start. international conference on hydrogen safety (ichs) hydrogen onboard storage – an insertion...

Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing - Germany

Bildüberschrift

Start

Start

International Conference on Hydrogen Safety (ICHS)

HYDROGEN ONBOARD STORAGE –AN INSERTION OF THE PROBABILISTIC

APPROACH INTOSTANDARDS & REGULATIONS?

Georg W. MairBAM-III.2

ICHS Pisa 9th September 2005 BAM – III.2 Dr. Mair 3


Bildüberschrift

1. Introduction: 3 Hypothesis2.2. How to Build Safe Hydrogen Storage (StorHy-) How to Build Safe Hydrogen Storage (StorHy-)

Systems?Systems?3.3. Basics of Risk AssessmentBasics of Risk Assessment4.4. Good Reasons for a Probabilistic ApproachGood Reasons for a Probabilistic Approach5.5. Principle of Technical Progress in RCSPrinciple of Technical Progress in RCS6.6. Preview: First Steps to a Probabilistic ApproachPreview: First Steps to a Probabilistic Approach7.7. Summary and ConclusionsSummary and Conclusions

HYDROGEN ONBOARD STORAGE –AN INSERTION OF THE PROBABILISTIC APPROACH INTO

STANDARDS & REGULATIONS?



Bildüberschrift

Introduction: Hypothesis

Georg W. Mair



Bildüberschrift

1. Introduction: 3 Hypothesis2. How to Build Safe Hydrogen Storage (StorHy-)

Systems?3.3. Basics of Risk AssessmentBasics of Risk Assessment4.4. Good Reasons for a Probabilistic ApproachGood Reasons for a Probabilistic Approach5.5. Principle of Technical Progress in RCSPrinciple of Technical Progress in RCS6.6. Preview: First Steps to a Probabilistic ApproachPreview: First Steps to a Probabilistic Approach7.7. Summary and ConclusionsSummary and Conclusions





Bildüberschrift


Georg W. Mair



Bildüberschrift


Systems?3. Basics of Risk Assessment4.4. Good Reasons for a Probabilistic ApproachGood Reasons for a Probabilistic Approach5.5. Principle of Technical Progress in RCSPrinciple of Technical Progress in RCS6.6. Preview: First Steps to a Probabilistic ApproachPreview: First Steps to a Probabilistic Approach7.7. Summary and ConclusionsSummary and Conclusions





Bildüberschrift


Georg W. Mair



Bildüberschrift


Systems?3. Basics of Risk Assessment4. Good Reasons for a Probabilistic Approach5.5. Principle of Technical Progress in RCSPrinciple of Technical Progress in RCS6.6. Preview: First Steps to a Probabilistic ApproachPreview: First Steps to a Probabilistic Approach7.7. Summary and ConclusionsSummary and Conclusions





Bildüberschrift


Georg W. Mair



Bildüberschrift


Systems?3. Basics of Risk Assessment4. Good Reasons for a Probabilistic Approach5. Principle of Technical Progress in RCS6.6. Preview: First Steps to a Probabilistic ApproachPreview: First Steps to a Probabilistic Approach7.7. Summary and ConclusionsSummary and Conclusions





Bildüberschrift


Georg W. Mair



Bildüberschrift


Systems?3. Basics of Risk Assessment4. Good Reasons for a Probabilistic Approach5. Principle of Technical Progress in RCS6. Preview: First Steps to a Probabilistic Approach7.7. Summary and ConclusionsSummary and Conclusions





Bildüberschrift


Georg W. Mair



Bildüberschrift


Systems?3. Basics of Risk Assessment4. Good Reasons for a Probabilistic Approach5. Principle of Technical Progress in RCS6. Preview: First Steps to a Probabilistic Approach7. Summary and Conclusions





Bildüberschrift


Georg W. Mair



Bildüberschrift

1. Introduction: 3 Hypothesis2.2. How to Build Safe Hydrogen Storage (StorHy-) How to Build Safe Hydrogen Storage (StorHy-)

Systems?Systems?3.3. Basics of Risk AssessmentBasics of Risk Assessment4.4. Good Reasons for a Probabilistic ApproachGood Reasons for a Probabilistic Approach5.5. Principle of Technical Progress in RCSPrinciple of Technical Progress in RCS6.6. Preview: First Steps to a Probabilistic ApproachPreview: First Steps to a Probabilistic Approach7.7. Summary and ConclusionsSummary and Conclusions





Bildüberschrift


Georg W. Mair



Bildüberschrift

The central three Hypothesis behind all following The central three Hypothesis behind all following considerations of probabilistic aspects:considerations of probabilistic aspects:



Bildüberschrift

Introduction: 3 Hypothesis

1.1. In most cases RCS do not correspond with In most cases RCS do not correspond with the State of the Art (SA) or/and the State of the Art (SA) or/and the State of the Art of Safety Technology (SAST). the State of the Art of Safety Technology (SAST).

2.2. It is very often not sufficient to fulfil the technical It is very often not sufficient to fulfil the technical requirements of RCS only, requirements of RCS only, which mean national hurdles to innovation.which mean national hurdles to innovation.

3.3. The The final long term final long term result of a necessary review of RCSresult of a necessary review of RCS could be the formulation of could be the formulation of - protection goals - protection goals in terms of allowable risk limits and in terms of allowable risk limits and - procedures of correct demonstration of reliability. - procedures of correct demonstration of reliability.



Bildüberschrift

1.1. Introduction: 3 HypothesisIntroduction: 3 Hypothesis2. How to Build Safe Hydrogen Storage (StorHy-)

Systems?3.3. Basics of Risk AssessmentBasics of Risk Assessment4.4. Good Reasons for a Probabilistic Approach:Good Reasons for a Probabilistic Approach:5.5. Principle of Technical Progress in RCSPrinciple of Technical Progress in RCS6.6. Preview: First Steps to a Probabilistic ApproachPreview: First Steps to a Probabilistic Approach7.7. Summary and ConclusionsSummary and Conclusions





Bildüberschrift

Safe StorHy-Systems

Georg W. Mair



Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift

Safe StorHy-Systems

Experience with petrol has everyone!Experience with petrol has everyone!

The lack of own experience The lack of own experience is still a reason for low acceptance of is still a reason for low acceptance of

gases used as propellant.gases used as propellant.

The demonstration of high safety is the main issue to The demonstration of high safety is the main issue to achieve high acceptance!!achieve high acceptance!!

The key question is:The key question is:

Are Hydrogen-Vehicles more dangerous Are Hydrogen-Vehicles more dangerous than those with gasoline ???than those with gasoline ???



Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift

Safe StorHy-Systems

This has to be analysed with respect to different subjective disquiets (fears) and perceptions (view points)!

How to compare and evaluate the safety of such How to compare and evaluate the safety of such different techniques as petrol and Hydrogen?different techniques as petrol and Hydrogen?

Risk Analysis !

pearapple



Bildüberschrift

The probabilistic safety assessment of the The probabilistic safety assessment of the today’s level leads to some problems: today’s level leads to some problems:



Bildüberschrift

Technical Progress in RCS

The most material strength relevant testing procedures The most material strength relevant testing procedures are not build to validate a quantitative safety value.are not build to validate a quantitative safety value.

The given “to go or not to go” decisions of the The given “to go or not to go” decisions of the standards are not sufficient for a differentiating standards are not sufficient for a differentiating assessment of safety properties.assessment of safety properties.

Some tests are created in such a way that the specific Some tests are created in such a way that the specific effects cancel out each other.effects cancel out each other.

The current tests of the standards are mainly not The current tests of the standards are mainly not appropriate for a probabilistic safety approach (PSA).appropriate for a probabilistic safety approach (PSA).



Bildüberschrift

1.1. Introduction: 3 HypothesisIntroduction: 3 Hypothesis2.2. How to Build Safe Hydrogen Storage (StorHy-) How to Build Safe Hydrogen Storage (StorHy-)

Systems?Systems?3. Basics of Risk Assessment4.4. Good Reasons for a Probabilistic ApproachGood Reasons for a Probabilistic Approach5.5. Principle of Technical Progress in RCSPrinciple of Technical Progress in RCS6.6. Preview: First Steps to a Probabilistic ApproachPreview: First Steps to a Probabilistic Approach7.7. Summary and ConclusionsSummary and Conclusions





Bildüberschrift

Safe StorHy-Systems

Georg W. Mair



Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift

Basics: Safety and Risk

What is „Safety“?

The Status of „Safety“ is achieved, if the relevant risk applies to this:

LimitRRSafety :The Status of Danger exists, if risk applies to:

LimitRRDanger :

With the accepted historical grown or by the politics given Risk Limit:

LimitR



Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift


And what‘s meant by “Risk”?

The concept of “Risk” paraphrases the statistical context of:

Risk Frequency Consequence

R F C

Risk can be evaluated not only reflective, it can also estimated under prognostic aspects by using probabilistic tools.........



Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift


the design / dimensioning of the technical system the conditions of service incl. inspection a.s.o. ...........

Die Consequence C depends on aspects as:

The Frequency F or Failure Probability (with the System Reliability as complement ) depends on:

mechanical forces from the failure (e. g. splinters), material properties of the gas (e. g. explosion), geographical factors (e. g. valley, garage), population density, (if necessary) weather and so on...............



Bildüberschrift


Systems?Systems?3.3. Basics of Risk AssessmentBasics of Risk Assessment4. Good Reasons for a Probabilistic Approach5.5. Principle of Technical Progress in RCSPrinciple of Technical Progress in RCS6.6. Preview: First Steps to a Probabilistic ApproachPreview: First Steps to a Probabilistic Approach7.7. Summary and ConclusionsSummary and Conclusions





Bildüberschrift


Georg W. Mair



Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift

Three Good Arguments

The perspective knowledge of “Probability/Reliability” as the main risk aspect enables to achieve some goals which are not manageable by a deterministic approach.

Examples are:

- Trustworthy Results of Safety Assessment- Use of Risk Management Tools- Save of Resources by Probabilistic Optimisation



Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift

Three Good Arguments: RM

Trustworthy Results of Safety Assessment



Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift

Three Good Arguments: Thrust

Example: Probabilistic optimisation of a hoop wrapped cylinder made of steel and carbon fibre

Working steps: 1. Analysis of possible failure forms

2. Assessment of the failure forms

3. Construction of a calculation model for failure sequences

4. Construction of probabilistic load / strength analysis procedures

5. Design optimisation for different operation parameters

6. Evaluation the elaborated optimisation results

CFK+Steel Requirement: VBurst 10-6



Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift

Three Good Arguments: Thrust

Relation von Materialeinsatz und Berstdruck

1,5

1,7

1,9

2,1

2,3

2,5

2,7

2,9

3,1

0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1

relatives Gewicht

stat

isch

er

Sic

he

rhe

itsb

eiw

ert

Stahlflasche

vermeintlicher Zusammenhang von Sicherheit und erforderlichem Gewicht (Materialaufwand)

putative link of safety and required weight (consumption of materials)

CFK+SteelSta

tic S

afet

y F

acto

r

Relative Weight

Relation between Safety Factor and Weight

steel cylinder



Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift

Three Good Arguments: ThrustZuverlässigkeit über statischem Sicherheitsbeiwert

99,9995%

99,9996%

99,9997%

99,9998%

99,9999%

100,0000%

1,6 1,8 2 2,2 2,4 2,6 2,8 3 3,2

statische Sicherheit

Ba

ute

ilsic

herh

eit

Damit ist die Vermutung eines Zusammenhanges zwischen statischem Sicherheitsbeiwert und probabilitsicher Bauteilsicherheit zumindest für Sonderfälle widerlegt!!!

CFK+Steel

Saf

ety

acco

rdin

g to

rel

iabi

lity Requirement was : PBurst 10-6

Static Safety Factor concerning Bursting

Reliability and Static Safety Factor

By this the assumption of a link between static safety factor and probabilistic safety is disproved – at least in some cases of statically undefined components.



Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift


Use of Risk Management Tools



Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift


The accepted risk limit is able to be validated and decided according to ethical and economic aspects as a kind of balance of risk and chance.

2. The reduction of an existing risk R requires mostly some additional effort of financing!

1. The consequence C is a damage to property and/or caused to some one‘s health!

The balance of a risk and the effort for the reduction of this risk is a monetary consideration of health and life balance at long last!

3. A prohibition of any damage to some one‘s health or life would be a general ban on technique!



Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift




Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift


The consequences for a highly efficient and provident risk management are in general following requirements:

Classification of products concerning their relevance to public safety (casual bystander);

A probabilistic or at least partly risk based dimensioning of products which are of relevance to the public safety;

Evaluation of specific risk limits of acceptance and of public attention before product development;

Elaboration of provisions for reduction of consequences or of failure probability before launching a product on the market.



Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift


Save of Resources by Probabilistic Optimisation



Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift

Three Good Arguments: SavingQuantitative risk based models and probabilistic system optimisation procedures also help by a more specific adaptation of the solution to the requests to use the effort optimally and finally to reduce the effort:

Analogy to the building of towers: Aspects of StorHy - System



Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift

Three Good Arguments: Saving

Dimensioning of the single elementsfollowing deterministic aspects

Bursting of Cylinder

Leakage of Cylinder

PRD-Failure

Pipe-Failure




Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift


Dimensioning of the single elementsfollowing deterministic aspectswith respect to their interaction in the system



Leakage of Cylinder

PRD-Failure

Pipe-Failure



Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift


Saving resources by: Probabilistic optimisation of the components as an integral part of the total system



Leakage of Cylinder

PRD-Failure

Pipe-Failure



Bildüberschrift


Systems?Systems?3.3. Basics of Risk AssessmentBasics of Risk Assessment4.4. Good Reasons for a Probabilistic ApproachGood Reasons for a Probabilistic Approach5. Principle of Technical Progress in RCS6.6. Preview: First Steps to a Probabilistic ApproachPreview: First Steps to a Probabilistic Approach7.7. Summary and ConclusionsSummary and Conclusions





Bildüberschrift


Georg W. Mair



Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift


Progress in Science and Engineering (PSE)Progress in Science and Engineering (PSE)

State of the Art (SA) / State of the Art of Safety Technology (SAST) State of the Art (SA) / State of the Art of Safety Technology (SAST)

Well-known Engineering Rules (WER)Well-known Engineering Rules (WER)



Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift


…..with respect to the public-technical safety and regulations

Result of the “Kalkar” (atom energy plant) decision by the German Result of the “Kalkar” (atom energy plant) decision by the German Federal Constitutional Court (1978; compare Seveso II Directive):Federal Constitutional Court (1978; compare Seveso II Directive):

As far as a potential high consequence of an accident is not As far as a potential high consequence of an accident is not excluded (damage to life, health and physical assets) the courts excluded (damage to life, health and physical assets) the courts require an safety level which is not only represented by the WER require an safety level which is not only represented by the WER (standards and approval rules). At least the SA is required. (standards and approval rules). At least the SA is required.

Thus means that in Germany and other countries with similar Thus means that in Germany and other countries with similar principles it is not sufficient to fulfil the RCS only. It’s a duty to principles it is not sufficient to fulfil the RCS only. It’s a duty to watch the state of the art and to improve the design. In case of the watch the state of the art and to improve the design. In case of the SAST it is necessary to improve the products in use additionally. SAST it is necessary to improve the products in use additionally.



Bildüberschrift


Systems?Systems?3.3. Basics of Risk AssessmentBasics of Risk Assessment4.4. Good Reasons for a Probabilistic ApproachGood Reasons for a Probabilistic Approach5.5. Principle of Technical Progress in RCSPrinciple of Technical Progress in RCS6. Preview: First Steps to a Probabilistic Approach7.7. Summary and ConclusionsSummary and Conclusions





Bildüberschrift


Georg W. Mair



Bildüberschrift

3. to perform the “fire resistance test ” of containments until

rupture and separately from PRD tests

1. to perform the cycle test at constant -20°C

and until leakage

5. to use more meaningful and

precise QM-toolssuch as e. g. AE

4. to perform the “drop test” dependent on statistic crash data

and chassis properties

2. to perform the “Accelerated Stress Rupture Test” as a longtime burst test

under constant high temperature conditions

Crash Energy

Crash Energy

50%

1%

99%

Probability



Bildüberschrift

Preview: First StepsPossible first steps of a probabilistic approach within standards (will be assessed within StorHy):



Bildüberschrift


Systems?Systems?3.3. Basics of Risk AssessmentBasics of Risk Assessment4.4. Good Reasons for a Probabilistic ApproachGood Reasons for a Probabilistic Approach5.5. Principle of Technical Progress in RCSPrinciple of Technical Progress in RCS6.6. Preview: First Steps to a Probabilistic ApproachPreview: First Steps to a Probabilistic Approach7. Summary and Conclusions





Bildüberschrift


Georg W. Mair



Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift

Summary

By this it is demonstrated, that...

... a pure deterministic safety assessment is often not very trustworthy – but a probabilistic one is;

…a provident risk assessment by probabilistic tools allows to achieve a better acceptance by RM;

…a probabilistic optimisation shows new potentials of weight reduction and safety increase;

... a quantitative reliability assessment opens the door to a regulation which can follow the state of the art permanently.



Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift

Conclusions

We need a step into the probabilistic approach as We need a step into the probabilistic approach as a choose able alternative to the current a choose able alternative to the current approach…approach…

… which helps to use technical precaution action at the point of highest efficiency with the benefit - of weight reduction, - of saving resources and - of cost reduction

… which allows to take into account the spread of a technique and the operational aspects in detail!!!



Bildüberschrift



Bildüberschrift

Conclusions

Yes, it is high time to have a strong look Yes, it is high time to have a strong look on all levels of RCS to combine the on all levels of RCS to combine the

quantitative probability assessment with quantitative probability assessment with a comprehensive description of the a comprehensive description of the protection purpose of regulations protection purpose of regulations

- as an alternative way of component - as an alternative way of component approval and in addition to a system approval and in addition to a system

approval not later than 2010!approval not later than 2010!




Bildüberschrift

Ende

Thank you for your attention

start. international conference on hydrogen safety (ichs) hydrogen onboard storage – an insertion...

Documents

mair slide

mair bam

probabilistic approach

ichs pisa

hypothesis georg

standards regulations

safe storhysystems georg

safe storhysystems experience