l e , major power i n t e r s t a t e

m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t , d e f i n e d as an e x p l i c i t t h r e a t or use o f m i l i t a r y

f o r c e by a major power, a g a i n s t a member of the i n t e r s t a t e system.

Appendix C c o n t a i n s a d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of the data c o l l e c t i o n

p r o c e d u r e , as w e l l as a l i s t i n g of the c o n f l i c t c a s e s ; below, I

s h a l l merely present the c a t e g o r i e s i n t o which the c o n f l i c t s have

been d i v i d e d .

1 An a l l i a n c e of all the major powers, i . e . , u n i - p o l a r i t y (as o c c u r s in 1820), r e s u l t s i n a score of 0 . 0 , s i n c e there are no major power t a r g e t s f o r the a l l i a n c e . Thus, the b i - p o l a r i t y index equates an a l l i a n c e of " a l l a g a i n s t none" w i t h "no a l l i a n c e , " t h e r e being in both i n s t a n c e s no opposing a l ignments of major powers.

66

In the c u r r e n t i n v e s t i g a t i o n , m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s are

c l a s s i f i e d under two broad h e a d i n g s : (1) i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s and (2) i n t e r s t a t e wars. I n t e r s t a t e military c o n f r o n t a t i o n s (or IMCs) encompass two l e v e l s of m i l i t a r y

c o n f l i c t :

i n t e r s t a t e t h r e a t : e x p l i c i t verbal s tatement , by a high o f f i c i a l on b e h a l f o f a member s t a t e ' s government, d e c l a r i n g an i n t e n t to use m i l i t a r y f o r c e a g a i n s t another member s t a t e f o r other than s t r i c t l y d e f e n s i v e purposes; o r , o v e r t m o b i l i z a t i o n o f armed f o r c e s by a member s t a t e , f o r other than s t r i c t l y d e f e n s i v e p u r p o s e s , d u r i n g p e r i o d s of d i s p u t e or high t e n s i o n . In case o f e i t h e r v e r b a l statement or m o b i l i z a t i o n , the t a r g e t s t a t e must be c l e a r l y s p e c i f i e d or e a s i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e . And,

i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y a c t i o n : the use of armed f o r c e s by a member s t a t e , d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t the t e r r i t o r y and people of another member s t a t e ; o r , combat between armed f o r c e s , i n v o l v i n g at l e a s t one member of the i n t e r s t a t e system on each s i d e . M i l i t a r y a c t i o n taken by one s t a t e ( e . g . , the s e i z u r e of land or b l o c k a d i n g of t e r r i t o r y ) may f a i l to provoke the t a r g e t s t a t e i n t o m i l i t a r y a c t i o n ; i f the t a r g e t s t a t e remains p a s s i v e , the c o n f r o n t a t i o n i s l a b e l e d " u n r e c i p r o c a t e d m i l i t a r y a c t i o n . " M i l i t a r y a c t i o n may, however, provoke the t a r g e t s t a t e to engage the f i r s t a c t o r i n m i l i t a r y combat; so long as the subsequent combat r e s u l t s i n fewer than one thousand b a t t l e -connected deaths to the armed f o r c e s and/or l a s t s f o r l e s s than t w e n t y - f o u r h o u r s , i t i s l a b e l e d " h o s t i l i t i e s . "

Sometimes, however, h o s t i l i t i e s e s c a l a t e to h i g h e r l e v e l s of

m i l i t a r y v i o l e n c e . These s u s t a i n e d , more v i o l e n t m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s

are c l a s s i f i e d as i n t e r s t a t e wars, and d e f i n e d a s :

combat between armed f o r c e s , i n v o l v i n g at l e a s t one member of the i n t e r s t a t e system on each s i d e , r e s u l t i n g i n a t o t a l of one thousand or more b a t t l e - c o n n e c t e d deaths to the armed f o r c e s , and l a s t i n g f o r more than t w e n t y - f o u r hours.

67

Thus, i n t e r s t a t e t h r e a t i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from i n t e r s t a t e military

a c t i o n i n that the former does not i n v o l v e the a c t u a l use of

m i l i t a r y f o r c e . And i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i s , in t u r n ,

d i s t i n g u i s h e d from i n t e r s t a t e war i n t h a t the l a t t e r , but not

the former , r e s u l t s i n a t o t a l of one thousand or more b a t t l e

f a t a l i t i e s (whi le l a s t i n g more than t w e n t y - f o u r h o u r s ) .

The outcome v a r i a b l e i n the subsequent a n a l y s e s w i l l be

the i n c i d e n c e of e i t h e r i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y confrontation

(Chapters Three and Four) or i n t e r s t a t e war (Chapter F i v e ) .

As has a l r e a d y been s t a t e d , s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s hypothesized

to make s t a t e s prone to involvement i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n ;

b u t , once such a c o n f r o n t a t i o n o c c u r s , a d i f f e r e n t s e t o f

dynamics i s i n v o l v e d and the l i k e l i h o o d of war i s h y p o t h e s i z e d

to be a s s o c i a t e d wi th p r o p e r t i e s more immediate to the c o n f l i c t

i t s e l f — p r o p e r t i e s that are most f r u i t f u l l y sought i n the

d y a d i c r e l a t i o n s h i p of the s p e c i f i c p r o t a g o n i s t s to the c o n f l i c t .

The i n v e s t i g a t i o n s t h a t f o l l o w focus upon o n l y i n t e r s t a t e

c o n f l i c t s . Such e x t r a - s y s t e m i c combat as i m p e r i a l or c o l o n i a l

wars are o m i t t e d , as are i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d c i v i l c o n f l i c t s and

p u r e l y i n t e r n a l c i v i l wars. At t i m e s , some p a r t i e s to the c o n f l i c t s

under examination w i l l be designated " i n i t i a t o r s . " This i s not

meant to assess blame, but r a t h e r to i d e n t i f y the s t a t e t h a t

f i r s t makes s e r i o u s t h r e a t s or f i r s t a t t a c k s i n s t r e n g t h i t s

opponent's armies or t e r r i t o r y .

68

A n a l y z i n g the Data

The s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f the s p a t i a l - t e m p o r a l domain, the

g e n e r a t i o n of d a t a , and the c o n s t r u c t i o n of i n d i c a t o r s are

necessary elements of any r e s e a r c h endeavor, but they are

h a r d l y s u f f i c i e n t . The f i n a l and c r i t i c a l element i s t h a t of

data a n a l y s i s and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . In the c u r r e n t i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,

we seek to d i s c o v e r whether underrecognized s t a t e s , d i s s a t i s f i e d

w i t h t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n the extant i n t e r s t a t e o r d e r , t r y to

i n c r e a s e t h e i r a t t r i b u t e d importance by b e l l i c o s e l y demonstrat ing

t h e i r power c a p a b i l i t i e s . We a l s o wish to determine the c o n d i t i o n s

under which the r e s u l t i n g i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s (IMCs)

e s c a l a t e i n t o war. The data a n a l y s e s are d i v i d e d i n t o two s e c t i o n s .

In the f i r s t (Chapters Three and F o u r ) , n a t i o n - s t a t e s are the

u n i t s of a n a l y s i s ; in the second (Chapter F i v e ) , m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . The research design w i l l i n c o r p o r a t e both c r o s s -

s e c t i o n a l and l o n g i t u d i n a l a s p e c t s . For i n s t a n c e , we w i l l be

a s k i n g whether "in those years i n which c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i n v o l v i n g

major powers b e g i n , are the major powers t h a t e n t e r and/or

i n i t i a t e the c o n f r o n t a t i o n s more s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t than those

t h a t do not?" Y e t , at the same t i m e , we w i l l be e x p l i c i t l y

l a g g i n g the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y v a r i a b l e i n order to a s c e r t a i n

whether or not a p e r i o d of time must e l a p s e before s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s manifested as a g g r e s s i v e b e h a v i o r .

The p r i n c i p a l means of a n a l y z i n g the data w i l l be

c o n t i n g e n c y t a b l e , b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n , and p r o b i t a n a l y s i s .

69

Cont ingency t a b l e a n a l y s i s seeks to determine whether the

d i s t r i b u t i o n of data i n t o c a t e g o r i e s d e f i n e d by the i n t e r s e c t i o n

o f two n o m i n a l - or o r d i n a l - s c a l e d v a r i a b l e s i s l i k e l y to have

o c c u r r e d by chance. Of the v a r i e t y of c o e f f i c i e n t s a v a i l a b l e

to measure the s t a t i s t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h i n a c o n t i n g e n c y

t a b l e (Weisberg, 1974), we w i l l r e l y h e a v i l y upon Y u l e ' s Q

and Cramer's 0.

B i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s (McNemar, 1969) are a p p r o x i m a t i o n s

of Pearson product moment c o e f f i c i e n t s , employed when we wish to

a s c e r t a i n the a s s o c i a t i o n between two v a r i a b l e s , one of which

i s measured on a continuous s c a l e and the o t h e r as a dichotomy.

The use of the b i s e r i a l c o e f f i c i e n t , r b , assumes t h a t u n d e r l y i n g

the dichotomy i s a n o r m a l l y - d i s t r i b u t e d cont inuous v a r i a b l e .

Thus, i n the case of our a n a l y s e s , we are p o s i t i n g t h a t c o n f l i c t

i s a matter of degree, and t h a t the c a t e g o r i z a t i o n (IMC/no IMC)

o f the outcome v a r i a b l e i s a r e s u l t of our d e f i n i t i o n or

measurement procedure r a t h e r than being i n h e r e n t i n the c o n c e p t .

F i n a l l y , p r o b i t a n a l y s i s i s one of a f a m i l y of a l g o r i t h m s

designed f o r r e g r e s s i o n on n-chotomous outcome v a r i a b l e s . 1 In the

1 Although p r o b i t a n a l y s i s ( F i n n e y , 1971; Frank, 1971; McKelvey and Z a v o i n a , f o r t h c o m i n g ; T o b i n , 1955; Zavoina and McKelvey , 1969) i s the most w i d e l y used of these t e c h n i q u e s , i t has been shown, both e m p i r i c a l l y and m a t h e m a t i c a l l y (Mokken, 1971, pp. 1 0 5 - 1 1 ) , t h a t the s i m p l e r l o g i s t i c p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n ( l o g i t ) a f f o r d s an e x c e l l e n t a p p r o x i m a t i o n o f the c u m u l a t i v e normal d i s t r i b u t i o n ( p r o b i t ) and i s , f o r a lmost a l l p u r p o s e s , i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . For a d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s and an i n t r o d u c t i o n to l o g i t , see Berkson (1944, 1946, 1949, 1953, 1 9 5 5 ) , DuMouchel (1974), G r i z z l e (1971) , and T h e i l (1967,

70

normal r e g r e s s i o n s i t u a t i o n , there i s a c o n t i n u o u s outcome

v a r i a b l e , Y, which i s to be p r e d i c t e d by a g iven s e t of

v a r i a b l e s , X1 . . . X n , where the u n d e r l y i n g assumption i s

t h a t Y i s approximately normal ly d i s t r i b u t e d i n the sub-

p o p u l a t i o n s d e f i n e d by the values of X1 . . . Xn . I f , however,

as i n the present s t u d y , the outcome v a r i a b l e i s dichotomous

(IMC/no IMC), then the l e a s t - s q u a r e s assumption — t h a t the

e r r o r term be normal ly d i s t r i b u t e d about the r e g r e s s i o n l i n e

w i t h mean zero and constant v a r i a n c e — i s v i o l a t e d . But suppose,

as was done i n the preceding paragraph, t h a t the dichotomous

nature of the outcome v a r i a b l e r e s u l t s from measurement or

d e f i n i t i o n a l i n a d e q u a c i e s , i . e . , there i s a c o n t i n u o u s

u n d e r l y i n g c o n f l i c t s c a l e of which our c a t e g o r i e s are merely

an i m p e r f e c t r e f l e c t i o n . What we wish to d e t e r m i n e , f o r a l l

v a l u e s of X1 . . . Xn , are the probabil i t ies o f a p a r t i c u l a r

case being in each of our two Y - c a t e g o r i e s .

Let us assume that there e x i s t s an index I = z 3 Q + / 4 1 ^ 1 + / * 2 ^ 2 +

. . . +^> n^ n t h a t i s the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t a major power w i l l engage

i n an i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n . When I i s s m a l l , the

l i k e l i h o o d of IMC i s low; when l a r g e , the l i k e l i h o o d i s h i g h .

Let us a l s o assume t h a t f o r each major power t h e r e e x i s t s a

c r i t i c a l value of t h i s i n d e x , denoted I . I f the value of I

f o r a given major power i s l e s s than the c r i t i c a l value I ,

1972). For a comparison of p r o b i t w i t h r e g r e s s i o n and d i s c r i m i n a n t f u n c t i o n a n a l y s i s , see A l d r i c h and Cnudde (1975) .

71

then t h a t major power does not engage i n i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n (Y = 0 ) ; i f i t i s equal to or exceeds the c r i t i c a l

v a l u e , then the major power engages i n IMC (Y = 1 ) . That i s ,

0 i f K I *

1 i f I">I

Over the p o p u l a t i o n of major powers, the I s are assumed to be

n o r m a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d with mean zero and standard d e v i a t i o n one.

Then, f o r a major power, the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t , given I, Y = 0 i s

/ ° 2 Pr(Y = o|l) = P r ( I < I * ) = — ( e " ( t _ I ) 1 2 dt (1)

-Mh2'2 dt (2) V2TT

= 9 ( - I ) (3)

where 9 ( - l ) i s the cumulat ive s tandard normal d i s t r i b u t i o n

= 1 - 0(1) (4)

= l - 9to 0 +/a 1 x 1 +/3 2 x 2 +.. . -»a n x n ) (5)

C o n v e r s e l y , the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t Y = 1 i s

Pr (Y=l|l ) - 1 - Pr(Y=0|I) = 9(1) (1)

= 9(^ 0 + / S 1 X 1 +/i 2 X 2 +...+/2 n X n ) (2)

72

The s i m i l a r i t y to the m u l t i p l e r e g r e s s i o n e q u a t i o n i s apparent .

As i n o r d i n a r y r e g r e s s i o n , we wish to e s t i m a t e the parameters

^ O ' ^ l ' ^ ' " * '^rf ^ n i t e r a t i v e maximum-l ike l ihood procedure A ^ A A

i s used to s e l e c t those parameter e s t i m a t o r s /3g , / 3 , . . . ^

t h a t make the p r o b a b i 1 i ty of Y=0 l a r g e f o r cases i n which Y = 0

and the probability of Y=1 l a r g e f o r cases i n which Y = 1. These

c o e f f i c i e n t s are r e l a t e d to the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t u n i t changes

i n the p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e s w i l l a l t e r the category assignment

of the outcome v a r i a b l e , and have a "slope" i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

analogous to r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s .

Having now completed the t e d i o u s , but n e c e s s a r y , process

of s p e c i f y i n g the s p a t i a l - t e m p o r a l domain, d e s c r i b i n g the data

s e t and the r e s u l t i n g i n d i c a t o r s , and i d e n t i f y i n g the modes of

a n a l y s i s , l e t us put the model to the t e s t .

CHAPTER III

FROM STATUS INCONSISTENCY TO MILITARY CONFRONTATION:

THE BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIP

We begin wi th an examinat ion of the f i r s t stage of the

model. In t h i s chapter we e x p l o r e o n l y the b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p

between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and c o n f l i c t , i n t r o d u c i n g the

i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s i n the next c h a p t e r . The reader w i l l r e c a l l

t h a t , i n f o r m u l a t i n g the model, I h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t underrecognized

( i . e . , s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t ) c o u n t r i e s would be i n v o l v e d i n

i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s more f r e q u e n t l y than would be

expected by chance. D i a g r a m m a t i c a l l y ,

s t a t u s i n t e r s t a t e i n c o n s i s t e n t + military

s t a t e s c o n f r o n t a t i o n s

In the pages t h a t f o l l o w we w i l l examine the extent to which t h i s

p r o p o s i t i o n i s supported by e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e .

Assuming Homogeneity among the Major Powers

The most d i r e c t t e s t of the p o s i t e d a s s o c i a t i o n i s to

examine the e n t i r e 1820-1970 p e r i o d w i t h o u t d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g among

73

74

the major powers. As a f i r s t c u t , we s imply d i c h o t o m i z e the

c o u n t r i e s i n t o two groups: those t h a t are underrecognized i n a

g i v e n year and those that are n o t . Two cont ingency t a b l e s are

c o n s t r u c t e d . The f i r s t t a b l e , l a b e l e d " p a r t i c i p a t e , " i n c l u d e s

all major power involvements i n i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ;

the second t a b l e , l a b e l e d " i n i t i a t e , " i n c l u d e s o n l y those

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s t h a t are i n i t i a t e d by a major power, i . e . , only

those i n which i t i s a major power t h a t f i r s t makes s e r i o u s

t h r e a t s or f i r s t a t t a c k s i n s t r e n g t h i t s opponent's armies or

t e r r i t o r y . S ince every war begins as a m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n

— i t i s coded as a "war" only a f t e r i t reaches one thousand

b a t t l e f a t a l i t i e s — the IMC o b s e r v a t i o n s i n the t a b l e s i n c l u d e

t h r e a t s , m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s , and "pre-war" combat.

TABLE 1

STATUS INCONSISTENCY VS. INVOLVEMENT IN INTERSTATE MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS, 1820-1970

P a r t i c i p a t e Initiate

no IMC IMC no IMC IMC

o v e r ­ 79.9%: 20.1% o v e r ­ 8 1 . 9 % 18.1% r e c o g n i z e d (318) ( 80) 398 r e c o g n i z e d (326) ( 72)

under­ 77.1% 22.9% under­ 79.2% 2 0 . 8 % r e c o g n i z e d (326) ( 97) 423 r e c o g n i z e d (335) ( 88)

644 177 621 160

Q = +.08 Q = +.09

75

We can see (from Table 1) t h a t there i s l i t t l e a s s o c i a t i o n

between being s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t and p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n , or

i n i t i a t i n g , an i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n . In any given

y e a r , those major powers t h a t are underrecognized have o n l y a

s l i g h t l y g r e a t e r l i k e l i h o o d (22.9%) of p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a

c o n f r o n t a t i o n than those major powers t h a t are o v e r r e c o g n i z e d

( 2 0 . 1 % ) . S i m i l a r l y , underrecognized s t a t e s are only s l i g h t l y more

l i k e l y (20.8%' vs. 18.1%) to i n i t i a t e a c o n f r o n t a t i o n . The

Y u l e ' s Q, a measure of the independence of c e l l f r e q u e n c i e s ,

c o n f i r m s t h i s p o i n t . The Q can range from +1.00 ( i f no- o v e r -

r e c o g n i z e d , or a l l u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d , s t a t e s p a r t i c i p a t e i n or

i n i t i a t e IMCs) to - 1 . 0 0 ( i f a l l o v e r r e c o g n i z e d , or no under-

r e c o g n i z e d , s t a t e s p a r t i c i p a t e i n or i n i t i a t e them). A Q-

c o e f f i c i e n t having a value near z e r o , l i k e the ones we o b t a i n ,

shows t h a t there i s l i t t l e r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y

and involvement in i n t e r s t a t e c o n f r o n t a t i o n s d u r i n g the 1820-1970

p e r i o d when we do not (1) d i f f e r e n t i a t e among the major powers,

or (2) a l l o w f o r time l a g s .

M a n i p u l a t i n g the Time Factor

Let us m a i n t a i n , f o r the moment, the assumption t h a t a l l

major powers respond s i m i l a r l y when they e x p e r i e n c e s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y , and e x p l o r e the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t time l a g s need

to be i n t r o d u c e d , i . e . , that i t r e q u i r e s a p e r i o d of t ime before

s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s mani fested as a g g r e s s i v e b e h a v i o r . The

76

reader w i l l r e c a l l t h a t the t h e o r e t i c a l argument set out i n

Chapter One p o s i t s that a g g r e s s i v e b e h a v i o r i s an e x p r e s s i o n of

d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n aimed at r e c t i f y i n g an e x i s t i n g arrangement.

Because we are concerned wi th e x i s t i n g arrangements and because

most of the m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s upon which we are f o c u s i n g

( e . g . , t h r e a t s and s m a l l - s c a l e uses of f o r c e ) r e q u i r e only a

minimum of p r e p a r a t i o n , we need only e x p l o r e r a t h e r b r i e f time

l a g s . In order to t e s t f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t some minimal

p e r i o d of time i s necessary , I i n t r o d u c e one- to f i v e - y e a r l a g s .

TABLE 2

Q-SCORES FROM CONTINGENCY TABLE ANALYSIS OF MAJOR POWER STATUS INCONSISTENCY VS. INVOLVEMENT IN INTERSTATE

MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS, 1820-1970 (0NE- TO FIVE-YEAR TIME LAGS)

1*3. P a r t i c i p a t e I n i t i a t e

0 + .08 + .09

-1 + .06 + .05

- 2 + .05 + .06

- 3 + .01 + .03

-4 - . 0 9 - . 0 6

- 5 - . 1 1 - . 0 5

As might be e x p e c t e d , Table 2 demonstrates t h a t the a l r e a d y weak

a s s o c i a t i o n between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n d i m i n i s h e s w i t h the passage of t i m e , a c t u a l l y

becoming n e g a t i v e as the l a g i s extended to f o u r y e a r s .

77

C o n t i n u i n g to manipulate the time element, we e x p l o r e

the p o s s i b i l i t y of i n t e r - c e n t u r y d i f f e r e n c e s — a phenomenon t h a t

has r e c u r r e d i n several s t u d i e s of i n t e r s t a t e war ( c f . S i n g e r ,

1972). I f the a s s o c i a t i o n between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and

p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n , or i n i t i a t i o n o f , i n t e r s t a t e c o n f r o n t a t i o n s

i s d i f f e r e n t i n the n i n e t e e n t h than i n the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y ,

we may be o b s c u r i n g t h i s important f i n d i n g by s i m u l t a n e o u s l y

a n a l y z i n g the e n t i r e 1820-1970 p e r i o d .

TABLE 3

STATUS INCONSISTENCY VS. INVOLVEMENT IN INTERSTATE MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS, BY CENTURY

P a r t i c i pate (19th century)

I n i t i a t e (19th century)

no IMC IMC no IMC IMC

o v e r ­ 8 2 . 3 % 17.7% o v e r ­ 84.2% 15.8% r e c o g n i z e d (172) ( 37) 209 r e c o g n i z e d (176) ( 33)

under­ 78.9% 21.1% under­ 80.6% 19.4% r e c o g n i z e d (187) ( 50) 237 recognized (191) ( 46)

359 87 367 79

P a r t i c i p a t e I n i t i a t e (20th century) (20th century )

no IMC IMC no IMC IMC

o v e r ­ 77.2% 22.8% o v e r ­ 79.4% 20.6% r e c o g n i z e d (146) ( 43) 189 r e c o g n i z e d (150) ( 39)

under­ 74.7% 25.3% under- 77.4% 22.6% r e c o g n i z e d (139) ( 47) 186 r e c o g n i z e d (144) ( 42)

285 90 294 81

78

TABLE 4

Q-SCORES FROM CONTINGENCY TABLE ANALYSIS OF MAJOR POWER STATUS INCONSISTENCY VS. INVOLVEMENT IN INTERSTATE

MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS, BY CENTURY (ONE- TO FIVE-YEAR TIME LAGS)

Lag P a r t i c i p a t e I n i t i a t e Lag

t o t a l 19th 20th t o t a l 19th 20th p e r i o d century century p e r i o d century century

0 + .08 + .11 + .07 + .09 + .12 + .06

-1 + .06 + .00 + .14 + .05 + .01 + .11

- 2 + .05 - . 1 0 + .20 + .06 - . 1 0 + .22

- 3 + .01 - . 0 5 + .09 + .03 - . 0 5 + .11

- 4 - . 0 9 - . 1 5 - . 0 2 - . 0 6 - . 1 8 + .07

- 5 - . 1 1 - . 0 5 - . 1 5 - . 0 5 + .02 - . 1 2

The data presented i n Table 3 , and the c o r r e s p o n d i n g

Q - c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r these data ( r e p o r t e d i n the f i r s t row of

Table 4 ) , f a i l to support the s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t we are masking

i n t e r - c e n t u r y d i f f e r e n c e s . That i s to s a y , d i v i d i n g the cases

by c e n t u r y ( i . e . , 1820-1899 and 1900-1970) does not s u b s t a n t i a l l y

a l t e r the r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and

involvement i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . In both the n i n e t e e n t h

and t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s the s t a t u s - c o n f l i c t r e l a t i o n s h i p i s

weak, but i n the p r e d i c t e d d i r e c t i o n . I n t r o d u c i n g time lags

f o r each century (Table 4) produces, as i t d i d f o r the e n t i r e

1820-1970 p e r i o d , a general p a t t e r n of d i m i n i s h i n g a s s o c i a t i o n ,

a l t h o u g h there i s some meager evidence s u p p o r t i n g a r e l a t i o n s h i p

79

between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and involvement i n m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s when a two-year l a g i s i n t r o d u c e d f o r the

t w e n t i e t h century .

A l t e r i n g the Level of Measurement

To t h i s p o i n t , we have merely manipulated the time

element and have found l i t t l e to suggest that, a s i g n i f i c a n t

b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y

and i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n . But the apparent

absence of such a r e l a t i o n s h i p may w e l l be a r e s u l t of my

d e c i s i o n to dichotomize the p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e . Another way

t h a t we might examine the data a t hand i s to a l t e r the l e v e l

of measurement of the p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e . For example, l e t

us rank the major powers each year on s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y ,

and then ask whether the h i g h e s t r a n k i n g n a t i o n s ( r e g a r d l e s s

of t h e i r i d e n t i t i e s ) are more o f t e n i n v o l v e d i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s

than those nat ions t h a t have lower r a n k s . The p r i n c i p a l

d i f f e r e n c e between t h i s procedure and the one used i n the

p r e c e d i n g s e c t i o n i s that s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s now being

t r e a t e d as an ordered v a r i a b l e , r a t h e r than a dichotomous one.

Depending upon the time l a g s i n t r o d u c e d i n our data s e t ,

there are from 803 to 821 major power n a t i o n - y e a r s (where a

n a t i o n - y e a r equals one n a t i o n c l a s s i f i e d as a major power f o r

one y e a r ) and from 177 to 188 c o n f l i c t - y e a r s i n which major powers

become i n v o l v e d i n i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . This gives

80

u s , f o r i n s t a n c e , an expected frequency of .22 c o n f l i c t - y e a r s

per n a t i o n - y e a r ( i . e . , 177/821) when no time lags are u s e d ,

o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y one c o n f l i c t - y e a r i n every f i f t h n a t i o n - y e a r .

Thus, i f there i s no r e l a t i o n s h i p between a n a t i o n ' s rank on

s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and the frequency w i t h which i t becomes

i n v o l v e d i n i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , we would expect

to observe at all ranks that s t a t e s become i n v o l v e d i n IMCs

i n a p p r o x i m a t e l y one of every f i v e years t h a t the rank i s

o c c u p i e d by a major power. On the o t h e r hand, i f s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to involvement i n m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , we should expect that the r e l a t i v e f requency of

IMC involvement should be g r e a t e s t f o r the h i g h e s t r a n k i n g s t a t e s ,

and d e c l i n e as we move toward lower r a n k s .

Looking at Tables 5 and 6, we can see t h a t the s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y argument does r a t h e r p o o r l y i n the i n d i v i d u a l

c e n t u r i e s as w e l l as in the o v e r a l l p e r i o d . Indeed, w i t h longer

lags there i s a s l i g h t tendency f o r the more underrecognized s t a t e s

to be among the 1 east c o n f l i c t prone c o u n t r i e s . Only d u r i n g the

t w e n t i e t h century w i t h no l a g or a l a g of one y e a r , do the number

one-ranked s t a t e s d i s p l a y the h i g h e s t frequency of c o n f l i c t

involvement and, even t h e n , the a c t u a l number of years of involvement

turns out to be only one standard d e v i a t i o n above the mean f o r a l l

the n a t i o n s . Not only do Tables 5 and 6 f a i l to produce the

m o n o t o n i c a l l y d e c r e a s i n g frequency p a t t e r n t h a t would c h a r a c t e r i z e

a p e r f e c t f i t to the " u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n leads to c o n f l i c t " h y p o t h e s i s ,

but they c l e a r l y f a i l to even approximate t h i s f i t .

81

TABLE 5

OBSERVED AND EXPECTED FREQUENCY OF MAJOR POWER PARTICIPATION IN INTERSTATE MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS AT DIFFERENT RANKS

OF STATUS INCONSISTENCY, FOR 1820-1970 AND BY CENTURY (ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)

Rank Total Per iod 19th Century 20th Century

0 -1 -2 -3 0 -1 - 2 - 3 0 -1 - 2 - 3

1 .22 .24 .22 .22 .18 .18 .17 .19 .29 .32 .29 .25

2 .22 .21 .22 .21 .23 .18 .19 .18 .22 .25 .25 .25

3 .19 .24 .22 .26 .19 .23 .18 .19 .20 .25 .27 .36

4 .21 .27 .26 .23 .18 .25 .24 .19 .25 .29 .29 .27

5 .21 .21 .25 .24 .21 .15 .17 .22 .20 .29 .36 .27

6 .23 .23 .26 .23

Exp't F r e q . .22 .23 .23 .23 .20 .20 .20 .20 .24 .27 .28 .27

TABLE 6

OBSERVED AND EXPECTED FREQUENCY OF MAJOR POWER INITIATION OF INTERSTATE MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS AT DIFFERENT RANKS

OF STATUS INCONSISTENCY, FOR 1820-1970 AND BY CENTURY (ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)

Rank Total P e r i o d 19th Century 20th Century

0 -1 -2 -3 0 -1 -2 - 3 0 -1 -2 - 3

1 .21 .22 .18 .18 .16 .16 .15 .17 .27 .29 .22 .19

2 .19 .17 .19 .19 .20 .15 .15 .17 .19 .20 .24 .22

3 .18 .22 .19 .22 .19 .23 .18 .18 .17 .20 .20 .27

4 .18 .22 .25 .19 .15 .22 .23 .17 .22 .24 .27 .22

5 .18 .19 .20 .22 .18 .14 .14 .21 .18 .25 .29 .25

6 .22 .19 .24 .21

Exp't F r e q . .19 .20 .20 .20 .18 .18 .18 .18 .22 .23 .23 .22

82

Moving to a s t i l l h igher l e v e l of measurement, i . e . ,

t r e a t i n g s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y as a cont inuous v a r i a b l e , s t i l l

does not a l t e r the p a t t e r n of our f i n d i n g s . To see t h i s ,

we need o n l y view the r e s u l t s of analyses of v a r i a n c e and

b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s presented i n Table 7.

TABLE 7

ANALYSES OF VARIANCE AND BISERIAL CORRELATIONS OF STATUS INCONSISTENCY VS. INTERSTATE MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS,

FOR 1820-1970 AND BY CENTURY (ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)

P a r t i c i p a t e

Lag T o t a l P e r i o d 19th Century 20th Century

N rb rb eta N

r b r2

eta2 N r b r b eta2

0 821 + .00 .00 446 + .00 .00 375 + .00 .00

-1 815 + .00 .00 438 + .00 .00 377 + .00 .00

-2 809 + .00 .00 431 - .00 .00 378 + .01 .00

- 3 802 + .00 .00 424 - .00 .00 378 + .00 .00

I n i t i a t e

Lag T o t a l P e r i o d 19th Century 20th Century

N r, b

2 r b

f 2 eta N r b

2 r b eta N 2

r b . 2 eta

0 821 + .00 .00 446 + .00 .00 375 + .00 .00

-1 815 + .00 .00 438 + .00 .00 377 + .00 .00

-2 809 + .00 .00 431 - .00 .00 378 .01 .00

- 3 802 + .00 .00 424 - .00 .00 378 .00 .00

NOTE: Status inconsistency scores were m u l t i p l i e d by - 1 . 0 so t h a t p o s i t i v e rbs denote t h a t i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h more IMC involvement.

83

The weakness of the b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y and involvement i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s (both

p a r t i c i p a t i o n and i n i t i a t i o n ) , d u r i n g the e n t i r e p e r i o d and

f o r the i n d i v i d u a l c e n t u r i e s , i s amply demonstrated. Whi le

we do f i n d that u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n g e n e r a l l y c o v a r i e s (rb)

p o s i t i v e l y w i t h IMC involvement, the squares of both the

b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s ( i n t e r p r e t e d as a p p r o x i m a t i o n s

of the amount of var iance i n IMC involvement accounted f o r by

the v a r i a n c e i n the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y s c o r e s ) and the etas

( i n t e r p r e t e d as the degree to which the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y

s c o r e s f o r s t a t e s t h a t become i n v o l v e d i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s are

d i s t i n c t from the scores f o r s t a t e s t h a t do not become i n v o l v e d )

a r e , f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, z e r o .

Examining the I n d i v i d u a l S t a t e s

The major c o n c l u s i o n t h a t can be drawn from a l l the

f o r e g o i n g analyses i s that f o r the major powers as a whole

— r e g a r d l e s s of whether we look a t the e n t i r e p e r i o d or the

i n d i v i d u a l c e n t u r i e s , and i r r e s p e c t i v e of time l a g s , l e v e l s

of measurement, or a n a l y t i c t e c h n i q u e — o n l y a tenuous b i v a r i a t e

r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and p a r t i c i p a t i o n

i n , or i n i t i a t i o n o f , i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . This

c o n c l u s i o n i s p r e d i c a t e d upon an o r i g i n a l assumption t h a t a l l

major powers r e a c t s i m i l a r l y to being s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t — a n d

i f t h i s assumption i s c o r r e c t , we might b e t t e r expend our energy

examining other v a r i a b l e s . I t may be, however, t h a t by "lumping"

84

t o g e t h e r the data f o r a l l s t a t e s we are masking s u b s t a n t i a l

n a t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s . And, i n d e e d , t h i s t u r n s out to be the

c a s e . For example, i f we dichotomize the p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e

and look at i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s , we f i n d t h a t the United

S t a t e s i s c o n s i d e r a b l y more l i k e l y to become engaged i n

m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s d u r i n g those t w e n t i e t h century years

i n which i t i s u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d , w h i l e Germany i n the n i n e t e e n t h

century i s somewhat more i n c l i n e d to i n i t i a t e c o n f r o n t a t i o n s

when i t i s o v e r r e c o g n i z e d .

TABLE 8

AMERICAN AND GERMAN STATUS INCONSISTENCY VS. INVOLVEMENT IN INTERSTATE MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS

P a r t i c i p a t e I n i t i a t e (USA 20th Century) (GMY 19th Century)

no IMC IMC no IMC IMC

o v e r ­ 97.1% 2.9% o v e r ­ 87.5% 12.5% r e c o g n i z e d ( 34) ( 1 ) 35 recogni zed ( 28) ( 4)

under- 70.8% 29.2% under­ 91.7% 8.3% r e c o g n i z e d ( 17) ( 7) 24 recognized ( 44) ( 4)

51 8 72 8

Q = +.87 Q = -- .22

In Table 9, I present the Q - c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r a l l nine major

powers, examining the i n d i v i d u a l c e n t u r i e s as w e l l as the e n t i r e

1820-1970 p e r i o d , and i n t r o d u c i n g one- to t h r e e - year time l a g s .

85

TABLE 9

Q-SCORES FROM CONTINGENCY TABLE ANALYSIS OF EACH MAJOR POWER'S STATUS INCONSISTENCY VS. INVOLVEMENT IN INTERSTATE MILITARY

CONFRONTATIONS, FOR 1820-1970 PERIOD AND BY CENTURY (ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)

N a t i o n Lag P a r t i c i p a t e I n i t i a t e

t o t a l p e r i o d

19th century

20th century

t o t a l p e r i o d

19th century

20th century

USA N=60 N=59 N=60 N = 59

0 + .86 ***

+ .87 **

+ .83 + .84

-1

- 2

+ .53

+ .16

+ .46

+ .18

*•

+ .67

+ .31

•

+ .62

+ .33 - 3 + .01 + .04 + .30 + .32

UK N = 139 N=80 N = 59 N = 139 N = 80 N = 59

0 + .08 + .20 - . 0 4 + .18 + .22 + .16

-1 + .15 - . 0 8 + .55 - . 0 8 - . 2 2 + .21

- 2 + .21 - . 0 7 **

+ .54 + .24 - . 0 7 **

+ .56

- 3 + .06 - . 0 9 •

+ .44 + .03 - . 0 8 + .34

FRN N=139 N=80 N = 59 N = 139 N = 80 N = 59

0 + .06 + .30 - . 1 6 + .10 + . 4 0 * - . 2 7

-1 - . 0 8 + .20 - . 4 5 + .11 + .30 - . 1 2

-2 + .01 + .09 - . 0 3 + .04 + .05 + .18

- 3 + .05 + .12 + .10 + .08 + .08 + .40

86

TABLE 9 - - - C o n t i n u e d

N a t i o n Lag P a r t i c i p a t e I n i t i a t e

t o t a l 19th 20th t o t a l 19th 20th p e r i o d century century p e r i o d century century

GMY N-108 N = 80 N = 28 N = 108 N=80 N=28

0 - . 0 7 .00 - . 3 1 - . 2 1 - . 2 2 - . 3 1

-1 + .05 - . 0 2 + .39 - . 0 7 - . 2 4 + .39

- 2 - . 0 9 - . 2 6 + .39 - . 2 2 - . 5 0 + .39

- 3 - . 0 9 - . 0 6 + .25 - . 2 2 - . 2 8 + .25

A-H N = 94 N--80 N = 14 N = 94 N=80 N = 14

0 - . 0 7 - . 0 8 - . 3 0 - . 2 5 - . 1 8 - . 6 4

-1 + .03 + .11 - . 3 0 + .03 + .25 - . 6 4

- 2 + .03 - . 0 6 - . 3 0 + .03 + .07 - . 6 4

- 3 + .03 - . 2 6 + .30 + .03 - . 1 4 .00

ITA N=74 N = 40 N-34 N = 74 N = 40 N-34

0 - . 0 3 + .63 - . 2 0 - . 0 3 + .63 - . 2 0

-1 - . 1 5 + .02 + .47 - . 1 5 + .02 + .47

- 2 - . 4 2 - . 4 5 + .33 - . 3 7 - . 4 5 + .40

- 3 + .28 + .51 + . 8 2 * + .34 + .51 **

+ .85

87

TABLE 9 - - - C o n t i n u e d

N a t i o n Lag P a r t i c i pate I n i t i a t e

t o t a l 19th p e r i o d century

20th century

t o t a l p e r i o d

19th century

20th century

USR N=136 N=80 N=56 N=136 N = 80 N = 56

0 +.35 +.34 **

+ .58 + .41 + .34 + .60

-1 k k

+.50 4.35 ***

+ .74 **

+ .56 + .35 •k-kk

+ .75

-2 •kk u

+.49 +1.00 •kk

+ .63 •kk

+ .55 +1.00* **

+ .62

- 3 - . 1 1 +.33 - . 0 2 - . 0 3 + .33 - . 0 4

CHN N-21 N=21 N = 21 N = 21

0 + .43 + .43 + .43 + .43

-1 - . 5 0 - . 5 0 - . 5 0 - . 5 0

-2 + .02 + .02 + .02 + .02

- 3 - . 3 3 - . 3 3 - . 3 3 - . 3 3

JPN N-50 N = 45 N = 50 N=45

0 - . 3 5 - . 4 1 - . 3 5 - . 4 1

-1 - . 1 5 +1.00* - . 2 4 +1.00*

-2 - . 0 5 +1.00^ - . 1 3 + i .oo? i

- 3 + .43 +1.00* + .36 +1.00*

NOTE : The N's f o r each country are those f o r zero time l a g .

# The Q i s equal to +1. 00 because the country i s never i n v o l v e d i n an IMC when i t i s o v e r r e c o g n i z e d . However, Russia i s o v e r r e c o g n i z e d f o r only ten years d u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h century and Japan f o r only f o u r years d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h .

F i s h e r exact t e s t : *** < . O K ** <" . 0 5 < * <".10

88

No c l e a r p a t t e r n emerges from Table 9, a l t h o u g h the s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y argument appears to most a p p l i c a b l e to the

t w e n t i e t h century ( i n g e n e r a l , w i t h a one- or two-year l a g )

and to best f i t the two superpowers — the U n i t e d S t a t e s and

the S o v i e t Union. There does not seem to be much d i f f e r e n c e

between the e f f e c t of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y on c o n f l i c t

p a r t i c i p a t i o n and i t s e f f e c t on c o n f l i c t i n i t i a t i o n , but t h i s

i s not s u r p r i s i n g s i n c e major powers are coded as the i n i t i a t o r s

i n e i g h t y - s i x percent of t h e i r c o n f l i c t i n v o l v e m e n t s . Looking

at the i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s : the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' p a t t e r n has the

s t r o n g e s t f i t w i t h the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y h y p o t h e s i s , the

r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n c o n s i s t e n c y and m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n

d i m i n i s h i n g as time lags are i n t r o d u c e d . The U n i t e d Kingdom's

e x p e r i e n c e does not support the h y p o t h e s i s i n the n i n e t e e n t h

c e n t u r y , but i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of i t when l a g s are i n t r o d u c e d

i n the t w e n t i e t h . There i s a weak a s s o c i a t i o n between s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y and m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n i n the n i n e t e e n t h

century f o r F rance, but even t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p does not hold

i n the t w e n t i e t h century . Germany, somewhat l i k e B r i t a i n ,

does not support the hypothesis i n the n i n e t e e n t h , b u t , w i t h

the i n t r o d u c t i o n of time l a g s , produces a weak a s s o c i a t i o n i n

the t w e n t i e t h . A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y appears not to support the

h y p o t h e s i s in e i t h e r c e n t u r y ; and I t a l y c u r i o u s l y may support

i t i n the n i n e t e e n t h when there i s no time l a g , and a l s o i n the

t w e n t i e t h when lags are i n t r o d u c e d . R u s s i a supports the h y p o t h e s i s

89

i n both c e n t u r i e s , though more s t r o n g l y i n the t w e n t i e t h ; and

China and Japan produce very u n s t a b l e c o e f f i c i e n t s due to the

small number of observat ions i n the former case and the

i n f r e q u e n t i n c i d e n c e of " o v e r r e c o g n i t i o n " i n the l a t t e r .

In s h o r t , the b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n c o n s i s t e n c y and

m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n i s not overwhelming, but there does

appear to be s o m e — a n d at t i m e s , a s i z a b l e — a s s o c i a t i o n f o r

s e l e c t e d s t a t e s . Other than the f a c t t h a t the weakest f i t s

are a s s o c i a t e d with the t r a d i t i o n a l powers of c e n t r a l Europe

( F r a n c e , Germany, and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y ) and the s t r o n g e s t

a s s o c i a t i o n s occur i n the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , there does not

seem to be any prominent r a t i o n a l e f o r the d i s p a r i t y i n the

f i n d i n g s .

I n t e r e s t i n g l y , these c o u n t r y - s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s are

g r e a t l y d i m i n i s h e d i f s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s t r e a t e d as a

c o n t i n u o u s v a r i a b l e . In Table 10, we can see t h a t the

a s s o c i a t i o n s f o r the United S t a t e s , B r i t a i n , I t a l y , and the

S o v i e t Union l a r g e l y v a n i s h , making i t q u i t e v i s i b l e t h a t the

" i n t e r v a l - l e v e l " c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s r e f l e c t s i g n i f i c a n t l y

l e s s powerful r e l a t i o n s h i p s between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and

involvement in c o n f r o n t a t i o n s than were uncovered i n the

c o n t i n g e n c y t a b l e a n a l y s i s . F u l l y c o g n i z a n t of the f a c t t h a t

Q-scores tend to be l a r g e r than o t h e r c o n t i n g e n c y t a b l e

c o e f f i c i e n t s , t h i s f i n d i n g n e v e r t h e l e s s suggests an i n t r i g u i n g

i n f e r e n c e — s i m p l y s t a t e d , the a s s o c i a t i o n between u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n

TABLE 10

ANALYSES OF VARIANCE AND BISERIAL CORRELATIONS OF EACH MAJOR POWER'S STATUS INCONSISTENCY VS INTERSTATE MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS, BY CENTURY (ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)

Nation Lag P a r t i c i p a t e Nation Lag

19th century 20th century

2 2 N r, r, eta b b n 2 + 2

r b r b e

USA 0 -1 -2 - 3

X X X X X X X X

59 + .13 . 0 5 * 59 + 58 + 57 - .01

UK 0 -1 -2 - 3

80 + .02 .01 79 + 78 + 77 +

59 + .01 59 + .03 .01 59 + .04 .02 59 + .12 .07**

FRN 0 -1 - 2 - 3

80 + 79 + .03 .02 78 + .01 .01 77 + .01 .01

59 -59 -59 -58 -

GMY 0 -1 -2 - 3

80 + 79 + 78 - .03 .01 77 - .01

28 - .12 .07 29 - .01 .01 30 - .05 .03 31 - .03 .02

I n i t i a t e

19th century 20th century

r, 2 , 2 N r, r, eta b b 2 2 N r̂ r̂ eta

X X X X X X X X

59 + .13 . 0 5 * 59 + .03 .01 58 + .03 .01 57 + .02 .01

80 + .02 .01 79 + 78 -77 +

59 + .01 .01 59 + 59 + .02 .01 59 + .05 .02

80 + .01 79 + .05 .03 78 + .01 77 + .01

59 -59 + .06 .03 59 + 58 + .04 .01

80 - .02 .01 79 - .03 .01 73 - .10 .94* 77 - .05 .02

28 - .12 .07 29 - .01 .01 30 - .05 .03 31 - .03 .02

TABLE 1 0 - - - C o n t i n u e d

Nation Lag P a r t i c i p a t e Nation Lag

19th century 20th century

Nation Lag

N r, r, 2 eta^ b b 2 2 N r, r, eta b b

A-H 0 -1 -2 - 3

80 - .01 79 -78 -77 -

14 -15 - .04 .03 16 + .06 .04 17 + .06 .04

ITA 0 -1 -2 - 3

40 + .13 .06 39 -38 - .02 .01 37 + .03 .01

34 + 35 + .01 36 + .08 .05 37 + .09 .06

USR 0 -1 - 2 - 3

80 -79 -78 + .02 .01 77 +

56 + .06 .03 56 + .10 . 0 6 * 56 + .03 .02 56 - .01 .01

CHN 0 -1 - 2 - 3

X X X X X X X X

21 + .03 .02 20 - .01 .01 19 + .01 .01 18 - .08 .05

I n i t i a t e

19th century 20th century

2 2 N r̂ eta 2 2 N r, r, eta b b

80 - .02 .01 79 + .01 78 + 77 +

14 - .06 .04 15 - .18 .11 16 + .01 17 +

40 + .13 .06 39 -38 - .02 .01 37 + .03 .01

34 + 35 + .01 36 + .07 .05 37 + .19 . 1 1 * *

80 -79 -78 + .02 .01 77 +

56 + .04 .02 56 + .06 .04 56 + .02 .01 56 - .02 .01

X X X X X X X X

21 + .03 .02 20 - .01 .01 19 + .01 .01 18 - .08 .05

TABLE 1 0 - - - C o n t i n u e d

Nation Lag P a r t i c i pate Nation Lag

19th century 20th century

Nation Lag

2 2 N r, r, eta b b N r, rj~ eta^ b b

JPN 0 -1 -2 - 3

X X X X X X X X

45 - .02 .01 45 + .12 .06 45 + .02 .01 45 + .01 .01

I n i t i a t e . . . . . . T

19th century j 3th century

e t a 2 | N r b

2 • + 2 r b eta

X X 45 _ .02 .01 X X 45 + .15 . 0 6 * X X 45 + .03 .01 X X 45 + .03 .01

NOTE: In t h i s t a b l e , a "blank" designates a c o e f f i c i e n t w i t h a value of . 0 0 , w h i l e an "x" d e s i g n a t e s t h a t a country i s not a major power f o r a s u f f i c i e n t number of years dur ing the n i n e t e e n t h century f o r c o e f f i c i e n t s to be m e a n i n g f u l . In a d d i t i o n , s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y scores have been m u l t i p l i e d by - 1 . 0 so that p o s i t i v e rbs denote t h a t i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h more IMC involvement.

F - t e s t from a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e (anova): ** < . 0 5 < * < . 1 0 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l

93

and involvement in m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s may b e t t e r be d e s c r i b e d

as a t h r e s h o l d than as a continuous l i n e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p . 1

l n the l i t e r a t u r e on s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y among i n d i v i d u a l s , some s o c i o l o g i s t s ( e . g . , Treiman, 1966; Wesolowski , 1966) have speculated t h a t , over t i m e , i n d i v i d u a l s may come to a c c e p t t h e i r s t a t u s d i s c r e p a n t p o s i t i o n s . This suggests a p a r a l l e l hypothesis t h a t , over t i m e , s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e s may come to accept t h e i r s i t u a t i o n . Put another way, the average l e v e l of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y may be i n t e r n a l i z e d and serve as a benchmark a g a i n s t which to measure c u r r e n t p o s i t i o n . The q u e s t i o n then becomes whether a s t a t e i s more l i k e l y to p a r t i c i p a t e i n , or i n i t i a t e , a c o n f r o n t a t i o n (not when i t i s u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d , but) when i t i s more s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t than usual . In order to examine t h i s q u e s t i o n , I computed a t e n - y e a r moving average on s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y f o r each major power, and then c o n s t r u c t e d a dichotomous i n d i c a t o r t h a t had a value of "one" i f a s t a t e ' s s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y score f o r a g i v e n y e a r was above i t s moving average f o r that y e a r , and "zero" i f i t was below. By means of cont ingency t a b l e s , 1 compared t h i s dichotomous "moving average" i n d i c a t o r w i t h the dichotomous "absolute" measure of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y t h a t has been used i n a l l the preceding a n a l y s e s . The Q-scores and F i s h e r exact t e s t s comparing these two i n d i c a t o r s wi th one another are r e p o r t e d below:

N a t i o n 19th Century 20th Century N Q-score F i s h e r N Q- score F i s h e r

Exact Exact

USA 33 + .96 .00 UK 71 + .96 .00 41 + .97 .00 FRN 71 + .69 .00 41 .77 .01 GMY 71 + .50 .03 19 + .71 .18 A-H 71 + .90 .00 14 + 1 .00 .00 ITA 31 + .34 .28 25 + .73 .22 USR 71 + .92 .00 38 + .95 .00 CHN 12 4 .96 .01 JPN 21 + .79 .17

S u r p r i s i n g l y , the moving average i n d i c a t o r proved to be q u i t e h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d with the a b s o l u t e measure of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y . And, as a consequence, when the analyses ( t h a t have been reported i n t h i s chapter ) were r e - r u n , u s i n g the moving average i n d i c a t o r , the r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n c o n s i s t e n c y and m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n d i d not m a t e r i a l l y a l t e r . In subsequent c h a p t e r s , t h e r e f o r e , only the a b s o l u t e measure of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s used.

94

Summarizing the F i n d i n g s

To summarize, we have found t h a t the b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p

between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and major power involvement i n

m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i s , f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, non­

e x i s t e n t when we f a i l to d i f f e r e n t i a t e among the c o u n t r i e s i n

our s p a t i a l domain. N e i t h e r the i n t r o d u c t i o n of time l a g s nor

the d i v i s i o n of the data s e t i n t o separate c e n t u r i e s a l t e r s

t h i s r e s u l t . However, by examining the r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r the

i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s , we d i s c o v e r t h a t some major powers — i n

p a r t i c u l a r , the United States and the S o v i e t U n i o n — a r e d e c i d e d l y

more prone to involvement i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s when under- r a t h e r

than o v e r r e c o g n i z e d . Several o t h e r s t a t e s a l s o e x h i b i t t h i s

tendency, but not very s t r o n g l y . By and l a r g e , the a s s o c i a t i o n

between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n , or i n i t i a t i o n

o f , i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i s g r e a t e r i n the t w e n t i e t h

century than i n the n i n e t e e n t h . And f i n a l l y , i t appears t h a t the

r e l a t i o n s h i p between u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n and m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n

i s most e v i d e n t when the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y v a r i a b l e i s t r e a t e d

d i c h o t o m o u s l y .

CHAPTER IV

FROM STATUS INCONSISTENCY TO MILITARY CONFRONTATION:

INTRODUCING THE INTERVENING VARIABLES

In an attempt to uncover a s t r o n g b i v a r i a t e a s s o c i a t i o n

between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n

(IMC), we int roduced time l a g s and i n t e r - c e n t u r y d i f f e r e n c e s ,

a l t e r e d the l e v e l of measurement of the p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e ,

and d i s c a r d e d the assumption o f homogeneous b e h a v i o r . However,

the f i n d i n g s were l e s s than d r a m a t i c . We d i d uncover a number

of s i z a b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , but even those

s t a t e s t h a t e x h i b i t the s t r o n g e s t a s s o c i a t i o n do not g e n e r a l l y

become i n v o l v e d i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s when they are

u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d . We may take the Uni ted S t a t e s as an example

(Table 8 ) . Seven of the e i g h t m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i n our

data s e t i n which the United S t a t e s becomes i n v o l v e d d u r i n g the

twent ieth century occur w h i l e she i s s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t . Y e t ,

seventy percent of the time t h a t she i s u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d , the US

is not i n v o l v e d i n IMCs. T h i s suggests t h a t , a t b e s t , the p o s i t e d

b i v a r i a t e a s s o c i a t i o n between u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n and m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n does not c o n s t i t u t e a f u l l y - s p e c i f i e d model, i . e . ,

95

96

s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y alone i s inadequate to account f o r

major power c o n f l i c t involvement. This should not s u r p r i s e

us, f o r i n the t h e o r e t i c a l chapter I h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t

c e r t a i n p h y s i c a l , p s y c h o l o g i c a l , and s t r u c t u r a l v a r i a b l e s

i n t e r v e n e between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and a g g r e s s i v e

b e h a v i o r .

Let us r e f r e s h our memories as to the nature of

these v a r i a b l e s and the p r e d i c t e d d i r e c t i o n of t h e i r e f f e c t

on the s t a t u s - c o n f l i c t r e l a t i o n s h i p . I h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t i f

a s t a t e i s predisposed to involvement i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s

( i . e . , i t i s u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d ) , an i n c r e a s e i n i t s power

c a p a b i l i t i e s w i l l i n c r e a s e the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t i t w i l l

m a n i f e s t a g g r e s s i v e behavior . On the o t h e r hand, I h y p o t h e s i z e d

t h a t the more deadly and more r e c e n t a s t a t e ' s p r i o r war

e x p e r i e n c e , the lower the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t i t w i l l d e s i r e

to engage i n a new a l t e r c a t i o n . F i n a l l y , I p o s i t e d t h a t a

h i g h l y p o l a r i z e d major power system w i l l decrease the

o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r m u l t i p l e competing a f f i l i a t i o n s and thereby

i n c r e a s e the l i k e l i h o o d of c o n f r o n t a t i o n ; whereas, the more

c r o s s - c u t a s t a t e ' s bonds, the more c r o s s - p r e s s u r e d i t w i l l be

and the less l i k e l y i t w i l l engage i n a g g r e s s i v e b e h a v i o r .

S c h e m a t i c a l l y ,

97

s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t

s t a t e s

i n t e r s t a t e military

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s

used only i n 20th century runs (not measured p r i o r to 1879)

+ = i n c r e a s e s l i k e l i h o o d of IMC - = decreases l i k e l i h o o d of IMC

Since we a l r e a d y have evidence to suggest the e x i s t e n c e

of i n t e r - c e n t u r y d i f f e r e n c e s , I s h a l l examine the e f f e c t s of the

i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s on the s t a t u s - c o n f l i c t r e l a t i o n s h i p

s e p a r a t e l y f o r each of the c e n t u r i e s i n our temporal domain.

B i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n and p r o b i t a n a l y s i s w i l l be used i n t h i s

i n v e s t i g a t i o n . Before t u r n i n g to the r e s u l t s , s e v e r a l caveats

need to be made.

F i r s t , a l though the model presented i n Chapter One purports

to " e x p l a i n " only the behavior of underrecognized s t a t e s , I

n e v e r t h e l e s s b e l i e v e i t inadequate to examine the e f f e c t s of the

i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s on merely that subset of c a s e s . For example,

i f we were to d i s c o v e r that our model has high p r e d i c t i v e power

f o r the subset of underrecognized s t a t e s , we would not know

whether the g o o d n e s s - o f - f i t (1) was a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the f a c t that

underrecognized s t a t e s are prone to involvement i n m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s or (2) was a general f i n d i n g a p p l i c a b l e to the

major powers r e g a r d l e s s o f s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y . I f the l a t t e r

98

were t r u e , i . e . , the f i n d i n g was not a s s o c i a t e d w i t h s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y , we could view the subset of underrecognized

s t a t e s s imply as a random sample from a known p o p u l a t i o n .

A h y p o t h e s i s congruent wi th the l a t t e r f i n d i n g would be t h a t

major powers r e s i d e in an a n a r c h i s t i c world i n which s t a t e s

are a t a l l times prone to c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , s u b j e c t to c o n t e x t u a l

c o n s t r a i n t s . In order to d i s t i n g u i s h between the "status

i n c o n s i s t e n c y " and "anarchy" hypotheses, we need to examine

the e f f e c t s of the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s on both the subset

of underrecognized s t a t e s and on the e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n of c a s e s ,

and determine whether the r e s u l t i n g c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the former

c o u l d have occurred by chance, given the d e s c r i p t i v e parameters

f o r the l a t t e r , i . e . , could we have randomly s e l e c t e d a sample

of cases wi th c o e f f i c i e n t s t h a t are t h i s d i f f e r e n t from the

p o p u l a t i o n parameters?

A second c a v e a t , c o n c e r n i n g the r e l e v a n c e of s i g n i f i c a n c e

l e v e l s and conf idence i n t e r v a l s , f o l l o w s from t h i s f i r s t , p o i n t .

S t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , n e i t h e r t e s t s of s i g n i f i c a n c e nor c o n f i d e n c e

i n t e r v a l s are a p p r o p r i a t e when a n a l y z i n g non-sampled d a t a . In

p a r t i c u l a r , the c o e f f i c i e n t s from a n a l y s e s on a p o p u l a t i o n of

cases ( e . g . , a l l major power IMCs) are d e s c r i p t i v e parameters

and i t i s not meaningful to ask whether these c o e f f i c i e n t s could

have o c c u r r e d by chance. However, I r e p o r t standard e r r o r s and

s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l s f o r two r e a s o n s . One, whether the subset of

underrecognized s t a t e s i s a p o p u l a t i o n or a random sample i s a

99

q u e s t i o n that we hope to answer; and i f i t i s the l a t t e r , then

sample s t a t i s t i c s are a p p r o p r i a t e . Two, some readers may take

the unorthodox view t h a t , even f o r a p o p u l a t i o n of c a s e s , l e v e l s

of s i g n i f i c a n c e are an a i d f o r j u d g i n g the s t a b i l i t y of an

e s t i m a t e , e s p e c i a l l y i f there i s the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t one may

subsequent ly sample from t h a t p o p u l a t i o n (Winch and C a m p b e l l ,

1 9 7 0 ) . Both these reasons are g iven a d v i s e d l y ; u l t i m a t e l y ,

the reader must decide upon t h e i r soundness.

A t h i r d caveat concerns the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p r o b i t

c o e f f i c i e n t s . The c o e f f i c i e n t s r e p r e s e n t the amount of change

i n the outcome v a r i a b l e (as "measured" on i t s h y p o t h e s i z e d

u n d e r l y i n g s c a l e ) brought about by u n i t changes i n the p r e d i c t o r

v a r i a b l e s o r , a n a l o g o u s l y , the increment i n the p r o b a b i l i t y of

the observed outcome v a r i a b l e being i n a d i f f e r e n t response

c a t e g o r y , given u n i t changes i n the p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e s (McKelvey

and Z a v o i n a , f o r t h c o m i n g ) . The p a r a l l e l to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of

r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s i s e v i d e n t . However, s i n c e r e g r e s s i o n

c o e f f i c i e n t s represent the amount of change i n the observed

outcome v a r i a b l e brought about by u n i t changes i n the p r e d i c t o r

v a r i a b l e s , the c o e f f i c i e n t s from p r o b i t and u n s t a n d a r d i z e d

r e g r e s s i o n are not d i r e c t l y comparable.

F o u r t h , we know t h a t r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s may be

t ransformed i n t o beta weights by n o r m a l i z i n g the c o e f f i c i e n t s

by a r a t i o of standard d e v i a t i o n s (sx/sy , where x i s the p r e d i c t o r

and y the outcome v a r i a b l e ) . In p r o b i t a n a l y s i s , however, the

100

v a r i a n c e of the outcome v a r i a b l e on i t s u n d e r l y i n g i n t e r v a l s c a l e

i s not known. This i s unimportant i f we are merely i n t e r e s t e d i n

(1) p r e d i c t i n g the p r o b a b i l i t y of a p a r t i c u l a r outcome ( i n which

case we would use the raw c o e f f i c i e n t s ) , or (2) d e t e r m i n i n g the

r e l a t i v e importance of p r e d i c t o r s w i t h i n a s i n g l e e q u a t i o n ( i n

which case we need only n o r m a l i z e f o r the v a r i a n c e i n the

p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e s ) . However, i f we wish to make comparisons

a c r o s s e q u a t i o n s , we need to c o n t r o l f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the

outcome v a r i a b l e s w i l l have d i f f e r e n t v a r i a n c e s . I have used the

square r o o t of the "estimated t o t a l sum of squares d i v i d e d by the

degrees of freedom," i . e . , y TSS/df , as an a p p r o x i m a t i o n of the

s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n of the outcome v a r i a b l e ( I v e r s e n , 1 9 7 1 ; McKelvey

and Z a v o i n a , f o r t h c o m i n g ) . The degree to which t h i s may b i a s

small sample p r o p e r t i e s of m u l t i v a r i a t e p r o b i t a n a l y s i s . My own

work suggests t h a t , w i t h dichotomous outcome v a r i a b l e s , the p r o b i t

c o e f f i c i e n t s are of ten c o n s i d e r a b l y l a r g e r than r e g r e s s i o n

c o e f f i c i e n t s est imated on the same d a t a . The standard e r r o r s of

the p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s a l s o tend to be l a r g e r . Comparisons of

r e g r e s s i o n and p r o b i t on known d i s t r i b u t i o n s c o n f i r m these p o i n t s

and show that the p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s more c l o s e l y approximate the

true parameters t h a t generate the u n d e r l y i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n of the

observed l i m i t e d (non-continuous) outcome v a r i a b l e (Zechman, 1974).

F i n a l l y , the reported R2 from p r o b i t a n a l y s i s i s o n l y an

e s t i m a t e of the p r o p o r t i o n of the v a r i a n c e i n the h y p o t h e s i z e d

the e s t i m a t e of b i s not known. Nor i s much known about the

101

u n d e r l y i n g outcome v a r i a b l e accounted f o r by the p r e d i c t o r s .

S i n c e p r o b i t uses a maximum l i k e l i h o o d r a t h e r than a l e a s t

squares t e c h n i q u e , the p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s are those t h a t

maximize the p r o b a b i l i t y of o b t a i n i n g the values of the

outcome v a r i a b l e , r a t h e r than m i n i m i z i n g squared d e v i a t i o n s

between p r e d i c t e d and observed v a l u e s . Thus, the R2 must be

e s t i m a t e d r a t h e r than d i r e c t l y d e r i v e d and may tend to be

s l i g h t l y l a r g e r than the "true" value (McKelvey and Z a v o i n a ,

f o r t h c o m i n g ; Zechman, 1974). On the other hand, s i n c e r e g r e s s i o n

tends to u n d e r e s t i m a t e — a n d , at t i m e s , may g r e a t l y under­

e s t i m a t e — the t rue parameters of the p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e s

when the outcome v a r i a b l e i s l i m i t e d ( n o n - c o n t i n u o u s ) , the

R2 from p r o b i t i s l i k e l y to more a c c u r a t e l y r e f l e c t the

p r e d i c t o r s ' g o o d n e s s - o f - f i t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , s i n c e the d i s t r i b u t i o n

of R2 i s unknown, we should be c a r e f u l not to o v e r - i n t e r p r e t

the s t a t i s t i c and perhaps may want to develop another measure

based upon the p r e d i c t e d p r o b a b i l i t i e s of the outcome v a r i a b l e

d e r i v e d from the raw p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s .

The s i m p l e s t such measure, the percent of c o r r e c t

p r e d i c t i o n s , i s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r our purposes. The reason i s

r a t h e r s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . I f the model proves to be a poor

p r o g n o s t i c a t o r of i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s , then the p r o b i t

a l g o r i t h m w i l l c o n t i n u a l l y p r e d i c t a p p r o x i m a t e l y the mean of the

outcome v a r i a b l e ; and s i n c e m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s are r e l a t i v e l y

rare e v e n t s , i t w i l l , i n e f f e c t , r e p e a t e d l y f o r e c a s t "no c o n f l i c t . "

102

But "no c o n f l i c t " w i l l in a l l l i k e l i h o o d be a " c o r r e c t " p r e d i c t i o n ,

g i v e n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the outcome v a r i a b l e . Thus, the percent

o f c o r r e c t p r e d i c t i o n s might w e l l prove to be a h i g h l y - i n f l a t e d

summary measure.

Rather than use such a s t a t i s t i c , I i n t r o d u c e a d i f f e r e n t ,

and r a t h e r c o n s e r v a t i v e , measure of the p r o b i t e q u a t i o n ' s power

to make p o i n t p r e d i c t i o n s . I t i s , of c o u r s e , p r e d i c a t e d upon

the assumption that i n t e r s t a t e c o n f l i c t i s a r a r e event and,

t h a t at any given p o i n t i n t i m e , one would be more o f t e n r i g h t

to p r e d i c t that a s t a t e would not become i n v o l v e d i n a c o n f l i c t

than t h a t i t would. The new measure, the p o i n t p r e d i c t i v e power

of the e q u a t i o n , r e f l e c t s the degree to which the model improves

our p r e d i c t i o n s as a g a i n s t the n u l l h y p o t h e s i s t h a t a s t a t e w i l l

not become i n v o l v e d in c o n f l i c t . 1 The r a t i o n a l e upon which

the s t a t i s t i c r e s t s i s s i m p l e . When a t t e m p t i n g to p r e d i c t a

s t a t e ' s involvement i n c o n f l i c t , one can make two types of e r r o r s .

F i r s t , one can f a i l to p r e d i c t c o n f l i c t involvements that o c c u r ;

a n d , s e c o n d , one can p r e d i c t c o n f l i c t involvements t h a t do not

o c c u r . We would say that we had a powerful p r e d i c t o r i f we had

a model t h a t could minimize both types of e r r o r s . For example,

i f the model p r e d i c t s e i g h t of a n a t i o n ' s ten c o n f l i c t i n v o l v e m e n t s ,

we would say that i t i n c r e a s e s our p r e d i c t i v e power by e i g h t y

1 I t i s important to r e c o g n i z e t h a t I am p o s t u l a t i n g a n u l l hypothesis of no c o n f l i c t involvement ( r a t h e r than the known p r o p o r t i o n of c o n f l i c t involvements) and, hence, t h i s i s not a measure of the p r o b a b i l i t y of c o r r e c t p r e d i c t i o n v i s - a - v i s a c t u a l involvements.

1 0 3

p e r c e n t i f and only i f these e i g h t o c c a s i o n s are the only t imes

i t p r e d i c t s c o n f l i c t . I f , on the o t h e r hand, the model had

p r e d i c t e d c o n f l i c t involvement on f o r t y o c c a s i o n s — only e i g h t

of which had been c o r r e c t — t h e p r e d i c t i v e power of the model

would be only o n e - f i f t h as good as we o r i g i n a l l y had thought.

Thus, i n s t e a d of e i g h t y percent p r e d i c t i v e power, i t would have

s i x t e e n percent p r e d i c t i v e power. P o i n t p r e d i c t i v e power, P,

i s d e f i n e d to be the p r o p o r t i o n of c o n f l i c t involvements

c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t e d , m u l t i p l i e d by the p r o p o r t i o n of " c o n f l i c t

involvement" p r e d i c t i o n s that are c o r r e c t . The s t a t i s t i c ranges

from zero (no improvement over the n u l l h y p o t h e s i s ) to one

( p e r f e c t p r e d i c t i o n ) . In c a l c u l a t i n g P, I have c o n s i d e r e d t h a t

i f the p r e d i c t e d p r o b a b i l i t y of the outcome v a r i a b l e d e r i v e d from

the raw p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s i s equal to or g r e a t e r than . 5 , then

t h i s i s a p r e d i c t i o n that the s t a t e w i l l become i n v o l v e d i n

c o n f l i c t ; i f l e s s than . 5 , i t i s a p r e d i c t i o n t h a t the s t a t e

w i l l not become i n v o l v e d . 1

1 If we used the a c t u a l p r o p o r t i o n of c o n f l i c t i n v o l v e m e n t s , p a , as our HQ ( r a t h e r than the h y p o t h e s i s of no c o n f l i c t i n v o l v e ­ment), we would want to s u b t r a c t from P a f a c t o r , P a , t h a t r e f l e c t s how many c o n f l i c t involvements we would get i f we randomly s e l e c t e d p a cases from our p o p u l a t i o n . For example, i t there are one hundred cases i n our p o p u l a t i o n — o f which ten are c o n f l i c t involvements — then we would expect that o n e - t e n t h of the cases drawn at random would be c o n f l i c t involvements. Now, i f we had an urn w i t h one hundred b a l l s (n inety white and ten red) and we s e l e c t e d randomly w i t h replacement ten b a l l s , we would expect to draw nine white b a l l s and one red b a l l . Our c o r r e c t i o n f a c t o r P a — t o be s u b t r a c t e d from our p r e d i c t i v e power P — w o u l d be . 0 1 ; t h a t i s , the p r o p o r t i o n of c o n f l i c t involvements c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t e d (one red b a l l of ten red b a l l s i n the urn) m u l t i p l i e d by the p r o p o r t i o n of " c o n f l i c t

104

The N i n e t e e n t h Century

A n a l y z i n g the Data

Let us now r e t u r n to the f i n d i n g s . Table 11 d i s p l a y s the

b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s between each of the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s

and involvement in m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s d u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h

c e n t u r y . For each major power there are f i v e rows of c o r r e l a t i o n

c o e f f i c i e n t s . The f i r s t row corresponds to the "anarchy"

h y p o t h e s i s ; i t c o n t a i n s the d i r e c t i o n of the a s s o c i a t i o n s ( p o s i t i v e

or n e g a t i v e ) and the squares of the c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s

(approx imat ions of the amount of v a r i a n c e i n a n a t i o n ' s IMC

involvements accounted f o r by v a r i a n c e i n each of the i n t e r v e n i n g

v a r i a b l e s ) f o r a l l annual o b s e r v a t i o n s of a major power d u r i n g

the n i n e t e e n t h century . For example, the f i r s t row of c o r r e l a t i o n s

i n Table 11 t e l l s us that B r i t a i n i s i n our data s e t f o r e i g h t y

y e a r s i n the n ineteenth c e n t u r y . During t h a t t i m e , i n c r e a s e s i n

her c a p a b i l i t i e s ( i . e . , p o s i t i v e delta power), the s e v e r i t y of her

p r i o r war e x p e r i e n c e , and the p o l a r i t y of the major power system

a l l covary p o s i t i v e l y wi th her p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , al though war e x p e r i e n c e c o v a r i e s n e g a t i v e l y (though

very weakly) wi th her i n i t i a t i o n of c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . The o n l y

s i z a b l e a s s o c i a t i o n s are those of systemic p o l a r i t y w i t h IMC

p a r t i c i p a t i o n (.30) and IMC i n i t i a t i o n ( . 2 3 ) , though a l l but one

involvement" p r e d i c t i o n s t h a t are c o r r e c t (one red b a l l out of ten b a l l s drawn from the u r n ) . P - P a c o u l d a t t a i n n e g a t i v e values and would never reach 1.0 as long as there was one c o n f l i c t involvement.

TABLE 11

BISERIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EACH MAJOR POWER'S INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS AND THE THREE INTERVENING VARIABLES, FOR THE 19th CENTURY (ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)

Nat ion Lag N P a r t i c i pate I n i t i a t e

Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y

P r e d i c t e d ---> + 2 r b - 2

r b + 2

r b + 2

r b - 2 r b

+ 2 r b

0 .01 00 .03 .00 *** UK 0 80 + .01 + 00 + .30 + .03 - .00 + .23 0 42 + .04 - 00 + •<* + .07 - .02 + .10

under­ -1 42 + .06 + 0 1 * + .13 + .13 - .00 + .05 recognized -2 41 + .06 16* + .17** + .08 + .06 +

. - 3 41 + .05 + 02 + .29 + .09 - .00 + .23

FRN 0 80 + .00 _ 00 + .00 + .00 _ .01 + .00 ' 0 28 + • 0 0 * + 01 + .01 + • 0 0 * + .01 + .01

under­ -1 27 + .22 + .00 + .01 + .22 + .00 + .01 recognized - 2 26 + .11 + 14 + .16 + .12 + .01 + . 2 1 *

. - 3 25 + .27** + 13 + .03 + .36** + .00 + .05

00 .01 .01 GMY 0 80 - .00 - 00 + .14 - .01 - .01 + .31 0 48 - .07 - 01 + . 2 8 * * - .19* - .02 + . 7 3 * * *

under­ -1 48 - .06 - .00 + . 1 5 * - .12 - .00 + . 4 3 * * * recognized - 2 48 - .05 + 00 + .01 - .13 + .00 + .12

- 3 48 - .05 - 00 + .08 - .13 - .00 + .29**

TABLE 1 1 - — C o n t i n u e d

Nat ion Lag N

P r e d i c t e d »-

P a r t i c i p a t e I n i t i a t e Nat ion Lag N

P r e d i c t e d »-

Delta Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y

Nat ion Lag N

P r e d i c t e d »- 2 2 2 b o b

2 2 2 + r b " r b + r b

A-H

under­r e c o g n i z e d

0 30 0 25

-1 25 - 2 24

k - 3 23

+ .00 + .01 + . 0 8 * + .00 - .09 + .04 + .01 - .03 - .00 - .01 - .00 - .00 - .02 - .00 + .47

- .00 - .00 + . 1 0 * - .00 - .07 + .19 + .01 - .03 - .00 - .01 - .00 - .00 - .02 - .00 + .47**

ITA

under­recognized

0 40 0 23

-1 23 . - 3 22

+ .03 - .00 + .02 + .00 + .03 - .01 + .07 + .00 + .04 + .04 - .00 + .09

+ .03 - .00 + .02 + .00 + .03 - .01 + .07 + .00 + .04 + .04 - .00 + .09

USR

under­recognized

0 80 0 70

-1 69 -2 68 - 3 67

+ .03 - .05 + .04 + .03 - . 0 4 ^ + .04 + .07 - .12 + .01 + .02 - .05 + .03 + .02 - .04 + .06

+ .03 - .05 + .04 + .03 - .04 + .04 + .07 - . 1 2 * * + .01 + .02 - .05 + .03 + .02 - .04 + .06

NOTE: I t a l y (with a l a g of two y e a r s ) engages i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n too i n f r e q u e n t l y when underrecognized to compute s t a b l e e s t i m a t e s .

F - t e s t from a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e : *** < .01 < ** < .05 < * < .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l

107

of her c o r r e l a t i o n s (and that i m p e r c e p t i b l e ) are i n the d i r e c t i o n

p r e d i c t e d by the model. The next f o u r rows correspond to the

" s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y " model; here we look o n l y at the subset

o f cases i n which the major power i s u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d . The l a t t e r

t h r e e rows ( lags one, two, and three) examine the c o v a r i a t i o n

between the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s and involvement i n i n t e r s t a t e

m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s one, two, and three years a f t e r the s t a t e

i s u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d . In other words, the c o n s t a i n i n g f a c t o r s are

always c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the IMC o b s e r v a t i o n f o r the same y e a r ;

what i s lagged i s the p u t a t i v e m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e ( i . e . , s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y ) . Thus, i n the t h i r d row of c o r r e l a t i o n s i n

Table 11 (UK, one-year l a g ) , i f B r i t a i n i s underrecognized i n

1822, 1827, e t c . , we wish to know whether the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s

are such as to permit or c o n s t r a i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s one year l a t e r ,

i . e . , 1823, 1828, e t c .

I t appears from Table 11 t h a t the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s

( i n p a r t i c u l a r , p o l a r i t y ) are most e f f i c a c i o u s f o r B r i t a i n and

Germany. For these two s t a t e s , p o l a r i t y c o v a r i e s p o s i t i v e l y and

s t r o n g l y w i t h both p a r t i c i p a t i o n and i n i t i a t i o n of c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ;

p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r o n g i s the a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h IMC i n i t i a t i o n when

Germany i s underrecognized (no time l a g ) . At the other extreme,

I t a l y d i s p l a y s no s i z a b l e a s s o c i a t i o n s and R u s s i a has only two

moderate b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s (war e x p e r i e n c e w i t h IMC p a r t i c i p a ­

t i o n , one-year l a g , and IMC i n i t i a t i o n , one-year l a g ) . The

a s s o c i a t i o n s f o r A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y and France l i e between those

108

f o r the f i r s t two s t a t e s and those f o r the l a t t e r two s t a t e s .

For A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , p o l a r i t y ( t h r e e - y e a r l a g ) c o v a r i e s s t r o n g l y

w i t h IMC involvement and, f o r F r a n c e , there are s e v e r a l

" r e s p e c t a b l e " b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s (mostly i n v o l v i n g i n c r e a s e s

i n power) when lags are i n t r o d u c e d . I t may be noted t h a t almost

a l l s i z a b l e c o r r e l a t i o n s are i n the d i r e c t i o n p r e d i c t e d by the

model .

Looking at the p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s and measures of

g o o d n e s s - o f - f i t in Table 12, we f i n d p r e c i s e l y the p a t t e r n of

a s s o c i a t i o n s d i s p l a y e d i n Table 11. There are very few s i g n

r e v e r s a l s and those a s s o c i a t i o n s t h a t p r e v i o u s l y produced

s t r o n g b i s e r i a l s now show good " c o e f f i c i e n t to e r r o r " r a t i o s .

This c o n s i s t e n t p a t t e r n in the beta weights (which are p a r t i a l

c o e f f i c i e n t s " c o n t r o l l i n g " f o r the o t h e r i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s )

i s s i m p l y a r e f l e c t i o n of the moderately low l e v e l of r n u l t i -

c o l l i n e a r i t y i n the n i n e t e e n t h century among the p h y s i c a l ,

p s y c h o l o g i c a l , and s t r u c t u r a l v a r i a b l e s used i n the a n a l y s i s .

For the United Kingdom and Germany, f o r France w i t h l a g s of

one, two, and three y e a r s , and f o r A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y w i t h a

t h r e e - y e a r l a g , the est imated m u l t i p l e c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s

(R ) and measures of p o i n t p r e d i c t i v e power (P) are not

i n c o n s i d e r a b l e .

TABLE 12

STANDARDIZED PROBIT COEFFICIENTS FOR THE THREE INTERVENING VARIABLES WHEN PREDICTING EACH MAJOR POWER'S INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS, FOR THE 19th CENTURY

(ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)

Nat ion Lag N

P r e d i c t e d »~

P a r t i c i p a t e I n i t i a t e Nat ion Lag N

P r e d i c t e d »~

Delta Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y ___

R 2 P A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y *2 R P

Nat ion Lag N

P r e d i c t e d »~ + - + + - +

*2 R P

UK

under-r e c o g .

0 80 0 42

-1 42 -2 41 - 3 41

11(15) 07(14) 49(14) 13(21) 03(20) 36(20) 25(22) 13(19) 33(21) 28(24) 33(18) 34(20) 26(21) 12(19) 51(21)

25 27 16 25 21 05 3 C 2 3

30 50

16(16) 00(15) 42(14) 24(22) -14(22) 23(21) 37(24) -03(20) 20(22) 32(26) 22(18) 28(21) 29(22) -01(20) 46(21)

20** 17 14 09 17 13 23 22 27* 22

FRN

under-recog.

0 30 0 28

-1 27 -2 26

_-3 25

04(15) -01(15) 04(15) 06(25) 10(24) 07(25) 62(30) -12(24) 28(24) 40(28) 24(21) ^8(26) 66(32) 18(20) 36(26)

00 00 02 00 35 40 39* 40 53 23

05(16) -11(16) 03(15) 06(25) 10(24) 07(25) 62(30) -12(24) 28(24) 53(29) -03(23) 53(27) 82(33) -16(25) 41(28)

01 00 02 00 35 40 42 43 61 46

GMY

under-r e c o g .

0 80 0 48

-1 48 -2 48 - 3 48

-04(22) -04(19) 34(17) -34(47) -28(28) 38(21) -47(48) -20(26) 32(20) -51(49) 06(26) 10(23) -47(42) -13(25) 23(19)

12 00 31* 22

' 3 4 17 28 00. 30 00

-13(29) -09(21) 49(18) -82(46) -30(25) 23(11) -85(43) -24(18) 31(13) -88(46) -20(19) 22(13)

• -83(39) -23(19) 29(13)

27** 00 88 56 88*** 50 86* 33 85*** 50

TABLE 12 — C o n t i n u e d

Nat ion Lag N

P r e d i c t e d * -

P a r t i c i p a t e I n i t i a t e Nat ion Lag N

P r e d i c t e d * -

A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y K2 i R P

i

A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y A 2 R P

Nat ion Lag N

P r e d i c t e d * - + - +

K2 i R P

i + - +

A 2 R P

A-H

under-r e c o g .

. 0 80 0 25

-1 25 -2 24

_-3 23

03(17) 13(16) 27(16) 28(32) -93(117) -02(18) 22(37) -41(51) -18(31)

-11(36) -03(36) -05(31) 03(27) 27(28) 98(46)

08 00 76 00 15 00 01 00 90 44

-02(19) 01(19) 23(16) 14(49) -40(118) 36(39) 22(37) -41(51) -18(31)

-11(36) -03(36) -05(31) 03(27) 27(28) 98(46)

08 00 40 00 15 00 01 00 90** 44

ITA

under-r e c o g .

0 40 0 23

-1 23 - 3 22

14(28) 16(34) 24(37) -01(31) 28(43) 14(44)

19(32) 20(39) 36(49) -00(41) 19(33) 57(57)

06 00 04 00 14 00 23 00

14(28) 16(34) 24(37) -01(31) 28(43) 14(44)

19(32) 20(39) 36(49) -00(41) 19(33) 57(57)

06 00 04 00 14 00 23 00

USR

under-r e c o g .

0 80 " 0 70 -1 69 -2 68 - 3 67

15(17) -24(17) 19(15) 17(18) -19(18) 19(17) 28(17) -42(21) 09(15) 14(18) -22(18) 17(17) 11(18) -19(19) 23(17)

13 00 11 00 28** 00 11 00 11 00

15(17) -24(17) 19(15) 17(18) -19(18) 19(17) 28(17) -42(21) 09(15) 14(18) -22(18) 17(17) 11(18) -19(19) 23(17)

13 00 11 00 28** 00 11 00 11 00

NOTE: A l l c o e f f i c i e n t s have been m u l t i p l i e d by one hundred so as to e l i m i n a t e decimal p o i n t s . Numbers w i t h i n parentheses are standard e r r o r s .

X* from p r o b i t {yj w i t h 3 d f ) : *** < .01 < ** < .05 < * < .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l

I l l

I n t e r p r e t i n g the R e s u l t s

These l a t e s t f i n d i n g s c o n t r a s t r a t h e r s h a r p l y w i t h the

f i n d i n g s f o r the n ineteenth century presented i n Table 9. The

reader w i l l r e c a l l that the b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between

s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i n the n i n e t e e n t h

century were not at a l l s t r o n g , and t h a t B r i t a i n and Germany

— the c o u n t r i e s that now produce the s t r o n g e s t a s s o c i a t i o n s —

e a r l i e r d i s p l a y e d the poorest f i t s to the " u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n

l e a d s to c o n f l i c t " h y p o t h e s i s . In l i g h t of our c u r r e n t r e s u l t s ,

two q u e s t i o n s come r e a d i l y to mind:

(1) Is i t p o s s i b l e t h a t some s i g n i f i c a n t b i v a r i a t e

r e l a t i o n s h i p s between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n were "masked" i n our e a r l i e r a n a l y s i s (Table 9)?

And,

(2) Do the a s s o c i a t i o n s t h a t we now uncover, having

i n t r o d u c e d the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s , a p p l y to the t o t a l

p o p u l a t i o n of cases f o r a g iven s t a t e or do they hold only f o r

the subset of underrecognized cases? I f the former i s t r u e ,

then i t i s the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s a l o n e , and not s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y , that are i m p o r t a n t .

As f o r the f i r s t q u e s t i o n , one manner by which the

b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p s might have been masked i s t h a t our

i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s — changes i n power, p r i o r war e x p e r i e n c e ,

and p o l a r i t y — m a y be c o r r e l a t e d w i t h s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y such

t h a t the c o n s t r a i n i n g e f f e c t s of these v a r i a b l e s occur

112

c o t e r m i n o u s l y w i t h u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n . That i s to s a y , i f i t i s

o f t e n the case t h a t , when a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e i s u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d ,

i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s are d e c l i n i n g , i t s war e x p e r i e n c e s are

d e v a s t a t i n g , and system p o l a r i t y i s l o w — i . e . , s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s n e g a t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h Delta power, p o s i t i v e l y

c o r r e l a t e d w i t h p r i o r war e x p e r i e n c e , and n e g a t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d

w i t h p o l a r i t y — t h e n we would not expect to f i n d a s t r o n g

p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n . P o i n t b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s (McNemar, 1969) can

be used to examine the r e l a t i o n s h i p between each c o n t i n u o u s l y -

measured i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e and the d i c h o t o m i z e d s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n d i c a t o r . The use of p o i n t b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s ,

r a t h e r than b i s e r i a l , i s a p p r o p r i a t e i f we wish to m a i n t a i n the

assumption ( s t a t e d at the end of the p r e c e d i n g c h a p t e r ) t h a t the

a s s o c i a t i o n between u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n and involvement i n m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n may b e t t e r be d e s c r i b e d as a t h r e s h o l d than as a

c o n t i n u o u s l i n e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p , and i s thus consonant w i t h the

s t r a t e g y of grouping the underrecognized cases as d i s t i n c t from

the o v e r r e c o g n i z e d o n e s — a s t r a t e g y employed throughout the

c u r r e n t c h a p t e r .

We see from the p o i n t b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s r e p o r t e d i n

Table 13 that f o r only one s t a t e — G e r m a n y — i s the masking

phenomenon l i k e l y . For n i n e t e e n t h century Germany, both war

e x p e r i e n c e and p o l a r i t y are such as might c o n s t r a i n c o n f l i c t i v e

b e h a v i o r when she i s underrecognized ( i . e . , war e x p e r i e n c e i s

113

TABLE 13

POINT BISERIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EACH MAJOR POWER'S STATUS INCONSISTENCY SCORES AND THE

THREE INTERVENING VARIABLES, FOR THE 19th CENTURY (ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)

N a t i o n Lay N S t a t u s I n c o n s i s t e n c y

& Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y

pb pb pb

UK 0 80 -1 79 -2 78 - 3 77

+.16 +.08 +.02 +.07 +.01 +.14 - . 2 2 * * +.03 +.16 +.06 +.04 +.22*

FRN 0 80 -1 79 -2 78 - 3 77

+.13 - . 3 8 * * * - . 1 4 - . 0 4 - . 3 2 - . 2 7 * * - . 0 1 - . 3 2 * * * - . 3 9 * * * +.07 - . 3 1 * * * - . 4 5 * * *

GMY 0 80 -1 79 -2 78 - 3 77

*** *** -•02 + . 3 0 , , , - . 5 1 , , ,

+.20 +.35 - . 5 1 +.03 +.36*** - . 4 1 * * *

A-H 0 80 -1 79 -2 78 - 3 77

+.13 - . 0 1 +.22** +.io -.04 +.27::, - . 0 3 - . 0 8 + . 3 7 ^ +.05 - . 1 2 +.47

ITA 0 40 -1 39 -2 38 - 3 37

+.25 - . 1 4 +.16 +.33** - . 1 2 +.31** +.14 - . 1 1 + . 3 1 , +.06 - . 0 5 +.30

USR 0 80 -1 79 -2 78 - 3 77

- . 0 4 - . 0 9 + . 2 5 „ - . 1 3 - . 0 6 + - 2 5 „ +.07 - . 0 3 +.26, +.03 +.00 +.19

F - t e s t from a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e : *** < .01 < ** < .05 < * < .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l

114

p o s i t i v e l y , and p o l a r i t y i s n e g a t i v e l y , c o r r e l a t e d w i t h s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y ) . Given the absence of any s i z a b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p

between war exper ience and German involvement i n m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s (Table 1 1 ) , however, i t i s the p o l a r i t y v a r i a b l e

t h a t i s important . For one o t h e r major p o w e r — F r a n c e —

t h e r e i s the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the s t a t u s - c o n f l i c t r e l a t i o n s h i p

might be masked. H y p o t h e t i c a l l y , system p o l a r i t y may c o n s t r a i n

France when she i s u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d , but there i s l i t t l e evidence

i n Table 11 t h a t t h i s i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e a p p r e c i a b l y a f f e c t s

her c o n f l i c t b e h a v i o r . For the remaining major powers — B r i t a i n ,

A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , I t a l y , and R u s s i a — the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s

do not i n t r o d u c e confounding e f f e c t s , and, f o r them, the f i n d i n g

t h a t there are no s i g n i f i c a n t b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p s remains

u n a l t e r e d .

This then b r i n g s us to the second q u e s t i o n — t h e crux

of the m a t t e r : do the a s s o c i a t i o n s t h a t we uncover , having

i n t r o d u c e d the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s , apply to the t o t a l

p o p u l a t i o n or j u s t the subset of underrecognized c a s e s , i . e . ,

does s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y make a d i f f e r e n c e i n the n i n e t e e n t h

c e n t u r y ? The evidence that we have compiled i s not amenable to

a s i m p l e , unambiguous i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . There would appear to be

t h r e e crude c a t e g o r i e s in which to c l a s s i f y the n i n e t e e n t h century

major powers. F i r s t there i s the s i t u a t i o n i n which s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s not i m p o r t a n t , but the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s a r e .

Next i s the category i n which s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s i m p o r t a n t ,

115

but the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s are not . F i n a l l y there i s the

c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n which the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s are important

when a s t a t e i s s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t .

The United Kingdom f a l l s i n t o the f i r s t category i n

t h a t the evidence f a i l s to support the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s an important f a c t o r i n B r i t a i n ' s involvement

i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s d u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . In

Table 9 we were unable to uncover f o r her a s i g n i f i c a n t s t a t u s -

c o n f l i c t r e l a t i o n s h i p and we subsequent ly demonstrated (Table 13)

t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s not being masked by any of the

i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s . We now f i n d (Table 12) that the o v e r a l l

f i t of the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s and the p o i n t p r e d i c t i v e power

of the p r o b i t equations when B r i t a i n i s underrecognized are not A O

a p p r e c i a b l y d i f f e r e n t from the R and P f o r B r i t a i n d u r i n g the

e n t i r e n i n e t e e n t h century , and v i r t u a l l y a l l the s t a n d a r d i z e d

p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s ( r e g a r d l e s s of

time l a g ) are w i t h i n one standard e r r o r of the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r

the e n t i r e c e n t u r y . This does not mean t h a t our i n t e r v e n i n g

v a r i a b l e s have no p r e d i c t i v e power, f o r they account f o r

a p p r o x i m a t e l y twenty to t w e n t y - f i v e percent of the "var iance"

i n B r i t a i n ' s involvement in m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , w i t h

p o l a r i t y being by f a r the most c o n s i s t e n t and powerful i n f l u e n c e .

We have s imply found t h a t the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s — o r , a t l e a s t ,

p o l a r i t y — a r e a p p l i c a b l e to the e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n of cases and

1 1 6

t h a t s t r a t i f y i n g the p o p u l a t i o n a c c o r d i n g to s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y

i s no more than a means of "random" s a m p l i n g .

The p l i g h t s of I t a l y and Russia d u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h

c e n t u r y are somewhat o p p o s i t e t h a t of B r i t a i n ; they f a l l i n t o the

second c a t e g o r y — t h e category t h a t r e p r e s e n t s the unmediated

a s s o c i a t i o n between our p r e d i c t o r and outcome v a r i a b l e s . Both

I t a l y and Russia are more l i k e l y to p a r t i c i p a t e i n , and i n i t i a t e ,

m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s when they are under- r a t h e r than o v e r -

r e c o g n i z e d (Table 9 ) . However, n e i t h e r country i s l i k e l y to

become i n v o l v e d i n an IMC more than twenty-two p e r c e n t of the

t ime t h a t i t i s s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t . Thus, i f we were asked to

p r e d i c t , f o r a p a r t i c u l a r y e a r , whether or not e i t h e r of these

c o u n t r i e s would become i n v o l v e d i n a m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n ,

g i v e n t h a t i t was u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d , we would do best to say "no."

Having a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the s t a t e ' s power

c a p a b i l i t i e s , p r i o r war e x p e r i e n c e , and the p o l a r i t y of the

major power system w i l l n o t , f o r the most p a r t , improve our

p r e d i c t i v e power.

F i n a l l y , France and Germany, and perhaps A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y ,

f a l l i n t o the t h i r d c a t e g o r y — t h e category to which our p o s i t e d

model a p p l i e s . S t a t e s in t h i s t h i r d category are c o n f l i c t - p r o n e

when u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d , but are c o n s t r a i n e d from involvement i n

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s by i n t e r v e n i n g f a c t o r s . Taking France as a case

i n p o i n t , f o r the e i g h t y - y e a r p e r i o d d u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h century

when she i s a major power, none of the h y p o t h e s i z e d i n t e r v e n i n g

117

v a r i a b l e s are a s s o i c a t e d wi th her p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n , or i n i t i a t i o n

o f , i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . However, d u r i n g the

n e a r l y t h i r t y years in which France i s underrecognized (with a

lag of one, two, or e s p e c i a l l y three y e a r s ) , the i n t e r v e n i n g

v a r i a b l e s g ive us r a t h e r s i z a b l e f i t s and p r e d i c t i v e power.

Increases i n French power c a p a b i l i t i e s would appear to be most

i m p o r t a n t , al though the p o l a r i t y of the major power system may

play some r o l e ; p r i o r war exper ience c o n t r i b u t e s l i t t l e to our

a b i l i t y to p r e d i c t French involvement i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s .

The c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r changes i n power (when time lags are

i n t r o d u c e d ) are u s u a l l y two to three standard e r r o r s removed

from the parameters f o r the e n t i r e e i g h t y - y e a r p e r i o d , and the

c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r p o l a r i t y are g e n e r a l l y one to two standard e r r o r s

removed. I t i s noteworthy t h a t the e f f e c t s of both these

i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s are i n the d i r e c t i o n p r e d i c t e d by the model.

For Germany, i n t e r p r e t i n g the r e s u l t s i s a b i t more

d i f f i c u l t . For the subset of cases i n which Germany i s under-

r e c o g n i z e d , we f i n d t h a t , w i t h no time l a g and a lag of one y e a r , A O

both the R and P a s s o c i a t e d w i t h IMC p a r t i c i p a t i o n ( i . e . , all

IMCs i n which Germany i s i n v o l v e d ) are c o n s i d e r a b l y l a r g e r than

the c o r r e s p o n d i n g s t a t i s t i c s f o r the e n t i r e e i g h t y - y e a r p e r i o d

(Table 1 2 ) . However, the standard e r r o r s of the p r o b i t

c o e f f i c i e n t s are of such magnitude as to make i t p r o b l e m a t i c to

argue t h a t , f o r IMC p a r t i c i p a t i o n , the p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the

underrecognized subset are s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t than the

118

c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the e n t i r e p e r i o d . On the o t h e r hand, when

l o o k i n g at German c o n f l i c t i n i t i a t i o n ( i . e . , o n l y those IMCs

t h a t Germany i n i t i a t e s ) , such doubts are l e s s j u s t i f i e d . The

c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r changes i n power and p o l a r i t y f o r the

underrecognized subset are q u i t e d i s t i n c t (about two standard

e r r o r s removed) from the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the e n t i r e p e r i o d ,

*2

and the R~s and Ps are a l s o q u i t e d i f f e r e n t and r e s p e c t a b l y

r o b u s t . I t should be noted, however, t h a t w h i l e the e f f e c t

of p o l a r i t y i s i n the p r e d i c t e d d i r e c t i o n , t h a t f o r changes

i n power i s not .

F i n a l l y , A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y presents the most d i f f i c u l t

case to i n t e r p r e t . There appears not to be any b i v a r i a t e

r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n (Table 9 ) , nor do the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s

seem to have much p r e d i c t i v e p o w e r — w i t h one e x c e p t i o n .

For the subset of underrecognized cases w i t h a t h r e e - y e a r l a g , *2

we uncover a s i z a b l e R and r e s p e c t a b l e P. From Tables 11 and 12

i t i s e v i d e n t t h a t t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s accounted f o r almost

e n t i r e l y by the l a r g e p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n between system p o l a r i t y

and IMC involvement. S ince f o r A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y t h i s i s the s i n g l e

i n s t a n c e of any a s s o c i a t i o n among the v a r i a b l e s and i s based upon

o n l y t h r e e c o n f l i c t i n v o l v e m e n t s , I am s k e p t i c a l about p l a c i n g

much c o n f i d e n c e in t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p .

I t i s not c l e a r to me what d i s t i n g u i s h e s the major powers

i n t h i s l a s t category from those i n the o t h e r two c a t e g o r i e s . I t

119

i s not t h e i r scores on s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y ; f o r example, Germany

d u r i n g the n ineteenth century i s , on the average, s l i g h t l y more

s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t than B r i t a i n , but France i s l e s s . Nor i s the

c l a s s i f i c a t i o n based upon n a t i o n a l power c a p a b i l i t i e s ; F r a n c e ,

on the average, being s l i g h t l y more powerful than B r i t a i n ,

Germany l e s s p o w e r f u l . N e i t h e r do I see any reason to suggest

a g e o p o l i t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t would emphasize the c e n t r a l

l o c a l e of Germany, France, and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y in the n i n e t e e n t h

c e n t u r y major power system, and the p e r i p h e r a l l o c a t i o n of B r i t a i n ,

R u s s i a , and I t a l y . What may account f o r Germany's and France's

adherence to the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y model i s t h e i r p o s i t i o n

i n the m i l i t a r y - p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e of n i n e t e e n t h century Europe.

Germany's years of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y are c o n c e n t r a t e d i n the

1820 to mid-1870s p e r i o d ; F r a n c e ' s , p r i o r to 1860. This i s the

time of Germany's ( P r u s s i a ' s ) s p e c t a c u l a r r i s e and of the r a p i d ,

i f tumultuous, r e b u i l d i n g of p o s t - N a p o l e o n i c France. The

h i s t o r i e s of P r u s s i a and France d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d are ones of

c a r e f u l s c r u t i n y of European al ignments accompanied by opportunism.

At the same t ime, we f i n d B r i t a i n a l o o f from c o n t i n e n t a l a f f a i r s ,

Russia expanding eastward a g a i n s t non-major power e n t i t i e s , and

A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , under M e t t e r n i c h and u n t i l the Seven Weeks War

( 1 8 6 6 ) , t r y i n g to m a i n t a i n the major power s t a t u s quo. I t may

thus be s p e c u l a t e d t h a t German and French adherence to the model

is a s s o c i a t e d wi th t h e i r c a r e f u l l y - o r c h e s t r a t e d c l i m b s to

prominence, dur ing which n e i t h e r i s s u f f i c i e n t l y powerful to

120

h e e d l e s s l y vent her f r u s t r a t i o n , but both are w i l l i n g to a c t when

the o p p o r t u n i t y presents i t s e l f . (In keeping w i t h t h i s s c e n a r i o ,

the absence of any r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and

c o n f l i c t involvement f o r B r i t a i n i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h her p o l i t i c a l

i s o l a t i o n from the "European" major powers.) This argument,

however, does not account f o r A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y ' s f i t to the model

— o n e t h a t i s l a r g e l y dependent upon her c o n c e n t r a t i o n of s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n t years dur ing the 1880s and 1890s; b u t , as noted above,

i t may w e l l be m i s l e a d i n g to draw i n f e r e n c e s from an a s s o c i a t i o n

based upon only three c o n f l i c t i n v o l v e m e n t s .

Examining the "Residuals"

Before moving on to the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , we should

b r i e f l y examine one f u r t h e r i t e m . Does our model more a c c u r a t e l y

p r e d i c t c e r t a i n l e v e l s or types of c o n f l i c t and are our r a t h e r

modest f i n d i n g s the r e s u l t of our f a i l u r e to d i f f e r e n t i a t e among

these l e v e l s and types? Table 14 o f f e r s a means of s y s t e m a t i c a l l y

examining t h i s q u e s t i o n . I have d i v i d e d each major power's

c o n f l i c t s i n two d i f f e r e n t ways. F i r s t , I have d i v i d e d the

c o n f l i c t s by l e v e l of v i o l e n c e , t h a t i s , as to whether they are

wars, m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s short of war, or merely t h r e a t s to use

force."' Second, I have d i s t i n g u i s h e d c o n f l i c t s by t y p e , i n t h i s

p a r t i c u l a r c a s e , between those c o n f l i c t s t h a t c o n f r o n t one major

^See Chapter Two and Appendix C f o r the d e f i n i t i o n s of war, m i l i t a r y a c t i o n , and t h r e a t .

TABLE 14

NUMBER OF CONFLICT-YEARS INVOLVING MAJOR POWERS AND THE PROPORTION OF THESE CONFLICT-YEARS THAT IS CORRECTLY PREDICTED BY THE PROBIT EQUATION, FOR THE 19th CENTURY (ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)

Nat ion Lag Part i c i pate I n i t i a t e

Level of C o n f l i c t Type of C o n f l i c t Level of C o n f l i c t Type of C o n f l i c t

N War N M i l . N Thr't N Maj/ N Maj/ N War N M i l . N Thr't N Maj/ N Maj/ A c t . M a j . Mi n. A c t . Maj . M i n .

UK 0 2 .50 12 .33 6 .33 5 .60 15 .27 1 1 .00 11 .09 6 17 5 .40 13 .08 1" 0 1 1.00 7 .00 4 .50 3 .67 9 .11 1 1 .00 6 .00 4 00 5 .20 12 .00

under- -1 2 .50 6 .00 2 .00 3 .33 7 .00 1 1 .00 5 .00 1 00 3 .33 5 .00 r e c o g . - 2 1 1 .00 6 .33 3 .00 3 .33 7 .29 1 1 .00 5 .20 3 00 3 .33 6 .17

L-3 1 1.00 4 .50 5 .40 3 .67 7 .43 1 1 .00 3 .00 5 20 3 .67 6 .00

FRN 0 7 .00 11 .00 4 .00 7 .00 15 .00 6 .00 10 .00 4 00 6 .00 14 .00 ' 0 1 .00 6 .00 3 .00 3 .00 7 .00 1 .00 6 .00 3 00 3 .00 7 .00

under- -1 1 1.00 6 .50 2 .50 2 .50 7 .57 1 1 .00 6 .50 2 50 2 .50 7 .57 r e c o g . -2 2 .50 4 .50 2 .50 2 .50 6 .50 1 .00 4 .50 2 50 1 .00 6 .50

. -3 3 .33 3 .33 2 .50 4 .50 4 .25 2 1 .00 3 .33 2 50 3 .67 4 .50

GMY 0 4 .00 2 .00 4 .00 4 . 00 6 .00 3 .00 2 .00 3 00 2 .00 6 .00 0 4 .25 0 2 .50 3 .00 3 .67 1 .00 1 1.00 2 1'. 00 2 .50 2 1.00

under- -1 4 .25 0 2 .00 3 .00 3 .33 3 .67 0 1 00 1 1.00 .33 r e c o g . -2 3 .00 0 2 .00 3 .00 2 .00 2 .50 0 1 00 1 1 .00 2 .00

.-3 3 .00 0 3 .00 3 .00 3 .00 2 .50 0 2 50 1 1.00 3 .33

TABLE 1 4 - - - C o n t i n u e d

Nat ion Lag P a r t i c i p a t e I n i t i a t e

Level of C o n f l i c t Type of C o n f l i c t Level of Conflict Typ e of C o n f l i c t

N War N M i l . N Thr't N Maj/ N Maj/ N War N M i l . N Thr' t N Maj/ N Maj/ A c t . Ma j . M i n . A c t . M a j . M i n .

A-H 0 5 .00 3 .00 6 00 5 .00 9 .00 3 .00 3 .00 6 00 4 .00 8 .00 r 0 1 .00 1 .00 2 00 0 4 .00 0 1 .00 2 00 0 3 .00

under- -1 • 1 .00 2 .00 2 00 0 5 .00 1 .00 2 .00 2 00 0 5 .00 r e c o g . -2 0 1 .00 3 00 2 .00 2 .00 0 1 .00 3 00 2 .00 2 .00

L - 3 0 1 .00 2 1 00 2 1.00 1 .00 0 1 .00 2 1 00 2 1 .00 1 .00

ITA r o 2 .00 2 .00 2 00 1 .00 5 .00 2 .00 2 .00 2 00 1 .00 5 .00 0 2 .00 1 .00 1 00 1 .00 3 .00 2 .00 1 .00 1 00 1 .00 3 .00

under- -1 1 .00 1 .00 1 00 1 .00 2 .00 1 .00 1 .00 1 00 1 .00 2 .00 r e c o g . - 3 1 .00 2 .00 1 00 1 .00 3 .00 1 .00 2 .00 1 00 1 .00 3 .00

USR 0 3 .00 4 .00 7 00 2 .00 12 .00 3 .00 4 .00 7 00 2 .00 12 .00 0 3 .00 4 .00 6 .00 2 .00 11 .00 3 .00 4 .00 6 00 2 .00 11 .00

under- -I 3 .00 4 .00 6 00 2 .00 11 .00 3 .00 4 .00 6 00 2 .00 11 .00 recog. -2 3 .00 4 .00 6 00 o

L .00 11 .00 3 .00 4 .00 6 00 2 .00 11 .00 1 -3 2 .00 4 .00 6 .00 1 .00 11 .00 2 .00 4 .00 6 .00 1 .00 11 .00

123

power w i t h another major power and those t h a t p i t a major power

a g a i n s t only non-major powers.

S i n c e , dur ing the f i r s t stage of the r e s e a r c h d e s i g n ,

the u n i t of a n a l y s i s i s the y e a r , we can a s s i g n o n l y one l e v e l

or type of c o n f l i c t to a given y e a r . B e l i e v i n g t h a t the model

should be more capable of p r e d i c t i n g the s e v e r e r l e v e l s and t y p e s ,

I have so assigned c o n f l i c t s when more than one of them occur

i n a g iven y e a r . Thus, i f a war, m i l i t a r y a c t i o n , and t h r e a t

a l l occur i n the same y e a r , the country i s " c r e d i t e d " w i t h a

war involvement. I f there i s no war, then the country r e c e i v e s

a " m i l i t a r y a c t i o n " f o r that y e a r , e t c . S i m i l a r l y , i f a country

i s i n v o l v e d i n a c o n f l i c t w i t h a major power and one w i t h a

minor power in the same y e a r , t h a t year i s a s s i g n e d a major power

c o n f l i c t . The p r o p o r t i o n s in the t a b l e r e p r e s e n t the f r a c t i o n

of t imes t h a t the model c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t s the year i n which a

p a r t i c u l a r l e v e l or type of c o n f l i c t o c c u r s . Thus, i n the f i r s t

row of Table 14 we see that f o r the t o t a l p e r i o d d u r i n g which

B r i t a i n i s a n i n e t e e n t h century major power, there are twenty

years i n which she p a r t i c i p a t e s i n m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s . There

are two w a r - y e a r s , of which the model c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t s one ( . 5 0 ) ;

twelve m i l i t a r y a c t i o n - y e a r s , of which we p r e d i c t f o u r ( . 3 3 ) ; and

s i x years d u r i n g which her a c t i v i t i e s are l i m i t e d to t h r e a t s ,

of which we p r e d i c t two ( . 3 3 ) . These twenty c o n f l i c t - y e a r s can

a l s o be d i v i d e d i n t o f i v e years d u r i n g which B r i t a i n p a r t i c i p a t e s

in a t l e a s t one c o n f l i c t a g a i n s t another major p o w e r — t h r e e (.60)

124

of which wo c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t ; and f i f t e e n years i n which her

c o n f l i c t s are with non-majors — f o u r (.27) a c c u r a t e l y p r e d i c t e d .

The r i g h t - h a n d s ide of the t a b l e repeats the same i n f o r m a t i o n ,

o n l y t h i s time i t i s f o r o n l y those c o n f l i c t s t h a t a country

i n i t i a t e s . As i s our usual p r o c e d u r e , rows two through f i v e

f o r each n a t i o n represent the y e a r s i n which i t i s u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d ,

the l a s t three rows encompassing time l a g s . The number of IMCs

may vary from row to row depending on the time s l i c e s .

From Table 14 i t i s f a i r l y obvious t h a t the model does

not p r e d i c t war-years more a c c u r a t e l y than m i l i t a r y a c t i o n - or

t h r e a t - y e a r s . Nor does i t do a p p r e c i a b l y b e t t e r i n f o r e c a s t i n g

major power/major power r a t h e r than major power/minor power

c o n f l i c t s . Put another way, the modest f i n d i n g s f o r the n i n e t e e n t h

c e n t u r y are not the r e s u l t of any obvious s y s t e m a t i c b i a s i n the

l e v e l s or types of c o n f l i c t to which the model p r e d i c t s .

Summarizing the Nineteenth-Century F i n d i n g s

Thus, to summarize our r e s u l t s f o r the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y :

the " u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n leads to c o n f l i c t " model as p o s t u l a t e d w i t h

i t s m e d i a t i n g f a c t o r s i n Chapter One i s not u n i v e r s a l l y supported

by the e v i d e n c e — e i t h e r f o r c o n f l i c t s as a whole or f o r v a r i o u s

l e v e l s and types of c o n f l i c t . We f i n d t h a t , f o r one major power

( B r i t a i n ) , s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y p l a y s no r o l e ; and, f o r two others

( I t a l y and R u s s i a ) , the p u t a t i v e m e d i a t i n g f a c t o r s have n e g l i g i b l e

e f f e c t s . But we do uncover some evidence f o r three s t a t e s (France,

Germany, and Austr ia-Hungary) i n support of the model. And we

125

suggest t h a t the f a c t o r that d i s t i n g u i s h e s the behavior of some

s t a t e s from t h a t of others may be t h e i r p o s i t i o n ( e . g . , c h a l l e n g e r ,

m a i n t a i n e r of the s t a t u s quo, o u t s i d e r ) w i t h i n the m i l i t a r y -

p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e of the major power system. We d i s c o v e r

t h a t , i n g e n e r a l , the model best f i t s the data when a l a g of

three years i s int roduced and when we are p r e d i c t i n g the

i n i t i a t i o n of m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . But we a l s o f i n d t h a t ,

i n the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , only two of three m e d i a t i n g f a c t o r s

appear o p e r a t i v e , those being p o l a r i t y and changes i n power.

The e f f e c t s of p o l a r i t y are c o n s i s t e n t l y i n the p r e d i c t e d

d i r e c t i o n , i . e . , the more p o l a r i z e d the major power system,

the more l i k e l y a country w i l l engage i n c o n f l i c t i v e b e h a v i o r .

On the o t h e r hand, f o r the two c o u n t r i e s f o r which changes in

power are r e l e v a n t , one (France) i s more c o n f l i c t i v e when i t s

power c a p a b i l i t i e s i n c r e a s e and the o t h e r (Germany) when i t s

c a p a b i l i t i e s decrease.

The Twentieth Century

A n a l y z i n g the Data

The f i n d i n g s f o r the t w e n t i e t h century are both more

powerful and more complex than those f o r the p r e c e d i n g c e n t u r y .

An overview of the b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s between the i n t e r v e n i n g

v a r i a b l e s and involvement i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s (Table 15)

o f f e r s us an i n t r o d u c t i o n to the c o m p l e x i t y . By and l a r g e ,

there are many more s i z a b l e a s s o c i a t i o n s i n the l a t e r than i n

TABLE 15

BISERIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EACH MAJOR POWER'S INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS AND THE FOUR INTERVENING VARIABLES, FOR THE 20th CENTURY (ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)

Nation Lag N

P r e d i c t e d -->

P a r t i c i pate Initiate Nation Lag N

P r e d i c t e d -->

A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y X - C u t t i n g Delta Power War Exp. Polarity X - C u t t i n g

Nation Lag N

P r e d i c t e d --> 2 " r b • ^ 2

" r b 2

" r b 2

" r b

USA

un.der-r e c o g .

0 59 0 24

-1 25 -2 25

. - 3 25

- .00 - .01 - .00 - .21 - .12

+ .05 + .11 + .02

+ .44

: > + .29 + .22 + . 3 5 * *

- .05 - .09 - .03 - .22

%%** - .39

- .00 - .10 - .00 - .21 - .12

+ .01 - .00 + .02 + 20 + .44

+ .08** + .28 + . 2 9 * *

+ .35

- .01 - .00 - .03

" '11** - .39

UK

under-r e c o g .

0 59 0 18

-1 16 -2 15

. - 3 13

+ .00 - .10 - .14 - .00 + .11

+ . 0 8 * + .06 + .00 - .12 + .09

- .01 - .00 + .03 + .16 - .09

** '+ .11 + .00 - .03 + .06 + .08

+ .01 - .10 - .09 - .00 + .11

** + .14 + .06 + .05 - .12 + .09

- .05 - .00 - .03 + .16 - .09

+ .30 + .00 + .19 + .06 + .08

FRN

under-r e c o g .

0 59 0 36

-1 36 -2 36

. - 3 36

- .09 - .09 - .10 - .io* - .16

+ .22 + 'l\*** + .60 + .37 + .12

- .00 + .00\ - . 1 6 * - .02 + .00

+ .11

+ .33 + .12 + .09

- .07 - .04 - .10 - .08 - .13

*** + 29

* + .20 + .60 + .50 + . 1 8 *

- .01 - .01 - .16* - .07 - .00

+ .09 + .09 + . 3 3 ^ + .17 + .14

GMY 0 28 - .01 - .12 + .31 + .04 - .01 - .12 + .31 + .04

A-H 0 14 + .41 - .08 - .01 + .34 - .03 - .04

TABLE 1 5 — Continued

Nat ion Lag N P a r t i c i p a t e I n i t i a t e

Delta Power War Exp. Polarity X- C u t t i n g A Power War Exp. Polarity X- C u t t i n g

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 P r e d i c t e d — + r tT - r b 4-

r b - r b 4- r b — r b 4- r b r b

ITA 0 34 4- .06 4- 09 4- .00 - .04 4- .06 4- .09 4- .00 - .04

USR 0 56 _ .05 _ 04 4- .14** + .00 _ .05 _ .01 4- .16** _ .02 * " 0 31 - .00 - 07 4- .03 4- .00 - .00 - .03 4- .05 - .04

under- -1 30 - .02 - 08 4- .01 4- .03 - .03 - .03 + .03 - .01 r e c o g . -2 29 - .02 - 04 + .09 4- .04 - .03 - .01 4- . 1 5 * - .01

. -3 28 - .04 - 10 4- .11 4- .00 - .05 - .07 4- .11 - .01

CHN 0 21 _ .05 4- 01 _ .00 _ .00 _ .05 4- .01 _ .00 _ .00 under- [ o 9 + .07 4- 31 4- .21 - .17 4- .07 4- .31 + .21 - .17

JPN 0 45 + . 1 9 * _ 08 _ .01 4- .07 + . 1 9 * _ .08 _ .01 4- .07 0 41 4- .04 - .06 - .03 4- .17* 4- .04 - .06 - .03 4- . 1 7 *

under- -1 38 4- .34 - 06 - .02 - .01 4- - .06 - .02 - .01 r e c o g . - 2 35 4-

• 3 3 * - 07 - .02 - .01 4- . 3 3 , - .07 - .02 - .01 . -3 32 4- . 2 5 * - 09 - .02 - .00 4- .25 - .09 - .02 - .00

NOTE: Germany, A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , and I t a l y are underrecognized on too few o c c a s i o n s and/or engage in c o n f r o n t a t i o n too i n f r e q u e n t l y when underrecognized to compute s t a b l e e s t i m a t e s . In a d d i t i o n , China i s too i n f r e q u e n t l y underrecognized to o b t a i n s t a b l e e s t i m a t e s when time lags are i n t r o d u c e d .

F - t e s t from a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e : * * * < . 0 1 < * * < .05*^ * .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l

128

the e a r l i e r century . B u t , u n l i k e the n i n e t e e n t h , some of the

m e d i a t i n g e f f e c t s of the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s i n the c u r r e n t

c e n t u r y appear to be q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from those t h a t were

h y p o t h e s i z e d i n Chapter One. In p a r t i c u l a r , p r i o r war

e x p e r i e n c e would seem to be p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to involvement

i n subsequent m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s ,

B r i t a i n , France, and, perhaps, I t a l y and C h i n a , a l though not

f o r Germany, the S o v i e t Union, and Japan. And c r o s s - c u t t i n g

bonds, l e s s important because o f the smal lness of the b i s e r i a l

c o r r e l a t i o n s , a l s o appear to d e v i a t e from the d i r e c t i o n

h y p o t h e s i z e d i n the m o d e l — a t l e a s t f o r France and, perhaps,

B r i t a i n and Japan, w i t h only the United S t a t e s c l e a r l y e x h i b i t i n g

the n e g a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p p o s i t e d i n the model. The e f f e c t s of

the two remaining i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s , p o l a r i t y and changes i n

power, a r e , however, g e n e r a l l y i n the h y p o t h e s i z e d d i r e c t i o n

when s i z a b l e ; y e t , a g a i n , France may be an e x c e p t i o n .

Before attempting to e x p l a i n why these c o e f f i c i e n t s d e v i a t e

from the e x p e c t e d , we would l i k e to know i f the d i r e c t i o n s of the

b i v a r i a t e b i s e r i a l s i n Table 15 remain u n a l t e r e d when we " c o n t r o l "

f o r the e f f e c t s of the o t h e r v a r i a b l e s . For example, i s p r i o r war

e x p e r i e n c e s t i l l p o s i t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h involvement i n

subsequent c o n f r o n t a t i o n s a f t e r we have a l l o w e d changes i n

c a p a b i l i t y , l e v e l of system p o l a r i t y , and c r o s s - c u t t i n g to account

for a l l the "variance" t h a t they can? The p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s

would normal ly help us to answer t h i s q u e s t i o n s i n c e the "variance"

129

accounted f o r by the other v a r i a b l e s i s " p a r t i a l l e d o u t . " B u t ,

as we s h a l l see below, there are c o n d i t i o n s under which these

e s t i m a t o r s are i m p r e c i s e .

When we examine the s t a n d a r d i z e d p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s

i n Table 17 (p. 135), we f i n d , i n a number of i n s t a n c e s , that

there are s i g n r e v e r s a l s and t h a t the r e l a t i v e s i z e of the

betas are a good deal d i f f e r e n t than we might expect based upon

the b i s e r i a l s . What we are w i t n e s s i n g , however, may not be the

e f f e c t s of p a r t i a l l i n g out " v a r i a n c e , " but r a t h e r the suppressor

e f f e c t s t h a t can r e s u l t from m u l t i c o l i n e a r i t y among the

i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s . That i s to s a y , i f two or more of the

i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s are h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h one another

and s i m u l t a n e o u s l y employed i n an e q u a t i o n , the importance

( i . e . , the c o e f f i c i e n t f o r ) one or more of these v a r i a b l e s

may be i n f l a t e d w h i l e that f o r o t h e r s i s , c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y ,

d e f l a t e d . Under these c o n d i t i o n s i t i s not p o s s i b l e to have

much f a i t h i n the d i r e c t i o n or magnitude of the p r o b i t

c o e f f i c i e n t s . I t i s p o s s i b l e , however, to p a r t i a l l y d i s e n t a n g l e

the e f f e c t s of the i n t e r c o r r e l a t e d i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s ( i . e . ,

to s p e c i f y which v a r i a b l e s are most powerful in p r e d i c t i n g c o n f l i c t

i n v o l v e m e n t ) . The c a p a b i l i t y to do so i s based upon the f a c t that

the m u l t i p l e c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s are not a f f e c t e d by m u l t i -

c o l l i n e a r i t y . A s imple way to view t h i s i s t h a t the p r o b i t

c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r some of the c o l l i n e a r v a r i a b l e s are being d e f l a t e d

to compensate f o r the i n f l a t i o n of o t h e r c o e f f i c i e n t s , but the

130

o v e r a l l s t r e n g t h of a s s o c i a t i o n i s u n a l t e r e d . Based upon t h i s

f a c t , we can re- run the p r o b i t a n a l y s i s , a l t e r n a t e l y removing

one i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e a t a t i m e . Great care should be taken

when i n t e r p r e t i n g the r e s u l t s of t h i s procedure. I f the

c o r r e c t l y - s p e c i f i e d model n e c e s s i t a t e s the i n c l u s i o n of a l l

f o u r i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s , of which two or more happen to be

s i g n i f i c a n t l y c o r r e l a t e d , then the e s t i m a t e d parameters w i l l be

i n e f f i c i e n t ( i . e . , have l a r g e e r r o r terms) but they w i l l not be

b i a s e d ( i . e . , the expected value w i l l be the t r u e p o p u l a t i o n

parameter ) . The more h i g h l y c o l l i n e a r the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s ,

the more i n e f f i c i e n t the e s t i m a t o r s . However, when we omit

h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d — b u t n e c e s s a r y — v a r i a b l e s , the r e s u l t i n g

e s t i m a t e s will be b iased (al though they w i l l a l s o be more

e f f i c i e n t ) . That i s to say, i f and X^ are two c o r r e l a t e d

v a r i a b l e s that are necessary to account f o r an outcome v a r i a b l e Y,

then by o m i t t i n g X-j from the a n a l y s i s , we c r e d i t X̂ w i t h the

"explanatory power" unique to X̂ and t h a t shared j o i n t l y w i t h .

Thus, to the extent that X-j and X̂ are c o r r e l a t e d , the c o e f f i c i e n t

f o r X^ i s b i a s e d . However, we do gain some i n f o r m a t i o n . I f K2 Ry-x X 1 S *^i the multiple c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t r e s u l t i n g from

1 2 A p the p r e d i c t i o n of Y from X-j and X^, and Ry.^ i s t h a t from Y on

A 2 A 2 2

X,, a l o n e , then R y ^ ^ - R y ^ i s t h a t p o r t i o n of Y t h a t i s

u n i q u e l y accounted f o r by X-j. In t h i s manner we can i d e n t i f y

the most powerful v a r i a b l e s — the ones t h a t c o n t r i b u t e most to

131

the d e c l i n e i n the s t rength of r e l a t i o n s h i p m e a s u r e s — e v e n though

we cannot get an unbiased e s t i m a t e of the parameters.

T h i s i s an expensive and t ime-consuming process and,

f o r e x p l o r a t o r y purposes, I decided to s e l e c t only one s e t of

cases f o r each major power. To maximize c o m p a r a b i l i t y , I chose

(when p o s s i b l e ) the same cases f o r each s t a t e : the subset of

underrecognized cases wi th a t h r e e - y e a r l a g . This subset of

cases produced the s t r o n g e s t f i t s d u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y

and, as we s h a l l see below i n Table 17, i t g e n e r a l l y c o n t a i n s

the best f i t s in the t w e n t i e t h century as w e l l . For one major

p o w e r — C h i n a — a s o l u t i o n f o r the underrecognized subset c o u l d

only be o b t a i n e d when there was no time l a g . Three o t h e r powers

— G e r m a n y , A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , and I t a l y — w e r e too i n f r e q u e n t l y

i n v o l v e d i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s when underrecognized to permit the

p r o b i t a l g o r i t h m to converge a n d , as a r e s u l t , were not examined.

By and l a r g e we f i n d t h a t the p r o b i t e s t i m a t e s o b t a i n e d

from the " c o m p l e t e l y - s p e c i f i e d " model (the f i r s t row f o r each

country i n Table 16) are upheld when we a l t e r n a t e l y e x c l u d e

i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s (rows two through f i v e f o r each c o u n t r y ) .

Of c o u r s e , the i n o r d i n a t e l y i n f l a t e d beta weights ( > 1 . 0 ) from

I he " c o m p l e t e l y - s p e c i f i e d " model are reduced when c o l l i n e a r

v a r i a b l e s are excluded (as seen f o r France and C h i n a ) , but the

d i r e c t i o n s of the c o e f f i c i e n t s remain q u i t e s t a b l e , and the

omiss ion of the v a r i a b l e s w i t h the l a r g e r beta weights i n row one

i'. a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the most p r e c i p i t o u s d e c l i n e i n the R s i n

TABLE 16

STANDARDIZED PROBIT COEFFICIENTS AND THE INTERCORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE FOUR INTERVENING VARIABLES WHEN PREDICTING EACH MAJOR POWER'S PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS, FOR THE 20th CENTURY

(SUBSET OF UNDERRECOGNIZED CASES, THREE-YEAR TIME LAG)

Nat ion Lag N

P r e d i c t e d

A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y X-Cut. R 2 Nation Lag N

P r e d i c t e d + - +

R 2

USA -3 24 -62(48) 26(57) 52(60) 15(51) 27(62) 65(69) 09(54)

-54(43) 68(62) -04(20) -74(51) 40(44) 09(42) -59(47) 10(26) 58(73)

69* 54* 76** 72* 72**

UK - 3 12 35(28) 02(34) -55(69) 62(76) 18(55) -20(66) 52(59)

35(27) -57(52) 62(72) 37(35) 42(35) 41(48) 51(40) 10(55) -35(60)

80 37 80 46 30

FRN -3 33 -13(14) 100(45) 153(73) 58(26) 101(50) 161(30) 60(28)

-43(39) 30(32) 49(33) -66(34) 28(19) 06(22) -53(27) 71(35) 64(45)

-k-r-k

? K k *

94 3 4 * * 52 61**

A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y X-Cut

War Exp. Polarity X-Cut. IMC

War Exp. Polarity X-Cut . IMC

War Exp. Polarity X-Cut. IMC

-17 06 43 21 -87

-34 66

- 2 3 ^ 34 -81 30 -11 33 31

02 -06 -66

07 42 -39 35

-62

29

31

TABLE 1 6 - - - C o n t i n u e d

Nat ion Lag N

P r e d i c t e d

Delta Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y X-Cut . - 2 R̂ Nat ion Lag N

P r e d i c t e d + - +

- 2 R̂

USR - 3 25 -13(18) -77(97) 69(45) -06(28) -85(112) 64(43) -06(29)

-11(19) 79(57) 27(23) -21(25) -74(64) -29(30) -13(18) -67(57) 74(45)

75 54 39 69

CHN^ 0 9 35(41) 154(148) 157(246) 235(297) 198(133) 185(215) 318(258)

57(41) 155(330) 74(283) 49(42) 129(139) 53(126) 59(41) 80(96) 00(90)

65 68 64 60 56

JPN - 3 32 74(36) -27(29) -29(22) 13(19) -66(57) 02(26) -29(31)

82(41) -41(28) 21(22) 63(35) -45(39) 06(26) 71(37) -35(32) -28(23)

88 29 83** 73* 86

A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y X-Cut

War Exp. Polarity X-Cut. IMC

War Exp. Polarity X-Cut . IMC

War Exp. Polarity X-Cut. IMC

-46 -49 89

54 -94 -97 26 55 45 -42

-18 11 52

-05 -56 -18 50 -29 -13 06

NOTE: A l l c o e f f i c i e n t s have been m u l t i p l i e d by one hundred so as to e l i m i n a t e decimal p o i n t s . Numbers w i t h i n parentheses are standard e r r o r s . (̂ ) The c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r China are est imated on the subset of underrecognized cases w i t h no time l a g .

k O >

X L from p r o b i t (% w i t h 3/4 d f ) : *** < .01 < ** < .05 < * <_.10 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l

134

rows two through f i v e . Thus we see t h a t changes i n power

account f o r a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n of unique "var iance" i n

A m e r i c a n , B r i t i s h , and Japanese p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ; war exper ience i s s a l i e n t f o r French and S o v i e t

p a r t i c i p a t i o n ; p o l a r i t y has i t s g r e a t e s t unique e f f e c t on B r i t i s h ,

F r e n c h , and S o v i e t c o n f l i c t b e h a v i o r ; and c r o s s - c u t t i n g i s

important f o r B r i t i s h and French b e h a v i o r . Due to the very high

degree of m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y among the i n d i c a t o r s f o r C h i n a ,

the e x c l u s i o n of any p a r t i c u l a r v a r i a b l e does l i t t l e to reduce K 2

her R (although c r o s s - c u t t i n g does the most ) .

Emboldened by the r e s u l t s r e p o r t e d i n Table 16, I w i l l

move on to a d e s c r i p t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s uncovered by the

p r o b i t runs as d e p i c t e d i n Table 17. I t should be kept c l e a r l y

in mind, however, t h a t such d e s c r i p t i o n and any subsequent

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the e f f e c t s of the i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r v e n i n g

v a r i a b l e s are h i g h l y tenuous, a l though the o v e r a l l f i t s of the

p r o b i t equat ions are not.

We can see from Table 17 t h a t the f i r s t i n t e r v e n i n g

v a r i a b l e — c h a n g e s i n p o w e r — i s n o t , i n g e n e r a l , very p o w e r f u l .

For the two s t a t e s f o r which i t i s most i m p o r t a n t — A u s t r i a -

Hungary and J a p a n — a n d f o r a t h i r d s t a t e — I t a l y — i t i s

p o s i t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d wi th involvement i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ,

1 Since R i s merely as e s t i m a t e of the "true" m u l t i p l e c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t , the e x c l u s i o n of a v a r i a b l e may be accompanied, from time to t i m e , by a s l i g h t i n c r e a s e in the s t a t i s t i c .

TABLE 17

STANDARDIZED PROBIT COEFFICIENTS FOR THE FOUR INTERVENING VARIABLES WHEN PREDICTING EACH MAJOR POWER'S INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS, FOR THE 20th CENTURY (ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)

Nation Lag N

Predi cted »-

P a r t i c i pate Initiate Nation Lag N

Predi cted »-

A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y X-Cut. R P A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y X-Cut . A 2 R P

Nation Lag N

Predi cted »- + - + -

R P

+ - +

A 2 R P

USA

under-r e c o g .

0 59 * 0 24 -1 24 - 2 24 - 3 24

-03(20) 21(35) 34(24) 09(37) -55(47) 77(55) 90(40) 101(66)

02(23) 53(67) 88(51) 67(74) -63(46) 18(60) 54(43) 21(65) -62(48) 26(57) 52(60) 15(51)

14 00 63** 26 50 27 5 6 , 13 69 33

-05(21) 08(38) 32(25) 08(38) -72(52) 39(58) 86(42) 37(71)

02(23) 53(67) 88(51) 67(74) -63(46) 18(60) 54(43) 21(65) -62(48) 26(57) 52(60) 15(51)

10 00 70 30 50 27 5 6 , 13 69 33

UK

under-recog.

0 59 " 0 18 -1 16 -2 14

.-3 12

-05(17) 34(21) 27(23) 33(17) -51(43) 46(50) 30(50) -21(35) -43(36) 69(52) 73(53) -07(31)

04(33) -03(64) 32(60) 17(31) 35(28) 02(34) -55(61) 62(76)

18 11 34 10 35 46 16 44 80 33

02(17) 26(20) 13(23) 48(17) -51(48) 46(50) 30(50) -21(35) -37(33) 10(26) -41(60) 94(117)

04(33) -03(64) 32(60) 17(31) 35(23) 02(34) -55(61) 62(76)

•k -k

29 11 34 10 92* 36 16 44 80 33

FRN

under-r e c o g .

0 59 ' 0 36 -1 35 -2 34 - 3 33

-22(14) 91(39) 117(59) 44(22) -10(11) 111(65) 156(99) 50(31) -26(15) 141(107) 143(141) 36(42) -19(10) 122(59) 162(83) 43(22) -18(14) 100(45) 158(73) '58(26)

77*** 16 •k k

37 17 89*** 64 98*** 60 96*** 46

-22(16) 88(38) 107(57) 47(24) -10(17) 104(66) 135(97) 49(35) -26(15) 141(107) 143(141) 36(42) -26(17) 125(87) 145(124) 40(36) -22(19) 99(64) 149(104) 61(37)

69*** 27 70* 27 89*** 64 90*** 44 *** 88 38

GMY 0 28 00(00) -101(84) -02(02) 00(00) •k k

99 22 00(00) -101(84) -02(02) 00(00) go,*** 22

A-H 0 14 74(47) -41(35) -19(29) 71* 36 64(45) -32(36) -24(31) 54 50

TABLE 1 7 - - - C o n t i n u e d

Nat ion Lag N

P r e d i c t e d

P a r t i c i pate Initiate Nat ion Lag N

P r e d i c t e d

A Power War E X D . P o l a r i t y X-Cut. P/ P A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y X-Cut. A 2 R P

Nat ion Lag N

P r e d i c t e d + - + -

P/ P

+ - + -

A 2 R P

ITA 0 34 20(21) 57(27) 22(31) -32(26) 30 25 20(21) 57(27) 22(31) -32(26) 30 25

USR

under-r e c o g .

0 56 r 0 31 -1 29 -2 27

.-3 25

-14(16) -30(23) 48(21) 01(21) -04(23) -39(31) 16(26) -14(30) -03(26) -30(30) 19(27) 04(32) -10(23) -15(26) 55(35) 31(29) -13(18) -77(97) 69(45) -06(28)

31 09 14 21 11 42 32 41 72* 26

-16(17) -31(23) 43(23) -14(22) -04(23) -46(30) 09(26) -44(31) -20(26) -35(30) 10(27) -35(33) -11(21) -20(25) 63(46) 03(29) -21(20) -86(107) 58(46) -27(31)

29* 13 19 25 14 18 39 36 70* 30

CHN 0 21 under- [ 0 9

-21(30) 50(62) -05(71) 41(87) 35(41) 154(148) 157(246) 235(297)

10 20 65 64

-21(30) 50(62) -05(71) 41(87) 35(41) 154(148) 157(246) 235(297)

10 20 65 64

JPN

under-recog.

0 45 0 41

-1 38 -2 35

.-3 32

71(28) -21(28) -33(20) 39(18) 65(34) -19(32) -35(21) 41(19) 87(40) 11(45) -44(30) 20(20) 77(35) -34(39) -43(29) 27(26) 74(36) -27(29) -29(22) 13(19)

87 17 84 07 83** 27

k k

76 20 •kk

88 20

71(28) -21(28) -33(20) 39(18) 65(34) -19(32) -35(21) 41(19) 87(40) 11(45) -44(30) 20(20) 77(35) -34(39) -43(29) 27(26) 74(36) -27(29) -29(22) 13(19)

87*** 17 •kk

84 07 83** 27 76** 20 88** 20

NOTE: A l l c o e f f i c i e n t s have been m u l t i p l i e d by one hundred so as to e l i m i n a t e decimal p o i n t s . Numbers w i t h i n parentheses are standard e r r o r s .

from p r o b i t ( 7 . w i t h 4 d f ) : *** < .01 < ** <• . 0 5 < * ^ .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l

137

as h y p o t h e s i z e d in Chapter One. However, f o r f o u r o t h e r s t a t e s

— m o s t n o t i c e a b l y the United S t a t e s and B r i t a i n , but a l s o France

and the S o v i e t U n i o n — t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p may be n e g a t i v e , al though

the l a r g e e r r o r terms make i t d i f f i c u l t to say. The e f f e c t s of

the second i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e — p r i o r war e x p e r i e n c e — a r e the

same as we found wi th the b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s . Contrary to

what i s hypothesized i n Chapter One, t h i s v a r i a b l e i s g e n e r a l l y

p o s i t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d wi th p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n , and i n i t i a t i o n o f ,

i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . A g a i n , Germany, the S o v i e t

U n i o n , and perhaps Japan are e x c e p t i o n s . For almost a l l major

powers, the t h i r d i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e — p o l a r i t y — i s p o s i t i v e l y

r e l a t e d to involvement in c o n f r o n t a t i o n s as p o s i t e d i n the model.

The two anomalies are A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y and J a p a n , f o r n e i t h e r of

which i s p o l a r i t y a p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r o n g i n t e r v e n i n g f o r c e . And

f i n a l l y , the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the f o u r t h i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e

— c r o s s - c u t t i n g — d o not support the h y p o t h e s i s p o s i t e d in the

model . By and l a r g e we f i n d t h a t the more c r o s s - c u t a s t a t e ' s

bonds, the g r e a t e r the p r o b a b i l i t y of m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n .

While the S o v i e t Union, I t a l y , and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y g e n e r a l l y

d i s p l a y the p o s i t e d negat ive r e l a t i o n s h i p , the magnitude of the

s t a n d a r d e r r o r s suggests t h a t these e s t i m a t e s may not be s t a b l e .

Despite our seeming i n a b i l i t y to c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t the

d i r e c t i o n of the a s s o c i a t i o n s between the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s

and involvement in m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n f o r many s t a t e s , the

p r o b i t equations produce very good f i t s to the d a t a . The m u l t i p l e

138

c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s and measures of p o i n t p r e d i c t i v e power

are q u i t e s i z a b l e f o r a l l the major powers, p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r

France and Japan. And as we found when we examined the b i v a r i a t e

r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and IMC involvement

i n Chapter Three, the s t r e n g t h s of a s s o c i a t i o n s i n the t w e n t i e t h

c e n t u r y are d e c i d e d l y g r e a t e r than those f o r the n i n e t e e n t h

c e n t u r y .

I n t e r p r e t i n g the R e s u l t s

The f i n d i n g s presented above r a i s e two b a s i c i s s u e s :

*2

(1) While the R s and Ps from the p r o b i t equat ions

demonstrate t h a t we have i d e n t i f i e d some very potent i n f l u e n c e s

on major power c o n f l i c t b e h a v i o r , we may n e v e r t h e l e s s have

i n c o r r e c t l y s p e c i f i e d the d i r e c t i o n of the a s s o c i a t i o n f o r a

number of c o u n t r i e s . We, t h e r e f o r e , need to ask whether there

are p l a u s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r these a s s o c i a t i o n s .

And,

(2) While we have o b t a i n e d much s t r o n g e r f i t s to the data

i n the t w e n t i e t h century than we had i n the n i n e t e e n t h , we need

to a s c e r t a i n whether knowing t h a t a major power i s s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n t s i g n i f i c a n t l y enhances our a b i l i t y to p r e d i c t

i t s c o n f l i c t behavior in the c u r r e n t c e n t u r y .

Let us turn to the f i r s t i s s u e c o n c e r n i n g a l t e r n a t i v e

e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r the s ign r e v e r s a l s i n the probit. c o e f f i c i e n t s .

Given the small N and the degree of m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y among the

i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s , the s i m p l e s t e x p l a n a t i o n f o r these r e v e r s a l s

139

i s t h a t the c o e f f i c i e n t s are u n s t a b l e . As we can s e e , the

s t a n d a r d e r r o r s of the p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s are g e n e r a l l y q u i t e

l a r g e and i t i s not d i f f i c u l t to imagine what would happen i f

a few data p o i n t s were d i f f e r e n t . Indeed, i f our R s had

turned out to be s m a l l , t h i s s e c t i o n of the c h a p t e r would

have been q u i t e b r i e f , as I would have probably i n t e r p r e t e d

the s i g n r e v e r s a l s to be randomly-generated " n o i s e . " However,

the c o n s i s t e n t l y high R's n e c e s s i t a t e t h a t I at l e a s t s p e c u l a t e about h i s t o r i c a l , i f not t h e o r e t i c a l , reasons t h a t might account f o r the numerous d i s c r e p a n c i e s between our l a t e s t f i n d i n g s and the r e l a t i o n s h i p s that I p o s t u l a t e d i n Chapter One. A g a i n , I wish to make i t c l e a r that I am assuming i n the e x p l i c a t i o n below t h a t the v a r i a b l e s w i t h the l a r g e s t p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s g e n e r a l l y account f o r the most unique "var iance" i n the outcome v a r i a b l e and have s igns t h a t a c c u r a t e l y r e f l e c t the d i r e c t i o n of t h e i r a s s o c i a t i o n s (see Table 1 6 ) , but the reader i s c a u t i o n e d about the tenuous nature of t h i s assumption.

The f i r s t i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e — c h a n g e i n p o w e r — i s

h y p o t h e s i z e d to be p o s i t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h involvement i n

m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . Although we f i n d t h a t t h i s hypothesized

r e l a t i o n s h i p i s g e n e r a l l y supported by the b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s ,

we d i s c o v e r that the p a r t i a l ( p r o b i t ) c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the

U n i t e d S t a t e s , B r i t a i n , F r a n c e , and, to a l e s s e r e x t e n t , the

S o v i e t Union are n e g a t i v e , i . e . , c o n t r o l l i n g f o r the o t h e r

i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s , these s t a t e s are more c o n f l i c t - p r o n e when

140

t h e i r power c a p a b i l i t i e s are d e c r e a s i n g . This does not appear

to be a s s o c i a t e d wi th any s y s t e m a t i c d i f f e r e n c e between the

n a t i o n a l power scores f o r these s t a t e s and the scores f o r the

o t h e r major powers. What, t h e n , do the f o u r aforementioned

s t a t e s have in common that might account f o r the s i g n r e v e r s a l s ?

I would contend t h a t , f o r most of the y e a r s d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h

c e n t u r y i n which they are i n our data s e t , the US, UK, F r a n c e ,

a n d , to a l e s s e r e x t e n t , Russia/USSR are s t a t u s quo powers.

By t h i s I mean that they have f a i r l y c l e a r l y d e f i n e d spheres

of i n f l u e n c e and are more or l e s s s a t i s f i e d w i t h the e x i s t i n g

demarcations of these boundar ies. I would p o s t u l a t e t h a t

s t a t u s quo powers perceive t h e i r p r e f e r e n t i a l p o s i t i o n s to be

t h r e a t e n e d when t h e i r r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s d e c l i n e and,

under such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , b e l l i c o s e b e h a v i o r becomes a mechanism

f o r warning a d v e r s a r i e s and u n d e r l i n g s about the dangers of

adventurous p o l i c i e s . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t , i n the

t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , the three s t a t e s — A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , J a p a n ,

and, to a l e s s e r e x t e n t , I t a l y — t h a t e x h i b i t the p o s i t e d p o s i t i v e

a s s o c i a t i o n are a l l " d i s s a t i s f i e d " powers. Both Japan and I t a l y

openly pursue e x p a n s i o n i s t p o l i c i e s i n d e f i a n c e of the s t a t u s quo

powers; and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , which i s i n our data set f o r only

a very few y e a r s , can a c c u r a t e l y be d e s c r i b e d d u r i n g these years

1 S i n g e r and Small (1974) f i n d , when l o o k i n g at wars between major powers, t h a t the United S t a t e s i s d e c l i n i n g i n power p r i o r to each of i t s involvements. This f i n d i n g , however, i s based upon only t h r e e war exper iences (WW I, WW I I , and the Korean).

141

as d i s s a t i s f i e d wi th e x i s t i n g spheres of i n f l u e n c e and i n t e n t on

r e a s s e r t i n g her c o n t r o l over the B a l k a n s . In s h o r t , the e f f e c t of

changes i n power on c o n f l i c t behavior may w e l l depend on whether

or not a n a t i o n i s a s t a t u s quo power.

The second i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e — p r i o r war e x p e r i e n c e —

was o r i g i n a l l y hypothesized to be n e g a t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h

involvement in m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , but most of the b i s e r i a l

c o r r e l a t i o n s and p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the t w e n t i e t h century

are p o s i t i v e . This leads me to surmise t h a t f o r these s t a t e s

( i n p a r t i c u l a r France and C h i n a , but a l s o the U n i t e d S t a t e s ,

B r i t a i n , and I t a l y ) war l o s s e s are not s u f f i c i e n t l y severe to

outweigh perceived gains from m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n . In f a c t ,

i t i s to be argued t h a t , f o r these s t a t e s , wars a c t u a l l y serve

to enhance the b e l i e f that m i l i t a r y f o r c e i s a u s e f u l means of

o b t a i n i n g one's ends. What we appear to have i s o l a t e d are the

v i c t o r s ( o r , at l e a s t , the undefeated p r o t a g o n i s t s ) of l a r g e wars.

A l l these s t a t e s a l s o become i n v o l v e d i n the use of m i l i t a r y f o r c e

to p r e s e r v e o r d e r , or to e n f o r c e c l a i m s , s h o r t l y a f t e r the

c e s s a t i o n of major wars. On the o t h e r hand, the three s t a t e s

— G e r m a n y , the S o v i e t U n i o n , and J a p a n — t h a t d i s p l a y the p o s i t e d

1 The a t t e n t i v e reader may have boggled a t the d i f f e r e n c e between the z e r o - o r d e r b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n (Table 15) and the p a r t i a l c o e f f i c i e n t (Table 17) f o r p r i o r German war e x p e r i e n c e when p r e d i c t i n g IMC involvement. The f i g u r e s below should demonstrate the importance of the war e x p e r i e n c e v a r i a b l e , as w e l l as the extent to which the c o e f f i c i e n t f o r the h i g h l y c o l l i n e a r p o l a r i t y v a r i a b l e i s i n c r e a s e d when war e x p e r i e n c e i s omit ted from a run. On the r i g h t i s presented the i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n

142

n e g a t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n between war e x p e r i e n c e and involvement i n

subsequent c o n f r o n t a t i o n s are a l l c o u n t r i e s t h a t are denied

t a n g i b l e gains and/or s u f f e r c a t a s t r o p h i c l o s s e s as a r e s u l t

of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n l a r g e - s c a l e wars. C o n c o m i t a n t l y , f o r e i g n

o c c u p a t i o n (Germany a f t e r WW I ) , c i v i l war (USSR a f t e r WW I ) ,

and m i l i t a r y and economic e x h a u s t i o n (Japan a f t e r Russo-Japanese)

o f t e n make i t i m p o s s i b l e f o r these s t a t e s to engage i n renewed

h o s t i l i t i e s . I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , not too u n l i k e l y that these

two s e t s of s t a t e s have very d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t i o n s about the

u s e f u l n e s s of m i l i t a r y f o r c e — t h e former p e r c e i v i n g t h a t the

m a t r i x a n d , on the l e f t , the s t a n d a r d i z e d p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the f o u r i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s when p r e d i c t i n g German involvement i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s (no time lag) d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . J u s t as i n Table 16, the p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the " c o m p l e t e l y - s p e c i f i e d " model (see Germany, Table 17) are given i n the f i r s t row, w h i l e , i n each subsequent row, one i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e i s a l t e r n a t e l y o m i t t e d . When ( i n row three) war exper ience i s o m i t t e d , the R̂ d e c l i n e s p r e c i p i t o u s l y , y e t , at the same t i m e , the c o e f f i c i e n t f o r the h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d p o l a r i t y i n d i c a t o r d r a m a t i c a l l y i n c r e a s e s . The d e c l i n e i n the R̂ i l l u s t r a t e s the importance of the war e x p e r i e n c e v a r i a b l e . The i n c r e a s e i n the p o l a r i t y c o e f f i c i e n t i s due to the f a c t t h a t , i n row t h r e e , the c o e f f i c i e n t r e f l e c t s both the "explanatory power" unique to p o l a r i t y and t h a t shared j o i n t l y w i t h the omitted war e x p e r i e n c e v a r i a b l e .

A Power War Exp. P o l a r . X-Cut .

00(00) -101(84) -02(02) 00(00) -101(84) -02(02) 00(00)

-06(22) 62(34) 13(22) -00(01) -100(142) 01(01) -00(00) -101(113) -02(02)

A 0

99 99 42 99 99'

A War 3ower Exp

War Exp. -lT^ P o l a r . -02 - 6 2 X - C u t . -11 20 IMC -11 - 3 5

Po- X-

(NOTE: A l l c o e f f i c i e n t s have been m u l t i p l i e d by one hundred so as to e l i m i n a t e decimal p o i n t s . Two a s t e r i s k s (**) denote " s i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l . " )

143

f r u i t s of combat may w e l l outweigh p o s s i b l e l o s s e s , the l a t t e r

having much lower e x p e c t a t i o n s concerning the u t i l i t y of f o r c e .

The t h i r d i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e — p o l a r i t y — i s p o s i t e d

to be p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to involvement i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , and

t h i s hypothesized r e l a t i o n s h i p i s s t r o n g l y supported by the d a t a .

There are some s ign r e v e r s a l s w i t h the b i s e r i a l s , but the p a r t i a l

c o e f f i c i e n t s c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e a p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r most

major powers. There a r e , however, two e x c e p t i o n s to t h i s f i n d i n g

— A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y and J a p a n — a l t h o u g h f o r n e i t h e r of these s t a t e s

i s p o l a r i t y a very important i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e . The s i g n

r e v e r s a l f o r A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y i s somewhat m i s l e a d i n g , being

accounted f o r by a s h i f t i n p o l a r i t y of o n l y f o u r percent d u r i n g

the f o u r t e e n years i n which she i s a major power; t h a t f o r Japan

i s more complex. I would argue t h a t , u n l i k e the o t h e r major powers,

Japan p e r c e i v e s h e r s e l f to be excluded from the a l l i a n c e network

d u r i n g most of her years as a major power. When the system i s

h i g h l y p o l a r i z e d , Japan's i n t e r a c t i o n o p p o r t u n i t i e s are n o t ,

as p o s i t e d f o r other s t a t e s , s e v e r e l y r e d u c e d ; i n d e e d , Japan's

c o o p e r a t i o n i s a c t i v e l y pursued by the competing a l l i a n c e s . When

the system i s l e s s p o l a r i z e d , Japan has somewhat more numerous

i n t e r a c t i o n o p p o r t u n i t i e s , b u t , at the same t i m e , her support i s

l e s s v i g o r o u s l y sought. I t may be hypothesized t h a t , under such

c i r c u m s t a n c e s , Japan employs demonstrat ions of f o r c e to "prop up"

her sagging p r e s t i g e , an a c t i o n not needed when she i s being

"courted" i n the b i - p o l a r w o r l d .

144

F i n a l l y , the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the f o u r t h i n t e r v e n i n g

v a r i a b l e — c r o s s - c u t t i n g — d o n o t , f o r the most p a r t , support

the h y p o t h e s i z e d negative a s s o c i a t i o n p o s i t e d i n the model.

Even the United S t a t e s , which e x h i b i t s n e g a t i v e b i s e r i a l

c o r r e l a t i o n s , has p o s i t i v e p a r t i a l c o e f f i c i e n t s . (The three

major p o w e r s — A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , I t a l y , and the S o v i e t Union —

t h a t d i s p l a y the p o s i t e d negat ive p a r t i a l s a l s o have l a r g e

s t a n d a r d e r r o r s , suggest ing t h a t these c o e f f i c i e n t s are probably

not s t a b l e . ) The repeated ev idence s u p p o r t i n g a p o s i t i v e

r e l a t i o n s h i p between the c r o s s - c u t t i n g i n d i c a t o r and the outcome

v a r i a b l e suggests two p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . One i s t h a t

major powers are s imply not c r o s s - p r e s s u r e d . As e x p l a i n e d in

Chapter Two, the c r o s s - c u t t i n g i n d i c a t o r ranges from - 1 . 0 (no

c r o s s - c u t t i n g bonds) to +1.0 ( c o m p l e t e l y c r o s s - c u t bonds) .

However, d e s c r i p t i v e s t a t i s t i c s r e v e a l t h a t the mean c r o s s -

c u t t i n g score f o r a major power, r e g a r d l e s s of time l a g , i s

n e a r l y always n e g a t i v e — t h e h i g h e s t mean score being +.03.

What we seem to be tapping i n the t w e n t i e t h century i s the

p r o p o r t i o n of m i l i t a r y a l l i e s w i t h which a major power t r a d e s .

That i s , the s t a t e s w i t h the h i g h e s t c r o s s - c u t t i n g scores t u r n out

to be those t h a t do not trade ( h e a v i l y ) w i t h a l l t h e i r major power

a l l i e s , r a t h e r than those t h a t have d i s t i n c t l y d i f f e r e n t s e t s of

t rade and a l l i a n c e p a r t n e r s . Thus, i t may be argued t h a t these

s t a t e s (having the h ighest c r o s s - c u t t i n g s c o r e s ) are not more

c r o s s - p r e s s u r e d , but s imply l e s s r e i n f o r c e d and, c o n s e q u e n t l y ,

145

the c r o s s - c u t t i n g hypothesis may not be r e l e v a n t . The other

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s that our measure of c r o s s - c u t t i n g i s q u i t e

s a t i s f a c t o r y , but that our hypothesis i s i n c o r r e c t . That i s

to s a y , w h i l e s t a t e s that have more c r o s s - c u t bonds are

more c r o s s - p r e s s u r e d , c r o s s - p r e s s u r e s may not m i t i g a t e c o n f l i c t s .

I t may be argued that c r o s s - p r e s s u r e s produce t e n s i o n and

u n c e r t a i n t y , and thereby exacerbate p o t e n t i a l l y c o n f l i c t f u l

s i t u a t i o n s .

Having suggested i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s f o r the unexpected

e f f e c t s of some of our i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s , we are brought to

the second of the two issues r a i s e d at the b e g i n n i n g of t h i s

s e c t i o n — the one concerning the importance of s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . In p a r t i c u l a r , to what

e x t e n t do the r e s u l t s from the p r o b i t runs on the subset of

underrecognized cases d i f f e r from the runs on a l l t w e n t i e t h

c e n t u r y cases f o r a given major power? S i n c e , as we have noted

(and not w i t h s t a n d i n g the preceding i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ) , the

s t a n d a r d i z e d p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the t w e n t i e t h century

may be u n r e l i a b l e guides to s i g n i f i c a n t changes, i . e . , they may

be i n e f f i c i e n t e s t i m a t o r s , we w i l l r e l y upon the R s and Ps to

address t h i s q u e s t i o n .

Somewhat o v e r s t a t i n g our answer, I would say t h a t the

ev idence f o r the t w e n t i e t h century demonstrates t h a t we can more

a c c u r a t e l y p r e d i c t the years i n which a major power w i l l engage

in m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i f we know t h a t i t i s underrecognized

146

than we can i f we d i d not know. Put another way, the m e d i a t i n g

e f f e c t s o f the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s are g r e a t e r f o r most major

powers when they are underrecognized and, by e x t e n s i o n from our

model , are g r e a t e r when they are prone to c o n f r o n t a t i o n . More

s p e c i f i c a l l y , there are two major powers — the U n i t e d S t a t e s and A?

China — t h a t d i s p l a y dramatic i n c r e a s e s i n R s and Ps when we

s t r a t i f y by s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y . The Uni ted S t a t e s , which was

e a r l i e r shown to have e i g h t y - s e v e n percent of i t s c o n f l i c t s w h i l e

underrecognized (Table 8 ) , now appears to be a f f e c t e d by the

i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s only when i t i s s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t .

S i m i l a r l y , C h i n a , a major power f o r which we were unable to

i d e n t i f y a c o n s i s t e n t b i v a r i a t e a s s o c i a t i o n between u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n

and m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n , a l s o appears to have q u i t e p r e d i c t a b l e

c o n f l i c t behavior when s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t . For t h r e e o t h e r s t a t e s

— B r i t a i n , France, and the S o v i e t U n i o n — w e appear to have more

p r e d i c t a b l e behavior when they are s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t , but perhaps

not s i g n i f i c a n t l y so. B r i t a i n and the S o v i e t Union both e x h i b i t

moderate R s f o r t h e i r t o t a l y e a r s i n the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y major

power subsystem. When lags are i n t r o d u c e d f o r underrecognized A 2

B r i t a i n , we get c o n s i d e r a b l y improved R~s and P s ; and f o r the

S o v i e t U n i o n , wi th a l a g of t h r e e y e a r s , we a l s o get h e f t y i n c r e a s e s .

For F r a n c e , we have a r a t h e r s i z a b l e f i t f o r a l l f i f t y - n i n e major

power y e a r s , yet o b t a i n s t i l l g r e a t e r p r e d i c t i v e power when we

examine o n l y her s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t y e a r s . However, f o r a l l three

c o u n t r i e s , the improvements i n R s and Ps are probably not

147

s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e to warrant a statement t h a t the subsets of

underrecognized cases a r e , w i t h c e r t a i n t y , d i f f e r e n t from the

s e t of a l l y e a r s — o u r i n a b i l i t y to determine whether the

d i f f e r e n c e s are s i g n i f i c a n t being a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the f a c t

t h a t the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the R s t a t i s t i c i s unknown.

The f i n d i n g s f o r Japan c o n t r a d i c t the statement t h a t

we can more a c c u r a t e l y p r e d i c t the years i n which a major power

w i l l engage i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n i f we know t h a t i t i s

s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t , f o r we can p r e d i c t Japanese c o n f l i c t

b e h a v i o r e q u a l l y w e l l f o r a l l years i n which she i s i n our data

s e t . T h i s , however, should be expected s i n c e Japan i s s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n t i n f o r t y - o n e of the f o r t y - f i v e years d u r i n g which

she i s a major power. We a r e , t h e r e f o r e , r e a l l y o n l y examining

underrecogni zed J a p a n — a n d , f o r under r ecogniz ed J a p a n , our model

produces s i z a b l e f i t s to the d a t a .

F i n a l l y , there are three s t a t e s — G e r m a n y , A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y ,

and I t a l y — t h a t are too i n f r e q u e n t l y i n v o l v e d i n m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n when s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t f o r the p r o b i t a l g o r i t h m

to converge on a s o l u t i o n . A l l three have weak, n e g a t i v e b i v a r i a t e

r e l a t i o n s h i p s between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and c o n f r o n t a t i o n when

there i s no time l a g (Table 9 ) , a l t h o u g h Germany and I t a l y have

p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n s when l a g s are i n t r o d u c e d . S i n c e we have

too few cases to make the comparisons between under r ecogniz ed years

and a l l years f o r these s t a t e s (and, hence, should pr obably say

that the d i f f e r e n c e i s u n i m p o r t a n t ) , I s h a l l only comment t h a t the

148

i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s produce s i g n i f i c a n t R s f o r Germany and

A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , but are l e s s powerful f o r I t a l y .

Examining the "Residuals"

Before summarizing the r e s u l t s f o r the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y ,

l e t us again b r i e f l y examine the " r e s i d u a l s " — a s we d i d f o r the

n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y — t o d i s c o v e r whether our model i s p r e d i c t i n g

d i f f e r e n t i a l l y f o r var ious l e v e l s or types of c o n f l i c t s . We

d i s c o v e r , when we look at Table 18, t h a t i t i s n o t . We do not

s y s t e m a t i c a l l y p r e d i c t b e t t e r f o r war-years than f o r m i l i t a r y

a c t i o n - or t h r e a t - y e a r s . Nor do we p r e d i c t major power/

major power c o n f l i c t s more a c c u r a t e l y than major power/

minor power c o n f l i c t s . Although there are some d i f f e r e n c e s

from country to c o u n t r y , there i s n o t h i n g t h a t I would be w i l l i n g

to c a l l a p a t t e r n .

Summarizing the Twentieth-Century F i n d i n g s

We have found i t r a t h e r d i f f i c u l t to i n t e r p r e t the

f i n d i n g s f o r the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . For a l though we d i s c o v e r e d

t h a t each of the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s accounts f o r some "unique

v a r i a n c e " i n the involvement of major powers i n m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s and t h a t the e n t i r e set of v a r i a b l e s , i n c o n j u n c t i o n

w i t h our measure of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y , p r o v i d e s us w i t h

c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e d i c t i v e power, the d i r e c t i o n s of the a s s o c i a t i o n s

between the mediat ing and outcome v a r i a b l e s are o f t e n d i f f e r e n t

than those p o s i t e d i n Chapter One. Consequent ly , I have suggested

TABLE 18

NUMBER OF CONFLICT-YEARS INVOLVING MAJOR POWERS AND THE PROPORTION OF THESE CONFLICT-YEARS THAT IS CORRECTLY PREDICTED BY THE PROBIT EQUATION, FOR THE 20th CENTURY (ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)

Nation Lag P a r t i c i pate Initiate

Level of Conflict Type of C o n f 1 i c t Level of C o n f l i c t Type of C o n f l i c t

N War N M i l . N Thr't N Maj/ N Maj/ N War N M i l . I N Thr't N Maj/ N Maj/ A c t . M a j . M i n . A c t . M a j . M i n .

USA 0 2 .00 2 .00 4 .00 5 .00 3 .00 1 .00 2 .00 4 .00 4 .00 3 .00 0 2 .00 2 .00 3 1.00 5 .60 2 .00 1 .00 2 .00 3 1 .00 4 .75 2 .00

under- -1 1 .00 1 , .00 3 .67 4 .50 1 .00 1 .00 1 .00 3 .67 4 .50 1 .00 r e c o g . -2 1 .00 1 .00 2 .50 3 .33 1 .00 1 .00 1 .00 2 .50 3 .33 1 .00

. - 3 1 .00 0 3 .67 3 .67 1 .00 1 .00 0 3 .67 3 .67 1 .00

UK 0 1 .00 11 .18 5 .20 1 .00 16 .19 1 .00 8 .25 5 .20 1 .00 13 .23 0 1 .00 2 .50 2 .00 1 .00 4 .25 1 .00 2 .50 2 .00 1 .00 4 .25

under- -1 0 5 .80 2 .00 1 .00 6 .67 0 3 .67 2 .50 1 .00 4 .75 recog. -2 0 3 .67 3 .67 1 1.00 5 .60 0 3 .67 3 .67 1 1 .00 5 .60 recog.

. - 3 0 1 .00 3 .67 0 4 .50 0 1 .00 3 .67 0 4 .50

FRN 0 ! .00 9 .33 1 .00 0 11 .27 ] .00 8 .38 1 1 .00 0 10 .40 0 1 .00 5 .40 0 0 6 .33 1 .00 4 .50 0 0 5 .40

under- -1 1 .00 3 1 .00 1 1.00 0 5 .80 1 .00 3 1 .00 1 1.00 0 5 .80 r e c o g . -2 1 .00 5 .80 1 1.00 0 7 .71 1 .00 4 .75 1 1.00 0 6 .67

. - 3 .00 5 .60 1 1.00 0 7 .57 1 .00 4 .50 1 1.00 0 6 .50

GMY 0 4 .50 2 .00 1 .00 5 .40 0 4 .50 2 .00 1 .00 5 .40

TABLE 1 8 - - - C o n t i n u e d

Nat ion Lag P a r t i c i pate I n i t i a t e

Level of Conflict Type of Conflict Level of Conflict Type of Conflict

N War N M i l . N Thr't N Maj/ N Maj/ N War N M i l . N Thr't N Maj/ I n Maj/ A c t . Maj . Mi n. A c t . M a j . i Mi n.

A-H 0 0 3 .67 2 .50 0 5 .60 0 3 .67 1 .00 0 i

.50

ITA 0 2 .50 7 .29 2 1 .00 0 11 .45 2 .50 6 .33 3 .67 0 h i i

.45

USR 0 2 .50 9 .11 6 .17 7 .29 10 .10 1 1 .00 7 .14 6 .17 4 .50 1 10 .10 r o 2 .50 5 .20 6 .50 6 .33 7 .43 1 1 .00 4 .00 6 .67 4 .75 7 .29

under- -1 2 1 .00 5 .40 6 .83 6 .50 7 .86 1 1 .00 4 .25 6 33 4 .50 7 .29 r e c o g . -2 2 1 .00 4 .50 6 .67 6 .50 6 .83 1 1 .00 3 .33 6 50 4 .50 6 .50

. - 3 1 .00 1 1 .00 5 .40 3 .33 4 .50 0 1 1 .00 5 40 2 .50 4 .50

CHN 0 2 .50 6 .33 1 .00 2 .50 7 .29 2 .50 6 .33 1 .00 2 .50 7 .29 under- [ o 1 1 .00 3 .67 1 1.00 2 .50 3 1.00 1 1 .00 3 .67 1 1 00 2 .50 3 1.00

JPN 0 3 .67 3 .00 0 2 .50 4 .25 3 .67 3 .00 0 2 .50 4 .25 0 2 .00 3 .33 0 1 .00 4 .25 2 .00 3 .33 0 1 .00 4 .25

under- -1 3 .67 2 .00 0 2 .50 3 .33 3 .67 2 .00 0 2 .50 3 .33 r e c o g . -2 3 .67 2 .00 0 2 .50 3 .33 3 .67 2 .00 0 2 .50 3 .33

. - 3 3 .67 2 .00 0 2 .50 3 .33 3 .67 2 .00 0 2 .50 3 .33

151

s e v e r a l f a c t o r s — i n c l u d i n g s t a t u s quo f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s , v i c t o r i e s

i n major wars, and perceived e x c l u s i o n from i n t e r n a t i o n a l

a l i g n m e n t s — that might " e x p l a i n " these d i s c r e p a n c i e s . We have

d i s c o v e r e d that the s t r o n g e s t evidence l i n k i n g u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n ,

i n the presence of c e r t a i n c o n t e x t u a l v a r i a b l e s , to involvement

i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i s found f o r the United S t a t e s and

C h i n a ; t h i s connect ion a l s o tends to e x i s t f o r B r i t a i n , F r a n c e ,

the S o v i e t Union, and Japan. And f u r t h e r m o r e , the r e l a t i o n s h i p

i s best supported when a t h r e e - y e a r time l a g i s i n t r o d u c e d .

F i n a l l y , there does not appear to be much d i f f e r e n c e between

our a b i l i t y to p r e d i c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s and our

a b i l i t y to f o r e c a s t the i n i t i a t i o n of c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ; nor do we

more a c c u r a t e l y f o r e c a s t war-years than m i l i t a r y a c t i o n - or

t h r e a t - y e a r s , or c o n f r o n t a t i o n s w i t h major powers more a c c u r a t e l y

than those w i t h minor powers.

CHAPTER V

FROM MILITARY CONFRONTATION TO INTERSTATE WAR

Having examined the f i r s t stage of the m o d e l — a n d having

d i s c o v e r e d a l a r g e number of d i s c r e p a n c i e s 'between what the

l i t e r a t u r e suggests and the data r e v e a l — w e turn our a t t e n t i o n

to the second s t a g e . Here the u n i t of a n a l y s i s becomes the

c o n f l i c t , r a t h e r than the year , and we focus upon dyadic

r e l a t i o n s h i p s . We have a p o p u l a t i o n of c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ; some

e v e n t u a t i n g in war, and others not . We are i n t e r e s t e d i n knowing

whether we can a c c u r a t e l y p r e d i c t which i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s (IMCs) w i l l e s c a l a t e i n t o these more severe and

s u s t a i n e d c o n f l a g r a t i o n s .

In Chapter One i t i s argued t h a t the same i n t e r v e n i n g

v a r i a b l e s t h a t account f o r changes i n the p r o b a b i l i t y of a

c o n f r o n t a t i o n o c c u r r i n g a l s o l a r g e l y account f o r the e s c a l a t i o n

of m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i n t o f u l l - s c a l e wars. However,

r a t h e r than viewing these v a r i a b l e s as a t t r i b u t e s of n a t i o n s ,

it i s necessary to now see them as p r o p e r t i e s of c o n f l i c t i n g dyads.

Thus, i t i s hypothesized that the g r e a t e r the d i s c r e p a n c y between

the n a t i o n a l power of opposing p a r t i e s , the J e s s the l i k e l i h o o d

152

153

that the c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i l l e rupt i n t o war. C o n c o m i t a n t l y ,

s i n c e the o p p o r t u n i t y to employ l a r g e - s c a l e m i l i t a r y f o r c e i s

g r e a t e s t when c o u n t r i e s are cont iguous to one a n o t h e r , non-

n e i g h b o r i n g opponents are l e s s l i k e l y to become i n v o l v e d i n war,

w h i l e cont iguous s t a t e s are more l i k e l y . A t h i r d f a c t o r i n the

p o s i t e d c o n f l i c t s p i r a l i s past e x p e r i e n c e , and i t i s hypothesized

i n Chapter One t h a t the g r e a t e r the j o i n t s u f f e r i n g of the p a r t i e s

i n p r i o r war encounters ( r e g a r d l e s s of the i d e n t i t y of t h e i r

o p p o n e n t s ) , the less probable i t w i l l be that they w i l l push

c u r r e n t c o n f r o n t a t i o n to open w a r f a r e . F i n a l l y , the s t r u c t u r a l

i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s among the component u n i t s are important.. The

g r e a t e r the b i - p o l a r i t y of the major power subsystem, the more

l i k e l y the occurrence of war; b u t , i f the opponents are major trade

p a r t n e r s or m i l i t a r y a l l i e s , the p r o b a b i l i t y of war i s reduced.

S c h e m a t i c a l l y , the second stage appears as below:

i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s

TRADE* & ALLIANCES

i n t e r s t a t e wars

*used only i n 20th century runs (not measured p r i o r to 1879)

+ = i n c r e a s e s l i k e l i h o o d of IMC - = decreases l i k e l i h o o d of INC

154

The procedures f o r the b a s i c index c o n s t r u c t i o n of the

i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s are d e t a i l e d i n Chapter Two and i t would

be redundant to r e i t e r a t e them here. I t s h a l l s u f f i c e f o r me

to o u t l i n e the manner by which these measures of n a t i o n a l

a t t r i b u t e s are converted i n t o i n d i c a t o r s of dyadic r e l a t i o n s h i p s .

F i r s t , the i n d i c a t o r of d i f f e r e n c e s i n n a t i o n a l power

c a p a b i l i t i e s between opposing s t a t e s (PWRDIF) i s formulated as

a s i m p l e dichotomy. This i s necessary because we used data f o r

o n l y the major powers when we computed power c a p a b i l i t y scores

i n Chapter Two. As a r e s u l t , we do not have scores f o r non-major

powers. We c a n , however, make a s i m p l i f y i n g assumption t h a t

major powers are more or l e s s equal to one another i n terms of

power c a p a b i l i t i e s , but t h a t they are c o n s i d e r a b l y more powerful

than o t h e r s t a t e s . Thus, i f a m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n i s between

two major powers, PWRDIF i s scored "zero"; i f between a major and

minor power, i t i s scored "one." I t should be r e c o g n i z e d , however,

t h a t w h i l e t h i s dichotomous i n d i c a t o r r e f l e c t s d i f f e r e n c e s i n power,

i t a l s o taps a host of other d i f f e r e n c e s between major and non-major

powers, e . g . , the g r e a t e r number and d i v e r s i t y of major power

i n t e r a c t i o n s , the s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t treatment of major powers

by o t h e r s t a t e s , the d i f f e r e n t p e r c e p t i o n s of d e c i s i o n makers

c o n c e r n i n g the r o l e and a b i l i t y of major powers, the use of major

power languages as i n t e r n a t i o n a l languages and major power

c u r r e n c i e s as i n t e r n a t i o n a l c u r r e n c i e s , the l a r g e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of

home o f f i c e s of m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s i n major powers, and the

155

p r e f e r e n t i a l vot ing s t r u c t u r e i n most u n i v e r s a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l

governmental o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h a t accords g r e a t e r weight to

major power v o t e s . While d i f f e r e n c e s i n n a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t y

are probably the most fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n between major

and non-major powers, and w h i l e I w i l l c o n t i n u e to l a b e l the

i n d i c a t o r "PWRDIF," the reader would do w e l l to keep i n mind

the assortment of d i f f e r e n c e s housed under t h i s r u b r i c .

The i n d i c a t o r of the second v a r i a b l e — c o n t i g u i t y —

i s a l s o dichotomously scored and, as o u t l i n e d i n Chapter Two,

r e f l e c t s common land boundaries and o v e r l a p p i n g t e r r i t o r i a l

w a t e r s . The i n d i c a t o r of the t h i r d v a r i a b l e — p r i o r war

e x p e r i e n c e - - - i s simply the sum of the b a t t l e deaths per m i l l i o n

p o p u l a t i o n (modif ied by the i n v e r s e l o g i s t i c decay f u n c t i o n ) of

the opposing s t a t e s . The i n d i c a t o r of system b i - p o l a r i t y i s the

same as t h a t used i n the p r e c e d i n g c h a p t e r s . And f i n a l l y , t rade

and a l l i a n c e s are dichotomous i n d i c a t o r s , measured as d e t a i l e d

in Chapter Two. In the c u r r e n t c h a p t e r , we are i n t e r e s t e d i n

whether the s t a t e s i n c o n f l i c t are major t rade p a r t n e r s or

have mutual defense pacts w i t h one a n o t h e r .

The primary problem a s s o c i a t e d w i t h these r u l e s f o r

i n d i c a t o r c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t h a t they assume t h a t a l l c o n f r o n t a t i o n s

are s t r i c t l y d y a d i c . But , s i n c e t h i r t y percent of the i n t e r s t a t e

m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s (IMCs) i n the c u r r e n t data s e t i n v o l v e

more than one s t a t e on a g iven s i d e , a r u l e had to be adopted

In o r d e r to i n c l u d e these cases i n the a n a l y s e s . I decided to

156

t r e a t these "n-nat ion" c o n f r o n t a t i o n s as a set of dyadic encounters

between each major power i n v o l v e d i n the IMC and the s t a t e on the

opposing s i d e that would maximize the e f f e c t of a p a r t i c u l a r

v a r i a b l e . This coding r u l e r e f l e c t s my hunch that n a t i o n a l

d e c i s i o n makers, l i k e p o l i t i c a l r e s e a r c h e r s , do not have an

adequate c a l c u l u s f o r aggregat ing the a t t r i b u t e s of t h e i r opponents.

They are t h e r e f o r e l i k e l y to make "worst case" e s t i m a t e s on a

d y a d i c b a s i s . That i s , i f any of t h e i r opponents are c o n t i g u o u s ,

the most l i k e l y s i t e f o r an a t t a c k i s from or a g a i n s t the

c o n t i g u o u s a d v e r s a r y ; i f any opponent i s more p o w e r f u l , then t h a t

a d v e r s a r y i s most f e a r e d ; i f any opponent i s an a l l y , then the

g r e a t e s t t h r e a t to the a l l i a n c e i s a c o n f l i c t w i t h t h a t a d v e r s a r y ;

and so f o r t h . In a d d i t i o n , the d e c i s i o n to maximize the e f f e c t s

o f the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s means t h a t each major power i s

i n c l u d e d only once i n each n - n a t i o n IMC a n d , t h e r e f o r e , the

importance of n-nat ion c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i s not a r t i f i c i a l l y i n f l a t e d

as i t might be i f a s t r a t e g y was adopted such as i n c l u d i n g a l l

p o s s i b l e c o n f l i c t dyads that c o n t a i n at l e a s t one major power

member. Thus, a c c o r d i n g to the "maximizing" d e c i s i o n r u l e , a major

power i s coded as p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a major/major c o n f r o n t a t i o n

i f any s t a t e i n the opposing c o a l i t i o n i s a l s o a major power.

S i m i l a r l y , i f any s t a t e in the opposing c o a l i t i o n i s cont iguous

to a p a r t i c i p a t i n g major power, then the major power i s r e p o r t e d

to be i n a c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h a cont iguous c o u n t r y . The war

e x p e r i e n c e score i s computed as the sum of the war e x p e r i e n c e

157

of a g i v e n major power and the s t a t e i n the opposing c o a l i t i o n

having the most severe war e x p e r i e n c e . And a major power i s

s a i d to be i n a c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h a t r a d e p a r t n e r or a l l y

i f i t has t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h any s t a t e i n the opposing

c o a l i t i o n . The b i - p o l a r i t y i n d i c a t o r i s , of c o u r s e , u n a f f e c t e d

by n - n a t i o n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s .

The d e c i s i o n to t r e a t these c o a l i t i o n IMCs as a s e t of

d y a d i c d i s p u t e s does no v i o l e n c e to the a n a l y t i c r e s u l t s f o r

the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y ; a r e - a n a l y s i s of the d a t a , o m i t t i n g

the n - n a t i o n c a s e s , does not produce any s i g n i f i c a n t changes.

In the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , however, o m i t t i n g n - n a t i o n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s

n e c e s s i t a t e s that we exclude the h o s t i l i t i e s t h a t e s c a l a t e i n t o

the two wor ld wars. These two c o n f l a g r a t i o n s i n c o r p o r a t e more

than h a l f of a l l t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y war dyads i n our data set

and an even l a r g e r p r o p o r t i o n o f the major power/major power

war dyads. T h e i r omission e l i m i n a t e s a l l German and a l l A u s t r o -

Hungarian war dyads, and reduces by a s i z a b l e amount the "variance"

i n the outcome v a r i a b l e f o r a l l o t h e r major powers. In s h o r t ,

s i n c e the wor ld wars exer t such an a p p r e c i a b l e i n f l u e n c e on the

t w e n t i e t h century r e l a t i o n s h i p s r e p o r t e d below, the d e c i s i o n to

t r e a t n - n a t i o n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s as a set of dyadic encounters has

more import f o r the l a t e r than f o r the e a r l i e r c e n t u r y .

The N i n e t e e n t h Century

The o b j e c t of the f o l l o w i n g data a n a l y s e s i s to a s c e r t a i n ,

for a l l c o n f l i c t dyads t h a t c o n t a i n at l e a s t one major power member,

158

whether or not the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s — as they e x i s t at the

time of the c o n f r o n t a t i o n — s e r v e to enhance or c o n s t r a i n the

o c c u r r e n c e of war. For t h i s reason no time lags are i n t r o d u c e d .

P a r a l l e l analyses are undertaken on o v e r l a p p i n g sets of d a t a .

One data set i n c l u d e s the e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n of c o n f l i c t dyads;

the o t h e r , only s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t dyads, i . e . , dyads i n which

at l e a s t one major power member i s s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t . In t h i s

manner, we s h a l l be able to determine (1) whether a p a r t i c u l a r

i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e a p p r e c i a b l y enhances our a b i l i t y to account

f o r the occurrence of war and (2) whether knowing t h a t the

c o n f l i c t dyad c o n t a i n s a s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e i n c r e a s e s

our a b i l i t y to c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t the outbreak of war. I t should

be remembered t h a t , in the model p o s t u l a t e d i n Chapter One,

i t i s p o s i t e d t h a t (1) a r e l a t i o n s h i p does e x i s t between

i n c o n s i s t e n c y and c o n f r o n t a t i o n , but t h a t (2) no d i r e c t a s s o c i a t i o n

e x i s t s between i n c o n s i s t e n c y and war.

We s h a l l cont inue to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between n i n e t e e n t h and

t w e n t i e t h century r e l a t i o n s h i p s and to examine the e f f e c t s of the

i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s s e p a r a t e l y f o r each major power. C o r r e l a t i o n a l

and p r o b i t techniques are employed as the primary modes o f data

a n a l y s i s . S ince there a r e , i n g e n e r a l , too few o b s e r v a t i o n s f o r

each n a t i o n to c a r r y out m u l t i v a r i a t e a n a l y s i s , we begin by

examining b i v a r i a t e a s s o c i a t i o n s .

159

The I n d i c a t o r s of Reachability

Let us look f i r s t a t the two dichotomously-measured

i n d i c a t o r s of r e a c h a b i l i t y ( d i f f e r e n c e i n power and presence of

c o n t i g u i t y ) to see whether or not they help us to account f o r

the outcome v a r i a b l e (no war/war). As a measure of the s t r e n g t h

o f a s s o c i a t i o n between the r e a c h a b i l i t y i n d i c a t o r s and the outcome

v a r i a b l e , I use the contingency t a b l e s t a t i s t i c Cramer's 0.

Phi i s a c h i - s q u a r e - b a s e d measure t h a t , i n the 2 x 2 t a b l e , i s

e q u i v a l e n t to the Pearson product moment c o e f f i c i e n t r (Hays, 1963).

TABLE 19

CRAMER'S PHI-SQUARE BETWEEN EACH MAJOR POWER'S WAR INVOLVEMENT AND THE TWO INDICATORS OF REACHABILITY,

FOR 19th CENTURY CONFLICT DYADS

A l l Dyads S t a t . Inc. Dyads

PwrDif Con t i g PwrDif C o n t i g

P r e d i c t e d —> - N - 0 2 + 0

2 N 0 - r

+ 0 2

UK 27 - .01 19 - .12

FRN 29 - .07 - .00 17 - .06 + .00

GMY 11 - .05 + .15 6 .00 .00

A-H 14 - .00 - .00 8 .00 + .11

ITA 7 - .22 + .53 6 - .20 + .50

USR 16 - .09 - .00 15 - .09 - .00

F i s h e r exact t e s t : *** < .01 < ** < .05 < * < .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e lev

160

As can be seen from the 0 s r e p o r t e d i n Table 19, the

d i r e c t i o n s of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the two r e a c h a b i l i t y

i n d i c a t o r s and war involvement are g e n e r a l l y as p r e d i c t e d ;

t h a t i s , d i f f e r e n c e i n power i s f o r the most p a r t n e g a t i v e l y

c o r r e l a t e d , and c o n t i g u i t y p o s i t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d , w i t h war

i n v o l v e m e n t . However, n e i t h e r r e a c h a b i l i t y i n d i c a t o r i s

p a r t i c u l a r l y p o w e r f u l . Indeed, i t i s o n l y f o r the smal l subset

of I t a l i a n cases that we f i n d s i z a b l e 0^ s .

Having found that the a s s o c i a t i o n s r e p o r t e d i n Table 19

are not very p o w e r f u l , we n e v e r t h e l e s s ask whether the

r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the r e a c h a b i l i t y i n d i c a t o r s and war

involvement are d i f f e r e n t f o r the subset of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t

dyads than f o r the set of a l l c o n f l i c t dyads. C h i - s q u a r e t e s t s

are used to i n v e s t i g a t e t h i s q u e s t i o n . The l o g i c u n d e r l y i n g the

t e s t s i s as f o l l o w s : i f s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s u n a s s o c i a t e d w i t h

war i n v o l v e m e n t , then we would expect t h a t the p r o p o r t i o n of

s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t dyads t h a t r e s u l t s i n war would be the same

as the p r o p o r t i o n of all dyads t h a t r e s u l t s i n war. Thus, f o r

each major power, the d i s t r i b u t i o n of cases f o r s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t

dyads (the observed frequency) i s compared w i t h the d i s t r i b u t i o n

of cases f o r a l l dyads (the expected f r e q u e n c y ) . Due to the small

number o f cases in t h i s p a r t i c u l a r i n v e s t i g a t i o n , the observed

f requency i s a d j u s t e d by 0.5 u n i t s , so as to reduce the d i f f e r e n c e

between the expected and observed f r e q u e n c i e s i n each c e l l of the

t a b l e ( c f . B l a l o c k , 1960). Not a s i n g l e X proves to be

161

s i g n i f i c a n t at the .10 l e v e l , demonstrat ing t h a t the 0 s f o r the

underrecognized dyads are not a p p r e c i a b l y d i f f e r e n t from those

f o r a l l c o n f l i c t dyads.

On the b a s i s of the preceding p a r a g r a p h s , I conclude t h a t ,

f o r major powers dur ing the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y — w h e t h e r or not

they are i n s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t dyads — there i s a weak n e g a t i v e

z e r o - o r d e r r e l a t i o n s h i p between d i f f e r e n c e i n power and war

i n v o l v e m e n t , and a weak p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between c o n t i g u i t y

and involvement. Thus, a c o n f r o n t a t i o n between two major powers

i s s l i g h t l y more l i k e l y to erupt i n t o war than one between a major

and a minor power; i n d e e d , t h i r t y percent of major-major as compared

to e i g h t e e n percent of major-minor c o n f r o n t a t i o n s d u r i n g the

n i n e t e e n t h century r e s u l t i n war. And, s i m i l a r l y , a c o n f r o n t a t i o n

between n e i g h b o r i n g s t a t e s (at l e a s t one of which i s a major power)

i s more v o l a t i l e than one between noncontiguous s t a t e s — t h i r t y

p e r c e n t of the former as compared to seventeen percent of the

l a t t e r ending i n war.

The I n d i c a t o r of War Experience

Turning to the i n d i c a t o r of war e x p e r i e n c e , not much needs

to be s a i d . As we found when examining the f i r s t stage of the

model , there i s very l i t t l e r e l a t i o n s h i p d u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h

century between p r i o r war e x p e r i e n c e and subsequent c o n f l i c t

( i n t h i s i n s t a n c e , war) involvement.

162

TABLE 20

BISERIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EACH MAJOR POWER'S WAR INVOLVEMENT AND PRIOR WAR EXPERIENCE,

FOR 19th CENTURY CONFLICT DYADS

A l l Dyads S t a t . Inc. Dyads

War Exp. War Exp.

2 2 P r e d i c t e d —>- N r " N r, " b__ b_

UK 27 - .01 19 - .08

FRN 29 - .00 1 7 - .01

GMY 11 - .00 6 + .23

A-H 14 + .01 8 - .01

ITA 7 + .00 6 .02

USR 16 - .08 15 - .09

F - t e s t from anova: *** < .01 < ** < .05 *̂ * £ .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l

B i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s between the c o n t i n u o u s l y - m e a s u r e d

war e x p e r i e n c e i n d i c a t o r and the dichotomously-measured outcome

v a r i a b l e (no war/war) are presented i n Table 20. We can see t h a t ,

f o r the s e t of a l l c o n f l i c t dyads, t h e r e i s no r e l a t i o n s h i p very

d i f f e r e n t from z e r o . For the subset of c o n f l i c t dyads having

at l e a s t one s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t major power member, o n l y Germany

has a squared b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n of any s i z e , but the magnitude

of the sampling e r r o r of the b i s e r i a l r suggests t h a t t h i s i s

probably not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the .00 c o r r e l a t i o n f o r

a l l German c o n f l i c t dyads. Indeed, none of the b i s e r i a l

163

c o r r e l a t i o n s f o r the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t c o n f l i c t dyads i s

s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the r b s f o r a l l c o n f l i c t dyads.

Thus, whether we examine a l l c o n f l i c t dyads or o n l y s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n t c o n f l i c t dyads, there i s , f o r the n i n e t e e n t h

c e n t u r y major powers, no meaningful b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p

between p r i o r war exper ience and the e s c a l a t i o n of subsequent

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i n t o wars.

The I n d i c a t o r s of S t r u c t u r a l R e l a t i o n s h i p s

F i n a l l y , we look a t the i n d i c a t o r s of s t r u c t u r a l

r e l a t i o n s h i p s — p o l a r i t y and r e c i p r o c a l i n t e r s t a t e bonds. From

the b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s i n Table 2 1 , we see t h a t major power

p o l a r i t y appears to b e — a s i t was i n the f i r s t stage of the

m o d e l — t h e most powerful i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e i n the n i n e t e e n t h

c e n t u r y . However, u n l i k e our e a r l i e r f i n d i n g s , p o l a r i t y i s now

c o n s i s t e n t l y n e g a t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h war i n v o l v e m e n t , and

the magnitude of the sampling e r r o r of the b i s e r i a l r suggests

t h a t t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s r e g a r d l e s s of whether or not

s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t major powers are i n v o l v e d i n the c o n f l i c t

dyads. Other r e s e a r c h e r s have a l s o uncovered t h i s n e g a t i v e

a s s o c i a t i o n between major power b i - p o l a r i t y a n d , in t h e i r

i n v e s t i g a t i o n , the magnitude and s e v e r i t y , as w e l l as f requency

of war i n the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y i n t e r s t a t e system ( S i n g e r and

S m a l l , 1968). These f i n d i n g s of a n e g a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between

b i - p o l a r i t y and w a r — i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p

164

between b i - p o l a r i t y and m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n , u n v e i l e d i n the

p r e c e d i n g c h a p t e r — o f f e r e m p i r i c a l support d u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h

c e n t u r y f o r Waltz' (1964, 1967) c o n t e n t i o n t h a t b i - p o l a r i t y i s

a s s o c i a t e d w i t h r e c u r r e n t c r i s e s and c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , but t h a t

these c o n f l i c t s remain l i m i t e d and do not evolve i n t o wars.

TABLE 21

BISERIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EACH MAJOR POWER'S WAR INVOLVEMENT AND SYSTEM POLARITY,

FOR 19th CENTURY CONFLICT DYADS

A l l Dyads S t a t . , Inc. Dyads

Polarity Polarity

P r e d i c t e d — N + r, 2

b N • ^

UK 27 - .00 19 - .37

FRN 29 - .17 17 - .22

GMY 11 - .33 6 - .04

A-H 14 - .17 8 - .38

ITA 7 - . 7 7 * * 6 - . 8 3 *

USR 16 - .26 15 - .34

from anova: *** < .01 < ** "5 .Ob"^ * 5 10 s i g n i f i c a n c e

As f o r the measures of r e c i p r o c a l i n t e r s t a t e bonds, i t

has a l r e a d y been mentioned t h a t r e l i a b l e t rade data are not

a v a i l a b l e f o r the n i n e t e e n t h century major powers, and c o n s e q u e n t l y

we cannot examine the r e l a t i o n s h i p between t rade p a r t n e r s h i p s and

165

war involvement. The a l l i a n c e d a t a , however, do produce an

i n t e r e s t i n g r e s u l t . There are o n l y f o u r i n s t a n c e s (Convention

of Olmutz , 1850; Seven Weeks War, 1866; Montenegrin T r o u b l e s ,

1880; and China Concessions to R u s s i a , 1898) d u r i n g t h i s

e a r l i e r century when major powers t h r e a t e n to use or a c t u a l l y

employ m i l i t a r y f o r c e a g a i n s t a s t a t e w i t h which they have a

mutual defense p a c t , one of these c o n f r o n t a t i o n s r e s u l t i n g i n

war. Thus, w h i l e the number of o b s e r v a t i o n s i s o b v i o u s l y too

smal l f o r us to c o n f i d e n t l y d e s c r i b e the r e l a t i o n s h i p between

a l l i a n c e s and war involvement, we can say t h a t m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between n i n e t e e n t h century a l l i a n c e p a r t n e r s

are q u i t e r a r e . This should i n c r e a s e our c o n f i d e n c e t h a t

the r e l a t i o n s h i p between b i - p o l a r i t y and war involvement i s

not b e i n g d i s t o r t e d by m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s w i t h i n the

p o l e s .

The M u l t i v a r i a t e R e l a t i o n s h i p

Although we have too few o b s e r v a t i o n s to examine the

" c o m p l e t e l y - s p e c i f i e d " second stage of the model f o r the

i n d i v i d u a l major powers, we have the f o r t u n a t e s i t u a t i o n t h a t

the d i r e c t i o n s of the z e r o - o r d e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s are g e n e r a l l y

c o n s i s t e n t across s t a t e s . Thus, i t i s p o s s i b l e to pool our

cases and to c a u t i o u s l y i n t e r p r e t the r e s u l t s as a p p l i c a b l e

to a l l n i n e t e e n t h century c o n f l i c t dyads c o n t a i n i n g major

powers.

TABLE 22

CORRELATION AND STANDARDIZED PROBIT COEFFICIENTS FOR THE FOUR INTERVENING VARIABLES WHEN PREDICTING TO POOLED MAJOR POWER

WAR 1 INVOLVEMENTS, FOR 19th CENTURY CONFLICT DYADS

PwrDif

A l l

C o n t i g

Dyads

War Exp. Polarity K2 R P

P r e d i c t e d - 4- - +

0 or r̂ 98 - . 1 1 + .14 - . 0 6 _ 38***

98 - . 1 7 + .07 - . 1 5 - . 3 6 .18** .00

S t a t . I nc. Dyads

0 or r, b 67 - . 1 1 + .20 - . 0 5 (. 1 8) - , 5 0 ( . 1 5 ) * * *

b* 67 - . 2 2 ( . 1 7 ) +.21(.16) - . 2 7 ( . 2 5 ) - . 5 0 ( . 1 8 ) .36*** .17

NOTE: Numbers w i t h i n parentheses are standard e r r o r s . F i s h e r exact t e s t ( f o r 0 ) , f - t e s t from anova ( f o r r, ) , and ^ from p r o b i t {yJ- w i t h 4 df) *** < .01 < ** < .05 < * < .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l .

167

When we do so (Table 2 2 ) , there are no r e a l s u r p r i s e s .

The z e r o - o r d e r c o r r e l a t i o n s (0 and r^) are in the same d i r e c t i o n

and are approximately of the same magnitude as the p a r t i a l p r o b i t

c o e f f i c i e n t s (b ) . This i s a r e f l e c t i o n of the low l e v e l of

m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y among the f o u r i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s . The only

c o e f f i c i e n t that d i f f e r s f o r the pooled data from that f o r the

i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s i s war e x p e r i e n c e , and i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d

that t h i s v a r i a b l e i s b a s i c a l l y u n c o r r e l a t e d w i t h war involvement

except f o r a p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h Germany i n underrecognized

c o n f l i c t dyads. S i n c e , however, t h a t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n i s

based upon only s i x c a s e s , i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t i t e x e r t s

l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e on the pooled d a t a .

With the except ion of b i - p o l a r i t y , the e f f e c t s of the

i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s are i n the p r e d i c t e d d i r e c t i o n , but account

for l i t t l e "variance" i n major power war i n v o l v e m e n t ; the b i - p o l a r i t y

v a r i a b l e produces a moderately s t r o n g c o r r e l a t i o n , but one o p p o s i t e

to t h a t which we hypothesized in Chapter One. A l though the

measures of both s t r e n g t h of a s s o c i a t i o n and p r e d i c t i v e power

i n c r e a s e when we examine only those c o n f l i c t dyads c o n t a i n i n g

s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t major powers, "X2--tests on the 0 s , the e r r o r

of the sampling d i s t r i b u t i o n of the r^s, and the s tandard e r r o r s

of the I) s , a l l suggest t h a t the r e p o r t e d c o r r e l a t i o n s and

p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t dyads are not

s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from those f o r a l l n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y

c o n f l i c t dyads.

168

And f i n a l l y , from the p r o b i t " r e s i d u a l s " i t appears that

we come nearest to p r e d i c t i n g wars between major powers

(as opposed to ones between major and minor powers) . B u t , given

the smal l number of war involvements t h a t we can c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t

i n the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , i t seems somewhat t r i v i a l to l i n g e r

on t h i s p o i n t .

The Twentieth Century

There a r e , a g a i n , i n the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , too few

o b s e r v a t i o n s f o r the i n d i v i d u a l major powers to permit m u l t i ­

v a r i a t e a n a l y s i s . Thus, we once more t u r n to the examinat ion

of b i v a r i a t e a s s o c i a t i o n s .

The I n d i c a t o r s of Reachability

We f i n d f o r the r e a c h a b i l i t y i n d i c a t o r s (Table 23)

c o n s i d e r a b l e convergence between the n i n e t e e n t h and t w e n t i e t h

c e n t u r y r e s u l t s . As i n the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , the d i r e c t i o n s

of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the i n t e r v e n i n g and outcome

v a r i a b l e s a r e , by and l a r g e , those t h a t are p o s i t e d i n the

model .

D i f f e r e n c e s i n power are i n v e r s e l y r e l a t e d to war

involvement; that i s , c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between major powers are

more l i k e l y to r e s u l t in war than are c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between

major and minor powers. A p p r o x i m a t e l y h a l f of the major-major

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s end i n these more severe c o n f l a g r a t i o n s ,

whereas only s l i g h t l y more than ten percent of the major-minor

169

TABLE 23

CRAMER'S PHI-SQUARE BETWEEN EACH MAJOR POWER'S WAR INVOLVEMENT AND THE TWO INDICATORS OF REACHABILITY,

FOR 20th CENTURY CONFLICT DYADS

A l l Dyads

PwrDif C o n t i g

S t a t . Inc. Dyads

PwrDif C o n t i g

Predicted — N - 0 2 + N - i + 0 2

USA 14 - .12 - .22 10 .00 - .25

UK 22 - . 3 5 * * 10 - .17

FRN 15 - .34* + .20 9 - .25 + .25

GMY 11 - .59** + .13 8 - .56 + .05

A-H 7 - 1.00 + .03 3 - 1.00

ITA 15 - .20 + . 4 2 * 4 - .33 + 1 .00

USR 32 - .17** + .00 29 - . 1 5 * * + .00

CHN 11 - .15 - .45 6 - .40 - 1 .00

JPN 13 - .01 + .00 13 - .01 + .00

F i s h e r exact t e s t : *** < .01 < ** < .05 < • *L .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e le<

170

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s e s c a l a t e i n t o war. The negat ive r e l a t i o n s h i p

between d i f f e r e n c e in power and war involvement appears to

c o n t r a d i c t F e r r i s ' (1973) f i n d i n g t h a t , f o r the 1850-1965 p e r i o d ,

there i s some evidence to suggest a positive a s s o c i a t i o n between

power d i s p a r i t y and involvement i n i n t e n s e m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t .

However, s i n c e F e r r i s i s working w i t h a d i f f e r e n t p o p u l a t i o n

of c a s e s , a d i f f e r e n t i n d i c a t o r of power, and, most i m p o r t a n t l y ,

i s not c o n t r o l l i n g f o r the average power d i s p a r i t y in c o n f l i c t ,

dyads, the d i s c r e p a n c y may be more apparent than r e a l . In

a d d i t i o n , i t should be remembered t h a t the dichotomous PWRDIF

i n d i c a t o r used i n the c u r r e n t study i s tapping not only d i f f e r e n c e s

i n power, but a l s o the host of other a t t r i b u t e s t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h

major powers from minor powers.

The second r e a c h a b i l i t y v a r i a b l e — c o n t i g u i t y — i s not

s t r o n g l y a s s o c i a t e d wi th war involvement. Almost a l l the

c o e f f i c i e n t s are p o s i t i v e , but weak; the few s i z a b l e c o e f f i c i e n t s

are g e n e r a l l y based upon a very small number of c a s e s . Two

c o u n t r i e s — the United States and China — a c t u a l l y have n e g a t i v e

c o r r e l a t i o n s . The negat ive f i n d i n g s f o r the United S t a t e s

1 I f the two world wars were coded to r e f l e c t , all p o s s i b l e c o n f l i c t dyads, r a t h e r than one c o n f l i c t dyad f o r each major power p a r t i c i p a n t , then the p r o p o r t i o n of major-minor c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ending in war would i n c r e a s e to a p p r o x i m a t e l y one in t h r e e . T h i s , however, would i n t r o d u c e a number of dyads t h a t were o n l y p e r i p h e r a l l y engaged i n combat, as w e l l as some that o c c u r r e d s imply because minor powers were i n the path of onrushing a r m i e s . In a d d i t i o n , the i n c l u s i o n of a l l p o s s i b l e c o n f l i c t dyads would c r e a t e a s i t u a t i o n i n which the two wor ld wars would t o t a l l y dominate the t w e n t i e t h century s t a t i s t i c a l r e s u l t s .

171

l e g i t i m a t e l y r e f l e c t the f a c t t h a t a l l American war involvements

i n the t w e n t i e t h century (WW I, WW I I , Korea, and Vietnam) take

p l a c e a b r o a d , w h i l e the negat ive c o r r e l a t i o n s f o r China are

somewhat m i s l e a d i n g . China i s i n v o l v e d i n e leven m i l i t a r y

c o n f l i c t s — i n c l u d i n g two wars — s i n c e becoming a major power;

o n l y one of these c o n f l i c t s (the Korean War) i s fought a g a i n s t

noncontiguous a d v e r s a r i e s . And i n t h a t war, d i r e c t Chinese

i n t e r v e n t i o n occurs only a f t e r a cont iguous country (People's

R e p u b l i c of Korea) has been invaded. Thus, f o r most major powers

d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , c o n t i g u i t y i s p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d

to war involvement, but the a s s o c i a t i o n i s g e n e r a l l y weak.

Indeed, i f we combine the data f o r a l l major powers, we d i s c o v e r

t h a t the same p r o p o r t i o n ( t w e n t y - f o u r percent ) of m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between noncontiguous c o u n t r i e s , as between

n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s , e s c a l a t e s i n t o wars.

2

In the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , as i n the n i n e t e e n t h , - t e s t s

demonstrate t h a t , f o r both r e a c h a b i l i t y i n d i c a t o r s , the c o r r e l a t i o n s

f o r c o n f l i c t dyads c o n t a i n i n g s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t major power

members are not s i g n i f i c a n t l y (at the .10 l e v e l ) d i f f e r e n t from

those f o r a l l c o n f l i c t dyads. On the whole, t h e n , the r e s u l t s

f o r the two c e n t u r i e s are q u i t e s i m i l a r — a l t h o u g h , d u r i n g the

c u r r e n t c e n t u r y , the c o r r e l a t i o n s between d i f f e r e n c e i n power

and war involvement are s t r o n g e r than those f o r the p r e c e d i n g

e i g h t y y e a r s , w h i l e the a s s o c i a t i o n between c o n t i g u i t y and

involvement i s probably somewhat weaker.

172

The I n d i c a t o r of War Experience

The t h i r d i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e i n our m o d e l — p r i o r war

e x p e r i e n c e — t u r n s out to be important f o r o n l y a very few major

powers i n the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . The g r e a t e s t s u r p r i s e s i n

Table 24 are the exceedingly l a r g e p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n s between

German, A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n , and Chinese war e x p e r i e n c e and

subsequent war involvement.

TABLE 24

BISERIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EACH MAJOR POWER'S WAR INVOLVEMENT AND PRIOR WAR EXPERIENCE,

FOR 20th CENTURY CONFLICT DYADS

A l l Dyads S t a t . Inc. Dyads

War Exp. War Exp.

Predicted — N 2 - r b N 2

" r b

USA 14 - .03 10 - .34

UK 22 - .10 10 - .20

FRN 15 - .17 9 - .22

GMY 11 + . 9 9 * * * 8 + . 9 9 * *

A-H 7 - .05 3 + .99

ITA 15 - .20 4 - .37

USR 32 + .08 29 + .07

CHN 11 + .25 6 + .99**

JPN 13 - .04 13 - .04

from anova: *** <. 01 < ** < .05 < • < .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l

173

The c o r r e l a t i o n s f o r Germany and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y are not

o n l y s u r p r i s i n g , they are a l s o somewhat d e c e i v i n g . For example,

d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , Germany i s i n v o l v e d i n two wars

(WW I and WW II ) out of e leven i n s t a n c e s of m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n .

In 1914, the German war exper ience score i s zero and, i n 1939,

i t i s a l s o extremely low. S i m i l a r l y , Germany's opponents i n

1914 ( R u s s i a ) and 1939 (France) have r e l a t i v e l y low war exper ience

s c o r e s . Y e t , d e s p i t e the very small a b s o l u t e v a l u e s of the dyads'

j o i n t war e x p e r i e n c e s , the Russo-German (1914) and Franco-German

(1 939) dyads have r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e sums when compared w i t h the

o t h e r nine war exper ience scores i n v o l v i n g German c o n f l i c t dyads

— i n d e e d , these are the h i g h e s t war e x p e r i e n c e s c o r e s of any

German c o n f l i c t dyads. Hence, very small a b s o l u t e values

2

n e v e r t h e l e s s produce very l a r g e r^'s. I d e n t i c a l l y , the A u s t r o -

Hungarian c o r r e l a t i o n f o r s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t c o n f l i c t dyads

(based on only three o b s e r v a t i o n s ) a l s o r e f l e c t s the f a c t t h a t

a very smal l war exper ience score ( A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y / R u s s i a , 1914)

can n e v e r t h e l e s s be the l a r g e s t score f o r a subset o f dyads. On

the o t h e r hand, the c o r r e l a t i o n f o r Chinese s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t

dyads a c c u r a t e l y r e f l e c t s t h a t her one war involvement w h i l e

underrecognized (Korean War, 1950) occurs not o n l y f o r the Chinese

dyad having the l a r g e s t war exper ience v a l u e , but a l s o when both

she and her opponent (the U n i t e d S t a t e s ) have c o n s i d e r a b l e n a t i o n a l

war e x p e r i e n c e s c o r e s . Thus, d e s p i t e the somewhat v a r i e d

d i r e c t i o n of the war experience/war involvement r e l a t i o n s h i p s

174

f o r the i n d i v i d u a l major powers, i t i s o n l y the Chinese t h a t

appear to be a p p r e c i a b l y more war prone under c o n d i t i o n s of

high b a t t l e l o s s e s i n p r i o r c o n f l a g r a t i o n s .

F i n a l l y , the magnitude of the e r r o r s of the sampling

d i s t r i b u t i o n suggests that there are no s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s

i n the r^s f o r s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t dyads as compared to a l l

c o n f l i c t dyads, wi th the e x c e p t i o n of those f o r A u s t r i a -

Hungary and C h i n a . However, due to the smal l number of

o b s e r v a t i o n s f o r these l a t t e r two s t a t e s ( three and s i x

r e s p e c t i v e l y ) , I am indeed s k e p t i c a l about the " s i g n i f i c a n c e "

of these d i f f e r e n c e s .

The I n d i c a t o r s of S t r u c t u r a l R e l a t i o n s h i p s

The set of s t r u c t u r a l i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s produces some

i n t e r e s t i n g f i n d i n g s (Table 2 5 ) . F i r s t , p o l a r i t y appears to be

p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to war involvement i n the t w e n t i e t h century

(the o n l y s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r

s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t dyads and those f o r a l l c o n f l i c t dyads being

f o r the f o u r I t a l i a n o b s e r v a t i o n s ) . The c o r r e l a t i o n s are not

g e n e r a l l y very p o w e r f u l , but they are d r a m a t i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t

from the f i n d i n g s f o r the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . Thus, whereas

i n the e a r l i e r century we uncovered support f o r W a l t z 1 (1964, 1967)

argument t h a t b i - p o l a r i t y may i n c r e a s e the p r o b a b i l i t y of

c o n f r o n t a t i o n but w i l l reduce the p r o b a b i l i t y of war, we see t h a t

the t w e n t i e t h century b e t t e r approximates the Deutsch and S i n g e r

175

TABLE 25

BISERIAL CORRELATIONS AND CRAMER PHI-SQUARES BETWEEN EACH MAJOR POWER'S WAR INVOLVEMENT AND TWO

INDICATORS OF STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIPS, FOR 20th CENTURY CONFLICT DYADS

A l l Dyads S t a t . Inc. Dyads

Polarity Trade Polarity Trade

Predicted — N + 2 r b - N 2

r b - i USA 14 .00 + . 49** 10 - .14 + . 4 3 *

UK 22 + .15 + .09 10 + .25 + .03

FRN 15 + .20 + .34* 9 + .12 + .25

GMY 11 + .09 + .59** 8 + .17 + .56

A-H 7 - .07 + 1.00 3 - .31 + 1.00

ITA 15 + .36* + .10 4 + mgg*** + .33

USR 32 + .03 - .00 29 + .02 + .00

CHN 11 - .00 6 + .18

JPN 13 _ .01 + .15 13 _ .01 + .15

F - t e s t from anova ( f o r r, ) and F i s h e r exact t e s t ( f o r 0 ): *** <; mQi < ** < .05 < * < .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e t e s t

176

(1964) c o n t e n t i o n t h a t b i - p o l a r i t y i n c r e a s e s the p r o b a b i l i t y of

both c o n f l i c t and war.

Second, we f i n d t h a t , c o n t r a r y to e x p e c t a t i o n , t r a d e

c o n s i s t e n t l y c o r r e l a t e s p o s i t i v e l y w i t h war involvement. That

i s to s a y , i f the opposing c o u n t r i e s i n a c o n f l i c t dyad are

major t r a d i n g p a r t n e r s , then t h a t c o n f r o n t a t i o n i s more l i k e l y

to erupt i n t o war than one between n o n - t r a d e p a r t n e r s . Indeed,

a p p r o x i m a t e l y h a l f of the c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i n v o l v i n g t rade p a r t n e r s ,

as compared to f i f t e e n percent of those i n v o l v i n g n o n - t r a d e

p a r t n e r s , r e s u l t i n war. (And, a g a i n , there are no s i g n i f i c a n t

d i f f e r e n c e s between the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t

dyads and those f o r a l l c o n f l i c t d y a d s . ) T h i s a s s o c i a t i o n between

t rade and war may not be as c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e as i f f i r s t a p p e a r s .

W a l l e n s t e e n (1973) reports t h a t , d u r i n g 1920-1965, n e a r l y a l l

m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s between topdogs and underdogs occur i n areas

i n which the i n t e r v e n i n g topdog has s i z a b l e t r a d i n g i n t e r e s t s

(a l though t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p does not hold f o r topdog-topdog

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ) . And Russett (1967) f i n d s t h a t f o r p a i r s of

c o u n t r i e s i n v o l v e d i n c o n f l i c t s r e s u l t i n g i n over one hundred

b a t t l e - r e l a t e d f a t a l i t i e s between 1946 and 1965, those t h a t

belong to the same trade group are more than twice as l i k e l y

to f i g h t one another than are n a t i o n s t h a t belong to d i f f e r e n t

groups or to no group.

One p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h i s p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n

between t rade and war involvement i s t h a t economic exchange

177

makes t r a d e partners more s a l i e n t to one another and i n c r e a s e s

the o p p o r t u n i t y f o r d i f f e r e n c e s on economic i s s u e s to p l a c e

s t r a i n s on the b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . I t may be t h a t common

economic i n t e r e s t s o f t e n serve to l e s s e n these s t r a i n s ; however,

once a c o n f l i c t between trade p a r t n e r s reaches the l e v e l of

m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n (the l e v e l on which our a n a l y s i s f o c u s e s ) ,

the c o n f l i c t may have a l r e a d y exceeded t h a t p o i n t at which these

mutual economic i n t e r e s t s might m i t i g a t e n a t i o n a l b e h a v i o r . A

second p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n — p a r t i a l l y incongruent w i t h the

f i r s t — i s t h a t , w h i l e major t rade p a r t n e r s are l i k e l y to be

s a l i e n t to (and i n t e r a c t o f t e n w i t h ) one another and to thereby

become more a t t e n t i v e to i n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s , t rade r e p r e s e n t s

such a smal l f r a c t i o n of a n a t i o n ' s gross n a t i o n a l product t h a t

i t i s u n l i k e l y to f o s t e r that degree of economic interdependence

that might m i t i g a t e c o n f l i c t a t any l e v e l .

While the f i r s t two e x p l a n a t i o n s focus upon the i n c r e a s e d

o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r i n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s to a r i s e between major t r a d e

p a r t n e r s , a t h i r d p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n i s t h a t we might s i m p l y

be drawing a spur ious i n f e r e n c e from the p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n s

between t r a d e and war involvement. Linnemann ( 1 9 6 6 ) , i n a

c r o s s - n a t i o n a l study of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t rade p a t t e r n s i n 1959,

f i n d s t h a t the amount of t rade between c o u n t r i e s i s p o s i t i v e l y

r e l a t e d to the s i z e of t h e i r gross n a t i o n a l products and

n e g a t i v e l y r e l a t e d to the geographic d i s t a n c e between them.

Thus, Linnemann's f i n d i n g s would suggest t h a t major powers are

178

most likely to trade with other major powers and with countries

that are geographically proximate. If this is so, the positive

correlations between trade and war involvement may reflect no

more than that both these variables are associated with the

relative capabilities of, and geographic distance between, states.

When looking simply at bivariate relationships (as we are presently

doing), we are unable to eliminate these possibly confounding

effects. We shall, however, reconsider this problem below

when we examine the multivariate relationships.

Finally, let us look at the third indicator of structural

relationships—military alliances. As in the previous century,

there are too few instances in the twentieth century when a major

power becomes involved in a military confrontation with a defense

pact ally to say anything definitive. Of the eight occasions

on which states having mutual defense pacts oppose one another,

two (Italy-Germany, 1915; the Soviet Union-Hungary, 1956) result

in war, the remaining six do not. This is approximately the same

proportion of confrontations/wars as found for the entire

population of cases. Thus, once a confrontation occurs, the fact

that the opposing states have a mutual defense pact with one another

does not appear to alter the likelihood that the confrontation will

escalate into war. However, the fact that there are only eight

confrontations between allies strongly suggests that countries that

have mutual defense pacts rarely become involved in military

confrontations with their cosignatories.

1 7 9

The M u l t i v a r i a t e R e l a t i o n s h i p

S i n c e we once more f i n d a g r e a t deal of s i m i l a r i t y a c r o s s

major power c o n f l i c t dyads, we s h a l l a g a i n pool our o b s e r v a t i o n s

and proceed w i t h m u l t i v a r i a t e a n a l y s i s . Caut ion i s , of c o u r s e ,

a p p r o p r i a t e when i n t e r p r e t i n g the r e s u l t i n g c o e f f i c i e n t s .

We see i n Table 26 t h a t the z e r o - o r d e r c o r r e l a t i o n s

(0 and r^) are i n the same d i r e c t i o n and are of a p p r o x i m a t e l y

the same magnitude as the p a r t i a l p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s (b ) .

In a d d i t i o n , the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t dyads

are not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r a l l

t w e n t i e t h century c o n f l i c t dyads.

There are no r e a l s u r p r i s e s i n the d i r e c t i o n or magnitude

of the c o e f f i c i e n t s from the pooled d a t a . As would be expected

from the a n a l y s e s on the "by n a t i o n " c o n f l i c t dyads, d i f f e r e n c e s

in power and trade are the most powerful i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s .

We see t h a t major power/major power c o n f r o n t a t i o n s are more

l i k e l y to evolve i n t o war than are major power/minor power

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s and, s i m i l a r l y , c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between t rade

p a r t n e r s are more v o l a t i l e than those between n o n - t r a d i n g s t a t e s .

The q u e s t i o n t h a t comes immediately to mind i s , of c o u r s e ,

how best to i n t e r p r e t the p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n between t r a d e and

war involvement . The reader w i l l r e c a l l t h a t i t was suggested above

that the t r a d e v a r i a b l e may s i m p l y be t a p p i n g power c a p a b i l i t y

awl geographic p r o x i m i t y , and t h a t i t i s these l a t t e r two f a c t o r s ,

r a t h e r than t rade per s e , t h a t are a s s o c i a t e d w i t h war involvement .

CORRELATION AND STANDARDIZED PROBIT COEFFICIENTS FOR THE FIVE INTERVENING VARIABLES WHEN PREDICTING TO POOLED MAJOR POWER

WAR INVOLVEMENTS, FOR 20th CENTURY CONFLICT DYADS

A l l Dyads

*2 PwrDif C o n t i g War Exp. P o l a r i t y Trade R

P r e d i c t e d —>- N + - +

or r, 130 - . 4 5 * * * +.01 - . 1 3 +.17 +.38*** D

b* 130 - . 3 6 - . 0 3 - . 1 0 +.17 +.30 . 3 5 * * * .32 § j

S t a t . Inc. Dyads

0 or r b 82 - . 4 0 * * * - . 1 0 - . 0 9 ( . 1 5 ) + . ! ! ( . 1 5 ) +.37***

b* 82 - . 3 3 ( . 1 3 ) - . 0 6 ( . 1 3 ) - . 0 3 ( . 1 4 ) +.20(.15) +.36(.14) . 3 5 * * * .34

NOTE: Numbers w i t h i n parentheses are standard e r r o r s . F i s h e r exact t e s t ( f o r 0 ) , f - t e s t from anova ( f o r r b ) , and ^ * from p r o b i t ( X 2 w i t h 5 d f ) : *** < .01 < * * < . 0 5 < * < .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l .

181

To r u l e out the p o s s i b i l i t y of s p u r i o u s i n f e r e n c e , we would have

to " c o n t r o l " f o r power and p r o x i m i t y . The p r o b i t a l g o r i t h m does

j u s t t h a t ; the b*s reported i n Table 26 are p a r t i a l c o e f f i c i e n t s ,

i . e . , the p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t f o r each v a r i a b l e r e f l e c t s the

a s s o c i a t i o n between t h a t v a r i a b l e and war involvement , a f t e r

the e f f e c t s of the other v a r i a b l e s i n the e q u a t i o n have been

removed. Thus, the p o s i t i v e p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r t rade

(Table 26) d e p i c t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between t rade and war

involvement when d i f f e r e n c e s i n power and geographic c o n t i g u i t y

are c o n t r o l l e d . To t h i s e x t e n t , the i n f e r e n c e t h a t t rade i s

p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to war involvement i s not s p u r i o u s . However,

i t s h o u l d be recognized that t h i s i s not a f u l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y

c o n t r o l f o r the f a c t o r s that Linnemann (1966) c l a i m s to be

important f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e f l o w s . This i s because

the measures of c a p a b i l i t y and p r o x i m i t y t h a t I use are both

dichotomously s c a l e d ; c o n t i n u o u s l y - s c a l e d measures would o f f e r

s t r o n g e r evidence as to whether s p u r i o u s n e s s may be r u l e d o u t .

However, the f a c t that we have, a t l e a s t i n a crude manner,

c o n t r o l l e d f o r both p o t e n t i a l l y confounding v a r i a b l e s and s t i l l

uncovered a p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n between t rade and war involvement

should reduce the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t we might draw i n c o r r e c t

i n f e r e n c e s from the s t a t i s t i c a l r e s u l t s .

Returning to Table 2 6 , we see t h a t p o l a r i t y i s the t h i r d

most powerful i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e — t h e more b i - p o l a r the major

power subsystem, the more p r o b a b l e the outbreak of war. C o n t i g u i t y ,

182

on the o t h e r hand, i s b a s i c a l l y u n r e l a t e d to war involvement .

The near zero c o e f f i c i e n t i s , i n small p a r t , due to the

d i f f e r e n t i a l e f f e c t s t h a t v a r i a b l e has f o r d i f f e r e n t n a t i o n s

i n c o n f l i c t dyads; but even i n the "by n a t i o n " a n a l y s e s ,

c o n t i g u i t y d i d not prove to be a p a r t i c u l a r l y powerful

d i s c r i m i n a t o r . This i s a s u b s t a n t i v e l y i n t e r e s t i n g f i n d i n g .

N e a r l y t w e n t y - e i g h t percent of the dyads i n v o l v e d i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s

d u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h century and more than f o r t y - t w o percent of

the dyads i n the t w e n t i e t h century c o n t a i n cont iguous n a t i o n -

s t a t e s , phenomenally high percentages given the much s m a l l e r

p r o p o r t i o n of s t a t e s i n the i n t e r s t a t e system t h a t are cont iguous

to major powers. In the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , f i f t e e n percent of

a l l p o s s i b l e dyads t h a t c o n t a i n at l e a s t one major power are

comprised of g e o g r a p h i c a l l y cont iguous s t a t e s . During the

t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , t h i s f i g u r e d e c l i n e s to e i g h t p e r c e n t .

Standard scores ( i . e . , z - s c o r e s ) can be computed to determine

the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t we c o u l d o b t a i n as high a p r o p o r t i o n of

cont iguous dyads i n v o l v e d i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ( .28 i n the n i n e t e e n t h

century and .42 i n the t w e n t i e t h ) as we do, g iven the known

p r o p o r t i o n of contiguous dyads (.15 i n the n i n e t e e n t h century

and .08 i n the t w e n t i e t h ) . The standard score f o r the n i n e t e e n t h

century (N=98) i s 3 . 4 8 ; f o r the t w e n t i e t h century (N=130), 1 4 . 4 3 .

Thus, the p r o p o r t i o n of cont iguous c o n f l i c t dyads i n the n i n e t e e n t h

century i s about three and o n e - h a l f s tandard d e v i a t i o n s l a r g e r than

would be e x p e c t e d — a s i t u a t i o n t h a t would a r i s e by chance about

183

f i v e t imes i n ten thousand. The p r o p o r t i o n of cont iguous

c o n f l i c t dyads i n the t w e n t i e t h century i s a p p r o x i m a t e l y

f o u r t e e n and o n e - h a l f standard d e v i a t i o n s l a r g e r than would be

e x p e c t e d — a s i t u a t i o n that approaches s t a t i s t i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y

i f geographic c o n t i g u i t y i s u n r e l a t e d to involvement i n m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . I t can only be c o n c l u d e d , t h e n , t h a t c o n t i g u i t y

o f f e r s a very l a r g e number of o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n . However, the f i n d i n g s i n the c u r r e n t c h a p t e r

demonstrate t h a t , once a c o n f r o n t a t i o n has been i n i t i a t e d , major

powers are no more l i k e l y to go to war w i t h n e i g h b o r i n g a d v e r s a r i e s

than w i t h more d i s t a n t opponents — s u g g e s t i n g t h a t , f o r major powers,

geographic d i s t a n c e does not p l a c e very great c o n s t r a i n t s on the

u s a b i l i t y of l a r g e - s c a l e m i l i t a r y f o r c e .

Turning to the f i f t h of our i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s — p r i o r

war e x p e r i e n c e — t h e near zero c o e f f i c i e n t s are e x p e c t e d . As has

a l r e a d y been n o t e d , the only s i z a b l e c o r r e l a t i o n s i n the "by

n a t i o n " a n a l y s e s are f o r China ( r e f l e c t i n g a s i n g l e high s c o r e )

and f o r Germany and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y (having e x c e e d i n g l y smal l

a b s o l u t e s c o r e s ) . Thus, when these o b s e r v a t i o n s are pooled wi th

those f o r other major power dyads, the Chinese case has l i t t l e

i n f l u e n c e and the German and A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n ones appear

r e l a t i v e l y small ( a c t u a l l y i n c r e a s i n g the a s s o c i a t i o n between low

scores and war involvement) .

F i n a l l y , the q u e s t i o n a r i s e s as to whether we are b e t t e r

able to p r e d i c t that war w i l l erupt g i v e n c e r t a i n types of

184

c o n f l i c t dyads; i n our p a r t i c u l a r a n a l y s e s , whether we can p r e d i c t

b e t t e r f o r major power/major power c o n f l i c t s ( i . e . , PWRDIF = 0)

than f o r those between major and minor powers ( i . e . , PWRDIF = 1 ) .

For an answer, we look at the " r e s i d u a l s " from the t w e n t i e t h

c e n t u r y p r o b i t a n a l y s e s .

TABLE 27

TOTAL NUMBER OF MAJOR POWER/MAJOR POWER AND MAJOR POWER/MINOR POWER CONFLICT DYADS THAT TERMINATE IN WAR AND THE PROPORTION OF EACH

TYPE THAT IS CORRECTLY PREDICTED BY THE PROBIT EQUATION, FOR THE 20th CENTURY

A l l Dyads S t a t . Inc. Dyads

N P r o p o r t i o n N P r o p o r t i o n

major/major dyads 18 .67 18 .67

major/minor dyads 10 .00 7 .00

I t i s q u i t e e v i d e n t from Table 27 t h a t we are not a b l e to

p r e d i c t the occurrence of major power/minor power wars. On the

o t h e r hand, we can a c c u r a t e l y f o r e c a s t t w o - t h i r d s of major power/

major power wars. Given t h i s s t a r k f i n d i n g , I look a t the data

f o r the second stage of the model one f i n a l t i m e , o m i t t i n g a l l

cases of major/minor c o n f r o n t a t i o n .

The Major Power/Major Power Conflict Dyads

In r e - a n a l y z i n g the d a t a , u s i n g o n l y the major power/

major power c o n f l i c t s , we c o n f r o n t the most severe s m a l l - N problem

185

to d a t e . The maximum number of c o n f l i c t dyads i n v o l v i n g any

p a r t i c u l a r major power dur ing the n i n e t e e n t h century i s e i g h t

( f o r F r a n c e ) , and the number i s as smal l as one ( f o r I t a l y ) .

With these few o b s e r v a t i o n s i t makes l i t t l e sense to examine

the data by n a t i o n , and we are f o r c e d to pool the o b s e r v a t i o n s

f o r a l l major/major c o n f l i c t dyads. E l i m i n a t i n g d u p l i c a t e c a s e s ,

we o b t a i n the r e s u l t s reported i n the top h a l f of Table 28.

The top h a l f of Table 28 r e v e a l s t h a t , i n g e n e r a l ,

p o l a r i t y and d i f f e r e n c e i n power are s t r o n g l y and i n v e r s e l y

r e l a t e d to the e r u p t i o n of war i n n i n e t e e n t h century major power/

major power c o n f l i c t dyads; w h i l e c o n t i g u i t y and p r i o r war

e x p e r i e n c e are more weakly and p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d . The e f f e c t of

the war exper ience f a c t o r i s o p p o s i t e t h a t which we found when

examining a l l n ineteenth century c o n f l i c t dyads (Table 2 2 ) ,

s u g g e s t i n g t h a t involvement i n major/major dyads may o v e r r i d e A 2

past e x p e r i e n c e . The R f o r the t o t a l p r o b i t e q u a t i o n i s a

phenomenal . 9 8 , the measure of p o i n t p r e d i c t i v e power a s t r o n g . 4 4 .

In e f f e c t , we c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t f o u r of s i x major/major war

i n v o l v e m e n t s , m i s s i n g only the B r i t i s h / R u s s i a n c o n f l i c t i n Crimea

and the A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n / P r u s s i a n c o n f l a g r a t i o n i n the Seven Weeks

*2

War. The high R r e f l e c t s the f a c t t h a t we b a r e l y f a i l to

f o r e c a s t (">.50) these l a t t e r two war i n v o l v e m e n t s ; the p r e d i c t e d

p r o b a b i l i t y f o r B r i t a i n / R u s s i a being .46 and t h a t f o r A u s t r i a -

Hungary/Prussia . 4 7 . S i n c e we l o s e but two o b s e r v a t i o n s (France/

A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y i n the War of I t a l i a n U n i f i c a t i o n , 1859, and

TABLE 28

CORRELATION AND STANDARDIZED PROBIT COEFFICIENTS FOR THE INTERVENING VARIABLES WHEN PREDICTING TO POOLED MAJOR POWER WAR INVOLVEMENTS, FOR

ALL 19th AND 20th CENTURY MAJOR/MAJOR CONFLICT DYADS

19th C e n t u r y — A l l Major/Major Dyads A 2

PwrDif C o n t i g War Exp. P o l a r i t y Trade R P

P r e d i c t e d — * - _N_ - + - + -

0 or r b 20 - . 3 3 +.09 +.30 - . 7 3 * * *

b* 20 - . 6 9 +.21 +.23 - . 6 7 .98*** .44

20th C e n t u r y — A l l Major/Major Dyads

34 +.17 +.19 - . 0 5 +.02 +.42**

34 +.15 +.22 +.07 +.17 +.54 .34 .59

F i s h e r exact t e s t ( f o r 0 ) , f - t e s t from anova ( f o r r. ) , and \ from p r o b i t ( 7 - w i t h 4/5 df) *** < .01 < ** < .05 < * < .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l

0 or r.

187

Germany/Japan in the T r i p l e I n t e r v e n t i o n , 18.95) when we examine

o n l y s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t dyads, the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r t h i s subset

of cases prove to be n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l to those recorded i n

Table 28 and a r e , thus, not r e p o r t e d . What t h i s does t e l l us ,

however, i s that almost every major power/major power c o n f l i c t

dyad d u r i n g the n ineteenth century c o n t a i n s a s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t

member.

In the twentieth century we a l s o have the s m a l l - N problem

that conf ronted us i n the e a r l i e r c e n t u r y . Major power

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s wi th other major powers range from a maximum of

e l e v e n ( f o r the S o v i e t Union) to a minimum of one ( f o r A u s t r i a -

Hungary). Thus, we once more pool the o b s e r v a t i o n s f o r c o n f l i c t

dyads (bottom h a l f of Table 2 8 ) .

We f i n d t h a t , i n the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , only the t rade

v a r i a b l e has a s i g n i f i c a n t impact on war involvement, again

s u g g e s t i n g that the trade i n d i c a t o r may be more s t r o n g l y r e f l e c t i n g

i n t e r s t a t e s a l i e n c e than economic interdependence. The e f f e c t s of

both d i f f e r e n c e i n power and c o n t i g u i t y d e v i a t e from what we

uncovered f o r a l l t w e n t i e t h century c o n f l i c t dyads (Table 2 6 ) .

C o n t i g u i t y i s , as o r i g i n a l l y h y p o t h e s i z e d , p o s i t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d

wi th war involvement (a l though the a s s o c i a t i o n i s weak). But

PWRDIF i s a l s o , though u n e x p e c t e d l y , p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d . The

PWRDIF i n d i c a t o r being used i n the a n a l y s i s of major power/

major power dyads i s not the same as the one used i n p r e v i o u s

a n a l y s e s ; s i n c e we are now examining only major (lowers,

188

i n t e r v a l - s c a l e scores (as opposed to dichotomous measures) of

power c a p a b i l i t y are being a n a l y z e d . I t might be argued that

these i n t e r v a l - s c a l e scores o f f e r a s t r o n g e r t e s t of the

" d i f f e r e n c e i n power" h y p o t h e s i s . As we have a l r e a d y n o t e d ,

the n i n e t e e n t h century PWRDIF c o e f f i c i e n t s , presented i n the

top h a l f of Table 2 8 , s t r o n g l y support the h y p o t h e s i s t h a t

war i s more l i k e l y when opposing s t a t e s are r e l a t i v e l y equal

i n power. The t w e n t i e t h century c o e f f i c i e n t s , presented i n

the bottom h a l f of the t a b l e , do not. Indeed, f o r major power/

major power c o n f l i c t dyads d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , the

g r e a t e r the d i s p a r i t y i n power c a p a b i l i t i e s , the g r e a t e r the

l i k e l i h o o d of war. The r e l a t i o n s h i p i s , of c o u r s e , a very

weak one — the square of the b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t

demonstrates t h a t " d i f f e r e n c e i n power" accounts f o r o n l y

three percent of the "variance" i n the outcome v a r i a b l e .

The c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the remaining two v a r i a b l e s — b i - p o l a r i t y

and p r i o r war e x p e r i e n c e — a r e a l s o very weak. B i - p o l a r i t y i s ,

as we found e a r l i e r , p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to war involvement i n the

t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y ; p r i o r war e x p e r i e n c e i s , f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l

p u r p o s e s , u n r e l a t e d to subsequent war i n v o l v e m e n t . A 2

The R from the p r o b i t a n a l y s i s i s not as s i z a b l e as we

might have e x p e c t e d , r e f l e c t i n g the f a c t t h a t a l a r g e number of

p r e d i c t i o n s l i e around the .50 p r o b a b i l i t y mark. The measure of

p o i n t p r e d i c t i v e power i s q u i t e r o b u s t , as we c o r r e c t l y f o r e c a s t

t h i r t e e n of e ighteen war involvements. We do, however, f a i l to

189

p r e d i c t some rather c r u c i a l c o n f l a g r a t i o n s , e . g . , the Russo-

Japanese War (1904), the German i n v a s i o n of the S o v i e t Union (1941),

and the Korean f i g h t i n g between China and the U n i t e d S t a t e s (1950).

F i n a l l y , i t should be noted t h a t a l l major power/major power

c o n f l i c t dyads i n the t w e n t i e t h century c o n t a i n at l e a s t one

s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t member a n d , t h e r e f o r e , the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r

t h a t subset of cases are i d e n t i c a l to those r e p o r t e d i n the

bottom h a l f of Table 28.

Summarizing the R e s u l t s of the Second Stage

The analyses of dyadic r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the c u r r e n t chapter

produce much more c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t s a c r o s s s t a t e s than d i d the

n a t i o n a l - l e v e l analyses in Chapters Three and Four. During both

the n i n e t e e n t h and the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s we f i n d , as p r e d i c t e d ,

t h a t (1) c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between major powers are more l i k e l y to

e v o l v e i n t o wars than are c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between major and minor

powers, (2) the more severe the p r e v i o u s war e x p e r i e n c e s of the

p a r t i e s to the c o n f r o n t a t i o n , the s m a l l e r the p r o b a b i l i t y of war

(a l though t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s ext remely weak and has s e v e r a l

e x c e p t i o n s ) , and (3) c o u n t r i e s l i n k e d by mutual defense pacts

r a r e l y become i n v o l v e d in m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t w i t h one a n o t h e r . In

the e a r l i e r century we d i s c o v e r , as h y p o t h e s i z e d , t h a t

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between cont iguous s t a t e s are more l i k e l y to erupt

into war than those between n o n - n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s ; a l t h o u g h

no c o n s i s t e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r t h i s v a r i a b l e i s uncovered i n the

190

l a t e r c e n t u r y . We f i n d a n e g a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between b i - p o l a r i t y

and war i n the n ineteenth c e n t u r y ; a p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n i n the

t w e n t i e t h . And c o n t r a r y to e x p e c t a t i o n , t r a d e i s shown to be

p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to war involvement i n the present c e n t u r y .

I t i s demonstrated t h a t the e f f e c t s of the i n t e r v e n i n g

v a r i a b l e s are the same f o r c o n f l i c t dyads c o n t a i n i n g s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n t major powers as they are f o r the e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n

o f c o n f l i c t dyads. And f i n a l l y , we d i s c o v e r t h a t a l t h o u g h the

p o s i t e d model does not help us to p r e d i c t whether or not

major power/mi nor power c o n f l i c t dyads w i l l eventuate i n war,

r a t h e r good p r e d i c t i o n i s o b t a i n e d f o r major power/major power

dyads.

CHAPTER VI

STATUS, CONFLICT, AND WAR

We have completed our i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p s

p o s i t e d i n Chapter One. I t i s now time to "take s t o c k " — t o

r e c a p i t u l a t e and i n t e g r a t e the f i n d i n g s , and to a s c e r t a i n what

i m p l i c a t i o n s may be drawn from the preceding a n a l y s e s . I s h a l l

f i r s t proceed s y s t e m a t i c a l l y through the hypotheses t h a t comprise

the model t e s t e d i n t h i s t h e s i s , r e s t a t i n g the expected r e l a t i o n s h i p s

and r e i t e r a t i n g the e m p i r i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n s t h a t have been uncovered.

I s h a l l then conclude w i t h a few o b s e r v a t i o n s f o r peace r e s e a r c h

i n g e n e r a l .

Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y and Military C o n f l i c t

I o r i g i n a l l y hypothesized t h a t s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e s

are prone to involvement i n i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ,

but argued t h a t no d i r e c t l i n k e x i s t s between u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n

( i . e . , s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y ) and war involvement . Subsequent

analyses l e a d to the f o l l o w i n g general c o n c l u s i o n s :

(1) S t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s not u n i v e r s a l l y a s s o c i a t e d

w i t h c o n f l i c t proneness; al though u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n has some import

191

192

i n the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , i t s e f f e c t on c o n f l i c t behavior i s

l a r g e l y a t w e n t i e t h century phenomenon. And,

(2) While we f i n d t h a t s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s a s s o c i a t e d

w i t h major power m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s (at l e a s t d u r i n g the

t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y ) , i t has no a d d i t i o n a l e f f e c t on war involvement.

U n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n and C o n f r o n t a t i o n

There i s a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of e m p i r i c a l evidence t h a t ,

i f s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n ,

i t i s m a i n l y a t w e n t i e t h century r e l a t i o n s h i p . To begin w i t h ,

b i v a r i a t e analyses r e v e a l , a t b e s t , o n l y a few moderate

a s s o c i a t i o n s between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and involvement i n

m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s dur ing the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . And

m u l t i v a r i a t e analyses demonstrate t h a t knowing which s t a t e s are

underrecognized d e c i d e d l y improves our a b i l i t y to p r e d i c t the

o c c u r r e n c e of i n t e r s t a t e c o n f r o n t a t i o n s f o r o n l y two (France and

Germany) of s i x major powers. In a d d i t i o n to t h i s , we f i n d t h a t

e i g h t e e n of twenty major power/major power c o n f l i c t dyads i n the

n i n e t e e n t h century c o n t a i n a t l e a s t one u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d s t a t e

and o n l y o n e - f o u r t h of the twenty dyads a c t u a l l y c o n t a i n two

s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t members. A c c o r d i n g to the b i n o m i a l p r o b a b i l i t y

d i s t r i b u t i o n , the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t e i t h e r of these c o u l d occur by

chance i s l a r g e — t h e former would be expected to o c c u r one i n

t h r e e t imes and, the l a t t e r , n e a r l y two i n three t i m e s . To p i c t u r e

t h i s , imagine that we have an urn c o n t a i n i n g red ( s t a t u s

193

i n c o n s i s t e n t ) and white ( n o n - s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t ) b a l l s , where

t h e r e i s one b a l l f o r each major power and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of

c o l o r s i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e to the d i s t r i b u t i o n of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t

s t a t e s . I f there i s a t o t a l of T b a l l s , W of which are white and

R r e d , then the p r o b a b i l i t y P-j o f s i m u l t a n e o u s l y drawing from

the urn two b a l l s , at l e a s t one o f which i s red ( i . e . , not

drawing two w h i t e ) , i s

(T(T-l)/2) - (W(W-l)/2) W(W-l) = i >

T(T-l)/2 T (T- l )

and the p r o b a b i l i t y P̂ of s e l e c t i n g two b a l l s , both of which are

r e d , i s

R ( R - l ) / 2 R ( R - l )

T(T-l )/2 T (T- l )

The c l a s s i c binomial problem would be to determine the l i k e l i h o o d

of drawing K or more p a i r s c o n t a i n i n g at l e a s t one red b a l l i n N

t r i a l s , g iven the expected p r o b a b i l i t y P-j ( o r , s i m i l a r l y , the

l i k e l i h o o d of drawing K or more p a i r s c o n t a i n i n g two red b a l l s ,

g i v e n the p r o b a b i l i t y P 0 ) . To p l a c e t h i s example back i n t o c o n t e x t ,

we are a s k i n g "what i s the l i k e l i h o o d of s e l e c t i n g , a t random,

e i g h t e e n or more c o n f l i c t dyads c o n t a i n i n g at. 1 e a s t one s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n t member from a group o f twenty c o n f l i c t dyads, g i v e n

t h a t the p r o b a b i l i t y of s e l e c t i n g such a dyad i s P-j?" Or,

s i m i l a r l y , "what i s the l i k e l i h o o d of s e l e c t i n g f i v e or more

194

conflict dyads in which both members are status inconsistent,

given that the probability of selecting such a dyad is P0?"

With the data that we have, however, we need to make a minor

adjustment. Since the number of major powers and the proportion

of underrecognized states vary from one year to the next, we

really have N urns, each with its own expected probability.

The question becomes, "what is the likelihood that from these

N urns we could draw K or more pairs having at least one red

ball (or K or more pairs having two red balls), given the mean

expected probability P-j (or P̂ ) for the urns?" The likelihood

is expressed by the cumulative binomial formula

where Q = 1 - P. In the nineteenth century, the probability (P-j)

of selecting a conflict dyad containing at least one status

inconsistent member is .833, resulting in a likelihood of .32

that we could draw by chance eighteen or more dyads with at least

one underrecognized member in twenty attempts; and the probability

(P )̂ of selecting a conflict dyad in which both members are

status inconsistent is .264, giving a likelihood of .64 that we

could randomly select five or more dyads in which both members

are underrecognized. Thus, "all the empirical evidence—whether

i t be bivariate or multivariate, national level or dyadic—

N

k=K

195

p o i n t s to the f a c t that there i s no consistent , a s s o c i a t i o n

between u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n and m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n f o r major

powers i n t h i s e a r l i e r century .

On the other hand, there i s evidence s u p p o r t i n g a

p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n between u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n and m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n i n the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . The United S t a t e s ,

U n i t e d Kingdom, and Soviet Union a l l d i s p l a y s t a t i s t i c a l l y

s i g n i f i c a n t b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n t h i s l a t e r c e n t u r y ,

and most o t h e r major powers (with the e x c e p t i o n of A u s t r i a -

Hungary, which i s dismembered i n 1918) a l s o show p o s i t i v e

c o e f f i c i e n t s . S i m i l a r l y , i n the m u l t i v a r i a t e a n a l y s e s ,

knowing which s t a t e s are underrecognized i n c r e a s e s our a b i l i t y

to f o r e c a s t the occurrence of i n t e r s t a t e c o n f r o n t a t i o n s a c r o s s

a l l major powers f o r which s u f f i c i e n t data o b s e r v a t i o n s are

a v a i l a b l e . ^ F i n a l l y , we d i s c o v e r t h a t a l l t h i r t y - f o u r

major power/major power c o n f l i c t dyads i n the t w e n t i e t h century

c o n t a i n a t l e a s t one s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t member, and twenty-two

of these dyads have underrecognized c o u n t r i e s on both s i d e s .

During the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , the expected p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t a

major power/major power c o n f l i c t dyad w i l l c o n t a i n at l e a s t one

s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t member i s . 8 3 3 ; the expected p r o b a b i l i t y that

i t w i l l c o n t a i n two such members i s . 2 6 5 . From the b i n o m i a l

d i s t r i b u t i o n , we can a s c e r t a i n t h a t the l i k e l i h o o d of s e l e c t i n g

1 There are three major powers — Germany, A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , and I t a l y — t h a t are too i n f r e q u e n t l y i n v o l v e d in c o n f r o n t a t i o n when s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t to permit s t a b l e parameter e s t i m a t e s .

196

by chance t h i r t y - f o u r dyads w i t h at l e a s t one s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t

member i s approximately two i n a thousand, and the l i k e l i h o o d of

s e l e c t i n g twenty-two or more dyads i n which both p a r t i e s are

underrecognized i s l e s s than f o u r i n a m i l l i o n . The reader may

f e e l t h a t these p r o b a b i l i t i e s underest imate the " r e a l " l i k e l i h o o d

t h a t major power c o n f l i c t dyads w i l l c o n t a i n s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t

members, and t h a t they are s imply an a r t i f a c t of the "maximizing"

d e c i s i o n r u l e a p p l i e d to n - n a t i o n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . Under the

"maximizing" r u l e , i f any major power in a c o a l i t i o n i s

u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d , then s t a t e s i n the opposing c o a l i t i o n are

c o n s i d e r e d to be i n a c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h a s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t

s t a t e . A much more c o n s e r v a t i v e manner of d e a l i n g w i t h n - n a t i o n

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i s to s e l e c t all p o s s i b l e p a i r s of opposing s t a t e s .

Then, f o r example, i f there are three s t a t e s on e i t h e r s i d e ,

there are nine c o n f l i c t dyads. Using t h i s d e c i s i o n r u l e f o r the

t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , we f i n d t h a t f o r t y - o n e of f o r t y - s i x major power/

major power c o n f l i c t dyads c o n t a i n at l e a s t one s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t

major power, and twenty-two of f o r t y - s i x c o n t a i n two. With the

expected p r o b a b i l i t i e s being r e s p e c t i v e l y .834 and . 2 6 4 , the

l i k e l i h o o d s d e r i v e d from the binomial d i s t r i b u t i o n are .20 and

. 0 0 1 . Thus, w h i l e we could expect to randomly s e l e c t f o r t y - o n e

or more major power/major power dyads w i t h at l e a s t one s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n t member o n e - f i f t h of the t i m e , the l i k e l i h o o d of

randomly s e l e c t i n g twenty-two or more dyads i n which both p a r t i e s

are underrecognized i s only one i n a thousand.

1 0 /

In s h o r t , there appears to bo a c o n s i s t e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p

between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and major power involvement in

m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n dur ing the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . This

r e l a t i o n s h i p i s p a r t i c u l a r l y s t rong f o r major power/major power

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , suggesting t h a t underrecognized major powers

demonstrate t h e i r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n by c o n f r o n t i n g o t h e r major

powers. To the extent that t h i s i s t r u e , p o l i c i e s of e x c l u s i o n

and d i p l o m a t i c i s o l a t i o n i s m l i k e those d i r e c t e d by the western

Powers a g a i n s t the S o v i e t Union and, l a t e r , the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c

o f China are c o u n t e r - p r o d u c t i v e i n t h a t , c e t e r i s p a r i b u s , they

i n c r e a s e the l i k e l i h o o d of m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n . On the

o t h e r hand, p o l i c i e s e x p l i c i t l y aimed at f o s t e r i n g d i p l o m a t i c

rapprochement are no guarantee f o r more p e a c e f u l b e h a v i o r .

That i s to say, w h i l e the e f f e c t s of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y are

p e r v a s i v e i n the twent ieth c e n t u r y , u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n i s not

a s u f f i c i e n t cause of m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n nor a necessary

cause of major power/mi nor power c o n f r o n t a t i o n (though i t may

be a necessary f a c t o r i n major power/major power i n v o l v e m e n t ) .

U n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n and War

The second c o n c l u s i o n from the a n a l y s e s on s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s that it. has no e f f e c t on major power war

involvement beyond i n c r e a s i n g (at l e a s t d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h

century) the l i k e l i h o o d of m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n . For one t h i n g ,

knowing t h a t a c o n f l i c t dyad c o n t a i n s one or more s t a t u s

198

i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e s does not improve our a b i l i t y to p r e d i c t

whether or not a war w i l l e r u p t . This i s t r u e d u r i n g both

c e n t u r i e s and f o r a l l major powers.

A second piece of ev idence i s found f o r major power/

major power c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . In the n i n e t e e n t h century t h e r e

are s i x major power/major power war dyads, f o u r of which c o n t a i n

one s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t member and a f i f t h c o n t a i n s two s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e s . The expected p r o b a b i l i t y of s e l e c t i n g

a dyad having at l e a s t one underrecognized member i s . 8 5 0 ;

and of s e l e c t i n g a dyad wi th two such members, . 2 5 0 . The

l i k e l i h o o d of o b t a i n i n g by chance f i v e or more dyads, each

c o n t a i n i n g at l e a s t one underrecognized major power i s . 7 8 ;

of o b t a i n i n g one or more dyads w i t h two underrecognized major

powers, . 8 2 . Thus, the a c t u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t

s t a t e s i n n i n e t e e n t h century major power/major power war dyads

i s h i g h l y l i k e l y .

The most c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e , however, i s found amongst

the t w e n t i e t h century r e s u l t s . Using the "maximizing" d e c i s i o n

r u l e f o r i n c l u d i n g n-nat ion c o n f l i c t s , t h e r e are e i g h t e e n

major power/major power war dyads. Seven of these c o n t a i n one

s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e , and the o t h e r e leven c o n t a i n s t a t e s

t h a t are both underrecognized. Given the d i s t r i b u t i o n of s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e s i n the years i n which these wars o c c u r ,

the expected p r o b a b i l i t y of s e l e c t i n g a war dyad having at l e a s t

one underrecognized member i s . 8 3 4 , and the p r o b a b i l i t y of

199

s e l e c t i n g a dyad w i t h two such members i s . 2 6 3 . The l i k e l i h o o d s

of o b t a i n i n g by chance as many or more dyads i n each category

as we a c t u a l l y do a r e , r e s p e c t i v e l y , .04 and . 0 0 2 . That i s ,

g i v e n the expected p r o b a b i l i t i e s , the war dyads are u n l i k e l y

to be random c h o i c e s . However, once we c o n t r o l f o r the

d i s t r i b u t i o n of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e s i n conflict dyads

(as opposed to the d i s t r i b u t i o n w i t h i n the p o p u l a t i o n of

major powers i n war y e a r s ) , we r e c e i v e a very d i f f e r e n t p i c t u r e .

S i n c e a l l major power/major power conflict dyads i n the t w e n t i e t h

c e n t u r y have at l e a s t one underrecognized member, the p r o b a b i l i t y

i s u n i t y t h a t a l l war dyads (which are a subset of c o n f l i c t dyads)

w i l l a l s o c o n t a i n a s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t member. S i m i l a r l y ,

the p r o p o r t i o n of c o n f l i c t dyads having two u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d major

powers i s .647 and, as a r e s u l t , the l i k e l i h o o d o f randomly

s e l e c t i n g eleven or more of e i g h t e e n war dyads w i t h t h i s property

i s . 7 3 . I f we use a d e c i s i o n r u l e f o r n - n a t i o n wars t h a t i n c l u d e s

all p o s s i b l e major power/major power war p a i r s , the e f f e c t i s the

same. To summarize, t h e n , once we have c o n t r o l l e d f o r the

d i s t r i b u t i o n of underrecognized major powers i n c o n f l i c t dyads,

we f i n d t h a t the l i k e l i h o o d i s q u i t e l a r g e t h a t we w i l l o b t a i n

— s i m p l y by c h a n c e — a s many major power/major power war dyads

c o n t a i n i n g s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t members as we do.

Thus, the overwhelming c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t s t a t u s

i n c o n s i s t e n c y does not a l t e r the l i k e l i h o o d of major power war .

beyond i t s e f f e c t i n i n c r e a s i n g the p r o b a b i l i t y of i n t e r s t a t e

200

m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . The i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s f i n d i n g would

appear to be that once c o u n t r i e s engage i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n , a set

of dynamics q u i t e d i s t i n c t from the o r i g i n a l p r e c i p i t a t i n g f a c t o r s

may w e l l determine the l i k e l i h o o d of war. As a r e s u l t ,

a m e l i o r a t o r y procedures, designed to s a l v e the sources of the

p r e c i p i t a t i n g i n j u r y or prevent the development of the m o t i v a t i n g

f a c t o r s , may be i n e f f e c t i v e a f t e r a c o n f r o n t a t i o n has a l r e a d y

begun. Such procedures need to be enacted before the use of

m i l i t a r y f o r c e i s threatened or a c t u a l l y employed.

The Intervening V a r i a b l e s and Military C o n f l i c t

I t was o r i g i n a l l y hypothesized t h a t there are environmental

f a c t o r s — some p h y s i c a l , some p s y c h o l o g i c a l , and some s t r u c t u r a l —

t h a t , w h i l e not i n themselves causes of m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t ,

n e v e r t h e l e s s serve to a l t e r the p r o b a b i l i t y that c o n f r o n t a t i o n s and

wars w i l l e r u p t . What have we d i s c o v e r e d about these i n t e r v e n i n g

v a r i a b l e s ?

P h y s i c a l A t t r i b u t e s

Three hypotheses concerning " r e a c h a b i l i t y " were p o s i t e d :

(1) Given that a s t a t e i s prone to c o n f l i c t , the

p r o b a b i l i t y that i t w i l l become i n v o l v e d i n a m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n

i n c r e a s e s i f i t s power c a p a b i l i t i e s are i n c r e a s i n g and decreases i f

i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s are d e c r e a s i n g .

(2) Given t h a t s t a t e s are engaged i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n ,

the l i k e l i h o o d of war i s great i f the opposing s t a t e s are r e l a t i v e l y

201

equal i n power c a p a b i l i t i e s and the l i k e l i h o o d i s s m a l l e r i f the

s t a t e s are very unequal i n c a p a b i l i t i e s . And,

(3) Given t h a t s t a t e s are engaged i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n ,

wars are more l i k e l y to occur i f the p a r t i e s to the c o n f r o n t a t i o n

are cont iguous than i f they are d i s t a n t .

We f i n d t h a t the f i r s t hypothesis i s o n l y p a r t i a l l y

supported by the e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e . For n i n e t e e n t h century

major powers, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between change i n power and

involvement i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n i s g e n e r a l l y q u i t e weak,

but i n the p r e d i c t e d d i r e c t i o n (with o n l y Prussia/Germany

d i s p l a y i n g a s i z a b l e negat ive a s s o c i a t i o n ) . In the t w e n t i e t h

c e n t u r y , change i n power i s again weakly a s s o c i a t e d w i t h

involvement i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n f o r most major powers, but n e a r l y

every s i g n i f i c a n t c o e f f i c i e n t i s i n the p r e d i c t e d p o s i t i v e

d i r e c t i o n . The s t a t e s d i s p l a y i n g these p o s i t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t s

appear to espouse g e n e r a l l y e x p a n s i o n i s t f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s , w h i l e

t h e r e i s a n o t i c e a b l e tendency f o r the s t a t u s quo major powers

to have s m a l l e r , but negat ive c o e f f i c i e n t s . Thus, those p o l i c y

makers who f e a r the growth of power c a p a b i l i t i e s i n e x p a n s i o n i s t

s t a t e s have grounds f o r c o n c e r n . On the other hand, at l e a s t

f o r the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , we should be wary about the d e s t a b i l i z i n g

e f f e c t s o f any p r e c i p i t o u s d e c l i n e i n the c a p a b i l i t i e s of the

s t a t u s quo major powers.

Once a major power becomes engaged i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n ,

there i s a very c o n s i s t e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p between the r e l a t i v e

2 0 2

c a p a b i l i t i e s of the p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d and the l i k e l i h o o d of war.

The f i n d i n g s from the dyadic a n a l y s e s demonstrate t h a t

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between major powers tend toward war, w h i l e

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between major and minor powers are more l i k e l y

to a v o i d t h i s outcome. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between r e l a t i v e

e q u a l i t y i n c a p a b i l i t i e s and war involvement i s p a r t i c u l a r l y

pronounced i n the twent ieth c e n t u r y . When we focus e x c l u s i v e l y

on c o n f r o n t a t i o n s among major powers, we f i n d t h a t the p o s i t e d

r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n e q u a l i t y i n power and the decreased

p r o b a b i l i t y of war i s q u i t e s t r o n g l y supported i n the e a r l i e r

c e n t u r y , a l though there i s a weak r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n e q u a l i t y

and i n c r e a s e d l i k e l i h o o d of major power/major power war i n the

c u r r e n t c e n t u r y . O v e r a l l , however, the i m p l i c a t i o n of the

f i n d i n g s from the second h y p o t h e s i s on c a p a b i l i t i e s seems c l e a r ,

i f ominous: given the c a t a s t r o p h i c e f f e c t s of t w e n t i e t h century

major power wars, m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n between the major' powers

— e v e n the t h r e a t to use f o r c e — m u s t be a v o i d e d .

F i n a l l y , we f i n d o n l y scanty support f o r the t h i r d

r e a c h a b i l i t y h y p o t h e s i s , t h a t c o n c e r n i n g geographic p r o p i n q u i t y

and war. In the n ineteenth century the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s p o s i t i v e

as p r e d i c t e d , but very weak; i n the t w e n t i e t h , i t i s g e n e r a l l y

n o n e x i s t e n t . Focusing e x c l u s i v e l y on major power/major power

c o n f l i c t dyads, c o n t i g u i t y has a weak p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h

war involvement i n both c e n t u r i e s . S i n c e the data r e v e a l ,

e s p e c i a l l y f o r the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , t h a t a l a r g e number of the

203

m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s in which major powers engage i n v o l v e

n e i g h b o r i n g s t a t e s , the absence of any a p p r e c i a b l e a s s o c i a t i o n

between c o n t i g u i t y and war involvement i s of c o n s i d e r a b l e i n t e r e s t .

In e s s e n c e , the data analyses support the p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t

b o r d e r i n g s t a t e s are s a l i e n t to one a n o t h e r , and t h a t the

l a r g e number of i n t e r a c t i o n o p p o r t u n i t i e s a v a i l a b l e to cont iguous

s t a t e s a f f o r d c o n s i d e r a b l e l a t i t u d e f o r m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n .

B u t ; c o n t r o l l i n g f o r t h i s l a t t e r f a c t , major powers are n e a r l y

as l i k e l y to wage war a g a i n s t more d i s t a n t opponents as a g a i n s t

b o r d e r i n g c o u n t r i e s . In s h o r t , major powers are capable of

(and do) reach out w i t h s u b s t a n t i a l m i l i t a r y f o r c e beyond t h e i r

immediate n e i g h b o r s , r a i n i n g death and d e s t r u c t i o n almost as

r e a d i l y on the more d i s t a n t as on the c o n t i g u o u s . Indeed, i t i s

t h i s very a b i l i t y to reach out t h a t l a r g e l y i d e n t i f i e s t h a t c l a s s

of s t a t e s t h a t we designate "major powers."

The P s y c h o l o g i c a l Factor

In a d d i t i o n to the p r e c e d i n g p h y s i c a l a t t r i b u t e s , a

p s y c h o l o g i c a l f a c t o r was p o s i t e d to comprise a p o r t i o n of a s t a t e ' s

d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g m i l i e u . I t was h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t :

(1) The more c o s t l y p r e v i o u s wars ( o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d i n

terms of b a t t l e d e a t h s ) , the l e s s l i k e l y i s a s t a t e to become

i n v o l v e d i n , or to i n i t i a t e , subsequent m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s .

And,

(2) Given t h a t such a c o n f r o n t a t i o n does n e v e r t h e l e s s

o c c u r , the g r e a t e r the l o s s e s s u f f e r e d by the p a r t i e s to the

204

c o n f r o n t a t i o n in t h e i r previous war encounters ( r e g a r d l e s s of

the i d e n t i t y of t h e i r p r i o r opponents) , the s m a l l e r the

p r o b a b i l i t y that the c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i l l e r u p t i n t o war.

The data f o r the n i n e t e e n t h century o f f e r weak to

n e g l i g i b l e support f o r the f i r s t p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t war l o s s e s

reduce the p r o b a b i l i t y of subsequent c o n f l i c t i n v o l v e m e n t s .

A n a l y s e s on the t w e n t i e t h century data y i e l d more s i z a b l e

c o e f f i c i e n t s . However, the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r most t w e n t i e t h

c e n t u r y major powers are p o s i t i v e , s u g g e s t i n g a r e v a n c h i s t

syndrome. The only s t a t e s r e v e a l i n g the p r e d i c t e d n e g a t i v e

c o e f f i c i e n t s are those t h a t , d u r i n g the c u r r e n t c e n t u r y , s u f f e r

c a t a s t r o p h i c m i l i t a r y and a s s o c i a t e d economic l o s s e s w i t h o u t

t a n g i b l e gain ( i . e . , Japan i n the Russo-Japanese War; Germany

and R u s s i a i n WW I ) . This r a i s e s the q u e s t i o n of what, i f

a n y t h i n g , n a t i o n s "learn" from p r i o r war e x p e r i e n c e s . I t appears

t h a t the t w e n t i e t h century major powers have d i s c o v e r e d t h a t

m i l i t a r y adventurism can be a p r o f i t a b l e t a c t i c f o r o b t a i n i n g

n a t i o n a l ends; only the most ravaging war e x p e r i e n c e s seem to

d e t e r these c o u n t r i e s from subsequent involvements i n m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s .

Given the gloomy i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t war l o s s e s do not deter

subsequent conflict involvement, do they n e v e r t h e l e s s d issuade

s t a t e s from e s c a l a t i n g c o n f r o n t a t i o n i n t o war? The a n a l y s e s

r e v e a l t h a t , f o r the most p a r t , b a t t l e l o s s e s a r e , as p r e d i c t e d ,

i n v e r s e l y r e l a t e d to subsequent war involvement. However, i t i s

205

an ext remely weak r e l a t i o n s h i p , and the s i g n s become p o s i t i v e

when we look only at n ineteenth century major power/major power

c o n f l i c t dyads. By and l a r g e t h e n , w h i l e i n c r e a s e d b a t t l e l o s s e s

do have a tendency to reduce the p r o b a b i l i t y of subsequent war

i n v o l v e m e n t , the e f f e c t i s n e g l i g i b l e .

S t r u c t u r a l R e l a t i o n s h i p s

The l a s t set of i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s are concerned w i t h

s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . I t was h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t :

(1) The l e s s b i - p o l a r the major power subsystem, the

s m a l l e r the p r o b a b i l i t y of both m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n and war.

(2) The more c r o s s - c u t a s t a t e ' s bonds, the l e s s l i k e l y

i t i s to become i n v o l v e d i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n . And,

(3) Given t h a t such a c o n f r o n t a t i o n does o c c u r , the

p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t i t w i l l r e s u l t i n war w i l l be reduced i f the

opposing s t a t e s have bonds w i t h one a n o t h e r .

The f i r s t h y p o t h e s i s , a s s o c i a t i n g b i - p o l a r i t y w i t h m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n and war, i s o n l y p a r t i a l l y c o r r o b o r a t e d i n the

n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , but f i n d s more c o n s i s t e n t support i n the

t w e n t i e t h . During the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , b i - p o l a r i t y i s r e g u l a r l y

( i f o n l y moderately) a s s o c i a t e d w i t h g r e a t e r involvement i n

m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n . At the same t i m e , however, b i - p o l a r i t y i s

s t r o n g l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h l e s s war involvement . Thus, i n the

n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , b i - p o l a r i t y leads to probing and s p a r r i n g ,

but not war. In the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , b i - p o l a r i t y i s n e a r l y

206

always a s s o c i a t e d wi th both a h igher l i k e l i h o o d of m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n and a g r e a t e r p r o b a b i l i t y of war. T h i s i m p l i e s ,

f o r the c u r r e n t c e n t u r y , t h a t p o l i c i e s t h a t l e a d to the l o o s e n i n g

of b l o c t i e s serve to m i t i g a t e the p o s s i b i l i t y of o v e r t m i l i t a r y

c o n f l i c t . I t should be made c l e a r , however, t h a t the l o o s e n i n g

of these t i e s w i l l n o t , i n i t s e l f , prevent c o n f l i c t ; r a t h e r ,

the demise of r i g i d al ignments s i m p l y e l i m i n a t e s a c leavage

t h a t tends to focus and exacerbate e x i s t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n s .

As f o r the second h y p o t h e s i s — p o s i t i n g a n e g a t i v e

a s s o c i a t i o n between c r o s s - c u t t i n g and involvement i n m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n — i t i s d i s c o n f i r m e d . The r e l a t i o n s h i p i s o n l y

examined f o r the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , but d u r i n g t h i s c e n t u r y

the m a j o r i t y of the c r o s s - c u t t i n g c o e f f i c i e n t s are p o s i t i v e ,

though g e n e r a l l y weak. As e x p l a i n e d i n Chapter Four, one

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the p o s i t i v e ( i f weak) a s s o c i a t i o n between

c r o s s - c u t t i n g and m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n i s t h a t , d u r i n g the

t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , major powers s imply do not have enough c r o s s -

c u t t i n g bonds to produce c r o s s - p r e s s u r e s a n d , t h e r e f o r e , the

c r o s s - c u t t i n g hypothesis i s j u s t not a p p l i c a b l e to i n t e r n a t i o n a l

i n t e r a c t i o n s i n the c u r r e n t c e n t u r y . A judgment as to the v a l i d i t y

of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n must await a more p r e c i s e s p e c i f i c a t i o n of

what d o e s , and what does n o t , c o n s t i t u t e c r o s s - c u t t i n g . However,

an i n t e l l e c t u a l l y a t t r a c t i v e c o u n t e r - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the

p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n between c r o s s - c u t t i n g and m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n i s t h a t the s t a t e s t h a t have the most c r o s s - c u t bonds

207

are (as hypothesized) the most c r o s s - p r e s s u r e d , but t h a t

( c o n t r a r y to e x p e c t a t i o n ) c r o s s - p r e s s u r e s produce t e n s i o n and

u n c e r t a i n t y , and thereby exacerbate p o t e n t i a l l y c o n f l i c t f u l

s i t u a t i o n s . At the present t i m e , i t i s i m p o s s i b l e to choose

between these a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . T h i s , however,

i s not a major problem, s i n c e i t appears t h a t c r o s s - c u t t i n g

i s o n l y p e r i p h e r a l l y r e l a t e d to major power involvement i n

m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s .

F i n a l l y , the t h i r d s t r u c t u r a l h y p o t h e s i s p o s i t s t h a t

i n t e r s t a t e bonds serve to l e s s e n the l i k e l i h o o d of war. Looking

f i r s t a t the e f f e c t s of m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s , we f i n d t h a t ,

d u r i n g both c e n t u r i e s , m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s and wars r a r e l y

i n v o l v e s t a t e s having mutual defense pacts w i t h one a n o t h e r .

Whi le t h i s i m p l i e s t h a t a l l i a n c e s make c o n f l i c t s among a l l i a n c e

members l e s s l i k e l y , we have seen t h a t d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h

c e n t u r y they i n c r e a s e the p r o b a b i l i t y of wars between a l l i a n c e

b l o c s . Thus, if a l l i a n c e s are to be used as a mechanism f o r

p r e v e n t i n g wars, the evidence suggests t h a t a "grand a l l i a n c e "

of a l l a g a i n s t none would be maximal. The p o s t - N a p o l e o n i c

Concert of Europe may w e l l be an example of t h i s . However,

c u r r e n t p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s would appear to p r e c l u d e such a

" s o l u t i o n . " I t should be remembered t h a t , between the two

w o r l d wars , " c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y " proved to be a dismal f a i l u r e

because governments were u n w i l l i n g to p l a c e common n a t i o n a l or

human i n t e r e s t s above t h e i r own n a t i o n - s p e c i f i c i n t e r e s t s .

208

Today, there i s l i t t l e evidence to suggest t h a t t h a t s i t u a t i o n

has changed.

Looking at a second type of i n t e r s t a t e bond, i . e . , t rade

p a r t n e r s h i p , we uncover q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t a s s o c i a t i o n from what

we f i n d f o r m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s . During the t w e n t i e t h century

(the o n l y p e r i o d f o r which we have d a t a ) , t r a d e proves to be

positively and s t r o n g l y r e l a t e d to war i n v o l v e m e n t . Thus, i f

major t r a d i n g partners become i n v o l v e d i n a m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n

w i t h one a n o t h e r , then the p r o b a b i l i t y of war s h a r p l y i n c r e a s e s .

T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t t rade i s by no means a route to more peaceful

i n t e r a c t i o n among n a t i o n s . Trade appears to make n a t i o n s more

s a l i e n t to one a n o t h e r — p e r h a p s a m p l i f y i n g b i l a t e r a l t e n s i o n s —

w h i l e not c r e a t i n g s u f f i c i e n t economic interdependence to m i t i g a t e

c o n f l i c t b e h a v i o r . This f i n d i n g , i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the f i n d i n g

r e p o r t e d i n the preceding p a r a g r a p h , s t r o n g l y suggests t h a t

( c o n t r a r y to our o r i g i n a l c r o s s - c u t t i n g h y p o t h e s i s ) having a

major t r a d e p a r t n e r s h i p , but not a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e , w i t h another

country i s a p o t e n t i a l l y v o l a t i l e r e l a t i o n s h i p . I t may be t h a t

t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p a r i s e s most o f t e n between c o u n t r i e s t h a t have

few common i n t e r e s t s beyond p u r e l y economic ones, or between

c o u n t r i e s t h a t have a t r a d i t i o n of m i l i t a r y a n i m o s i t y , y e t possess

the raw m a t e r i a l s , manufactured goods, or t e c h n o l o g i c a l e x p e r t i s e

to make t r a d e e c o n o m i c a l l y a t t r a c t i v e . Whatever the reason f o r

the r e l a t i o n s h i p , having a major t r a d e p a r t n e r s h i p , but not a

m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e , wi th another n a t i o n appears to o f f e r an

209

environment that i s conducive to the e s c a l a t i o n of m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i n t o i n t e r s t a t e wars.

This completes the review of the hypotheses that we

examined i n t h i s t h e s i s and the e m p i r i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n s that

were uncovered. As a summary of t h i s c h a p t e r , I present

Table 29 (p. 210). The t a b l e i s devoid of a l l nuances and

e x c e p t i o n s ; i t c o n t a i n s only the most general t rends in our

d a t a . More d e t a i l e d r e s u l t s c a n , of c o u r s e , be found in

Chapters Three through F i v e .

General Observat ions f o r Peace Research

I conclude t h i s c h a p t e r , and the t h e s i s , by h i g h l i g h t i n g

some i m p l i c a t i o n s t h a t our f i n d i n g s hold f o r r e s e a r c h on war i n

g e n e r a l . In t h i s l i g h t , I see four p e r t i n e n t p o i n t s .

F i r s t , i t cannot be assumed (but r a t h e r should be e x p l i c i t l y

examined) that on any dimension the major powers, or any o t h e r

group of s t a t e s , comprise a homogeneous set of a c t o r s . This

suggests that there may be s e r i o u s problems i n drawing n a t i o n -

s p e c i f i c i n f e r e n c e s from analyses that have employed data pooled

a c r o s s s t a t e s . This i s true f o r s y s t e m - l e v e l s t u d i e s i n which

scores are aggregated over a l l c o u n t r i e s and from which n a t i o n -

s t a t e - l e v e l i n f e r e n c e s are subsequently drawn, and f o r "modal-

n a t i o n " analyses i n which, a f t e r p o o l i n g and s i m u l t a n e o u s l y

a n a l y z i n g scores from a number of d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s , n a t i o n -

s p e c i f i c i n f e r e n c e s are drawn from what i s r e a l l y an examination

TABLE 29

GENERAL SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM CHAPTERS THREE THROUGH FIVE

Predicted

19th C

20th C

Predicted

19th C

20th C

Stage One: P r e d i c t i n g to M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n

S t a t . Inc. A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y X - C u t t i n g

+ + - +

+

+/- +/-

Stage Two: P r e d i c t i n g to I n t e r s t a t e War

S t a t . Inc. PwrDif C o n t i g u i t y War Exp. P o l a r i t y

0 - + - +

o

A l l y : T r a d e

+ = i n c r e a s e s p r o b a b i l i t y of m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t - = decreases p r o b a b i l i t y of m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t 0 = does not a l t e r p r o b a b i l i t y of m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t

211

of a composite "average" n a t i o n . In a s i m i l a r v e i n , t h i s l a c k

of homogeneity presents d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r p r o b a b i l i t y model ing

on data pooled from a number of s t a t e s . When p r o b a b i l i t y

d i s t r i b u t i o n s are compared to a c t u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s of events

i n o r d e r to determine the presence or absence of such p r o p e r t i e s

as c o n t a g i o n or independence, an assumption i s made t h a t a c t o r s

d i s p l a y s i m i l a r p a t t e r n s of behavior on whatever dimension i s

being examined. I f t h i s assumption i s v i o l a t e d , no i n f e r e n c e s

can be drawn.

A second f i n d i n g of general importance i s the e x i s t e n c e

of i n t e r - c e n t u r y d i f f e r e n c e s . Whether or not the n i n e t e e n t h /

t w e n t i e t h century dichotomy i s the opt imal b r e a k - p o i n t cannot

be a s c e r t a i n e d from what we have done; to l o c a t e such a p o i n t

would n e c e s s i t a t e a much more thorough search p r o c e d u r e . I t i s ,

however, q u i t e e v i d e n t that the r e l a t i o n s h i p s among some of the

key v a r i a b l e s i n t h i s study d i f f e r from century to c e n t u r y . The

reason why there are i n t e r - c e n t u r y d i f f e r e n c e s i s , p r e s e n t l y ,

a m a t t e r of s p e c u l a t i o n . My s u s p i c i o n i s t h a t i t i s a s s o c i a t e d

w i t h a fundamental r e o r i e n t a t i o n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s .

P o l i t i c s i n the n ineteenth century was dominated by a l i m i t e d

number o f Euro-centered a r i s t o c r a t i c r e g i m e s , having both f a m i l i a l

t i e s a n d , e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t l y , v a s t areas of unclaimed t e r r i t o r y

i n t o which to expand. I n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s i n the t w e n t i e t h

c e n t u r y i s dominated by b o u r g e o i s - n a t i o n a l i s t governments, o p e r a t i n g

i n a w o r l d beset by a p r o l i f e r a t i n g number of "independent" a c t o r s ,

212

the concomitant disappearance o f unclaimed t e r r i t o r y f o r n a t i o n a l

e x p a n s i o n , and the development of r a t h e r r i g i d i d e o l o g i c a l schisms

— a l l tending toward making p o l i t i c s assume the a s p e c t s of a

"zero-sum game." T h i s , of c o u r s e , i s o n l y s p e c u l a t i o n . But

whatever the cause, the f a c t t h a t there e x i s t s t h i s n i n e t e e n t h /

t w e n t i e t h century dichotomy should g ive pause to anyone who would

i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y s e l e c t a time s l i c e f o r a n a l y s i s . For what we

have d i s c o v e r e d i s an absence of temporal homogeneity t h a t can

produce the same types of i n f e r e n t i a l f a l l a c i e s as are generated

by a l a c k of s p a t i a l homogeneity. I t i s o n l y f a i r , however, to

i n s e r t a caveat : the more s u b - p e r i o d s i n t o which we d i v i d e a

t ime s e r i e s , the fewer o b s e r v a t i o n s w i t h i n each s u b - p e r i o d , and

the more l i k e l y we are to o b t a i n d i f f e r e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s merely

by chance. C o m p l i c a t i n g the s i t u a t i o n i s the f a c t t h a t there i s

no c e r t a i n r u l e that informs us t h a t we have too few data p o i n t s .

T h i r d , t h i s study suggests t h a t the c o n f l i c t process i s

d i v i s i b l e i n t o f a i r l y d i s t i n c t s t a g e s . I have employed a s imple

two-stage model; perhaps a m u l t i - s t a g e t y p o l o g y , such as the one

used to c a t e g o r i z e the m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t data presented i n

Appendix C, would be more adequate ( c f . B a r r i n g e r , 1972;

B l o o m f i e l d and B e a t t i e , 1971a, 1971b; B l o o m f i e l d and L e i s s , 1969;

and W r i g h t , 1965a). Using such a "stage" c o n c e p t i o n of the p r o c e s s ,

we s h o u l d be able to determine whether the same v a r i a b l e s t h a t

" e x p l a i n " the occurrence o f c o n f r o n t a t i o n s a l s o " e x p l a i n " the

o c c u r r e n c e of wars and, s i m i l a r l y , whether the same v a r i a b l e s

213

account f o r both the occurrence (yes/no) and the amount (magnitude,

s e v e r i t y , and i n t e n s i t y ) of m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t . Moreover, the

f i n d i n g s from the present study suggest t h a t , w h i l e n a t i o n s may

become i n v o l v e d i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s f o r a v a r i e t y of r e a s o n s , the

b e h a v i o r of c o n f l i c t dyads i s l i k e l y to be h i g h l y p r e d i c t a b l e .

Thus, f i e l d t h e o r e t i c approaches f o c u s i n g on dyadic i n t e r a c t i o n s

( e . g . , Rummel, 1969, 1971) may be very powerful techniques f o r

u n d e r s t a n d i n g how wars e v o l v e .

F i n a l l y , as i s c l e a r l y s t a t e d i n the opening c h a p t e r ,

i t has been my i n t e n t to combine i n t o a s i n g l e model some of the

more f r e q u e n t l y - p o s i t e d " e x p l a n a t i o n s " of why c o u n t r i e s become

i n v o l v e d i n m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t and to e m p i r i c a l l y examine the

model's a b i l i t y to account f o r n a t i o n - s t a t e b e h a v i o r . I have

done t h i s . The c o n s t r u c t t e s t e d i n t h i s t h e s i s , however, o f f e r s

o n l y one of a number of p l a u s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . In the

l i t e r a t u r e on war we f i n d many f a c t o r s — a m o n g o t h e r s , power,

need f o r r e s o u r c e s , s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n , and the d e s i r e to r e g a i n

l o s t t e r r i t o r y — t h a t are a l l e g e d to c o n t r i b u t e to the e x i s t e n c e

of m i l i t a r y h o s t i l i t i e s . What needs to be done i s to c o n c i s e l y

s p e c i f y and t e s t competing models of c o n f l i c t involvement i n

o r d e r to i d e n t i f y those c o u n t r i e s , time p e r i o d s , and/or mixes

o f models t h a t best account f o r a n d , u l t i m a t e l y , e x p l a i n

c o n f l i c t i v e behavior among s t a t e s . To r e i t e r a t e the p o i n t w i t h

which I began t h i s t h e s i s , an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of why wars occur

i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e to the development of e f f e c t i v e measures f o r

214

p r e v e n t i n g them. I t i s my profound hope t h a t the p r e c e d i n g

c h a p t e r s have to some extent i n c r e a s e d t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Y e t ,

even i f they have, we are u n f o r t u n a t e l y s t i l l f a r removed from

the day when

they s h a l l beat t h e i r swords i n t o p l o w s h a r e s , and t h e i r spears i n t o pruninghooks: n a t i o n s h a l l not l i f t up sword a g a i n s t n a t i o n , n e i t h e r s h a l l they l e a r n war any more.

I s a i a h 2:4

APPENDIX A

DATA SOURCES

A l l the data used i n t h i s t h e s i s — w i t h the s i n g l e

e x c e p t i o n of the i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t l i s t — h a v e been

a c q u i r e d from the C o r r e l a t e s of War P r o j e c t a t the U n i v e r s i t y

of M i c h i g a n . As an a s s o c i a t e of the p r o j e c t , I have, m y s e l f ,

spent many months c o m p i l i n g and r e - c o n s t r u c t i n g data s e t s of

i n t e r s t a t e c o n t i g u i t i e s and m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s . And, f o r the

purpose of t h i s t h e s i s , I devoted an a d d i t i o n a l year to c o m p i l i n g

the l i s t of i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s t h a t appears i n

Appendix C. I, t h e r e f o r e , r e c o g n i z e and a p p r e c i a t e the e f f o r t

t h a t has been expended by my c o l l e a g u e s — b o t h past and p r e s e n t —

i n data g e n e r a t i o n , and I would l i k e to thank the p r o j e c t ' s

d i r e c t o r , J . David S i n g e r , f o r making p r o j e c t data s e t s a v a i l a b l e

to me.

215

APPENDIX B

INTERSTATE SYSTEM MEMBERS

On the f o l l o w i n g pages are l i s t e d those c o u n t r i e s t h a t

q u a l i f y as i n t e r s t a t e system members and the i n c l u s i v e years

d u r i n g which they are members. To q u a l i f y , a s t a t e must have

independent c o n t r o l over i t s own armed f o r c e s and r e c e i v e

d i p l o m a t i c r e c o g n i t i o n from any two s t a t e s t h a t f u l f i l l the

same requirements ( c f . S inger and S m a l l , 1972). The i n c l u s i v e

dates o f membership f o r some s t a t e s d i f f e r from those found i n

S i n g e r and S m a l l , and r e f l e c t the e x t e n s i o n of the temporal

domain to i n c l u d e 1970, as w e l l as some r e v i s e d e s t i m a t e s of

when c o u n t r i e s f u l f i l l e d , or f a i l e d to f u l f i l l , the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s

f o r system membership.

216

217

INCLUSIVE YEARS IN INTERSTATE

ABB. NATION SYSTEM

AFG A f g h a n i s t a n 1921-1970 ALB A l b a n i a 1913-1914

1920-1939 1944-1970

ALG A l g e r i a 1962-1970 ARG Argent ina 1825-1970 AUL A u s t r a l i a 1920-1970 AUS A u s t r i a 1919-1938

1955-1970 A-H Aust r ia-Hungary 1816-1918 BAD Baden 1816-1871 BAR Barbados 1966-1970 BAV Bavar ia 1816-1871 BEL Belgium 1831-1940 Belgium

1944-1970 BOL B o l i v i a 1839-1970 BOT Botswana 1966-1970 BRA Braz i l 1824-1970 BUL Bulgaria 1878-1970 BUR Burma 1948-1970 BUI Burundi 1962-1970 CAO Cameroun 1960-1970 CAN Canada 1920-1970 CEN C e n t r a l A f r i c a n R e p u b l i c 1960-1970 CHA Chad 1960-1970 CHL C h i l e 1827-1970 CHN China 1843-1970 COL Colombia 1825-1970 CON Congo 1960-1970 COS Costa Rica 1849-1970 CUB Cuba 1902-1906

1909-1970 CYP Cyprus 1960-1970 CZE C z e c h o s l o v a k i a 1919-1939

1945-1970 DAH Dahomey 1960-1970 DEN Denmark 1816-1943

1945-1970 DOM Dominican R e p u b l i c 1882-1888

1892-1916 1925-1970

ECU Ecuador 1837-1970 EGY Egypt/U.A.R. 1855-1882 Egypt/U.A.R.

1922-1970

218

INCLUSIVE YEARS IN INTERSTATE

ABB. NATION SYSTEM

EQG E q u a t o r i a l Guinea 1968-1 970 EST E s t o n i a 1920-1 940 ETH E t h i o p i a 1897-1 936

1941-1 970 FIJ F i j i 1970-1 970 FIN F i n l a n d 1918-1 970 FRN France 1816-1 942

1944-1 970 GAB Gabon 1960-1 970 GAM Gambia 1965-1 970 GDR German Democratic R e p u b l i c 1954-1 970 GFR German Federal R e p u b l i c 1955-1 970 GMY Germany/Prussia 1816-1 945 GHA Ghana 1957-1 970 GRC Greece 1831-1 941

1944-1 970 GUA Guatemala 1840-1 970 GUI Guinea 1958-1 970 GUY Guyana 1966-1 970 HA I H a i t i 1861-1 915

1934-1 970 HAN Hanover 1838-1 866 HSE Hesse E l e c t o r a l 1816-1 866 HSG Hesse Grand Ducal 1816-1 871 HON Honduras 1854-1 970 HUN Hungary 1919-1 970 ICE Iceland 1942-1 970 IND India 1947-1 970 INS Indonesia 1949-1 970 IRN Iran ( P e r s i a ) 1826-1 970 IRQ Iraq 1932-1 970 IRE I r e l a n d 1923-1 970 ISR I s r a e l 1949-1 970 ITA I t a l y / S a r d i n i a 1816-1 970 IVO Ivory Coast 1960-1 970 JAM Jamaica 1962-1 970 JPN Japan 1859-1 945

1952-1 970 JOR Jordan 1947-1 970 KEN Kenya 1963-1 970 KHM Khmer R e p u b l i c (Cambodia) 1954-1 970 KOR Korea 1883-1 905 PRK Korea, Dem. People's Rep. 1949-1 970 ROK Korea, Republ ic of 1949-1 970

219

INCLUSIVE YEARS IN INTERSTATE

ABB. NATION SYSTEM

KUW Kuwait 1961-1970 LAO Laos 1954-1970 LAT L a t v i a 1920-1940 LEB Lebanon 1945-1970 LES Lesotho 1966-1970 LBR L i b e r i a 1920-1970 LIB L i by a 1952-1970 LIT L i t h u a n i a 1921-1940 LUX Luxemburg 1891-1914

1918-1940 1944-1970

MAG Malagasy 1960-1970 MAW Malawi 1964-1970 MAL M a l a y s i a 1957-1970 MAD Maldive I s l a n d s 1965-1970 ML I M a l i 1960-1970 MLT Malta 1964-1970 MAU M a u r i t a n i a 1960-1970 MAS M a u r i t i u s 1968-1970 MEC Mecklenburg Schwerin 1816-1867 MEX Mexico 1823-1970 MOD Modena 1824-1860 MON Mongolia 1929-1943 Mongolia

1949-1970 MNT Montenegro 1877-1919 MOR Morocco 1839-1911

1956-1970 NEP Nepal 1948-1970 NTH Netherlands 1816-1940

1945-1970 NEW New Zealand 1920-1970 NIC Nicaragua 1854-1970 NIR Niger 1960-1970 NIG N i g e r i a 1960-1970 NOR Norway 1905-1940 Norway

1945-1970 PAK P a k i s t a n 1947-1970 PAN Panama 1904-1970 PAP Papal S t a t e s 1816-1860 PAR Paraguay 1846-1870 Paraguay

1876-1970 PMA Parma 1818-1860 PER Peru 1826-1880

1883-1970

220

INCLUSIVE YEARS IN INTERSTATE

ABB. NATION SYSTEM

PHI P h i l i p p i n e s 1947-1970 POL Poland 1919-1939

1945-1970 POR Portugal 1816-1970 RUM Rumania 1861-1970 RWA Rwanda 1962-1970 SAL Salvador 1854-1970 SAU Saudi A r a b i a 1930-1970 SAX Saxony 1816-1867 SEN Senegal 1960-1970 SIE S i e r r a Leone 1961-1970 SIN Singapore 1965-1970 SOM Somalia 1960-1970 SAF South A f r i c a 1920-1970 SPN Spain 1816-1970 SRI S r i Lanka (Ceylon) 1948-1970 SUD Sudan 1956-1970 SWA Swaziland 1968-1970 SWD Sweden 1816-1970 SWZ S w i t z e r l a n d 1816-1970 SYR S y r i a 1946-1958

1961-1970 TAW Taiwan 1949-1970 TAZ Tanzania/Tanganyika 1961-1970 THI Thai land 1881-1970 TOG Togo 1960-1970 TRN Transvaal 1889-1899 TRI T r i n i d a d 1962-1970 TUN T u n i s i a 1825-1881

1956-1970 TUR Turkey/Ottoman Empire 1816-1970 TUS Tuscany 1816-1860 SIC Two S i c i l i e s 1816-1860 USR U . S . S . R . (Russia) 1816-1970 UGA Uganda 1962-1970 UK United Kingdom 1816-1970 USA United S t a t e s of America 1816-1970 UPP Upper V o l t a 1960-1970 URU Uruguay 1843-1970 VEN Venezuela 1835-1970 DRV Vietnam, Democratic Rep. 1954-1970 RVN Vietnam, R e p u b l i c of 1954-1970 WRT Wuerttemburg 1816-1871

221

NATION

Yemen Arab R e p u b l i c Yemen People's R e p u b l i c Y u g o s l a v i a / S e r b i a

Z a i r e (Congo, Kinshasa) Zambia Zanzibar

INCLUSIVE YEARS IN INTERSTATE SYSTEM

1947-1970 1967-1970 1868-1941 1944-1970 1960-1970 1964-1970 1963-1964

APPENDIX C

IDENTIFYING INTERSTATE CONFLICTS

To t e s t the model p o s i t e d i n t h i s t h e s i s i t was necessary

to i d e n t i f y the s e r i o u s i n t e r s t a t e c o n f l i c t s and d i s p u t e s i n which

major powers have become engaged s i n c e 1820. The wor ld p o l i t i c s

l i t e r a t u r e suggests t h a t the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c t h a t i s common to a l l

such events i s the t h r e a t or use of m i l i t a r y f o r c e . Being unable

to l o c a t e any s a t i s f a c t o r y c o m p i l a t i o n o f i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y

c o n f l i c t s t h a t encompassed the a p p r o p r i a t e s p a t i a l and temporal

domains, I expended the g r e a t e r p a r t of one year c o n s t r u c t i n g

such a data s e t .

C r i t e r i a f o r Inclusion

For a case to q u a l i f y f o r i n c l u s i o n i n t h i s data s e t , i t

had to f i r s t s a t i s f y three c r i t e r i a . One, the m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t

had to be between 1 members of the i n t e r s t a t e system, i . e . , i t had

"4 have c o l l e c t e d one type of c o n f l i c t ( i . e . , i n t e r n a t i o n ­a l i z e d c i v i l c o n f l i c t ) t h a t i s b e t t e r d e s c r i b e d as " c r o s s - s t a t e " r a t h e r than " i n t e r - s t a t e " s i n c e i t i n v o l v e s i n t e r v e n t i o n w i t h i n , r a t h e r than between, system members. Al though these i n t e r n a t i o n ­a l i z e d c i v i l c o n f l i c t s are not i n c l u d e d i n the p r e c e d i n g a n a l y s e s , they are n e v e r t h e l e s s l i s t e d i n t h i s appendix .

2 2 2

223

to be between n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l e n t i t i e s t h a t had independent

c o n t r o l over t h e i r own armed f o r c e s and r e c e i v e d d i p l o m a t i c

r e c o g n i t i o n from any two members o f the i n t e r s t a t e system.

(Appendix B l i s t s the members o f the system and the years i n

which they hold membership.) I t was not necessary t h a t the

c o n f l i c t take place w i t h i n or a long the borders of a member

s t a t e ; i t was only necessary t h a t r e g u l a r m i l i t a r y f o r c e s

(or i r r e g u l a r f o r c e s under the d i r e c t command) o f a member s t a t e

be used.

The second c r i t e r i o n was t h a t one of the s t a t e s u s i n g ,

or t h r e a t e n i n g to use, m i l i t a r y f o r c e d u r i n g the c o n f l i c t had

to be a major power. Major powers and the y e a r s d u r i n g which

they h e l d t h a t s t a t u s were i d e n t i f i e d through a mai l q u e s t i o n n a i r e

sent to twenty- four d i p l o m a t i c and m i l i t a r y h i s t o r i a n s . (A l i s t

o f the major powers can be found i n Chapter Two.)

The t h i r d c r i t e r i o n was t h a t the c o n f l i c t be government-

d i r e c t e d , n o n - a c c i d e n t a l , and n o n - r o u t i n e . I was s e a r c h i n g f o r

cases i n which governments were making demands, backed by the

t h r e a t o r use of combat f o r c e s , on o t h e r governments. I f h o s t i l e

a c t i o n was c l e a r l y u n r e l a t e d to government p o l i c y but was r a t h e r

the r e s u l t of some a c c i d e n t ( e . g . , the i n a d v e r t e n t s i n k i n g of a

s h i p ) o r the a c t i v i t i e s of groups over which the government had

no e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l ( e . g . , "independent" t r i b e s m e n , b a n d i t s , or

t e r r o r i s t s ) , the case was e x c l u d e d . S i m i l a r l y , i f n a t i o n a l f o r c e s

were c o n t r i b u t e d to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l governmental o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s

224

peace-keeping o p e r a t i o n and were thereby e f f e c t i v e l y removed from

the d i r e c t c o n t r o l of the s u p p l y i n g government, t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n

i n m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s was not i n c l u d e d . F i n a l l y , there were

r o u t i n e i n t e r a c t i o n s among both f r i e n d l y and h o s t i l e s t a t e s t h a t

would i n t r o d u c e much "noise" i f i n c l u d e d , e . g . , the s u p p l y i n g of

a d v i s o r s and noncombat support to a l l i e s , the s p o r a d i c (but non-

s u s t a i n e d ) border c l a s h by smal l numbers of t roops along a h o s t i l e

f r o n t i e r , or the downing of a s i n g l e a i r c r a f t t h a t had v i o l a t e d

n a t i o n a l a i r s p a c e .

Gather ing the Data

Several hundred books and a r t i c l e s were used i n c o l l e c t i n g

the cases t h a t comprise the major power i n t e r s t a t e c o n f l i c t data

s e t . I i n i t i a l l y combined e i g h t e e n l i s t s 1 c o v e r i n g v a r i o u s s p a t i a l

and temporal domains, s e l e c t i n g cases t h a t s a t i s f i e d my c r i t e r i a .

I then g r e a t l y expanded my c o l l e c t i o n by t h o r o u g h l y s e a r c h i n g

Langer's voluminous and h i g h l y - r e s p e c t e d E n c y c l o p e d i a of World

Hi s t o r y (1972 ) . A f t e r twice r e a d i n g Langer , I next garnered a l l

a p p r o p r i a t e cases from Dupuy and Dupuy's e x t e n s i v e survey,

E n c y c l o p e d i a of Military H i s t o r y ( 1 9 7 0 ) . Having c o n s t r u c t e d a

c a n d i d a t e l i s t , I proceeded to r e s e a r c h each case using annual

] Cady (1968) , C a r r o l l ( u n p u b l i s h e d ) , Deitchman ( 1 9 6 4 ) , Emerson (1972, 1973), Goldmann ( 1 9 7 1 ) , Greaves ( 1 9 6 2 ) , H o l s t i (1966), K e l l o g ( u n p u b l i s h e d ) , Kende (1968) , L e i s s and B l o o m f i e l d ( 1 9 6 7 ) , North ( 1 9 6 9 ) , Richardson ( 1 9 6 0 ) , Sabrosky and Morton ( u n p u b l i s h e d ) , S i n g e r and Small (1972), S o r o k i n ( 1 9 3 7 ) , Wainhouse (1966), Wood ( 1 9 6 8 ) , and Wright (1965).

225

r e g i s t e r s , o f f i c i a l documents, and newspaper r e p o r t s , as w e l l as

n a t i o n a l , r e g i o n a l , and general h i s t o r i e s . I compared my pruned

l i s t to two others that were being s i m u l t a n e o u s l y c o m p i l e d ,

Leng's unpubl ished c o l l e c t i o n of i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s

(1816-1945) and Jones and Bennett's unpubl ished l i s t of c i v i l wars

( 1 8 1 6 - 1 9 7 0 ) , and found no case i n e i t h e r of these that f u l f i l l e d

my t h r e e c r i t e r i a and, y e t , d i d not appear i n my c o l l e c t i o n .

F i n a l l y , I asked a d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r i a n to review the c o n f l i c t

cases i n order to judge the m e r i t o f t h e i r i n c l u s i o n and to suggest

p o s s i b l e cases t h a t may have escaped my r e s e a r c h net .

The v a l i d a t i o n process i s s t i l l c o n t i n u i n g at t h i s t ime.

The B e h a v i o r a l C o r r e l a t e s of War P r o j e c t , under the d i r e c t i o n of

R u s s e l l Leng, i s i n the midst of c o l l e c t i n g a c o n f l i c t data set

f o r a l l members of the i n t e r s t a t e system s i n c e 1816. The Leng team

i s s y s t e m a t i c a l l y combing a s e l e c t e d set of n a t i o n a l h i s t o r i e s ,

w r i t t e n i n several languages. When t h e i r u n d e r t a k i n g i s completed,

my data set w i l l be compared w i t h the BCOW c o m p i l a t i o n i n order to

determine the r e l a t i v e m e r i t s of the two d i f f e r e n t search procedures.

C I a s s i f y i n g the Cases

I have s o r t e d the m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s t h a t I c o l l e c t e d i n t o

one o f f o u r c a t e g o r i e s . Only the f i r s t three of these c a t e g o r i e s

are s t r i c t l y i n t e r s t a t e , i . e . , c o n f l i c t between members of the

i n t e r s t a t e system. The f o u r t h category i s r e a l l y " c r o s s - s t a t e "

s i n c e i t c o n t a i n s cases i n which a member s t a t e i n t e r v e n e s i n a

226

c i v i l c o n f l i c t w i t h i n another member s t a t e . The c a t e g o r i e s are

as f o l l o w s :

(1) i n t e r s t a t e war: combat between armed f o r c e s , i n v o l v i n g at l e a s t one member of the i n t e r s t a t e system on each s i d e , r e s u l t i n g i n a t o t a l o f one thousand or more b a t t l e - c o n n e c t e d deaths to the armed f o r c e s , and l a s t i n g f o r more than t w e n t y - f o u r hours.

(2) i n t e r s t a t e military a c t i o n : combat between armed f o r c e s , i n v o l v i n g at l e a s t one member of the i n t e r s t a t e system on each s i d e ; o r , the use of armed f o r c e s by a member s t a t e , d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t the t e r r i t o r y and people of another member s t a t e . M i l i t a r y a c t i o n taken by one s t a t e may provoke the t a r g e t s t a t e to engage the f i r s t a c t o r i n m i l i t a r y combat; so long as the subsequent combat r e s u l t s in fewer than one thousand b a t t l e -connected deaths to the armed f o r c e s and/or l a s t s f o r l e s s than twenty- four h o u r s , i t i s l a b e l e d " h o s t i l i t i e s . " M i l i t a r y a c t i o n taken by one s t a t e ( e . g . , the s e i z u r e of land or b l o c k a d i n g of t e r r i t o r y ) may, however, f a i l to provoke the t a r g e t s t a t e i n t o m i l i t a r y a c t i o n ; i f the t a r g e t s t a t e remains p a s s i v e , the c o n f l i c t i s l a b e l e d "unreciprocated m i l i t a r y a c t i o n .

(3) i n t e r s t a t e t h r e a t : e x p l i c i t v e r b a l s t a t e m e n t , by a high o f f i c i a l on behal f of a member s t a t e ' s government, d e c l a r i n g an i n t e n t to use m i l i t a r y f o r c e a g a i n s t another member s t a t e f o r o t h e r than s t r i c t l y d e f e n s i v e purposes; o r , overt m o b i l i z a t i o n of armed f o r c e s by a member s t a t e , d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t another member s t a t e f o r other than s t r i c t l y d e f e n s i v e p u r p o s e s , d u r i n g p e r i o d s of d i s p u t e or high t e n s i o n . 2 In case of e i t h e r verbal statement or m o b i l i z a t i o n , the t a r g e t s t a t e must be c l e a r l y s p e c i f i e d or e a s i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e .

(4) i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d c i v i l c o n f l i c t : p h y s i c a l i n t e r v e n t i o n (with or without combat) by the armed f o r c e s of a member s t a t e in a c i v i l c o n f l i c t w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r y

Whether a m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i s r e c i p r o c a t e d u s u a l l y depends upon the t a r g e t s t a t e ' s w i l l i n g n e s s (or u n w i l l i n g n e s s ) to submit n o n v i o l e n t l y r a t h e r than upon any fundamental d i f f e r e n c e i n the i n i t i a t o r ' s a c t i o n s .

2 S h o w s - o f - f o r c e , by t h e m s e l v e s , are not s u f f i c i e n t l y

e x p l i c i t i n terms of i n t e n t to use armed f o r c e to be i n c l u d e d .

227

of another member s t a t e f o r the purpose of s u p p o r t i n g one s i d e to the c o n f l i c t or s u p p r e s s i n g the c o n f l i c t e n t i r e l y . I n t e r v e n t i o n t h a t i s f o r the purpose of p r o t e c t i n g the l i v e s and property of f o r e i g n n a t i o n a l s and does not s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n t e r f e r e i n the ongoing c i v i l c o n f l i c t i s e x c l u d e d . The c i v i l c o n f l i c t remains i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d , and does not s t r i c t l y become i n t e r ­s t a t e , so long as the combat remains c o n f i n e d to the t e r r i t o r y of the n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l u n i t i n which i t has erupted and so long as the major opposing f a c t i o n s i n the c i v i l c o n f l i c t do not j o i n i n common cause to r e s i s t the f o r c e s of the i n t e r v e n i n g s t a t e . 1

P r e s e n t i n g the Cases

My purpose in c o l l e c t i n g the c o n f l i c t data set was to

i d e n t i f y s e r i o u s i n t e r s t a t e d i s p u t e s i n v o l v i n g major powers,

o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d i n terms of the t h r e a t or use of m i l i t a r y f o r c e

by a major power. My c o n f i d e n c e i n the inclusiveness of the

c o m p i l a t i o n i s b o l s t e r e d by the f a c t s that (1) v i o l e n t i n t e r s t a t e

b e h a v i o r g e n e r a l l y leaves s u b s t a n t i a l t r a c e s and (2) the m i l i t a r y

a c t i v i t i e s of the major powers are p a r t i c u l a r l y l i k e l y to be

w e l l documented. I have kept the t h r e s h o l d of v i o l e n c e

r e a l i s t i c a l l y high so as to maximize the p r o b a b i l i t y that the

event would be r e p o r t e d . N a t u r a l l y , as the l e v e l of v i o l e n c e

d i m i n i s h e s , my conf idence i n the i n c l u s i v e n e s s of the data set

a l s o d e c l i n e s , i . e . , I am more c e r t a i n that I have c o l l e c t e d the

p o p u l a t i o n of cases t h a t , a c c o r d i n g to my coding r u l e s , q u a l i f i e s

as i n t e r s t a t e wars than I am that I have found a l l those cases

I n t e r v e n t i o n in a c i v i l c o n f l i c t , as d i s t i n c t from " i n t e r ­s t a t e m i l i t a r y a c t i o n , " i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the p r i o r e x i s t e n c e of f a c t i o n a l m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h i n the t a r g e t s t a t e , o t h e r than t h a t c r e a t e d by the i n t e r v e n i n g s t a t e as a p r e t e x t f o r i n t e r f e r i n g .

228

t h a t q u a l i f y as i n t e r s t a t e t h r e a t s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , having l a b o r e d

one y e a r on t h i s data s e t , I must express my s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h

i t s o v e r a l l q u a l i t y . In a s e p a r a t e volume, to be d e p o s i t e d w i t h

the Department of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e a t the U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n ,

I have e x p l i c a t e d and c i t e d sources f o r each case i n the c o n f l i c t

data s e t — i n g e n e r a l , the more obscure the c a s e , the l o n g e r the

e x p l i c a t i o n and the more numerous the c i t a t i o n s .

Below can by found an enumeration of those cases that are

i n c l u d e d i n the i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t data s e t and a l s o

those cases t h a t I l a b e l i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d c i v i l c o n f l i c t . For

each c a s e , I l i s t the date d u r i n g which major powers were i n v o l v e d ,

the name I have given to the c o n f l i c t , the major power p a r t i c i pants

and t h e i r opponents, as w e l l as the level o f v i o l e n c e t h a t the

c o n f l i c t a t t a i n e d . I f no major power was i n v o l v e d d u r i n g a p o r t i o n

o f a c o n f l i c t , then an i n c l u s i v e date (enclosed i n parentheses) i s

g i v e n f o r the e n t i r e c o n f l i c t f o l l o w i n g the c o n f l i c t name. In

l i s t i n g p a r t i c i p a n t s , the purported i n i t i a t o r i s g iven f i r s t ,

the "defender" i s given a f t e r the "vs." The coding of i n i t i a t o r /

defender was somewhat p o e t i c ; i t was an attempt to i d e n t i f y the

a c t o r s t h a t were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r b e g i n n i n g the m i l i t a r y

c o n f r o n t a t i o n , but when t h i s was i m p o s s i b l e to e s t a b l i s h , e . g . ,

both s i d e s exchanging minor f i r e , I i d e n t i f i e d as the i n i t i a t o r

the s i d e t h a t e s c a l a t e d the c o n f l i c t to a more s e r i o u s phase, e . g . ,

e s c a l a t e d the exchange of small arms f i r e to a major a t t a c k . In

column f o u r , f o l l o w i n g the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of some c o n f l i c t s as

229

e i t h e r "threats" or " u n r e c i p r o c a t e d m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s , " the reader

w i l l f i n d an a s t e r i s k (*). T h i s i s used o n l y f o r major power/

major power c o n f l i c t s , and denotes t h a t the t h r e a t or use of

m i l i t a r y f o r c e was u n r e c i p r o c a t e d , i . e . , the t a r g e t of the t h r e a t

or a c t i o n d i d not respond ( m i l i t a r i l y ) a g a i n s t the i n i t i a t o r .

The a s t e r i s k n o t a t i o n i s employed o n l y f o r major power/major power

c o n f l i c t s because the l i s t i s p r i m a r i l y designed to i d e n t i f y major

power conflict b e h a v i o r . (By and l a r g e , i t can be assumed t h a t

t h r e a t s by major powers a g a i n s t non-major powers are not

r e c i p r o c a t e d . )

The f o l l o w i n g are the cases t h a t s a t i s f y the c r i t e r i a f o r

major power i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s and i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d

c i v i l c o n f l i c t s . The a b b r e v i a t i o n " M . A c t . ( u ) " r e p r e s e n t s

" u n r e c i p r o c a t e d m i l i t a r y a c t i o n " ; the a b b r e v i a t i o n " M . A c t . ( r ) "

denotes " r e c i p r o c a t e d m i l i t a r y a c t i o n , " i . e . , h o s t i l i t i e s . A l l

o t h e r n o t a t i o n should be s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y .

DATE CONFLICT MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL

1820- 21 N e a p o l i t a n R e v o l u t i o n A-H i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1821 Piedmont U p r i s i n g A-H i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1821 Morea I n s u r r e c t i o n USR vs TUR Threat

1823 Spanish R e v o l u t i o n (1820-23) FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1826 Danubian P r i n c i p a l i t i e s I n s u r r e c t i o n s USR vs TUR Threat

1827-•28 Portuguese C o n s t i t u t i o n R e b e l l i o n UK i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1827 B a t t l e of Navarino Bay UK,FRN,USR vs TUR,Egyptians M . A c t . ( r )

1828-1828-

29 29

Russo-Turk ish War Russo-Turk ish War

USR vs TUR FRN vs TUR,Egyptians

War M . A c t . ( r )

1831 1831

M i g u e l i t e Wars (1828-34) M i g u e l i t e Wars (1828-34)

UK i n t e r v e n t i o n FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n

C i v i l C i v i l

1831-1832

32 I t a l i a n U p r i s i n g s I t a l i a n U p r i s i n g s

A-H i n t e r v e n t i o n FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n

C i v i l C i v i l

1831 1832 1832- 33

B e l g i a n Independence R e v o l u t i o n (1830-33) B e l g i a n Independence R e v o l u t i o n (1830-33) B e l g i a n Independence R e v o l u t i o n (1830-33)

FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n FRN vs NTH FRN,UK vs NTH

C i v i l M . A c t . ( r ) M . A c t . ( u )

DATE CONFLICT MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL

1835- 39 C a r l i s t War (1834-39) FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l 1836- 39 C a r l i s t War (1834-39) UK i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1838-•39 Occupation of Vera Cruz FRN vs MEX M. A c t . ( r )

1838- 40 A r g e n t i n e A f f a i r FRN vs ARG M. A c t . ( r ) 1838- 40 A r g e n t i n e A f f a i r FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1840 Second S y r i a n C r i s i s (1839-40) FRN vs UK,GMY Threat*

1845- 48 Wars of l a P l a t a (1843-52) FRN,UK(1845-47) vs ARG M . A c t . ( r ) 1845-•49 Wars of l a P l a t a (1843-52) FRN,UK i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1847 Occupation of F e r r a r a A-H vs PAP M . A c t . ( u )

1848-•49 A u s t r o - S a r d i n i a n War I T A , I t a l i a n S t a t e s vs A-H War

1848-•49 S i c i l i a n I n s u r r e c t i o n UK,FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1848-•49 1st S c h l e s w i g - H o l s t e i n War GMY vs DEN War

1849 Hungarian I n s u r r e c t i o n (1848-49) USR i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1849 I n s u r r e c t i o n i n Tuscany (1848-49) A-H i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1849 War of the Roman R e p u b l i c FRN,A-H,SIC vs PAP War

1849 German S t a t e s I n s u r r e c t i o n s GMY i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

DATE CONFLICT MAJOR 1 POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL

1850 Convention of Olmutz C r i s i s A-H ,BAV,GMY i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l 1850 Convention of Olmutz C r i s i s A-H vs GMY Threat

1850 Don P a c i f i c o A f f a i r UK vs GRC M . A c t . ( u )

1853 L e i n i n g e n M i s s i o n A-H vs TUR Threat

1853- 56 Crimean War (1853-56) USR vs TUR,FRN(1854-56), War UK(1854-56), ITA(1855-56)

1854 Crimean War (1853-56) A-H vs USR Threat* 1855 Crimean War (1853-56) A-H vs USR Threat*

1854- 57 Occupation of P i r a e u s UK,FRN vs GRC M . A c t . ( u )

1856- 57 Neuchatel A f f a i r GMY vs SWZ Threat

1856- 57 A n g l o - P e r s i a n War IRN vs UK War

1856-•60 2nd Opium "War" UK,FRN(1857-60) vs CHN M . A c t . ( r )

1859 War of I t a l i a n U n i f i c a t i o n A-H vs ITA,FRN War

1860 Italo-Roman War ITA vs PAP War 1860 Italo-Roman War FRN vs ITA Threat*

1860-•61 I t a l o - S i c i l i a n War ITA vs SIC War 1860-•61 I t a l o - S i c i l i a n War FRN vs ITA M . A c t . ( u ) *

DATE CONFLICT MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL

1860-•64 T a i p i n g R e b e l l i o n (1851-64) UK,FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1861 Occupation of Tsushima USR vs JPN M . A c t . ( u )

1861 Trent A f f a i r UK vs USA Threat

1861- 62 Mexican E x p e d i t i o n FRN,UK,SPN vs MEX M . A c t . ( u )

1862- 67 Franco-Mexican War FRN vs MEX War

1863- 65 A n t i - f o r e i g n Movement JPN vs USA,FRN,NTH,UK M . A c t . ( r )

1864 2nd S c h l e s w i g - H o l s t e i n War A-H,GMY vs DEN War

1866 Seven Weeks War GMY,ITA vs A-H,German A l l i e s War

1870 T i e n t s i n Massacre FRN,UK,USA vs CHN Threat

1870-•71 F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n War FRN vs GMY,German A l l i e s War

1876 1877-1878

•78 Russo-Turk ish War (1877-78) Russo-Turk ish War (1877-78) Russo-Turk ish War (1877-78)

USR vs TUR USR vs TUR UK vs USR

Threat War Threat*

1880 H i V a l l e y Dispute USR vs CHN Threat

1880 1880

Montenegrin Troubles Montenegrin Troubles

UK,FRN,USR,GMY,A-H,ITA vs TUR UK vs TUR

Threat Threat

DATE CONFLICT MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL

CO CO OO CO

T u n i s i a n Adventure T u n i s i a n Adventure

FRN vs TUN TUR vs FRN

M . A c t . ( r ) Threat

1882 1882

A l e x a n d r i a A f f a i r A l e x a n d r i a A f f a i r

•UK,FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n UK vs EGY

C i v i l M . A c t . ( r )

1884-•85 Si no-French War FRN vs CHN War

1885-1885-

•86 •87

A n g l o - R u s s i a n Afghan C r i s i s A n g l o - R u s s i a n Afghan C r i s i s

UK vs USR UK vs KOR

Threat* M . A c t . ( u )

1885 Khevenhul ler M i s s i o n A-H vs BUL Threat

1886 G r e c o - T u r k i s h Dispute UK,A-H,GMY,USR,ITA vs GRC M . A c t . ( u )

1886-•87 B u l g a r i a n C r i s i s USR vs BUL Threat

1890 B r i t i s h - P o r t u g u e s e C o l o n i a l Dispute UK vs POR Threat

1893 Siamese C o n f l i c t FRN vs THI M . A c t . ( r )

1894 Mosquito Controversy UK vs NIC M . A c t . ( u )

1895 Delegoa Bay Rai lway Ultimatum UK vs TRN Threat

1895 The T r i p l e I n t e r v e n t i o n USR,GMY,FRN vs JPN Threat*

DATE CONFLICT MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL

1897 Cretan I n s u r r e c t i o n USR,A-H,GMY,ITA,FRN,UK vs GRC M . A c t . ( u )

1397-1898 1898 1898

•98 China Concessions China Concessions China Concessions China Concessions

GMY vs CHN USR vs CHN UK vs CHN FRN vs CHN

M . A c t . ( u ) Threat Threat M . A c t . ( u )

1897 Chemulpo Naval Demonstration UK,JPN vs USR,KOR Threat*

1898 N i g e r i a n Dispute (1897-98) UK vs FRN Threat

1898 Evacuat ion of Crete UK,FRN,USR,ITA vs TUR Threat

1898 Fashoda C r i s i s UK vs FRN Threat*

1899-•02 Boer War TRN vs UK War

1899-1900

•00 Masampo Naval Base Concession Masampo Naval Base Concession

USR vs KOR JPN vs USR

Threat Threat*

1900-1900-

•01 •04

Boxer R e b e l l i o n (1900-01) Boxer R e b e l l i o n (1900-01)

USR,GMY,JPN,FRN,UK,USA,ITA,A-H vs CHN USR vs CHN

M . A c t . ( r ) M . A c t . ( r )

1900 Dominican Debt C r i s i s FRN vs DOM Threat

1902-•03 Venezuelan Debt Blockade UK,GMY,ITA vs VEN M . A c t . ( u )

1903 Dominican Debt Demonstration GMY vs DOM Threat

DATE CONFLICT MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL

1903 Panama Canal Dispute USA i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1904- 05 Russo-Japanese War JPN vs USR War

1905 Macedonian Question A-H,USR,UK,FRN,ITA vs TUR M . A c t . ( u )

1906 S i n a i Ultimatum UK vs TUR Threat

1906- 09 Cuban I n t e r v e n t i o n USA i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1907- 10 French-Moroccan C o n f l i c t FRN vs MOR M . A c t . ( r )

1908- 09 Bosnian C r i s i s YUG,MNT vs A-H Threat

1908 P e r s i a n Indemnity R e t r i b u t i o n USR vs IRN M . A c t . ( u )

1909 P e r s i a n C i v i l War (1905-09) USR i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1910 A n t i - Z e l a y a R e v o l u t i o n (1909-10) USA i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1911-1911 1911

•12 2nd Moroccan C r i s i s 2nd Moroccan C r i s i s 2nd Moroccan C r i s i s

FRN GMY UK

i n t e r v e n t i o n vs FRN vs GMY

C i v i l Threat* Threat*

1911-•12 P e r s i a n Invasion USR vs IRN M . A c t . ( u )

1911-•12 I t a l o - T u r k i s h War ITA vs TUR War

DATE CONFLICT

1912 Nicaraguan I n t e r v e n t i o n

1912 1st Balkan War (1912-13) 1912-13 1st Balkan War (1912-13) 1913 1st Balkan War (1912-13) 1913 1st Balkan War (1912-13) 1913 1st Balkan War (1912-13)

1913 A l b a n i a n C o n f r o n t a t i o n

1914 Occupation of Vera Cruz

1914-16 Dominican R e p u b l i c I n t e r v e n t i o n 1916-24 Dominican R e p u b l i c I n t e r v e n t i o n

1914- 18 World War I

1915- 34 H a i t i a n Customs Dispute

1916- 17 P e r s h i n g Mexican E x p e d i t i o n

1917 Cuban R e v o l t

1917- 22 Russian C i v i l War (1917-22) 1918 Russian C i v i l War (1917-22) 1918- 19 Russian C i v i l War (1917-22)

MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL

USA i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

USR vs BUL Threat A-H vs YUG Threat USR vs TUR Threat A-H,ITA,UK,FRN,GMY vs MNT M.Act. (u) A-H vs MNT Threat

A-H vs YUG Threat

USA vs MEX M . A c t . ( r )

USA i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l USA vs DOM M . A c t . ( u )

A - H , GMY, A l l i e s War vs

UK,FRN,USR(1914-17),JPN, ITA(1915-18),USA( 1 9 1 7 - 1 8 ) , A l l i e s

USA i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

USA vs MEX M . A c t . ( r )

USA i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

JPN i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l GMY i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l FRN,UK,USA(1918-20) i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

DATE CONFLICT MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL

1918- 19 E s t o n i a n Independence F i g h t i n g USR vs Estonians,UK M.Act. (r)

1919-1920-1920-1922

21 21 23

T u r k i s h N a t i o n a l i s t Movement (1919-23) T u r k i s h N a t i o n a l i s t Movement (1919-23)' T u r k i s h N a t i o n a l i s t Movement (1919-23) T u r k i s h N a t i o n a l i s t Movement (1919-23)

ITA vs TUR FRN vs TUR UK,FRN,ITA vs TUR UK,FRN,ITA vs GRC

M.Act. M.Act. M.Act. Threat

(u) ( r ) (u)

1920 S p a r t a c i s t U p r i s i n g FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1921 Panama-Costa R i c a Boundary Dispute USA vs PAN Threat

1921 1921- 25

London R e p a r a t i o n Ultimatums London Reparat ion Ultimatums

FRN,UK,BEL,ITA vs GMY FRN,UK(1921),BEL vs GMY

Threat M.Act. (u)

1923- 25 Ruhr Occupation FRN,BEL vs GMY M.Act. (u)

1923 Corfu I n c i d e n t ITA vs GRC M.Act. (u)

1924 Sudan Ultimatum UK vs EGY M.Act. (u)

1926- 33 Nicaraguan I n s u r r e c t i o n (1925-33) USA i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1927 Egyptian Army Ultimatum UK vs EGY Threat

1928-•29 Chinese C i v i l Wars (1920-49) JPN i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1928 Freedom of Assembly Ult imatum UK vs EGY Threat

1929 Chinese Eastern Railway Dispute USR vs CHN M.Act. (r)

DATE CONFLICT MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL

1931- 33 Manchurian War JPN vs CHN War

1934 D o l l f u s s A f f a i r ITA vs GMY Threat*

1934 Durazzo Demonstration ITA vs ALB Threat

1934 1935- 36

I t a l o - E t h i o p i a n War (1935-36) I t a l o - E t h i o p i a n War (1935-36)

ETH ITA

vs ITA vs ETH

M . A c t . ( r ) War

1934- 37 Japanese Expansion i n North China JPN vs CHN M . A c t . ( u )

1934 1937

S i n k i a n g U p r i s i n g s (1931-37) S i n k i a n g U p r i s i n g s (1931-37)

USR USR

i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t e r v e n t i o n

C i v i l Civil

1935- 39 Spanish C i v i l War ITA,GMY i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1937- 41 Sino-Japanese War JPN vs CHN War

1938 Russo-Japanese Border C o n f l i c t JPN vs USR M . A c t . ( r )

1938-•40 T i e n t s i n C r i s i s JPN vs UK,FRN M . A c t . ( u ) *

1938 Anschluss GMY vs AUS M . A c t . ( u )

1938 Annexation of the Sudetenland GMY vs CZE M . A c t . ( u )

1939 Russo-Japanese War JPN vs USR.MON War

1939 D e s t r u c t i o n of C z e c h o s l o v a k i a GMY vs CZE M . A c t . ( u )

DATE CONFLICT

1939 Annexation of Memel

1939 Conquest of A l b a n i a

1939-45 World War II ( E u r o p e / A f r i c a )

1941-45 World War II ( P a c i f i c )

1939 Russian Invasion of Poland

1939 B a l t i c Bases Demand 1939 B a l t i c Bases Demand 1939 B a l t i c Bases Demand 1940 B a l t i c Bases Demand 1940 B a l t i c Bases Demand 1940 B a l t i c Bases Demand

1939- 40 R u s s o - F i n n i s h War 1940 R u s s o - F i n n i s h War

1940 C l o s i n g of the Burma Road

1940- 41 Japanese S e i z u r e of Indochina

1940 Rumanian Acquiescence

MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL

GMY vs LIT M . A c t . ( u )

ITA vs ALB M . A c t . ( r )

ITA ( 1 9 4 0 - 4 3 ) , A l l i e s War vs

UK,FRN(1939-40,1944-45), USR(1941-45),USA(1941-45), I T A ( 1 9 4 3 - 4 5 ) , A l l i e s

JPN vs USA,UK,CHN,USR(1945),Al l ies War

USR vs POL M . A c t . ( r )

USR vs EST Threat USR vs LAT Threat USR vs. LIT Threat USR vs EST M . A c t . ( u ) USR vs LAT M . A c t . ( u ) USR vs LIT M . A c t . ( u )

USR vs FIN War FRN,UK vs USR Threat*

JPN vs UK Threat*

JPN vs FRN M . A c t . ( r )

USR vs RUM M . A c t . ( u )

DATE CONFLICT MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL

1 944-4 5 Greek I n s u r r e c t i o n UK i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1945- 46 A z e r b a i j a n R e v o l t USR i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1943- 49 B e r l i n Blockade USR vs USA,UK,FRN M.Act. (u)*

1950 Peking-Taipeh C o n f l i c t CHN vs TAW M . A c t . ( r )

1950-•53 Korean War PRK, CHN vs ROK,USA,UN War

1951-•52 A n g l o - E g y p t i a n Clashes UK vs EGY M.Act . (u)**

1954-•55 Bombardment of Of fshore I s l a n d s CHN vs TAW M . A c t . ( r )

1955 Anglo-French I n t e r v e n t i o n i n S i n a i War UK,FRN vs EGY War 1956 Anglo-French I n t e r v e n t i o n i n S i n a i War USR vs UK,FRN Threat*

1956 Burma Border Dispute CHN vs BUR M . A c t . ( u )

1956 Russo-Hungarian War USR vs HUN War

1956 P o l i s h October C r i s i s USR vs POL Threat

1957 Yemen-Adenese Border C o n f l i c t YAR vs UK M . A c t . ( r )

1957 S y r i a n C r i s i s USR vs TUR Threat 1957 S y r i a n C r i s i s USA vs USR Threat*

1953 T u n i s i a n Border C o n f l i c t FRN vs TUN M.Act. (r)

DATE CONFLICT MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL

1958 Lebanese C r i s i s USA i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1953 J o r d a n i a n C i v i l C o n f l i c t UK i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1958-1958

•59 Quemoy C r i s i s Quemoy C r i s i s

CHN USA.

vs TAW vs CHN

M . A c t . ( r ) Threat*

1959 S i n o - I n d i a n Border Clashes CHN vs IND M . A c t . ( r )

1960 U-2 I n c i d e n t (& RB-47 I n c i d e n t ) USR vs TUR,PAK,NOR Threat

1960-•63 Cameroun R e b e l l i o n FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1961-1964-

64 •73

Vietnam War (1956-75) Vietnam War (1956-75)

USA i n t e r v e n t i o n R V N , U S A , A l l i e s vs NLF,DRV

C i v i l War

1961 B i z e r t a C r i s i s TUN vs FRN M . A c t . ( r )

1961 B e r l i n Wall C r i s i s USA vs USR Threat***

1962 Quemoy C o n f l i c t CHN vs TAW M . A c t . ( r )

1962 S i n o - I n d i a n War CHN vs IND War

1962 1962 1962

Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s

USR vs USA USA,OAS vs USR USA vs CUB

Threat* M . A c t . ( u ) * Threat

1-963- 65 "Crush M a l a y s i a " Campaign INS vs MAL,UK,AUL,NEW M . A c t . ( r )

DATE CONFLICT MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL

1 963-•64 C y p r i o t C i v i l C o n f l i c t UK i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1964 Yemeni-Adenese Border A t t a c k UK vs YAR M . A c t . ( r )

1964 East A f r i c a n I n s u r r e c t i o n s UK i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1964 Gabon Coup FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1964-•73 2nd L a o t i a n C i v i l War (1963- ) USA i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1965 Sikkam Border Dispute CHN vs IND Threat

1 965-66 Dominican R e p u b l i c C i v i l War USA(1965),OAS i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1967 Sikkam Border C o n f l i c t CHN vs IND M . A c t . ( r )

1968 Invasion of C z e c h o s l o v a k i a USR,Warsaw Pact A l l i e s vs CZE M.Act . (u)

1969- 71 Chad I n t e r v e n t i o n FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

1969 S i n o - S o v i e t Border Clashes CHN vs USR M . A c t . ( r )

1 970-73 Cambodian C i v i l War (1967-75) USA i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l

NOTE: Three c o n f l i c t s l i s t e d as "wars" by S i n g e r and Small (1972) are coded d i f f e r e n t l y above. F i r s t , the French-Spanish encounter i n 1823 i s coded as a French i n t e r v e n t i o n i n an ongoing Spanish c i v i l c o n f l i c t r a t h e r than as a war between France and S p a i n . Second, the B a t t l e o f Navarino Bay ( 1 8 2 7 ) — a s i n g l e naval engagement t h a t l a s t s l e s s than a d a y — i s coded as a " r e c i p r o c a t e d m i l i t a r y a c t i o n " r a t h e r than as a "war." And, f i n a l l y , the Boer War i s coded as an i n t e r s t a t e war ( r a t h e r than an e x t r a - s y s t e m i c war, as found i n S i n g e r and S m a l l ) because a more r e c e n t assessment of the membership of the i n t e r s t a t e system suggests t h a t the Transvaal i s a f u l l - f l e d g e d member of the system i n 1899, the year i n which the war b e g i n s .

In the t a b l e above, one a s t e r i s k (*) denotes t h a t a t h r e a t or m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i n i t i a t e d by a major power, and d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t another major power, i s not r e c i p r o c a t e d . Two a s t e r i s k s (**) denote t h a t n e i t h e r par ty to a c o n f l i c t i s coded as an i n i t i a t o r . This occurs i n the A n g l o - E g y p t i a n Clashes (1951-52) when B r i t i s h f o r c e s respond to a t t a c k s i n i t i a t e d by Wafd-supported g u e r r i l l a f o r c e s t h a t are not under the d i r e c t c o n t r o l of the Egypt ian government. Three a s t e r i s k s (***) denote s imultaneous i n i t i a t i o n . This occurs i n the B e r l i n Wall C r i s i s of 1 9 6 1 — b o t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s and the S o v i e t Union are coded as i n i t i a t o r s i n t h i s c o n f l i c t .

APPENDIX D

SUMMARY PRESENTATION OF MILITARY CONFLICT DATA

The f i g u r e s and t a b l e s on the f o l l o w i n g pages o f f e r a

p i c t o r i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t data presented

i n Appendix C. F igure One d e p i c t s the number of m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s

i n v o l v i n g major powers that occurs d u r i n g each decade from 1820

to 1 970. The s o l i d l i n e r e p r e s e n t s the number of i n t e r s t a t e

c o n f l i c t s (wars, m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s , and t h r e a t s ) , and the broken

l i n e g i v e s the same i n f o r m a t i o n f o r a 11 major power m i l i t a r y

c o n f l i c t s (wars, m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s , t h r e a t s , arid i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d

c i v i l c o n f l i c t s ) . F igure Two p r e s e n t s the number of m i l i t a r y

c o n f l i c t s at var ious l e v e l s of v i o l e n c e t h a t occurs d u r i n g each

decade. When d e p i c t i n g data on " m i l i t a r y a c t i o n , " both the number

of r e c i p r o c a t e d a c t i o n s and the number of u n r e c i p r o c a t e d a c t i o n s

are g i v e n , and then the sum of the two i s d i s p l a y e d as " a l l m i l i t a r y

a c t i o n . "

F igure Three c o n t a i n s bar graphs t h a t i n d i c a t e how many

of the t h i r t y f i v e - y e a r p e r i o d s i n the 1820-19/0 temporal domain

c o n t a i n no m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s , one c o n f l i c t , two c o n f l i c t s , three

c o n f l i c t s , and so f o r t h . The h e i g h t of the bar r e p r e s e n t s the

number of per iods in which 0 , 1, 2 , 3 , e t c . c o n f l i c t s o c c u r .

245

246

Once a g a i n , t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i s presented f o r all major power

m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s and f o r i n t e r s t a t e c o n f l i c t s . F igure Four

o f f e r s the same i n f o r m a t i o n f o r the d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of c o n f l i c t .

On the l a s t two pages of the a p p e n d i x , 1 present, the

t o t a l number of major power n a t i o n - y e a r s d u r i n g each century in

the 1820-1970 temporal domain (Table 3 0 ) , and a l s o , f o r each

l e v e l of m i l i t a r y v i o l e n c e , the p r o p o r t i o n of n a t i o n a l involvements

i n m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s per n a t i o n - y e a r (Table 3 1 ) . F i n a l l y , at.

the bottom of the l a s t page, I note the p r o p o r t i o n s of n a t i o n a l

involvements i n m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s t h a t r e s u l t i n war (Table 3 2 ) .

247

FIGURE 1

NUMBER OF MILITARY CONFLICTS PER 10-YEAR PERIOD

NOTE: For t h i s and the f o l l o w i n g graphs, each c o n f l i c t i s coded o n l y once. Since any c o n f l i c t may span s e v e r a l l e v e l s of v i o l e n c e , only the highest l e v e l (war > military a c t i o n > t h r e a t ) i s s e l e c t e d . For example, i f a c o n f l i c t c o n t a i n s a t h r e a t , m i l i t a r y a c t i o n , and war, only "war" i s coded. S i m i l a r l y , i f an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d c i v i l c o n f l i c t e v o l v e s i n t o an i n t e r s t a t e c o n f l i c t , the c o n f l i c t i s coded as being i n t e r s t a t e .

248

FIGURE 2

NUMBER OF MILITARY CONFLICTS (AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF VIOLENCE) PER 10-YEAR PERIOD

249

FIGURE 2 - - - C o n t i n u e d

Number I n t e r s t a t e Threat

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 s s s s s s s s

I 2 0 0 s s

1 9

5 6 0 0

Year

Number

8

I n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d C i v i l C o n f l i c t

3 4 0 0

5 6 7 8 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 s s s s s s s s

4 5 0 0 s s

Year

250

FIGURE 3

DISTRIBUTION OF THE OCCURRENCE OF MILITARY CONFLICTS WITHIN 5-YEAR PERIODS

frequency of occur rence A l l M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t s

5 | 1

4 . 1

3 , 1 | r

2 1 | 1

1

0 I ' 1 1 1 ' 1 1 ' ' '

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 I'M number of c o n f l i c t s per 5-year p e r i o d

f requency of o c c u r r e n c e I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t s

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

number of c o n f l i c t s per 5-year p e r i o d

10 1 M

251

FIGURE 4

DISTRIBUTION OF THE OCCURRENCE OF MILITARY CONFLICTS (AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF VIOLENCE) WITHIN 5-YEAR PERIODS

f requency of o c c u r r e n c e

12 11 10

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

I n t e r s t a t e War

0 1 2

number of c o n f l i c t s per 5-year p e r i o d

12 10

8 6 4 2

0

R e c i p -rocated

Unrecip-rocated

1 I 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 5+

I n t e r s t a t e Military

A c t i o n

1 2

number of conflicts 5-year p e r i o d

4 5

per

f requency of o c c u r r e n c e

I n t e r s t a t e Threat

0 1 2 4+

number of c o n f l i c t s per 5-year p e r i o d

11 10

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

I n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d C i v i l

Conflict

0 1 2 3 4 5

number of c o n f l i c t s per 5-year p e r i o d

252

TABLE 30

NUMBER OF YEARS AS MAJOR POWER DURING THE 1820-1899 AND 1900-1970 TIME PERIODS

Major Powers 1820-1 899

1900-1970

USA '1899-1970) 1 71

UK 1820-1970) 80 71

FRN 4 820-1940, 1945- 1970) 80 67

GMY [1820-1918, 1925- 1 945) 80 40

A-H [1820-1918) 80 19

ITA (1860-1943) 40 44

USR [1820-1917, 1 922-1 970) 80 67

CHN [1950-1970) -- 21

JPN [1895-1945, 1960- 1 970) 5 57

Total Nat ion-Years 446 457

253

TABLE 31

NATIONAL INVOLVEMENTS IN MILITARY CONFLICTS PER NATION-YEAR

M i l i t a r y Years Wars A c t i o n s Threats C i v i l

1820-99 .05 (23) .08 (35) .07 (29) .03 (14)

1900-70 .07 (32) .13 (61) .05 (25) .05 (24)

I n t e r s t a t e A l l Years M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t s Military C o n f l i c t s

1820-99 .20 (87) .23 (101)

1900-70 .26 (118) .31 (142)

NOTE: The number of c o n f l i c t s at each l e v e l of v i o l e n c e d u r i n g the 1820-99 and 1900-70 time p e r i o d s i s g iven i n parentheses

TABLE 32

PROPORTION OF NATIONAL INVOLVEMENTS IN MILITARY CONFLICTS RESULTING IN WAR

I n t e r s t a t e A l l Years M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t s M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t s

1820-99 .26 .23

1900-70 .27 .23

NOTE: For the purpose of p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the t a b l e s above, o n l y one l e v e l of c o n f l i c t i s coded f o r any n a t i o n in a g iven y e a r . S i n c e a n a t i o n may become i n v o l v e d i n c o n f l i c t at s e v e r a l l e v e l s of v i o l e n c e i n the same y e a r , o n l y the h i g h e s t l e v e l (war > m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s > t h r e a t ) i s s e l e c t e d . S i m i l a r l y , i f a n a t i o n i s i n v o l v e d i n both an i n t e r s t a t e and an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d c i v i l c o n f l i c t in the same y e a r , only the i n t e r s t a t e c o n f l i c t i s s e l e c t e d .

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A l b r e c h t - C a r r i e , Rene. Europe a f t e r 1815, 3rd ed. P a t e r s o n , N. J . : L i t t l e f i e l d , Adams, 1959.

A l d r i c h , John and Char les F. Cnudde. "Probing the Bounds of Convent ional Wisdom: A Comparison of R e g r e s s i o n , P r o b i t , and D i s c r i m i n a n t A n a l y s i s . " American J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , 19/3 (August 1975), 571-608.

A l k e r , Hayward R. Mathematics and P o l i t i c s . New York: M a c m i l l a n , 1 965.

- "A Typology of E c o l o g i c a l F a l l a c i e s , " in M a t t e i Dogan and S t e i n Rokkan ( e d s ) , Q u a n t i t a t i v e E c o l o g i c a l A n a l y s i s i n the S o c i a l S c i e n c e s . Cambridge, M a s s . : MIT P r e s s , 1969, 6 9 - 8 6 .

A l l i s o n , J o e l and David E. Hunt. " S o c i a l D e s i r a b i l i t y and the E x p r e s s i o n of Aggression under Vary ing C o n d i t i o n s of F r u s t r a t i o n . " Journal of C o n s u l t i n g P s y c h o l o g y , 23/6 (December 1959), 528-32.

Arney, W i l l i a m Ray. "A Ref ined Status Index f o r S o c i o m e t r i c Data." S o c i o l o g i c a l Methods and Research, 1/3 (February 1 9 7 3 ) , 3 2 9 - 4 6 .

A r o n , Raymond. On War: Atomic Weapons and Global D i p l o m a c y , t r a n s l a t e d by Terence K i l m a r t i n . London: Seeker and Warburg, 1 958.

. Peace and War: A Theory of I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , t r a n s l a t e d by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox. Garden C i t y , N. Y . : Doubleday, 1966.

B a i l e y , Norman T. J . The Mathematical Approach to Biology and M e d i c i n e . New York: W i l e y , 1 967.

Bandura, A l b e r t . "Influence of Models' Reinforcement C o n t i n g e n c i e s on the A c q u i s i t i o n of I m i t a t i v e Responses." J o u r n a l of P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology, 1/6 (June 1 9 6 5 , 5 8 9 - 9 5 .

254

255

__, Dorothea Ross, and S h e i l a A. Ross. "Transmission of Aggression through I m i t a t i o n of A g g r e s s i v e M o del s ." J o u r n a l of Abnormal and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , 63/3 (November 1961), 575-82.

_ . "A Comparative Test of the S t a t u s Envy, S o c i a l Power, and Secondary Reinforcement Theor ies of I d e n t i f i c a t o r y L e a r n i n g . " Journal of Abnormal and S o c i a l Psy chology , 67/6 (December 1963), 527-34. " "

B a r r i n g e r , Richard E. War: P a t t e r n s of C o n f l i c t . Cambridge, M a s s . : MIT P r e s s , 1972.

B e r k o w i t z , Leonard. "Repeated F r u s t r a t i o n s and E x p e c t a t i o n s i n Hostility A r o u s a l . " Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 60/3 (May 196017 4 2 2 - 2 9 7

. A g g r e s s i o n : A S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g i c a l A n a l y s i s . New York: M c G r a w - H i l l , 1962.

. "The Concept of A g g r e s s i v e D r i v e : Some A d d i t i o n a l C o n s i d e r a t i o n s , " i n Leonard Berkowitz ( e d ) , Advances i n Experimental S o c i a l Psychology, v o l . 2. New York: Academic P r e s s , 1965, 301-29.

_ _ _ _ _ and R u s s e l l G. Geen. "Fi lm V i o l e n c e and the Cue P r o p e r t i e s of A v a i l a b l e T a r g e t s . " J o u r n a l of Personality and S o c i a l Psychology, 3/5 (May 1966), 5 2 5 - 3 0 .

B e r k s o n , Joseph. " A p p l i c a t i o n of the L o g i s t i c F u n c t i o n to B i o -a s s a y . " Journal of the American S t a t i s t i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , 39/227 (September 1944), 3 5 7 - 6 5 .

. "Approximation of C h i - s q u a r e by ' P r o b i t s ' and by ' L o g i t s ' . " Journal of the American S t a t i s t i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , 41/233 (March 1946), 7 0 - 7 4 .

. "Minimum X2 and Maximum L i k e l i h o o d S o l u t i o n i n Terms of a L i n e a r Transform, w i t h P a r t i c u l a r Reference to B i o -a s s a y . " Journal of the American S t a t i s t i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , 44/246 (June 1949), 273-78.

. "A S t a t i s t i c a l l y P r e c i s e and R e l a t i v e l y Simple Method of E s t i m a t i n g the B i o - a s s a y w i t h Quantal Response, Based on the L o g i s t i c F u n c t i o n . " Journal of the American S t a t i s t i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , 48/263 (September 1953), 5 6 5 - 9 9 .

256

"Maximum L i k e l i h o o d and Minimum Est imates of the L o g i s t i c F u n c t i o n . " J o u r n a l of the American S t a t i s t i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , 50/269 (March 1955), 130-62.

B l a l o c k , Hubert M. S o c i a l S t a t i s t i c s . New York: M c G r a w - H i l l , 1960.

. "Comment: Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y and the I d e n t i f i c a t i o n Problem." P u b l i c Opinion Q u a r t e r l y , 30/1 ( S p r i n g 1966a), 1 3 0 - 3 2 .

. "The I d e n t i f i c a t i o n Problem and Theory B u i l d i n g : The Case of Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y . " American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 31/1 (February 1966b), 5 2 - 6 1 .

. "Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y and I n t e r a c t i o n : Some A l t e r n a t i v e M o d e l s . " American J o u r n a l of S o c i o l o g y , 73/3 (November 1967a), 305-15.

. "Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y , S o c i a l M o b i l i t y , Status I n t e g r a t i o n , and S t r u c t u r a l E f f e c t s . " American Socio logical Review, 32/5 (October 1967b), 790-801.

B l o c h , Ivan S. The Future of War. New York: Doubleday and M c C l u r e , 1899.

Bloombaum, M i l t o n . "Doing S m a l l e s t Space A n a l y s i s . " J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 14/3 (September 1970), 4 0 9 - 1 6 .

B l o o m f i e l d , L i n c o l n P. and Robert B e a t t i e . CASCON 11: Computer-Aided System f o r Handling Information on Local Conflicts . Cambridge, M a s s . : Center f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s , MIT, 1971a.

. "Computers and P o l i c y - m a k i n g : The CASCON Exper iment." J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 15/1 (March 1971b), 3 3 - 4 6 .

B l o o m f i e l d , L i n c o l n P. and Amelia C. L e i s s . C o n t r o l l i n g Small Wars: A S t r a t e g y f o r the 1970's. New York: Knopf, 1969.

B o u l d i n g , Kenneth E. C o n f l i c t and Defense: A General Theory. New York: Harper, 1962.

Box, Steven and J u l i e n n e F o r d . "Some Q u e s t i o n a b l e Assumptions in the Theory of Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y . " S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 17/2 ( July 1969), 187-201.

Brandmeyer, Gerald A. "Status C o n s i s t e n c y and P o l i t i c a l B e h a v i o r . " S o c i o l o g i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , 6/3 (Summer 1965), 241-56.

257

Bremer, S t u a r t A. "The Powerful and the War-Prone: R e l a t i v e N a t i o n a l C a p a b i l i t i e s and War E x p e r i e n c e , 1820-1965." (Forthcoming.)

B r o d i e , Bernard. A Guide to Naval S t r a t e g y , 4th ed. P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1958.

. S t r a t e g y i n the M i s s i l e Age. P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1959.

E s c a l a t i o n and the Nuclear O p t i o n . P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1966.

Broom, Leonard and F. Lancaster Jones. "Status C o n s i s t e n c y and P o l i t i c a l P r e f e r e n c e : The A u s t r a l i a n Case." American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 35/6 (December 1970), 989-1001.

Brown, Paul and Rogers E l l i o t t . "Control of A g g r e s s i o n in a Nursery School C l a s s . " Journal of Experimental C h i l d Psychology, 2/2 (June 1965), 103-07.

B u s s , A r n o l d H. " I n s t r u m e n t a l i t y of A g g r e s s i o n , Feedback, and F r u s t r a t i o n as Determinants of P h y s i c a l A g g r e s s i o n . " J o u r n a l of P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , 3/2 (February 1 9 6 6 ) , 153-62.

C a r r , Edward H a l l e t t . The Twenty Years' C r i s i s , 1919-1939: An I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Study of I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , 2nd ed. New York: Harper and Row, 1964.

Coleman, James S. I n t r o d u c t i o n to Mathematical S o c i o l o g y . G l e n c o e , Ill.: Free P r e s s , 1964.

Col s o n , E l i z a b e t h . "Social C o n t r o l and Vengeance i n P l a t e a u Tonga S o c i e t y . " A f r i c a , 23/3 ( Ju ly 1 9 5 3 ) , 199-212.

C o o l e y , W i l l i a m W. and Paul R. Lohnes. M u l t i v a r i a t e Procedures f o r the B e h a v i o r a l S c i e n c e s . New York: W i l e y , 1962.

Coombs, Clyde H. A Theory of Data. New York: W i l e y , 1964.

Cos o r , Lewis A. The Functions of S o c i a l C o n f l i c t . New York: Free P r e s s , 1956.

. " C o n f l i c t : S o c i a l A s p e c t s , " i n David L. S i l l s ( e d ) , I n t e r n a t i o n a l Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, v o l . 3. New York: Macmil lan and Free P r e s s , 1968, 2 3 2 - 3 6 .

258

C u t t e r , Henry S. G. "Aggressive Response S t r e n g t h as a F u n c t i o n of I n t e r f e r e n c e with G o a l - o r i e n t e d Responses near to and f a r from t h e i r G o a l . " P s y c h o l o g i c a l R e p o r t s , 12/3 (dune 1963) , 8 5 5 - 6 1 .

D a v i e s , James C. "Toward a Theory of R e v o l u t i o n . " A m e r i c a n S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 27/1 (February 1962), 5 - 1 9 .

D e u t s c h , Kar l W. and J . David S i n g e r . " M u l t i p o l a r Power Systems and I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t a b i l i t y . " World P o l i t i c s , 16/3 ( A p r i l 1964) , 390-406.

D o l l a r d , J o h n , Leonard W. Doob, Neal E. M i l l e r , 0. H. Mowrer, and Robert R. S e a r s . F r u s t r a t i o n and A g g r e s s i o n . New Haven: Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1939.

DuMouchel , W i l l i a m H. "The R e g r e s s i o n of a Dichotomous V a r i a b l e . " I n t e r n a l memorandum, I n s t i t u t e f o r S o c i a l R e s e a r c h , U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n , 1974.

Duval 1, Raymond. "An A p p r a i s a l of the M e t h o d o l o g i c a l and S t a t i s t i c a l Procedures of the C o r r e l a t e s of War P r o j e c t . " Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s A s s o c i a t i o n , S t . L o u i s , 1974.

E a s t , Maurice A. "Status D i s c r e p a n c y and V i o l e n c e i n the I n t e r n a t i o n a l System: An E m p i r i c a l A n a l y s i s , " i n James N. Rosenau, V incent D a v i s , and Maurice A. East ( e d s ) , The A n a l y s i s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s : Essays in Honor of H a r o l d and Margaret S p r o u t . New York: Free P r e s s , 1972, 299-319.

F e r r i s , Wayne H. The Power C a p a b i l i t i e s of N a t i o n - S t a t e s : I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f l i c t and War. L e x i n g t o n , M a s s . : Heath, 1 973.

Feshbach, Seymour. "The F u n c t i o n of Aggression and the R e g u l a t i o n of Aggress ive D r i v e . " P s y c h o l o g i c a l Review, 71/4 (July 1 9 6 4 ) , 257-72.

F e s t i n g e r , Leon. "The A n a l y s i s of Sociograms Using M a t r i x A l g e b r a . " Human R e l a t i o n s , 2/2 ( A p r i l 1949), 153-58.

F i n n e y , David John. P r o b i t A n a l y s i s , 3rd ed. Cambridge, E n g . : U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1971.

F o r s y t h , E l a i n e and Leo Katz . "A M a t r i x Approach to the A n a l y s i s of S o c i o m e t r i c Data: P r e l i m i n a r y Report ." S o c i o m e t r y , 9/4 (November 1946), 340-47.

259

Frank, C h a r l e s R. S t a t i s t i c s and E c o n o m e t r i c s . New York: H o l t , R i n e h a r t , and Winston, 1971.

G a l t u n g , Johan. "A S t r u c t u r a l Theory of A g g r e s s i o n . " JournaI of Peace Research, 1/2 (1964) , 9 5 - 1 1 9 .

. "Peace," in David L. S i l l s ( e d ) , Internat ional E n c y c l o p e d i a of the S o c i a l S c i e n c e s , v o l . 11. New York: M a c m i l l a n and Free P r e s s , 1968, 4 8 7 - 9 6 .

Geen, R u s s e l l G. " E f f e c t s of F r u s t r a t i o n , A t t a c k , and P r i o r T r a i n i n g i n Aggressiveness upon A g g r e s s i v e B e h a v i o r . " J o u r n a l of P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology, 9/4 (August 1968), 3 1 6 - 2 1 .

and Leonard B e r k o w i t z . "Name-mediated A g g r e s s i v e Cue P r o p e r t i e s . " Journal of P e r s o n a l i t y , 34/3 (September 1966), 4 5 6 - 6 5 .

Geen, R u s s e l l G. and Edgar C. O'Neal. " A c t i v a t i o n of C u e - e l i c i t e d A g g r e s s i o n by General A r o u s a l . " J o u r n a l of P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology, 11/3 (March 19697, 2 8 9 - 9 2 .

Geen, R u s s e l l G. and Roger P i g g . " A c q u i s i t i o n of an A g g r e s s i v e Response and i t s G e n e r a l i z a t i o n to Verbal B e h a v i o r . " Journal of P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology, 15/2 (June 1 9 7 0 ) , 165-70.

Geen, R u s s e l l G. and David Stonner. "The E f f e c t s of Aggressiveness H a b i t St rength upon Behavior i n the Presence of A g g r e s s i o n -R e l a t e d S t i m u l i . " Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 17/2 (February 1971), 149-53.

G l e d i t s c h , N i l s P e t t e r and J . David S i n g e r . "Distance and I n t e r n a t i o n a l War, 1816-1965." Proceedings of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Peace Research A s s o c i a t i o n F i f t h Genera 1 Conference, 1 975. Sonarpura, Varanasi ( I n d i a : A s i a n P r i n t i n g Works, 1975, 481-506.

Goffman, I rwin W. "Status C o n s i s t e n c y and P r e f e r e n c e f o r Change i n Power D i s t r i b u t i o n . " American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 22/3 (June 1957), 2 7 5 - 8 1 .

Goodman, Leo A. " E c o l o g i c a l Regressions and Behavior of I n d i v i d u a l s . " American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 18/6 (December 1953), 6 6 3 - 6 4 .

. "Some A l t e r n a t i v e s to E c o l o g i c a l C o r r e l a t i o n . " American J o u r n a l of S o c i o l o g y , 64/6 (May 1959), 6 1 0 - 2 5 .

260

Graham, Frances K., Wanda A. Charwat, A l i c e S. Honig, and Paula C. Wel tz . "Aggression as a F u n c t i o n of the At tack and the A t t a c k e r . " Journal of Abnormal and S o c i a l Psvchology, 46/4 (October 1951), 5 1 2 - 2 0 . * "

Green, Paul E. and Frank J . Carmone. M u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l S e a l i n g and Related Techniques i n Market ing A n a l y s i s . Boston: A l l y n and Bacon, 1970.

G r i z z l e , James E. " M u l t i v a r i a t e L o g i t A n a l y s i s . " B i o m e t r i c s , 27/4 (December 1971), 1057-62.

G u r r , Ted Robert. Why Men R e b e l . P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1970.

Guttman, L o u i s . "A General Nonmetric Technique f o r F i n d i n g the S m a l l e s t Coordinate Space f o r a C o n f i g u r a t i o n of P o i n t s . " Psychometr ika, 33/4 (December 1968), 469-506.

Haas, M i c h a e l . " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Subsystems: S t a b i l i t y and P o l a r i t y . " American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, 64/1 (March 1970), 98-123.

H a r a r y , Frank, Robert Z. Norman, and Dorwin C a r t w r i g h t . S t r u c t u r a l Models: An I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Theory of D i r e c t e d Graphs. New York: W i l e y , 1965.

Harman, Harry H. Modern F a c t o r A n a l y s i s , 2nd ed. Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s , 1967.

H a r t , H o r n e l l . " L o g i s t i c S o c i a l Trends." American Journal of S o c i o l o g y , 50/5 (March 1945), 337-52.

Hartman, Moshe. "On the D e f i n i t i o n of Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y . " American Journal of S o c i o l o g y , 80/3 (November 1974), 7 0 6 - 2 1 .

Hays, W i l l i a m L. S t a t i s t i c s . New York: H o l t , R i n e h a r t , and Winston, 1963.

H e r z , John H. I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s in the Atomic Age. New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1959.

H i l t o n , Gordon. "A Review of the D i m e n s i o n a l i t y of Nat ions P r o j e c t . " Sage P r o f e s s i o n a l Papers: Internat ional Studies S e r i e s , 2/15 (1973).

Hokanson, Jack E. "The E f f e c t s of F r u s t r a t i o n and A n x i e t y on Overt A g g r e s s i o n . " J o u r n a l of Abnormal and S o c i a l Psychology, 62/2 (March 196177 3 4 6 - 5 1 .

261

H o l l a n d , Janet and M. D. S t e u e r . Mathematical S o c i o l o g y : A S e l e c t i v e Annotated B i b l i o g r a p h y . New York: Schocken Books , 1 970.

H o l s t i , K. J . I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s : A Framework f o r A n a l y s i s . Englewood C l i f f s , N. J . : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1967.

Morton, L o i s E. " G e n e r a l i z a t i o n of A g g r e s s i v e Behavior i n A d o l e s c e n t Del inquent Boys." J o u r n a l of A p p l i e d B e h a v i o r A n a l y s i s , 3/3 ( F a l l 1 9 7 0 ) , 2 0 5 - 1 1 .

Hovland, C a r l I. "Human Learning and R e t e n t i o n , " i n S t a n l e y S. Stevens (ed) , Handbook of Experimental Psychology. New York: W i l e y , 1951, 613-89.

Hyman, M a r t i n D. "Determining the E f f e c t s of Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y . P u b l i c Opinion Q u a r t e r l y , 30/1 ( S p r i n g 1966), 120-29.

I v e r s e n , Gudrnund R. A p p l i e d S t a t i s t i c s . Ann A r b o r , M i . : I n t e r -u n i v e r s i t y Consortium f o r P o l i t i c a l R e s e a r c h , 1971.

J a c k s o n , E l t o n F. "Status C o n s i s t e n c y and Symptoms of S t r e s s . " American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 27/4 (August 1962), 4 6 9 - 8 0 .

and Peter J . Burke. "Status and Symptoms of S t r e s s : A d d i t i v e and I n t e r a c t i v e E f f e c t s . " American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 30/4 (August 1965), 556-64.

J a c k s o n , E l t o n F. and Richard F. C u r t i s . " E f f e c t s of V e r t i c a l M o b i l i t y and Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y : A Body of Negat ive E v i d e n c e . " American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 37/6 (December 1972), 701-13.

J e g a r d , Suzanne and Richard H. W a l t e r s . "A Study of Some Determinants of Aggression i n Young C h i l d r e n . " C h i l d Development, 31/4 (December 1960), 739-47.

J o h n s t o n , J . Econometric Methods, 2nd e d . New York: M c G r a w - H i l l , 1 972.

J o s t , A. "Die A s s o z i a t i o n s f e s t i g k e i t i n i h r e r A b h a n g i g k e i t von der V e r t e i l u n g der Wiederholungen." Z e i t s c h r i f t f u r P s y c h o l o g i e , 14 (1897), 436-72.

Kahn, Herman. On Thermonuclear War, 2nd e d . P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1961.

T h i n k i n g About the U n t h i n k a b l e . New York: H o r i z o n , 1962

262

. On E s c a l a t i o n : Metaphors and S c e n a r i o s . New York: Praeger , 1965.

K a t z , Leo. "A New Status Index Derived from S o c i o m e t r i c A n a l y s i s . " P s y c h o m e t r i k a , 18/1 (March 1953), 3 9 - 4 3 .

K e l l y , K. Dennis and W i l l i a m J . Chambl iss . "Status C o n s i s t e n c y and P o l i t i c a l A t t i t u d e s . " American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 31/3 (June 1966), 375-82.

Kemeny, John G . , J . L a u r i e S n e l l , and G e r a l d L. Thompson. I n t r o d u c t i o n to F i n i t e Mathematics, 2nd ed. Englewood C l i f f s , N. J . : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1966.

K e n k e l , W i l l i a m F. "The R e l a t i o n s h i p between S t a t u s C o n s i s t e n c y and P o l i t i c o - E c o n o m i c A t t i t u d e s . " American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 21/3 (June 1956), 365-68.

K i n t s c h , W a l t e r . L e a r n i n g , Memory, and Conceptual P r o c e s s e s . New York: W i l e y , 1970.

K i s s i n g e r , Henry A. Nuclear Weapons and F o r e i g n P o l i c y . New York: Harper, 1957.

K n o r r , Klaus Eugen. Cm the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age. P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1966.

K r u s k a l , J . B. " M u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l S c a l i n g by O p t i m i z i n g Goodness of F i t to a Nonmetric H y p o t h e s i s . " P s y c h o m e t r i k a , 29/1 (March 1964a), 1-27.

. "Nonmetric M u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l S c a l i n g : A Numerical Method." P s y c h o m e t r i k a , 29/2 (June 1964b), 115-29.

Laumann, Edward 0. and David R. S e g a l . "Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y and E t h n o r e l i g i o u s Group Membership as Determinants of S o c i a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n and P o l i t i c a l A t t i t u d e s . " American Journal of S o c i o l o g y , 77/1 (July 1971), 3 6 - 6 1 .

L e n s k i , Gerhard E. "Status C r y s t a l l i z a t i o n : A N o n - v e r t i c a l Dimension of S o c i a l S t a t u s . " American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 19/4 (August 1954), 4 0 5 - 1 3 .

. "Social P a r t i c i p a t i o n and S t a t u s C r y s t a l l i z a t i o n . " American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 21/4 (August 1956), 4 5 8 - 6 4 .

. "Comment." P u b l i c Opinion Q u a r t e r l y , 28/2 (Summer 1964), 326-30.

263

- Power and P r i v i l e g e : A Theory of Social Stratification. New York: M c G r a w - H i l l , 1966.

. "Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y and the Vote: A four N a t i o n T e s t . " American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 32/2 ( A p r i l 1967), 2 9 8 - 3 0 1 .

L i n g o e s , James C. "A General Survey of the Guttmao-Lingoes Nonmetric Program S e r i e s , " i n Roger N. Shepard, A. K i m b a l l Romney, and Sara Beth Nerlove ( e d s ) , M u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l S c a l i n g : Theory and A p p l i c a t i o n s i n the Behavioral Sciences, v o l . 1. New York: Seminar P r e s s , 1972, 4 9 - 6 8 .

. The Guttman-Lingoes Nonmetric Program S e r i e s . Ann A r b o r , M i . : Mathesis P r e s s , 1973.

Linnemann, Hans. An Econometric Study of International Trade Flows. Amsterdam: N o r t h - H o l l a n d P u b l i s h i n g C o . , 1966.

L o t k a , A l f r e d J . Elements of Mathematical B i o l o g y . New York: Dover, 1956.

M c C l e l l a n d , Char les A. et a l . "The Management and A n a l y s i s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Event Data: A Computerized System f o r M o n i t o r i n g and P r o j e c t i n g Event F lows." Mi moo, U n i v e r s i t y of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , 1971.

McGeoch, John A. The Psychology of Human L e a r n i n g , 2nd e d . , r e v i s e d by Ar thur L. I r i o n . New York: Longmans, Green, 1952.

McKelvey, Richard D. and W i l l i a m Z a v o i n a . "A S t a t i s t i c a l Model f o r the A n a l y s i s of O r d i n a l Level Dependent V a r i a b l e s . " J o u r n a l of Mathematical S o c i o l o g y , f o r t h c o m i n g .

McNemar, Quinn. P s y c h o l o g i c a l S t a t i s t i c s , 4th ed. New York: W i l e y , 1969.

M a l e w s k i , A n d r z e j . "The Degree of S t a t u s Incongruence and i t s E f f e c t s . " P o l i s h S o c i o l o g i c a l B u l l e t i n , 1/7 ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 9 - 1 9 .

Maslow, Abraham H. " C o n f l i c t , F r u s t r a t i o n , and the Theory of Threat ." Journal of Abnormal and Social P s y c h o l o g y , 38/1 (January 1943), 8 1 - 8 6 .

Melman, Seymour. The Peace Race. New York: George B r a z i l l e r , 1962.

M e l t o n , A r t h u r W. (ed). C a t e g o r i e s of Human L e a r n i n g . New York: Academic P r e s s , 1964.

264

M i d l a r s k y , Manus . Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y and the onset of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Warfare. Unpublished Ph.D. t h e s i s , Northwestern U n i v e r s i t y , 1969.

M i t c h e l l , Robert Edward. "Methodological Notes on a Theory of S t a t u s C r y s t a l l i z a t i o n . " P u b l i c Opinion Q u a r t e r l y , 28/2 (Summer 1964), 315-25.

M i t r a n y , D a v i d . A Working Peace System. C h i c a g o : Quadrangle Books, 1966.

M o d e l s k i , George. "War and the Great Powers." Peace Research S o c i e t y ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l ) Papers , 18 (1972), 4 5 - 5 9 .

Mokken, Robert J . A Theory and Procedure of Scale A n a l y s i s w i t h A p p l i c a t i o n s i n P o l i t i c a l Research. The Hague: Mouton, 1971.

Moreno, Jacob L. (ed). The Sociometry Reader. G l e n c o e , 1 1 1 . : Free P r e s s , 1960.

N o r t h , Robert C. " C o n f l i c t : P o l i t i c a l A s p e c t s , " i n David L. S i l l s (ed) , I n t e r n a t i o n a l Ency c lopedia of the Social S c i e n c e s , v o l . 3. New York: Macmil lan and Free P r e s s , 1968, 2 2 6 - 3 2 .

. The Behavior of N a t i o n - S t a t e s : S t u d i e s in Conflict and I n t e g r a t i o n . (Forthcoming. )

O l s e n , Marvin E. and Judy Corder T u l l y . " S o c i o e c o n o m i c - e t h n i c S t a t u s I n c o n s i s t e n c y and Preference f o r P o l i t i c a l Change." American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 37/5 (October 1972), 560-74.

O r g a n s k i , A. F. K. World P o l i t i c s , 2nd ed. New York: Knopf, 1968.

Osgood, C h a r l e s E. An A l t e r n a t i v e to War or S u r r e n d e r . Urbana, 1 1 1 . : U n i v e r s i t y of I l l i n o i s P r e s s , 1962.

O v e r a l l , John E. and C. James K l e t t . A p p l i e d M u l t i v a r i a t e A n a l y s i s . New York: M c G r a w - H i l l , 1972.

P a s t o r e , N i c h o l a s . "The Role of A r b i t r a r i n e s s i n the F r u s t r a t i o n -Aggress ion H y p o t h e s i s . " Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 47/3 (July 1952), 7 2 8 - 3 1 .

P e a r s o n , F r e d e r i c S. "Geographic P r o x i m i t y and Foreign M i l i t a r y I n t e r v e n t i o n . " Journal of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 18/3 (September 1974), 4 3 2 - 6 0 7 "

265

P e p i t o n e , A l b e r t Davison. A t t r a c t i o n and H o s t i l i t y . New York: Atherton P r e s s , 1964.

P r u i t t , Dean G. and Richard C. Snyder. Theory and Research on the Causes of War. Enqlewood C I i f f s , N.J. Prentice-Hall, 1969.

P u c h a l a , Donald James. I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s Today. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1971.

Ranney, A u s t i n . The Governing of Men, r e v i s e d ed. New York: H o l t , R i n e h a r t , and Winston, 1966.

Rapoport , A n a t o l . F i g h t s , Games, and Debates. Ann A r b o r , M i . : U n i v e r s i t y of Michigan P r e s s , I960.

. St rategy and Conscience. New York: Harper and Row, 1964.

R a s e r , John R. "Learning and A f f e c t i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s . " J o u r n a l of Peace Research, 2/3 (1965), 2 1 6 - 2 7 .

Ray, James L. Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y and War lnvolvement among European S t a t e s , 1816-1970. Unpubl ished Ph.D. thesis," U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n , 1974.

. "Aggregation and C o n f u s i o n : The L e v e l s Problem R e v i s i t e d . " (Forthcoming.)

R i c h a r d s o n , Lewis F. Arms and I n s e c u r i t y : A Mathematical Study of the Causes and O r i g i n s of War, e d i t e d by N i c o l a s Rashevsky and Ernesto Trucco. P i t t s b u r g h : Boxwood P r e s s , 1960a.

. S t a t i s t i c s of Deadly Q u a r r e l s , e d i t e d by Quincy Wright and C a r l C. L i e n a u . P i t t s b u r g h : Boxwood P r e s s , 1960b.

R o b i n s o n , W. S. " E c o l o g i c a l C o r r e l a t i o n s and the Behavior of I n d i v i d u a l s . " American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 15/3 (June 1 9 5 0 ) , 351-57.

R o s e c r a n c e , Richard N. " B i p o l a r i t y , M u l t i p o l a r i t y , and the F u t u r e . " Journal of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 10/3 (September 1 9 6 6 ) , 314-27.

Rosen, Steven. "Tolerance of Human L i f e Costs f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y G o a l s . " Peace Research S o c i e t y ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l ) P a p e r s , 17 (1971), 6 1 - 7 3 .

266

. "War Power and the W i l l i n g n e s s to S u f f e r , " in Bruce M. Russett ( e d ) , Peace, War, and Numbers. B e v e r l y H i l l - . , C a l i f . : Sage, 1 972, 167-83.

Rosenzweig, S a u l . "An O u t l i n e of F r u s t r a t i o n Theory," in J . McVicker Hunt (ed) , P e r s o n a l i t y and the Behavior D i s o r d e r s . New York: Ronald P r e s s , 1944, 3 7 9 - 8 8 . "

Rousseau, Jean Jacques. A L a s t i n g Peace through the F e d e r a t i o n of ' Europe and The State o f War,' t r a n s l a ted "by C. E. Vaughan.

London: C o n s t a b l e , 1917.

R u l e , Brendan G. and E l i z a b e t h P e r c i v a l . "The E f f e c t s of F r u s t r a t i o n and Attack on P h y s i c a l A g g r e s s i o n . " J o u r n a l of Experimental Research i n P e r s o n a l i t y , 5/2 (June 19/177 111-18.

Rummel , Rudolph J . "Understanding F a c t o r A n a l y s i s . " Journal of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 11/4 (December 1967), 444-80.

. " F i e l d and A t t r i b u t e Theor ies of Nat ion B e h a v i o r : Some Mathematical I n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s . " H o n o l u l u : U n i v e r s i t y of Hawaii D i m e n s i o n a l i t y of Nat ions P r o j e c t , Research Report - 3 1 , 1969.

. A p p l i e d Factor A n a l y s i s . Evans t o n , 1 1 1 . : Northwestern U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1970.

. "A S t a t u s - F i e l d Theory of I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s . " H o n o l u l u : U n i v e r s i t y of Hawaii D i m e n s i o n a l i t y of Nat ions P r o j e c t , Research Report #50, 1971.

. The Dimensions of N a t i o n s . B e v e r l y H i l l s , C a l i f . : Sage, 1 972.

R u s s e l l , B e r t r a n d . Common Sense and N u c l e a r Warfare. London: George A l l e n and Urwin, 1959.

R u s s e t t , Bruce M. "The C a l c u l u s of D e t e r r e n c e . " J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 7/2 (June 1 9 6 3 ) , 9 7 - 1 0 9 .

. I n t e r n a t i o n a l Regions and the International System: A Study i n P o l i t i c a l Ecology. C h i c a g o : Rand M c N a l l y , 1967.

S c h e l l i n g , Thomas C. Nuclear Weapons and L i m i t e d War. Santa M o n i c a , C a l i f . : Rand C o r p o r a t i o n , 1959.

. The S t r a t e g y of C o n f l i c t . New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1963.

267

. Arms and I n f l u e n c e . New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 966.

Schuman, F r e d e r i c k L. I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s : The D e s t i n y of the Western State System, 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948.

. "Aggression: I n t e r n a t i o n a l A s p e c t s , " i n David L. S i l l s (ed) , I n t e r n a t i o n a l E n c y c l o p e d i a of the S o c i a l Sciences , v o l . 1. New York: Macmil lan and Free P r e s s , 1968, 174-76.

S e g a l , David R. "Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y , Cross P r e s s u r e s , and American P o l i t i c a l B e h a v i o r . " American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 34/3 (June 1969), 352-59.

and David Knoke. " S o c i a l M o b i l i t y , S t a t u s I n c o n s i s t e n c y , and P a r t i s a n Realignment i n the Uni ted S t a t e s . " Social F o r c e s , 47/2 (December 1968), 154-57.

Shepard, Roger N. "The A n a l y s i s of P r o x i m i t i e s : M u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l S c a l i n g wi th an Unknown D i s t a n c e F u n c t i o n . I." P s y c h o m e t r i k a , 27/2 (June 1962a), 125-40.

. "The A n a l y s i s of P r o x i m i t i e s : M u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l S c a l i n g w i t h an Unknown Distance F u n c t i o n . I I ." P s y c h o m e t r i k a , 27/3 (September 1962b), 219-46.

. "Representation o f S t r u c t u r e i n S i m i l a r i t y Data: Problems and P r o s p e c t s . " P s y c h o m e t r i k a , 39/4 (December 1 974 ) , 3 7 3 - 4 2 1 .

, A. Kimball Romney, and Sara Beth Ner love ( e d s ) . M u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l S c a l i n g : Theory and A p p l i c a t i o n s i n the B e h a v i o r a l S c i e n c e s , v o l . 1. New York: Seminar P r e s s , 1972.

S h i v e l y , W. P h i l l i p s . " ' E c o l o g i c a l ' I n f e r e n c e : The Use of Aggregate Data to Study I n d i v i d u a l s . " American P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review, 63/4 (December 1969), 1183-96.

Shy, John. "The American M i l i t a r y E x p e r i e n c e : H i s t o r y and L e a r n i n g . " Journal of I n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y H i s t o r y , 1/2 (Winter 1971), 205-28.

S i n g e r , J . David. "The L e v e l - o f - A n a l y s i s Problem i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , " i n Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba ( e d s ) , The I n t e r n a t i o n a l System: T h e o r e t i c a l E s s a y s . P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1961, 7 7 - 9 2 .

. Deter rence, Arms C o n t r o l , and Disarmament: Toward a S y n t h e s i s i n N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y P o l i c y . Columbus, Ohio: Ohio S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1962.

268

_ _ . "The ' C o r r e l a t e s of War' Project: Inter im Report and R a t i o n a l e . " World P o l i t i c s , 24/2' (January 1972), 243-70.

and N e l v i n S m a l l . "The Composit ion and Status Order ing "of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l System: 181 5 - 1 9 4 0 . " World P o l i t i c s , 18/2 (January 1966), 236-82.

. " A l l i a n c e Aggregation and the Onset of War, 1 81 5-1 945 , " i n J . David Singer (ed) , Q u a n t i t a t i v e International Politics: I n s i g h t s and Evidence. New York: Free Press, 1968, 247-86.

. The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook. New York: W i l e y , 1972.

. "Foreign P o l i c y I n d i c a t o r s : P r e d i c t o r s of War in H i s t o r y and in the State of the World Message." Policy S c i e n c e s , 5/3 (September 1974), 271-96.

S m a l l , M e l v i n and J . David S i n g e r . "The D i p l o m a t i c Importance of S t a t e s , 1816-1970: An Extension and Refinement of the I n d i c a t o r . " World P o l i t i c s , 25/4 ( J u l y 1973), 577-99.

S m a l l , M e l v i n and Robert Bennett . The Strength of N a t i o n s : Comparative Capabilities since Water loo. ( for thcoming. )

Snyder, Glenn H. Deterrence by Denial and Punishment. P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1959.

. Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National

S e c u r i t y . P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1961.

S o r o k i n , P i t i r i m A. S o c i a l M o b i l i t y . New York: Harper, 1927.

. Social and C u l t u r a l Dynamics, v o l . 3 ( F l u c t u a t i o n of S o c i a l R e l a t i o n s h i p s , War, and R e v o l u t i o n ) . New York: American Book, 1937.

S t r a c h e y , John. On the Prevent ion of War. London: M a c m i l l a n , 1962. — "

S t u c k e y , John and J . David S i n g e r . "The Powerful and the War-Prone: Ranking the Nations by R e l a t i v e C a p a b i l i t y and War E x p e r i e n c e , 1820-1964." Paper presented at a conference on Poder S o c i a l : America L a t i n e en El Mundo, Mexico C i t y , 1973.

Taagepera, R e i n . "Growth Curves of Empires." General Systems Yearbook, 13 (1968), 171-75.

269

T a u t e r , Raymond and Manus M i d l a r s k y . " A Theory of Revolution." Journal of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 11/3 (September 1 9 6 7 ) , 264-807

T a y l o r , A. J . P. The S t r u g g l e f o r Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918. London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1954.

T h e i l , H e n r i . Economics and Information Theory. Amsterdam: N o r t h - H o l l a n d P u b l i s h i n g C o . , 1967.

. Statistical Decomposition A n a l y s i s . Amsterdam: N o r t h - H o l l a n d P u b l i s h i n g C o . , 1972.

T o b i n , James. "The A p p l i c a t i o n of M u l t i v a r i a t e P r o b i t A n a l y s i s to Economic Survey Data." Cowles Foundation D i s c u s s i o n Paper #1 , Yale U n i v e r s i t y , 1 955.

Treiman, Donald J . "Status Discrepancy and Prejudice." American J o u r n a l of S o c i o l o g y , 71/6 (May 1966), 651-64.

von R i e k h o f f , H a r a l d . "Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y and the War Behaviour of Major Powers, 1815-1 965." Paper presented at. the Conference on I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s Theory, York U n i v e r s i t y (Canada), 1973.

W a l l a c e , Michael D. " A l l i a n c e P o l a r i z a t i o n , Cross-cutting, and I n t e r n a t i o n a l War, 1815-1964: A Measurement. Procedure and Some P r e l i m i n a r y Evidence." Journal of Conflict Resolution, 17/4 (December 1 973a), 575-604.

. War and Rank among N a t i o n s . L e x i n g t o n , M a s s . : Heath, 1973b.

W a l l e n s t e e n , P e t e r . S t r u c t u r e and War: On International Relations, 1920-1968. Stockholm: Raben and Sjogren 1 9 7 3 "

W a l t z , Kenneth N. Man, the S t a t e , and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1959.

. "The S t a b i l i t y of a B i p o l a r World." Daedalus, 93/3 (Summer 1964), 881-909.

" I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t r u c t u r e , National Force, and the Balance of World Power." Journal of International Affairs 21/2 ( 1 967 ) , 21 5 - 3 1 .

Weber, Max. " C l a s s , S t a t u s , and P a r t y , " in W i l l i s D. Hawley and F r e d e r i c k M. Wirt ( e d s ) , The Search f o r Community Power. Englewood C l i f f s , N. J . : Prentice-Hall, 1968, 5-20.

270

Weinberg, Herbert F. "Models of S t a t i s t i c a l R e l a t i o n s h i p . " American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, 68/4 (December 1974), 1 6 3 8 - 5 5 .

Wesolowski , W l o d z i m i e r z . "Some Motes on the F u n c t i o n a l Theory of S t r a t i f i c a t i o n , " i n Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M a r t i n L i p s e t ( e d s ) , C l a s s , S t a t u s , and Power, 2nd ed. New York: Free P r e s s , 1966, 64-69.

W i c k e l g r e n , Wayne A. "Trace R e s i s t a n c e and the Decay of Long-term Memory." Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 9/4 (November 1972), 4 1 8 - 5 5 .

Winch, Robert F. and Donald T. Campbel l . "Proof? No. Evidence? Yes. The S i g n i f i c a n c e of Tests of S i g n i f i c a n c e , " in Denton E. M o r r i s o n and Ramon E. Henkel ( e d s ) , The S i g n i f i c a n c e Test C o n t r o v e r s y : A Reader. Chicago: Aldine, 1970, 199-206.

W o h l s t e t t e r , Roberta. Pearl Harbor: Warning and D e c i s i o n . S t a n f o r d , C a l i f . : Stanford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1962.

W o l f e r s , A r n o l d . D i s c o r d and C o l l a b o r a t i o n : Essays on I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s . B a l t i m o r e : Johns Hopkins P r e s s , 1962.

Worchel , P h i l i p . " H o s t i l i t y : Theory and Experimental I n v e s t i g a t i o n , " i n Dorothy W i l l n e r (ed ) , Decisions, Values, and Groups, v o l . 1. New York: Pergamon, 1960, 254-66.

. "Displacement, and the Summation of F r u s t r a t i o n . " Journal of Experimental Research i n P e r s o n a l i t y , 1/4 "(December 1966), 256-61.

W r i g h t , Quincy. A Study of War. Chicago: University of Chicago P r e s s , 1942 (2nd e d . , 1965b).

. " E s c a l a t i o n of I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f l i c t s . " Journal of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 9/4 (December 1965a), 4 3 4 - 4 9 .

Z a v o i n a , W i l l i a m and Richard D. McKelvey. "A S t a t i s t i c a l Model for the A n a l y s i s of L e g i s l a t i v e Vot ing B e h a v i o r . " Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e A s s o c i a t i o n , New York, 1069.

Zechman, M a r t i n J . "A Comparison of the Small Sample P r o p e r t i e s of Probit . and OLS Est imators w i t h a L i m i t e d Dependent V a r i a b l e . " Mimeo, U n i v e r s i t y of R o c h e s t e r , 1974.

Z i n n e s , Dina A. "An A n a l y t i c a l Study of the Balance of Power T h e o r i e s . " Journal of Peace R e s e a r c h , 4/3 (1967) , 270-88.

SPECIAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CONFLICT DATA SOURCES

Cody, R i c h a r d H. "U.S. Naval Operat ions in Low Level Warfare." Report BSR 2453, Bendix Systems D i v i s i o n , 1968. ( C i t e d in E r n s t B. Haas, Robert L. B u t t e r w o r t h , and Joseph 5. Nye, Conflict Management by I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organizations. M o r r i s t o w n , N. J . : General Learning P r e s s , 1972.)

C a r r o l l , B e r e n i c e A. How Wars End. Mimeo, U n i v e r s i t y of I l l i n o i s .

Deitchman, Seymour J . L i m i t e d War and American Defense P o l i c y . Washington, D. C. : I n s t i t u t e of Defense Analysis, 1964.

Dupuy, R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy. The Encyclopedia of M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y . New York: Harper and Row, 19 70.

Emerson, J . Terry . "War Powers L e g i s l a t i o n . " West. V i r g i n i a Law Review, 74/1 (1 972), 53-1 1 9." (Revised edition in the C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record, 20 J u l y 1973, S14174-84.)

Goldmann, K j e l l . I n t e r n a t i o n a l Norms and War- between S p a t e s : S t u d i e s in I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s . Stockholm:

L a r o m e d e l s f o r l o g e n , 1971.

Greaves, F i e l d i n g V. "Peace in Our Time — Fact, or Fable: 1 " Military Review (December 1962 ) , 5 5 - 5 8 .

H o l s t i , K. J . "Resolving I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f l i c t s : A Taxonomy of Bella v i or- and Some Figures on Procedures." J o u r n a l of Conflict R e s o l u t i o n , 10/3 (September 1 966)," 277-913."""

J o n e s , Susan D. and Robert Bennett . "A L i s t of C i v i l Wars: 1816-1970." Mimeo, U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n .

K e l l o g , James C. "A Synopsis of M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t , 1945-1964." Mimeo, Bendix Systems D i v i s i o n , Ann Arbor .

Kendo, I s t v a n . Nyolcvannyolc Haboru, l 9 4 5 - 6 7 . Budapest, 1 968.

La rigor, W i l l i a m L. An Encyclopedi a of World History, 5th ed. B o s t o n : Houghton", M i f f l i n , 1 972."

271

272

L e i s s , Amelia C , L i n c o l n P. B l o o m f i e l d , et a l . The Control of Local Conflict: A Design on Arms Control and Limited War in the Developing Areas, 4 v o l s . Cambridge: Center for I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s , MIT, 1967.

Leng, R u s s e l l . "A L i s t of I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s : 1 8 1 6 - 1 9 4 5 . " Mimeo, Middlebury C o l l e g e .

N o r t h , Robert C. The Foreign R e l a t i o n s of C h i n a . Belmont, C a l i f . : Dickenson, 1969.

R i c h a r d s o n , Lewis F. S t a t i s t i c s of Deadly Q u a r r e l s , e d i t e d by Quincy Wright and Car l C. L i e n a u . P i t t s b u r g h : Boxwood P r e s s , 1960.

Sabrosky, A l a n N. and E l a i n e Morton. " C r i s i s and Outcome: 1 920-1 9 6 5 . " Mimeo, U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n .

S i n g e r , J . David and Melv in S m a l l . The Wages of War. 1816-1965: A S t a t i s t i c a l Handbook. New York: Wiley, 1972.

S o r o k i n , P i t i r i m A. Social and C u l t u r a l Dynamics, v o l . 3

( F l u c t u a t i o n of S o c i a l R e l a t i o n s h i p s , War, and Revolution). New York: American Book, 1937.

Wain house, David D. et al. I n t e r n a t i o n a l Peace Observation: A H i s t o r y and F o r e c a s t . B a l t i m o r e : Johns Hopkins P r e s s , 1966.

Wood, D a v i d . " C o n f l i c t in the Twentieth Century." Adelphi Paper #48, I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , 1968.

W r i g h t , Quincy. A Study of War, 2nd ed. Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s , 1965.