MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2019ME82Docket: SRP-17-364Argued: September12,2018Decided: May30,2019Panel: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.

STATEOFMAINEv.

ANTHONYLORDSAUFLEY,C.J.

[¶1]InJuly2015,AnthonyLordwentonamulti-hour,violentrampage

throughAroostookandPenobscotCounties. By the time thepolicearrested

him, Lord had killed two people and severely injured several others. He

eventuallypleadedguiltytotwomurders,see17-AM.R.S.§201(1)(A)(2018),

andadozenothercrimes.Atsentencing,thecourt(PenobscotandAroostook

Counties,A.Murray,J.)imposedalifesentenceforeachofthetwomurdersand

concurrent sentences of various terms of years for the other crimes. The

Sentence Review Panel accepted Lord’s petition to appeal from the life

sentences,bringingthismatterbeforeus.Statev.Lord,No.SRP-17-364(Me.

Sent.Rev.PanelNov.8,2017);see15M.R.S.§§2151-53(2018);M.R.App.P.19.

2

[¶2]Lordarguesthatthecourterredinenteringthetwolifesentences

because, in setting thebasic sentences, the court improperly considered the

othercrimesthathecommittedduring thosefatefulhours. Lordalsoargues

thatthecourtimproperly“double-counted”hiscriminalhistorybyconsidering

itboth(1)indeterminingthebasicsentenceand(2)asanaggravatingfactor

whendetermininghismaximumsentence.Weaffirmthesentencesenteredby

thecourt.

I.BACKGROUND

A. FactualHistory

[¶3] The following facts are drawn from the State’s summary of the

evidencethatitwouldhavepresentedhadLordnotpleadedguiltyandhadthe

mattergonetotrial.SeeM.R.U.Crim.P.11(b)(3),(e).AlthoughLorddisputed

orcorrectedcertainof thedetails in theState’s representations,hedoesnot

disputetheevidentiarysupportforanyofthefollowingfacts.

[¶4]InJuly2015,AnthonyLordwasthirty-fiveyearsold.Twomonths

priortotheeventsinissue,hissix-month-oldsonhaddiedasaresultofwhat

Lord considered tobe the intentional act of anotherman. Also prior to the

eventsinissue,Lord’sformergirlfriendhadreportedcriminalconductbyLord

towardher.

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[¶5]Sometimebefore8:30p.m.onJuly16,2015,Lordsetfiretoabarn

onpropertyownedbythatyoungwoman’smotherinAroostookCounty.The

mother, who suffers from multiple sclerosis, was alerted to the fire by a

neighbor,afterwhichthemothercalledherdaughter.Asthefirewasraging,

theyoungwomanarrivedwiththemanshewasthendating,andtheystayed

with her mother after the fire department left. The fire burned intensely,

eventuallylevelingthebarn.

[¶6]Hourslater,atapproximately4:00a.m.,Lordknockedonthedoor

ofafriend’suncle,wholivedinAroostookCounty.Hetoldtheunclethatthe

carhewasdrivingwasoutofgasandhadbrokendown.Whentheunclecame

outside,Lordhithimintheheadwithahammer,orderedhiminside,tooktwo

guns—ashotgunanda.22caliberrevolver—andammunition,andbarricaded

theuncleinthebasementofthehouse.Lordnextdrovetotheresidenceofhis

ownbrotherandfiredthroughthewindowwiththerevolver.Hisbrotherwas

athomebutwasnotinjured.

[¶7]Lordthenwentbacktothepropertyoftheyoungwoman’smother.

Arriving at the home after all of the fire responders had left, Lord used the

revolver he had stolen to shoot through the door of the mother’s home,

woundinghisformergirlfriendinthearm.Hethenenteredthehomeandshot

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eight bullets into the neck, chest, and pelvis of her boyfriend, who, after

attemptingtotalkwithhisownmotherbyphoneonelasttime,laterdiedofhis

wounds.Theyoungwomanrantothebathroomwherehermotherhelpedher

escapethroughthewindow.Lordshothermotherintheshoulder,theyoung

womansuccessfullyescaped,andLordreloadedhisgunandexitedthehouse.

[¶8]Astheyoungwomanfled,jumpingintothebedofapassingtruck,

Lordcameafterherandjumpedintothetruckbedwithher.Whenthedriver

responded to their unexpected presence in the truck bed and pulled into a

nearbydriveway,Lordshothimthreetimesintheneckandupperbackusing

therevolver. Both theyoungwomanandLord leaptoutof the truckatthat

point.Thedriversurvivedhisinjuries.

[¶9]Inapickuptruckstolenfromhisfriend’suncle,Lorddrovetoward

the Penobscot area with the young woman in the truck. Police found and

pursuedthetruck,andLordshotatoncomingtrafficandatlawenforcement

officers. Lordeventuallydrovetoawoodlotwhereheencounteredtwomen

whohadjustdroppedoffaloadofwood.Hedidnotknoweitherofthosemen.

Lordaskedforacigaretteandaphoneandthenaimedtherevolveratoneof

themen,whosaid,“No,no,noman.”Themantriedtorunaway,butLordshot

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directlyathimandkilledhim.Astheothermanturnedtorun,Lordfiredand

hitthemanonce;hesurvived.

[¶10]Withtheyoungwomanstillwithhim,LordreturnedtoAroostook

Countyinatruckownedbyoneofthemenhehadshot;brokeintoanumberof

differentcampsandresidences;andstoleafour-wheeler,anotherfirearm,and

otheritems.Hewasfinallyarrestedaftermeetingwithafamilymember.

B. ProceduralHistory

[¶11] Theproceduralhistoryisnot indispute. InJuly2015,theState

filed two complaints charging Anthony Lord with murder, 17-A M.R.S.

§201(1)(A),andkidnapping(ClassB),17-AM.R.S.§301(1)(B)(1)(2018), in

AroostookCountyandmurder,17-AM.R.S.§201(1)(A),inPenobscotCounty.

InAugustandSeptember,Lordwaschargedbyindictmentsfiledineachcounty

withthosecrimesandmultipleothers.1

1Thechargesincluded:

• Two counts of attemptedmurderwith a firearm (ClassA), 17-AM.R.S. §§201(1)(A),1158-A(1)(B),1252(5)(2018);

• Arson(ClassA),17-AM.R.S.§802(1)(A)(2018);• Elevatedaggravatedassaultwiththeuseofadangerousweapon(ClassA),17-AM.R.S.

§§208-B(1)(A),1158-A(1)(B),1252(5)(2018);• Three counts of aggravated assault with the use of a dangerous weapon (Class B),

17-AM.R.S.§§208(1)(B),1158-A(1)(B),1252(5)(2018);

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[¶12] Lord initiallypleadednotguilty toall charges. In late2016,he

movedtosuppressevidenceobtainedduringapoliceinterviewofhim.2InJune

2017,afterfindingLordcompetenttostandtrial,thecourtheldanevidentiary

hearingonLord’smotiontosuppress,receivinginevidencearecordingofthe

policeinterview.

• Two counts of theft by unauthorized taking of a firearm (Class B), 17-A M.R.S.

§353(1)(B)(2)(2018);• Fourcountsofrecklessconductwiththeuseofadangerousweapon(ClassC),17-AM.R.S.

§§211(1),1158-A(1)(B),1252(4),(5)(2018);and• Eludinganofficer(ClassC),29-AM.R.S.§2414(3)(2018).

2Monthspassedbetweenthefilingoftheindictmentandthefilingofthemotiontosuppressdue

toamotionforamentalexaminationandresultingreportfiledin2016;thewithdrawalofdefensecounselandassignmentofnewcounselin2016;anddiscoverymotionsfiledin2015and2016.

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[¶13] Before the court could rule on the motion to suppress, Lord

decided to plead guilty to the twomurder charges and twelve of the other

chargedcrimes,3andtheStateagreedtodismissthethreeremainingcharges.4

C. TheGuiltyPleas

[¶14]ThecourtheldahearinginJuly2017atwhichitacceptedLord’s

guiltypleas.ThecourtheardtheState’ssummaryofthefactualbasisforthe

charges,and it thoroughlyandcarefully followedtherequirementsofM.R.U.

Crim.P.11toensurethatthepleawasmadeknowinglyandvoluntarily. See

M.R.U.Crim.P.11(b)-(e).

3Lordpleadedguiltytothetwomurderchargesandthefollowingothercrimes:

• Two counts of attemptedmurderwith a firearm (ClassA), 17-AM.R.S. §§201(1)(A),1158-A(1)(B),1252(5);

• Arson(ClassA),17-AM.R.S.§802(1)(A);• Elevatedaggravatedassaultwiththeuseofadangerousweapon(ClassA),17-AM.R.S.

§§208-B(1)(A),1158-A(1)(B),1252(5);• Three counts of aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon (Class B), 17-AM.R.S.

§§208(1)(B),1158-A(1)(B),1252(5);• Twocountsoftheftofafirearm(ClassB),17-AM.R.S.§353(1)(B)(2);• Twocountsofrecklessconductwiththeuseofadangerousweapon(ClassC),17-AM.R.S.

§§211(1),1158-A(1)(B),1252(4),(5);and• Eludinganofficer(ClassC),29-AM.R.S.§2414(3).

4 The State agreed to the dismissal of the charge of kidnapping (Class B), 17-A M.R.S.

§301(1)(B)(1) (2018), and two chargesof reckless conductwith adangerousweapon(ClassC),17-AM.R.S.§§211(1),1158-A(1)(B),1252(4),(5).

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[¶15] AftertheStatepresenteditssummaryoftheavailableevidence,

thecourtaffordedLordtheopportunitytocorrectthefacts,andhecorrected

orclarifiedcertaindetailsbutdidnotdisputethathehadcommittedanyofthe

crimesdescribed.Hedidagreethattherewasafactualbasisforeachcharge.

SeeM.R.U.Crim.P. 11(b)(3), (e). Thecourt thenreviewedthedetailsof the

majorcrimeswithLordandallowedhim finally toclarifyanydiscrepancies.

There isnoquestion from the record thatLordunderstoodall of theState’s

evidence against him and that, once clarified, he agreed with the State’s

recitation.ItwasultimatelyclearthatLordchoseofhisownvolitiontoenter

theguiltypleas.5Hedoesnotchallengethatprocessorthecourt’sacceptance

ofhispleasofguilty.

D. TheSentencingHearing

[¶16]Thecourtheldasentencinghearingtwoweekslater.Lordandthe

StateagreedthatthecourtcouldconsiderthevideorecordingoftheJuly17,

2015, police interview of Lord that had earlier been admitted at the

suppression hearing. The State summarized the facts of the horrifying and

lethalcriminalactivityinwhichLordhadengagedandarguedforabasicand

5 Defensecounselalsotookpainstomaketherecordclearthatthechoicetopleadguiltywas

entirelyLord’s.Herepresentedthatheandco-counselhadnotpressuredLord,andtheyhadbeenpreparedtotrythecase.

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maximumsentenceoflifeimprisonmentforeachofthemurders.Insupportof

itsrecommendationofbasicsentencesoflifeimprisonment,theStateargued

thatLordhadinfactpremeditatedatleastoneofthekillings;hadintentionally

causedmultipledeaths;hadusedafirearm,which,asafelon,hewasprohibited

frompossessing;hadkilledthefirstmurdervictiminwhatshouldhavebeen

thesafetyofaresidence;andhadkilledthesecondmurdervictimasarandom

act of violence. The State further argued for themaximum sentence of life

imprisonment because, despite the mitigating factor of Lord accepting

responsibility for the murders, his actions had a devastating impact on the

victimsandtheirfamilies;hehadnotbeenundertheinfluenceofanysubstance

and was aware of what he was doing; he had multiple prior convictions,

includingassaultandunlawfulsexualcontact;andhehadviolatedthetermsof

hisprobationbypossessingafirearm.

[¶17] The State presented victim impact statements from the young

womanwhowastheobjectofLord’spursuit,hermother,thedriverwhomLord

shotfromthetruckbed,andfamilymembersofthosekilledorinjuredbyLord.

[¶18] Lord addressed the court, the victims, and their families and

apologizedforhisactions.Lord,hismother,andanumberofLord’srelatives

eachtestifiedthathesufferedfrommentalillnessandthathehadbeenlosing

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controlsincehissix-month-oldsondied.6Lordacknowledgedthathissentence

shouldexceedtheminimumsentencebutaskedthattherebesome“daylightat

theend.” Lordreasoned thata termof fortyyearswouldbea justsentence

under the circumstances because he went peacefully into police custody

followingtherampage,confessedtopolicetruthfully,andhadshownremorse

sincetheeventsatissue.

E. TheSentence

[¶19] The court considered the informationoffered at the sentencing

hearing, including the videoof thepolice interviewand the summaryof the

evidencefromtheRule11hearing,indeterminingLord’ssentence.Insetting

thebasicsentence,thecourtconsideredthecrimes“inthecontextoftheentire

courseofMr.Lord’sconduct,”includinghisburningofthebarn;hisassaultand

barricadingofhisfriend’suncle;theshotshefiredintohisbrother’shome;the

shootingsandmurderat theresidenceofhis formergirlfriend’smother;his

pursuitofthatyoungwomanintothebedofapassingtruck;hisshootingofthe

truck’s driver; the shots he fired at police officers and other vehicles; his

shootingofthetwomeninthewoodlot,causingthedeathofoneofthem;and

6Asmentionedearlier,Lordbelievedthathisinfantsonhadbeenmurdered.

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his theft of vehicles andof firearms,which, as a convicted felon,hewasnot

allowedtopossess.See17-AM.R.S.§1252-C(1)(2018).

[¶20]Indeterminingthebasicsentence,thecourtfoundtwoaggravating

considerations that made it appropriate to set a basic sentence of life

imprisonment:(1)Lordintendedmultipledeathsand(2)thedeathsoccurred

duringacriminalrampagethatincludednumerousactsofviolencebyafelon

whocommittedarsonandstolemotorvehiclesandguns.Thecourtfoundthat

Lordhadengagedinthemostseriousmeansofcommittingmurderanddidnot

findothercaseswithsimilarfacts.Itultimatelyconcludedthatabasicsentence

oflifeinprisonwaswarranted.

[¶21]Thecourtthenconsideredtheaggravatingandmitigatingfactors

separatefromthemeansofcommittingthecrimetodeterminethemaximum

sentence. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C(2) (2018). The aggravating factors

identifiedweretheconscioussufferingoftheyoungwoman’sboyfriendbefore

hedied; theawarenesson thepartof themanwhodied in thewoodlot that

Lordwasabouttoshoothim;thedevastatingeffectonthevictims’families;and

Lord’scriminalhistorygoingbackto1999,includinganassaultandunlawful

sexualcontactin2005and,mostrecently,adomesticviolenceassaultin2015,

forwhich hewas on probation at the time of the murders. The court also

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consideredthathewentonthisrampagedespitehavingsupportfromfamily

andfriends.ThemitigatingfactorswereLord’spost-traumaticstressafterthe

deathofhisson,themutuallovebetweenLordandmembersofhisfamily,and

hisacceptanceofresponsibilityandexpressionsofremorse.

[¶22]Concludingthattheaggravatingfactorsoutweighedthemitigating

factors,thecourtenteredajudgmentofconvictionandsentencedLordtotwo

concurrentlifesentencesforthemurders.ThecourtalsosentencedLordon

theremainingconvictions,withalltobeservedconcurrently:

• Twentyyearseachforo Twocountsofattemptedmurderwithuseofafirearm,o Elevatedaggravatedassaultwithuseofadangerousweapon,ando Aggravatedassaultwithuseofadangerousweapon;

• Fifteenyearsforarson;

• Sevenyearseachforo Twocountsofaggravatedassaultwithuseofadangerousweapon,and

o Twocountsoftheftofafirearm;and

• Fiveyearseachforo Twocountsofrecklessconductwithuseofadangerousweapon,and

o Eludinganofficer.

Given the life sentences and Lord’s demonstrated lack of success with

probation,thecourtdidnotsuspendanyportionofthesentencesthatwerefor

atermofyearsororderanyprobation. See17-AM.R.S.§1252-C(3)(2018).

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ThecourtorderedLordtopaycourtfinesof$490andrestitutionof$38,046.75

toreimbursetheVictims’CompensationFundforamountspaidtothevictims’

families.7See17-AM.R.S.§1301(2018).

[¶23]LordappliedtotheSentenceReviewPanelseekingtoappealfrom

his sentence, and the Panel granted his application. State v. Lord,

No.SRP-17-364(Me.Sent.Rev.PanelNov.8,2017);see15M.R.S.§§2151-53;

M.R.App.P.19.Hefocuseshisappealentirelyonthelifesentencesimposedon

themurderconvictions.

II.DISCUSSION

A. Two-StepSentencingProcedureforaMurderConviction

[¶24]Whenadefendantistobesentencedformurder,thecourtemploys

atwo-stepprocess.See17-AM.R.S.§1252-C(2018)(settingoutthethree-step

procedure for establishing sentences); 17-A M.R.S. § 1201(1)(A) (2018)

(providing that aperson sentenced formurdermay notbe considered for a

periodofprobation,thuseliminatingthethirdstepofthesentencingprocess);

Statev.Hayden,2014ME31,¶17,86A.3d1221.“Inthefirststep,thecourt

7Atthesentencinghearing,thecourtorderedLordtoreimbursetheVictim’sCompensationFund

$38,046.75, but the court’s judgment and commitment ordered Lord to pay $600more, totaling$38,646.75.Itislikelyatypographicalerror.AlthoughLorddoesnotraisethisissueonappeal,thedocket should be corrected to be consistent with the court’s oral order to reflect the orderedrestitutionof$38,046.75.

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determinesthebasicperiodofincarceration,andinthesecond,themaximum

period of incarceration.” Hayden, 2014 ME 31, ¶ 17, 86 A.3d 1221. On a

discretionary appeal from a sentence, we review the “‘determination of the

basic sentence de novo for misapplication of legal principles and [the]

determinationofthemaximumsentenceforabuseofdiscretion.’”Id.(quoting

Statev.Waterman,2010ME45,¶42,995A.2d243).

1. StepOne

[¶25] In order to determine the basic sentence for any crime, the

sentencingcourtmustfirstidentifytherangewithinwhichalawfulsentence

maybeimposedforthecrimeatissue.SeeStatev.Sweet,2000ME14,¶11n.3,

745A.2d368(holdingthatinstepone,thesentencingcourtmustbeawareof

factorsthatwouldeitherincreaseordecreasetheclassofthecrime).Whenthe

convictionisformurder,thebasicsentencerangeisasfollows:“imprisonment

forlifeorforanytermofyearsthatisnotlessthan25.”17-AM.R.S.§1251(1)

(2018).

[¶26]“Imprisonmentforlife”—alifetimeinprison,withnopotentialfor

release—isinherentlydifferentthanasentenceforatermofyearsevenwhen

thetermofyears is lengthy. See,e.g.,Sweet,2000ME14,¶8,745A.2d368

(affirmingtheimpositionofasixty-fiveyearsentenceandaforty-yearsentence

15

forindividualsagedthirty-twoandforty-seven,respectively);seealsoStatev.

Shortsleeves, 580 A.2d 145, 149 (Me. 1990). Even when a defendant is

sentencedtoalongtermofyears,thedefendantmayaccumulategoodtimeand

othercreditsandmayeventuallybereleasedfromprison,sometimesearlier

thantheorderedtermofyears.Seegenerally17-AM.R.S.§1253(2018).Alife

sentenceprovidesnosuchoption. Anindividualsentencedtoimprisonment

forlifewillneverbereleased.Accordingly,itisnecessaryforasentencingcourt

settingthebasicsentencetodistinguishbetweenapotentiallifesentenceand

asentenceforatermofyearsasthepotential longestsentence. SeeHayden,

2014ME31,¶18,86A.3d1221.

[¶27] Ifacourt isconsideringimposinga lifesentenceformurder,the

courtmustconsider—inthefirststepofthesection1252-Canalysis—whether

thereare“aggravatingcircumstances”relatingtothenatureandseriousnessof

themurder. Shortsleeves, 580A.2d at 150; see17-AM.R.S. § 1252-C(1). In

contrast,whenconsideringatermofyears,thecourtmustaddressthenature

and seriousness of the offense, but it will ordinarily defer concepts of

aggravationtothesecondphaseoftheanalysis.SeeShortsleeves,580A.2dat

149-50.

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[¶28] The “aggravating circumstances” applicable at the first stage

requirethecourttoconsiderwhetherthemurderwascommittedinawaythat

includedanynumberofcircumstancesfromwhichsocietywouldexpectthat

themurdererwillneverreturntofreedom.Id.Theaggravatingcircumstances

werefirstaddressedinStatev.AndersonandSabatino,No.78-37,78-40at7-8

(Me.App.Div.1980),andlatersummarizedinShortsleeves,580A.2dat149-50.

[¶29]ThelistcontainedinShortsleeves,however,is“‘neitherexhaustive

nor all-inclusive.’”8 Hayden, 2014 ME 31, ¶ 18, 86 A.3d 1221 (quoting

Waterman, 2010ME 45, ¶ 44, 995 A.2d 243). Since Shortsleeves, we have

affirmedtheimpositionofsentenceswhere,insettingthebasicsentence,the

sentencing court considered aggravating circumstances that we did not

enumerateinShortsleeves.See,e.g.,Statev.Downs,2009ME3,¶20,962A.2d

950 (affirming the court’s consideration in step one of the fact that the

foundationalcrimewaspartofaspreeofcrimescommitted,reasoningthatthis

factbore“onthenatureandseriousnessofthecrime”);cf.Sweet,2000ME14,

¶ 17, 745 A.2d 368 (affirming the court’s consideration in step one of the

8TheaggravatingcircumstanceslistedinShortsleevesare:premeditation-in-fact;multipledeaths;

murderinvolvingapersonwhohasbeenpreviouslyconvictedofahomicideoracrimeinvolvingtheuseofdeadlyforce;murderaccompaniedbytorture,sexualabuse,orextremecrueltytothevictim;murder committed in a penal institution by an inmate of that institution; murder of a lawenforcementofficerwhile inperformanceofhisorherduties;andmurderofahostage. State v.Shortsleeves,580A.2d145,149-50(Me.1990).

17

offenders’criminalhistory).Accordingly,becausetheintentionalorknowing

takingofahumanlifewillrarelyoccurinanotherwiseneutralsetting,andthe

rangeofhumanbehavioranddecisionsthatleadtomurderarecomplex,the

potentiallyaggravatingcircumstances thatmay justifya lifesentencewillbe

equallydiverse.Thus,theso-called“Shortsleeves”frameworkisintendedtobe

usedasa“guidetodistinguishbetweenthetwotypesofsentences,”Hayden,

2014ME31,¶18,86A.3d1221,andit“providesaframeworkforthepotential

identificationofother[circumstances]thatcouldwarranttheimpositionofa

lifesentence,”Waterman,2010ME45,¶44,995A.2d243.SeegenerallySweet,

2000ME14,¶11,745A.2d368.

[¶30] Ultimately, in order to promote public understanding of

sentencingdecisionsand,whereappropriate,toallowappellatereviewofthe

sentence, the role of the sentencing court in the first step of sentencing a

defendantformurderistoidentifywithclarityanyaggravatingcircumstance

foundtoexistinacasewherethecourtintendstoconsiderimposingasentence

oflifeinprison.Asisnotedbelow,thecourtinthematterbeforeusdidjust

that.

2. StepTwo

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[¶31] After establishing thebasic sentence, the courtmustdetermine

“themaximumperiodofimprisonmenttobeimposedbyconsideringallother

relevant sentencing factors, both aggravating andmitigating, appropriate to

thatcase.”17-AM.R.S.§1252-C(2).“Thesesentencingfactorsinclude,butare

notlimitedto,thecharacteroftheoffenderandtheoffender’scriminalhistory,

theeffectoftheoffenseonthevictimandtheprotectionofthepublicinterest.”

Id. Whenthecrimeat issueismurder, conduct leadingtocontemporaneous

convictions that may have been identified in the first step as aggravating

circumstancesmaybeseparatelyaddressedfortheirsubjectivevictimimpact

inthesecondstep.SeeDowns,2009ME3,¶20,962A.2d950.

[¶32]Inessence,becausethefactssurroundingaconvictionformurder

do not sort neatly into separately identifiable characteristics, there will

inevitablybe timeswhen an “aggravating”Shortsleevescircumstancewill be

considered inboth the impositionof a life sentence in steponeof amurder

sentencinganalysisandasanaggravatingfactorthatmustbeaddressedinstep

two.However,thewayinwhichthecourtconsidersthefactwillbedistinctat

thetwosteps.

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B. ReviewofLord’sSentences

1. StepOneApplication

[¶33] The court’s sentencing analysis here demonstrates that it

understoodtheframeworkinwhichthesentencesmustbecalculated,andit

correctlyidentifiedtherequirementthatatleastoneaggravatingcircumstance

mustbepresent inordertoestablishtheoutersentenceasa lifesentencein

stepone.Inaddressingthefactsconstitutingthoseaggravatingcircumstances,

thecourtnotedthepresenceofoneoftheShortsleevecircumstances—multiple

deaths—as well as the presence of other facts not explicitly identified in

Shortsleeves—thatthemurderswerepartofacrimespreeandthatLordused

a firearm in the commission ofmany of these crimes,which, as a convicted

felon, he was prohibited from possessing. The court graphically described

Lord’sconductasaseriesofpotentiallyfatalandpersistentlyviolentactsthat

lefttwopeopledeadandthreeothersinjured:

Asaresultof[Lord’s]criminalrampage,twopeoplearedead.Onewas a completely and random act of violence with nocomprehensiblemotive.Threemorepeoplewereshotbutlived....TheseshotswerefiredwhileMr.Lordwasaconvictedfelon.Theywereshotwithgunsandammunitionthathadbeenstolenortakenshortlybeforehand.Onepersonwashitontheheadwithahammerandinjured.Onelivingroomwindowwasshot.Twomovingcarswereshotandhit.AllbyMr.Lord.Therewereshotsfiredatlawenforcement. Therewas an arson and therewas theft ofmotorvehiclesandtheguns,and[Lord]wasonprobationatthetime.

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[¶34] The court concluded in step one that the convicted felon’s

seeminglyunendingreignofviolence,bothtargetedandrandom,constituted

anaggravatingcircumstance,andwefindnofaultwiththatdetermination.The

court did notmisapply legal principles in considering the nature of the two

murdersaspartofaviolentrampagedirectedtowardspecificindividualsand

toward the public at large when determining that a basic sentence of life

imprisonmentwasappropriate.SeeHayden,2014ME31,¶17,86A.3d1221;

Shortsleeves,580A.2dat150-51.NordidthecourterrinconsideringLord’s

prohibitedpossessionofafirearm.SeeWaterman,2010ME45,¶¶25,45,995

A.2d 243. The court properly considered the conduct that surrounded the

murdersindeterminingthenatureandseriousnessofeachmurder.SeeDowns,

2009ME3,¶20,962A.2d950(affirmingtheconsiderationofothercriminal

conductinsettingabasicsentencewhenthatconductprovidedevidenceofthe

motiveforthecrimebeingsentenced).

2. StepTwoApplication

[¶35]Thecourtdidnotrepeatitsconsiderationoftheobjectiveaspects

of Lord’s criminal history in step two of the analysis. See 17-A M.R.S.

§1252-C(1)-(2).Instepone,thecourtconsideredthatLordwasnotallowed

topossessafirearmasaconditionofhisprobation.Althoughthisprohibition

21

arosefromLord’scriminalhistory,thecourtconsideredit inawaythatwas

distinctfromthefactthatLordhasacriminalhistory. Lord’sviolationofhis

probation was appropriately considered in step one as an aggravating

circumstance regarding the “nature and seriousness” of the offenses

committed.Separately,thecourtwasnotprecludedfromconsideringinstep

twothefactthatLordalsohadasignificantcriminalhistory.

[¶36] We also note that the court appropriately considered as an

aggravatingfactorinsteptwotheprofoundeffectofthecrimesonthefamilies

ofthemurdervictims.SeeSweet,2000ME14,¶18,745A.2d368(considering

theeffectofthecrimesonthevictims).Itaddressedthefirstmurdervictim’s

consciousnessofhisimpendingdemiseashetriedtotalktohismotherandthe

horrorthatthesecondmurdervictimundoubtedlyfeltasLord“brandishedthe

gun”andshothimatpointblankrange.Considerationofthedevastatingeffect

onthemurdervictims’lovedonesleftbehindandtheknowledgeoftheviolence

abouttodescendareproperandclassicaspectsofthesteptwoanalysis.

[¶37]Finally,contrarytoLord’sargument,thecourtdidnotoverlookthe

mitigatingfactors,includingLord’sgenuineloveforhisson,hispost-traumatic

stressfollowinghisson’sdeath,thesupportofhisfamily,andthefactthathe

tookfullresponsibilityforhisactionsinpleadingguilty.Thecourtcommitted

22

noerrorinconcludingthatthosemitigatingfactorssimplywerenotenoughto

reducethemurdersentencesfromlifeinprison.

III.CONCLUSION

[¶38]Thecourtengagedintheproperconsiderationsateachstepofthe

sentencing analysis, and it thoughtfully considered whether a life sentence

shouldultimatelybe imposed. The court’s recognitionofLord’s violent and

persistentlydangerousconductatthetimeofthemurdersconstitutedneither

amisapplication of legal principles nor an abuse of discretion. SeeHayden,

2014ME31,¶17,86A.3d1221.

Theentryis:

Judgmentaffirmed.9 Andrea S. Manthorne, Esq. (orally), Roach, Hewitt, Ruprecht, Sanchez &Bischoff,Portland,forappellantAnthonyLordJanetT.Mills,AttorneyGeneral,DonaldW.Macomber,Asst.Atty.Gen.(orally),andAbaigealM.Ridge,Stud.Atty.,OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,Augusta,forappelleeStateofMaineAroostookCountyUnifiedCriminalDocketdocketnumberCR-2015-30062PenobscotUnifiedCriminalDocketdocketnumberCR-2015-2550FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY

9Thedocketentryfortheamountofrestitutionshallbecorrectedasorderedinfootnote7.