soviet involvement in ogaden war

8/11/2019 Soviet Involvement in Ogaden War

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PROFESSIONAL

P PER

269 / February198

THE

SOVIET

INVOLVEMENT

IN THE OG DEN W R

KennethG Weiss

CENTER

FOR

N V L N LYSES

2000North Beauregard S tree t A lexand r ia Virginia 22311


2/50

Copyright CNA Corporation Scanned October 2003

The ideas expressed inthispaper arethoseof theauthor The

paper

doesno t necessarily represent theviewsof

either

the

Center

for Naval Analysesor the

Department

o f Defense


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PROFESS IONAL PAPER269

February

1980

THE

SOVIET INVOLVEMENT

IN THE

OG DEN

W R

Kenneth C.Weiss

nstitut

of aval Studies

CENTER FOR

N V L N LYSE S

2000North

Beauregard

Street

Alexandria Virginia22311


4/50

I NTRODUCTI ON

Moscow s i nvol vement i n t he Somal i - Et hi opi an conf l i c t i n

1977 and

1978

c ul m nat ed i n t he mos t i mpr es s i v e ex er c i s e

of Sovi et pol i t i c o- m l i t ar y di pl omac y s i nce Angol a. An

anal ys i s o f t hat i nvo l vement t hen can he l p us appr oach

t hose quest i ons t hat have been asked r egar d i ng Sov i et pol -

i cy f or mul at i on i n Thi r d Wor l d c r i s es . I n r egar d t o mot i -

vat i on i n Sovi e t

pol i cy,

t hes e que s t i o ns i nc l ude : To what

ext ent

i s

Sov i et c r i s i s b ehav i o r pur pos i v e?

To

what

de-

gr ee i s Sov i et pol i c y r eac t i v e? Co nc er ni ng t he mo dal i t y

of

Sovi et pol i cy: I s Sovi et cr i s i s pol i cy ac t i v i s t or

caut i ous? I n regard t o Sovi et per f or mance i n t hese cr i -

ses: How we l l hav e t he Sovi et s done dur i ng c r i s es i n

l i ght

of

t hei r pol i cy obj ec t i ves ? Bef or e ev al uat i ng

So-

v i et f o r e i gn po l i cy i n t he Ogaden War i n t e rms o f t hese

que s t i o ns , i t i s f i r s t u s ef ul t o summar i z e t he s al i ent

ev ent s i n t he Hor n i n 1977 and 1978. Af t e r doi ng s o, we

wi l l di s c us s Sov i et i nv ol v ement i n t er ms o f t he ques t i ons

r ai sed above.

THE

OGADEN WAR:

AN

OVERVI EW

The Pr e- War Per i od

The

Hor n

of

Af r i c a, cons i s t i ng

of

Et hi opi a, Dj i bout i ,

and

Somal i a f or ms wi t h

t he

near by Ar abi an peni nsu l a ,

t he

mout h


5/50

of t he Red Sea and I ndi an Ocean. The count r i es o f t he

Hor n rank

amonq

t he wor l d' s poor es t . Y et , as a r es ul t of

i t s

qeoqr aphi c al r e l at i ons hi p

t o

bl a ck s u bs a ha r a n Af r i c a

and

t o t he Mi d dl e Eas t and Nor t h Af r i c a, t he Horn has

as s umed an i mpor t ance i n excess of i t s i nt r i ns i c val ue.

The year 1974 was a s i gni f i c ant one on t he Horn. U. S.

i nf l uenc e s t i l l pr e dom nat ed i n Et hi o pi a t hen whi l e

Soma

l i a

l ook ed t o t he So vi e t Uni o n f or s uper power s uppor t . I n

t hat y ea r , t he So vi e t s and t he So ma l i s s i q ne d a T r e a t y of

F r i ends hi p

and Cooper at i on. The t r eat y s y mbo l i z e d t he mu-

t ual l y benef i c i al r e l at i ons hi p

Moscow

and

Mo ga di s c i o

had

e s t a bl i s he d wi t h eac h ot her .

I n

r e t u r n

f or

per m s s i on

i n

1972 t o devel op va l uab l e nava l suppor t f a c i l i t i es , * t he

Sovi et s s uppl i ed

t he

Somal i s wi t h m l i t a r y e qui pme nt

and

t r a i ni ng i n i t s use. However , even b ef or e Mo ga di s c i o

s i gned t he t r eat y wi t h Mos c ow i n J ul y , So ma l i a , a Mo s l e m

but no n- Ar a b s t a t e d, j oi ned t he Ar a b

League.

I t was t hi s

Ar a b o pt i on t ha t c o mpl i c a t e d

S ov i e t - So ma l i

t i es i n

1977.

2

At t he same t i me t he So vi e t s wer e i nc r e as i n g t hei r t i es

wi t h So ma l i a , Ame r i c a n t i es wi t h Et hi o pi a wer e l oo s eni ng,

* A

p o r t , a

c ommuni c at i ons s t at i on, an a i r f i e l d, and a

m s s i l e

s to rage a nd h an dl i n g f ac i l i t y .


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de s pi t e c l os e r el at i ons s i nc e 1952. I n 1974, t he Emper or

Hai l e

Sel as s i e was r epl aced by a r evol ut i onar y m l i t ar y

gover nment . * By 1976, t he

i nc r eas i ngl y

pr o- Sovi et , ant i -

i mper i al i s t s t a nc e of t he

Der gue

combi ned wi t h i t s r epr es -

s i ve pol i c i es and l ar ge ar ms r equi r ement s t o f i ght t he

Er i t r ean secess i oni s t movement s made i t di f f i c ul t f or t he

U. S. gover nment

t o

j us t i f y

i t s

suppor t

of

Et hi opi a.

3

As Was hi ngt on' s i nt er es t f a de d, Mos cow' s i nt ens i f i ed. At

r oughl y t he t i me t he U. S. c anc el l ed i t s m l i t a r y gr ant as -

s i s t anc e pr ogr a m t o

Et hi opi a, * *

t he So vi e t Uni o n s i gne d a

100 m l l i o n dol l ar ar ms agr eement i n December 1976

4

I t

was a

l i m t e d a gr e eme nt

by

whi c h Et hi o pi a

was t o

r ec ei ve

second- l i ne equi pment l i ke T- 34

t anks . I n

Febr uar y 1977,

Mengi s t u Ha i l e

Mar i am s

v i c t or y over t he Der gue' s moder -

a t es i n t he CI A coup enhanced Sov i et pr ospect s f or r e-

pl ac i ng

t he

U S

as

Et hi opi a' s p r i nc i pal ar ms s uppl i er .

But

Sovi et i nvo l vement

i n

Et h i opi a posed pr obl ems

f or

Mos -

cow' s

r el at i ons wi t h Somal i a.

* Pr ovi s i onal Mi l i t ar y Adm ni s t r a t i v e Counc i l ( PMAC)

or

Der gue.

* * The Et hi opi ans wer e s t i l l al l owed t o c ont i nue pur c ha s i ng

U S ar ms .

3


7/50

The qoal of uni t i ng al l

Somal i s under

one f l ag

r epr es e nt s

t he

pr i mar y t hr u s t

of Somal i f or ei gn

pol i c y.

As a

r e s ul t ,

Mo ga di s c i o c l a i ms E t h i o pi a s Og ad en , Keny a s Nor t her n

Fr ont i er

Di s t r i c t , and

Dj i bout i

as pr oper l y a

pa r t

o f So-

mal i a. 1977 s eemed

an

i deal t i me

t o

pr es s Somal i c l a i ms

t o t he Og ad en as t he E t h i o pi a n r e vo l u t i o n ad de d t o t he

c ent r i f ugal

f or c es

t hr eat eni ng

t he

i nt egr i t y

of t he em-

pi r e . Not

on l y wer e

t he

Er i t r eans s e em ngl y gr as pi ng

i r -

r es i s t i bl y f or i ndependence , but ar med mov emen t s

r epre -

s ent i ng Et hi o pi a s var i ous e t hni c gr oups ( Ti gr eans , Gal -

l as , Af ar s , Somal i s ,

et c . ) ,

c o ns er v at i v e

l andowner s ,

and

r a di c al c i t y dwel l er s ma de Et hi opi a s eem on t he ve rge of

di s i nt egr a t i on and

a na r c h y. T hu s , S ov i e t s u ppor t

f or

Et hi opi a t hr eat ened

t o put

Moscow

on a

c ol l i s i on c our s e

wi t h

Mo gad i s c i o .

To

ov er c ome t hi s c on t r a di c t i o n

i n i t s

f or ei gn pol i c y,

t he

Kr em i n

pr oposed

a f ede r a t i on bet ween Soma l i a and E t hi opi a

i n

Febr uar y 1977, t he s ame mon t h t he pr o- Sovi et Me ng i s t u

emer ged a s t h e

PMAC

s new cha i r man. ^ I n Mar ch , Cuban

Pr es i dent F i del Cas t r o t r av el l ed

t o t he

Hor n

an d

a r r a ng ed

a

meet i ng bet ween Mengi s t u

and

Somal i Pr es i dent Mohammed

Si ad

B a r r e

i n Aden. At t he me e t i n g , Cas t r o a dv oc a t e d a

Ma r x i s t f eder at i on of Et hi opi a and Er i t r ea a nd a c onf eder -

4


8/50

at i on of Et hi opi a, Somal i a , Dj i bou t i , and Nor t h and Sout h

Yemen.

6

Si ad Barr e f ound

Cas t r o' s

appeal s f or a s et t l e-

ment wi t h Menqi s t u on t he bas i s o f soc i a l i s t br ot her hood

unconv i nc i ng. He r ej ect ed t he

pr oposa l .

But t he Somal i s

pr om s ed, ac c or di ng t o

Cas t r o ,

t ha t t hey woul d never i n-

vade

Et hi opi a , t ha t t hey woul d never car r y

o ut a

m l i t ar y

at t ac k aqa i ns t

Et hi opi a.

7

( Cast r o pr obabl y

di d no t

t ake i nt o account t ha t t he Somal i s di d no t cons i der t he

Oqaden t o be a r i ght f ul par t of Et hi opi a. ) Sov i et Pr es i -

den t Ni kol a i Podgorny, on an Af r i c a n t our , unex pec t edl y

f o l l owed Cast r o i nt o Mogadi sc i o and urged pat i ence on

t he Somal i

l eader .

8

I n

May, Moscow compl et ed i t s di spl acement of Washi ngt on i n

Et hi opi a.

The

Der gue announced

i n

Apr i l

t he

c l os ur e

of

t he Kagnew Communi cat i ons St at i on and ot her U. S. f ac i l i -

t i es . Al t ho ugh t hi s ac t i on f ol l owed c l os e upon an

Amer i can dec i s i on

t o

r educe

t he

U. S. m l i t ar y advi s or y

gr oup and t o c l ose t he obsol et e Kagnew f ac i l i t y , i t was

unl i k el y t hat

Mengi s t u

woul d have made such a deci si on

wi t hou t

t he

pr ospect

of

i ncr eased Sovi et ar ms

ai d. ^

0

I n-

deed,

t he need f or Mosc ow' s ai d became i mper at i ve af t er

t he U. S. s t opped del i ver y

of

near l y

100

m l l i on dol l ar s

i n

ar ms sol d t o Et hi opi a H

Ther ef o r e

i n May , Mengi s t u j our -


9/50

neyed t o Mos cow and s i gned a d ec l a r a t i o n on t he f o unda -

t i ons f or f r i ends hi p and cooperat i on.

1

- ^ NO doubt i n

def er e nc e t o t he Somal i s , t he Kr e m i n c onf i ned i t s c on-

t r ac t ual r el at i ons hi p wi t h Et hi opi a t o a dec l ar at i on, a

l ev el l ower t ha n

t he

Sov i et - So ma l i Tr eat y

of

F r i ends hi p

and Cooper a t i on.

I n

a ddi t i on

t o

t ec hni c al

and

econom c

agr eement s , t he Sov i e t s agr eed t o a maj or ar ms package

wi t h

t he Et hi o pi a ns wor t h 400 m l l i o n dol l ar s.

13

F u r t h e r -

mor e, some

50 Cuban

m l i t ar y adv i s er s ar r i ved

i n

Et hi opi a

i n

May.

^

The

Somal i s wer e unwi l l i ng

t o pass up t he

hi s t o r i c

oppor-

t u ni t y t o i ncor por at e t he Ogaden i nt o a g r e at e r Soma l i a .

Many Somal i l eader s wer e no l onger i mpr essed by Sov i e t ap -

peal s t o be pat i ent . Ex pr es s i ng t hei r v i e w, Si ad Bar r e

asked

r h et o r i c al l y:

But who can guar ant ee us t hat once h i s r egi me i s con-

s o l i da t e d and hi s

ar my st r engt hened

[ by t he

Sov i et s ] ,

Me ng i s t u wi l l c ons ent

t o

negot i at e

t he

t e r r i t o r i al

c o nf l i c t b et ween us s o as t o f i nd a s ol ut i on t hat

c ompl i es wi t h t he wi she s of t he Somal i peopl e i n t he

Ogaden?

15

To r educe h i s ar my ' s dependence on t he Sov i e t s f o r ar ms ,

s par e pa r t s ,

and

POL , Si a d Bar r e e xe r c i s e d

hi s

Ar ab

op-

t i on. So Soma l i a e xpanded i t s se ar ch f o r suppor t beyond

t he r a di c al Sovi et - or i ent ed s t at es l i ke I r aq and Syr i a t o

t he

mor e conse r vat i ve Mi de as t coun t r i e s and t h rough t hem


10/50

t he

Un i t e d St at e s . Saudi Ar a bi a r e newed

i t s

l onq- s t andi nq

of f er t o gi v e Mogadi s c i o 300 m l l i on dol l ar s t o expel t he

Sovi et s . 16 Sy mbol i z i ng hi s ef f or t t o al i gn h i ms e l f mor e

c l os el y wi t h mode r a t e Ar a b s t at e s i n t he r e gi on, Si ad Bar -

r e

t r avel l ed

t o

Tai z , Nor t h Yemen, wher e

he

a t t e nde d

a

meet i ng

sponsor ed

by t he

Saudi s wi t h r e pr e se nt at i v es

of

t he Sudan and No r t h and Sout h Yemen. The purpose of

t h i s

Mar ch meet i ng

was t o

di s c us s

Red Sea

s ec ur i t y

or

what

t he Sovi et s c al l ed an Ar ab l ake sc heme desi gned t o ex-

c l ude

Moscow

and Tel

Av i v

f r o m

t he Red

Sea.

I n

a ddi t i on, t he

Somal i s

sought weapons f r o m t he Wes t .

The

Uni t e d St at e s

was

agr eeabl e because

i t

v i ewed

Somal i

di senchant ment

wi t h t he Sovi et s as an o ppor t uni t y t o r e-

s t ore a sembl ance of a bal ance of power i n t heHorn. ^ I t

woul d

al s o

pl ease moder at e

Mi deas t

s t a t e s i n t he r e gi on.

I n J ul y , t he Un i t e d St at e s al ong wi t h F r a nc e and Br i t a i n

agr eed t o suppl y t he Somal i s wi t h de f e ns i v e

ar ms. 19

i n

t hat

same mont h , Somal i r egul ar f or ces j o i ned Somal i - sup-

por t ed guer r i l l as * f i ght i ng i n t he Ogaden.

*Wes t e rn Soma l i L i ber a t i on F r ont ( WSLF) .

7


11/50

THE SOMALI - ETHI OPI AN WAR

The Sov i et s appar ent l y di d not a nt i c i p at e t he Somal i of -

f ens i ve. The Et hi opi ans l at er c l ai med t hat t he Sovi et s

had

as s ur ed t he m t hat t hey woul d pr ev ent t he So mal i s f r om

at t ac ki ng i n

f or c e.

Thes e a s s ur anc es l ed t he E t h i o pi a ns

i n Apr i l

t o

move

an

ar t i l l er y

and an

ar mor ed b at t a l i o n

f r o m

Code,

a s t r at egi c al l y l ocat ed t own near t he Somal i

bor der wi t h

t he

onl y good a i r por t

i n t he

Ogaden,

t o

f i ght

r i ght i s t s i n

no r t hwes t e r n Et hi opi a.

2

1

Once t he Somal i s di d i nvade, Moscow pl ayed f or t i me t o

per suade Si ad Ba r r e t o wi t hdr aw. Havana s publ i shed ac-

count

of

Cuban par t i c i pat i on

i n t he

Ogaden

War

gave

t he

da t e of t he

Somal i i nv as i o n

as

J ul y

13, y et t he

Et hi opi ans

di d

not publ i c l y deno unc e t he at t ac k unt i l J ul y 24. 22

N

Or

di d

t hey s ev er t hei r r el at i ons wi t h Somal i a unt i l Sept em-

ber 7. 23 Thi s s ugges t s t hat t he Et hi o pi a ns del a yed t hes e

s t eps i n de f e r e n c e t o So vi e t p r o m s e s t o p er s u ade t he So-

mal i s

t o

wi t hdr aw.

To

demonst r at e

t he

c ont i nui ng

v al ue

of

t he

Sov i et c onnec t i on

t o t he

Soma l i s , Moscow s i gned

an

econom c agr eement wi t h Mogadi sc i o i n Augus t . 24 Howeve r ,


12/50

di s c us s i ons wi t h Si ad Bar r e

i n

Moscow

at t he end of

August

f a i l e d t o yi el d a

Somal i

agr eement t o wi t hdr a w.

25

Af t er Si ad Bar re s v i s i t , t he Sovi et s t i l t ed f ur t her t o -

wa r ds Et hi o pi a .

The

Sovi et s

c ut of f

f uel s h i pment s

t o So-

mal i a .

2

* > They s i gned a 385 m l l i on dol l a r a r ms agr eement

wi t h Et hi opi a

i n

September.

27

Even

bef o re t he

v i s i t ,

So -

v i et

weapons sh i pment s t o Somal i a had exper i enced i nt er -

m t t ent del ays

and by

Sept ember ,

i t was

c l ear t hat Sov i et

ar ms d el i v er i e s t o Mo gadi s c i o had been l i m t e d t o s par e

par t s a nd l i ght ar ms .

2

Heavy weapons del i ve r i e s had r e-

por t edl y ceased a l t oget her .

Ne ve r t he l e s s , Moscow

ma i n t a i ned i t s connec t i on wi t h Moga-

di s c i o . Addi s Ababa comp l a i ned o f cont i nu i ng weapons de -

l i ver i es t o

Somal i a . Meng i s t u po i nt edl y r emarked

at a

press conf er ence

on

Sept ember

18:

I f s oc i al i s t c ount r i es ar e s t i l l s uppl yi ng ar ms t o

Somal i a, t hen t hi s i s not onl y v i o l at i ng

one s

pr i n-

c i pl es , but al s o t ant amount t o compl i c i t y wi t h t he

r eac t i ona ry Mo gadi s c i o

r egi me.

2

^

I n

m d- Oc t ober ,

Moscow s

Ambas s a dor t o Et h i o pi a pu bl i c l y

announced t hat ar ms de l i ver i es t o Somal i a had

ceased. 30

F ur t her mo re , Me ng i s t u

1

s secr et v i s i t s t o Moscow and Havana

at t he end of

Oct ober

s eem t o have been r ecei ved sympa-

t het i c al l y . 31

The

number

of

Cuban m l i t ar y advi s er s i n

9


13/50

Et hi o pi a i nc r e as ed f r om 150 t o 400 dur i n q t he f ol l owi nq

t wo weeks. 32

Even

s o,

Sovi et m l i t a r y

a dvi s er s , who had

l i t t l e to do wh i l e Soma l i f or ces were

r ampaqi nq

i n t he

Oqaden, r emai ned

i n

Soma l i a .

By November , t he Somal i of f ensi ve had boqqed down. The

i n i t i a l t h r u s t ha d y i el ded

l ar qe

qai ns , whi c h c ul m nat ed

i n

t he c apt ur e of J i j i qa i n m d- Sept ember . 33

g

u

t

Et hi o-

pi an r es i s t anc e

ha d

har dened ar ound Har ar

and

Di r edawa,

t he

ot her maj or t owns i n t he Oqa den. 34 TO d i sa ss o c i a t e

t hems e l v es f r om t he Somal i i nv as i on, t he Uni t e d St a t es ,

Br i t a i n, and

F rance

had

c a nc el l ed pl a ns

t o

sel l ar ms

t o

Mo qa di s c i o .

I f t he

Somal i s wer e qoi nq

t o

push

t he

Et hi o-

pi a ns out of t he Oqaden, t hey woul d have t o f i nd a secure

suppl y

of

ar ms , spar e pa r t s ,

and POL

necessary

t o

s us t a i n

moder n war f ar e. Mo qa di s c i o

1

s Mi d ea s t f r i ends c oul d s uppl y

POL and l i qht ar ms , but not t he heavy weapons t he Somal i s

r equi r ed. Onl y t he Wes t e rn c ount r i es c oul d do t hat . I f

t hey d i d not f i nd t he necessar y weapons, Sov i et a r ms s hi p-

ment s

t o

E t hi o pi a woul d

t i p t he

s c al es

i n t he

f i qht i nq

i n

f avor of Addi s Ababa . I n t he hopes of secur i nq a r ms f r om

t he West t he Soma l i s bu i l t a case f o r such suppor t by

c l ai m nq

t ha t

a

Sovi et - i ns pi r ed Cuban- Et hi opi an i nv as i on

of Somal i a was

i mm nent . 35 Fur t her mor e,

i n a q e s t u r e de-

- 10 -


14/50

s i gned

t o i mpr ov e i t s i maqe i n t he

Wes t ,

Mo ga di s c i o per-

m t t e d t he Wes t Ger mans t o rescue a L uf t ha ns a j et t ha t ha d

been skyj acked

by

Pal es t i ni ans

t o

So ma l i a . )

I n a

desper-

at e qambl e t hat West er n a i d woul d be

f or t hc om ng

i n r e -

war d, Si ad Bar r e on November 13 abr ogat ed t he 1974 Sovi et -

Somal i T rea ty of F r i ends hi p and Cooper at i on, e xpe l l e d So-

vi et ad vi s e r s , r evok ed So vi e t

use of

m l i t a r y f a c i l i t i es ,

r educed

Sovi et d i pl oma t i c r epr es ent at i on i n Mo ga di s c i o ,

and s ever ed r el at i ons wi t h

Cuba. 36

THE

SOVI ET I NTERVENTI ON

Fol l owi ng

t he

Somal i a ct i on,

t he

Sov i et s d ec i de d

t o

pl ay

a

mor e ac t i ve r ol e i n t he OgadenWar . Onl y af t e r Si a d s de-

c i s i o n di d Mos c ow di r e c t l y ac c us e Somal i a of a ggr e s s i on

a ga i ns t Et hi opi a. 37 Pr evi ous l y, t he Sovi et s had i ndi c at ed

t hei r s y mpat hi es f or Et hi o pi a by empha s i z i ng r es pec t f or

t he

pr i nc i pl e

of t er r i t o r i al i nt e gr i t y a s t h e bas i s f or a

ne got i a t e d s e t t l ement of t he

c onf l i c t . ^

On Nov ember 13,

t her e wer e s t i l l 1 678 Sovi et adv i s e r s i n So ma l i a , r epr e-

s ent i ng i mpl i c i t l y t he Kr em i n s i nt er e st i n t he coun-

t r y . 39 Af t e r t he e xpul s i on, Vas i l ey I . Pe t r ov, Deput y

Commander - i n- Chi ef of Sovi et Gr ound

Fo rces ,

ar r i ved t o di -

r e c t t he war a ga i ns t t he

Somal i s . O

The Sovi et ai r l i f t t o

- 11 -


15/50

Et hi opi a , s i qnal l i ng a mor e ac t i v e r ol e f or

Mos cow

i n t he

s t r uggl e, di d not be gi n unt i l t he end of

November . 41

Mor eover ,

al t h oug h t he numb er of Cu ba n a dv i s e r s i n Et hi o-

pi a r o s e

i n No ve mbe r f ol l owi ng Me ngi s t u s v i s i t t o

Havana,

Cuban c ombat

t r oop s

d i d not begi n ar r i v i ng unt i l m d- De-

cember .

42

Si nc e bot h t he Sovi et a i r l i f t and t he ar r i v al

of

Cuban

t roops

began af t er

Somal i a s

Nov ember

13 of f en-

s i v e a ga i ns t Har ar ha d f a i l ed, Mos c ow s i nt er vent i on was

pr o ba bl y ge ar e d mo r e t o t he e x pu l s i o n t h an t he of f en-

s i ve.

** 44

Ha v i n g

de c i d ed

t o

i nt er v ene,

t he

Sov i et s

no t

onl y l a un c he d

an i mpr es s i ve a i r l i f t and an ever l ar ger - s c al e s ea l i f t of

ar mament s

t o

Et h i o pi a , t hey a ugme nt e d t hei r na va l f or c es

i n t he

wa t e r s adj acent

t o t he war

z one, as s i s t ed

i n t he

dep l oyment of Cuban f or ces t o E t h i opi a , and p l anned and

di r ec t ed t he

subsequent Cuban- E t h i opi an campai gn t hat

d r o ve t he Soma l i s f r o m t he Ogaden.

*The 50 Cuban advi s er s s ent i n May wer e s upposed t o r epr e-

sent t he advance pa r t y of a l a rge r gr oup number i ng 400 or

500. The November i ncr ease i n t he number of Cubans i n

Et hi opi a

pr obabl y r epr es ent ed Cas t r o s f ul f i l l me nt of hi s

p r ev i ous comm t ment . ^

* * When

E t h i o pi a n f or c es wer e r e el i ng un de r

Somal i

a t t a c k s

i n t he

summer

of

1977,

Mos cow

f ai l ed

t o

r es pond commens u-

r at e wi t h i t s r eac t i on a f t er t he Somal i de c i s i o n of Nov em-

ber 13.

- 12 -


16/50

I n t he Un i t e d St at es and el s ewher e, c ons i der abl e al ar m was

expr essed concer ni ng

t he

ext ent

of

Sov i e t

and

Cuban

i n-

vol vement i n t he

war.

Bo t h P r es i den t Car t er and hi s Na -

t i onal Sec ur i t y Ad vi s e r Zbi gn i ew Br z ez i ns k i made v ague

r ef er ences

t o

l i nkages bet ween SALT

and

S ov i et be havi o r

i n

Af r i ca . S The U. S.

suspended

t he

Nav al Ar ms L i m t at i ons

Tal ks ( NALT) on the

I ndi an

Ocean. Concer n was al s o ex -

pr essed t hat t he Sovi et s m ght suppor t a Cuban o r E t hi o -

pi an i nvas i on of

Somal i a. 6

However , Mosc ow and Addi s

Ababa of f er ed assu r ances t hat t hey woul d r espec t t he

OAU s

doc t r i ne

on

t er r i t or i al

i nt egr i t y .

47

The

Cuba n- Et hi o pi a n

campai gn of Febr uar y and Mar ch 1978was hal t ed at t he So-

mal i bor der af t er Mo gadi s c i o s f or c es wi t hdr e w

i n

de f ea t .

SOVI ET I NVOLVEMENT: AN ANALYSI S

Hav i ng

s ummar i z ed

t he

s al i ent event s

of

Sovi e t i nvol vement

i n t he

Hor n,

i t i s

t i me

t o

r e t u r n

t o

ques t i ons r ai s ed

by

t hi s

panel r egar di ng Sovi et mo t i v at i o n, mo da l i t y , and per

f ormance i n Thi r d Wor l d Cr i s es .

Mot i v at i on

I n

addr ess i ng

t he

ques t i on

of

whet her Sovi et po l i c y

i n t he

Hor n

was pur pos i v e or r eac t i v e, i t i s wel l t o as k wha t we

13


17/50


18/50

br i nk

of

di s i nt egr at i on

and t o

r i sk Mos cow' s l ong- s t andi ng

r el at i ons hi p wi t h Somal i a

by

d oi ng

s o.

Sovi e t i nvol vement i n Et hi opi a may have been mot i vat ed by

a

bl end

of

i deol ogy

and

r eal pol i t i k ,

by a

hope

t o

c ont i nue

t hei r pol i cy t r i umphs i n Af r i c a and hal t , i f not r ever s e,

t he dec l i ne of t hei r i nf l uence i n t he Mi ddl e Eas t . The

f al l of Sout h Vi e t na m and t he emer genc e of s oc i al i s t -

or i ent ed s t a t es o f Ango l a and Mozambi que i n 1974 pr obabl y

encour aged

t he

Kr em i n

t o

bel i e ve t hat

i mpe r i a l i s m i n

Af r i ca and e l sewhere was on t he de f ens i ve. 8 The f a l l of

Hai l e Sel as s i e and t he a dopt i on by t he Der gue, i n Apr i l

1976, of a p rogram t o i mpl ement soc i a l i sm pr esumabl y con-

v i nced t he Sov i et s t ha t Et hi o pi a was r eady t o j oi n t he

gr owi ng l i s t of

pr o- Sovi et ,

pr o- Mar xi s t s t at es i n

Af r i ca. 49

n

addi t i on, Et hi opi a i t s el f mus t have at t r act -

ed Sovi et i nt er es t .

As has

been of t en no t e d, Et hi o pi a

i s

one of Af r i c a' s mos t popul ous s t at es , r i c h i n nat ur al r e-

sources , t he ol des t i ndependent count r y i n Af r i c a, and t he

s eat of t he Or gani z at i on of Af r i c an Uni t y . A Sovi et -

or i ent ed gover nment i n E t h i opi a woul d not onl y advance t he

cause of s oci al i s m but al s o expand Mos cow' s i nf l uenc e i n

Af r i ca.

Thus,

af t er t he Der gue i s s ued i t s pr ogr am t o

bui l d s oci al i s m an Et hi opi an s t at e del ega t i o n was f avor -

- 15 -


19/50

abl y r ec ei ved i n

Moscow. 50

The net r es ul t of t hat v i s i t

was a

m l i t ar y as si s t ance

agr eement i n Dec ember

1976. 51

I nvol vement

i n

Et hi opi a al s o of f er ed

t he

Sov i et s

an

oppor-

t uni t y t o sl ow down, i f not r e v e r s e , t he de cl i ne of t hei r

pos i t i on i n t he Red Sea r eqi on and t he Mi ddl e East i n gen-

er a l . The f ur t her det er i or a t i on of r e l at i ons wi t h Egy pt

and

t he

Sudan

i n

1976

not

onl y r epr esent ed

a

set back

t o

Sovi et pol i c y i n t he Mi d ea s t but al s o t o t hei r pos i t i on i n

t he Red

Sea.

Moscow bl amed t he U. S. and

Saudi

Ar abi a f or

i t s

pr obl ems wi t h Egypt

and t he

Mi d ea s t g ene r a l l y . 2. s

o

i t

was not

s ur pr i s i ng t hat

t he

Kr em i n

was

a nx i o us

t o

pre-

empt any e f f o r t s of pr o- Wes t er n Mi d e as t s t at e s t o t r ans -

f or m t he Red Sea i nt o an Ar ab l ake. I n Febr uar y 1977,

t he

Sovi e t s accused t he U. S. of pl anni ng

t o f o r m a new m l i t ar y bl oc t hat i nc l udes c er t ai n

s t at es of Red Se a, l ed by Sa ud i A r a bi a s o t ha t i t

woul d be a s t r i k i ng f or c e t o c hec k t he ant i - i mpe r i al -

i s t nat i onal f or c es i n t he r egi on par t i c ul ar l y t he

r ul i ng r evol ut i onar y r egi me of

Et hi opi a. ~ 4

* I n

Mar ch 1976, Egypt i an P r es i dent Anwar Sadat abr ogat ed

t he So vi e t - Egy pt i an Tr eat y of F r i e nd s hi p and Co ope r a t i on.

I n

J ul y ,

Sudan' s

P r es i dent Numai r y i conc l uded

a

def ense

agr ee me nt wi t h Egy pt a f t e r c h a r gi n g t hat t h e L i by ans wi t h

Sov i e t s u ppor t , wer e t r y i ng t o over t hr ow hi m 3

- 16 -


20/50

Conser vat i ve Ar ab

suppor t

f or t he onc e f avor ed Er i t r e an

l i ber at i on

gr oups

and ot her E t hi opi an

o ppos i t i on

f or c es

was seen by t he Sovi et s as par t of a conspi r acy t o est ab-

l i s h

a s t r i ng of

ant i - Sovi et s t a t es

on t he Red

Sea. *55

I f s uc c es s f ul , Mos cow' s

i nf l uenc e

i n

Somal i a

and

Sout h

Ye-

men m ght

er ode,

and Sov i et s hi ppi ng i n t he Red Sea

m ght

be host age t o t h e whi ms of these Arab s ta tes . By suppor t -

i ng

t he

Mar x i s t - or i ent ed gover nment

of

Et hi opi a,

t he So-

vi et s

coul d demons t r a t e t ha t t hey possessed cons i der abl e

c apac i t y t o

o bs t r uc t

t hi s

new m l i t ar y bl oc ' s ef f or t s

t o

exc l ude t hem not onl y f r om t he Red Sea i n par t i c ul ar but

al s o

t he

Mi ddl e

East i n genera l .

However , i nvol vement

i n

E t hi opi a meant t ha t

t he

Sovi et s

woul d have

t o

c ope wi t h Somal i na t i o nal i s m

and

Et hi opi a' s

i nt er nal t r oubl es , t he

most ser i ous

of

whi ch wer e

t he

Er i -

t r ean separ at i on movement s. The Sovi et s d i d not want t o

t r ade Somal i a

f or

Et hi opi a . They were undoubt edl y

an-

xi ous t o

pr eserve t hei r access

t o t he

val uabl e m l i t ar y

f a c i l i t i e s t hat t hey cons t r uc t ed at Berbera and el sewher e

i n

Somal i a. Mor eover ,

t he l os s of

Ber ber a woul d mean t hat

Mos c ow woul d h ave l i t t l e ba r ga i ni ng power v i s - a- v i s

t he

*By J une 1976, t he Sovi et s had endor sed t he

PMAC' s

ni ne-

poi nt pol i cy sol ut i on f or t he adm ni s t r at i v e r egi on ( s i c)

of

Eri t rea.

56

- 17 -


21/50

U. S. ba se

at

Di eqo

Gar c i a maki nq t he

U. S. - Sovi et

Naval

Ar ms L i m t at i ons

Tal k s

s uper f l uous . *

I n

a ddi t i on ,

i n-

f l uenc e

i n

Add i s Ababa woul d

be

val uabl e

onl y i f t he

i nde-

pendence

of

Er i t r ea ( whi c h

possesses

Et hi opi a' s ent i r e

Red

Se a

c oas t l i ne) c oul d

be

f or e s t al l ed.

To

r ec onc i l e t hes e pul l s

and

pushes

i n

t hei r pol i c y,

t he

Sovi e t s a dvoca t e d a f e de r a t i on scheme f o r t h e r eqi on.

Er i t r ea' s

des i r e f o r

s e l f - qo ve r n me nt

a nd t h e Et hi opi an' s

de man d

f or

sove r e i qnt y ove r

t he

p r o vi n c e wo ul d

be

recon-

c i l ed

by a f eder a t i on bet ween t he t wo. Somal i a nd E t hi o -

pi an

d i s put es vi s - a - v i s

t he

Oqaden

and

Dj i bout i woul d

be

s at i s f i ed by a c onf eder at i on of Et hi o pi a , Somal i a , Dj i bo u-

t i , and t he

Yemens . Such

a

s ol ut i o n woul d de mo ns t r a t e

t he

ut i l i t y

of t he s oc i al i s t way i n r es ol vi nq

Af r i c a ' s

na-

t i onal i s t

pr obl ems.

A Ma r x i s t bl oc woul d have t he

added

advant aqe

of

cons t i t ut i nq

a

count er

t o t h e U. S. - l ed

m l i -

t ar y bl oc i n t he r eqi on.

Howeve r ,

a f t e r

Cas t r o' s

f a i l ur e

t o

c r e a t e

a

Ma r x i s t f eder -

at i o n i n t he a r e a , So vi e t pol i c y b ec a me l es s s ha pi n q t ha n

shaped by event s i n t he

Hor n.

The Sovi et s became l ess and

l es s

on t op of

event s

as

t h ei r p ol i c y s us t ai ned s uc c es s i ve

*The

Sovi et s

had an i nt er es t i n l i m t i ng U. S. naval ac t i v-

i t y i n t he

I ndi an Ocean because U. S.

SSBNs

coul d t hr e at e n

t he Sovi et hear t l and i n t he unl i k el y e ve nt ' of t hei r de-

pl oyment

t o t he

I ndi an Ocean.

- 18 -


22/50

bl ows f r om

t he

Somal i s :

Mo gadi s c i o ' s

o v e r tu re s

by t he

Ar abs and t he Wes t f o r a i d agai ns t Sovi et - suppor t ed Et hi o -

pi a,

t he Somal i

i nvas i on

of t he

Ogaden,

and

f i nal l y Si ad

Bar r e' s expul s i on of t he Sovi et s f r om Somal i a. I n t he pe-

r i ods i n wh i c h t he f i r s t t wo bl ows wer e s u s t a i n ed , t he So-

vi et s r eact ed t o event s i n a way t hat woul d br i ng t he So-

mal i s t o see t hat t he f eder at i on scheme or anot her Moscow-

negot i at ed s et t l ement was t he onl y r at i o nal s o l ut i o n t o

t he Horn ' s

pr obl em But t he l as t bl ow pr ec i pi t at ed t he

ul t i mat e

r eact i on: ac t i ve Sovi et i nt er vent i on

on t he

s i de

of Et hi opi a. Onl y

i n

t hat

way

c oul d

t he

Sov i et s agai n

emer ge on t op of event s .

Al t ho ugh t h e

Somal i s

del i ver ed t he

bl ows , Sov i et r eac t i ons

seem t o have been gear ed not onl y t o Somal i a , but al so t o

Et hi opi a, ot her Af r i c an s t at es , c ons er vat i ve

Mi deast

coun-

t r i es , and t he Wes t .

L et ' s di s c us s Sovi et r eac t i ons

t o

Si ad Bar r e' s o ver t ur es

t o t he Ar abs and t he Wes t f or s uppor t agai ns t Et h i o pi a.

Sy mbo l i z i ng hi s r ej ec t i on of a Sovi et - s pons or ed s e t t l e me nt

wi t h

Et hi o pi a, Si ad Bar r e j our ney ed

i n

Mar ch

t o

Tai z

t o

di s c us s an Ar ab l ake sc heme. He al so made over t ur es t o

t he U. S.

and

ot her West er n s t at es

f or

ar ms suppor t .

The

Sovi et s , never t hel es s , per s i s t ed i n s t r engt heni ng t hei r

- 19 -


23/50

t i es wi t h Et hi opi a. I n May , t hey s i gne d a l ar ger m l i t ar y

agr e eme nt wi t h E t h i opi a .

I n a

sense,

Tai z j us t i f i ed Sovi et i nvol vement i n Et hi o-

pi a. *

I t

bec ame

a l l t he

mor e i mpor t ant

t o

f or es t al l Mos -

cow s exc l us i on f r om t he Red Sea by an Ame r i can- l e d Ar ab

bl oc .

At t he May mee t i ng ( f r om whi c h t he m l i t a r y

as s i s -

t ance agr eement

r e sul t ed) , t he

Sov i et s

and

Me ngi s t u

poi nt -

edl y c ondemned

t he

I nt r i gues

of

i mper i a l i s t s

i n t he

Hor n

and

t he ef f or t s of c er t ai n s t at es t o i mpr ov e t hei r con-

t r ol on t he Red Sea at t he e xpe ns e of t he l e gi t i ma t e

r i ght s of ot her s t at es and peopl es of t h i s r egi on.

^

Yet , t he Sovi et s wer e not i ns e ns i t i v e t o

Somal i

f eel i ngs .

As we have se en, t he Sovi e t s and E t h i opi ans s i gne d onl y a

dec l ar at i on

no t a

t r e a t y

of

f r i ends hi p

and

c o oper at i on.

The Sovi e t s we re appare nt l y hope f u l t ha t t he Soma l i s woul d

j o n

t he Red Sea ar ea' s pr o gr es s i v e f or c es i n c oor di nat -

i ng

t hei r s t r uggl e agai ns t

t he

i nt r i gues

of t he

common

enemy

i mper i al i s m

* At t he t i me of t he me et i n g, t he So vi et s e v en al t er ed

t hei r pr o po s al s f or a Mi ddl e

Eas t peace se t t l ement

t o i n-

c l ude a pr ovi s i on r ec ogni z i ng t he r i ght of al l s hi ps , i n-

c l udi ng I s r ael i

ones, t o

f r ee pass age t hr ough

t he

r e gi on' s

wat er ways.

Thi s sugges t s t ha t Moscow took

t he

meet -

i ng

very

s er i ous l y.

- 20 -


24/50

The

Sov i et s

may

have been hopef u l because t hey appar ent l y

di d

no t t hi nk Somal i over t ur es t o t he Ar abs and t he

Wes t

woul d s ucceed.

Mos cow

pr obabl y t hought t hat Somal i

ef -

f o r t s t o obt ai n m l i t ar y s uppor t f r o m Mi d eas t c ount r i es

woul d f ounder

on t he

i nabi l i t y

of t he

Ar abs

t o

pr ov i d e

t he

hea vy m l i t a r y e qui pme nt

necessary

f or a Somal i m l i t ar y

c ampai gn. J us t as So vi et bac k i ng of t he

Soma l i s

woul d v i -

ol at e

Moscow s

pr ev i ous comm t ment t o r espect t he

OAU s

s t r i c t ur es r egar d i ng t er r i t o r i al i nt egr i t y , t he Kr em i n

mus t hav e f el t t hat s i m l ar c ons i d er at i ons woul d pr ev ent

t he U. S.

and

ot her Wes t er n c ount r i es f r o m und er wr i t i ng

a

Somal i i nvas i on.

Mos cow

pr obabl y r easoned t h a t t he

Soma-

l i s wer e

t oo

dependent

on t he

Sovi et s

f o r a r ms ,

spare

p a r t s , and POL t o be abl e t o pur sue an i ndependent po l i cy

agai ns t E t hi o pi a. Thi s was a r eas onabl e vi ew c ons i d er i ng

t hat Si ad Bar r e was publ i c l y i nd i c at i ng as l at e as J une

1977 t hat he woul d s t ay wi t h t he Sov i e t Un i on because he

di d

no t

want

t o end up

l i k e Egy pt wi t ho ut

a

secur e suppl y

of arms. - >9 Ther ef or e, t o ac hi ev e any s at i s f ac t i on f or

t hei r t er r i t or i al c l ai ms f r om Ad di s Ababa, t he Somal i s

woul d have

t o go

t hr ough Mos cow.

As a

r e s ul t ,

t he

Sov i et s

as s ur ed t he Et h i o pi a ns i n Ap r i l t ha t t he So mal i s woul d n ot

- 21 -


25/50

at tack .

And i n

J une, Anat ol i y Gromyko

a

Sovi et Af r i can

exper t

and t he

F or ei gn Mi ni s t er s

s on

p r edi c t e d:

I n

s pi t e of hi s t or i c al c ont r adi c t i o ns bet ween Somal i a

and

E t h i opi a, t her e ar e pr ogr es s i v e f or ces i n bot h ,

abl e

t o

s o r t

out

t hei r soci al , pol i t i cal ,

and

econom-

i c p r obl ems. Her e

we ar e

opt i m s t s :

We

t hi nk

i t i s

pos s i bl e t o hav e a f e de r at i o n i n t he Hor n of

Af r i ca.

60

Howeve r , af t er t h e

Somal i s

i nvaded t he Ogaden, t he Sovi e t s

wer e f or ced t o adj us t t hei r pol i c y t o t he new s i t u at i o n i n

t he Hor n. As we have seen, t he Sovi e t s r eact ed t o t he i n-

vasi on by summoni ng Si ad

B a r r e

t o Moscow and at t empt i ng t o

per suade

h i m t o

wi t hdr aw

hi s f or c es

f r o m

t he

Ogade n. W t h

t hei r opt i m s m onl y s omewhat di mmed, t hey agai n r epor t edl y

r ai s ed

t he

f eder at i on i dea

a s the

pr oper bas i s

f or a

Soma-

l i - Et hi o pi an s e t t l ement . Al t ho ug h Si ad Bar r e r ef us ed t o

wi t hdr aw, t he Sov i e t s mus t have t hought t hat t hey coul d

mani pul at e ar ms

ai d t o t he

E t h i opi ans

and t he

Somal i s

i n a

way t h at woul d b r i ng t h e So mal i s t o t h e n eg ot i at i n g t ab l e .

Al t hough t hey had m s c al c ul at ed Somal i i nt ent i ons , t hey

had

n ot m s c a l c ul at e d t he ge ner al r e ac t i o n t o t he So mal i

i nv as i on. The

Wes t

was unwi l l i ng t o supp l y t he ar ms nec-

essary t o sus t a i n a Somal i campai gn i n t he Ogaden. Fur -

t her mor e , Ar ab pet r odo l l ar s coul d not pur chase on t he open

mar ket

t he

heavy equi pment Somal i a needed

f o r i t s

of f en-

s i ve.

The

Sov i et s r easonabl y hoped t hat

by

pr ogr es s i vel y

22


26/50

r es t r i c t i nq ar ms

ai d t o

Mogadi sc i o

t he Somal i s

woul d

see

t he

handwr i t i ng

on t he

wal l

and

accede

t o a

negot i at ed

peace. I n t he meant i me, t o mol l i f y Addi s Aba ba , t he So-

v i et s r esponded t o Et h i opi an appeal s f or suppor t by i n-

c r e as i ng

t he

amount

and

f l o w

of

weapons

t o

E t hi opi a.

Fi -

nal l y, t o al l ay Et hi opi an s us pi c i ons , t he Sov i et s r es pond-

ed t o Mengi s t u' s demands and cut of f al l ar ms s uppl i es t o

Somal i a by

Oct ober .

Moscow pr obabl y r easoned t hat t he

Et h i opi ans woul d gr ow ever s t r onger

on a

s t eady di e t

of

Sovi et ar ms and woul d ev ent ual l y pr essur e t he Somal i s on

t he

bat t l ef i el d.

At

t hat poi nt , Mo ga di s c i o woul d

be

f o r c ed t o

t u r n

t o Mos cow f o r a

negot i at ed se t t l ement .

I f

t he Sov i e t s aga i n m sr ead Soma l i det er m nat i on, i t was

onl y bec ause c hauv i ni s t expa ns i o ni s t moods pr ev ai l ed

over common sense.

The Somal i dec i s i on t o expe l t he Sov i e t s r epr esent ed t he

c ol l aps e of Moscow' s e f f or t s t o ne got i at e a s e t t l eme nt be-

t ween Somal i a and Et hi opi a. I n response t o t he dec i s i on,

t he Sovi et s de c i de d t o i nt er vene ac t i vel y i n t he conf l i c t

i n or der

t o

r egai n cont r ol

of

event s

i n t he

Hor n.

The Sov i et dec i s i on t o i nt e r vene was gear ed not onl y t o

Somal i a a nd Et hi o pi a but al so t o ot her Af r i c an s t at es ,

23


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c ons er v at i v e

Mi deas t

s t a t es , and t he U. S. and ot he r Wes t -

er n na t i ons . I n t he same way Sada t s abr oga t i on of t he

So vi e t - Egy pt i a n Tr eat y of F r i ends hi p and Cooperat i on i n

1976 r epr esent ed

a

sever e set back

t o

Sovi et pol i c y

i n t he

Mi d ea s t , t he Soma l i dec i s i on was a po t ent i a l bl ow t o So-

v i et pr es t i ge i n Af r i c a. The Somal i ac t i on a l s o r epr e-

sent ed t he

Sovi et f ai l ur e

t o

f o r m Ma r x i s t bl oc

i n t he

Hor n. I ndeed , t he Soma l i dec i s i on mus t have r epr esent ed

i n

Sovi e t eyes anot her success f o r t hose s ame Mi deast

s t a t e s

Sa udi Ar a bi a , Egy pt ,

and t he

Sudan

i n

t hei r

e f f o r t s t o ex c l ude t he Sov i et s f r om t he Red Sea r egi on i n

par t i c ul ar and i n t he Mi ddl e East i n gener al . * I n addi -

t i on, t he Sovi et s , ever m ndf ul o f K i s s i nger s ef f or t s t o

e xpel t hem f r om E gy pt , u nd ou bt e dl y r es ent ed what t hey s a w

as

t he

Amer i can r ol e

i n

t hei r expul s i on:

No

e xpl anat i on

by t he

U. S. St at e Depar t ment

can r e-

f u t e

t he f ac t t hat s i nc e t he s pr i ng of 1977 Was hi ng-

t on has

been ac t i vel y s t r i v i ng

f or a

det er i or at i on

i n

r e l a t i ons be t we en Soma l i a and t he Sov i et Uni on. 62

Al t hough t he U. S. ha d a l r eady publ i c l y r es c i nded i t s dec i -

s i on t o s uppl y t he So ma l i s wi t h ar ms , Mo ga di s c i o s ac t i o n

i n e xpel l i ng

t he

Sovi et s must have appear ed

t o

Moscow

as a

* Mo r e ov er , t he

Somal i ac t i on

was

ac compani ed

by

anot her

s et bac k t o Sovi et Mi d ea s t pol i c y. Sadat s dec i s i o n t o go

t o J er us al em at t hat t i me das hed

Moscow s

hopes t o pl ay a

maj or r ol e i n a

Mi ddl e

East peace set t l ement by maki ng su-

per f l uous t he Oct ober 1 Vanc e- Gr omyk o agr eement t o r econ-

vene

a

Geneva Conf er ence.

24


28/50

vi c t or y f or U. S. pol i c y i n t he

Hor n.

Al s o

ha vi ng

p robabl y

t hr eat ened Somal i a bef or ehand about

t he

consequences

of

any

a ct i on aqa i ns t

t he

Sovi et pos i t i on

i n

Somal i a ,

t he So-

vi et s

had t o

t ake some

ac t i on. *

F r u s t r a t e d ,

t he

Sovi et s

det er m ned t o demons t r a t e t ha t t hey wo ul d not t ol er a te

t hi s l a t e s t ex ampl e of l ese ma j e s t e on t he pa r t o f ano t her

Thi r d Wor l d count r y . As Geor g i y Samsonov, t he Ambas s ado r

t o

Somal i a ,

put i t :

We wi l l t ea ch [ t he Somal i s ] a l es s on t hey wi l l not

f o r q e t . We wi l l br i ng t hem t o t hei r knees.

63

I n doi ng

s o, t he

Sov i et s c oul d demons t r a t e t he i r c a pa ci t y

t o pr o t ec t t hei r i nt er es t s i n Af r i c a and t he Mi deas t .

Modal i t y

I n rega rd t o t he ques t i on: I s Sovi et c r i s i s pol i c y ac-

t i v i s t or c aut i ous ? I t c an be ar gued t hat S ovi et p ol i c y

i n

t he Hor n was bo th ac t i v i s t and caut i ous .

I t was a c t i v i s t i n t he s ens e t ha t t he Sovi et s d i s p l a ye d a

marked wi l l i ngness

t o

expl oi t ava i l abl e oppor t uni t i es

t o

* Al t houg h

t he Soma l i s , by

t hi s t i me,

had

l os t t hei r r evo-

l ut i ona r y democ r a t i c al l ur e, t he Sov i et s ha d at t empt ed

t hr oughout t o ma i nt a i n t hei r p os i t i o n i n Somal i a t o pr e-

s er ve t hei r m l i t ar y f ac i l i t i es i n t he count r y and t hei r

access

t o Ber ber a

wh i ch

was a

val uabl e count er

i n t he

NALT

negot i at i ons .

25


29/50


30/50

set t l ement t o t he Ogaden

War , Mos cow

woul d i mpose a Pax

Sov i et i c a

i n t he

Hor n.

The

ac t i v i s m

of

Sovi et cr i s i s pol i cy

was

hi ghl i ght ed

by

t he ext ent of

Mos cow' s

i nvol vement i n t he i nt er v ent i on. A

hi gh- r ank i ng Sovi et g ener al , Vas i l ey I . Pet r o v, di r ec t ed

Cuban

and

Et hi opi an m l i t ar y oper at i ons agai ns t

t he Soma-

l i s .

Sov i et s hi ps and Sov i et - suppl i ed pl anes he l ped de-

l i ver

t he Cubans t o

Et hi opi a.

6

^

Sov i et pi l ot s wer e as -

s i gned t o

Cuba re l eas i ng t he i r Cuban count e rpar t s

f or a c-

t i o n i n Et hi opi a. 65 Ev en t he maps t he Cubans pr oudl y pub-

l i s hed i n

Gr anma de t a i l i n g

t he

Cuban- Et hi opi an v i c t or y

bor e Rus s i an t r a ns l i t er at i ons of Et hi opi an pl ac e

names . 6

I n

addi t i on, t he S ovi et s pr ov ed wi l l i ng t o t ackl e t he

pr obl ems

and

di f f i c ul t i es as s oc i at ed wi t h mount i ng

a

l ar ge- s cal e ai r -

and

seal i f t

t o

Et hi opi a. Pr obl ems wi t h

t he

a i r l i f t s t emmed mai nl y f r om pol i t i c al r a t her t han

t echni cal reasons. To r eac h Et hi opi a, Sov i et t r ans por t

ai r c r af t had t o

over f l y many c ount r i es t hat ei t her d i r ec t -

l y suppor t ed ( wi t h suppl i es and adv i se r s ) or were

s ympa-

t het i c t o t he Somal i s

dur i ng

t he

conf l i c t .

To

over come

t hi s handi cap, Sovi e t s empl oyed a wi de var i et y of f l i ght

pa t hs , abused t he Mont r eaux Convent i on' s pr ovi s i ons r e-

27


31/50

qar di nq o ver f l i ght s t hr ough Tur k i s h ai r cor r i dor s , engaged

i n s uch s ubt er f uges as l i s t i ng f al s e f i nal des t i nat i ons

( us ual l y Ad en ) and m s r epr es ent i ng t he na t u r e of t he

t r a n s p o r t s

car goes. 7

W t h t he r ai l r o ad t o Dj i bout i cut

and wi t h Ma ss awa c ut of f f r om l a nd a cc es s by t he Er i t r e-

ans,

Sovi et seabor ne shi pment s went t o Assab. To hel p r e-

l i eve

c onges t i on

at

Assab

and ut i l i z e t he adapt abi l i t y of

Aden s

Khor amaks ar

a i r por t t o amphi b i ous t r anspor t , some

ai r a nd s ea del i v er i es

wer e

d i r e c t e d t o Ad en a nd t he n

t r a ns - s hi pped t o As s a b by t ank l a n di n g

c r a f t . 6 8

Amphi b-

i ous s hi ps pr oba bl y pl a yed

an

even mor e i mpor t ant r ol e

i n

s u ppl y i n g E t h i o pi a n f or c es i n t he bes i ege d por t of Ma s s a-

wa.

Par t l y,

t o

pr ot ec t t hi s s ea l i f t , Mos c ow a ugme nt e d

t he

nu mber

of i t s

naval uni t s

t o t h e

h i ghe s t l evel ever

a c hi e ve d i n t he I ndi an

Ocean.

69

Des pi t e Sovi et a ct i v i s m

i n t he

conf l i c t ,

Moscow s

i nv ol v e-

me nt al s o r ef l ec t ed a c er t a i n c aut i on. Soma l i a v i ol a t e d

( def ac t o) i nt er na t i ona l l aw and OAU s t r i c t u r es by i n va di n g

t he Oga den, t he i nt er na t i ona l l y r ec ogni z ed t er r i t or y o f

* I r o n i c a l l y , t h e Sov i et s a cc ompl i s hed t hi s f ea t a f t er

l os i ng access t o Ber ber a.

28


32/50

Et hi opi a. * I n r eac t i on t o Somal i aggr ess i on, t he U. S. and

ot her Wes t er n c ount r i es had r enounc ed t he i r i nt ent i on t o

suppl y ar ms t o t he Sor aal i s . As l ong as Somal i f o rces wer e

on t he

wr ong s i de

of t he

bo r de r ,

t he

Sov i et s

had

l i t t l e

r eason t o f ear Wes t e rn a rms suppl i es t o Mogadi sc i o . The

ar ms

ai d

tha t Mi deast s t at es c oul d pr o vi de

t he

Somal i s

was

i ns i gni f i cant . T he r e f or e,

t he

Sov i et s coul d hope t hat

t hey woul d not become i nvol ved i n a debi l i t at i ng s t r uggl e

on t he s cal e of Vi e t na m

Howeve r ,

a

Sov i et - s uppor t ed Cu ba n- Et hi o pi a n i nv as i on

of

Somal i a m g ht pr ec i pi t at e U. S. ar ms a i d f or Mo ga di s c i o or

U. S. suppor t f or t hos e Mi d dl e Eas t c ount r i es l i k e Egy pt ,

Sudan, S audi Ar a bi a ,

and

I r a n, whi c h wer e i nc l i ned

t o

* To ever yone s

di s be l i e f ,

t he

Somal i s , unt i l l at e

i n t he

wa r , ma i nt a i ne d t ha t o nl y WSLF guer r i l l as wer e f i ght i ng

i n

t he

Ogaden.

- 29 -


33/50

i nt er vene

on t he s i de o f Somal i a i n such an

ev ent . *

Fur-

t her mor e , such

an

i nvas i on woul d damage

t he

Sov i et s

i mage

as de f e nde r s of t he

OAU s

pr i nc i pl e of t e r r i t o r i al i nt e-

gr i t y . Ra di c al Ar a b s t at es l i k e I r aq and Sy r i a s y mpat het -

i c

t o

Somal i a woul d

be

f ur t her of f ended.

The Sovi et s and t he Et hi o pi a ns pr ov ed wi l l i n g t o gi v e as -

sur ances t o t he U. S. t ha t t he E t hi o pi a ns woul d not vi ol at e

Somal i t er r i t or i al i nt egr i t y . Ther e f or e , t he Sov i e t s con-

f i ned

t he Cuba n and Et hi o pi a n o f f e ns i v e t o

dr i v i ng

t he So-

mal i s

out of t he i r e nt r e nc he d po s i t i o ns i n t he Amha r a

mount a i ns r a t he r t han pur su i ng

t he

eas i er m l i t ar y opt i on

of

occupy i ng Nor t her n Somal i a

and t r a di ng i t f or t he

Oga-

*U. S. Sec r et ar y

of

St at e Cyr us Vance war ned

t he

Sovi et s

i n

Febr uar y 1978:

We b el i e ve i t i s f unda me nt a l t ha t t he re be a r ec ogni -

t i on and a r es pec t by al l par t i es of i nt er nat i onal l y

r ecogni zed

borders We wi l l c ont i nue

our

p resent

course of ac t i on wi t h r es pec t t o not supp l y i ng ar ms

t o ei t her s i de but i f t her e wer e a c r os s i ng of bor -

der s , i t woul d pr es ent a di f f e r e nt s i t uat i on and we

woul d have t o cons i der i t t hen

7

^

Egypt i an P r es i dent Sadat t ol d t wo Amer i can Congr essmen i n

December 1977 t hat Egypt and Sudan woul d

each

send an ar-

mor ed br i gade t o Somal i a i f event s war r ant ed such ac -

t i on.

1 I n J anuar y 1978, bo th I r an and Saudi Ar abi a

war ned t hey woul d not s t and i dl e i f Soma l i a wer e i n-

vaded. 2

- 30 -


34/50

den. * Ac c or di ngl y , Moscow,

a t t h e

c onc l us i on

of t he

war ,

def ended i t s ac t i o ns i n t he Hor n by ma i nt a i ni ng t hat t he

USSR

had

ac ted

i n

f ul l ac c or danc e wi t h

. . . i nt er nat i onal l aw whi c h pe r m t s a i d t o a ny c o unt r y

t hat ' s

t he

vi c t i m

of

aggr ess i on. Even

i n t he

f i ght -

i ng, t he Sov i et Uni on suppor t ed t he E t hi opi an gover n-

ment ' s

s t at ement t hat i t had no i nt ent i on of c r os s i ng

i t s

bo rders ,

but onl y a i med t o r ebuf f a t tacks and

l i be ra t e i t s own t er r i t or y . The USSR and o t her coun-

t r i es i nt er es t ed

i n a

peacef u l set t l ement managed

t o

keep t he war f r om s pr eadi ng f r om al l par t s o f t he

Hor n of Af r i c a , and wi t hi n a c ompar at i v el y s hor t t i me

t he

war was st opped.

4

Des pi t e Mos cow' s wi l l i ngnes s t o be ex t r emel y a c t i v e i n t he

c onf l i c t , t he Sovi et s cl ear l y r ec ogni z ed t he l i m t s of ac -

cept abl e i nvol vement i n t he Ogaden War .

Per f or mance

Cer t a i n ques t i o ns ha ve been r ai s ed about So vi et c r i s i s

per f or mance:

How

wel l have

t he

Sovi et s done

dur i ng

cr i s es

i n

l i ght of t hei r pol i c y obj ec t i v es ? Do t he Sov i et s man-

age c r i s es def t l y or do t hey j us t muddl e t hr ough t hem?

I n t er ms of Sovi et pol i c y obj ec t i v es vi s - a- v i s Af r i c a and

t he Mi deast , one coul d ar gue t hat t he Sov i et s managed t he

c r i s i s

i n t he

Horn r at her wel l .

* A s egment of t he E t hi o pi a n m l i t a r y had f av or ed t he

easi er

a l t er nat i ve.

Ac t i v e Sov i et i nv ol v ement i n

t he

war pr obabl y

hel ped

make

c er t ai n t hat

i t was not

chosen.

31


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Tr ue,

t he

Sov i et s

d i d no t

a c hi ev e t hei r opt i mal obj ec t i v es

i n t he Horn nor di d

t hei r

pol i cy

f a i l

t o

i ncur

maj or

cost s

The Sovi et s f ai l ed t o ac hi e ve t hei r mos t de s i r ed

r es ul t

a

f eder at i on

of

Et hi opi a , Somal i a, Dj i bout i ,

and

t he Yemens . Nor

wer e t hey abl e

t o

pr es er v e t hei r

i n-

f l uenc e

i n

Soma l i a . Ye t ,

i f , i n t he

unl i k el y ev ent ,

t he

Soma l i s

s houl d

be

wi l l i nq

t o

seek

a

ne qo t i a t e d s e t t l e me nt

wi t h Et hi opi a conc er ni nq

t he

Oqaden,

t he

Sov i et s c o ul d

aqai n r ai s e t he f ede r a t i on scheme as a pot ent i a l

s ol u-

t i on.

*

I n addi t i on,

t he Sov i et s l os t ac ces s t o t h e

va l uab l e nava l

and

ai r

f ac i l i t i es t hat t hey

had

c o n s t r u c t e d

at

Be r b e r a

and el sewher e i n Somal i a. Ye t , t hey hav e of f s et t hi s l os s

by

o bt ai ni ng

access t o Aden and

E t hi opi a s

Da hl ac I s l and.

Howeve r ,

t h i s happy out come coul d

no t

have been count ed

on

at t he t i me . P r e v i o us l y, t he P DRY ha d be en r e l u c t a nt t o

q r a nt

t he

Sov i e t s access

t o

Aden compar abl e

t o t he

access

t hey enj oyed at Ber be r a . * * W t h Er i t r e a i n r ebel l i on i n

*Such

a

pos s i bi l i t y

i s not i nc onc ei vabl e. I n

J anuar y

1979, Si ad Bar r e i ndi c a t e d an i nt er es t i n i mpr ov i nq

r e l a-

t i ons wi t h

t he USSR

75

**Appar ent l y,

t he

coup d et at

i n t he

PDRY

i n

J une 1978

made i t pos s i bl e t o obt ai n eas i er ac c es s f r om

Aden s

new

and

more r adi ca l gover nment .

- 32 -


36/50

1977, t he pr ospect of ear l y use of Et hi opi an f ac i l i t i es

mus t have seemed bl eak.

Fur t her mor e, cont i nui ng quer r i l l a war f ar e by t he Er i t r eans

and t he Somal i s may make Sovi et and Cuban i nvol vement i n

Et hi opi a cos t l y over t he l ong t er m Yet , t he E t h i opi ans ,

wi t h Sov i et and Cuban l og i s t i cal suppor t , have succeeded

i n i nf l i c t i ng s ever e def eat s

on t he

E r i t r ean seces si oni s t s

i n t he

s ummer

and

f a l l

of

1978.

As a

r es ul t , Er i t r ea

i s

mor e secur el y a pa r t of E t hi opi a t han i t has been i n

years . Fur t her mor e, af t er t hei r de f e at , t h e Somal i s a r e

i nc apabl e of pr ov i di ng t he WSL F wi t h s uf f i c i e nt suppor t t o

s er i ous l y c hal l enge Et hi opi a' s s ov er ei gnt y over

t he

Oga-

den.

And

wi t hout s i gni f i c ant out s i de ar ms a i d, nei t her

t he

Er i t r e ans nor t he Somal i s ar e l i kel y t o i nf l i c t cost s

on t he Sovi et s and t he Cubans i n any way compar abl e t o t he

costs

suf f e red by t he U. S. i n Vi e t nam.

The oppor t uni t y t o s at i s f y S ov i e t s ecur i t y c onc er ns i n t he

I ndi an Ocean

was

l ost wi t h

t he

suspensi on

of

NALT.

Nor

ar e t h es e t al k s l i kel y t o be r ev i ved as l ong a s t he U. S.

and Sov i et Uni on

ar e

pur s ui ng c onf l i c t i ng goal s

i n t he I n-

di an

Ocean

or

what

has

come

to be

cal l ed

t he

ar c

of

cr i -

s i s .

33


37/50

Y et , d es p i t e t he a ppa r e nt

c o s t s ,

i t i s d i f f i c ul t , i n r e-

t r os pec t , t o s ee how t he Sov i e t s c oul d ha ve ac t ed d i f f e r -

ent l y knowi ng what t hey knew at each st age of t he game.

Cons i der i ng

t he

oppor t uni t y E t hi opi a af f or ded

f or a i di ng a

r ev ol ut i onar y r egi me wh i l e a dv an ci ng

i t s

i nt er e st s

i n

Af r i c a and t he Mi de as t ,

Mos cow s

i nvol veme nt se ems i nev i t -

a bl e . The Sov i e t s coul d r easonabl y hope t hat appeal s t o

Somal i a s Ma r x i s t c ons c i enc e f or mut ual l y benef i c i al r e l a-

t i ons wi t h t he r ev ol ut i onar y gov er nment o f Et hi opi a m g ht

be

e nt e r t a i ned i n v i ew of

Somal i

dependence on t he Sovi et s

f or ar ms and spar e p a r t s . Even i f t hose appeal s were r e -

j ec t ed,

as

t hey wer e,

t he

unl i k el i hood

of

Somal i a s bei ng

abl e t o obt ai n t h es e es s ent i al i t ems i n s uf f i c i ent quant i -

t i es

f r om ot her

sour ces

made a Somal i a t t ack on E t h i opi a

seem a f ool har dy pr opos i t i on. Ther e f or e , t he Soma l i s

woul d have to t u r n t o

Moscow

t o obt ai n any s at i s f ac t i on

f or t hei r cl ai ms t o t he Oga den. I f t he Sovi et s m s c al c u-

l at ed, t hen t hei r m s c al c ul at i on was bas ed on an i ns uf f i -

c i ent appr ec i at i on

of t he

i r r at i onal nat ur e

of

Somal i

na -

t i onal i s m

Y et , ev en i f t he Kr e m i n had c al c ul at ed c or r ec t l y, i t

coul d

not

have suppor t ed

t he

Somal i s a gai ns t Et hi opi a .

34


38/50

The

i l l i c i t

nat ur e of

Mo gadi s c i o

1

s

c l ai ms t o t he

Oqaden

woul d have br ought a bout Af r i ca n a nd wor l d conde mnat i on o f

Moscow. When

t he

Somal i s i nvaded

t he

Oqaden,

t he

Sovi et s

di d

t he

onl y t hi ng pos s i bl e

t hey t empor i zed. They sum

moned Si ad B a r r e t o Moscow and at t empt ed t o per s uade hi m

t o wi t hdr a w. Wh en t ha t f a i l e d, t hey ma ni p ul a t e d ar ms a i d

expand i ng

i t t o

Et hi opi a

nd

l i m t i ng

i t t o

Soma l i a

i n a ma nne r t ha t woul d a ssur e a n E t h i opi a n v i c t o r y e ven-

t ual l y. I n t he mea nt i me, t he Somal i s m g ht c ome t o t hei r

senses

and

seek

a

negot i at ed s o l ut i on t hr ough

Moscow.

Fi -

nal l y , when Si ad Bar r e, i n a de s pe r a t e bi d f or Wes t er n

s uppor t e xpe l l e d t he So vi et s and Cu ba ns ) f r om So ma l i a ,

t he

Sovi et s p ar r i ed t he bl ow t o t hei r p r e s t i ge by i nt er -

veni ng dec i s i v el y on t he s i de of Et hi opi a.

Not onl y di d t he So vi et s manage t he c r i s i s i n a r at i onal

ma nner , bu t , de s pi t e t he c os t s , t he o ut c o me was not al l

t hat unf avor abl e t o t hei r i nt er es t s . So vi et s uppor t f or

Et hi opi a f r us t r at ed t he ef f or t s of t hos e Mi de as t s t at es

who

wer e t r y i ng

t o

exc l ude Moscow f r om

t he Red

Sea.

The

Sovi e t Un i on al so de mons t r a t e d t hat t hey posse ssed cons i d-

er abl e c apac i t y t o def end t hei r i nt er es t s i n t he Mi ddl e

Eas t .

The

So vi et s wer e al s o a bl e

t o wi n t he

appr oval

of

t hose Af r i c a n s t at es f av or abl y i nc l i ne d t owar d Mos c ow

and

avoi d c r i t i c i s m of o t her Af r i c an c ount r i es i nc l i ned t owar d

- 35 -


39/50

t he

Wes t

by pos i ng as

d e f e nde r s

of t he

OAU' s pr i nc i pl e

c onc er ni ng t er r i t or i al i nt egr i t y. 6 ( Pot ent i al Af r i c an

c r i t i c i s m

of t he Sov i e t i nt e r vent i on was f ur t her mu t ed by

t he

e xt e ns i v e

use of nona l i gned

Cubans

i n

combat

rol es

Mor eover , t he Sovi et s not onl y succeeded i n r escui ng and

e mbe l l i s hi ng t hei r own pr es t i ge i n t he Mi deas t and Af r i c a,

t hey deal t a bl ow t o U. S. i nt er nat i onal pr es t i ge. The

U. S. was seen as

i ndec i s i ve

as t he Sovi et s seemed

pur pose-

f u l . The U. S. r esponse t o Sov i e t i nvol vement was v i ewed

by many as weak l i m t ed t o vague enunc i a t i ons of l i nk-

ages bet ween SALT

and

NALT. * Thi s pe r c e pt i on

was

shar ed

by

i mpor t ant r egi onal ac t or s l i k e Saud i Ar abi a . One Saud i

l eader was quot ed as sayi ng:

Why i s t he

Uni t ed St at es s t eppi ng f r om

one

f i asc o

t o

anot her ?

I n

Et hi opi a,

i n

Somal i a,

i n

Af ghani s t an,

t he Uni t e d St at es l ef t t he

f i el d

t o t h e Russ i ans

wi t h out as

muc h

as an

at t empt

t o

s t op t hem 77

I n

peacet i me,

t he

pe r cept i on

of

power

i s

al most

as

i mpor -

t ant

as t he r eal i t y of

power .

I n t hat r e s pect , t he So-

* I ndeed,

t he

pe r cept i on

of

Amer i can weaknes s became

so

wi des pr ead t hat an Af r i c an l eade r , a char ac t e r i n a L on-

don

s t age pl ay , Ni gh t

and Day by Tom

St oppar d, decl ar es

t hat Amer i can and Br i t i s h c owar di c e i n Af r i c a s t r et c hes

f r om Angol a t o

Er i t r ea.

- 36 -


40/50


41/50

NOTES

1.

Col i n Legum

and Bi l l Lee, Conf l i c t i n t he Hor n of

Af r i ca New

York,

London,

1978 ,

12.

2. Co l i n Lequm ed. ) , Af r i ca Cont emporar y Recor d; An-

nual Sur vey

and

Doc ument s 1974-1975 New Yor k, 1975 ,

B272.

3.

Legum

and

L ee, Conf l i c t

i n t he

Hor n

of

Af r i c a,

10.

4. Washi ngt on Post , 5 Mar ch 1978, Al .

5. Washi ngt on Post ,

28

Febr uar y 1977, A20.

6.

Washi ngt on

Post , 18 Mar ch 1977,

A19;

Washi ngt on Post ,

17

May

1977, A13.

7. Havana Radi o , 15 Mar ch 1978, For e i gn Br oadcast i ng I n-

f or mat i on Ser v i ce : La t i n Amer i ca , 16 Mar ch 1978,

016. Her eaf t er F BI St L A.

8. Af r i que - As i e , 13- 26 J une 1977, 10-14.

9. Washi ngt on Post , 5 Mar ch 1978, Al .

10. I bi d.

11. New York T i mes , 28

Apr i l 1977,

3.

12.

TASS,

8 May

1977,

F or ei gn Br oa dc as t i ng I nf or mat i on

Ser v i ce; Sov i et Un i on, 9 May 1977, H6. He r e a f t e r

FBI S t SU.

13.

Washi ngt on Post ,

5

Mar ch 1978, Al .

14. Washi ngt on Post , 25 May 1977, Al .

15. Af r i qu e- As i e , 13- 25 J une 1977, 10- 14.

16.

Doha ONA,

24

November 1977, F or ei gn Br oa dc as t i ng

I n-

f or mat i on Se r v i c e; Subs ahar an Af r i c a ,

25

November

1977,

R7.

Her eaf t e r FBI S: SSA.

17.

Ar ab Repor t

and

Recor d, 16- 31 Mar ch 1977, 224.

- 38 -


42/50

18. I n Apr i l , Pr es i dent Car t er

i ns t r uc t ed

Vi c e P r es i dent

Mondal e t o t el l Cy [ Vance] and Zbi g [ Br z ez i ns ki ]

that

I

want t hem

t o

move

i n

every

pos s i bl e

way t o get

Somal i a t o be our f r i end.

Ti me,

18 Apr i l 1977, A14;

i n

J une, Car t er s ai d

i n an

i nt er vi ew t hat U. S. pol i c y

was t o be one of

aggr es s i vel y c hal l eng i ng,

i n a

peacef u l

way of

course ,

t he

S ov i et Uni o n

and

o t h e r s

t o i nf l uenc e i n t he areas of t he wor l d t ha t we f eel

ar e

c r u ci al

t o u s now, or

pot ent i al l y c r uc i al :

New

York Ti mes,

12

J une 1977,

1.

19. New York

Ti mes,

27

J u l y , 1977,

3;

Manchest er Guar -

di an,

28

J u l y 1977,

1;

Wash i ngt on Pos t ,

1

Sept ember

1977, A25.

20.

Wash i ngt on Pos t ,

27

Sept ember 1977,

A14.

21.

I bi d.

22. Gr anma , 14 Ma r c h 1978, J o i nt P ub l i c a t i o ns Res e ar c h

Ser vi c e

70866

30

Mar c h 1978,

30.

Addi s Ababa Radi o,

24

J u l y 1977, FBI S; SSA,

25

J u l y 1977,

B1- B2.

Her e-

a f t e r

J PRS .

23.

Addi s Ababa Radi o ,

7

Sept ember 1977, FBI S; SSA,

8

Sep-

t ember

1977,

Bl .

24.

Mosc ow Radi o,

18

Augus t 1977, FBI S; SU,

19

August

1977, HI .

25. New

York Ti mes,

30

August 1977,

2.

26. Oc t ober ( Cai r o) , 11 Sept ember 1977.

27. New

York Ti mes,

25

Sept ember 1977,

2.

28. New

York Ti mes,

16

Sept ember 1977, A3.

29.

Washi ngt on

Post 27 Sept ember 1977,

A14.

30. Addi s Ababa Radi o , 19 Oct ober 1977, FBI S ; SSA, 20 Oc-

t ober 1977,

B4.

31. New

York Ti mes ,

27

Nov ember 1977,

E3.

32. New

York Ti mes,

15

Nov ember 1977,

1.

33. L egum and L ee, Conf l i c t i n t he Hor n of Af r i c a , 88.

34.

Ar ab Repor t

and

Recor d, 1- 31 Oct ober 1977, 859.

- 39 -


43/50

35. Mo gadi s c i o Radi o , 14 November 1977, FBI S; SSA, 14 No-

vember 1977,

B3.

36. New York

T i mes,

14

November 1977,

1.

37. I n t he

meant i me,

t he

Somal i - Et hi opi an c onf l i c t

and

t he det er i or at i on of

Sov i e t - Soma l i

r e l at i ons wer e t he

r esul t of a c t i o ns of r eac t i o nar y Ar ab and i mper -

i a l i s t st at es: Moscow Radi o, 28 Oct ober 1977,

FBI S; SU, 31 Oct ober 1977, H4.

38. For exampl e,

TASS,

11 Oct ober 1977, FBI S: SU, 15 No-

vember 1977,

Hi .

39.

News wee k,

13

Febr uar y 1978,

48.

40.

Washi ngt on St ar ,

17

J anuar y 1978,

2; New

York Ti mes,

25

Febr uar y 1978, 1.

41. F or ei gn

Repor t ,

21

Dec ember 1977,

1.

42. Havana Radi o, 15 Mar ch 1978,

F BI S: LA,

16 Mar c h 1978,

07.

43. Washi ngt on Post , 25 May 1977,

Al .

44.

Manchest er Guar d i an ,

28

Nov ember 1977.

45. New Yor k Ti mes, 2 Mar ch 1978, A6;

Washi ngt on

P o s t , 3

Mar ch

1978, Al .

46. New

Yor k Ti mes,

10

Febr uar y 1978,

8.

47. New York Ti mes , 11 Febr uar y 1978, 1; New Yor k Ti mes ,

17 Febr uar y 1978, 1.

48. For

exampl e, Moscow Radi o,

24

Nov ember 1976, FBI S; SU,

3 December 1976, A1- A2.

49. L equm and L ee, Conf l i c t i n t he Hor n of Af r i c a , 41.

50. TASS, 12 J ul y 1976, FBI S: SU, 13 J ul y 1976, Hi .

51. Washi ngt on Post , 5 Mar c h 1978, 1;

TASS,

6 J anuar y

1977,

F BI St S U,

6

J anuar y 1977,

H2.

52. The

Sovi et bi t t er l y r e s ent ed wha t t hey

saw as

U. S.

e f f o r t s , i n cooper at i on wi t h Saudi Ar abi a , t o di s -

pl ace t hem i n Egypt . I n r e ac t i on t o Sadat ' s cancel -

l at i on of t he

Sov i et - Egy pt i an

Tr eat y of F r i ends hi p

and

Cooper at i on,

t he

Sovi et s charged t hat . . .As-

- 40 -


44/50

Sadat ' s d ec i s i on

t o

abr ogat e

t he S ovi et - Egypt i an

agr eement came i mmedi at el y f ol l owi ng t he U. S. pl edge

t o r ender ec onom c a s s i s t anc e t o Egypt . . . and f ol l ow-

i ng Anwar

As - Sadat ' s

v i s i t t o Saudi Ar abi a wher e he

secured a pl edge f or ai d. . . . Moscow Radi o , 15 Mar ch

1976.

F BI St SU,

16 Mar c h 1976,

Fl .

53. I n J anuar y 1977, t he Egypt - Sudan def ense pact was

f or mal l y s i gned a f t er

Numai r yi

c l ai med t hat Et hi opi a

was pl anni ng an i nvas i on o f t he Sudan: Ar ab Repor t

and

Recor d, 1- 15 J anuar y , 1977, 3; see al so Ar ab Re-

por t

and

Recor d, 1- 15 J ul y 1976, 426; Ar ab Repor t

and

Recor d, 16- 31 J ul y 1976, 443.

54.

Moscow Radi o,

15

Febr uar y 1977, FBI S; SU,

16

Februar y

1977. B7-B8.

55. I bi d.

56.

Moscow Radi o ,

14

J une 1976, FRI S; SU,

16

J une 1976,

H5.

57. Pr avda

( Mosc ow) ,

22 Mar c h 1977.

58.

TASS

8 May 1977, FBI S: SU 9 May 1977, H6.

59. Af r i que- As i e, 13- 26 J une 1977, 10- 14.

60. Manchest er Guar d i an, 10 J ul y 1977, 10.

61. TASS 15 November 1977,

FBI Sr SSA,

15 November 1977,

HI .

62. Quot ed i n Sovi et Wor l d Out l ook, 15 Febr uar y 1978.

63.

Newsweek,

13

Febr uar y 1978,

45.

64.

Washi ngt on St ar ,

24

J anuar y 1978,

A4;

Ba l t i mor e Sun ,

4 Febr uar y 1978, 1.

65. New York Ti mes , 14 Febr uar y 1978, 1.

66. See Gr anma, 14

Mar ch 1978, J PRS 70866,

30

Mar c h 1978,

30- 38. I am

gr at ef ul

t o

Char l es

C.

Petersen

f or

t hi s

observat i on.

67.

I s t anbul Mi l l i yet ,

27

J anuar y 1978, For ei gn Br oad-

cast i ng I nf or mat i on Servi ce; West er n Eur ope,

30

J an-

uar y 1978, T2- T3; Newsweek 23 J anuar y 1978, 35;

Newsweek,

17

J ul y 1978,

54;

For e i gn Repor t ,

11

J an-

uar y 1978, 5- 6.

- 41 -


45/50

68. London T i mes, 12 Febr uar y 1978, 9.

69. St at ement of Rear Adm r a l S. Shapi r o, Di r ec t or of Na-

val I nt e l l i gence Bef or e t he Seapower Comm t t ee of t he

House Ar med Ser vi ces Comm t t ee, 12.

70. New

York Ti mes,

11

Febr uar y 1978,

1.

71. Ar ab Repor t and Recor d, 1- 15 J anuar y 1978, 19.

72. Hous e Comm t t ee on I nt er nat i o nal Rel a t i o ns , War i n

t he

Hor n of A f r i c a ; A F i r s t ha nd Repor t on the Chal -

l enges f or Uni t ed St at es Pol i c y,

( Washi ngt on,

DC,

1978 , 39- 40.

73.

Af r i c a , Ma r c h 1978,

18-19.

74. Moscow Radi o, 30 Mar c h 1978,

F BI S t S U,

3 Apr i l 1978,

B9.

75.

Mo gadi s c i o Ra di o ,

20

J anuar y 1979, FBI S t SSA,

23

J an-

uar y 1979, B4.

76. U. S. ef f or t s t o get some Af r i can nat i ons t o condemn

t he

Sovi et and Cuban i n t er vent i on f a i l ed because Mos -

cow and

Hav ana wer e seen

as

d ef endi ng Et hi opi a' s te r -

r i t or i al i nt egr i t y . El i z abet h Drew, A Repor t er at

Lar ge:

Br z ez i ns ki ,

i n New Y o rke r , 1 May 1978, 114.

77. New York Ti mes, 20 Mar c h 1979, A8.

42 -


46/50

CNA

Professional Papers 1973 toPresent*

PP 103

Friedheim. Robert L.. Political Aspectsof Ocean

Ecology 48

pp.,

Feb

1973.

published in Who

Pro

tects the

Oceans,

John

Lawrence

Margrave(ed.)

(St.

Paul: West Publ'g. Co.,

1974),

published by

the

American Society

of

International Law)

AD 757 936

PP 104

Schick, J ack M., A Reviewof

J ames

Cable, Gun-

boat Diplomacy

Political Applications

of

Limited

Naval

Forces, 5pp., Feb1973, (Reviewed in the

AmericanPolitical Science

Review, Vol.

LXVI,

Dec

1972)

PP

105

Corn, RobertJ . andPhillips, Gary R., On Optimal

Correction of Gunfire Errors, 22

pp..

Mar1973,

AD

761 674

PP 106

Stoloff, P eter

H.,

User's Guide

for

Generalized

Factor Analysis Program(FACTAN),

35

pp.,

Feb

1973, (Includes an addendum published Aug 1974}

AD 758 824

PP 107

Stoloff,

Peter

H., Relating

Factor Analytically

De-

rived

Measures to ExogenousVariables, 17

pp..

Mar

1973,

AD 7S8 820

PP 108

McConnell,

J ames

M and

Kelly,

Anne

M,

Super-

power Naval Diplomacy in the Indo-Pakistani

Crisis,

14

pp.,

5 Feb

1973,

(Published,

with

re-

visions

soviet involvement in ogaden war

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