Part IV: Building Iraqi Forces, the al-AnbarAwakening, and the Quest to RestoreStability to Iraq

ile counterinsurgency doctrine stress-es the need to launch surgical opera-tions aimed at pacifying territory and

cutting off the supply lines of insurgent fighters,the need to win the support of the populationremains critical. From the day they began theirsecond deployment, U.S. Marines made dedicat-ed efforts to build relationships with local lead-ers and the Iraqi population as a whole. Of par-ticular importance was the need to build stabili-ty by using locally raised security forces.

The question facing Marines and Coalitionforces in general, however, was what kind ofsecurity forces should be raised? Until 2006, mostof the Coalition's focus was on building an IraqiNational Army. One method for constructingsuch a force was to deploy Combined ActionProgram (CAP) platoons. An innovation of theVietnam War, CAPs combined U.S. Marines withIraqis as a means of building a professional, Iraqimilitary.

However, many Sunnis in al-Anbar Provincesaw the Shi'a-dominated Iraqi National Army asa force for occupation and oppression. As a con-sequence, many Marines and other Coalitionleaders found that building local police forceswas a more effective means for combating theinsurgency in western Iraq. Fearing the imminentwithdrawal of U.S. troops and subsequent domi-nation of the region by al-Qaeda in Iraq, tribalsheiks like Abdul Sattar Abu Risha approachedU.S. forces, offering to enroll the male members

155

of their tribes into the Iraqi police forces. Thischange, known as the Anbar Awakening, thusled to the development of a professional andefficient police force capable of confronting al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Awakening represents a highpoint in Marine and Army efforts to engage theIraqi population and build an effective securityapparatus.

The following selections provide readers witha summary of the efforts undertaken by Marinesto build local security forces. "The CombinedAction Platoon in Iraq" examines how this lega-cy of the Vietnam War was adapted for the situ-ation in Iraq. Carter Malkasian's essay 'WillIraqization Work?" explores the challenges ofbuilding security forces that the Sunnis of theAnbar province could trust in the Shi'a-dominat-ed state. Andrew Lubin and Austen Long's essaysprovide further analysis and detail about whatremains an ongoing effort to forge stability andsecurity in Iraq. Then-Colonel Sean B.

MacFarland and Major Niel Smith's essay focuseson the efforts undertaken by the U.S. Army's FirstBrigade Heavy Combat Team (commanded byColonel MacFarland) to build alliances with thelocal Sunni tribes of the Anbar Province. Finally,the diary of al-Qaeda in Iraq fighter Abu-Tariqdetails the impact of the Awakening on hisforce's resources and morale, as the diaristrelates the imminent collapse of al-Qaeda in Iraqin Anbar Province.

The Combined Action Platoon in Iraq

by First Lieutenant Jason R. Goodale and FirstLieutenant Jonathan F WebreMarine Corps Gazette, April 2005

Qn 30 May 2004, the Marines of 3d Platoon,Company G, Task Force 2d Battalion, 7thMarines (TF 2/7), Regimental Combat Team

7, were activated as one of the first combined actionprogram (CAP) platoons since the end of the pro-gram in 1971 during Vietnam. Upon entering intothis mission, which was new to everyone involved,the TF 2/7 CAP platoon had to "reinvent the wheel"and use an almost forgotten model in order to wagemodern counterinsurgency warfare in the west-cen-tral al-Anbar Province, Iraq. The scope of the TF 2/7CAP mission can be broken into three phases: initi-ating and founding the CAP mission, coordinatingand operating in a CAP environment, and establish-ing a training base to ensure the continuation of themission.

Phase I: Initiating the CAPMission

Because TF 2/7 operations continued up to theday of the CAP platoon activation, including TF 2/7displacement east in support of Fallujah offensiveoperations in April 2004, the CAP platoon was notable to start working with the Iraqi Security Forces(1SF) until late May 2004. The utilization of the. CAPplatoon as a semi-independent unit within TF 2/7'sarea of operations (AO) had been planned for a peri-od of weeks, since the battalion's arrival in February2004, and finally the opportunity to utilize it present-ed itself. When the order arrived, the TF 2/7 CAPplatoon, call sign "Golf 3," displaced from the battal-ion main forward operating base and moved 25 kilo-meters away into the platoon's new home near thecity of Hit, Iraq. The CAP platoon arrived at theheadquarters of the nascent Iraqi National Guard(ING) 503d Battalion on 30 May 2004.

Upon arriving at the 503d headquarters, the pla-

157

toon had three goals: establish initial security, famil-iarize itself with new responsibilities, and sustain-ment. After a brief introduction to the platoon's newhost, Colonel Fahad Ab'dal Aziz, commander of the503d, the platoon established local security andbegan settling into billeting areas.

The CAP platoon quickly set in motion the neces-sary functions to train the 503d in anticipation of thenational transfer of sovereignty in little over a month.The CAP platoon commander introduced the unit tothe staff and officers of the 503d and establishedshort-, mid-, and long-term training and operationsgoals. The CAP platoon sergeant ensured that alllogistical and security concerns were immediatelyaddressed and that future requirements were antici-pated. The platoon guide assumed the role of chieftrainer and began establishing the process of turningthe 503d into a capable Iraqi fighting force.

The noncommissioned officers (NCOs) of the pla-toon made sure tasks were assigned, watches androtations established, and everything was proceedingaccording to the platoon plan. The junior Marineshad perhaps the hardest role of adapting to a foreignculture by learning the language and working dailywith hundreds of non-English speaking, ill-trainedsoldiers. Needless to say, this was all ad hoc consid-ering that the CAP platoon's predeployment trainingconsisted of two days of orientation that alreadyproved far short of the expectations necessary tolive, eat, sleep, and fight with the 503d. Despitethese. shortcomings, the TF 2/7 CAP platoon wascognizant that they were going to carry out this mis-sion for the last three months of the battalion'sdeployment. The platoon wanted nothing short ofsuccess. The future local security in this AO neededto be transferred to the Iraqis as soon as they wereready.

Phase II: Coordination andOperations in a CAP Environment

Perhaps the biggest challenge that the TF 2/7

CAP faced in its mission was the establishment ofprocedures when it came to combined operationswith Marines and the 503d soldiers. Golf 3's role incoordinating all U.S. and 1SF training and opera-tions from the 503d headquarters decreasedthroughout the platoon's stay in Iraq. This wouldnever have been possible without the addition, inearly June, of a battalion detachment led by the TF2/7 S-3L (operations liaison officer). Along withsubject matter experts from each battalion staff sec-tion, the essential task of establishing an opera-tional capability at the 503d battalion level wasremoved from the CAP platoon.

The CAP platoon and battalion staff solidified, asthe weeks passed, into a solid band of Marines andsailors that became known as "Team JCC" (jointcoordination center). The JCC was the operationscenter at the heart of the mission. From the JCC, theCAP platoon and TF 2/7 tracked the majority ofactivity concerning the Marines, the ING, and theIraqi police in TF 2/7's AO. Despite some early dif-ficulties with command and control, understand-able for a mission of this type, Team JCC began toestablish useful techniques and procedures. Suchprocedures consisted of receiving direction from TF2/7 headquarters; establishing whether an Iraqi-only, U.S-only, or a combined effort would act onit; and supervising the execution of any action. Asa team, the officers from the respective agencieswould assess the situation and assign reactionteams from the 1SF to respond. These teams wereoften supported by the Marines of Company E,located at the adjacent battalion forward operatingbase, or other units of the battalion as required.

Difficulties would often arise due to lack of com-munications equipment and logistics assets, such asfuel, unreliability (or lack of training) of the localforces, or language barriers. Each one of theseproblems was dealt with as it occurred, and overthe course of months the CAP managed to find cre-ative solutions to solve each challenge.

A simple example is that of the language barri-ers. Many of the battalion's interpreters were eithernot Iraqi or were from a different part of Iraq, mak-ing it difficult for Iraqi soldiers to understand them.By learning enough tactical terms in the localdialect to issue a simple order, such as checkpoint,patrol, enemy, and weapons, while making up the

158

difference with diagrams and hand gestures, theproblem was solved. As in Vietnam, the CAP pla-toon's language ability was essential to mission suc-cess.

Combined operations with the 1SF are rarelysmooth, but as the mission matured and evolved,Team JCC developed a system that resulted in sev-eral successful operations against the enemy. TheCAP platoon jointly confiscated hundreds of illegalweapons and explosive material, captured severalinsurgents, and successfully engaged the enemy onnumerous occasions with no casualties to 1SF or TF2/7 Marines.

Phase III: Establish a TrainingBase

Perhaps the most visible success of CAP pla-toon's training mission was the establishment ofan instruction foundation that would ensure thecontinuation of sustainment training throughoutthe 503d. The CAP platoon initial training pack-age trained 700 soldiers of the 503d in basicweapons handling and marksmanship with theAK-47 and RPK (Soviet) light machinegun. The503d fired more than 13,000 rounds in the spanof four days and set a standard for 1SF training.

As a result of some collective thoughtbetween the 503d trainers and Marines, a plandeveloped to bring one platoon a week fromone of the four companies in the 503d (from thecities of Hit, Baghdad, Haditha, andAnah/Rawah) and train them in basic combatskills. The training package, which becameknown as "basic skills training," lasted fromMonday to Thursday of each week (accountingfor the Iraqi religious day on Friday) with Sundayas a receiving day. The package included physi-cal training and martial arts every morning andcovered the gamut of basic mission essentialtasks and combat skills to include procedures atcheckpoints; search actions for both vehicles andpersonnel; basic dismounted patrolling skills,such as hand/arm signals, mounted/dismountedtechniques; and medical training. Also includedwere urban skills, such as room clearing,patrolling, building entry techniques, and a fullday of live fire and movement training on the

503d's 300-meter rifle range that was recentlyrenovated by TF 2/7 civil affairs. The 503d so!-diers learned to rely on a basic formation thatthey called the "zigzag," or tactical column, formost combat operations.

The training week culminated in a series ofgraduation battle drills in which the three squadsof the 503d platoons would demonstrate—in aseries of events—all of the skills learned in theweek's training. During the CAP platoon's timewith the 503d, the 503d passed 10 platoons(approximately 400 soldiers) through the trainingpackage. Each week the plan fluctuated andevolved but ultimately became smoother.

The CAP platoon's most significant trainingaccomplishment was the establishment of a coregroup of approximately 10 Iraqi trainers led byMajor Ab'del Qader Jubair, Training Officer,503d, and the senior enlisted trainer, SergeantFirst Class Jafa Sadeq Hatani. With the personneladditions of other trainers, the group developedinto a highly skilled and well-versed trainingcadre.

Building on TF 2/7's military police platoon"train the trainer" package for 503d NCOs, theCAP platoon's initial training of the 503d wasconducted entirely by Marines. After an addition-al train the trainer piece, the 503d trainers, affec-tionately referred to as the "Red Sleeves" for thearmbands they wore, assumed responsibility.

By the beginning of August 2004, the RedSleeves assumed full control of the basic skillstraining package and shaped it as their own. TheMarines gladly and proudly allowed them to takethe reins and stood back. The CAP platoon real-ized that if it was theirs (the Iraqis') it was better.

Looking Back

On 9 September 2004, the last Marines of TeamJCC were extracted by helicopter, and Golf 3's CAPmission was complete. As the helicopter circledoverhead the 503d headquarters, the Marinesreflected that in three short months a small groupof Marines had stood up an ING battalion, conduct-ed combined operations against the enemy, andcreated a training program that had been adaptedby the Iraqis as their own. As of this writing, thetraining program continues beyond TF 2/7's stay. Anew CAP platoon from TF 1/23 carried on the mis-sion.

TF 2/7 CAP platoon results were often roughlybordered, and many times the unit had to adjustexpectations. Nevertheless, the overall goal wasdefined. The Team JCC leadership was completelyconfident that the mission was worthwhile. Thereactivated CAP has been a relative success in thismodern war on terror and should be closely exam-ined as an option for future conflicts.

NotesApril 2005, 40-42.Copyright Marine

About the AuthorFirst Lieutenant (now Captain) Jason R. Goodale is command-

ing officer, Company C, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. At the time this

article was published he was the executive officer for the weapons

company, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines.

First Lieutenant Jonathon F. Webre retired from the MarineCorps as a captain. At the time of this article's publication, he was

attending the Military Intelligence Officer's Course.

Marine Coips Gazette,Reprinted by permission.Cops Gazette.

159

Will IraqizationWork?

by Carter A. MalkasianCenter for Stability and Development, Centerfor Naval Analyses, February 2007

Introduction

raqization" is a critical element in theIraq debate. It is central to the U.S. mil-itary strategy and a key component of

the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group.The basic concept is that a properly trained andequipped Iraqi Army will be able to keep insur-gent violence at a low level, thereby allowingthe Coalition to withdraw forces. Conventionalwisdom is that the Iraqi Army is the sole institu-tion capable of stabilizing Iraq. Shortcomings inIraqization are usually attributed to an insuffi-cient focus on training, equipping, advising, andmanning on the part of the Coalition.

Two years of evidence on the actual perform-ance of the Iraqi Army in al-Anbar Province sug-gests that the current strategy of Iraqization isnot likely to enable U.S. forces to withdraw. Inspite of its dramatic growth, there are few signsthat the Iraqi Army can suppress insurgent activ-ity to a level that would permit the United Statesto withdraw substantial forces without leavingbehind a terrorist safe haven. Improvements intraining, equipping, and advising will not makea difference. Even the best-trained andequipped Iraqi Army units face continualattacks. The problem is the ethnic makeup ofthe Iraqi Army. Attacks cannot be suppressedbecause the Sunni population views the Shi'a-dominated army as an unjust occupation force,bent on oppressing them or at least unable toprotect them from hard-core insurgents. Thepopulation generally refuses to provide action-able intelligence on insurgents, allows insur-gents to mass freely, hides insurgents, and joinsinsurgents as fighters. As long as this sectarian

161

dynamic exists the Iraqi Army will do no betterat defusing the insurgency than Coalition forces.The Iraqi Army, no matter how well trained,advised, equipped, or manned, cannot mend thesectarian rift within Iraq and create understand-ing between the Sunni and Shi'a.

This paper is based on empirical evidencecollected on Iraqization while I served as anadvisor to the I Marine Expeditionary Force in al-Anbar Province from February 2004 to February2005 and February to August 2006. The evidenceincludes interviews with the Iraqi Army andpolice, discussions with U.S. advisors, and directobservation of Iraqi Army and police operations.Al-Anbar is overwhelmingly Sunni and infamousas a center of insurgent activity. Skeptics mightask whether the harsh environment of al-Anbaris a good case for testing the potential ofIraqization in general. The answer is that the fail-ure of Iraqization in al-Anbar matters. It means aU.S. withdrawal would leave the Iraqi govern-ment unable to control the Sunni heartland.Even if the Iraqi Army resorted to extreme bru-tality, its initial lack of artillery, air power, and anoverwhelming numerical advantage would pre-clude a rapid victory. The Iraqi governmentcould only accede to the division of the countryor engage in a long and bloody civil war toreclaim the province. Neither would appear tobe in the interest of the United States. In bothcases, hard-core insurgents (who are predomi-nantly Sunni), such as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI),would be free to operate in al-Anbar for a pro-longed period and organize terrorist operationsoutside al-Anbar. Even if successful everywhereelse in Iraq, Iraqization will have failed as a strat-egy if it cannot address al-Anbar.

Iraqization may enjoy better prospects if itsfocus is altered in al-Anbar. In contrast to theIraqi Army, local Sunni police forces have beenable both to collect intelligence and injure theinsurgency, especially hardcore groups of great-est concern to the United States, like AQI. Sunnipolice forces can do this because they enjoy afar stronger relationship with the populationthan the Iraqi Army. Thus, the emphasis ofIraqization in al-Anbar needs to be upon build-ing local Sunni police forces as much as build-

162

ing an integrated national army. Even then,Iraqization may founder. Widespread Sunni dis-affection from the Iraqi government detersSunnis from joining the police, leaving the policeembattled and outnumbered against the insur-gents. This leads to an equally important point.Iraqization is no substitute for efforts by the Iraqigovernment to reward cooperative Sunni lead-ers. For Iraqization to prosper, the Iraqi govern-ment must enact reforms sufficient to garner thesupport of a critical mass of Sunnis for thepolice. The success of Iraqization can never beguaranteed but, with firm support from the Iraqigovernment, local police forces can marginalizeAQI and secure the populated areas, whichcould serve as a basis for withdrawing U.S.forces.

The model of local Sunni police forces hasrelevance beyond al-Anbar. The Iraqi Army facessimilar limitations in other Sunni areas, whichlocally recruited police could overcome. Indeed,a few local Sunni units have been formed innorthern Iraq, which seem to perform well neartheir home base. The model would be less appli-cable in Baghdad where local police could bedrawn into sectarian violence. Furthermore, themodel has strong historical precedence. Locallyrecruited forces have been an effective means ofcounterinsurgency in earlier campaigns, such asthe firqats in Oman and regional and popularforces in Vietnam. Even in Afghanistan today,locally recruited "auxiliary police" are beingadvocated as a means of countering the Taliban.

The Origins and EarlyDevelopment of Ira qization

General George Casey, commander of MultiNational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I), implementedIraqization in the beginning of 2005. InDecember 2004, a review of the MNF-I campaignplan concluded that the formation of the IraqiArmy was lagging and needed to be accelerated.Multi National Support and Training CommandIraq (MNSTC-I) had planned to create 10 Iraqidivisions but by the end of 2004 only twobrigades had seen significant combat. The plan-ners expected that the Iraqi Army could provide

(Fable 1) Iraqi Army Brigades in al-A nbar

vital manpower and better gather intelligencethan Coalition forces. Additionally, they believedthat, unlike Coalition forces, the Iraqi Armywould not be perceived as occupiers, undercut-ting a major motivation behind the insurgency.Most importantly, there was an explicit assump-tion that the Iraqi Army could eventually shoul-der counterinsurgency operations, allowing U.S.forces to withdraw. The Iraqi Army would beable to prevent AQI from forming safe havens inIraq and preserve the integrity of the Iraqi state.As a result of this review, Casey directed that allCoalition forces shift their focus from fightinginsurgents to training Iraqis. In order to acceler-ate Iraqi Army development, MNF-I created thetransition team concept—i 2 advisors embeddedinto every Iraqi Army battalion, brigade, anddivision.

The army was meant to he a national forcethat integrated Kurds, Shi'a, and Sunni. After thedifficulties experienced with the Sunni IraqiNational Guard and Fallujah Brigade in 2004,

163

MNF-I did not want all-Sunni units.1 It wasthought that such units would undermine thedevelopment of a new Iraqi nation and cooper-ate with insurgents. True integration neveroccurred within the army. Few Sunnis joined in2004 and 2005. A number of battalions, brigades,and divisions had Sunni commanders but thevast majority of the officers and soldiers wereShi'a.

By the end of 2006, an Iraqi Army had beenbuilt but it appeared unable to survive on itsown. Prominent scholars cited flaws in the exe-cution of Iraqization and generally claimed thatthe United States needed to invest greaterresources into the effort. Ten divisions were con-sidered too few to handle the insurgency.2 Theyalso argued that the Coalition had failed to pro-vide sufficient training, equipment, or advisors tothe Iraqis. Iraqi Army battalions had only beengiven a few weeks of formal training. In terms ofequipment, the Coalition had left the Iraqi Armymore lightly armed than the insurgents, trans-

ported in unarmored pick-up trucks, and oftenbereft of essential personal items, like boots andcold-weather jackets. Twelve advisors, oftenreservists or national guardsmen rather than themost capable active-duty personnel, were shownto be inadequate to train, administer, and oper-ate alongside a battalion.3

In spite of these problems, today, the consen-sus remains that a national, ethnically integrated,and well-trained army is the best means of sup-pressing the insurgency. Ostensibly, the key toU.S. withdrawal from Iraq is simply to investgreater resources into the effort. General JohnAbizaid, commander of Central Command, told

the U.S. Senate in November: "In discussionswith our commanders and Iraqi leaders it is clearthat they believe Iraqi forces can take more con-trol fast, provided we invest more manpowerand resources into the Coalition military transi-tion teams, speed the delivery of logistics andmobility enablers, and embrace an aggressiveIraqi-led effort to disarm illegal militias."4Abizaid believed that U.S. forces might therebybe able to hand over security to Iraqi forces with-in one year.5 Similarly, the Iraq Study Group'shighly anticipated December 2006 report empha-sized: 'the urgent near-term need for significantadditional trained Army brigades, since this is the

(Figure 1) Iraqi forces as a percentage of total forces conducting counterinsurgency

164

key to Iraqis taking over full responsibility fortheir own security."6 The report implied that ashortcoming in "real combat capability" causedthe Iraqi Army to be unable to handle the insur-gency. It recommended increasing the number ofU.S. advisors and personnel supporting IraqiArmy units and providing improved equipment.7

The Iraqi Army in al-Anbar

Marine commands—the I Marine Expe-ditionary Force (I MEF) and II Marine Expe-ditionary Force (II MEF)—have held responsibil-ity for al-Anbar Province since March 2004. I

MEF's first experience with the Iraqi Armybrigades in al-Anbar was in the second battle ofFallujah, in November 2004. To the relief ofmany U.S. officers, the predominantly Shi'a IraqiArmy brigades stood and fought. After the battle,new Iraqi Army brigades flowed into al-Anbar asMNSTC-I trained more and more forces. In 2005,the Ministry of Defense decided that both the 1stand 7th Iraqi Divisions would be located in al-Anbar. By April 2006, all seven brigades hadbeen deployed. Table 1 gives the name, location,and time of arrival of every brigade.

Every Iraqi battalion, brigade, and division inal-Anbar had its 12-man advisory team. Nationalguardsmen and U.S. Army reservists composedthe first advisory teams. By the end of 2005 theMarine Corps devoted its own active-duty per-sonnel to the mission. Officers slated for com-mand and key personnel within Marine infantrybattalions became advisors. Additionally, Marineand Army battalions partnered with Iraqi battal-ions, in order to assist in their operations andtraining. Usually, the partnership process beganwith an Iraqi company working with a U.S. com-pany. Eventually, the company would operateindependently, followed by the battalion, andultimately the entire brigade.

The Capabilities of the IraqiArmy in al-Anbar

Throughout 2005, the Iraqi Army brigades inal-Anbar developed. Figure 1 shows the percent-age of Iraqis conducting counterinsurgency oper-

165

ations out of the total number of Coalition andIraq forces conducting counterinsurgency opera-tions in al-Anbar (the figure excludes headquar-ters, logistics, and aviation units). By December2005, the Iraqi Army was providing 40 to 50 per-cent of the manpower for counterinsurgencyoperations. By March 2006, three brigades oper-ated independently.

The Iraqi Army demonstrated strong combatperformance. Nearly every Iraqi Army battalionstood its ground in major firefights. Most couldperform advanced tasks such as calling in closeair support, combining movement with suppres-sive fire, maneuvering, and assaulting insurgentpositions. On no occasion did insurgents rout oroverwhelm an Iraqi Army unit. The experiencesof two Iraqi brigades prQvide detailed proof ofthe army's combat performance.

The 3d Brigade, 1st Iraqi Division (3-1 IraqiBrigade) operated in the rural area west ofFallujah, along the Euphrates River. Other than60 or so advisors, no Coalition ground forcessupported it. Some Marine officers likened thearea to Vietnam, with as many as 50 insurgentslaunching coordinated attacks against Iraqi Armyoutposts and patrols.8 The Iraqi soldiers gener-ally stood and fought. Under the leadership oftheir advisors, the Iraqis often employed close airsupport or artillery to break attacks and maneu-vered aggressively against their opponents. Forexample, on 11 May 2006, insurgents coordinat-ed two attacks against the brigade's first battal-ion. First, they hit a dismounted patrol with smallarms fire and RPGs. The Iraqis called for close airsupport. The air support saw insurgents settingup an ambush position. Using this surveillance,the Iraqis counterattacked and drove off theinsurgents. Then, insurgents engaged a nearbyoutpost with small arms, RPGs, and an antiair-craft gun. The Iraqis sent out their quick reactionforce, which outflanked the insurgent position.They killed one insurgent, captured six more,and seized the antiaircraft gun. According to itsadvisors, the brigade won battles like this at leastonce per month.

The 1st Brigade, 1st Iraqi Division (1-1 IraqiBrigade) fought in eastern Ramadi, the scene ofthe worst violence in al-Anbar. Insurgents

massed and assaulted brigade positions, sniped atpatrols, struck convoys with IEDs, and rammedsuicide car bombs into observation posts andentry control points. As many as 100 insurgentsparticipated in some attacks. Firefights could lastan hour. The brigade performed well. Advisorsrated the brigade, a veteran of battles in Najaf,Fallujah, Baghdad, and al-Qa'im, as highly com-petent in urban fighting. Other Coalition officersconsidered Brigadier General Razzaq, the brigadecommander, the equivalent of the average U.S.brigade commander. Razzaq's men clearly held atactical edge over the insurgents. Jundi (Arabicterm for an enlisted soldier) advanced under fireand officers aggressively took the initiative. Onone occasion, 40-50 insurgents tried to pin, sur-round, and destroy . patrol from the brigade'sfirst battalion in the volatile Milaab district ofsoutheast Ramadi. The patrol stole the initiativeand pre-empted the attack by assaulting the insur-gent positions in surrounding buildings.9 Thebrigade suffered casualties and desertions fromthe heavy fighting but never lost a firefight.

The other brigades succeeded in majorengagements as well. Even inexperienced andpoorly trained brigades stood and fought. Forexample, Coalition officers considered 1stBrigade, 7th Iraqi Division (1-7 Iraqi Brigade) tobe one of the two weakest brigades.

Nevertheless, its battalions endured heavyfighting in western Ramadi. They consistentlydefeated attacks involving 20 or more insur-gents.10 The soldiers of the brigade's third battal-ion would advance under fire, assault insurgentpositions, and generally attempt to encircle andoutflank opponents. When an lED exploded theywould immediately go after the triggerman. Iraqiofficers, not just the U.S. advisors, provided theleadership for such tactics. The jundi hunkereddown less than American troops and could berecklessly brave in combat. Some U.S. officerssaid that insurgents ran from the jundi of thirdbattalion.11

Besides succeeding in major firefights, the IraqiArmy in al-Anbar showed a basic proficiency incounterinsurgency techniques. Every battalionconducted patrols, raids, and clearing operations,sometimes as much as Coalition units. For exam-

ple, 3-1 Iraqi Brigade aggressively patrolled theirarea of operations and pressed outposts intoinsurgent safe areas.12 Because of their aggres-siveness, many Coalition officers candidly ratedthe brigade as better than certain U.S. units. GoodIraqi battalions sent out snipers, set ambushes,and operated at night. U.S. officers considered 1-1 Iraqi Brigade particularly good at squad- andcompany-level tactics. The brigade's ambushesregularly interdicted insurgents trying to enterRamadi.13 Iraqi units understood how to collectintelligence and target insurgents. As will bedescribed later, the problem with intelligence wasnot the Iraqi Army's understanding of how to col-lect it but the willingness of the population toprovide it in the first place. When intelligence wasavailable, Iraqi units could identify insurgents,locate them, and then capture them in a raid. 14

Overall, the Iraqi Army showed it could 1)0thfight and execute counterinsurgency techniques.It did not operate as well as the Coalition forcesbut could perform the same basic tasks. MajorLloyd Freeman, the operations officer with the 1stIraqi Division military transition team, summed upthe Iraqi Army's combat performance well:

Some advisors claim the insurgents arebetter than the Iraqi soldiers. However, Ihave not seen an instance where an Iraqiunit has been overrun or even required aCoalition QRF to come to their rescue. I

myself have seen enough patrols to beappalled at some of the simple things theyare unable to do but in no case have I seena situation where I felt I was surrounded bycomplete incompetence. I always felt theycould get the job done. It might he ugly butthe job would get done.15

Quite clearly, problems in advisors, equip-ment, and training were not preventing the IraqiArmy from fighting the insurgents and displayinga "real combat capability."

Sustained Insurgent Activity

The problem was that combat capability had lit-tle to do with the level of insurgent activity. In

166

spite of its dramatic growth and strong combatperformance, the Iraqi Army faced incessantattacks, enduring a steady stream of attacks bysmall arms fire, improvised explosive devices(IEDs), indirect fire, and suicide car bombs. Thisexperience was shared by nearly all Iraqi units,regardless of their skill level. Just like theCoalition, the Iraqi Army could fight well andunderstand counterinsurgency tactics yet still facea vibrant insurgency. Notably, proficiency incounterinsurgency techniques and combat per-formance did not save 1-1 and 3-1 Iraqi Brigadesfrom major attacks involving scores of insurgents.Incident levels remained high in nearly everybrigade area of operations, regardless of the resi-dent brigade's capabilities. Most disturbing forU.S. interests, AQI maintained a presencethroughout the province. Overall, insurgentattacks made it clear that the Iraqi Army could notmanage the insurgency with U.S. forces present,which makes it highly unlikely they will be ableto do so absent U.S. forces—the primary goal ofIraqization.

There is little reason to believe the answer tothis problem is more advising, training, or equip-ping. Above, I judged the Iraqi Army's combatcapability partly on the performance of two of itsbest brigades, which may seem unfair. However,1-1 and 3-1 Iraqi brigades represent critical casesfor Iraqization. One would expect them to facefewer attacks. The fact that they did not castsdoubt on any argument that better advising, train-ing, and equipping can enable Iraqization to suc-ceed. If the best of the Iraqi Army brigades facedheavy attacks, then more advising, training, andequipping to bring the other brigades up tospeed is not likely to solve the problem.

The answer was also not that the Coalition andIraqi Army lacked sufficient forces to quell insur-gent activity. Admittedly, Iraqi and Coalitionforces could not be everywhere, meaning theinsurgents had freedom to mass and gather forattacks. Iraqi Army officers frequently noted thatal-Anbar was too big to be controlled by only 7brigades. Furthermore, Iraqi battalions wereunder-strength. Most operated at 30 to 80 percentstrength (150-400 men), excluding men on leave.One-third of the 750 men in a battalion were on

167

leave at any time. Desertions and combat lossesfurther drained the strength of Iraqi battalions.Desertions occurred because of poor living con-ditions, irregular pay, distance from home, andconstant exposure to combat. Blame falls largelyon the Ministry of Defense, which failed to paysoldiers on time or provide combat replacementsfor most of 2006. There is evidence that reinforc-ing or building new Iraqi Army units would havehelped. In 2004 and 2005, saturating cities withforces, as in the second battle of Fallujah or thebattle of al-Qa'im, tended to reduce large-scaleattacks.

However, there is good reason to doubtwhether greater numbers would have made adecisive difference. Reinforcement of counterin-surgency operations in 2006 had disappointingresults. The number of Iraqi Army units inRamadi, Hit, and Haditha increased substantiallyin 2006 without any sustained drop in large-scaleattacks.

Indeed, attacks increased in Ramadi andHaditha even though the number of forces metthe 20 security personnel per 1,000 civilians ratiooften touted as needed for effective counterin-surgency.16 In Ramadi, areas supposedly"locked down" by thorough Iraqi patrolling wit-nessed attacks. In other words, even where theIraqi Army operated with sufficient numbers,major insurgent activity did not always subside.Thus, inadequate numbers alone do not seem toexplain why the Iraqi Army faced attacks.Perhaps if the Ministry of Defense had floodedal-Anbar with two or three additional divisions,violence could have been subdued by sheerweight of numbers. Even so, that would hardlyhave been the most efficient solution and prob-ably would not have removed the fundamentalroots of the violence.

Popular Opposition to theIraqi Army

The main reason that the Iraqi Army sufferedfrom incessant attacks is that the population sym-pathized with the insurgency. They generallywould not provide intelligence on the locationand identity of insurgents. Bottom-up intelligence

collection is essential to successful counterinsur-gency. Without it, insurgents cannot be identifiedfrom among the population and removed. AsFrank Kitson stated in his classic counterinsur-gency text, Low Intensity Operations, "if it is

accepted that the problem of defeating the enemyconsists very largely of finding him, it is easy torecognise the paramount importance of goodinformation."17 More recently, the U.S. Army andMarine Corps new counterinsurgency manualcited intelligence as one of the key principles ofcounterinsurgency:

Without good intelligence, counterinsurgentsare like blind boxers wasting energy flailing atunseen opponents and perhaps causing unintend-ed harm. With good intelligence, counterinsur-gents are like surgeons cutting Out cancerous tis-sue while keeping other vital organs intact.Effective operations are shaped by timely, specif-ic, and reliable intelligence, gathered and ana-lyzed at the lowest possible level and disseminat-ed throughout the force.18

In al-Anbar, insurgents could mass freelybecause local residents would not inform the IraqiArmy. Worse, some hid insurgents from IraqiArmy patrols and sweeps or even joined the insur-gency as fighters. Consequently, the Iraqi Armycould win every firefight and patrol diligentlywithout ever rooting out the insurgents.

The population opposed the Iraqi Army prima-rily because of its Shi'a identity. Sunnis dislikedthe Shi'a-dominated Iraqi government. The gov-ernment's insistence on denying Sunnis politicalpower and economic wealth convinced them ofits oppressive intentions. Sectarian violence inBaghdad following the February 2006 GoldenMosque bombing magnified the Sunni perceptionthat the Shi'a intended on oppressing them.Polling in 2006 found that 77 to 90 percent of thepeople viewed the government as illegitimate.Eighty percent considered civil war likely. 19 As faras Sunnis were concerned, Persians probably con-trolled the entire government. The Iraqi Army wasnothing more than a Shi'a militia bent on oppress-ing them. Polls confirmed that the majority ofSunnis in al-Anbar viewed the Iraqi Army as athreat.20

Virtually no Iraqi Army formation could gain

168

the support of a critical mass of the local popula-tion. Even the best brigades, like 3-1 IraqiBrigade, could not collect sufficient intelligence toreduce insurgent activity. One battalion in thatbrigade received only one actionable tip in eightmonths, in spite of an active civil affairs effort.The people in the area preferred to assist theinsurgents. They kept 3-1 Iraqi Brigade underobservation and reported its movements to insur-gents. The 1st Brigade, 1st Iraqi Division probablyheld the best record in collecting intelligence butthis never sufficed to decapitate insurgent com-mand and control or regularly warn of insurgentattacks.21 Few people wanted to interact with theIraqi Army. They refused to take free wateroffered by the brigade (some angrily poured itonto the ground) and did not stop insurgents frombombing mobile clinics devised to render medicalcare to the people. One battalion commander saidhe felt little sympathy from locals. Locals did notcome forward to provide information of value.From his perspective, popular opposition to theIraqi Army was deeply ingrained. His officersagreed that shaykhs and imams supported theinsurgents. The shaykhs and especially the imamshad the ear of the people and influenced them tohide information from the Iraqi Army. In the bat-talion's experience, no other area of al-Anbar hadbeen so opposed to the army. One officer estimat-ed that 25 to 30 percent of locals were insur-gents.22

On the other side of Ramadi, the battalions of1-7 Iraqi Brigade also could never get enoughintelligence to take out significant numbers ofinsurgent leaders. One battalion commander, aSunni, complained that the people, mukhtars, andcity leaders were not cooperating with him. Theywould not provide worthwhile information.23 Hebelieved locals were uncooperative because theyfound government policies anti-Sunni and unde-mocratic.24 Another battalion commander statedthat his men got little of value from the locals.25Some locals were openly hostile. They refused totalk and would not provide information.26 AMarine civil affairs team that interacted with thepopulation on a daily basis in Ramadi suspectedthat most people hoped that Saddam wouldreturn and the new government would leave.27

In Fallujah, locals gave the Iraqi Army minimalinformation on the location of insurgents and hidinsurgents who attacked the army.28 Irnams toldlocals to fight the Iraqi Army.29 Iraqi Army officersbelieved the people perceived them as occupiersand supported the insurgents.30 They never heardan imam denounce an attack on the army. Indeed,at one city council meeting, city officials laughedderisively at an Iraqi officer when he noted hismen received no cooperation from locals; as if toask why he would expect any different. City lead-ers regularly accused the Iraqi Army of beingJaysh al Mahdi, Badr Corps, or an Iranian occupa-tion force. At meeting after meeting, they claimedthe Iranians had taken charge of the govern-ment.31 A prominent imam said that the people ofFallujah were fighting a Persian occupation.32Similarly, a respected teacher accused Iraqi sol-diers of following their sectarian desires and beingan instrument of Iran.33 Unfounded tales of horri-ble Iraqi atrocities often accompanied accusationsof sectarianism. One local at a city council meet-ing said: "When your [Coalitioni forces questionus, we at least feel mostly safe. When the IraqiArmy and police take us, our people are killedand their bodies thrown into the streets."34 Somelocals called for revenge for the heavy-handed-ness of the Iraqi Army.

The Iraqi Army fed Sunni sectarian fears byoccasionally treating the population poorly. Attimes, Iraqi soldiers cursed at Sunnis, stole itemsfrom homes, and occupied Sunni residences asobservation posts.35 If under stress, Iraqi soldierscould be physically brutal. In particular, the deathof a comrade could motivate jundi to randomlydetain or even beat locals. Usually, though, Iraqiofficers intervened and reinforced discipline.

For example, Razzaq tried to counteract anyabusive or sectarian tendencies in his brigade.36And Brigadier General Abdullah, the Sunni com-mander of 4th Brigade, 1st Iraqi Division (4-1 IraqiBrigade), made a concerted effort to work withlocal leaders and have an amicable relationshipwith the population. City leaders in Fallujahupheld his brigade as a model of good behavior.Overall, brutality was an exception rather than therule for the Iraqi Army. In spite of some Sunnipropaganda, no Iraqi Army battalion ever acted as

169

a Shi'a death squad or persecuted the Sunni pop-ulation. Some jundi and officers had connectionsto a militia and many admired Moqtada Sadr. Butno entire unit pursued a sectarian agenda againstthe Sunnis.

3d Brigade, 7th IraqiDivision (3-7 Iraqi Brigade)

If Sunnis fought the Iraqi Army because of itsShi'a identity, one might expect that a Sunnibrigade would have a better ability to keep vio-lence at a low level. Indeed, the one Iraqibrigade with a large Sunni composition experi-enced minimal attacks and easily enforced secu-rity in its area. The 3d Brigade, 7th Iraqi Divisionarrived in al-Qa'im in February 2006, following amajor Coalition clearing operation (OperationSteel Curtain). The brigade obviously benefitedfrom Operation Steel Curtain and could not havecleared the city on its own. What the brigade didwas prevent insurgents from infiltrating backinto the city. In other cities, such as Haditha andto some extent Fallujah, insurgents reinfiltratedfollowing clearing operations and resumedattacks. Uniquely, a large number of Sunnis filled3-7 Iraqi Brigade's rolls. Over the next 10months, the brigade faced few attacks in spite ofbeing severely undermanned, often operating atless than 50 percent strength (excluding leaverotations). It suffered roughly a quarter of thecasualties the Iraqi Army suffered in Fallujah, thenext most benign operating environment ofcomparable size (200,000 people). The fact thebrigade was relatively untrained and under-manned yet subject to few attacks reinforces theargument that training and numbers were notcritical to the ability of the Iraqi Army to managethe insurgency.

The success of the brigade depended on theAlbu Mahal tribe, the most powerful tribe in theal-Qa'im area. Roughly 20 to 40 percent of thebrigade came from that tribe.37 The Albu Mahalhad been insurgents in 2004. In 2005, AQI cameto al-Qa'im. The tribe disliked AQI's indiscrimi-nate use of force, importation of foreign fighters,and encroachment upon their control of theblack-market. Unfortunately, AQI defeated the

Albu Mahal in a battle for control of the city in2005.38 Thereafter, the Albu Mahal helped theCoalition reassert control over al-Qa'im. In par-ticular, the Coalition formed a set of "DesertProtector" platoons, composed of Albu Mahaland advised by U.S. Special Forces. The Ministryof Defense made special allowance for the for-mation of these militia-like units. The DesertProtector platoons proved especially useful dur-ing Operation Steel Curtain, when they collectedlarge amounts of intelligence. Fellow tribesmenreadily provided information on AQI sleeperagents, safe houses, ammunition caches, andbomb-making workshops.39

The Iraqi government rewarded the AlbuMahal for their support of Operation SteelCurtain. The Ministry of Defense allowed tribes-men to serve in 3-7 Iraqi Brigade, breaking thestandard rule that brigades in al-Anbar could nothe composed of local Sunnis. An Albu Mahaltribal leader, Colonel Ishmael, became thebrigade's commander. Two battalion command-ers and several staff officers were also AihuMahal. The Coalition formed a police force,commanded by Colonel Ishmael's brother. Bythe end of the year, the police force numberedover 1,000, largely from the Albu Mahal.

The Albu Mahal received other forms ofrewards besides control over an Iraqi Armybrigade. The Ministry of Defense appointedMajor General Murthi, from the tribe, as com-mander of the entire 7th Iraqi Division. Anothertribal leader became mayor of al-Qa'im. In termsof money, the tribe now had freedom to retakecontrol of the black market and run smugglingoperations into Syria. Control over phosphatemines in Akashat gave the tribe a lucrative com-modity to trade through al-Qa'im.40 Theserewards meant the Albu Mahal had deep inter-ests in ensuring insurgents; particularly AQI,never returned to al-Qa'im.

The brigade, together with the police, provedhighly effective in suppressing insurgent activity.Insurgent infiltration back into the city was rap-idly cut off. In contrast to other Iraqi Army for-mations, 3-7 Iraqi Brigade demonstrated a robustcapability for human intelligence collection.Battalions collected intelligence prodigiously, in

170

spite of the fact they had been given little train-ing. Soldiers and officers aggressively pursuedleads and regularly captured insurgents.Information could be gathered easily from otherAlbu Mahal.

The Habbaniyah Mutiny

If Shi'a identity inhibited the effectiveness ofthe Iraqi Army, then the obvious answer wouldseem to be to recruit more Sunnis. I MEF and IIMEF recognized that the Shi'a identity of the IraqiArmy inflamed tensions with the local Sunni pop-ulation of al-Anbar. Accordingly, recruiting Sunnisinto the army, particularly during early 2006,became a priority. Unfortunately, outside al-Qa'im, recruiting Sunnis proved quite difficult.

In late 2005, the Ministry of Defense grantedthat 5,000 Sunnis from al-Anbar could be recruit-ed into the army. In early 2006, the figure wasraised to 6,500. However, the ministry did notwant all of the Sunnis serving in the 1st or 7thDivisions. Rather, the Sunni recruits would hedeployed throughout the armed forces. Thethought was that if allowed to remain in al-Anbarlarge numbers of Sunni soldiers, who would haveties to local insurgents, might undermine the 1stand 7th Iraqi Divisions. In the view of Ministry ofDefense as well as much of the Iraqi government,Sunni elements of the two divisions, mightbecome de facto Sunni militias resistant to theIraqi government, like the old Fallujah Brigade (37 Iraqi Brigade evidently was exempt from thisconcern because of the Alhu Mahal rivalry withAQI). Consequently, only a minority of therecruits was permitted to serve in al-Anbar.

The first recruiting effort occurred at the end ofMarch. It aimed for 1,000 recruits. Ultimately, IMEF sent 1,017 recruits to training, largely fromFallujah. Unfortunately, success had been built onfalse pretenses. The Sunni recruits believed theywould be serving near their homes. They did notknow they could be deployed anywhere in Iraqor even anywhere in al-Anhar. In fact, the mayorof Fallujah had reassured the Fallujah recruits thatthey would serve in Fallujah. By all accounts, hisassurances had induced many of them to volun-teer.

on 30 April, the new soldiers graduated fromtraining. During the ceremony, replete withCoalition and Iraqi generals, it was announcedthat many would be deployed outside al-Anbar.Yelling and throwing their uniforms to theground, 600 of the newly trained soldiers refusedto deploy. The main reason was a desire to stayclose to home hut this was connected to a fear ofShi'a militias and sectarian retribution if theyjoined predominantly Shi'a units and deployedoutside the Sunni triangle. Many told U.S. officersthat they would he attacked if they left al-Anbar.The mayor of Fallujah supported the recruits,telling Coalition officers: "As long as I am receiv-ing corpses from Baghdad, I will not send soldiersthere'41 In the end, more than 600 of the 1,000recruits deserted.42

The mutiny deterred Sunnis from subsequentrecruiting efforts. Local imams and shaykhs evi-dently spoke out against joining the army.43 IMEF never found 6,500 Sunnis for the army.

The Habhaniyah Mutiny showed that Sunniswould not serve in the Shi'a dominated army ordeploy outside al-Anbar. It is the final piece ofevidence that makes the Iraqi Army appear dis-tinctly unable to handle the Sunni insurgency. TheIraqi Army cannot gather the intelligence neces-sary for effective counterinsurgency because of itsShi'a identity; while its structure as an integratedand national force deters Sunnis, who alone cancollect vital intelligence, from joining.

The Year of the Police

After the Habbaniyah Mutiny, I MEF came tothe conclusion that the best way to recruitSunnis into the Iraqi security forces would bethrough forming local police forces. Unlike thearmy, the Iraqi government permitted policeforces to be locally recruited. Casey had alreadydubbed 2006 the "year of the police." He want-ed I MEF to recruit 11,330 police in Anbar by theend of the year. In the view of MNF-I, the estab-lishment of law or order by police after the IraqiArmy had suppressed large-scale insurgent activ-ity represented a natural progression toward sta-bility. The commanders of I MEF tried to buildpolice less for this reason than because they

171

needed Sunnis to fight the insurgency.44To the surprise of many U.S. officers, reliable

local police actually formed in Al Anbar. By theend of 2006, roughly 20 percent of the forcesconducting counterinsurgency operations in al-Anbar were police (see Figure 1). Although theyhad no love for the Iraqi government, a numberof Sunnis wanted the violence and instability inal-Anbar to end. While in 2004 Sunnis had stoodfairly united in support of the insurgency, by2006 divisions had emerged between local Sunnileaders and hard-core insurgent groups.45 Hard-core insurgent groups like AQI upset local Sunnileaders with their heavy-handed tactics anddomination of the black market.46 Polls foundthat the majority of Sunnis opposed the foreignfighters affiliated with AQI and viewed them asa significant threat. In fact, 47 to 65 percentfavored killing them.47 Accordingly, certainSunni leaders cooperated with the Coalition toform police forces, most notably in Ramadi andFallujah. In Fallujah, a set of local tribes, civicleaders, and imams supported the creation of apolice force of 1,200.48 None of these groupswanted hardcore insurgents in Fallujah. InRamadi, a group of tribes centered on the AlbuThiyab, Albu Mi Jassim, and Albu Risha formeda police force of 1,000, under the leadership ofShaykh Sittar, a leader of the Albu Risha. InSeptember, Sittar openly announced the opposi-tion of those tribes to AQI and foreign-backedterrorists.49 Other police forces equally commit-ted to fighting AQI formed in Bagdadi, Hit, andHaditha.

Police forces proved far more dangerous toinsurgents than the Iraqi Army. One policemantold a Marine advisor: "What makes an insur-gent's heart turn cold is to see an Iraqi police-man in uniform. It is as if he has been stabbedin the chest with a cold knife."5° The effective-ness of the police derived from their ability asSunnis and members of the community to collectactionable intelligence. In Fallujah, most tips oninsurgent activity came from the police.51Marines patrolling or standing post with thepolice were impressed with their knowledge ofinsurgent activity, insurgent tactics, and the alle-giances of the population in the surrounding

area. The police regularly detained insurgents,especially in retaliation for attacks on policemen.At least five insurgent cells were taken out inJuly and August alone. In Ramadi, the policeaggressively targeted insurgents from informa-tion gathered during patrols or from their tribalconnections.52

Locals praised them.53 On one patrol into aneighborhood controlled by AQI, locals were intears at the sight of police. When asked in a pollif tribes were a good source of security, 69 per-cent of respondents strongly agreed (whenasked the same question about the Iraqi Army,81 percent strongly disagreed).54 Through theiraccess to intelligence, the Ramadi police andtheir tribes gave AQI a bloody nose during thelast months of 2006. Not just thugs and fighterswere captured or killed but leaders off Coalitionhigh value targeting lists, including at least twoal-Qaeda in Iraq "emirs" (senior leaders withinRamadi). The total number of publicized killingsnumbered over 20 by the end of October.55

Coalition officers were particularly impressedwith the willingness of the Ramadi police tostand and fight. In one notable engagement,roughly 25 insurgents positioned in an apart-ment complex ambushed a police raiding force.The police held their ground despite casualtiesand then assaulted the apartment complex. ACoalition quick reaction force provided somefire support hut the police cleared the insurgentsout of the apartments entirely on their own overan hour of fighting, capturing many of the insur-gents in the process. Insufficient numbers pre-vented the police from suppressing insurgentactivity throughout Ramadi but their willingnessto stand and fight plus access to intelligenceallowed them to at least keep their own tribalareas relatively free of violence.

Unlike the Albu Mahal in al-Qa'im, policeforces in Fallujah and Ramadi were too small (forreasons described below) to completely sup-press insurgent activity. However, their ability toreduce insurgent activity still surpassed that ofthe Iraqi Army. In Fallujah, the support ofimams, shaykhs, and former military officersenabled the police to lock down the city for theOctober 2005 referendum, December 2005 elec-

172

tion, and March 2006 Iraqi Army recruitingdrive.6 During the referendum and election,both the Coalition and Iraqi Army stayed withintheir bases and outposts, meaning the policehandled the bulk of the security duties. InRamadi, the police controlled incidents withintheir tribal areas and neighborhoods, even ifthey could not secure the city as a whole.

Police forces only succeeded because of thesupport of local leaders, such as shaykhs andimams, who encouraged young men to volun-teer and locals to provide information. The Iraqigovernment motivated local leaders to buildpolice forces and stand against AQI through pay-offs, political positions, and allowing them tocontrol their own security forces. These rewardsdid not mean that local leaders trusted the Iraqigovernment. Rather, they made it worthwhile forlocal leaders to risk their lives opposing AQI inorder to secure their own communities.

In Fallujah, economic assistance did notrestore prosperity but gave the city leaders, whosupported the police, the ability to keep portionsof the population complacent. The Iraqi govern-ment provided $180 million for housing com-pensation and the Coalition conducted majorprojects to improve power, water, sewage, andmedical care.57 Politically, the Coalitionarranged for Fallujah city leadership to havedirect access to the Iraqi government by bring-ing major national political leaders to Fallujah fortalks. Militarily, the Fallujah police became theprotectors of the city. People approved of thepolice not only because they opposed AQI butalso because they kept out Shi'a militias fromBaghdad.

In Ramadi, Maliki purportedly awarded Sittarand his subordinates cash gifts and salaries.58The government turned a blind eye when Sittarregained control of criminal activity along thehighways near Ramadi, which AQI had dis-turbed.59 The government also provided presti-gious political positions. At the end of October,the Ministry of the Interior granted Sittar author-ity over security in al-Anbar. Another leader inhis movement became the provincial policechief. The ministry permitted the movement tocreate three "emergency" battalions, totaling

2,250 men. This was a huge concession. For allintents and purposes, the government was per-mitting Sittar and his movement to have theirown militia. Sittar probably received vehiclesand weapons from the Iraqi government as well.Maliki's aides have stated that the prime ministersupports Sittar's movement and has met with itsleaders.60

Unfortunately, the government only boughtoff a minority of the population. This is the rea-son the police could not completely suppressinsurgent activity. Given high levels of attacks,insurgents probably outnumbered the policeeverywhere except al-Qa'im. One imam said that5 percent of the people in Fallujah were hard-core insurgents. This was undoubtedly an exag-geration but even if the figure was 2 percent, thepolice would still be outnumbered. Four thou-sand insurgents (if Fallujah contained 200,000people) would exceed the combined strength ofthe Coalition, Iraqi Army, and police. In Ramadi,Sittar slowly built support among other tribes butkey tribes and most of the insurgent fighterswould not oppose AQI. Sectarian violence anddisaffection with the government remained amajor concern for the bulk of the population inboth Fallujah and Ramadi that deterred wideraction against AQI. Rising sectarian violencemotivated men in Fallujah to join the insurgency,particularly refugees from Baghdad. Accordingto comments from some Sunnis, these menviewed AQI as the only means of defenseagainst the Shi'a militias. By mid-2006, continu-ing violence in Baghdad made many imamsresistant to moderation. Without their support,the police lost their best means of securing pop-ular sympathy and discouraging insurgents fromattacking them.61 People had similar opinions inRamadi. Lieutenant Colonel Adnan, chief of apolice station in Ramadi, said:

The people believe that the main reasonfor problems in Iraq is the government.Hakim and Sadr dominate the government.They work against Iraq. The situation hadinstilled hopelessness in the population.They do not believe stability will return.Good government in Baghdad would

173

make everything successful. It would endsectarian violence. The government pro-vides no help to Ramadi and hence the sit-uation is not good.62

In many respects, the Iraqi government hadonly done enough to reconcile with selectgroups that had their own reasons to opposeinsurgent activity. Efforts had been insufficient toovercome the deep grievances held by most ofthe population.

At the end of 2006, the police in Fallujah andRamadi remained resilient hut the situation couldhardly be called stable. In Fallujah, insurgentsconstantly targeted the police and their support-ers with sniper attacks, suicide car bombs, andassassinations. Casualties included the deputypolice chief, the traffic police chief, two capablesenior officers, a senior imam, and two chairmenof the Fallujah city council. The Coalition count-ed over 30 assassinations in July and August2006 alone. Locals were not willing to risk theirlives to protect the police, even if they appreci-ated their overall efforts. In Ramadi, AQI slewoff-duty police and members of their tribesalmost daily, including the shaykh of the AlbuAll Jassim tribe.6 Still, as of January 2007, thewill of the police in al-Anbar never broke; theycontinued to fight and contribute more towardstability than either the Coalition or the IraqiArmy.

Conclusion

This paper has asked whether Iraqization canproduce security forces able to suppress theinsurgency in al-Anbar. The answer is not withan integrated and predominantly Shi'a army. Ifthe United States withdrew today, the war wouldcontinue unabated. The Iraqi Army would besurrounded by a population unwilling to helpthem. At best, the army would operate as theydo now, unable to control much of al-Anbar. Atworst, the army would be isolated around theirposts and slowly whittled away by insurgentattacks.

Eventually, the insurgents, including AQI,would drive the army from al-Anbar and consol-

idate control over the province. The Shi'a gov-ernment might eventually win through sheernumbers or ruthless brutality but the stagewould be set for a long and bloody civil war.Insurgent and AQI control over al-Anbar and acivil war would hardly be positive outcomes forU.S. interests in the Middle East.

This grim forecast is not likely to change, nomatter the hours of training, amount of equip-ment, or number of advisors invested into theIraqi Army. Sunnis view the Iraqi Army as anoccupation force and consequently refuse toprovide the intelligence vital to successful coun-terinsurgency. The recommendations of the IraqStudy Group and other notable scholars to addadvisors, improve equipment, lengthen training,or increase the number of brigades will improvethe efficiency of the Iraqi Army but not enable itto reduce insurgent activity. More advisors, train-ing, or equipment will not change the identity ofthe Iraqi Army or motivate Sunnis to join it; norwill increasing the size of the Iraqi Army.

Iraqization might still work in al-Anbar butthe Iraqi Army cannot he the lone vehicle. Anycapable security force must include Sunnis inorder to gather intelligence from the population.Yet Sunnis will not join an army dominated byShi'a.

Unfortunately, the majority Shi'a share of thepopulation of Iraq argues that any integratedarmy will inherently have a Shi'a "face."Consequently, the Coalition should focus onbuilding local police forces. Under the right con-ditions, Sunnis have shown themselves willing tojoin local police forces, which have been able tocombat AQI, America's number one enemy inIraq. Select areas have been formed that enjoyrestricted insurgent activity. The growth of thepolice could expand these areas an enable areduced U.S. presence.

Furthermore, this model might be implement-ed outside al-Anbar. Local police forces shouldbe no less effective in other Sunni provinces,where the same division between AQI and Sunnileaders exists. To give three examples, 3dBrigade, 2d Iraqi Division, in Ninewa Provincehas a battalion of locally recruited Sunnis.According to U.S. officers, this battalion per-

forms well against AQI as long as it operates inits local area. Similarly, in Mosul, the Iraqi gov-ernment granted the Jabburi tribe control overthe police forces in order to counter AQI.Finally, Prime Minister Maliki has reportedly con-sidered implementing the model in Diyalaprovince, where there is a large Sunni popula-tion and AQI is present.64

The success of police in the Sunni provincesturns on the ability of the Iraqi government toreach out to local Sunni communities andgroups, particularly tribes, as they did with theFallujah city leadership, the Albu Mahal tribe,and Shaykh Sittar's movement. So far, the Iraqigovernment has not done enough to win overmore than a minority of the population. Imarns,shaykhs, and other local leaders would need tobe lavished with political and economic rewardsfor supporting the police. Such rewards couldinclude: political positions, command of militaryformations, civil affairs projects, economic com-pensation packages, salaries, and permission torun black market activities. Otherwise, localleaders will not risk their lives against the insur-gents. This form of Iraqization cannot succeedwithout the support of the Iraqi government. Ifthe government cannot deliver rewards to theSunnis, then Sunnis will not form security forcesand the insurgency will not be suppressed.

To be clear, the evidence suggests that themodel, and Iraqization as a whole, can onlylessen, not eliminate, insurgent activity in Sunniareas. Sectarian violence and some degree ofinsurgent activity will continue as long as nopolitical solution is found to the differencesbetween the Sunni and the Shi'a within Iraq.Iraqization cannot bring peace to Iraq even if itmight reduce the requirement for U.S. forcesthroughout the country.

Building local police forces would be a fun-damental shift from the current structure ofIraqization, which holds an integrated nationalarmy as the key to victory. The army should notbe abandoned; it has a proven ability to conductcombat operations and can provide backbone topolice operations. Nevertheless, greater effortwould need to be placed behind local policeforces of a single identity. Although police in

174

name, the Coalition would essentially be allow-ing local .Sunni militias. The formation of anational democracy would be undermined. TheUnited States would be tacitly permitting theSunnis, like the Shi'a with Jaysh al Mahdi and theBadr Corps, to defend themselves. With eachcommunity's military forces balancing againstone another, this would be one more steptoward the fragmentation of Iraq into Sunni,Shi'a, and Kurdish areas. A real possibility existsthat Sunni police in Baghdad and other mixedareas would clash with Shi'a militias in defenseof their neighborhoods. Under the worst case,Sunni police might attack Shi'a areas.Additionally, the government would be devolv-ing power from democratically elected officialsto traditional non-elected authority figures, suchas imarps and shaykhs, which could furtherundermine the democratization effort. Indeed,the move would drive Iraqi political develop-ment backwards toward the way that Iraq wasruled by the British, who gave the tribes consid-erable power in order to balance the authority ofthe government. That policy eventually left theIraqi government dependent on certain tribes forauthority (ironically, many of the very ones nowforming local police) and may have contributedto its ultimate downfall.

These possibilities reduce but do not elimi-nate the value of building local Sunni police. Toa certain extent, the costs can be exaggerated.National unity may be weakened but it is unlike-ly that local police would actually fragment thestate. Outside Baghdad, Sunni police forcesprobably have a better relationship with the Iraqigovernment than any other element of Sunnisociety and there are no cases of Sunni policefrom al-Anbar attacking Shi'a areas. Sunnis maynot help the Iraqi Army detain fellow Sunnis butall are not at open war with the Iraqi govern-ment either. The risk of clashes with Shi'a militiacould be mitigated by not forming Sunni policewithin Baghdad. Furthermore, the Iraqi govern-ment has already been willing to countenancethe formation of Sunni police. This suggests thatthe government does not view Sunni police as athreat. Indeed, an official from the Maliki gov-ernment told the Washington Post: "Obviously

175

some people see this as a threat, but when com-pared to other threats, this is a rather benignone."6 As long as the Iraqi government is pro-viding the economic and political rewards tosupportive Sunni groups, the likelihood of theBritish experience being repeated will be limit-ed. These Sunni groups will inherently dependon the government for patronage and power.They will be hard-pressed to challenge itsauthority without undermining their own posi-tion.

Ultimately, the United States faces a choice. Anational and integrated state can continue to bepushed, at the cost of the presence of hard-coreSunni insurgents, such as AQI. Or the ties thatbind the state can be loosened in order toremove hard-core insurgents, at the cost of for-malizing sectarian divisions and weakeningdemocratization. The latter is hardly optimal butstill preferable to allowing America's numberone enemy—AQI—to thrive in Iraq. By reducingthe insurgency, the Iraqi government may actu-ally gain better control over Iraq than it enjoysnow, or ever will if a national and integratedarmy remains the sole focus of Iraqization.

NotesWorking paper, Center for Stability and

Development, Center for Naval Analyses,February 2007. Reprinted by permission of theCenter for Naval Analyses.

1. In 2004, the Iraqi National Guard in al-Anbar plus theill-fated Fallujah Brigade performed poorly, eitherbecause of insurgent intimidation or outright sympathyfor the insurgency. Only one of the seven Iraqi NationalGuard battalions demonstrated minimal levels of effec-tiveness. The Fallujah Brigade was basically controlledby the insurgents and would not cooperate with theIraqi government.2. Of the 10 divisions, those in Shi'a and Kurdish areaswere locally based and could not be deployed to fightthe insurgency in Sunni areas.3. Michael Vickers, "Military Strategies forUnconventional Warfare," Council on Foreign Relations,New York, 27 October 2006; Thomas X. Hammes, AnOversight Hearing on the Planning and Conduct of theWar in Iraq," Senate Democratic Policy Hearing, 25September 2006; Thomas Ricks, "U.S. Military is StillWaiting for Iraqi Forces to 'Stand Up'," WashingtonPost, 1 October 2006; Thomas Ricks, "Flaws Cited in

Effort to Train Iraqi Forces," Washington Post, 21November 2006; Hans Binnendijk and Bing West,"Force Multiplier," Wall Street Journal, 21 November2006.4. General John Abizaid, Testimony to Senate ArmedServices Committee, 15 November 2006.5. Ibid.6. The Iraq Study Group Report (New York: VintageBooks, 2006), 70.7. Ibid., xvi, 70-75, 77-83.8. Discussion following I MEF Staff Visit to 3-1 IraqiBrigade, Camp Fallujah, 20 April 2006.9. Discussion with 1st Battalion, 506th U.S. InfantryRegiment (1-506 IN), Camp Corregidor, 12.10. Discussion with 1st Battalion, 172d InfantryRegiment (1-172 IN); Camp Ramadi, 14 March 2006.Discussions with 3d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment(3/7), Hurricane Point, Ramadi, 11 March 2006.11. Discussion with 1-172 IN, Camp Ramadi, 14 March2006.12. Discussion following I MEF Staff Visit to 3-1 IraqiBrigade, Camp Fallujah, 20 April 2006.13. Discussion with 1-506 IN, Camp Corregidor, 12 July2006.14. Discussion with 1-1 Iraqi Brigade military transitionteam, Combat Outpost, 10 July 2006.15. Correspondence with 1st Iraqi Division militarytransition team, 27 May 2006.16. James Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in StabilityOperations," Parameters 25 (Winter 1995).17. Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion,Insurgency & Peacekeeping (London: Faber and Faber,1971), 95.18. Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of theArmy, December 2006), 1-23.19. Al-Aribar Survey 11: September/October 2006,October 2006, 24; Al-Anbar Survey 7: May 2006, 10 June2006, 43.20. Al-Anbar Survey 7: May 2006, 10 June 2006, 43.21. Discussions with 1-1 Iraqi Brigade military transitionteam, Combat Outpost, 10 July 2006; Discussions with1-1 Iraqi Brigade, Combat Outpost, 10 July 2006;Discussions with 1-506 IN, Camp Corregidor, 10-12 July2006.22. Discussion with 1-1 Iraqi Brigade, Ramadi, 11 July2006.23. Provincial Reconstruction Meeting, GovernmentCenter, Ramadi, 13 March 2006.24. Discussion with 1-172 IN, Camp Ramadi, 14 March2006.25. Brief with 1-7 Iraqi Brigade, Camp Ramadi, 15March 2006.26. Discussion with military transition team for a battal-ion in 1-7 Iraqi Brigade, Ramadi, 6 July 2006.27. Discussion with Government Support Team,Government Center, Ramadi, 12 March 2006.28. Fallujah City Council Meeting, Fallujah Mayor's

176

Compound, 31 July 2006.29. Discussions with 2-1 Iraqi Brigade, CMOC, Fallujah,20 March 2006.30. Discussion with 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st IraqiDivision military transition team, Fallujah, 31 July 2006.31. Security Council Meeting, CMOC, Fallujah, 20 March2006.32. Fallujah City Council Meeting, Fallujah Mayor'sCompound, 31 July 2006.33. Fallujah City Council Meeting, Fallujah Mayor'sCompound, 16 May 2006.34. Correspondence with al-Anbar State DepartmentRepresentative, 13 March 2006.35. Coalition units also occupied Sunni residences asobservation posts.36. Discussion with Brigadier General Razzaq, CombatOutpost, 11 April 2006. Discussion with 1-1 IraqiBrigade, Combat Outpost, 10 July 2006.37. Discussions with Regimental Combat Team 7 (RCT-7), Camp Al Asad, 23 February 2006.38. Hannah Allam and Mohammed al Dulaimy, "IraqisLament Call for Help," Philadelphia Inquirer, 17 May2005.39. "Iraq's Desert Protection Force at War," Front Page,1 January 2006.40. Discussions with RCT-7, Camp Al Asad, 15 July2007.41. Fallujah City Council Meeting, Mayor's Complex, 2May 2006.42. 1 MEF Staff Meeting, Camp Fallujah, 2 May 2006.43. Regimental Combat Team 5 (RCT-5) CombinedCommanders' Meeting, Camp Fallujah, 10 May 2006,44. I MEF Commanders' Conference, Camp Fallujah, 8August 2006.45. Hence, in 2004, the Iraqi National Guard andFallujah Brigade were ineffective because the Sunnipopulation fully supported violent resistance. By 2006,that dynamic had changed and local Sunni forces couldbe formed.46. Michael Gordon, "Wary Iraqis are Recruited asPolicemen," New York Times, 24 July 2006.47. AJ-Anbar Survey 11: September/October 2006,October 2006, 29,41.48. Discussion with Fallujah Police Transition Team,Camp Fallujah, 25 March 2006.49. Khalid al-Ansary and Ali Adeeb, "Most Tribes inAnbar Agree to United Against Insurgents,"New YorkTimes, 18 September 2006.50. Discussions with RCT-7, Camp Al Asad, 15 July2006.51. Discussion with Fallujah Police Transition Team,Camp Fallujah, 25 March 2006; Anna Mulrine, "Gettingit Right with the Law," U.S. News & World Report, 24 July2006.52. Thiebauld Malterre, "Ramadi: Defended byInsurgents Turned Police," AFP 2 December 2006.53. Discussion with 1-506 IN, ECP-8, Ramadi, 11 August2006.

54. Poll of Ramadi, April 2006.55. Mussab al Khairalli, "Sunni Chiefs Offer al-MalikiHelp in War on Militants," Washington Times, 28September 2006; Ellen Knickmeyer and MuhammedSaif Adin, "Families Flee Iraqi River Towns on 4th Dayof Sectarian Warfare," Washington Post, 17 October2006.56. Discussion with Fallujah Police Transition Team,Fallujah Police Station, 26 April 2006; Meeting with for-mer Iraqi Army generals, Fallujah Police Station, 6 April2006.57. Discussion with 3d Civil Affairs Group, FallujahCMOC, 26 April 2006.58. Peter Beaumont, The Guardian, 3 October 2006.59. Mark Kukis, "Turning Iraq's Tribes Against al-Qaeda," Time, 26 December 2006.60. Joshua Partlow, "Sheiks Help Curb Violence inIraq's West, U.S. Says," Washington Post, 27 January2007.

177

61. Discussion with al-Anbar imam, 30 June 2006.62. Discussions with Ramadi Police, Jazirah PoliceStation, 28 July 2006.63. Ibid.64. Joshua Partlow, "Sheiks Help Curb Violence inIraq's West, U.S. Says," Washington Post, 27 January2007.65. Ibid.

About the AuthorCarter A. Malkasian directs the Small Wars Program at the Center

for Naval Analyses. Prior to his current job, he was assigned to the

I Marine Expeditionary Force as an advisor on counterinsurgency.

He deployed with I MEF to Iraq from February to May 2003,

February 2004 to February 2005, and February 2006 to August

2006.

The Anbar Awakening

by Austin G. LongSurvival, April-May 2008

Jn late 2006, after several failed attempts andfalse starts, a tribal grouping in Iraq's restiveprovince of Anbar allied with the United States

and the central government of Iraq to fight 'al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia." The U.S. alliance with thisgroup, known, as the Anbar Salvation Council(ASC), was widely hailed as a breakthrough bothby members of the press and some officials in theU.S. and Iraqi governments.' Certainly the ASC'scooperation made Anbar's capital Ramadi, previ-ously one of the most violent cities in Iraq, muchsafer. Cooperation with the tribes of Anbar was notunprecedented for Washington and Baghdad, butthe alliance with the ASC was both more publicand more dramatic than previous, cooperation andsaw significant linking of certain tribes and triballeaders with the formal government structure of theprovince. In 2007, the U.S. military began seekingto forge similar alliances across Iraq, making Anbarthe model for the provision of internal security.

Relying on tribes to provide security is not anew phenomenon for Iraq. The British did so inthe 1920s; later Saddam Hussein became a masterof using them to ensure the continuity of his rule,particularly once the formal Iraqi state and theBa'ath Party withered in the 1980s and 1990s.While the current attempt in Anbar is analogous, itis not identical, and the differences suggest that itis likely to be less successful in the long run thanSaddam's effort. Moreover, the current attempthighlights tension between the means and ends ofIraq strategy. The tribal strategy is a means toachieve one strategic end, fighting al-Qaeda inMesopotarnia, but is antithetical to another, the cre-ation of a stable, unified and democratic Iraq.

The Tribe and the State

The nature of tribes can be quite confusing tothose unfamiliar with them. In general, a tribe con-

179

sists of various smaller clans, in turn composed ofextended families. Members of a tribe claim kin-ship, which is often based on association and asser-tion of a 'myth of common ancestry' rather thanactual consanguinity.2 This asserted relationship issometimes called "fictive kinship." Fictive or not,this kinship helps regulate conflict and providesbenefits such as jobs and social welfare in environ-ments where the modern state does not exist or istoo weak to function.3 In Iraq, both the basic struc-ture of tribes and the terms used to refer to themhave changed over time. In present-day Anbar, thebasic unit is the tribe (rashira), which is composedof clans (aflthacO. These clans are made up of line-ages or households (hamoulas>, which are in turnmade up of houses (bayts) that contain individualfamilies ('alias). In some cases, the term qabila isused to refer to a large tribe or confederation oftribes.4 Saddam Hussein's tribal position at the timeof the second Ba'ath coup of 1968 provides a goodexample of this system. His tribe was the AlbuNasir, one of three main groupings in the town ofTikrit. The Albu Nasir had six clans; Saddam wasfrom the Beijat, the dominant clan. Within the Beijatclan were 10 lineages; Saddam was from the AlbuGhafur lineage. Within the Albu Ghafur were twomain houses; Saddam's was the Albu Majid. Hisfamily was that of Hussein, though Hussein him-seif—Saddam's father—died before Saddam wasborn.5

It is important to note that kinship ties, whileimportant, are not sacrosanct, particularly at themore abstract level of tribe and clan. Once again,Saddam Hussein's life provides an example.Saddam at the time of the 1968 coup was deputy tohis kinsman Ahrnad Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr wasalso from the Beijat clan. However, as his nameindicates, al-Bakr was from a different lineage, theAlbu Bakr. Despite these affiliations, Saddam even-tually maneuvered al-Bakr out of power and madehis own lineage, Albu Ghafur, supreme.6 AJ-Bakr'ssubsequent death under mysterious circumstancesis often attributed to those loyal to Saddam.

Saddam's closer kinsmen provided a more loyalpower base. After the death of Saddam's father, hismother's remarriage to a member of the AlbuKhattab lineage of the Beijat clan gave him threehalf-brothers from another lineage. He also drewupon his close cousins from the Aibu Majid houseof the Albu Ghafur lineage to fill his top securityranks. In general, close kinships like this have fargreater strength than the more abstract links of tribeand clan.7

The impact of tribes on state formation in theMiddle East has varied from state to state.8 In Iraqin the 1920s, the tribe was a rural organization thatstood in opposition to all things urban and modern.Following a revolt against the new Hashemitemonarchy, the British and their allies in the royalfamily sought to appease and manipulate the tribes.In exchange for their support, areas outside citieswere in many ways made a law unto themselves.9

The overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in1958 initiated a decline in tribal power, as the newmilitary regime eliminated laws that gave sheikhslegal authority and control of agricultural land. Thisled to an exodus from rural areas to the cities andthe first encounters of peasant tribesman with analien urban environment. Many used affiliation toanchor themselves in this often hostile setting andtribalism came to coexist with urban modernity asever more Iraqis migrated to towns and cities.

However, though some Iraqis clung to tradition-al names and affiliations, tribalism's power wanedthrough the 1960s. Iraq :was slowly but surelybecoming a modern nation-state with a functioningsecurity apparatus, judiciary and bureaucracy. Bythe late 1960s, tribalism was at its nadir, with manyIraqis ceasing to define themselves in the tradition-al way (though more than a few existed in a sort ofdual state, with membership in both a tribe and amodern organization such as a trade union).10

In theory, the return of the Ba'ath Party to powerin 1968 (it had briefly held power in 1963 but wasousted by the military) should have heralded thedeath knell of the tribe. Ba'ath ideology is relent-lessly secular and modernist. As Amatzia Baramnotes, the first Ba'ath communique in July 1968declared: 'We are against religious sectarianism,racism, and tribalism', the latter being one of 'theremnants of colonialism'.11

180

However, the Ba'ath Party was highly insecure inits control of Iraq. In order to prevent another coup,the party both massively expanded membershipand sought to place loyal elements in the militaryand security services. Many of these loyalists weremembers of the same tribe as the senior leaders ofthe party.12 Thus, from its inception, the Ba'athregime had an inconsistent policy and attitudewhich ensured that tribal power, though teniporar-ily diminished, would endure.

Tribal-State Security Relations

The Ba'ath government's use of tribes to con-trol Iraq's state-security apparatus is far fromunique. Modern nation-states have in manyinstances turned to tribes to help provide inter-nal security, generally because the state is eithertoo weak to provide security itself or because itis too expensive to do so. In general, the weak-er the state, the more autonomy is given to tribesto provide what the state cannot.

There are three basic patterns the relationshipcan take. These are not necessarily mutuallyexclusive, so that different patterns can be seenin the same state. The first is most likely in rela-tively stronger states and occurs when one groupseeks to dominate the state's security apparatusby commingling tribal networks with the formalstate structure. This 'state tribalism' is common instates that have not fully institutionalized themechanism for providing internal security.13 Inthe Middle East, Iraq, Syria, and many of the GulfStates have practiced various forms of state trib-alism.14 Other countries, such as Jordan, useelectoral arrangements favoring tribes to ensurecontrol of ostensibly democratic legislatures,partly to ensure internal security.15

Outside the Middle East, this pattern is com-monly seen in postcolonial Africa. Kenya, forexample, was dominated in the early postcolo-nial period by the Kikuyu tribe. The governmentof Jomo Kenyatta intentionally filled the armywith Kikuyu tribesmen in the late 1960s to neu-tralise the Kamba and Kalenjin tribes that haddominated the country under the British. Thegovernment also used a paramilitary organizationcalled the General Service Unit as a Kikuyu

Praetorian guard and 'Kikuyuised' the police andother intelligence services.16 Following the deathof Kenyatta in 1978, Vice President Daniel arapMoi, a member of the Kalenjin tribe, assumed thepresidency and began to seed the security serv-ices with his own kinsmen, allowing him tothwart an attempted coup in 1982:17 This patternof state tribalism in the security services has con-tinued and affiliation remains important toKenyan politics and the preservation of internalsecurity.18

The second pattern is common in weakerstates and involves quasi-autonomous militiasbased on tribe (or more broadly on ethnicity).These militias are effectively "deputized" to pro-vide internal security in certain regions inexchange for some form of payment from thecentral state. This pattern can be termed "auxil-iary tribalism." Afghanistan in the late 1980s andearly 1990s provides one of the best examples ofthe successful application of this pattern as wellas a Caution about its possible consequences.The communist government of Afghanistan faceda tenacious multiparty insurgency beginning inthe late 1970s that even major Soviet interventionwas unable to quell. The Afghan governmentbegan to. arm and pay various tribal and ethnicmilitias to fight the insurgency, . or to at leastremain neutral. This process accelerated afterMohammed Najibullah replaced Babrak Karmalas president in 1986, and enabled Najibullah'sregime to survive the Soviei withdrawal in1989.19 Perhaps the most famous of these mili-tias was that of General Abdul Rashid Dostum,an ethnic Uzbek from northwestern Afghanistan.Dostum's militia grew from a small force intend-ed to protect gas fields to over 20,000 menarmed with heavy equipment and artillery by thelate 1980s. Dostum was so effedtive he became ade facto mobile reserve for the Afghan govern-ment. However, when the collapsing SovietUnion cut funding to Afghanistan and the abilityof the Afghan government to pay declined,Dostum quickly switched sides to the insurgents.This defection precipitated the rapid collapse ofthe Afghan government in early 1992.20

The final pattern of relations is the cession ofall but the most desultory control over a territory

181

to a tribe. Only the weakest or poorest of. stateswould normally accept this type of relationship.Tribal leaders become, in effect, palatine vassalsof the central state, and are often as restive astheir medieval counterparts. This pattern can betermed "baronial tribalism." It is fairly rare, assuch feudal relations are anathema to modernnation-states, but can be seen in Pakistan in theregion along the border with Afghanistan. Eitherdejure or de facto tribal autonomy characterizesmuch of Baluchistan, the Federally Administered.Tribal Areas (which includes North and SouthWaziristan) and the NorthWest FrontierProvince. The federal governinent's presence isfelt lightly, if at all (apart from the occasionalpunitive expedition), a situation echoing theBritish imperial experience in these rugged bor-der regions.21 Yemen offers another example:clashes between a very weak central state andwell-armed tribes are frequent and violent.22However, in most rural regions tribal . law is farmore powerful than the laws of the government,so despite these clashes the government alsouses tribes to provide a degree of internal secu-rity.23

A final variation on these three patterns occurswhen an external power becomes involved inthe provision of internal security to a state. Thispresents the possibility, of a three-way relation-ship among tribe, state and external power thatcan produce many complications. The externalpower might choose to ally itself with groupsthat are hostile to the state or vice versa, poten-tially creating serious problems. Further, the exis-tence of multiple tribes can 'mean that the exter-nal power must also balance relations withgroups that compete among themselves.

The United States' involvement in Viet:nam isa good example. In the early 1960s, the CIA andU.S. Army Special Forces began arming andtraining Montagnard tribesmen in the mountain-ous west of South Vietnam to fight Communistinsurgents supported. by North Vietnam (a formof auxiliary tribalism). The Montagnard recruitswere enthusiastic in fighting the insurgents, yetwere only slightly less hostile to the governmentof South Vietnam, which had never treated theMontagnard minority particularly well. The gov-

Iraqi Freedom. Tribal forces were to be integratedwith other military and paramilitary formations toprevent an uprising like that of 1991 and, if need-ed, to fight invading Coalition forces. To ensurethat he could continue to buy tribal loyalty,Saddarn removed over a billion dollars from theIraqi Central Bank right before the war.39Unfortunately for him, once the attack began theloyalty of the tribes proved ephemeral and manychose not to fight. A senior military adviser to theBa'ath Party near the city of Samawa recalled afterthe war: "They called the tribal chiefs in As-Samawa to try and get more men, but the tribessaid, 'We have no weapons, so how can we fight?'I sensed we were losing control of the situation—and the American forces had not yet arrived, therewere only air attacks."40

The U.S. -Iraqi Tribal Strategy

Following the rapid success of U.S. conven-tional forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom, therewas a need to provide internal security acrossthe heterogeneous Iraqi nation, including inAnbar, the former bastion of the Ba'athist tribalstrategy. Even in concert with Iraq's interim gov-ernment, this proved challenging and 2003-04saw the birth of an insurgency in Anbar andmajor anti-Coalition violence. Participants in theinsurgency came from a mixture of groups andincluded former senior Ba'athists, tribesmen andforeign fighters. Though their motives differed,these groups made common cause against theCoalition.41

In this period, the U.S-Iraqi tribal strategywas rudimentary in Anbar. However, by early2004, U.s. and Iraqi officials began engaging indialogue with tribes, and in limited cases coop-erated with them. Still, the tribes overall saw lit-tie reason to support the new order and oftensided with the newly declared al-Qaeda inMesopotamia or other insurgent groups.

Attitudes began to shift in early 2005, follow-ing the massive Coalition assault on Fallujah inNovember 2004 and the Iraqi national electionsin January 2005. Many tribal leaders began toconclude that the political process might holdmore benefit than continued fighting. Further, al-

184

Qaeda in Mesopotamia's transnational and fun-damentalist goals were at odds with the local ornational goals of the tribes. Finally, and perhapsmost importantly, al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia wascompeting for control of revenue sources—suchas banditry and smuggling—that had long beenthe province of the tribes.42

Under this interpretation, the tribes did notchange sides in response to violence towardscivilians or their Anbar kinsmen, as press'accounts have suggested. While this violencewas not irrelevant, it does not appear to havebeen the central motive for the shift. For exam-ple, some began fighting al-Qaeda inMesopotamia at least as early as the beginningof 2005, well before most of the violencetowards civilians and tribesmen in Anbaroccurred. The primary motive was not moral; itwas self-interested.

In fact, it can be argued that much (though farfrom all) of al-Qaeda's violence against Sunnis inAnbar was intended to coerce the tribes backinto alignment with the insurgents. Certainly thiswas the intent of attacks on selected tribal lead-ers. In other words, al-Qaeda's violence wasprincipally an effect of shifts in allegiance ratherthan a cause. Though it often appears senselessand brutal to outsiders, the coercive use ofextreme violence in insurgency and civil war isboth fairly common and sometimes quite effec-tive.43

This shift in the strategic calculus of the tribesmade a successful U.S. Iraqi tribal strategy pos-sible, but the opportunity was not fully exploit-ed. For example, the United States did not takefull advantage of a shift among members of thepowerful Dulaimi confederation in westernAnbar. The Albu Mahal tribe around the city ofQaim resented the influx of al-Qaeda inMesopotamia to their border town and thegroup's competition with Albu Mahai's lucrativesmuggling operations. With the support of mem-bers of the Albu Nimr, the Albu Mahal formedthe Hamza Forces (also called the HamzaBattalion) to fight the newcomers. AI-Qaedaproved to be a tough opponent and in May of2005 the tribes decided to turn to Coalitionforces for help in battling them. Fasal al-Gaoud,

a former governor of Anhar and sheikh of theAlbu Nimr, contacted U.S. Marines for support.44

The Marines had already been planning anoffensive around Qaim, so this could have beenan ideal moment to cement an alliance. Instead,the Marine offensive, known as OperationMatador, was uncoordinated with the tribes(some Marines appear to have not beeninformed about the requested alliance) andmade use of intensive firepower, which alienat-ed many tribesmen by destroying portions ofQaim. Furthermore, the Iraqi government washostile to the Hamza Forces, declaring that suchvigilantes had no place in Iraq.45

After Operation Matador, there were no fur-ther attempts by the Hamza Forces to coordinatewith the Coalition for several months. WithoutCoalition support, the Hamza Forces were over-whelmed by al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia bySeptember of 2005.46 Fortunately, Coalitionforces in Anbar learned from their earlier mis-take and may have begun supporting the AlbuMahal with air strikes in late August 2005. Thiswas insufficient, however, to defeat the power-ful al-Qaeda forces around Qaim and inNovember 2005 Coalition forces launchedOperation Steel Curtain. This operation wasmarked by far better coordination with the AlbuMahal, and cooperation improved still furtherafter the operation, when Marines and IraqiArmy personnel stayed behind to support theAlbu Mahal in providing security.48

The eventual success of U.S-Iraqi coordina-tion with the Albu Mahal in 2005 was not wide-ly emulated, though some tribes did continue tofight al-Qaeda. For example, members of theDulaimi confederation fought the group aroundRamadi in August 2005. However, many inthe Coalition remained reluctant to fullyembrace a tribal strategy. More importantly, trib-al leaders were targeted by al-Qaeda in a coer-cive campaign of murder and intimidation whichsapped many tribes of the will to fight.50 Thesuccess of the terrorists in this campaign wasdue in part to the nature of tribal loyalty. Al-Qaeda was able to turn clans and families fromthe same tribe against one another with a com-bination of carrots (money and other patronage)

185

and sticks (threats of assassination).This pattern of failed efforts to oppose al-

Qaeda in Anbar continued into 2006. Elements ofthe Albu Fahd tribe, for example, began distanc-ing themselves from al-Qaeda in Ramadi in late2005 and early 2006. Al-Qaeda quickly targetedSheikh Nasr al-Fahdawi and other prominenttribesmen for assassination, which was (;arriedout in early 2006 (with the support of some of al-Fahdawi's pro-al-Qaeda fellow tribesmen).51 Acaptured al-Qaeda document from this periodreveals this strategy. Noting that tribal leadershad begun to cooperate with Americans, theauthors write: 'we found that the best solutions[sic] to stop thousands of people from renounc-ing their religion, is to cut the heads of the Sheiksof infidelity."52 They accuse Sheikh Nasr al-Fahdawi of using his money, power, and reputa-tion in Ramadi to "violate" the authors' 'broth-ers," continuing: "so the brothers raided hishouse in the middle of the night wearing thenational guards uniform and driving similar cars,they took him and killed him, thank God."53

Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia's campaign of mur-der and intimidation had the desired effect, asthe document notes:

Then there was a complete change ofevents than is was [sici before thank god,cousins of Sheik Nasr came to theMujahidin begging, announcing theirrepentance and innocence, saying we'rewith you, we'll do whatever you want. Theturmoil is over, our brothers now are roam-ing the streets of AlbuFahd without anycheckpoints.54

The document goes on to list others who werekilled or intimidated, indicating that the terrorists'coercive violence was successful.55

Coalition cooperation with the tribesremained limited through early 2006.56 Therewere some exceptional success stories, as withthe Albu Mahal and U.S. Army Special Forcesrelationship with the Albu Nimr around the cityof Hit. Even in these limited cases, al-Qaedarecognised the threat and sought to target thesetribes. In captured documents, the group noted

the need to attack the Albu Nimr and regrettednot crushing the Albu Mahal when it had thechance.57

Starting in mid-to-late 2006, however, thecooperation started to become more serious. InRamadi, Sheikh Sattar al-Rishawi of the Dulaimiconfederation's Albu Risha tribe formallylaunched a concerted campaign against al-Qaedain September 2006. Along with other leaderssuch as the Albu Nimr's Fasal al-Gaoud, Sattarfounded a tribal alliance known as the AnbarSalvation Council (ASC).

Sattar himself was a smuggler and highwayrobber, and a fairly minor sheikh. However, hewas bold and charismatic and had shrewd advis-ers such as his brother Ahmed; when opportuni-ties presented themselves he was well positionedto take advantage. Sattar had previously beenwilling to work with al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia,but began to clash with the group as it muscledin on his illegal revenue. In 2005, Sattar turned toother Iraqis to help him battle his unwelcomecompetitors, but this alliance was ineffective andshort lived. He subsequently seems to haverealised that the best way to defeat al-Qaeda andgain power was to side with the United States.58

Sattar and his new alliance were soon sup-ported by the Coalition. The U.S. military helpedto protect Sattar, and the government of Iraqembraced him, albeit reluctantly, as well. Sattarwas eventually made the counterinsurgencycoordinator for the province, his tribesmenjoined the Iraqi police around Ramadi in droves,and his militias were formally deputized as"Emergency Response Units." A blind eye wasturned to Sattar's extralegal revenue genera-tion.59

With the Albu Mahal and the Albu Risha, theCoalition was clearly employing both state-tribal-ism and auxiliary-tribalism strategies to provideinternal security. The Albu Mahal were allowedto effectively take over the Iraqi Army brigade intheir region, while the Albu Risha came to dom-inate the Ramadi police.60 The Iraqi governmentdelegated significant authority to both tribes,along with the Albu Nimr around Hit.

The effect of this strategy in 2007 was dramat-ic. By the late spring and early summer, parts of

186

Anbar (such as Ramadi) that had previously beenhorrifically violent were relatively peaceful. Sattarwas hailed as a hero by many Iraqis andAmericans.

The success was striking enough that theCoalition attempted to duplicate the modelacross Iraq, giving rise to the euphemism 'con-cerned local citizens' or 'CLCs' (presumably tomake the use of tribesmen and other formerinsurgents sound more palatable). These fightershave been recruited to help the Coalition inBaghdad and in parts of Salah ad Din and Diyalaprovinces.61 There are also efforts to expand thestrategy to the Shi'a south of Iraq.62 By mid 2007,Saddam's tribal strategy had in effect become theCoalition's.

Comparing Strategies

Despite the similarities between Saddam's rela-tively successful strategy and the Coalition's pres-ent-day efforts, there is no guarantee that theCoalition will prevail. The two have very differentcontexts.

The first and most obvious difference is therole of the United States as a third party. This cre-ates the possibility for tension between Baghdadand Washington regarding the means• and ends ofany tribal strategy. Presently, the government ofPrime Minister Nun al-Maliki is supporting thestrategy, albeit with reservations. His governmenthas been unable to establish security and has lit-tle authority in Anbar, so some formal deputiza-tion of tribes there does not represent a tangibleloss of government power. However, someShi'ites may cease to support what they regard asa generous approach to the Sunni; the politicalCoalition that supports al-Maliki is already frayingand might not survive.

This would confront the United States with adilemma similar to. that it faced in Vietnam's high-lands in the 1960s. Supporting the tribes wouldincrease the likelihood of success against 'theinsurgents, but would alienate the governmentand possibly precipitate government-tribe conflictor even the collapse of the frail Iraqi state.Supporting the government would make the sur-vival of a unified Iraq more likely, but could drive

the tribes back to the insurgency. This situationwould actually be worse than Vietnam; the Sunnitribes of Anbar are not a small rural minority likethe Montagnard, which makes it harder for theCoalition to exert leverage over them.

These tensions highlight a second and relateddifference between Saddam's and the Coalition'stribal strategies. Saddam's strategy was relativelysimple in that it had only one goal: keepingSaddam in power. The United States has at leasttwo goals: achieving a stable, democratic Iraq anddefeating al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia. If the Iraqigovernment ceases to support the tribal strategy,these two goals would become mutually exclu-sive, at least in the short run. Already, thestrengthening of unelected sheikhs in Anbarmeans an end to democracy in that province, atleast for the present.

Further, the tribes themselves are no more uni-fied now than they were under Saddam. Thepotential for both inter- and intra-tribal conflictremains. Some reports suggest that friction withinthe ASC is already high. Even if this is overstatedit illustrates the potential for conflict in the future.Other tribes are reported to feel neglected orexcluded from government and security-forcepositions.63

Intra-tribal relations can be equally challeng-ing. As an example, in the powerful Albu Nimr,Sheikh Fasal al-Gaoud was relatively weakdespite (or perhaps because of) being the formergovernor of Anbar. The real power in the AlbuNimr belongs to other members of his lineage,such as Sheikhs Jubair and Hatem al-Gaoud.Hatem and Jubair in turn have some rivalrydespite being not only from the same lineage butthe same house (Hatem is Jubair's nephew).64

While Hatem and Juhair have a good relation-ship with U.S. special operations forces, othermembers of the al-Gaoud family had close links toSaddam Hussein. Sattarn al-Gaoud was the direc-tor of the largest network: of Iraqi front compa-nies involved in smuggling for the regime. Thenetwork, Al-Eman, had numerous al-Gaoud fami-ly members in key positions. Sattam and many ofhis relatives were also associated with the IraqiIntelligence Service.6 While they have taken tospending much of their time in Jordan since the

187

fall of Saddam, these al-Gaouds retain both wealthand connections inside Iraq, including to insur-gent groups.66

This tangled family Situation represents theintricacies of just one prominent family in oneprominent tribe. As it expands its tribal strategy inIraq, the United States will have to managedozens or even hundreds of these relationships,leading one intelligence officer in Anbar to com-pare Iraqi tribal relations to Latin American telen-ovelas in drama and complexity.6 BecauseWashington lacks the detailed knowledge of Iraqiclans possessed by Saddam, its approach is morelike the British approach of the 1920s. Rather thanmanaging the tribes, it is simply ceding Anbar tothem, and potentially other territories as well. Thiscession undermines the past five decades ofattempts to build a modern state in Iraq.

The third difference between the two strategiesis the relative strength of the Iraqi state. UnderSaddam, the state was battered by two decades ofwar and sanctions, yet it nonetheless retained sig-nificant coercive capability. This was due in nosmall part to Saddam's ruthless willingness tocause civilian casualties and suffering, and thestate's large numbers of military and security-serv-ice personnel backed by totalitarian intelligenceservices. On the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom,for example, Saddam is estimated to have hadabout 400,000 military personnel supplementedby perhaps as many police and security-servicemembers. In contrast, the current Iraqi govern-ment has an authorized military end strength of175,000, supplemented by a Ministry of Interiorwhich has over 320,000 personnel on its payroll.Taking these numbers at face value, Saddam hada 50 percent advantage in total personnel, andmore than double the number of military person-nel. Yet the modern Iraqi military and securityservices are in reality nowhere near their author-ized strength; indeed the Ministry of Interior isunable to determine which if any of its 320,000employees is actually working. Further, the Iraqimilitary lacks much of the heavy equipment thatenabled Saddam to punish tribal uprisings such asthe Albu Nimr's 1995 revolt.68

Admittedly, the government of Iraq does pos-sess one significant tool of coercion: the U.S. mil-

itary. Yet the United States lacks the ruthlessnessof Saddam, and its forces are better suited to con-ventional battle than internal security. Also, theUnited States will clearly not maintain major forcelevels in Iraq indefinitely, so this coercive tool isa temporary asset for the government of Iraq.Whereas Saddam was able to restrict the power ofthe tribes to some degree, the present governmentof Iraq could soon face a situation in which baro-nial tribalism reigns throughout Anhar.

The fourth difference is the nature of theenemy that the respective tribal strategies areintended to defeat. Saddam's strategy was prima-rily aimed at other Sunni tribes and the restiveShi'a. Neither of these enemies had either motiveor opportunity to outbid Saddam for the loyalty oftribes; the combination of carrots and sticks hecould wield was too compelling.

Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, on the other hand,possesses a real capacity to outbid the Coalitionas it attempts to build alliances. Moreover, it is stillcapable of murder and intimidation against triballeaders. For example, al-Qaeda is believed to bebehind the bombing of the Mansour Hotel in June2007 that killed Fasal al-Gaoud, the Albu Nimrsheikh who had long sought to arrange Coalitioncooperation with the tribes. The bombing alsokilled two other leaders of the Albu Nimr and asheikh of the Albu Fahd, who had once againswitched sides to join the ASC.6 Other killings ofASC members take place frequently despite U.S.support and protection.70 Sunnis who have joinedwith the Coalition in Baghdad and elsewhere alsoface fierce reprisals.71

Most notably, Sheikh Sattar was killed on 13September 2007 by an improvised explosivedevice emplaced near his farm outside Ramadi.Unlike many previous assassinations of triballeaders, this attack did not demolish the will tofight of the Albu Risha or the ASC.72 Sattar'sbrother Ahmed quickly stepped into his place,and while lacking some of Sattar's charisma, he isa capable leader. He has begun negotiations withShi'a leaders and, realizing that his tribal powerbase is limited, has attempted to build a politicalbase beyond his tribe.73 However, the fact thatSattar was killed in essentially his own backyarddespite significant ASC and Coalition protection

188

suggests that al-Qaeda (who may have bribed oneor more of Sattar's guards) retains the ability touse coercive violence against even well-guardedsenior figures, let alone rank-and-file tribesmen.74

Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia still has substantialrevenue from activities in Iraq as well as dona-tions from abroad (according to some reports ithas sufficient excess revenue to fund al-Qaeda inPakistan in addition to its own efforts).75 Al-Qaeda thus has significant carrots and sticks withwhich to motivate the tribes, or portions thereof,to switch sides.

Moreover, whereas Saddam, like the membersof al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, was a Sunni, the cur-rent government of Iraq is principally Shi'a. ManySunni believe it is little more than a tool of Iran.Shi'a death squads have carried out ethnic cleans-ing in Baghdad and have infiltrated parts of theIraqi government. In November 2007 senior lead-ers in Anhar complained that the government wasnot providing them sufficient resources, whichthey attributed to the government's sectarian bias.Leaders south of Baghdad have made similarcomplaints.6 This perception of bias could makethe tribes more inclined to listen to al-Qaeda,which can portray itself as seeking to protect theSunni and limit the influence of Iran. This will beparticularly true if sectarian violence rises again.

Looking to the Future

With these key differences in mind, two sce-narios can be envisioned for the next two tothree years. In the first, current trends continueunchanged. The government of Iraq continues toembrace the current tribal strategy, and thereremains sufficient U.S. combat power to supportand protect the tribes in Anhar and elsewhere.Patronage from both the government of Iraq andthe United States continues to flow and thetribes' extra-legal income remains lucrative,while sectarian violence does not worsen.

This scenario looks favorable for the UnitedStates, as it would mean that al-Qaeda inMesopotamia would be substantially weakened(though probably not eliminated). The trade-offfor allowing continued state and auxiliary tribal-ism would be the possibility of putting democra-

tization on hold: elections in Anbar would likelybe postponed or the formal structure of gover-nance marginalized. Though unfortunate, thiswould not necessarily be permanent and wouldprobably be accepted in the short term by manyresidents of Anbar as the price of security. It ispossible that the ASC could jointly assume gov-erning authority with provincial officials as partof a state-of-emergency government. And ifSheikh Ahmed succeeds in creating a non-tribalparty, local democracy might even be preserved.

For the government of Iraq, this scenariomeans accepting a short- to medium-term contin-uation of Saddam's tribal strategy with all thehazards that entails. The loyalty of the tribeswould have to be continually paid for and rela-tionships both with and among the tribes wouldhave to be managed. Anbar would enjoy at leastas much autonomy as it enjoyed under Saddam,when it was governed by a system approachingbaronial tribalism. Indeed, the government ofIraq would have little more control over Anbarthan the government of Pakistan does over itswestern provinces. Further, by allowing thetribes a virtual monopoly on military and securi-ty forces in Anbar, the strategy would makefuture coups or civil war possible. The power oftribes in other regions would be expanded aswell. For the Shi'a majority of Iraq, this might beacceptable but would remain worrisome.

As problematic as the above outcome wouldbe, a much worse outcome is easily imaginedsimply by factoring in likely medium-termevents, among them a withdrawal of U.S. forcesthat is not precipitous but nonetheless substan-tially reduces combat power in Anbar and otherprovinces. This would mean less ability to pro-tect and support the ASC and other tribes. Itwould also make the supply of material supportand patronage by the United States more difficult(though not impossible).

At the same time, the al-Maliki government ascurrently constituted is likely to change. It couldshift towards a more hard-line Shi'a position orhe supplanted entirely. Regardless, its supportfor the tribes will probably decrease if not endaltogether. The combination of a U.S. drawdownand a shift in the position of the Iraqi govern-

189

ment could exacerbate sectarian violence.Even as Coalition support to the tribes wanes,

al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia is likely to retain muchof its ability to employ both carrots and sticks.The tribes may therefore be made "an offer theycan't refuse." Like Rashid Dostum in Afghanistan,they could readily conclude that switching sideswas in their best interest. This would be a partic-ularly had outcome for the Coalition as it wouldhave helped train, equip and sustain forces thatwould then begin to work against it. For theUnited States, this would mean Anbar and otherregions would become havens for al-Qaeda as itworked to destabilize the region and possiblysupport attacks further afield. For the govern-ment of Iraq, it would mean de facto partition,civil war, or both.

Finally, it is not clear that the present internal-security model can be expanded to the Shi'asouth. The power of the tribes dwindled more inthe face of modernization among the Shi'a thanit did among the Sunni. The tribe was replacedor at least modified by the power of politicalIslam, so that in Shi'a areas political-religiousparties or groups tend to dOminate.77 The largestat present are Muqtada al-Sadr's Office of theMartyr Sadr and affiliated militia Jaiysh al-Mahdi;and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim's Supreme Iraqi IslamicCouncil and affiliated militia, the Badr organiza-tion. However, there are numerous other groupswith affiliated militias including the Fadhila Partyand several smaller organizations. While tribalgroups are not wholly absent, they lack thepower and organization of these religious-politi-cal groups. In Basra, for example, armed tribes-men play a role in the fighting hut the major fac-tions are party militias.78 So even if the UnitedStates' tribal strategy succeeds in the Sunni cen-ter and west of Iraq, the Shi'a south would like-ly remain problematic.

Fully embracing a tribal strategy for internalsecurity in Anbar has been successful to date andexpansion of this strategy over the rest of Iraqcould provide real short-term security gains in atleast some areas. There is little guarantee thatthese gains will persist, however, and there issome chance that the strategy will backfire in themedium term. Even Saddam Hussein had diffi-

culty managing Iraq's tribes despite his totalitari-an state and lavish patronage. As the UnitedStates prepares to reduce its commitment to Iraq,it should be clear on both the tension in itsstrategic goals and the potential for the tribes toonce again switch sides.

Beyond Iraq, there has been discussion of aU.S. alliance with tribes in Pakistan to fight al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the border region withAfghanistan. This alliance would face a welter ofproblems, including the lack of U.S. combatforces in Pakistan and the fact that the Talibanand al-Qaeda in Pakistan have had years to inte-grate with and even dominate the area's tribes.79Beyond these daunting issues, the central chal-lenge would remain the same as in Iraq: manag-ing a three-cornered relationship between thetribes, the state, and an external power as well asinter- and intra-tribal relations.

The tribe and the modern bureaucratic stateare inherently in tension. Max Weber identifiedthis difficulty nearly a century ago: tribes derivelegitimacy from what he termed "the authority ofthe eternal yesterday" while the modern statederives legitimacy from the rational applicationof the rule of law.8° Attempting to use the for-mer to secure the latter is at best a stop-gapmeasure. At worst, it sows the seeds of futurestate failure.

Notes

Survival, April-May 2008, 67-93. Reprinted bypermission of the Taylor and Francis Group.

1. "Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia" and "Anbar SalvationCouncil" (ASC) are the terms used throughout this paper,though both groups are known by other names. Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia is more officially "The

Organization of al-Qaeda (the Base) in the Land of TwoRivers" and has overlapping and often interchangeablemembership with the Mujahedin Shura Council, theIslamic State of Iraq, and Jamaat al-Tahwid Wa al-Jihad(Group for Monotheism and Holy War). The AnbarSalvation Council is also referred to as the 'Sahawa al-Anbar' (Anbar Awakening) or more recently "Sahawa al-Iraq" (Iraq Awakening), often abbreviated SAA and SAL.2. See Albert Hourani, "Conclusion: Tribes and States in

190

Islamic History," in Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner,eds., Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 304-

6.

3. Abbas Kelidar provides a concise summary of the his-torical weakness of the Iraqi state in "States withoutFoundation: The Political Evolution of State and Societyin the Arab East," Journal of Contemporary History, vol.

28, no. 2 April 1993, pp. 315-39.4. See Hosham Dawood, "The 'Stateization' of the Tribeand the Tribalization," in Jahar and Hosham Dawood,eds., Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in theMiddle East (London: Saqi Books, 2003), pp. 315-16.5. This summary is drawn from Faleh Jahar, "Sheikhs andIdeologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of TribesUnder Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998," in

Jabar and Dawood, pp. 103-5.6. See Ibid., pp. 85-8.7. Ibid., p. 87.8. See Khoury and Kostiner, Tribes and State Formationin the Middle East.

9. See Khoury and Kostiner, Tribes and State Formationin the Middle East. Jabar, "Sheikhs and Ideologues," pp.75-8; and Amal Vinogradov, "The 1920 Revolt in IraqReconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Polities,"JnternationalJournai of Middle East Studies, vol. 3, no. 2,

April 1972, pp.123-39.

10. See Jabar, "Sheikhs and Ideologues," pp. 75-9. For amuch more detailed account, see Hanna Batatu, The OldSocial Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq:A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classesand of its Communists, Ba'athists, and Free Qffzcers(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).

11. Amatzia Baram, "Neo-tribalism in Iraq: SaddamHussein's Tribal Policies, 1991-1996," InternationalJournal of Middle East Studies, vol. 29, no. 1, February1997, p. 1.12. Jabar, "Sheikhs and Ideologues," pp.80-3.13. Jabar refers to this as "etatist tribalism," Ibid., pp. 69and 79-80.14. See James Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing: Its I'ractice and

Consequences in the Middle East," International Security,

vol. 24, no. 2, Autumn 1999, pp. 131-65.15. See "Islamists' Electoral Disaster," Economist Intel-ligence Unit 22 November 2007, http://www.economist.corn /daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10178007.16. Mordechai Tamarkin, "The Roots of Political Stability in

Kenya," African Affairs, vol. 77, no. 308, July 1978, pp. 300-1.

17. Samuel Decalo, "Modalities of Civil-Military Stability in

Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 27, no. 4,

December 1989, p. 557.18. See "Going Up or Down?" The Economist, 7 June2007, http://www.economist.com/wor1d/africa/dis-playstory.cfm?story_id=9304146, for comments on thecontinued importance of tribe in Kenyan politics.19. Mark Fineman, "Militias Reflect Tribal Splits," LosAngeles Times, October 1989; and Charles Dunbar,"Afghanistan in 1986: The Balance Endures," AsianSurvey, vol. 27, no. 2, February 1987, pp. 128 and 134-5.20. Mark Fineman, "Powerful Militia Unit in Open RevoltAgainst Kabul Regime," Los Angeles Times, 15 March1992; Mark Fineman, "Afghan Leader Forced Out byArmy, Rebels," Los Angeles Times, 17 April 1992; and Shah

Tarzi, "Afghanistan in 1992: A Hobbesian State of Nature,"

Asian Survey, vol. 33, no. 2, February 1993, pp. 165-6.21. See Asaf Hussain, "Ethnicity, National Identity andPraetorianism: The Case of Pakistan," Asian Survey, vol.16, no. 10, October 1976, pp. 925-30; "Turning a Fightinto a War," The Economist, 29 June 2006,

http://www.economist.corn/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=7121811; and "The Frontier Spirit," The

Economist, 13 December 2006, http://www.economist.corn/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8413130.22. For example, see Mohammed Bin Sallam, "Sa'ada WarDue to Break Out as Mediation Committee Ceased Work,"Yemen Times, 11 November 2007, http://www.yemen-tirnes.com/article.shtml?i=1 10 2&p=local&a=1; and "CalmReturns to Shabwa Following Clash between Governmentand Bilharith Tribe," Yemen Times, 9 November 2007,http://www.yementimes.com/article.shtml?i= 1 102&p=loc

al&a=4.

23. Michael Slackman and Mohammed Al-Asadi, "GermanFamily is Kidnapped by Yemeni Tribe," New York Times,29 December 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/29/international/middleeast/29yemen.html.24. On CIDG, see Francis Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces1961 -1971 (Washington DC: Center for Military History,1973), chapters 3, 5, and 6; and Thomas Ahern, CIA andRural Pacflcation in South Vietnam (Washington DC:Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001), chapters 3, 5,and pp. 179-82.25. Baram, "Neo-tribalism," p. 5.26. Jabar, "Sheikhs and Ideologues," pp. 81-3.27. Baram, "Neo-tribalism," pp. 3-4.28. Baram, "Neo-tribalism," p. 5.29. Keiko Sakai, "Tribalization as a Tool of State Control

191

in Iraq: Observations on the Army, the Cabinets, and theNational Assembly," inJabar and Dawood, p. 152; Baram,"Neo-tribalisrn," p. 7; and Jabar, "Sheikhs andIdeologues," p. 90.30. Jabar, "Sheikhs and Ideologues," pp. 88-89.31. Baram, "Neo-tribalism," p. 7; Jabar, "Sheikhs andIdeologues," pp. 92-3; and David Wurmser, "Coping withCrumbling States: A Western and Israeli Balance of PowerStrategy for the Levant," Institute for Advanced Strategicand Political Studies Research Paper, December 1996, pp.9-10. For more on the regime's efforts to provide internalsecurity, see Kevin Woods et al., Iraqi PerspectivesProject: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom fromSaddam 's Senior Leadership (Norfolk, VA: Joint Center for

Operational Analysis, 2005), p. 48.32. Baram, "Neo-tribalism," pp. 12-13.33. Jabar, "Sheikhs and Ideologues," pp. 95-6.34. Woods et a!., p. 52.35. Jabar, "Sheikhs and Ideologues," pp.97-9.36. Baram, "Neo-tribalisrn," pp. 5-6.37. Jabar, "Sheikhs and Ideologues," pp. 99-100; Bararn,"Neo-tribalisrn," p. 6; and Wurrnser, pp. 10-11.38. Baram, "Neo-tribalism," p. 6; and Jahar, "Sheikhs andIdeologues," p. 100.

39. Woods et a!., pp. 113-14.40. Woods et al., p. 102.41. Much of the following discussion is informed by theauthor's observations in Iraq from August to December2007; conversations with U.S. military and intelligence-community personnel who have served in Anbar; anddiscussions with Carter Malkasian of the Center for NavalAnalyses, who was an adviser to the Marine

Expeditionary Force in Anbar.42. On the importance of smuggling to many of thetribes, see Nir Rosen, "Fa!lujah: Inside the IraqiResistance," Asia Times, 15 July 2004, http://www.atimes.cornlatimes/others/Fallujah.html; and Leila Fadel,"Iraqi Tribal, U.S. Relations Could Spell Success orDisaster," McClatchy Newspapers, 13 June 2007,

http : //www . mccl a tchydc .corn/st a ff/l e i la_fade!/story/16890.html. On disputes over revenues betweentribes and al-Qaeda in Mesopotarnia, see CarterMalkasian, "A Thin Blue Line in the Sand," Democracy,no. 5, Summer 2007, p. 55.43. On the strategic use of violence in insurgency, seeStathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (NewYork: Cambridge iJniversity Press, 2006); and StathisKalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless?: The Logic of Massacres

in Algeria," Rationality and Society, vol. 11, no. 3, 1999.44. See Malkasian, "Thin Blue Line," p. 55; and HannahAllarn and Mohammed al-Dulaimy, "Marine-led

Campaign Killed Friends and Foes, Iraqi Leaders Say,"McClatchy Newspapers, 16 May 2005, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/staff/hannah_allam /story/1 1656.html.45. See Allam and al-Dulaimy, "Marine-led Campaign";and Ellen Nickmeyer, "Looking for Battle, Marines FindThat Foes Have Fled; Hunt for Foreign Insurgents ProvesFrustrating but Deadly," Washington Post, 16 May 2005,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-cle/2005/05/15/AR2005051500785_pf html.46. Ellen Nickmeyer and Jonathan Finer, "InsurgentsAssert Control Over Town Near Syrian Border,"Washington Post, 6 September 2005, http: //www.wash-ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/05/AR2005090500313.html.

47. Ellen Nickmeyer and Omar Fekeiki, "U.S. WarplanesTarget Alleged Rebel Havens Along Iraq-Syria Border,"Washington Post, 31 August 2005.48. See Carter Malkasian, "Did the Coalition Need MoreForces in Iraq?" Joint Force Quarterly, no. 46, Summer2007, p. 124; and John Ward Anderson, "U.S. WidensOffensive in Far Western Iraq," Washington Post, 15November 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/1 1/14 /AR20051 1 1400979.html.49. Ellen Knickmeyer and Jonathan Finer, "Iraqi SunnisBattle To Defend Shiites," Washington Post, 14 August2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/13/AR2005081301209.html.50. Jonathan Finer and Ellen Nickmeyer, "Sunni LeadersAttacked in Iraq," Washington Post, 19 August 2005,http ://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/content/arti-cle/2005/08/18/AR2005081800330.html.

51. Hala Jaber, "Sunni Leader Killed for Joining Cease-fire Talks," London Times, 5 February 2006,http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/arti-cle727041 .ece.52. Declassified, translated internal al-Qaeda in

Mesopotamia document; available from West Point'scombating Terrorism Center at http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/IZ-060316-01-Trans.pdf.

53. Ibid.54. Ibid.

55. Ibid. For example, the document mentions Mazhar al-'Alawani, "a candidate for the elections": "His pictureswere all over Ramadi, where the entire Albu'Alwan tribewas supporting him, proud of him, one day before the

192

elections, the brothers killed him while he was visitingRamadi, no one from his tribe opened his mouth, insteadthey got more scared and weaker."56. On Special Forces and Albu Nimr, see Ann ScottTyson, "In a Volatile Region of Iraq, U.S. Military TakesTwo Paths," Washington Post, 15 September 2006,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-cle/2006/09/14/AR2006091401900.html.57. See the document cited in note 52 and anotherdeclassified, translated internal al-Qaeda in Mesopotamiadocument, available from West Point's CombatingTerrorism Center at http://ctc.usma.edu /aq/pdf/1Z-060316-02-Trans.pdf.

58. See Greg Jaffe, "Tribal Connections: How CourtingSheiks Slowed Violence in Iraq," Wall Street Journal, 8August 2007, http://on1ine.ws.com/article/SB118653546614491198.html; and Mark Kukis, 'Turning Iraq's Tribes

Against Al-Qaeda', Timed 26 December 2006,

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/08599,1 572796,00.html.

59. See Malkasian, "Thin Blue Line," p. 55; Steve

Schippert, "This is Counterterrorism, Senator," NationalReview Online, 25 April 2007, http://article.nationalre-view.com/?q=NGI4ODY3ZGZmOGM1NGMwMWM3Mjg

wZDYxMWU5OTQ5ZTI=.

60. Malkasian, "Thin Blue Line," pp. 55-6.61. Nancy Youssef and Leila Fadel, "Critics: Arming Sunni

Militias Undercuts Iraqi Government," McClatchy

Newspapers, 17 June 2007, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/world/story/16989.htrnl; Alexandra Zavis, "U.S.

Courts Sheikhs in Hussein Terrain," Los Angeles Times, 14

November 2007; and David Mays,"Concerned LocalCitizens Vastly Improve Security in Iraq's Diyala

Province," American Forces Press Service, 12 October2007, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47783.

62. Kim Gamel, "Sheikhs Ponder Expanding AnbarModel," Oakland Tribune, 16 September 2007.63. Joshua Partlow and John Ward Anderson, "TribalCoalition in Anbar Said to Be Crumbling," WashingtonPost, 10 June 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/10/AR2007061001453.html.

64. See Tyson, "In a Volatile Region of Iraq, U.S. MilitaryTakes Two Paths."65. See Comprehensive Report of the SpecialAdvisor to theDCI on Iraq's WMD (The Duelfer Report), vol. 1, "FrontCompany Conglomerates: Al-Eman and Al-Handal,"

https ://www. cia .gov/!ibrary/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/index.htrnl.

66. See Kirk Semple, "Iraqi Says He Plans to ConveneParliament," New York Times, 12 April 2006,

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/13/world/13iraq.html;and Suleiman al-Khalidi, "Interview: Iraqi Rebels RejectAnti-Qaeda Pact-Tribal Leader," Reuters, 23 March 2007,http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL23556078.

67. Private communication, Iraq, November 2007.68. See Department of Defense, Measuring Stability andSecurity in Iraq, June 2007, pp. 30-7, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/9010-Final-20070608.pdf;Woods et al., pp. 48-55 and 60-5; and The MilitaiyBalance (London: International Institute for Strategic

Studies, 2002), pp. 105-6.69. Sam Dagher, "Sunni Muslim Sheikhs Join U.S. inFighting Al-Qaeda," Christian Science Monitor, 3 May2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0503/p01s04-wome.html; and "Baghdad Hotel Bombing Kills Anti-Qaeda Sunni Sheikhs," International Herald Tribune, 24June 2007.70. Malkasian, "Thin Blue Line," p. 56; and Todd Pitman,"Iraq's Sunni Sheikhs Join Americans to Fight

Insurgency," Associated Press, 25 March 2007.71. Lauren Prayer, "Former Insurgents Face Al-QaidaWrath," Washington Post, 14 August 2007, http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyri/content/arti-cle/2007/08/14/AR2007081400767.html.72. Alissa Rubin, "Sheik's Allies Vow Revenge for HisKilling," New York Times, 15 September 2007,

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/1 5/world/mid-dleeast/lsiraq.html.73. Tina Sussman, "Slain Sheik a Stark Contrast to HisBrother," Los Angeles Times, 13 October 2007; and HamzaHendawi, "Reconciliation in Iraq Goes Local,"

Washington Post, 17 October 2007, http://www.washing-tonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/17/AR2007101701681 .html?tid=informbox.

193

74. James Janega, "From Killing to Reconciliation Bid,"Chicago Tribune, 12 October 2007.75. Greg Miller, "Influx of Al Qaeda, Money into Pakistanis Seen," LosAngeles Times, 20 May 2007; andAlexandra Zavis, "Iraq Militants Seen As TakingKickbacks," Los Angeles Times, 26 October 2007.

76. Michael Gordon, "Sunnis Say Baghdad HampersAnbar Gains," New York Times, 3 November 2007,http://www.nytimes.com/2007/1 1/03/world/mid-dleeast/O3anbar.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss; and YochiDreazen and Gina Chon, "Will the Security Improvementsin Iraq Endur&," Wall Street Journal, 3 December 2007,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1 19664380500411225html.

77. See Faleh Jabar, The Shi'ite Movement in Iraq(London: Saqi Books, 2003), especially pp.63-7.78. See Babak Rahimi, "Basra Tears Itself Apart," AsiaTimes, 10 July 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimesIMiddle_East/IG10Ak01 html; and Gethin Chamberlin,"Message from Basra: 'Get Us Out, of Here," DailyTelegraph, 29 October 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/10/28/nrbas-ra128.xml.

79. Eric Schmitt, Mark Mazzetti and Carlotta Gall, "U.S.Hopes to Arm Pakistani Tribes Against Al Qaeda," NewYork Times, 19 November 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/1 1/19/washington/l9policy.html.80. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (Philadelphia, PA:Fortress, 1965; originally published 1919).

About the AuthorAustin Long is an assistant professor at Columbia University's

School of International and Public Affairs, where he teaches secu-

rity policy He previously worked as an associate political scientist

for the RAND Corporation and served as an advisor for MultiNational Force-Iraq. He is the author of Deterrence—From Cold

War to Long War: Lessons from S Decades of RAND Research

and On "Other War". Lessons from Five Decades of RANDCounterinsurgency Research.

Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point

by Major Niel Smith, USA, and Colonel Sean B.MacFarland, USAMi1itay Review, March-April 2008

The stunning security improvements in al-

Anbar Province during 2007 fundamentallychanged the military and political landscape

of Iraq. Many, both in and outside the military (andas late as November 2006), had assessed the situa-tion in Anbar as a lost cause. The "AnbarAwakening" of Sunni tribal leaders and their sup-porters that began in September 2006 near Ramadiseemed to come out of nowhere. But the changethat led to the defeat of al-Qaeda in Ramadi—whatsome have called the "Gettysburg of Iraq—was nota random event.' It was the result of a concertedplan executed by U.S. forces in Ramadi. Tacticalvictory became a strategic turning point when far-sighted senior leaders, both Iraqi and American,replicated the Ramadi model throughout AnbarProvince, in Baghdad, and other parts of the coun-try, dramatically changing the Iraq security situationin the process.

The "Ready First Combat Team"

The 1st Brigade of the 1st Armored Division, the"Ready First Combat Team," was at the center of theAnhar Awakening. When we arrived in Ramadi inJune 2006, few of us thought our campaign wouldchange the entire complexion of the war and pushal-Qaeda to the brink of defeat in Iraq. The soldiers,Marines, sailors, and airmen who served in or withour brigade combat team (BCTU enabled the AnbarAwakening through a deliberate, often difficultcampaign that combined traditional counterinsur-gency (COIN) principles with precise, lethal opera-tions. The skilled application of the same principlesand exploitation of success by other great units inAnbar and other parts of Iraq spread the success inRamadi far beyond our area of operations (AO) ata pace no one could have predicted.

195

The Ready First enabled the AnbarAwakening by:

• Employing carefully focused lethal oper-ations.

• Securing the populace through forwardpresence.

• Co-opting local leaders.• Developing competent host-nation secu-

rity forces.• Creating a public belief in rising success.• Developing human and physical infra-

structure.

The execution of this approach enabled thebrigade to set conditions, recognize opportunity,and exploit success when it came, to create aremarkable turnaround.

Ramadi on the Brink

In the summer of 2006, Ramadi by any measurewas among the most dangerous cities in Iraq.2 Thearea of operations averaged over three times moreattacks per capita than any other area in the coun-try. With the exception of the embattled govern-ment center and nearby buildings held by a compa-ny of Marines, al-Qaeda-related insurgent:s hadalmost complete freedom of movement throughoutthe city. They dominated nearly all of the city's keystructures, including the city hospital, the largest inAnbar Province. Their freedom of movementallowed them to emplace complex subsurface lEDbelts, which rendered much of the city no-go ter-rain for U.S. and Iraqi Army (IA) forces.

The situation in Ramadi at this point wasmarkedly different from that in Tal Afar, where theReady First began its tour of duty. Although Ramadiwas free of the sectarian divisions that bedeviledTal Afar, it was the provincial capital, it was at leastfour times more populous, and it occupied a chokepoint along the key transit rutes west of Baghdad.Perhaps recognizing these same factors, al-Qaeda

had declared Ramadi the future capital of its

"caliphate" in Iraq. Local Iraqi security was essen-tially nonexistent. Less than a hundred Iraqi policereported for duty in June, and they remained intheir stations, too intimidated to patrol. Addition-ally, the fledgling IA brigade nearest Ramadi had lit-tle operational experience.

In late 2005, the Sunni tribes around Ramadiattempted to expel al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQIZ) aftergrowing weary of the terrorist group's heavy-hand-ed, indiscriminate murder and intimidation cam-paign.3 A group calling itself the al-Anbar People'sCouncil formed from a Coalition of local Sunnisheiks and Sunni nationalist groups. The councilintended to conduct an organized resistance against1)0th Coalition forces and al-Qaeda elements, hut,undermanned and hamstrung by tribal vendettas, itlacked strength and cohesion. A series of triballeader assassinations ultimately brought down thegroup, which ceased to exist by February 2006.This collapse set the conditions that the brigadefound when it arrived in late May. The assassina-tions had created a leadership vacuum in Ramadiand, by cutting tribal ties to outside tribal centers,had isolated the city. For their part, the tribes hadadopted a passive posture, not wishing to antago-nize a powerful al-Qaeda presence in and aroundRamadi. In short, as the Ready First prepared tomove from Tal Afar, their new AO was essentiallyin enemy hands.

Actions in Summer and Autumn,2006

The situation in Ramadi clearly required a

change in Coalitioh tactics. We had to introduceIraqi security forces (1SF) into the city and the ruralareas controlled by the enemy. But, even with atotal of five Marine and Army maneuver battaliontask forces, the Ready First did not have enoughcombat power to secure such a large city by itself.The Iraqi Army and at some point, the Iraqi police(IP), had to be brought into play. They would help,but we understood that without the support of thelocal leaders and populace, any security gainsachieved solely through lethal operations would hetemporary at best. In particular, we had to over-come the fallout from the unsuccessful tribal upris-

196

ing of 2005. We had to convince tribal leaders torejoin the fight against al-Qaeda.

Developing the plan. We reckoned the brigadehad to isolate the insurgents, deny them sanctuary,and build Iraqi security forces, especially policeforces, to succeed. The staff developed a plan thatcentered on attacking al-Qaeda's safe havens andestablishing a lasting presence there to directlychallenge the insurgents' dominance of the city,disrupting their operations, attriting their numbers,and gaining the confidence of the people. Weintended to take the city and its environs back oneneighborhood at a time by establishing combatoutposts and developing a police force in thesecured neighborhoods. The plan called for simul-taneously engaging local leaders in an attempt tofind those who had influence, or wasta, and to gettheir support. We recognized this as a critical partof the plan, because without their help, we wouldnot he able to recruit enough police to take backthe entire city.

We also realized that in the plan's initial stages,our efforts at fostering local cooperation werehighly vulnerable. A concerted AQIZ attack on thesupportive sheiks could quickly derail the process,as it had in 2005-2006. We therefore took someextraordinary measures to ensure the survival oftribal leaders who "flipped" to our side. We estab-lished neighborhood watches that involved depu-tizing screened members of internal tribal militiasas "Provincial Auxiliary Iraqi Police," authorizingthem to wear uniforms, carry weapons, and pro-vide security within the defined tribal area. In themore important tribal areas, combat outpostsmanned by U.S. or IA forces would protect majorroutes and markets. In a few cases, we alsoplanned to provide direct security to key leaders'residences, to include placing armored vehicles atcheckpoints along the major access roads to theirneighborhoods.

We designed our information operations (JO)efforts to alienate the people from the insurgentswhile increasing the prestige of supportive triballeaders. We also made friendly sheiks the conduitsfor humanitarian aid efforts, such as free fuel dis-bursements. Wherever we established improvedsecurity, we established civil-military operationscenters (CMOCs) and began the process of restor-

ing services to the area. After securing RarnadiGeneral Hospital, we began an extensive effort toimprove its services and to advertise it throughoutthe city. Prior to our operation there in early July2006, the hospital's primary function had beentreating wounded insurgents, with most citizensafraid to enter the facility. We also took a different10 tack with the sheiks. Instead of telling them thatwe would leave soon and they must assumeresponsibility for their own security, we told themthat we would stay as long as necessary to defeatthe terrorists. That was the message they had beenwaiting to hear. As long as they perceived us asmere interlopers, they dared not throw in their lotwith ours. When they began to think of us as reli-able partners, their attitudes began to change. Still,we had to prove that we meant what we were say-ing.

Experience in Ta! Afar taught us that competentlocal police forces were vital for long-term success.An AQIZ intimidation campaign had all but elimi-nated the previous police force, and a suicidebomber killed dozens of potential recruits during arecruiting drive in January 2006, an event thatcaused recruitment to shut down for six months. InJune 2006, the Ramadi IP force claimed approxi-mately 420 police officers out of 3,386 authorized,and only about 140 of these officers ever showedup to work, with less than 100 present for duty onany given day. We realized that new recruiting wasthe key to building an effective police force.

Recruiting local security forces. Our desire torecruit local Iraqis into the IP was the catalyst forthe Awakening movement's birth in September2006. The way we went about it helped to provethat we were reliable partners, that we could deliv-er security to the sheiks in a way that broke thecycle of al-Qaeda murder and intimidation. In thebargain, the government of Iraq would assume theburden of paying their tribesmen to provide theirsecurity. The situation was a winner any way youlooked at it. The tribes soon saw that instead ofbeing the hunted, they could become the hunters,with well trained, paid, and equipped securityforces backed up by locally positioned Coalitionforces.

We began the process by shifting our recruitingcenter to a more secure location, at one of our for-

197

ward operating bases (FOBs) located closer to thetribes that had indicated a willingness to join the1SF. This shift helped to deter attacks and otherforms of intimidation that had undermined previ-ous recruiting drives. We maintained secrecy bycommunicating information about the recruitingdrive only to sympathetic sheiks who wanted toprotect tribesmen sent to join the IP. This techniqueresulted in a steadily growing influx of newrecruits. Over the six-month period from June toDecember 2006, nearly 4,000 police joined withoutincident.

This influx taxed the brigade security forces cell,composed of the deputy commander and a smallstaff of highly capable officers and NCOs. Themajority of the population in al-Anhar had eitherforged ID papers or none at all, so the recruitershad to determine the true identify and reliability ofthe potential recruits. Insurgent infiltration of thepolice force was (and still is) a problem in Iraq,and is inevitable; however, the Ready First madeuse of several methods and technologies to miti-gate this risk.

Biometric automated tool sets (BATS) provedextremely useful in screening recruits and prevent-ing previously caught insurgents from joining. Con-vincing supportive sheiks to vouch for their tribalmembers was a second filter in the screeningprocess. From June to December, more than 90percent of police recruits came from tribes support-ing the Awakening, and the sheiks knew whom totrust.

Our 1SF cell understood the importance of pay-ing the new police to prove that they were respect-ed and their service was valued. As a collateralbenefit, the growing IP force also created a smallengine for economic development by providingjobs in addition to security for the local communi-ty. Each recruit received a bonus if accepted fortraining. Officers also received a bonus if theyserved as active police members for 90 days. Theseboosts injected more vitality into the economy.

New Iraqi Army recruits also received incentivesto join. One obstacle to recruitment was that localswere hesitant to join the IA because of the possi-bility of receiving an assignment far from home. Tomitigate this, IA Division G-ls assigned the junch(junior soldiers) to an Iraqi battalion close to their

homes. This "station of choice" option helped elim-inate a major constraint of recruitment possibilitiesfor the IA.

Both Iraqi police and IA jundi assigned toRamadi were required to attend a one-week urbancombat training course run by the Ready First's fieldartillery unit to ensure that they could fight and sur-vive once they joined their units. This focused train-ing improved their confidence and discipline inurban combat, and significantly enhanced 1SF effec-tiveness in small-unit actions. In time, the local IAbrigade took responsibility for conducting the IAand IP courses with a cadre of drill sergeants, whichhelped forge closer bonds between the two servic-es and instilled an increased sense of confidence inthe Iraqi security forces.

The Ready First made every effort to helpunqualified Iraqi recruits become police officers orsoldiers. The most frequent disqualifier of recruitswas the literacy requirement. The brigade com-menced adult literacy classes, on a trial basis, forthe illiterate recruits. These classes also had a posi-tive, albeit unintended, collateral benefit. As securi-ty improved, hundreds of women enrolled in theclasses—about five times more than we expected.The fact that women eventually felt safe enough toseek education reinforced the impression ofimproved security while directly attacking al-Qaeda's ability to influence the population.

As the benefits of cooperation with our recruit-ing efforts became obvious to the various localsheiks, more and more of them expressed an inter-est in cooperating with us. This interest eventuallyresulted in an al-Qaeda reprisal that, although trag-ic, was instrumental in bringing the sheiks togetherin the Awakening movement.

Securing the populace. Past Coalition operationsin Ramadi had originated from large FOBs on theoutskirts of town, with most forces conducting"drive-by COIN" (or combat)—they exited the FOB,drove to an objective or patrolled, were attacked,exchanged fire, and returned to base. Because thephysical geography and road network in Ramadienabled the enemy to observe and predict Coalitionmovements, nearly every movement into the centerof the city was attacked multiple times by impro-vised explosive devices, RPGs, or small arms, oftenwith deadly results. Moreover, the patrols played

198

into the insurgents' information operations cam-paign: al-Qaeda exploited any collateral damage bydepicting Coalition soldiers as aloof occupiers andrandom dispensers of violence against the popu-lace.

It was clear that to win over the sheiks and theirpeople, our BCT would have to move into the cityand its contested areas. Thus, we decided toemploy a tactic we had borrowed from the 3dArmored Cavalry Regiment and used successfully inTal Afar: the combat outpost, or COP. Our COPsnormally consisted of a tank or infantry companyteam based in a defensible local structure in a dis-puted area. Eventually, the COPs included an IraqiArmy company wherever possible as they becameemboldened by our presence. Later, we began toestablish Iraqi police substations at or near theCOPs as well. At this early stage, the outposts pro-vided 'lily pads" for mechanized quick-reactionforces, safe houses for special operations units, andsecurity for civil-military operations centers. In ruralareas, the COPs sometimes doubled as firebaseswith mortars and counterfire radars.

Because we now maintained a constant pres-ence in disputed neighborhoods, the insurgentscould no longer accurately trace and predict ouractions. Frequent and random patrols out of theCOPs prevented AQIZ from effectively moving andoperating within the local populace. At the sametime, the COPs enhanced our ability to conductcivil-military operations; intelligence, reconnais-sance, and surveillance (ISR); and 10.

These outposts also acted as "fly bait," especial-ly in the period immediately after a new COP wasestablished. Experience in Tal Afar taught us thatinsurgents would attack a newly established out-post using all systems at their disposal, includingsuicide car bombs. These attacks usually did notend well for the insurgents, who often sufferedheavy casualties. During the establishment of thefirst outpost, in July 2006, the enemy mounted mul-tiple-platoon assaults. The frenzy of attacks on thenew outposts culminated in a citywide battle on 24July 2006 in which AQIZ forces were severely beat-en and sustained heavy casualties. By October,attacks were far less fierce, with elements consist-ing of a handful of men conducting hit-and-runtype operations. These noticeable decreases in

enemy strength indicated our plan to decimate theirranks was clearly working. Constant Coalition pres-ence, insurgent attrition, and loss of insurgentmobility freed the people from intimidation andsapped any support for AQIZ.

The COPs also allowed us to control the infra-structure in Ramadi and use it to once again sup-port the populace. This was the case with theRamadi General Hospital. We established a COPjust outside the hospital's walls while an IA unitsecured the premises. Within days, the hospital wasproviding quality medical attention for the first timein a year, and the IA was detaining wounded insur-gents who had come seeking treatment.

We continued to build new outposts in the cityand surrounding areas until our redeployment tran-sition began in February 2007. The strategy was notunlike the island-hopping campaign in the Pacificduring World War II. With new outposts establishedin an ever-tightening circle around the inner city,we wrested control of areas away from the insur-gents. As areas became manageable, we handedthem over to newly trained Iraqi police forces(whom we kept a watchful eye on), and used therelieved forces elsewhere to continue tightening thenoose. All these developments in securing the pop-ulace required an accompanying development ofkey alliances with tribal leaders, the history ofwhich is inseparable from the operational story ofthe Anbar Awakening.

Courting local leaders. Convincing the localsheiks to join us and undertake another uprisingwas an immense challenge, but obtaining their sup-port was the lynchpin of the second part of ourstrategy. We knew it would be pivotal when wearrived in Ramadi in June. The sheiks' memory oftheir first, failed attempt at establishing the al-AnbarPeople's Council (late 2005-early 2006) was themain obstacle to our plan in this regard. The Sunnitribal alliance was fragmented and weak comparedto the growing al-Qaeda forces that controlledRamadi in those days.

At the same time, area tribal sheiks had no greatlove for U.S. forces or the Iraqi Army. Early in theinsurgency, they had directly and indirectly sup-ported former-regime nationalist insurgents againstU.S. forces, and as a result they had temporarilyestablished an alliance of convenience with AQIZ.

199

Many tribal members were killed or captured com-bating Coalition forces, which diminished thesheiks' ability to provide income for their tribes.These conditions in turn enabled AQIZ to recruitfrom those families in need of money. Anotheraggravating factor was that IA forces initially sta-tioned in Anbar consisted largely of southern IraqiShi'ites. Ramadi area inhabitants regarded them asagents of the Sadr militia or Badr Corps, with acovert agenda to kill off Sunni tribes and enable aShi'ite takeover of Anbar.

Nevertheless, the tribal leaders were still fed upwith Al Qaeda's violence and frustrated by theirown loss of prestige and influence in their tradi-tional heartlands. The brigade staff believed that byoffering convincing incentives, we could create atribal alliance that could produce lasting security inRamadi. To persuade the tribes to cooperate, wefirst needed to understand the human terrain in ourAO, and that task fell to an outstanding and talent-ed junior officer, Captain Travis Patriquin.

An Arabic-speaking former special forces soldierand an infantry officer assigned as the Ready First'sS-9/engagements officer, Patriqu in coordinatedbrigade-level local meetings and discussions. Hequickly gained the sheiks' confidence through hislanguage and interpersonal skills and developedstrong personal bonds with their families. Hestrengthened these bonds during meetings betweenthe brigade commander or deputy commandingofficer and the sheiks. Battalion and company com-manders also worked on improving relations withthe townspeople on a daily basis. Thus, the sheiks'growing trust of the brigade's officers led them tosupport our efforts to reinvigorate police recruiting.

The combined effects of the engagement effortswere eventually hugely successful. However, somestaff officers outside the brigade became concernedthat we were arming a tribal militia that would fightagainst Iraqi security forces in the future. To allaythose concerns and to pass on the "best practices"we had developed in Ramadi, Captain Patriquincreated his now-famous PowerPoint stick-figurepresentation "How to Win in al-Anbar."4 This slide-show perfectly captured the Ready First's conceptfor winning the tribes over to our side.

We deliberately placed our first IP stationsmanned with newly recruited Sunni tribesmen

where they could protect the tribes that were sup-plying us with additional recruits. This tactic gavethe IPs added incentive to stand and fight andeffectively ended al-Qaeda's murder and intimida-tion campaign against the men serving in the 1SF. Ina significant change of circumstance, the newlyminted IPs quickly became the hunters, arresting anumber of insurgents and uncovering tremendousweapons caches. By the end of July 2006, AQIZwas definitely feeling the pinch.

In reacting to the pressure, al-Qaeda inadver-tently aided our efforts by overplaying its hand. Thegroup launched a series of attacks against the newIP stations. On 21 August, the insurgents attacked anewly established IP station in a tribal strongholdwith an immense suicide vehicle-borne improvisedexplosive device (S\TBIED). The IPs, however,refused to he scared away. Despite offers of safehaven at a nearby Coalition base, the survivorsremained at their posts, ran their tattered flag backup the flagpole, and even began to conduct patrolsagain that same day.

Hours later, al-Qaeda attempted to intimidatefuture recruits by murdering and desecrating thebody of a leading local sheik who had been instru-mental in our early push at recruiting tribe mem-bers into the 1SF. The attack inflamed tribal senti-ment against AQIZ and drove several fence-sittingtribes to support our police recruitment.

A significant leader for the burgeoning move-ment emerged in Sittar albu-Risha, a younger sheikwho resided on the west side of town and who wasreputed to have smuggling and business connec-tions throughout Anbar. In addition to having ques-tions about Sittar's true motives, some were con-cerned that we would he placing too much stock ina relatively junior sheik and undercutting ongoingnegotiations with Anhar tribal leaders who had fledto Jordan. However, with each successful negotia-tion and demonstration of trustworthiness by Sittar,we were able to whittle away at these reservations.

The Tipping Point

Sheik Sittar was a dynamic figure willing to standup to al-Qaeda. Other, more cautious, sheiks werehappy to let him walk point for the anti-AQIZ tribesin the early days, when victory was far from certain

200

and memories of earlier failed attempts were stillfresh. In The Tipping Poin! Malcolm Gladwellwrites that three types of individuals are necessaryfor a radical change, or a "tipping point," to occur:mavens, salespersons, and connectors. In brief,mavens have the goods, salespersons spread theword, and connectors distribute the goods far andwide.5 In Ramadi, the soldiers of the Ready Firstwere the mavens who had the goods—in this case,the ability to form, train, and equip 1SF and newleaders. The brigade and battalion commandersacted as salesmen. We identified Sittar as a connec-tor who could get the people to buy into theAwakening. All the elements were in place fortransformation; we only had to decide if we trustedSittar. When our salesmen decided to take a riskwith this connector, the effect was amazing in itsspeed and reach.

On 9 September 2006 Sittar organized a tribalcouncil, attended by over 50 sheiks and the brigadecommander, at which he declared the "AnbarAwakening" officially underway. The AwakeningCouncil that emerged from the meeting agreed tofirst drive AQIZ from Ramadi, and then reestal)lishrule of law and a local government to support thepeople. The creation of the Awakening Council,combined with the ongoing recruitment of localsecurity forces, began a snowball effect that result-ed in a growing number of tribes either openly sup-porting the Awakening or withdrawing their sup-port from AQIZ.

Although recruiting and establishing the neigh-borhood watch units was an important and neces-sary step to securing Ramadi, it was not sufficient toremove AQIZ influence in the city completely. Weneeded more police officers who would join usinside the city, which our soldiers called "the heartof darkness." A critical agreement emerging fromthe council resulted in commitments to providemore recruits from local tribes to fill out require-ments for police forces.

Soon after the council ended, tribes began anindependent campaign of eradication and retalia-tion against AQIZ members living among them. Al-Qaeda's influence in the city began to wane quick-ly. U.S. and Iraqi units operating from COPs killedor captured AQIZ's most effective elements whileresurgent IP and tribal forces raided their caches