ssl-cct: progress on cct's in latin america and caribbean-research findings from idb
DESCRIPTION
South-South Learning on Conditional Cash Transfers - Session 1: Introduction to the CourseTRANSCRIPT
Conditions for success in implementing CCT programs:
lessons for Asia from Latin America and the Caribbean
Marco Stampini,
IDB-ADB South-South learning event on Conditional Cash Transfers
Manila, 16-19 April 2013
18 LAC countries implementing CCT programs (2011)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
Source: Stampini and Tornarolli (2012)
129 million beneficiaries (2010)
Million individuals 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Argentina 1.1 1.5 2.4 2.8 11.3 11.8
Bolivia 3.8 4.2 5.1 5.5 5.7 Brazil 21.6 21.5 37.7 42.3 46.1 48.4 46.4 43.3 50.7 52.4
Chile 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3
Colombia 0.4 1.4 1.6 1.5 2.3 3.2 7.3 7.9 11.6 11.7
Costa Rica 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 Dominican Republic 0.8 0.9 1.2 2.8 2.9 3.0 Ecuador 4.0 4.3 4.7 4.9 5.0 5.1 6.3 6.1
El Salvador 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6
Guatemala 1.6 2.6 3.3
Honduras 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.1 0.8 1.1 Jamaica 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8
Mexico 15.6 21.6 21.6 25.0 24.5 25.0 25.0 25.3 26.1 27.3 Nicaragua 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Panama 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 Paraguay 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.6 Peru 0.2 0.9 1.9 2.3 2.3 2.6
Trinidad and Tobago 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Uruguay 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.8
TOTAL 38.3 45.8 66.3 74.8 82.2 91.4 96.8 100.4 124.3 129.4 Source: Stampini and Tornarolli (2012)
CCT beneficiaries’ characteristics
• Programs mostly rural, except in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay
• Average schooling of beneficiary household heads: 5.5 years
• Most frequent labor market status (hh heads):
– Self-employment in Colombia, Panama, Paraguay and Peru
– 40% are informal wage employees in Guatemala and Mexico
Source: Stampini and Tornarolli (2012)
CCTs yes or not? Cost-benefit analysis
Social costs Social benefits
• Administrative costs • Cost of complying with
program conditions: • Time • Transportation
• Value of increased human
capital: • Better health • More education Also in terms of future productivity (higher labor earnings)
• Increased equity
Transfers are not social costs
CCT impacts
• Higher consumption. More food, more variety, better quality
• Poverty headcount index would be on average 13% higher, had CCTs not been implemented (Stampini and Tornarolli 2012)
• Human capital: – More enrolment and attendance (½ - 1 year of additional
schooling in Mexico)
– Less clear cut evidence on health
– Less clear evidence on learning
• No or limited effects on labor supply
• No crowding out of other transfers (e.g. remittances)
CCTs and IDB Country Total AR 2,400 BH 8 BO 25 BR 1,505 CO 1,296 DR 530 EC 200 ES 535 GU 200 HO 243 JA 205
ME 3,800 NI 29 PE 186 PN 20 PR 30 SU 15 TT 50 UR 250
Total 11,527
• About USD 11.5 billion of approvals over the period 1998-2012
• Source: Stampini, Tejerina, Maekawa and Huang (2013)
– Investment loans: USD 7,508 million;
– PBLs: USD 3,211 million
Focus of South-South learning: Topics:
1. Financial sustainability
2. Selection of beneficiaries (targeting)
3. Monitoring and evaluation
4. Payment of cash transfers
5. Institutions and governance a. Providing complementary services (e.g. education and health)
b. Customer care (and case management)
c. Monitoring beneficiary co-responsibilities
d. Auditing
e. Recertification and graduation
6. Gender dimensions
Countries: Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru
Financial sustainability
• CCT programs are long term interventions (not easy to cut once started)
• CCTs tend to grow over time, both in terms of population coverage and in terms of value of the transfers
• Program budgets are in the range of 0.3-0.4% of GDP
• In addition, CCTs require the expansion of education and health supply (quantity and quality), in response to the increased demand imposed by program co-responsibilities
• No example of tax reform. Very few cases of reform of existing generalized price subsidies (DR). Some example of social protection reform (BR, JA).
Targeting
• CCTs are generally better targeted than pre-existing social assistance programs
• Yet, under-coverage and leakage exist
• Mixed targeting approaches are necessary to improve the targeting. Countries combine geographical, categorical, means-testing and community level targeting
• Good targeting adds credibility to the CCT programmes
• Single registries are key tools in the operation of the programs (targeting, monitoring, payment, re-certification, etc.)
Monitoring and Evaluation
• The dissemination of the results of regular evaluations is fundamental to ensure programs credibility and political sustainability
• M&E systems must be an integral part of program development (from the very early stages)
• M&E systems, including the construction of MISs, require substantial financial resources and the recruitment of highly qualified personnel
• M&E data is key to identifying implementation bottlenecks and possible solutions (incremental tweaks to program design)
Payment systems
• CCT programs tend to converge towards payments through banks (most often via bank cards)
• Engaging the bank network requires negotiation to define:
– minimum service standards (ensuring quality for CCT beneficiaries, e.g. in terms of flexibility of cashing options)
– a reasonable upper bound to the payment of fees
• This negotiation may lead to the expansion of the services for CCT beneficiaries, beyond the payment of the transfer
• Payments through cell phones represent the next frontier, either as the main form of payment (e.g. in specific areas of Colombia) or as a complement to more traditional platforms (e.g. in Brazil)
Institutions and governance
• CCT implementation requires a complex web of institutional actors
– Sector coordination with education and health is key to ensuring that CCTs achieve their human capital development objectives
– Strong political support from the highest government ranks is needed to produce the required inter-sectorial coordination
– In many countries, limited service coverage has weakened the efficacy of the conditional transfers and produced a relaxed interpretation of the conditionalities
• Customer service is required to handle the relationship between the program and beneficiary households (requests of information, applications, complaints on program malfunctioning) – Early setup needed
• Monitoring of co-responsibilities must be integrated with social work (to avoid adding to beneficiaries’ problems)
• Audits are important to maintain clean registries of beneficiaries (cross-checks of databases, public rosters of beneficiaries, social accountability mechanisms)
• Periodic recertification has been useful to limit leakage, and to adjust the value of the benefits to changes in demographic characteristics and socioeconomic status
Institutions and governance
Gender dimensions
• Few programs explicitly included a gender objective
• Nonetheless, de facto they had gender dimensions
– Most programs pay transfers to women, and include maternal health conditions
– Some include a women empowerment component
– Some differentiate the school benefit by gender
– Some give special admission to individuals with disabilities, or to indigenous people in some regions
• Key criticism: CCTs reinforced gender-stereotyped roles (women as children caretakers), and did nothing to include men in childrearing and domestic responsibilities
