1. Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez

Facts:

Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case initiated during the time of Japanese Occupation who established the Philippine Executive Commission. The Japanese Occupants at that time directed the government to continue with all its functions, including the judicial functions. The said government was then replaced by the Republic of the Philippines, a provisional government granted by the Japanese to the Filipinos which was however overturned by the Americans as represented by Gen. McArthur and reverted to as the Commonwealth of the Phils. A few days after his landing, he immediately issued a proclamation that 1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the supreme authority of the Government of the United States, the sole and only government having legal and valid jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control;

2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; and

3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control.

As a result of this proclamation, the respondent judge herein refused to rule on the complaint initiated by Co Kim Chan on the grounds that with the replacement of the Japanese rule with the Americans, and with the subsequent issuance of the aforementioned proclamation, the court no longer has any jurisdiction.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the judicial acts and proceedings of the court prior to the Commonwealth regime were valid and remained in force even after the liberation of the Philippines by the US.

(2) Whether the proclamation (par.3) of McArthur rendered void all judgments and proceedings of the said court.

(3) If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated by said proclamation, whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may continue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished in the Islands.

Held:

First Issue: The Court ruled YES.

It is a legal truism in political and international law that acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. With this, there is a need to determine whether the Philippines during that time was a de facto government.

First, let us enumerate the three types of de facto government:

(1) Government de facto in a proper legal sense- government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter

(2) which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force

(3) that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state of such as the government

According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the belligerent occupant has the right and is burdened with the duty to insure public order and safety during his military occupation, he possesses all the powers of a de facto government, and he can suspended the old laws and promulgate new ones and make such changes in the old as he may see fit, but he is enjoined to respect, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances prevailing in the occupied territory, the municipal laws in force in the country, that is, those laws which enforce public order and regulate social and commercial life of the country. (With the application of Consti 1, I think the relevance of the case would pronounce that a new government can only abrogate laws which are political in nature, but they cannot touch the laws regulating man to man)

On the other hand, laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, such as, among others, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the right to travel freely in the territory occupied, are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation. Although the local and civil administration of justice is suspended as a matter of course as soon as a country is militarily occupied, it is not usual for the invader to take the whole administration into his own hands. In practice, the local ordinary tribunals are authorized to continue administering justice; and judges and other judicial officers are kept in their posts if they accept the authority of the belligerent occupant or are required to continue in their positions under the supervision of the military or civil authorities appointed, by the Commander in Chief of the occupant. These principles and practice have the sanction of all publicists who have considered the subject, and have been asserted by the Supreme Court and applied by the President of the United States.

And applying the principles for the exercise of military authority in an occupied territory, which were later embodied in the said Hague Conventions, President McKinley, in his executive order to the Secretary of War of May 19,1898, relating to the occupation of the Philippines by United States forces, said in part: "Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. The judges and the other officials connected with the administration of justice may, if they accept the authority of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land as between man and man under the supervision of the American Commander in Chief."

In this case, the Court ruled that the Philippine Executive Commission which was established by the Japanes Occupants are de facto government of the second kind. (mao ni ang first importance ani nga case)

It was not different from the government established by the British in Castine, Maine, or by the United States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says, "The government established over an enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little consequence whether such government be called a military or civil government. Its character is the same and the source of its authority the same. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war, and so far it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world, those laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts." The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals, is of no consequence. The court made mention that in fact it had been practiced by a lot of countries who colonized others already. (murag ang contention man gud kay dili xa government de facto kay dili ang Japanese ang nagpa run kay what happened is gi delegate man sa Japanes ang running sa government didto sa mga Filipinos).

Now, dba tulo man to ka governments ang na establish here sa Philippines, with regards sa first two, katong Executive, and Commonwealth which were both established by the Japanese, niana ang SC nga: The so-

called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was the same — the Japanese military authority and government.

Indeed, even if the Republic of the Philippines had been established by the free will of the Filipino who, taking advantage of the withdrawal of the American forces from the Islands, and the occupation thereof by the Japanese forces of invasion, had organized an independent government under the name with the support and backing of Japan, such government would have been considered as one established by the Filipinos in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state or the Unite States. And as such, it would have been a de facto government similar to that organized by the confederate states during the war of secession and recognized as such by the by the Supreme Court of the United States in numerous cases, notably those of Thorington vs. Smith, Williams vs.Bruffy, and Badly vs. Hunter, above quoted; and similar to the short-lived government established by the Filipino insurgents in the Island of Cebu during the Spanish-American war, recognized as a de facto government by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of McCleod vs. United States (In here, US contended that the Commonwealth is not a de facto government because it was not established by the free will of the Filipino, and Japan had no right to grant liberation to Filipinos because they have not established their dominion as required by Int’l Laws since accdg to them US was still the one controlling the Phils.) THE SC therefore ruled that the Republic of the Phils was a de facto government of the third kind.

The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. According to that well-known principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, "does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. Were it otherwise, the whole social life of a community would be paralyzed by an invasion; and as between the state and the individuals the evil would be scarcely less, — it would be hard for example that payment of taxes made under duress should be ignored, and it would be contrary to the general interest that the sentences passed upon criminals should be annulled by the disappearance of the intrusive government ." (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 518.) And when the occupation and the abandonment have been each an incident of the same war as in the present case, postliminy applies, even though the occupant has acted as conqueror and for the time substituted his own sovereignty as the Japanese intended to do apparently in granting independence to the Philippines and establishing the so-called Republic of the Philippines.

That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are not of a political complexion, are and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the Proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944, which declares null and void all laws, regulations and processes of the governments established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, for it would not have been necessary for said proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio.

Second Issue:

NO. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other

governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated, according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law.

Third Issue:

YES. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.” And Taylor in this connection says: “From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit.” Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government established by the occupant of transient character.If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become reestablished and conceived of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy, may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principles “a state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their original shape upon removal of the external force, — and subject to the same exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content.”

DECISION: WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS ISSUED to the judge of the Court Of First Instance of Manila ordering him to take cognizance and continue to final judgment the proceedings in Case No. 3012.

NOTES:

3 Kinds of De Facto Government:1. Established through Rebellion – Governments gets possession and control through the force of the voice of the majority and maintains itself rightful government2. Established through Occupation – (PARAMOUNT FORCE) Maintained by the military forces who invade and occupy the territory of the enemy.3. Established through Insurrection – Established as an independent government by the inhabitants of the country who rise in insurrection against the parent state.

Effects of a belligerent occupationAccording to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, the belligerent occupant:

(i) possesses all the powers of a de facto government(ii) can suspend the old laws and promulgate new ones and make such changes in the old as he may see

fit;

(iii) the municipal laws in force in the country must be respected, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances prevailing in the occupied territory .i.e. affect private rights of person and property and provide for the punishment of crime);

(iv) laws of a political nature or affecting political relations are considered as suspended during the military occupation (i.e. right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the right to travel freely in the territory occupied)

(v) local ordinary tribunals are authorized to continue administering justice; judges and other judicial officers are kept in their posts if they accept the authority of the belligerent occupant or are required to continue in their positions under the supervision of the military or civil authorities appointed.

(vi) There is no transfer of sovereignty during a belligerent occupation. The occupation, being essentially provisional, does not serve to transfer sovereignty over the territory controlled. The de jure government, during the period of occupancy, is deprived of the power to exercise its rights as such

(Note: There is no suspension of sovereignty during a belligerent occupation, but merely the suspension of the exercise of sovereignty by the de jure government

2. Great Britain- Costa Rica Arbitration

Facts:

The Government of Costa Rica was overthrown by Frederico Tinoco,the Secretary of War whose reign lasted from 1917 to 1919. During such time, the TInocon administration contracted various obligations thorugh contracts one of which is the one it entered into with the Royal Bank and Costa Rica Petroleum Company, both of which are owned by GB nationals which include the circulation of colones (Costa Rica currency), indebtedness, and a grant to exploit Costa Rica petroleum resources. However, Tinoco’s government fell after he retired and left the country on 1919. After his government fell, the old Constitution was brought back, and elections were held under it. After the revival of the old government, it passed Law of Nullities No. 41 which invalidated all contracts between the executive power and private persons, made with or without approval of the legislative power between January 27, 1917 and September 2, 1919, covering the period of the Tinoco government. It also nullified the legislative decree No. 12 of the Tinoco government, dated June 28, 1919, authorizing the issue of the fifteen million colones currency notes. . The Nullities Law also invalidated the legislative decree of the Tinoco government of July 8, 1919, authorizing the circulation of notes of the nomination of 1,000 colones, and annulled all transactions with such colones bills between holders and the state, directly or indirectly, by means of negotiation or contract, if thereby the holders received value as if they were ordinary bills of current issue. With the passage of these laws, GB contended that it affected their rights with regards to the transactions mentioned above against the Government of Costa Rica. The Government of Costa Rica denies its liability for the acts or obligations of the Tinoco government and maintains that the Law of Nullities was a legitimate exercise of its legislative governing power. It further denies the validity of such claims on the merits, unaffected by the Law of Nullities.

Contentions of GB:1. that the Tinoco government was the only government of Costa Rica de facto and de jure for two years and nine

months; that during that time there is no other government disputing its sovereignty, that it was in peaceful administration of the whole country, with the acquiescence of its people.

2. , that the succeeding government could not by legislative decree avoid responsibility for acts of that government affecting British subjects, or appropriate or confiscate rights and property by that government except in violation of international law; that the act of Nullities is as to British interests, therefore itself a nullity, and is to be disregarded, with the consequence that the contracts validly made with the Tinoco government must be performed by the present Costa Rican Government, and that the property which has been invaded or the rights nullified must be restored.

Answers of Costa Rica:1. that the Tinoco government was not a de facto or de jure government according to the rules of international law.

This raises an issue of fact.

2. that the contracts and obligations of the Tinoco government, set up by Great Britain on behalf of its subjects, are void, and do not create a legal obligation, because the government of Tinoco and its acts were in violation of the constitution of Costa Rica of 1871.

3. that Great Britain is stopped by the fact that it did not recognize the Tinoco government during its incumbency, to claim on behalf of its subjects that Tinoco's was a government which could confer rights binding on its successor.

Held: YES

Relying on Dr. John Basset Moore the Court said:

Under the Principle of Continuity of States, the state is bound by the engagements entered into by governments that have ceased to exist. The restores government is generally liable for the acts of the usurper. Also changes in the government or the internal policy do not, as a rule, affect its position in the International Law. Though the government changes, the nation remains, with rights and obligations unimpaired. Non-recognition by other nations of a government claiming to be a national personality is usually appropriate evidence that it has not attained the independence and control entitling it by International Law to be classified as such. But when recognition of a government is determined by inquiry, not into its de facto sovereignty but into its illegitimacy or irregularity of origin, their non-recognition loses evidential weight – it cannot outweigh evidence of the de facto character if a government.( meaning aning last sentence kay if ang pag recognize or not recognize sa State kay dili tungod sa iyang sovereignty or independence, but as to what kind of govt it has or how it led to it, immaterial if gi recognize xa or wala.)

Considering the characteristics and attributes of the de facto government, a general government de facto having completely taken the place of the regularly constituted authorities in the state binds the nation. So far as its international obligations are concerned, it represents the state. It succeeds to the debts of the regular government it has displaced and transmits its own obligations to succeeding titular governments. Its loans and contracts bind the state and the state is responsible for the governmental acts of the de facto authorities. In general its treaties are valid obligations of the state. It may alienate the national territory and the judgments of its courts are admitted to be effective after its authority has ceased. An exception to these rules has occasionally been noted in the practice of some of the states of Latin America, which declare null and void the acts of a usurping de facto intermediary government, when the regular government it has displaced succeeds in restoring its control. 5'evertheless, acts validly undertaken in the name of the state and having an international character cannot lightly be repudiated and foreign governments generally insist on their binding force. The legality or constitutional legitimacy of a de facto government is without importance internationally so far as the matter of representing the state is concerned.

Second. It is ably and earnestly argued on behalf of Costa Rica that the Tinoco government cannot be considered a de facto government, because it was not established and maintained in accord with the constitution of Costa Rica of 1871. To hold that a government which establishes itself and maintains a peaceful administration, with the acquiescence of the people for a substantial period of time, does not become a de facto government unless it conforms to a previous constitution would be to hold that within the rules of international law a revolution contrary to the fundamental law of the existing government cannot establish a new government. This cannot be. and is not, true. The change by revolu tion upsets the rule of the authorities in power under the then existing fundamental law, and sets aside the fundamental law in so far as the change of rule makes it necessary. To speak of a revolution creating a de facto government, which conforms to the limitations of the old constitution is to use a contradiction in terms. The same government continues internationally, but not the internal law of its being. The issue is not whether the new government assumes power or conducts its administration under constitutional limitations established by the people during the incumbency of the government it has overthrown. The question is, has it really established itself in such a way that all within its influence recognize its control, and that there is no opposing force assuming to be a government in its place? Is it discharging its functions as a government usually does, respected within its own jurisdiction? As long a it is the effective government of the state – it is the government of the state. Debts owed are not owed by the government of the day but between the state – the only legal entity that is relevant is the state.

Even an illegal government may bind a state to international obligations. International law looks to the State, not the gov entity w/in the state.

→ Caveat: when government in power contrary to international law, not just domestic law, then doctrine of state continuity will not generally apply.

Tinoco was a sovereign government. Even though some sates did not recognize it – that cannot outweigh the evidence disclosed that de facto it was a government.

George W. Hopkins (USA) v. United Mexican States

Facts:Hopkins purchased six postal money orders from the Mexican Government which he presented in due time to Mexican authorities which were however denied since it was alleged that the said money orders issued by the Huerta Administration, which were illegal and hence does not bind Mexico, and that therefore these orders can not be made the basis of a claim against Mexico. Now, the Huerta Administration which usurped Mexico was an uprising led by Huerta, the military commander who instead of protecting the president went to the side of the enemy, who declared himself as acting president after imprisoning and forcing the President and VP to resign and declare him one. Subsequently, his rule came to an end, and the former government was revived who then subsequently issued Decrees of Nullity to declare null and void the obligations incurred during Huerta’s administration.

Issue:

Whether or not the Mexican Government can be held responsible for non payment of money orders of Huerta Government on the grounds that they involved acts of unpersonal character.

Whether or not a claimant state that did not recognize a previous government can be held in estoppel.

Held:

The court held that The greater part of governmental machinery in every modern country is not affected by changes in the higher administrative officers. The sale of postage stamps, the registration of letters, the acceptance of money orders and telegrams (where post and telegraph are government services), the sale of railroad tickets (where railroads are operated by the Government), the registration of births, deaths, and marriages, even many rulings by the police and the collection of several types of taxes, go on, and must go on, without being affected by new elections, government crises, dissolutions of parliament and even state strokes. A resident in Mexico who cleans the government bureaus or pays his school fee to I he administration does not and can not take into consideration the regularity or even legality of the present administration and the present congress; his business is not one with personal rulers, not one with a specific administration, but one with the Government itself in its unpersonal aspect.The court said that the personal and impersonal acts of the Government must be distinguished in order to determine if the subsequent government can be held liable for the obligations of the previous government. It is personal if it is undertaken to support particular agencies administering the government for the time being. To this class belong voluntary undertakings to provide a revolutionary administration with money or arms or munitions and the like. It is on the other hand impersonal if the ordinary agencies, departments, and bureaus of the Government must continue to function notwithstanding its principal administrative offices may be in the hands of usurpers, and in such a case the sale and delivery to these necessary and legitimate agencies of supplies, merchandise, and the like, to enable the Government itself in its unpersonal aspect to function is a very different transaction from one having for its object the support of an individual or group of individuals seeking to maintain themselves in office. The character of each transaction must be judged and determined by the facts of the particular case.

If the relations, and functions of the government agencies with persons continued regardless if it agreed or not with the new administration, these must be treated as government transactions and binding on it. The routine diplomatic and consular business of the nation continued to be transacted with the agencies assuming to act for the Government and which were in control of the foreign office, the treasury, and the embassies, legations, and consulates abroad. Even the United States, though placing its stamp of disapproval in the most unmistakable manner on the act of Huerta in usurping authority, kept its embassy in Mexico City open for the transaction of routine

business, entrusting it to a chargé d'affaires, and maintained its consulates throughout Mexico. Such relations, so maintained, were entirely unpersonal; they constituted relations with the United Mexican States, with its Government as such, without respect to the status of the individual assuming to act for the Government.

It is clear that the sale by the Mexican Government to and the purchase by the claimant Hopkins of postal money orders falls within the category of purely government routine having no connection with or relationto the individuals administering the Government for the time being. The facts as developed in the Memorial and the briefs, which are not contested by the Mexican Agent, aptly illustrate the necessity of the distinction here made between acts of the Huerta administration in its personal character and acts of the Government itself in its unpersonal character. From the facts so developed it appears that at the very time these postal money orders were issued the greater part of the States of Sonora and Sinaloa, from which they issued, was dominated by Carranza as First Chief of the Constitutional Army, while the City of Mexico, on which the orders were drawn, was dominated by Huerta. Yet the post offices in these two States under the domination of Carranza continued to issue money orders of the UnitedMexican States upon the postmaster in the Federal District of Mexico. In other cases that have been submitted to this Commission it is apparent that the government agencies functioning under the Huerta administration continued to carry out obligations under pre-existing contracts and otherwise functioned without reference to the change in the administration. It also appears that when Huerta seized the reins of government which in his capacity as provisional president he undertook to administer he did not change the government machinery as it had been set up under President Madero, which continued to operate in all its parts in the service of the people, and the great majority of the personnel of all of the bureaus and agencies of the Government remained unchanged and continued to discharge their duties to and in the name of Mexico. At no time did the government machinery cease to function, notwithstanding the change in the personnel of some members of its executive branch. To the extent that this machinery acted in the discharge of its usual and ordinary functions or to the extent that it received benefits from transactions of an unusual nature, Mexico is bound.

The Court ruled however, that it does not follow that if the contracts of the claimants, Hopkins in this case should be if ever treated as personal, that it no longer binds Mexico. The question arises as to how far can an administration which seizes the reins of the government by force and is illegal in its inception bind the nation. The court answered that the acts of such government became binding on the nation as of the date the territory comes under its domination and control conditioned upon its ultimate success. The bindingforce of such acts of the Huerta administration as partook of the personal character as contradistinguished from the Government itself will dependupon its real control and paramountcy at the time of the act over a majorportion of the territory and a majority of the people of Mexico. As long as the Huerta régime was in fact the master in the administration of the affairsof the Government of Mexico its illegal origin did not defeat the binding force of its executive acts.

Lastly, the court ruled that the Nullity decrees in no way affect the substantial rights of any claimant parties to an obligation. even when considered as subsequently invested with the character of a law by the Mexican Congress,could not possibly operate unilaterally to destroy an existing right vested in a foreign citizen or foreign State or a pre-existing duty owing by Mexico to a foreign citizen or foreign State. The fact that it follows that foreign citizensmay enjoy both rights and remedies against Mexico which its municipal laws withhold from its own citizens is immaterial. From the foregoing the Commission concludes that Hopkins' contracts are unaffected by the legality or illegality of the Huerta administration as such, that they bind the Government of Mexico, that they have not beennullified by any decree issued by Carranza, and that they have not been and can not be nullified by any unilateral act of the Government of Mexico.

On the issue of estoppel,,Has the American Government forfeited its right to espouse Hopkins' claim because in 1913 it warned its citizens against the "usurper" Huerta and never recognized his administration? The Commission holds that such warnings and such failure to recognize the Huerta administration cannot affect the vested rights of an American citizen or act as an estoppel of the right of the American Government to espouse the claim of such citizen before this Commission.The position assumed by the American Government under the administration of President Wilson was purely political and was binding, even on that administration, only so long as it was not modified. It was an executive policy, which, so long as it remained unmodified and unrevoked, would close to the American Government the avenue of diplomatic interposition and intervention with the Huerta administration. It temporarily, therefore, rendered this remedy—

diplomatic interposition or intervention—unavailable to an American citizen but it did not affect a vested right of such citizen. But nonrecognition of the Huerta administration by the American Government under the Wilson administration was not dependent upon Huerta's paramountcy in Mexico. It meant that, even if it were paramount, it came into power through force by methods abhorrent to the standards of modern civilization, that it was not "elected by legal and constitutional means", and hence, while the Government of Mexico continued to exist and to function, its administration was not entitled to recognition. (ang wala ra g recognize sa America kay ang government kay na usurped man gud xa through force, but it recognizes the State still, which is different.