spoudaios and teleology in the poetics
TRANSCRIPT
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merican Philological ssociation
and Teleology in the PoeticsAuthor(s): George F. HeldSource: Transactions of the American Philological Association (1974-), Vol. 114 (1984), pp. 159-176Published by: The Johns Hopkins University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/284145.
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Transactions
f
theAmerican
hilological
ssociation
14
1984)159-176
IHOYz?AIOI
AND
TELEOLOGY
IN
THE
POETICS
GEORGE F. HELD
Universityf Missouri
"Thoughthe Greeks
reated
tragedy,
. .
they
never
developed
a
theory
f
thetragicwhich, eachingbeyondthephenomenon fdrama,might ouch
on
man's
spiritual ttitudetowards
the world
as
a whole."'
Though
the
Greeks did
develop
theories f
tragedy,
hey
did
not,
n
Lesky's opinion,
develop any
whichevinces
"conception
f the
tragic
n the
modern,
more
philosophical
ense."2
mplicit
n
these statements s
Lesky's acceptance
of
Kommerell's conclusions
bout
Aristotle's
iew
of
tragedy,
.g.,
that
tragedy
or
Aristotle
s
ust
tage tragedy
"die
angefuhrte
rag6die")3
nd
that Aristotle n the Poetics
(unlike Horace
in
the Ars
Poetica)
is not
concerned to informpoetshow theyare to conceive ("angreifen")what
they
create.4Kommerell
concludes fromthe
manner
n
which
Aristotle
defines
ragedy
hat
he
does not
think f
tragedy
s a
thing
n
itself;
t
is
merely
a
basis
("Anlage") for the
production
f a
particular
ffect, .e.,
catharsis,
and,
as
such, is
merely a
formless
potentiality,which is
conceivable
only
in
relation
to
its effect.5 he
art of the
tragedian
is,
therefore, or Aristotle
to use
Kommerell'sown
examples)
like eyesight
rather
hanthe art
of
building.6 n both
there s
a passingfrom
otentiality
to
actuality,but whereas in
the latter
this
process produces
not
merely
building tself, ut concrete ndividualbuildings, n the formerwhat is
produced is
merely an
effect,
ight itself.
Aristotle,
e asserts,
has no
general
aesthetic
oncept or
quality n
mind to
which he
would
relate all
1
Albin
Lesky, Greek
Tragedy,
transl.
H.
A. Frankfort
London
1967)
4.
Quotations of
Greek
texts
herein will be
taken from
he
Oxford
Classical
Texts unless
otherwisenoted.
I
wishto
thank
he TAPA
referee or
his
helpful
riticisms
nd
especiallymy
dissertation
directors,D. J.Mastronarde nd M. Griffith,ortheirhelpful criticisms nd theiropen-
mindedness n
allowing me in
my
dissertation o
broach
the
speculative
subject
discussed
herein.
2
Lesky
(above, note
1)
6.
3
Max
Kommerell,
essing
und
Aristoteles
Frankfort
957) 58.
4
Kommerell
above,
note3)
55.
5
See
Kommerell
above,
note 3) 58-60.
6
Kommerell
above, note
3)
60.
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160
George
F.
Held
particular
xamples
of tragedy.
His
approach throughout
he
Poetics is
historical nd descriptive, is
sole purpose
Beobachtetes
u erklaren."8
Kommerell's nd Lesky'sconclusions bout Aristotle's iewof tragedy
have gone unchallenged
n the scholarly
iterature;
nd at least some
of
themhave sufficiently
ained
acceptance to reappear
n the works f other
scholars
as if
established
fact. Golden,
for
example, posits
without
argument hat
Aristotle id
not distinguish
etween tragedy
nd comedy
"on
the
basisof any essential
ualityof the action
tself."9
hisview is
also
held
by Schuetrumpf.10
esky's
opinions re
also implicitly
ndorsed
by
Else,
who
holds
that
"Aristotle
hought he pathos
the
basic, ndispensable
'part'
of the tragic plot,""1
nd
Jones,who concludes
that"what Aristotle
finds ssentiallyragic" s changeof fortune.'2 o theory f tragedywhich
makes
pathos
or change
of fortune he
onlyessential
lement
n
tragedy
can be said
to be "philosophical"
r to "touch on
man's spiritual
ttitude
towardsthe world
as a whole."
Yet there s
considerable
vidence
that
Kommerell
nd Lesky
have overstated
heir ase-and
notmerely ecause
the Poetics
is
too
informal
nd provisional
document
for the strict-
constructionisteading
f
t
n which hey
ndulge.
My
subsequentpresentation
f this
vidence
falls
ntotwo
main
parts.
In the firstdiscussAristotle's efinitionfcomedy.Kommerell nd Lesky
base their onclusions
bout
Aristotle'smodes
of thought
n
regard
to art
solely upon
the
manner of his
definition
f
tragedy. They
completely
ignore
his definition
f
comedy
n
which
Aristotle
emonstrates
he
very
modes of thought
f which
they
ssert
him
to
be
incapable.
In
the
second
part
I
argue
that
o--rov8aZos9,
avAXos
nd
yEXoios
are
for
Aristotle
teleological
erms
nd that
hisusage
of them
n
the
definitions
f
tragedy
and comedy
s evidence
thathe
means todistinguish
etween
ragedy
nd
comedy
longteleological
ines.
Tragedy
s
an imitation f an action
which
is significantlyelldirected owardman'sproper nd, happiness; omedy
is
an imitationof
an
action
of the
opposite
sort.
This is
not
the
only
distinction
hich
Aristotle ould
draw between
he
actions f
tragedy
nd
comedy-and
for
hatreason s
not
nearly
s
paradoxical
s it
may
seem.
t
is,
moreover,
distinction
hich
s
obviously philosophical"
n
nature,
nd
just
s obviously
an apply
to actions
ff
s well
as
on the
tage.
7
Cf. Kommerell
above,
note 3)
55:
"Ebenso
ist eine
Begrundung
der
Kunst
aus
der
Kunstheraus, lso aus einen asthetischWertbegriff,em Aristoteles anz fremd" nd 133:
"ist der
Mythos
ein
solcher
uberlieferter
usammenhang
des
Geschehens
nicht
in einer
ganz bestimmten
ualitat."
8
Kommerell
above,
note
3) 54.
9
L.
Golden,
"Is Tragedy
the Imitation
f a
Serious
Action'?,"
GRBS
6 (1965)
284.
10
See
Eckart
Schuetrumpf,
ie Bedeutung
des
Wortes
'Oovs
n der
Poetik
des
Aris-
toteles,
Zetemata
49
(Munich
1970) 63-64 and
78.
11
Gerald
F. Else,
Aristotle's
Poetics:
the
Argument Cambridge,
Mass.
1957)
229.
12
John
Jones,
On
Aristotle
nd
Greek Tragedy
New
York
1968)
16.
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Y7Tov8aLos9
nd
Teleology
n
the Poetics
161
* * *
Lesky does not
tell
us
whether he
Greeks,
who
created
comedy
as
well as tragedy, ver developed a theory f the comic "which, reaching
beyond
the
phenomenon
of
drama, might
touch on man's
spiritual
tti-
tude towardsthe world
as
a
whole,"
but
this,
t can
be
shown
from
the
manner
of
Aristotle's
efinition
f
comedy,
he would be
wrong
to
deny.
That
definition
s
"less
complete
than the definition
f
tragedy
at
the
beginning
of
the next
chapter,
but is
parallel
as far as it
goes."'13
he
definition
f
comedy
is
indeed
parallel
to
the
definition
f
tragedy
but
less
complete
than it in two
respects:
1)
the elements
which
belong
to
both tragedyand comedy primarily s art forms, .e., completeness,
length, ype
of
language,
manner of
presentation:
hough
mentioned
n
the definition f
tragedy, hey
are omitted
from
the
definition
f
com-
edy;
apart
from the
word
,utpn,qos,
herefore,
here is
nothing
n the
definition
f
comedy
which
ties it to "the
phenomenon
of
drama";
and
(2) the effect n a
spectator.Aristotle
oes not define
omedy n terms f
its
effecthere,
and
there s
no
evidence that he did
so in the
supposed
lost
second book of the
Poetics: "If
he
actually defined
comedy
in
terms
of its
effect,
t is
strange
hatno
intelligible,
learly-marked
estige f his
definition as come down to us."'14 ut Aristotle's efinitionfcomedy is
also
more
complete
than his
definition
f
tragedy
n
one very
mportant
respect:
t
contains n
explicit
definition
f
a universal
bstract oncept,
TO
yEAoLov, which is
"das spezifisch
Komische,"'15
he essential quality
which
belongs to all
comedy,
stage and otherwise.'6
hat
r0
yEXoZoV
is
indeed a universal
oncept, nd
not imited
n reference o
"the phenom-
enon
of drama,"
would
seem
likely from
he fact,which no
one denies,
that
Aristotle ntends
his
definition f To
yEXOLov as
a rebuttal
o Plato's
conclusions about its nature in Philebus
48A-5OB.17
Plato had argued
13
G. M.
A.
Grube, Aristotle:On
Poetry
nd
Style
New
York
1958) 10, note
1.
14
Lane Cooper,
An
Aristotelianheory
f
ComedyNew
York
1969) 64.
15
Johannes
Vahlen,
Beitrage
zu
Aristoteles'
Poetik,
Neudruck bes.
v. H.
Schone
(Leipzig-Berlin
1914)
16.
16
Elder
Olson, The
Theory of
Comedy
(Bloomington,
ndiana
1975) 51,
asserts
that
Aristotle's
tatement bout
TO
yEAo?ov,
hough t
"has
nvariably een
treated
s a
definition,"
cannot
be
one
because
"Aristotle
would
never
have
permitted definition
with a
negative
differentia,
or a
negative
term is
always
ambiguous
and
hence can
state the nature of
nothing."Negativedifferentia otwithstanding,viewAristotle'statement s a definition.
The
reason
for
he
negative
differentias that
Aristotle
wishes
pointedly
o deny what
Plato
asserts:
n intrinsic
onnection
etween
omedy
and
evil
which
causesharm.
17
Cf. Edward Poste's
commenton
Phlb.
49c2
in The
Philebus
of
Plato
(Oxford
1960)
ad
loc.:
'Aristotle's
efinition f the
Ridiculous
seems
to have
been
suggested
by this
passage."
Plato in
this
passage
is
primarily
oncernedto
demonstrate hat
ome
forms f
pleasure are
mixed with
pain,
and
discusses
the
nature
of
comedy
only
incidentally to
this
purpose-because the
pleasure
derived
from
t,
he
believes, s of
this
ype.
His
treatment
f
the
subject,
accordingly, s
cursory
nd
tendentious, is
reasoning
nd
psychology,n my
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162 George F. Held
that the subject matter f
comedy (ra
yEXoLa)
is self-ignorancea'yvota)
in one's friends
LktAo)
who are weak and without power to do one
harm, self-ignorancewith regard to the extent of their wealth, beauty
and virtue,
speciallywisdom.'8And since ignorance s a form f evil, as
Plato explicitlypoints out
in
the dialogue (49D9: Ov'Kov3v
r7v
ayvotav
EL7TO,UEV
OTLt
KaKoV
7raLv;)
it is a
formof evil
(KaKov)
which he asserts s
the
subject
matter
of
comedy and
the
proper object of comic laughter.
That Plato's
remarks n
the Philebus are
directedat comedy as a univer-
sal phenomenon
nd not merely t stage comedy is obvious frommuch
else in his
discussion,
ut
especially fromthe followingwords 502-3):
Ev
TpaywioLaLS
-
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-7rov8aLOs
nd
Teleology
n
the
Poetics
163
imitation
s
not
ust
forms
f
self-ignorance
r
people
afflicted
ith
them
(cavXoTE'pWV
is
probably
masculine),
but almost
all
forms
of evil
and
thoseafflictedwiththem.The onlykind of evil or evil personwhichhe
would
exclude is the most
extreme
kind-complete vice
or
wholly
vicious persons.
The reason
he gives for their xclusion
makes
clear how
he
would
define the
comic more
narrowly
han Plato.
To
yEAoZov,
e
says,
consists f that which
is
faulty
or
ugly
but does not
cause
pain
or
harm. For
Aristotle,
hen,
vil which causes
pain
or
harm to
anyone
not
just
potentially
o
oneself, s in Plato's
theory)
s not
comic.
But,
plainly,
it
is not
onlywholly vicious
persons nd extreme
vice which
cause
pain
or harm.
Arguably ll,
and
certainly
most,
forms f
vice,
faults nd
ugli-
ness, physicalor ethical, cause at least some pain or harm,physicalor
ethical, either to those who
have
them
or to others.
And
just
as
plainly,
the
misfortunes,
vils,
and
vices
of
stage
comedy
are
therein
epresented
as
causing
a
good deal of
pain
or
harm
to the
comic
characters.
Aristotle's
efinition f
ro
yEOoLov, herefore,
f
taken
as
an
attempt
"Beobachtetes u
erklaren," ither
n
the sense of
defining
he particular
essence of
stage
comedy
or
its
appropriate
subject
matter, must
be
deemed a
sorry
failure,20
nd
contradicts he
implicationsof
what
he
himselfhas said in 49A31-32. To thisit may be objected that the evil
actions
represented
n
stage
comedy only
seem
to
but do not
reallycause
pain
or
harm.
This,
however,
s
true also of
actions on
the
tragic stage.
Admittedly, much
greater degree
of
verisimilitude
ertainsgenerally
to the
actions,
nd
so
also
to
the
pain and
suffering,
f
stage
tragedy
han
of
stage
comedy.
But
althoughthe
difference n
verisimilitude
etween
the two
genres
is
relative, not
absolute, Aristotle's
xclusion from the
comic of that
which
causes
pain
or
harm is
stated
n
absolute,not
rela-
tive
terms.
And
if he
had
the
suggested dea in
mind,
he
ought to have
stated texplicitly, ot eft tforus to infer.
His definition f
ro
yEXoiozV,
owever, makes
quite
good sense if
taken
as
directed
at
the
comic
in
a
universal,
hough
omewhat
refined,
sense.
"Deaths,
beatings,etc."
are in
real life
as well as on
the
comic
stage sometimes
bjects
of
laughter, ut the
theorist s
under no
obliga-
tion to
make the
comic coextensive
with
the
laughable.
Aristotle,s also
Plato,
did
not
think t
was. His
definition
s, as it
were, a
"persuasive
20
Some mightexplain Aristotle's xclusion of pain and harmfromcomedy by arguing
that
he has in
mind
not
rowdyOld
Comedy,
but
the
much more
innocuous
Middle
and
New.
But
this is
a
lame
argument:
Middle
and New
Comedy
undoubtedly
ncluded
incidents
involving
pain
and/or
harm,
as, for
example,
Knemon's
fall
into a
well in
Menander's
Dyscolus.
And,
as
Cooper
(above, note
14) 18-41
has
shown,
there
s
no rea-
son to
believe,
as
some
have, that
Aristotle
iscounted he
importance
f
Aristophanes, he
leading
representative
f
Old
Comedy. It
is,
therefore,
most
unlikely
that he
would
not
have
expected his
theory
f
comedy
to
apply
to
Aristophanes'
lays
as
well
as those
of his
successors.
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164
George
F. Held
definition":2'
t includes
withinthe comic only
what we ought
to laugh
at, not all
at which we sometimes
do. Olson on
this point, as on many
others, as gotten o the bottom f Aristotle'smeaning.22 is distinctions
between comic, malevolent, nd scornful
aughter
re implicit n Aris-
totle'sdefinition
f comedy. The things
t which
the latter wo are typi-
cally
directedhe excludes from the
comic. His
definition f the comic
encompasseswhat
takes place on
the comic stage, for there
nothing
really painfulor harmful
ccurs,but
it is not directed,first nd
foremost,
at the
"phenomenon
f
drama."
To yEAoi2ov is frequently
ranslated nto English
as "the ludicrous,"
but
it
is
much more
appropriately
endered
"the comic." "The laugh-
able" would of coursebe the most iteraltranslation, ut is less prefera-
ble
for several reasons: ro
y6\oZov,
as
I have
shown,
s
not
in
fact, as
Aristotle
efines
t,
coextensivewith
the
laughable; "laughable"
is not as
commonly
used
in
ordinaryEnglish
as
was
yEXoZosg
n
Greek;
and "the
laughable"
s
simply
not the
standard riticalterm
n
English
for
expres-
sing
the essence
of
comedy.
Aristotle's hoice
of
yEXoios
to
refer
o
the
essence
of comedy
is
itselfnot
without
ignificance
hough
in this, of
course,
he was strongly nfluenced
by
Plato's
use of
the
word
in
the
Philebus. Anotheradjective,
KWMLKO ,23
was also available to him and
might
have
performed
this same
function,
but it
normally
meant
"comic"
only
n a narrow
ense, .e.,
"of
or
relating
o
stage
comedy."
As
Else
remarks, 'Comic'
would be
a
good
term but seems to
have been
still
o
closely
associated
with theatrical
roduction
n
Aristotle's
ay
.
that
it
lacked the
necessary cope
to
designate
the
object
of
comedy
as
such."24LEXoLOS, however,
n
common
usage
already possessed
he
neces-
sary scope,
which
K&)MLKO
might
have obtained
solely
with
the
aid of a
definition.
ristotle's
reference
or
yAoZoso
over
KWMLK9os
to refer o
the
essenceof comedy is, therefore,n itself o some extent ndicativeof his
recognition
hat comedy
as a whole
is more universal
han
stage comedy
and
of
his intention
o relate his definition
f
stage
comedy
to
thisbroad-
er,
more universal
henomenon.
The
scope
of the
Greek
adjective
TpayLKoS'
was
significantlyreater
than
that
of
KWIALKOS.
It
frequently
meant "of
or
relating
o
stage trag-
edy,"
but
could
also mean "solemn"
or
"exalted,"
and
even
on occasion
might
be used
in a sense dentical
withthatof
the
English
"tragic";
Aris-
totle n factseemsso to use it once in the Poetics,whenhe singlesout
21
"Persuasive
definition"s
a term
which was coined
by
C. L. Stevenson,
Persuasive
Definitions,"
Mind (1938)
331f.
Its meaning
hould be obvious
frommy own usage
of it.
22
Olson (above,
note
19) 161.
23
KwI,UwpKOs,
f course,
was also available
to Aristotle, s
also
rpay biuo
in
place
of
7pay
KoLS', but since
these
other words are
mere cognates
of
KxwpKoS
and
rpaytov
and
Aristotle ever
uses either
one of them,
my discussion
will ignore
them.
24
Else (above,
note 11) 186.
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8/10/2019 Spoudaios and Teleology in the Poetics
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17rovbadov
nd
Teleology n
the Poetics
165
Euripides as "most
tragic"
TpayLKcwTaTos,:
53A29)
of the
tragedians.
n
any
case, therecan be
no
doubt
that,
f
Aristotle ad
attempted
o
define
the tragic,he would have employedno adjectiveotherthan
TpayLKos
to
form
the articular
noun
to serve
as his
definiendum.
This
obviously
he
has
failed
to do. He
has,
however,
done,
as it
were,
the
next
best
thing:
to
include in his definition f
tragedy
he
adjective
o7rovbdLos,
hich
in
both
Aristotle
nd other
writers
s
frequently
n
antonym
to
the
key
word,
yEXotos-,hich
he
had
just
used
to denote the essence of
comedy.
17rovbdatos
oes not denote
the
essential
quality
of
tragedy, .e., the
tragic, he whole essence
of
tragedy,
ut it does
denote an
essential
ual-
ityof
tragedy, .e., a
part
of its
essence.
7rovbados-
s not
identical in
functionwithyEXoLoswhichdenotes the whole essence of comedy,not
just a
part,
but its
inclusion
n
the
definition f
tragedy
s
highly
ignifi-
cant. In
view of Aristotle's
sage of its
antonym
o define the
essence
of
comedy,
it indicates an
attemptby
him
to
distinguish
etween
tragedy
and
comedy
in
terms f
contrasting,
ssential
ualities. His
assertion hat
the
7rpats
itself f
tragedy
ught to be
rovbata,
moreover,
would seem
to
indicate a desire to
distinguish etween
tragedy
nd
comedy
in
terms
of
essential qualities
belonging
to the
actions
themselves of
each. At
least it does ifwe understandhisdefinition f comedyto implythat the
7rpaets-
f
comedy
ought
to
be
yEA\oa.
Cooper
does so
understand
t,25
and
it seems
only
natural to
do so.
In view of
these
considerations,
Aristotle's
ailure o
define he
tragic
does not
seem so
significant.
t
may
be
just an
oversight-and
perhaps
due
partly
to
the
knowledge
that a
definition f TO
TpayLKov
might,
without
too much
ingenuity,be
ex-
tracted
fromhis definition
f
TpayobLa:
EO'TV
O?Vv
rpayq8thla
Ml1tls
7Tpa'Ewss
a71ovbaLas-
KaL
TreELas-
f/yeOos-
VX'frs,
271VoOv y
XWpEs
KaOTO TcUV elIJWV V TOLS'/OptSt,
bpwvTrwv
KaL
01
a'JtayyeXtas-,
bt'
E'Aeov
KaL
fr0/3ov
repaLvovoa
T7/V
T7O
TOLOVTo)WV
7raOrq1.a'Tv
KaOapcTLv.
49B24-28)
If
we
eliminate from
his
definition
f
tragedy those
elements
which
belong to
tragedy
exclusivelyor
primarily
s an
art form,
we
are left
with
two
elementswhich
we may
be
sure
Aristotle
would have
included
in
a
definitionof
TO
TpayLKov:
(1)
the
ethical-physical26
lement,
To
r7rovdtZov;and
(2) pathos.27
The
former
infer
naturally
from the
words
7rpacfEws-
ovba'as; the
latter
from he
words
EAXov Kat
xo,0ov.
So
conceived, his definition f the tragicwould be explicitly arallel to his
definition
f the
comic, which
consistsof
two
similar
elements:
1) an
25
See
Cooper
(above,
note 14)
179.
26
17rovbaiov,
ike
#aiXov
and
yeXoios, an
have
a
physical as
well as an
ethical
sense.
Cf.
EN
1098A9.
27
Cf.
Else's
remark
bout the
importanceof
pathos
in
Aristotle's
onception of
tragedy
(see
above,
page 160).
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166 George F. Held
ethical-physical lement,denoted by the words
'Aa&pIIria
TL
KaL
aLoG-XO;
and (2) a negative element, the absence of pathos, as indicated by the
words
avw'vvov Ka'L
ov
40ap-LKdOV.
Whereas the comic forAristotle s
that
which
is
ugly or defective but does not cause pain or
harm, the
tragic, surmise,he would defineas that which s
a-7rov8ados9
ut causes
or, as may be inferred romPo.
53B21
and
54A4-9,
at least threatens o
cause, pain or harm.
The reader
may
surmise
omewhatdifferently,ut,
whetheror not
he accepts this admittedly uite hypotheticalAristotelian efinition f
the tragic, t should be clear fromthe preceding that a strong ase can
be made
against
Kommerell's nd
Lesky's conclusions oncerningAris-
totle'smode of thought bout tragedy nd art in the Poetics. It should
now be evident that Aristotle ould conceive of art as possessing defin-
able essence and
as
existing
n
its
own
right part from
ts
effect, hat he
did
conceive
of
comedy
in
this
way
and
very likely
could also
have
thought
f
tragedy
n
the same manner
and, lastly,
hat
he
did distin-
guish
between
tragedy
nd
comedy
"on
the
basis
of
[an]
essential
uality
of action itself." n what follows, will
no
longer
be
concerned to argue
these
points,
but rathernext to
establish
hat
o7rova&Los9
and
yEXoios
in
thePoeticsare teleological erms.
* * *
7wovbaLosg
s
employed
on
three ccasions
n
the Poetics
n
conjunction
with he word
4l,u71s0
or ts
cognate
yL1f'o1LaL.
No
one
today
doubts
hat
on
two of these occasions
48A2
and
49B10),
where
t is
applied
to
the men
imitated n tragedy,
--rov8aLos9
enotes an ethical
udgment
bout
them,
even if some insist hat
more
than
ust
an ethical
udgment
s
involved.28
But on thethird ccasion, n thedefinitionftragedy
49B24),
where tis
applied to
the action
of
tragedy tself,
cholars
have tended
to view it
rather s an aesthetic
erm,meaning
"serious."
They
have
done so
despite
theirrecognition
hat
the term
hould
be
used
univocally hroughout
he
work.29 ardie
seems
to
have
been the first
o
argue
that t
s so
used,30
nd
his ideas have been
revived
by
Grube
and
Golden.
All three scholars
support heir positionby citing49B38-50A2,
where Aristotle
nly
a few
sentences
fter he definition
f
tragedy
sserts hat
ctions
re of a
certain
sort n account
of
the
thought
nd
character
f those
who
perform
hem:
83Lay
ap
TOV'TWV KatL
rTsa
Tpace4st
Evai 4aEv 7TOLas' TLvas.31
Grube also cites
28
A. Gudeman, Aristoteles
HEPI
HIOHTIKHX (Berlin-Leipzig
1934) 270,
held that
-rov-
baiosv
n the Poetics
s
always
used
in an aesthetic ense. t means "tauglich
ur
die
Tragodie."
29
Cf. S.
H.
Butcher,
Aristotle'sTheory of Poetry
and
Fine
Art
(New
York
1951) 234-
35,
and Vahlen (above,
note 15)
267-68.
30
R.
P.
Hardie,
"The Poetics of Aristotle,"
Mind
4
(1895) 357.
31
Cf. Hardie (above,
note 30)
358,
Grube (above,
note 13)
xxi,and Golden (above,
note
9)
284-85.
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-
8/10/2019 Spoudaios and Teleology in the Poetics
11/19
168 George
F.
Held
possess n and of themselves he same qualities
as belong to that charac-
ter? Golden simply gnores
he passages cited by Grube where Aristotle
does seem to distinguish etween genreson thebasis of essential ualities
of the actions themselves.
He also ignores the fact that, though
"a
person'scharacter s
stamped on his deeds," his deeds are also stamped
on his character: There
can be no doubt . . that in Aristotle's thical
theory ction and action
alone shapes character."35he radical disjunc-
tion between action and character mplicit in
Golden's view of their
relationship
n
the Poetics
is foreign o Aristotle's
hought: he emphasis
in Aristotles on the interrelationshipetween
the two. Jones, herefore,
goes much too
far
in
asserting hat
"it
needs to be said
that
the plot-
character dichotomy s radically false to Aristotle's nderstanding f
Tragedy, hatcharacter,
ike colour,mustbe denied
even the mostprim-
itive autonomy";36ut
the autonomywhich Aristotle rants o action and
character n the
Ethics is not so great as to permit mere metaphorical
relationship etweenthem n the Poetics.
Let us consider
more closely the passage
which, f any, explains the
presenceof
a7rovat'a9S
in the definition f tragedy:
E7rEL
7rpa$EwS'
ecTTL
PLI/.L?70S,
7rpaTTETaL 8E
V7TO
TLVWV
7rpaTTovTwv,
ovs
avayK7/
rTOLOVs
rtvas
ELvat
KaTa
Te
TO ?70oS'
KaL
r77v
Ltavotav
bLa
\~ ~~~~aeL
'
a' qe7sova,s, -ra
,
v.e a..t
yap
TovTrV KaL
ras,
7rp4ELs
ELVaL4fEv 7roLasTLvas,
V
4V
ZvZ'
bVO
TrV
7rpafEwv
e1vaL, oLavotav
Kat
t'7os,]
KaL
Kara
ravTasv
Ka
TvyxavovO-L
Kaca
7rorvyxavovctL
7TavTes))....
(49B36-50A2)
Aristotle ddresses
himself
pecifically
o
the
question
of
why
actions
are
of a
certain
quality,
nd
asserts hat
they
are so
because
of
the
6oso
nd
bIaivota which
cause them. From the
proximity
f this
passage
to
the
definition
f
tragedy,
and
the
repetition
n it of the
words
pln/SO-ts
,rpace4sc romthat definition
s well as the obvious
purport
f
the
pas-
sage
as
a
whole,
would conclude
not
only
that herein
ies
the
explana-
tion for rovba'aS
in
the
definition f
tragedy,
ut that
this
passage
was
specifically
ntendedby
Aristotle
o
provide
n
explanation
or
t.
As Else
says
n
commenting
n this
passage:37
In
short,
Aristotle
means
by
7rpaTEw
he
7rpaEwv
7rovbalav
Kat
reXEL'as,
fthe
efinition:
e s
thinking,
ot f ll
action',
ut
pecifi-
cally
f
he
ragic
ctionwithts
ompleteness
nd ts eriousness.
...
The reference
o thedrama s
also
mplicit
n
elva'
.ba,.lEv
which-certainlyot y ccident-reappearselow
A6).
Else, however, hough
he has much to
say
about
the
passage
as a
whole,
does not
specifically
onclude,
as
I think
one
should,
that
this
passage
35
Else (above,
note 11) 71.
Cf. EN
1105A26-B12.
36
Jones above,
note
12) 31.
37
Else
(above,
note 11) 241.
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8/10/2019 Spoudaios and Teleology in the Poetics
12/19
?Irovbatos,
and Teleology
n the Poetics
169
affords n
explanation
for the
presence
of
a-rovbalas-
n the definition
f
tragedy.
The genuineness f the sentence
rEbVKV
. . .
'Oos has been widely
impugned.
Vahlen
and
Gomperz believe
it to
be
out
of
place
because Kat
iaTa
TavTav
ought
to follow
immediately
after
rota'S
Ttvas38
Else
agrees,
concludes
that t is an
interpolation,39
nd
asserts,
moreover,
hat
"it
is
a crude
and
misleadingparaphrase"
of
the
preceding
entence.40n
that
entence
blta
s
constructed
with the
genitive,
not the
accusative,
nd
denotes
mere
instrumentality,
ot
causality.
The
subsequent sentence,
therefore,
ntroduces somewhat
different
dea,
to which
Else
objects
as
follows:
The
doctrine s
in
fact
not
really
Aristotelian. he
two causes
of
action, accordingto Aristotle E.N.
6.2.1139A31;
De An. 3.10.433A10-
30),
are
mind or reason
(Xo\yos,LacoLa,
or
vovs;
but the
vov3s
an be
mere magination,
vrTaTLa) and desire
"p4tvs).
It
is true
of course that
character
ends
by shaping
one's
desires."'4'Schuetrumpf
grees
that
7rEfqVKEV...
'OoS may
be
out
of
place
for
the reason
given
by
Vahlen
and
Gomperz,
but
argues against Else
that there s no
conflict
etween
this
sentence and
the
preceding
one
and that
its
meaning s sufficiently
Aristotelian. e
points
out
that vov3s,
hich
Else holds to be one of the
causes of action, tselfnecessarily nvolvesan
'OLK'
'`tvS
and in the pas-
sage
from
he
Ethics cited
by Else (1139A31) is
in
factreplaced by 'OLK'
i'es
in the
very
next
sentence,
so that even this
passage shows
the
involvement
f
'Oo0S
n
causing action. But he also points
out that it is
clear from other
passages
in
the
Ethics that it is 7rpoaLpEo-Ls
hich for
Aristotle
s
ultimately
the
cause of action, and holds
that
Z7osv
nd
bLa'VoLa
are the
constituent
lements
of
7rpoaL'pEo-Ls-nd in
the passage
from the Poetics
function ogethervirtually s does
7rpoaLpEo-Ls
n the
Ethics:42
Haufig,
wenn
auch mit
wechselnden
Begriffen, ringt
uch
sonst
Aristotelesum
Ausdruck, ass Charakter nd Denken das
Handeln
bestimmen.43
it
diesen
beiden Begriffen mschreibt r, wie oben
gezeigt wurde, die
beiden Bestandteile der
7rpoaLpeo-Lvs
ie
7rpoalpfELT
is
nach
EN44
die
Bewegungsursache
er
Handlungen.
38
See Vahlen
(above, note
15) 20-21 and
Theodor
Gomperz,Zu
Aristoteles'Poetik, Ein
Beitrag
zur
Kritik
und
Erklarung
der Kapitel I-VI
(Vienna
1888) 29-31.
39
D.
W.
Lucas,
Aristotle:Poetics
(Oxford 1968) ad
loc., also
believes
the
passage to be
an interpolation.
40
Else
(above, note
11) 240.
41
Else
(above, note
11) 240,
note 70.
42
Schuetrumpf
above, note
10) 84-85.
43
Cf.
EN
1144A6:
E7rL
O
EpyoV
a7TOTEAELTaL
KaTa
T77V
pOVP7LV
Kal T1PV
7)OLK47V
pET47V
and Pol.
1323B32f.The
passages cited in this
note
and the next
are taken
directlyfrom
Schuetrumpf's
wn
notes.
See
Schuetrumpf
above,
note
10) 84,
notes6 and 7.
44
Cf.
EN
1138A31:
rpa4Ews
kv
o'v
apXn'
7rpoalpEfOL
b'0Ev X7
KLV7)oLT
&aAA'
Ov'
Oi
EVEKa).f.
also
EN
1139A33
andMetaph.
1065A32.
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170
George
F. Held
Schon as
passt urPoetik, o a
dOog
nd
LtavoLa
gemeinsamls die
UrsachenawTta)
derHandlungen
ezeichnet
ind....
So istdiese
Vorstellung
anz mEinklang it
erEthik es
Aristoteles.
I agree with
Schuetrumpf's
onclusions bout
this
passage as far as
they go,
but believe
that they do not
go far
enough, for he fails to
see
that this passage explains
the reason
for
ff7rovbaLaS
in
the definition f
tragedy.
n fact,although
he writes
chapterentitled
Die Bedeutung
von
a6osL,
L
rov3aZoS,
4avAos
in
der
Poetik,"45 e says
nothingt all
about
ff7rovbaLaS
in
the
definition f tragedy,
for which
he has been
justly
criticizedby Rees.46
infer from
thispassage that
the
-rpa^6s9
f
tragedy
s
ff7rovbaLa
ot merely because
it is
performedby characters
who are
ff7rovbaLoL
ith respect o their
Oq
and bLaVoLaut because it is
a product
of and
is
caused by the o-7rovbaia
rO'6 and
bLaVoLa of these
characters.47 he
reader may perhaps
question
whether t is possible
to
attribute
o the
O'q
nd bLaVoLa
of
the tragic
characters he sort
of unity
which
the preceding statement
eems
to imply they
possess.
Clearly,
their
(6q
and bLacVoLa are not of
a
piece, but
ultimately
here should be
no
more
difficulty
n
attributing
n
over-allunity
o the?'6i7and bLa'oLa
of
these characters
han to their ctions.
f
Aristotle's
se of the
singular
-rpa^
e
in the definition f tragedy o refer o the various actionswhich
comprise
a
tragicplot
is
conceptually
ntelligible,
hen this
explanation
of
how this
-rpaLs
comes
to
be o-rovia
a
is also
conceptually
ntelligible.
This explanation
f
o-rovbaasa
does
not
of
course
entail thatthe
action of
tragedy
must
be good
in the sense
of
actually producing
a
good
result-although
that is
what
happens
in
some tragedies,
e.g.,
the
Oresteia,
and is
generally
he
rule
in
epic
which
s also
an
imitation
f
a
7rp4LsL
-7rovbaLa.
1pa6eEws
7rovbaL'aS
in
the definition f
tragedy
ntails
no
more,
nd no
less,
than
that
"the
action
of the
play
as
a whole
should
be a 'good' one (i.e., it should portray ffortso bringabout a 'good'
result)."48 r,
to
put
it
another
way,
it entails that
at least some
of the
actions
of
which the
plot
consists hould
be
o-7rov8aLaL
in
the
sense
of
being
a
product
of
the
o-7rovbaia
7'j6)
and
bLafoLa
of the
characters.
But
tragedy
s not
merely
n imitation
f actionsof
or
by ff71ov8aZoL,
or
not
all
actions of
or
by crrovtaLot
do
in
fact
emanate
fromtheir
r0ovbaia
#'dq
nd bLacVoLa.
A
o-rov8aZoS9
may purposely
ct
out
of
character:
he
may,
for
example,
for comic
effect,
mitate
a
aviAos9.
Many
things
which
o-7rovtaLot
rdinarily o, moreover, re not especiallyrelated to
their
character.
Such actions
are
not what
Aristotle has
in
mind.
45
Schuetrumpf
above,
note 10)
52-63.
46
B. R.
Rees, CR
23 (1973)
52.
47
Of course,
not
everything
hat happens
in
a
play
is a product
of the
7'0-q
nd
bLavota
of the
characters;
ome
things
naturally
ccur through
hance or are
caused
by
natural
or
supernatural
orces.
48
Humphrey
House,
Aristotle'sPoetics
(London
1956) 84.
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X.rov8aLos0nd
Teleology
n
the Poetics
171
Y7-rovbaLas
t
the
very east
entails
that ome of
the actions
performed
y
the
o-7rovbaZoL
e thosecharacteristic f
them,
those
which
dentify
hem
as
o--rov8a^oL.
The reason
for
the
presence
of
o-rovbalaS
in
the definitionof
tragedy will
assume hereafter o be
that
ustgiven.
I
have
left
oT7rov-
baLos0ntranslated nd will
continueto do
so since there s no
satisfactory
English
equivalent.
In
what follows
will be
concerned
only
with
its
meaning,not its
translation.
chuetrumpf
holds
that
o-rov8aZoS9
n
the
Poetics is
an
ethical term
expressing
judgment
about
those
qualities
and
virtues
which
belong
to
'6oso n
the
Ethics,
i.e.,
moral,
not intellec-
tual,
qualities
and virtues.
believe
that
on the
contrary
7ov8aLos9
n
thePoetics, as also frequentlyn theEthics,expresses judgmentwhich
encompasses he
intellectual s well as
moral
sphere. will
present
elow
the
reasons for
my
opinion. But
Schuetrumpf
s
right
o
reject
the view
of
Gudeman that
o-7rov8aLos9
n
the
Poetics
is
an
aesthetic
term,49
nd
right lso,
I
believe, to
dispute Else's
assertion
hat
"Aristotle's ntithesis
a-rov8aZo0-.aviAos9
s
not
merely
moral,
n
any
narrow
ense
of
the word.
Political,
ocial,
and
aesthetic
lements
re
in
it from he
beginning,
nd
it
need
not
surprise
us
if
they emerge
more
clearly
later on."50
Schuetrumpfholds,on the contrary, hat only withthe words
T(J^
EV
MEyaA\7,
o
OVTCOV
Kal
EVTvXLca
(53A10)
does
Aristotle
ndicate
that
the
characters
should be
from the
upper class
and
argues that
Aristotle
would not
have
included
this
statement
f
his
previous
tatements
bout
the
tragic characters
had
contained a
"Feststellung
uber die
ausseren
Verhaltnisse es
Helden."'5'
His
disagreement
with
Else on this
point has
been
roundly
criticized
by Rees.52
Radical
disagreement n
this
point
can
perhaps be
quelled
if
scholars will
allow
a
distinction
etween the
denotation
and
connotation
f
these
words.
17rov8aLos9
nd
faviXos9,
n
my opinion, denote, as Schuetrumpfnsists, nly an ethical judgment
about
those to
whom
they
are
applied;
but they
may, I
would
allow,
even
in
the
hands of
Aristotle,
have
social,
political,
and
aesthetic
connotations s
well.
That
these
connotations
play
much of
a role in
Aristotle's
sage
of
them
n the
Poetics,
however,
do
not
believe.
It
is stated n
Cat.
10B6-10 that
a-wovbaLos0
s
the
adjective
for
pE T-:
EVLOTE
8e
Ka'L
Ovo/aTos
KXELMEVOV
V
XEYETaL
7rapWVV14W TO KaT
avTrJv
7ToLOv
AEyO/.LEVov,
Lov
ar7o
Ti?/
apTS
O
(T7rov8aLoS
TQ) yap
apET?/V
EXEWV
0rovba&ov A'yETaL,
&A\
ov 7rapwvvMws
ar7o T77
apET?/S.
49
Schuetrumpf
above, note
10)
52-55; cf.
above,
note
28.
50
Else
(above, note
11) 78.
51
Schuetrumpf
above,
note
10) 58.
52
Rees
(above,
note
46) 51.
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172
George F. Held
Schuetrumpf
s aware of
the
interrelationship
f
these words. He quotes
thispassage from he Categories
and
another o the same effect
rom he
Magna Moralia (1181A28:
TO
8
cT7rovbaLov
ElvaL
4EcTL
TO
TaS
apETasq
VXELV)53nd states
without qualification
that
-"r7rov8azosv
und
oaiXos
waren ... die apEr
) und
KaKla zugehorigen Adjektive."54
He
seems
unaware, however,of
the potential
conflict etween this statement
nd
othersby
him which restrict
he udgment xpressed
by fo7rovbaZoS'
to the
moral sphere. f
ff7rov8aLos9
s
the adjective
for
pErT?,
one would
expect
that t would express udgments
bout
any kind of
apET7/,
intellectual
s
well as moral.
Schuetrumpf's
onclusions
about
how
a
7rov8aLos9
s used in the
Poetics are based on his belief that 6oso n the Poetics has the same
meaning
as in the Ethics where it
includes moral
but not intellectual
qualities55
nd,moreparticularly, is
belief
that
t
has
such
a meaning
n
48A1-5 where the
men imitated n tragedy re said to
be
o-7rovbaZoL
ith
respect
to
their
jq.56
I
disagree
with him
and
believe
that
q6oso
n the
Poetics generally
has
the same sense as
in Rh.
1
and
2 where
it
includes
intellectual
as
well as moral
qualities.57
n a
forthcoming
rticle
in
Hermes
I give all
the reasons
why.
Here
I will
give
just
one: its
usage
in
48A1-5. The meaningsof
'6OSo
and
o--rov8aLos9
here are interwined.
HGoso
n that passage
should include intellectual qualities
because
i
rzov8a
os'
there,
n
the basis
of its
usage
elsewhere
n
Aristotle, ught
to
express judgment
which
spans
the intellectual
s
well
as moral
spheres.
Though a-wov3aLos'
s used
by
Aristotle t least
once
as a
purely
moral
term,58
t
carries
a
broader
meaning
when
contrasted
xplicitly
r
im-
plicitly
with
OaviAos
or
yEAoLoS.
This
is
clear from
he discussion
f con-
templation
t the end of
the
Ethics
1175B25-79A33).
There
-7Tov8aLos9
and
its
cognates
occur
at least eleven
times,59
ot
always
in direct
applicationto those who contemplate, ut always in wayswhich imply
that
they
are
among
the ff7rovbaZoL
because
of their ntellectual
uperi-
ority.
To
say
that
the
judgment
expressed by
ff7rovtaLOS
encompasses
both moral
and
intellectual
qualities,
however,
is
not to
delineate
its
precise
meaning.
I submit
that
o-7rov8aLos9
nd
its
antonyms
are
for
Aristotle,
t
least
when contrasted
explicitly
or
implicitly
with
each
other,
teleological
terms, .e.,
they denote
respectively
good
and
bad
53
Schuetrumpfabove,note 10) 49, note 1.
54
Schuetrumpf
above,
note 10)
51.
55
Cf.
Schuetrumpf
above,
note
10)
52-53.
56 Cf.
Schuetrumpf
above,
note
10)
47-52.
57
On the
usage
of
'Oo0
in Rh.
1
and 2, see Schuetrumpf
above,
note 10)
83, note
2.
58
Cf.
Rh.
1378A16
where
7rov6atosq
s used
together
with
opOdvq.os,
to form the
moral-intellectual
ntithesis.
Bonitz'
Index Aristotelicus
istsseveral
instanceswhere
it is
used synonomously
ith
E7TLLK7'.
59
IXoAij
(Vermehren)
ather
han
o-7rovbij
hould probably
be read
at 1177A19.
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,rrov8a^tos
nd Teleology
n the Poetics 173
relationship
etween
a
thing,
nimate
or
inanimate,
nd
its
proper
end
(and
form).The
following
passage (EN
1176B35-77A6)
from
the
discus-
sion of contemplationwill illustrate the teleological connotationsof
crT7rovIaLos,
nd its cognates:
ov
T27
EAos
'1
ava7ravrTLs
yLvEat
yap EvEKa
T7S1
EVEpyELasX
OKE O O
EvoaL,.Lv
8'o0 KaT apET7V lVal-
OVTOS Of
,AETa
(T7rov8?J;,
A'A
OVK
ev 7raLo3aL.
E37ATu
TE
A
TyoAev
ra rovbaLa
TrV
yEXOLWV
KatlAcTa
7ratLLa%
Kat
TOV
,E/3ATLOVOT
aft
Kat
lAoptOV Kat
avOpc7rov
aT7rov8aloTopav
TrV
evepyeLav
7/
E
TOV
ATlOVOT
Kp
ELTTWV
Kal
ETatLAoVLKWT
pa
77n.
Aristotle posits a direct
and
proportional
relationship
between the
o-7rovb
cf.
-7rovbaLoTepav)
of an activitynd theexcellence f the
part
of us
which it
employs and also
between the
a-7rovb
of
an
activity
nd
the
happiness
which it is
capable
of
producing.
Contemplation,
e
con-
cludes,
s
the most
o7rovba'a
of
activities nd the one
most
productive
f
happinessbecause it
employs
only thebest
part of
us,
vo3s.60
he
happy
life is
the
one that is lived
HuEra
ov7r07s.
It is,
therefore, nly by
manifesting
7mvb
and
by
engaging
n
o-7rovIa^LaL
7Tpa6ELv
and E'vfpyELaL
that
we
can
obtain our
end,
happiness.
The
teleological
connotations f
r-7rov8a&os
nd its cognates hould be apparent.
Another
mportant
passage for
illustrating he
teleological
connota-
tionsof
o-7rovIaZos-
s
1097A15-98A20.
There Aristotle
sserts hat all men
desire the
good, i.e., that forwhich
all
else is done
(1097A18).
Happiness,
therefore,must
be the
good,
for
we
choose
all
else for
the sake of it
(1097B1-6).
Happiness, however, an
be
obtained only by
performinghe
specificwork
,Epyov) roperto man's
nature. This
work
s
an
activity n
accordance
with reason
and virtue. t
is the
o-7rov8aZos
ho
performs
his
workwell
(cEv).Neither
4aviAos- oryE,oZos-s used in the passage,but we
may
nfer
rom he
many
passageswhere hese
words
re used as
antonyms
to
o-7rov8aZoL
hat t is the
4aVAoL
and
yEO^LOL
who do not
perform
man's
workwell and
whose
actions,
herefore,re
notwell directed
t man's
end,
happiness.
This,
I
submit,
s
the
fundamental
distinction
etweenAris-
totle's
-7rov8aZot
nd
OaviAoL,
the
distinction hich s
operative n
Po.
48A1-5.
60
EN
1177B27-78A9.
Aristotle t
one
point
1178B27-28) even
identifies
appiness
with
contemplation; nd on thisbasishe denies thatanimalscan be happy.This identifications
most
problematic:
how can it
be
reconciled
with
what else
Aristotle ays
about
happiness?
This
question and
the
general
nature
of
Aristotle's
onception of
happiness
have been the
subject of
much
recent
discussion. ee R.
Kraut,"Two
Conceptions
of
Happiness,"
PhR
88
(1979)
167-97; W. F.
R.
Hardie,
"Aristotle
n the
Best
Life for
Man,"
Philosophy 4
(1979)
35-50, esp.
36;
Klaus
Jacobi,
Aristoteles'
infuhrung es
Begriffs
evdbato.lda' im
I.
Buch
der
'Nikomachischen
Ethik,"'
Philosophisches
Jahrbuch
86
(1979)
300-325;
J.
L.
Ackrill,
Aristotle
on
'Eudaimonia,' (London
1975); Stephen
R.
L. Clark,
Aristotle'sMan
(Oxford
1975); John
M.
Cooper, Reason and
Human
Good in
Aristotle
Boston
1975).
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8/10/2019 Spoudaios and Teleology in the Poetics
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174
George F. Held
I
conclude,
therefore, hat
when Aristotle ays that the action
of
tragedy s o7rovbaLa, he means
that it should possess
the same qualities
whichbelong o the
7rov8zaoL,
it shouldbe in accordancewith t least
some of the virtues,
moral nd intellectual, ossessed
y the
7rov8aLoL,
and
it should be to
some significantxtentwell directed
at the end proper
to
man's nature,
happiness.We may, therefore, e
specific bout the
"'good'
result" t which ffortsn tragedy
re to be made (see
above, page 170): it s
the good result f happiness.As
Olson observes,
Tragedy exhibits ife as
directed o important nds; comedyas eithernot
directed o such
ends,or
unlikely
o
achieve
them."
1
Once
again Olson has gotten o the
heart of
Aristotle'smeaning;but "important
nds" may be
reduced to one, ourfinal
end, happiness.Tragedy mitates n action which s, comedy one which s
not,well directed
t happiness.Tragedy xhibits o
us characterswho
have,
comedy characters
who have not,
the wherewithal o be happy and
who
demonstrate
hisby whattheydo
in the play tself.
Such
characters,
f
course,
may fall nto misfortune-for
variety
f
reasons:moral flaws n themselves,
onestmistakes,
hance, the enmity f
the gods, etc. And
if
theydo, they
naturally ose
whateverhappiness hey
may have.
Tragedy,moreover,
ypically resents
hem
n
the very
ct of
falling ntomisfortune;nd Aristotlelearly houghtt appropriate or t to
do
so,
as
is
evident
from
his discussion
f
the
tragic
plot
n
chapters
13 and
14. My
views
about
his
conception
f
tragedy
need
to
be reconciled
with
thesefacts nd can be.
It
should
first e notedthathappiness
orAristotle
s
not identical
with good fortune.
Happiness
for
hinm
s
a
technical
and
prescriptive erm.Virtue
nd knowledge re preconditions
or
happiness,
though
not for
good
fortune.
Happiness
nvolves
pleasure,
but
not
ust
any
kind,only
thosepleasures onsequent
o and consistent
ith
he
possession
of
virtue
nd
knowledge cf.
EN
1177A23-B1). However, hough
happiness
and goodfortune re not dentical, reedom rommisfortunesnaturally
precondition
for
happiness.
This
is
a truism
which Aristotle
nowhere
bothers o
express,
hough
t
is
implied
n his comment
hat
the man who
contemplates
s the
happiest
f
men
because,
among
other
hings,
e
is the
most like
the gods
and
they
are
most
ikely
to look after omeone
like
themselves
EN
1179A23-33).
The
fact that
happiness depends
upon
freedom rom
misfortune,oupled
withthe other
factsmentioned
bove.
requires ome
modification
f my
tatement hat
ragedy
mitates
n action
well directed t happiness: hetragic ction is well directed t happiness
only
to some extent
nd in
certain
respects;
o
some
extent
nd
in
certain
respects t is poorly
o directed.
t
is
well directed
n
respect
o
the effects
upon
it of theo-rov8aZa
~Or,
and
btaVota
of the
tragic haracters,
ut it
is
poorly
o
directed
n
respect
to
the effects
pon
it of the
moral
flawsof
these ame
characters,
heirhonest
mistakes,
hance, angrygods,
tc.
That
61
Olson (above, note 16) 3-5.
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1?rov8aios9
and
Teleology
n
thePoetics
175
it is
poorlydirected
t
happiness
may
seem the more salientfact
about
it,
but
for
Aristotle t is essential hat the
tragic
action
possess
both
types
of
direction.This is evident fromhis definitionf tragedywhere thewords
7rpaEws-
o-irov8aias,
xplicitly
ttribute
o it the
one
direction,
while
the
words
\fov
Ka'L
0,8ov
implicitly
ttribute o
t
theother.
Ev8aqLoVLa, herefore,
falls within the
province
of
tragedy,
and
outside that of
comedy.
nterestingly,
ristotle
makes
a statement o
that
effect n the
Poetics,
though
the text of
this statement s
somewhat
corrupt. give itstext
s
printed
n
Else's edition:
?7
yap rpaycoba
f(LjAur0zT
-TLV
OVK
aVBpco7TCV
AXa
lTpaicv
KaL
LOV
KaL EvoaL.uoVL'as [
-
8/10/2019 Spoudaios and Teleology in the Poetics
19/19
176 George F. Held
whole much better than
does my own interpretation.My arguments
against t have been based
rather n the belief that t is inconsistent ith
Aristotle's sage of
o-7roviao0S
lsewhere n his corpus.One should keep
in mind, however, that,
even as traditionally nterpreted,Aristotle's
definition
oes
not
fit
he
genre as a whole, forthe action of some
Greek
tragedies s not serious t all. Every definition f tragedy
which triesto
distinguish
what is distinctly ragic and which rises above the mere
tautology hat a tragedy s a play by a tragedianproduced
on the tragic
stage,
will
necessarily
have a somewhat limited applicability and
practicality. ristotle'sheory s I interprett, however,
s very practical
in one very mportant espect:
t succeeds in distinguishing
hat makes
the mosttragiccharactersmost tragic.The term tragic" an be applied
intelligibly o a Creon,64
Medea, or a Jason,but the
term, as most
people
use it and understand t, applies much
better o
an
Antigone,
n
Oedipus,
or
a
Socrates.
Why do the latter trike
us as
more
fully ragic
than
the former? he reason cannot lie in the pathos
which they uffer,
for
some of the latter sufferno more than
some of the former.The
reason must lie
in
the
o-rovb
which they manifestgenerally n their
actions and especially in
those actions which
lead directly
to
their
respective catastrophes.The example of Socrates is most noteworthy
because his
death,
n
Plato's account of
it,
nvolves ittle
or no
pathos
at
all (cf. Phd. 117B3-7),
and
yet
strikes
many
of us as
exceedingly ragic.
It can do
so only
because
the
tragic
effect f
a
catastrophe
s
in
direct
proportionnot only
to
the pathos suffered,
ut also
to
the
a-7rov8w7
manifested by
the sufferers. hat this should
be
so is
implied
in
Aristotle's heory
s
I
interpret
t. That
theory,
herefore,
s I
interpret
it,
is
not
impractical,
hough
ts
practicality
s
of a different rder than
as traditionally nterpreted.
There
is,
I
suppose,
the
possibility
hat
a7rovbaZ0s
in thedefinitionf tragedy s ambiguous, hat, onsciously r
not, Aristotle
chose
to use it there because
it can
carry
both the
teleological
onnotations
which attribute
o it
and
a
more
general sense,
approximating
he
English
"serious."
To
hold
this
possibility
o be
an
actuality
s
a convenient
way
of
making
most
ense out
of
his
definition,
and
my arguments
n
favor
of my
own
interpretation,
s far as I
can
see,
pose
no
absolute
obstacle
to
the
adoption
of
such
a view.
64
As Karl
Reinhardt,
Sophocles,
transl.
Hazel and David
Harvey
(Oxford
1979)
93,
observes,Creon's fate in Antigone is "empty,"Antigone's full." By my interpretation,
Aristotle's efinition
f tragedy
mpliesthat
the
fate of Antigone
s
more appropriate
for
representation
n tragedy
than that
of Creon.
That Antigone's
actions
are
0a7rovbaZat,
Creon's largely
4aiAat, should
be evident
from he fact
that hers
are
in
accordance
with
nature
while his are
not, as
I have shown
in
"Antigone'sDual
Motivation
for theDouble
Burial," Hermes
111 (1983)
197-201.