spec pro digested cases

SPECPRO 3D- 2012

5. Pastor Jr. v. CA (3D 09-10)FACTS Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City on June 5, 1966, survived by

his Spanish wife Sofia Bossio (who also died on October 21, 1966), their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate child, not natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito Quemada QUEMADA PASTOR, JR. is a Philippine citizen, having been naturalized in 1936. SOFIA is a Spanish subject. QUEMADA is a Filipino by his mother's citizenship.

QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of PASTOR, SR. with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I (PROBATE COURT). The will contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of QUEMADA consisting of 30% of PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share in the operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (ATLAS) of some mining claims in Pina-Barot, Cebu.

The PROBATE COURT, upon motion of QUEMADA and after an ex parte hearing, appointed him special administrator of the entire estate of PASTOR, SR..

QUEMADA as special administrator, instituted against PASTOR, JR. and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate, which included the properties subject of the legacy and which were in the names of the spouses PASTOR, JR. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de Pastor, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance.

PASTOR, JR. and his sister SOFIA filed their opposition to the petition for probate and the order appointing QUEMADA as special administrator. PROBATE COURT issued an order allowing the will to probate.

On December 5, 1972, the PROBATE COURT issued an order allowing the will to probate. Appealed to the Court of Appeals, the order was affirmed in a decision dated May 9, 1977. On petition for review, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition in a minute resolution dated November 1, 1977 and remanded the same to the PROBATE COURT after denying reconsideration on January 11, 1978.

For two years after remand of the case to the PROBATE COURT, QUEMADA filed pleading after pleading asking for payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties subject of said legacy. PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA opposed these pleadings on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit with another branch of the Cebu Court of First Instance. All pleadings remained unacted upon by the PROBATE COURT.

The PROBATE COURT set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will for March 25, 1980, but upon objection of PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA on the e ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held on March 25. Instead, the PROBATE COURT required the parties to submit their respective position papers as to how much inheritance QUEMADA was entitled to receive.1. A. Pastor, Jr. ...................................40.5% 2. E. Pelaez, Sr. ...................................15.0% 3. B. Quemada .......................................4.5%

While the reconveyance suit was still being litigated in Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the PROBATE COURT issued the now assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to QUEMADA was not inofficious.

The order being "immediately executory", QUEMADA succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment, the oppositors sought reconsideration thereof on the same date primarily on the ground that the PROBATE COURT gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the question of ownership of the royalties and ordered the payment of QUEMADA's legacy after prematurely passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS (FOR SPEC PRO) whether the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 resolved with finality the

questions of ownership and intrinsic validity of the will?

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

1ANTONIO | ARRIOLA | BLEZA | CRISOLOGO | CURAMMENG | DOCENA | ESCUETA | FRANCISCO |

IMPERIAL | JULARBAL | PICHAY | PLAZO | ROJO | SIA

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NO. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic

validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9.) As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.

The rule is that execution of a judgment must conform to that decreed in the dispositive part of the decision

Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the win, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the holographic win "with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law." It declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed " subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties in Civil Case 274-T before Branch IX of the CFI of Cebu." [Parenthetically, although the statement refers only to the "intestate" aspect, it defies understanding how ownership by the estate of some properties could be deemed finally resolved for purposes of testate administration, but not so for intestate purposes. Can the estate be the owner of a property for testate but not for intestate purposes?] Then again, the Probate Order (while indeed it does not direct the implementation of the legacy) conditionally stated that the intestate administration aspect must proceed "unless . . . it is proven . . . that the legacy to be given and delivered to the petitioner does not exceed the free portion of the estate of the testator," which clearly implies that the issue of impairment of legitime (an aspect of intrinsic validity) was in fact not resolved. Finally, the Probate Order did not rule on the propriety of allowing QUEMADA to remain as special administrator of estate properties not covered by the holographic will, "considering that this (Probate) Order should have been properly issued solely as a resolution on the issue of whether or not to allow and approve the aforestated will."

That the Probate Order did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the estate inventory was appropriate, considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending in Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. What, therefore, the Court of Appeals and, in effect, the Supreme Court affirmed en toto when they reviewed the Probable Order were only the matters properly adjudged in the said Order

It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directed the special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The Order of execution issued by the probate Court, as well as all the Orders issued subsequent thereto in alleged implementation of the Probate Order dated December 5, 1972, are hereby set aside; and this case is remanded to the appropriate Regional Trial Court for proper proceedings.

6. US v. Chiu GuimcoFacts: Joaquin Cruz, a chinese merchant living for many years in the municipality of Gingoog, Province of Misamis, died while visiting China. Before his departure from the Philippines he had executed a will before Anastacio Servillon, a notary public, in which Chiu Guimco and Co-Iden were named as executors. Chiu Guimco is Joaquin Cruz’s brother. Guimco, as attorney in fact and manager of the estate of his deceased brother, entered into an agreement with his brother’s Filipina wife, whereby she relinquished her claims to the estate for a consideration. He also entered into an agreement with Uy Cuan, his brother’s Chinese wife, for the distribution of the estate and for the payment of rentals on her interest in the real estate. No payments have, however, been made by Guimco.



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Ramon Contreras, acting on behalf of Uy Cuan, wrote a letter to Guimco urging him to produce the will of the decedent for the institution of lawful proceedings in accordance therewith. Guimco replied that the will in question had never been in his possession and that he had never seen it.

A complaint was filed under section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure charging Guimco with the failure to produce the will within the time required by law. The court found the accused guilty and imposed upon him a fine of P1800. Subsequently, the court, believing that the will was in his possession, ordered him to produce it but Guimco still failed to do so. The court ordered the confinement of Guimco in the provincial jail.

Issue: Whether the judge was acting within his power when he ordered the commitment of Guimco to the provincial jail?

Held: No. Section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 5 of Rule 75), which allows imprisonment of a person who neglects to deliver a will after the death of the testator without reasonable cause, can only be applied when a court is acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the administration of the estates of deceased persons. Where administration proceedings are not already pending, the court, before taking action under this section, should require that there be before it some petition, information, or affidavit of such character as to make action by the court under this section appropriate.

The remedy provided in section 629 of the Code of Procedure is clearly a totally different remedy, having no relation with that provided in section 628 (now section 4 of Rule 75). It is not permissible in a prosecution under Sec. 628 to superimpose upon the penalty of fine therein prescribed the additional penalty of imprisonment prescribed under Sec. 629.

To enforce the production of the will by the accused at a trial under Sec. 628 would virtually compel him to convict himself, since the mere production of the will by him would be conclusive that he had possession of it as charged in the criminal complaint. This would constitute an infringement of the provision of law which says that in a criminal action the defendant shall be exempt from testifying against himself.

7. Rodriguez v. BorjaFacts: Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the City of Manila. On March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez; that on March 8, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will; that on March 11, 1963 before the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn; that on March 12, 1963, aforementioned petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Parañaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate; and that on March 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Parañaque, Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in Parañaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.

The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate. The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.

Issue: Which court acquires jurisdiction over the settlement of Fr. Rodriguez’s estate.



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Held: The SC ruled that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the settlement of the estate in question and the intestate proceedings in the Rizal Court should be discontinued.

The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):

The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.

The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins that:

8. Teotico v. Del ValDecedent Maria Mortera y Balsalobre vda. de Aguirre executed a will leaving a legacy to Dr. Rene Teotico, husband of her neice and universal heir Josefina Mortera. Vicente Teotico, son of Rene and Josefina, and herein petitioner, filed a petition for the probate of the will before the CFi of Manila. Ana Del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of one of the decedent’s sisters and a natural child of one of her brothers filed and opposition alleging that the will was not executed as required by law, the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will, and the will was executed under duress. The probate court allowed the opposition, who further alleged that the legacy to Dr. Teotico was void, him being the physician who took care of the testatrix during her last illness. The question whether the oppositor has the right to oppose as well as the validity of the will are the main issues of the case.

It is a well settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate. An interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor. Under the terms of the will, the oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will. Even if the will is denied probate, Del Val will not acquire any share of the estate because she is not a legal hair of the deceased. The relationship of the adopter is limited between such adopter and adopted.

With regard to the validity of the will, the witnesses to the will all attest that the testatrix was physically and mentally capable during the execution of the will and that the will conformed with the requisites of the law. Lastly, there is no proof that Dr. Rene Teotico and his spouse exerted any pressure upon the testatrix in order for her to execute a will leaving them a legacy and naming the spouse as the sole heir.

9. Fernando v. CrisostomoFacts: This case involved 2 cases.

One: Guardianship of Rufino Crisostomo and his 4 minor children. In this case, Hermogenes Fernando was appointed guardian of Rufino and his 4 minor children. When Rufino died, the children was left under



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the guardianship of Hermogenes. He then filed for the approval of an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased parents of the minors which was denied by the court ruling that the guardian of the children is not the administrator of the estate until and after the said estate has been acquired by the minors by proper proceedings.

Two: Intestate estate of Sps. Crisostomo. German Crisostomo filed a petition as next on kin for the opening of intestate proceedings of the estate of the deceased and the appointment of himself and Pacita Fernando as co-administrators which was granted by the court.

Issue: W/N the court’s appointment of Crisostomo and Fernando as co-administrators is valid

Held: YES!No evidence is presented why the brother and sister of the deceased, as nearest of kin, should not be appointed co-administrators of the Intestate Estate of said decedent either on account of their incompetency or lack of moral qualifications.

10. Araujo v. CelisFacts: Rosario Araujo inherited from her mother, Asuncion, the hacienda known as Pangpang. She subsequently married Jose Celis, Gregoria’s’s son. Rosario died leaving no descendants or ascendants, but only collateral relatives. Such relatives asked that the property inherited by Rosario from her mother be delivered to them. The property, however, is held by the Gregoria, who took possession of the same after the death of her son Jose. He died a year after the death of Rosario in l889.

The defendant claims that Rosario died leaving a will in which she bequeathed all of her property to her husband, Jose, and that the latter having died without a will, she, therefore, succeeded to all of his property, rights, and actions, thereby lawfully acquiring all the property that had formerly belonged to her daughter-in-law. The problem, however, is that the will could not be found alleging that insurgents had burned the Court of Pototan where the will was kept. She instead offered secondary parol evidence as to its contents. CFI allowed the evidence over the objection of the collateral relatives of Rosario and ruled in favor of Gregoria. Hence this appeal.

Issue:W/N secondary parol evidence is sufficient to prove Rosario’s will?

Held:NO. The loss of the alleged original will has not been sufficiently established. The principal witness, Calixto Delgado testified that he had acted as procurador for Gregoria in an action brought against her by one Jose involving the hacienda of Pangpang, and that as such there came into his possession a copy of the will of Rosario which was introduced in evidence in that action. However, he likewise testified that he never saw the original of that will because the same was retained by the notary. He likewise failed to affirm whether the copy in question was a simple or certified copy. More importantly, he further testified that the will was signed by two witnesses only. A will signed by two witnesses only could not under any circumstances be valid under the law in force at the time referred to by the witness, and legally speaking such will could not then have been probated or recorded.

As to the loss of the will, there is nothing to show that at the time these records were burned by the insurgents there existed in the court-house of Pototan the copy of the will referred to. Moreover, the testimony that all the notarial records were likewise burned as they were kept in the same courthouse is inconclusive as the same is plainly and manifested contrary to the royal decree concerning the organization of notaries, which provided that: “Notaries shall keep the protocols and books in the same building where they live, in their custody, and shall be responsible therefor.”

Their testimony is absolutely insufficient to establish in a satisfactory manner the loss of the alleged will of Rosario Darwin, and the court below should not have, therefore, allowed the secondary evidence introduced by her as to the contents of the will, particularly in view of the fact that, as it appears from the record, there had been pending since 1889 an action to declare this very will null and void.



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11. Lim Billian v. SuntayFACTS: When Jose B. Suntay died, his eldest son from his first marriage filed the intestate in the Court. In the same court, his second wife Maria Billian also instituted for the probate of a will allegedly left by the deceased. According to Maria, before the deceased died he left with her a sealed envelope (Exhibit A) containing his will and also another documents said to be a true copy of the original contained in the envelope. While the witness showed the envelope to Suntay, they snatched and opened it, took its contents and threw the envelope (they denied this). Upon these allegations, Maria asks that the children by the first marriage of the deceased, be ordered to present the will in Court, that a day be set for the reception of evidence on the will, and that she be appointed executrix pursuant to the designation made by the deceased in he will. ISSUE: Whether Exhibit B accompanying the petition is an authentic copy and whether it has been executed with all the essential and necessary formalities required by law for its probate. RULING: The evidence presented sufficiently establishes the loss of the will, thus justifying the presentation of secondary evidence of its contents. It was ordered that the case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.

12. Basa v. MercadoFACTS:Hon. Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of Pampanga CFI, allowed and probated the last will and testament of Ines Basa, decedent. The same judge also approved the account of the administrator of the estate, declared him the only heir and closed the administration proceedings. Joaquin Basa, et al., filed a motion to reopen the proceedings, alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction because there was failure to comply with the requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing. They contended that the hearing took place only twenty-one days after the date of first publication instead of three full weeks. Moreover, they questioned whether Ing Katipunan, the newspaper where the notice was published was a newspaper of general circulation as contemplated by the law.

ISSUEs:Whether or not there was compliance with the publication requirement Whether or not Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation

RULING:The language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing of the will. In other words, the first publication of the notice need not be made 21 days before the day appointed for the hearing.

The records show that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in view of the fact that it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals and that the trial court ordered the publication to be made in Ing Katipunan precisely because it was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga.

13. De Aranz v. GalingDoctrine: Failure to effect personal notification to legatees deprives the probate court of jurisdiction.

Joaqin Infante (RESPONDENT) filed a petition at the RTC of Pasig for the probate of the will of Monseratt Infante Y Pola. His petition named several individuals (PETITIONERS) with the surname Infante-Roxas as legatees and devisees.



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Thereafter, the probate court issued an order for the requisite hearing and the judge complied with the mandatory three week publication of the order. Come hearing date, no oppositor appeared and so the judge reset the hearing date. No oppositor made manifestation on the later date, compelling the judge to request for the submission of evidence ex-parte. Joaquin Infante immediately presented evidence that same fateful day. He called a lone witness to the stand.

Two days passed and the ten Petitioners made an appearance contesting the probate on the ground that no notice was ever sent to them. They requested ten days to file an opposition. Petitioners assert that failure to notify the legatees/devisees deprives the court of jurisdiction.

Joaqin Infante opposed the opposition and garnered the affirmation of both the RTC and the CA. The petition to deny probate was therefore denied.

ISSUE:w/n probate may proceed despite the failure of personal notice to the legatees/devisees?\

HELD:

No. The probate proceedings was mired in procedural lapses which deprived the court of jurisdiction. The pertinent rule follows:

Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court reads:

SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. — The court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.

The CA’s ruling that notification was merely a matter of convenience sits in stark disregard of the law which makes notice mandatory. Probate is a proceeding in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings after nullifying the CA.

14. In re Estate of Johnson (3D 09-10)FACTS On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United

States, died in the city of Manila, leaving a will by which he disposed of an estate valued at P231,800 This document is a holographic instrument, being written in the testator's own handwriting, and is

signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure

This will, therefore, was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands

Thereafter a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Thereafter the document was declared to be legal and was admitted to probate. Three months after the will had been probated, the attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg Johnson entered an

appearance in her behalf and asserted that Ebba is a legitimate heir of the testator. Thus, she cannot



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be deprived of the legitime to which she is entitled under the law governing testamentary successions in these Islands.

Therefore, she moved to annul the decree of probate and put the estate into intestate administration in order for her to claim the estate as the sole legitimate heir of her father.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the order of the probate can be set aside on the ground that the testator was not a resident of

the State of Illinois and that the will was not made in conformity with the laws of that State.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDINO.

In the testimony submitted to the trial court it appears that, when Johnson first came to the United States as a boy, he took up his abode in the State of Illinois and there remained until he came as a soldier in the United States Army to the Philippine Islands.

Although he remained in these Islands for sometime after receiving his discharge, no evidence was adduced showing that at the time he returned to the United States, in the autumn of 1902, he had then abandoned Illinois as the State of his permanent domicile.

Further, there is no law in force at that time by virtue of which any person of foreign nativity can become a naturalized citizen of the Philippine Islands;

Thus, it was impossible for the testator, even if he had so desired, to expatriate himself from the United States and change his political status from a citizen of the United States to a citizen of these Islands.

This being true, it is to be presumed that he retained his citizenship in the State of Illinois along with his status as a citizen of the United States

SC held that: the probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as regards the due execution of the will.

Further, the intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be determined by the law of Illinois and not of the Philippines.

In paragraph 2 of article 10 of the Civil Code it is declared that "legal and testamentary successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well as to the amount of the successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the laws of the nation of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the country where it may be situate."

In this case the petition submitted to the lower court was insufficient to warrant the setting aside of the order, probating the will in question, whether said petition be considered as an attack on the validity of the decree for error apparent, or whether it be considered as an application for a rehearing based upon the new evidence submitted in the affidavits which accompany the petition.

Further, in the latter aspect the petition is subject to the further fatal defect that it was not presented within the time allowed by law.

Thus, the trial court committed no error in denying the relief sought. The order appealed from is accordingly affirmed

15. Abut v. AbutFacts:Generoso Abut is one of the children of the deceased Cipriano Abut by his second marriage. On August 4, 1965, Generoso filed a petition before the CFI of Misamis, a petition for the allowance of the will of the said deceased and the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor alleging that he is the person named as executor in a will allegedly executed by his father. In an order dated September 1, 1965 the court a quo motu proprio set the petition for hearing and further directed compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court. These procedural steps admittedly took place. Opposition to the petition was filed by the children of Cipriano Abut by his first marriage.

During the pendency of the case below but before the court a quo could even start the formal hearing of the petition, Generoso died on January 10, 1966. This eventuality prompted Gavina Abut, a sister of Generoso and an heir and devisee under the will of the testator Cipriano Abut, to ask the court a quo to



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substitute her in lieu of Generoso and to admit an amended petition wherein she prayed that the probate of the will be allowed and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued in her favor.

The lower court dismissed the petition originally brought by the deceased Generoso, "without prejudice to the filing of another petition pursuant to the requirements of the Rules of Court". Said dismissal was based on the theory that the amended petition filed Gavaina, seeking to substitute her in place of the original petitioner, required a new publication in order to invest the court with jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not the probate court correctly dismissed the petition simply because the original petitioner — who was the executor named in the will sought to be probated — died before the petition could be heard and/or terminated.

Ruling:The Court found the dismissal of the original petition for probate and the refusal of the probate court to admit the amended petition to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the court became vested upon the filing of the original petition and upon compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.

A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the deceased. The fact that the amended petition named additional heirs not included in the original petition did not require that notice of the amended petition be published anew. All that Section 4 of Rule 76 provides is that those heirs be notified of the hearing for the probate of the will, either by mail or personally.

Jurisdiction of the court once acquired continues until the termination of the case, and remains unaffected by subsequent events. The court below erred in holding that it was divested of jurisdiction just because the original petitioner died before the petition could be formally heard. Parties who could have come in and opposed the original petition, as herein appellees did, could still come in and oppose the amended petition, having already been notified of the pendency of the proceeding by the publication of the notice thereof.

16. Rodelas v. AranzaFacts:Marcela Rodelas filed a petition to probate the holographic will of Ricardno Bonilla, which was opposed by Amaparo Aranza Bonilla, et al. on the grounds that “xxx (3) The alleged holographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect…” The court dimissed the probate of the will.

Issue: Whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found may be proved by means of a photostatic copy

Ruling: Yes. Footnote 8 of the case of Gan v Yap provides that the will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

17. Gan v. YapFACTS: Gan filed a petition for probate of the holographic will allegedly executed by Felicidad Yap. Opposing the petition, her surviving husband, Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime. The will itself was not presented. Petitioners tried to establish its contents and due execution by the statements of 4 witnesses who testified that Felicidad wrote, signed and dated a holographic will and that Felicidad allowed them to read the will.

ISSUE: w/n a holographic will may be probated upon the testimony of witnesses.

HELD: NO



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When the will itself is not submitted, the means of opposition, and of assessing the evidence are not available. And then the only guaranty of authenticity—the testator’s handwriting—has disappeared.

Unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial evidence when lost or destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the wills:

Holographic will Ordinary will1. guarantee of authenticity: the handwriting

itself 2. if oral testimonies were admissible, only

one man could engineer the whole fraud.3. In case of a lost holographic will, the

witnesses would testify as to their opinion of the handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion which cannot be tested in court because the handwriting itself is not at hand.

1. guarantee of authenticity: testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses

2. hard to convince 3 witnesses deliberately to lie.

3. In case of a lost will, the 3 subscribing witnesses would be testifying to a fact which they saw the act of the testator subscribing the will.

18. Gago v. MamuyacFacts: Francisco Gago filed a petition in the CFI for the probation of the will of Miguel Mamuyac executed on the 27th day of July 1918 however this was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac et al hence the petition was denied on the ground that the decedent executed another will. Gago then filed for the probate of the will dated April 16, 1919 however this was likewise opposed and denied on the ground that the will was revoked by the testator because the object of the will was sold. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: W/N the will was revoked

Held: YESWhere a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is that in the absence of other competent evidence, the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator has ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. This presumption is never conclusive and may be rebutted by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.

In the case at bar, the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator and in view of the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, the conclusion is that it had been revoked.

19. Aldanese v. Salutillo (3D 09-10)FACTS Salome Avila died a resident of Cebu. Her will appears to be executed by Moreta, Borromeo, and

Rafols, all residents of Manila. Since Avila left no ascendants or descendants, under her will she disposed the greater part of her estate in favor of petitioner Aldanese and his sister.

The petition for probate was filed in the CFI of Cebu. The respondents surnamed Salutillo and Llanos appeared as opponents, alleging that the will should be denied probate on the ground of fraud, undue influence, and testamentary incapacity of Avila at the time of execution. They also alleged that they were the nearest relatives of Avila and should thus succeed to her estate by operation of law.

Aldanese filed a motion asking the court to authorize the taking of the depositions of the witnesses to the will, since they were unable to appear personally before the CFI of Cebu – granted.

The Salutillos then filed a motion asking to the court to revoke the order authorizing the taking of depositions on the ground that it has not been sufficiently shown that it was impossible for the witnesses to appear personally before the court – and this was also granted. However, by the time that notice of this order was sent to Aldanese, the depositions had already been taken.

After hearing, the CFI denied probate of the will, holding that the depositions were inadmissible in evidence. Hence this petition.



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ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the CFI erred in declaring that the depositions taken were inadmissible as evidence in the

probate proceedings.


YES. THE CA ERRED IN DECLARING THE DEPOSITIONS AS INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.

While the rule in this jurisdiction is that when a will is contested the attesting witnesses must be called to prove the will, that does not necessarily mean that they must be brought bodily before the court. It is their testimony which is needed, not their actual presence.

Section 355 of the (old) Code of Civil Procedure provides:“The testimony of a witness in the Philippine Islands may be taken by deposition…in a special proceeding, after the question of fact has arisen therein, in the following cases:

2. When the witness resides out of the province in which his testimony is to be used.”

Section 406 of the same Code reads:“A witness is not obliged to attend as a witness in a civil action before any court, judge, justice, or other officer out of the province in which he resides, unless the distance be less than thirty miles from his place of residence to the place of trial by the usual course of travel, but his testimony may be taken in such case in the form of a deposition.”

In the present case, the will was presented for probate in Cebu, and the attesting witnesses were living in Manila. The required notice was duly given, and so the depositions would ordinarily be admissible.

However, the record indicates that the failure of the opponents to be present at the taking of the depositions was due to the fact that they were misled by petitioner’s action in seeking a special authorization from the court. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the depositions should be retaken, to give the opponents another opportunity to examine the witnesses.

It must also be noted that when the depositions of subscribing witnesses to a will are taken, a photographic copy of the will may be presented to them on their examination, and they may be asked the same original will.

Order reversed. Case remanded.

20. Cabang v. DelfinadoFACTS Celestino Delfinado died leaving an alleged will, which when presented for probate by his widow,

Cabang, such petition was opposed by Martin Delfinado, the son from the first marriage of the deceased alleging that the purported will cannot be the will of his fathero According to the witnesses presented by the proponent, the will was executed after the decedent

dictated the provisions in his dialecto The dictation was then typewritten and thereafter, the provisions were translated into Spanish so

that the decedent can understand the provisions in the typewritten versiono After the translation, the decedent affixed a cross after his name was written in the will, in the

presence of the witnesses and of each othero But according to Delfinado, his father could read, write, and sign his name

Cabang, after presenting witnesses to prove the due execution of the will, presented a motion asking that the case be reopened for the purpose of receiving the testimony of the other two subscribing witnesses, who were then living in Manila and Nueva Ecija, but such witnesses were not presented

The probate court admitted for probate the alleged will of Celestino Hence, this appeal

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS



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W/N the court erred in admitting the will to probate without having two of the subscribing witnesses called, although they were living within the jurisdiction of the court, or for not requiring any showing why they were not produced


YES. THE COURT FOLLOWED THE DECISIONS WITH REGARD TO THE INTENT OF THE LAW IN REQUIRING THE PRESENTATION OF THE SUBSCRIBING WITNESSES WHEN THE WILL IS CONTESTED Our code provides, as we have indicated, that non-contested may be admitted to probate upon the

testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses, but is silent as to the manner in which they shall be proved when contested. Provisions are also made for supplying the testimony of the three subscribing witnesses when they cannot be called. The provisions of the Vermont Statutes are essentially the same. We therefore, call to our aid the decisions of the supreme court of that State and the law upon which those decisions rest in determining the intention of the Philippine Legislature in enacting the provisions of Act No. 190, above referred to

An examination of the subsequent adjudicated cases and the statutes fails to disclose any modification of this rule in the State of Massachusetts. In Evans vs. Evans (18 Miss., 402), the court, following the rule adopted in Massachusetts, said: o We are inclined to hold that no will can be proved, unless all the subscribing witnesses, alive and

within the control of the process of the court, are produced to testify The rule that no will shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, unless "attested and

subscribed by three or more credible witnesses," is a matter of substantive law and an element of the will's validity. The rule that the attesting witnesses must be called to prove a will for probate is one of preference made so by statute. This rule of evidence is not to be confused with rules of quantity

The law places these witnesses "around the testator to ascertain and judge of his capacity" for the purpose of preventing frauds. The soundness of the rule is well illustrated in the case under consideration. Here the attesting clause was omitted and the testator signed by mark. The petitioner produced only one of the attesting witnesses. Had there not been a contest, this would have probably been sufficient under section 631. While there is no testimony in the record to the effect that the testator could neither read nor write, there is conclusive evidence that he could sign his name. This fact is established by the production of Exhibit 1, which all agree the testator did sign. The testator's signature to the document shows that he could write, at least his name, in a plain, clear manner, indicating a fairly good knowledge of writing

Had the proponent shown that the other two subscribing witnesses were not within the jurisdiction of the court and could not, therefore, be called, the due execution of the will would still be very doubtful. Believing, as we do, that it was the intention of the Legislature that the subscribing witnesses must be called or good and sufficient reason shown why they could not be had, and being supported by the authorities above cited and quoted, we must conclude that the proponent did not comply with the provisions of the law in the presentation of her case

21. Avera v. GarciaFacts:Eutiquia Avera instituted proceedings for the probate of the will of Esteban Garcia. Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, as guardians for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia, opposed the same. At the hearing, Avera introduced one of the three witnesses who testified that the will was executed with all necessary formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full possession of disposing faculties. The person who wrote the will at the request of the testator corroborated the witness’ testimony regarding the testamentary capacity of the decedent. Two of the attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor did Avera account for their absence.

The trial judge found that the testator at the time of making of the will was of sound mind and disposing memory and that the will had been properly executed. Thus, he allowed the will to probate.



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Issue: Whether the will in question can be admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a single attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the absence of the other two?

Held: No. When a contest is instituted, all of the attesting witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach of the process of the court. In the present case no explanation was made at the trial as to why all three of the attesting witnesses were not produced.

But the probable reason is found in the fact that, although the petition for probate of the will had been pending from 21 December 1917 until 5 April 1919, no formal contest was entered until the very day set for the hearing. It is probable that the attorney for the proponent, believing in good faith that the probate would not be contested, went to the court with only one of the three attesting witnesses. Although said circumstance may explain why the three witnesses were not produced, it does not in itself supply any basis for changing the rule requiring the presentation of all three witnesses.

However, Garcia and Rodriguez did not raise this point either upon the submission of the cause for determination in the lower court or upon the occasion of the filing of the motion for a new trial. Thus, this question cannot now be raised for the first time in this court.

22. Solivio v. CAFacts. This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.

During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack without having set up the foundation.

Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's properties. Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed a Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.. Later, she filed an amended petition praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her.

After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027.

Four months later, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. Her motion was denied by the court for tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed a civil case in the RTC of Iloilo for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages.

Issue: Whether the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings were still pending in the same court;

Held: The Regional Trial Court, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl,



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Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings.

It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties.

The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution, has power to determine the proportion or parts to which each distributed is entitled. The power to determine the legality or illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a just and legal distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold that a separate and independent action is necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the general tendency of the jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further, expensive, dilatory, and impractical.

23. Manaloto v. ParedesFlorencio Manalo, as guardian of minors Lazaro and Daria, both natural children of deceased Francisco Villegas filed the present action for mandamus ordering Judge Paredes to order the publication of the petition for the probate of the will of Francisco Villegas as well as injunction to prohibit the same judge from proceeding with a prior proceeding for the probate of the same will.

In the previous proceeding, Justina Mendieta the common law wife of Francisco presented the will for probate. However, upon learning that the will was not executed according to law, she along with the named executor withdrew their application for probate and entered into an agreement with the wife of Francisco adjudicating upon themselves shares of the latter’s estate. The court approved said agreement and distributed the estate accordingly among the legal heirs of the deceased. Subsequently a certain Gelacio Malihan, who claimed to be the first cousin of the deceased filed for a new application for the probate of the same will.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for mandamus and injunction reasoning that a proceeding for probate is an action in rem, and as such the probate court acquired jurisdiction over all the persons interested through the publication of the notice, including Gelacio Manahan. Being clothed with competent jurisdiction, the court’s ruling bound all the parties. The proper remedy for any interested party who are not satisfied with the decision of the court is to appeal and not to file a new application for probate and an action for mandamus and injunction.

24. Riera v. PalmaroliFacts: Juan Pons was a Spanish subject who died in Manila. He was married to Antonia Rierra who, at the time of Pons’ death, was residing in Palma de Mallorca. The Consul General for Spain in the Phil Islands produced a will and asked that it be admitted to probate. Because of the distance of Manila from Palma de Mallorca and the European War, the widow did not have any news until some time later. When she found out, she opposed the petition for probate however this was denied on the ground that more than 6 months has elapsed since the order of the court. The will deprives the widow opportunity to oppose the probate and she alleges that the formalities required by law were not complied with hence the case at bar.

Issue: W/N a rehearing can be ordered it being alleged that the widow was prevented from participating in the probate of the will and that will was not executed in the formalities required by law

Held: NO!The SC may have the power to set aside any judgment, order or proceeding under Sec. 113 however under Sec. 513 this power is limited to granting a new trial upon judgments rendered upon default. The



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default intended here can only arise in contentious litigations where a party has been impleaded as a defendant and served with process but fails to appear or to answer. The proceeding to probate is a will is not a contentious litigation because nobody is impleaded or served with process. It is a special proceeding, and although notice of the application is published, nobody is bound to appear and no order for judgment by default is ever entered.

The action of the court admitting a will to probate has the full effect of a judgment and is entitled to full faith and credence in other courts. The proceeding by which this is accomplished is considered a proceeding in rem hence binding on all person in interest whether they appear to contest the probate or not. The probate of a will, while conclusive as to its due execution, in no way involves the intrinsic validity of its provisions. In the case at bar, if it should appear later upon the distribution of the estate of Juan Pons that any provision in the will is contrary to law then the law will prevail. The widow can then go to court at the proper juncture and discuss the question of the validity of the will as it affects her interests adversely.

25. Manahan v. ManahanFacts:Tiburcia Manahan, niece of testatrix Donata and her named executrix, instituted special proceedings for the probate of the will of the deceased. The will was admitted to probate. 1 yr and 7 mos later, Engracia, the sister of Donata, filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial praying that the order to probate be vacated and the will be declared null and void ab initio. Trial Court denied the motions. Engracia, under the pretext of appealing the last order, likewise appealed from the judgement admitting the will to probate. She assigns the following errors:

1. That she was an interested party and as such, was entitled to be notified of the probate of the will

2. That the court did not really probate but merely authenticated the will3. That the will is null and void as the external formalities have not been complied with

Issue:W/N Engarcia’s contentions are meritorious?

Held:NO.

1. First contention is untenable. She was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will, and neither had she right to expect it as she was not an interested party- she did not file her opposition that she was not instituted as an heir. she is not a forced heir, hence no successional right.

2. Second contention is puerile. There is no essential difference between the authentication of the will and the probate thereof.

3. Once the will has been admitted to probate, questions as to its validity can no longer be raised on appeal. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and cannot be impugned, except on the ground of fraud. Moreover, proceedings in a testamentary case are in rem, hence it is binding upon her.



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