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Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Soviet Afghan War Revisited: Analyzing the Effective Aspects of the Counterinsurgency Effort
A thesis presented by
Andrei A. Doohovskoy
to the Standing Committee on the A.M. in Regional Studies – Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of the Arts in the subject of Regional Studies – Russia Eastern Europe, and Central Asia
Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts
September 2009
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Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Soviet‐Afghan War Revisited: Analyzing the Effective Aspects of the Counterinsurgency Effort
Abstract
In October 2001, over 10 years after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from across the
Friendship Bridge, American forces launched Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
As a result, there has been increased focus in the ensuing years both on Afghanistan and on
counterinsurgency. As U.S. and coalition forces find themselves conducting
counterinsurgencies in both Iraq and in Afghanistan, historical examples of similar
operations have renewed relevance for current policy. While it is problematic to attempt to
draw parallels between Soviet and U.S. experiences in Afghanistan, the Soviet experience is
useful for understanding general themes that recur for large powers facing insurgencies.
Many analyses have focused on the flaws of Soviet counterinsurgency strategy and
the ultimate failures of Kremlin policies in Afghanistan. Soviet political and military leaders
made many mistakes in formulating and implementing counterinsurgency strategy, and
these mistakes had significant and damaging effects both on Afghanistan and on the USSR.
Focusing solely on Soviet failures, however, does not yield a complete or accurate
understanding of the conflict. Dwelling on severe and ineffective Soviet military efforts, can
lead to overlooking the military, political, social and economic initiatives that were well‐
formulated and indicated understanding of counterinsurgency principles on the part of
Soviet leaders.
This thesis evaluates the effective aspects of Soviet counterinsurgency strategy in
Afghanistan in the context of classical and modern counterinsurgency theory. This work
does not seek to rewrite the failures of the Soviet government and military in Afghanistan,
but merely to point out the effective elements in their efforts. Understanding elements of
the Soviet strategy that held promise, even if they were not fully or successfully
implemented, provides a more nuanced understanding of the challenges and questions
counterinsurgency presents for large powers. Many of these same challenges and questions
are facing the United States today.
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Acknowledgements I would like to thank Lisbeth Tarlow and Donna Griesenbeck for their patience and accommodation. I am very grateful to Mark Kramer, who promptly responded to my every question and request for guidance. I am thankful to him for helping me conceptualize my project, assisting me with sources and remaining consistently positive about my work. I greatly appreciate the mentorship and kindness of Colonel Gilberto Villahermosa and his wife Natalie – their example was very instructive for me. I would also like to express my thanks to Major Robert Schaefer, who convinced me to choose Harvard in the first place, and whose expert advice inspired me to study counterinsurgency. I am thankful for the energy, helpfulness and leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Leo McGonagle, who supported me as a cadet and as a graduate student. I am also thankful to Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Hall, whose flexibility, guidance and appreciation for my studies helped me tremendously in balancing military training and academics.
I also deeply appreciate the help of Mary DiMatteo, whose perspective and understanding was a source of motivation for me. I would also like to acknowledge the support and friendship of my siblings: Katya, Alexei, Laryssa and Dimitry. Most of all, I am deeply indebted to my parents, Alexander and Helena, who never wavered in their support, encouragement and sacrifice.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................... 3
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 5
Chapter 1. Counterinsurgency Theory ......................................................................... 9 Enemy‐Centric Counterinsurgency .................................................................................... 12 Population‐Centric Counterinsurgency ............................................................................. 14 Soviet‐Afghan War and Counterinsurgency ....................................................................... 22
Chapter 2. Overview ................................................................................................. 25 Soviet‐Afghan War ........................................................................................................... 25 Soviet Counterinsurgency................................................................................................. 30
Chapter 3. Soviet Counterinsurgency: Non‐Military Aspects ...................................... 35 Political Initiatives............................................................................................................ 35 Social Initiatives ............................................................................................................... 39 Propaganda Initiatives ..................................................................................................... 42
Propaganda Within Afghanistan ........................................................................................... 44 Propaganda Directed at the International Community and Soviet Population .................... 49
Economic Initiatives ......................................................................................................... 55
Chapter 4. Soviet Counterinsurgency: Military Aspects ............................................. 62 Decentralization .............................................................................................................. 62
Zones of Responsibility .......................................................................................................... 62 Role of Junior Officers ............................................................................................................ 66
Limiting Outside Support for the Insurgency ..................................................................... 69 Monitoring the Population ............................................................................................... 74 Units and Training ............................................................................................................ 78 Intelligence ...................................................................................................................... 86 Tactical Adjustments ........................................................................................................ 91
Bronnegruppa Concept ......................................................................................................... 92 Enveloping Movements ......................................................................................................... 94 Ambushes .............................................................................................................................. 96 Convoy Security Techniques .................................................................................................. 98 Equipment ........................................................................................................................... 101
Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 106
Appendix I. Statistics of Soviet‐Afghanistan Credit/Aid Agreements ....................... 109 Graphic 1. Non‐Military Aid Levels in Soviet‐Afghan Formal Agreements ......................... 109 Graphic 2. Soviet Economic Aid Disbursements to Afghanistan ........................................ 110 Graphic 3. Soviet Economic Aid and Expenditures in Afghanistan .................................... 111 Graphic 4. Soviet‐Afghan Agreements on Energy, Oil, Natural Gas ................................... 112 Graphic 5. Soviet‐Afghanistan Agreements on Agriculture, Construction ......................... 113
Appendix II. Map of Afghanistan ........................................................................... 114
Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 115
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Introduction
Current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have directed considerable focus to the
questions of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. Understanding the historical examples
of insurgency conflicts and the regions in which they have occurred is of vital importance
for those who wish to understand present‐day events. The Soviet‐Afghan war is one such
historical example. Attempts at drawing direct parallels between the Soviet and U.S.
experiences in Afghanistan are problematic, as there are many substantial differences
between the two cases. Nevertheless, understanding the Soviet case is useful for identifying
basic themes that are common in the experience of large powers conducting
counterinsurgency campaigns. The Soviet‐Afghan war also represents an important step in
the evolution of insurgency warfare in the context of globalization and accelerating
technological progress. Many current phenomena such as transnational extremist networks
and information warfare were in a unique stage of development during the Soviet‐Afghan
war. A nuanced understanding of this conflict, therefore, is helpful for comprehending
current insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.
In February of 2009 I found myself at the corner table of a popular Cambridge pub,
translating for a group of Russian and American generals. In the midst of facilitating
conversation during their cocktail hour, the conversation turned to the Soviet‐Afghan War.
One of the senior Russian Generals at the table, a veteran of the conflict, said to me, ‘let me
tell you the thing about Afghanistan, the Afghans – mostly they loved us – we were able to
do whatever we wanted every day, we owned the place, but at night, everything would
change… the night was all theirs’. Regardless of the bias or oversimplification of this
statement, it does represent a valuable metaphor for the Soviet‐Afghan conflict of the
1980s.
The Soviet efforts in Afghanistan generally followed the paradigm of ‘three steps
forward and three steps back’. On the one hand Soviet forces were able to dominate in the
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field, but on the other hand they could never achieve the level of organizational
coordination necessary to sustain their gains. Tactical accomplishments were routinely
reversed whenever and wherever Soviet forces were absent.
The reversals and ultimate failures of Soviet policies in Afghanistan are well
documented. The Soviet‐Afghan war is often described as a victory for the mujahedeen1
over the larger, but ineffective, Soviet army. There is much attention given to the ingenuity
and resilience of the Afghan mujahedeen and the Soviets’ inability to defeat them. Many
analyses of this conflict have dwelled on the mistakes made by Soviet leaders and the
inability of Soviet forces to defeat the Afghan insurgency.
The strategy and conduct of the Soviet counterinsurgency in Afghanistan from
1979‐1989 certainly lend themselves to negative critiques. Over the course of the conflict,
the Soviet armed forces killed or maimed some 2.5 million civilians, were the cause of
millions more displaced persons and refugees and lost a reported 14,453 killed, 53,753
wounded, and millions of dollars worth of equipment.2 In 1989 when General Gromov
evacuated the country with the last troops in a highly orchestrated show of propaganda, the
situation was far from optimal from the Soviet point of view. Most key urban centers were
under the control of Soviet supported government troops, while the rest of the country was
subject to the influence of an insurgency that was supported by the majority of the
population.
The Kremlin had taken on a challenging mission by invading a Central Asian country
known for its resistance to outside influence and centralized rule. Moreover, Soviet troop
levels were limited by political considerations, and trained and equipped to do battle with
NATO forces in the European theater and not with irregular fighters in a mountain
1 Mujahedeen is a term for the fighters that opposed the Soviet troops and Soviet‐backed government in Kabul. 2 Krivosheev, G. F. (1997). Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century. London: Greenhill Books, 287‐288. The Russian Staff reports a higher number killed – 26,000. This statistic can be found in the
2 Krivosheev, G. F. (1997). Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century. London: Greenhill Books, 287‐288. The Russian Staff reports a higher number killed – 26,000. This statistic can be found in the following source: Russian General Staff (translated and edited by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress). (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 44. For additional statistics, see: Liakhovsky, A. (1995). Tragedia i Doblest' Afgana. Moscow: GPI Iskona, Appendix 14.
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environment. Partly due to the ideological origins of the Red Army and to simple negligence,
the Soviet military initially did not have an adequate counterinsurgency strategy. An
enduring insurgency was not anticipated; it was presumed that Soviet forces would win a
‘quick war’ in similar fashion to the actions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
While the Soviet ‘Limited Contingent’ was clearly not ready for the mission in
Afghanistan, it is an oversimplification to fault the Soviet security forces for the overall
failures of Kremlin policies in Afghanistan. It is undeniable that flaws in Soviet
counterinsurgency strategy and deficiencies in Soviet military capabilities seriously
hindered operations against the mujahedeen. However, from the earliest moments of the
invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet military leaders began to transform the 40th Army into a
more effective force for counterinsurgency missions in challenging terrain, and political
leaders worked to strengthen the Kabul government through political programs.
Partially due to the complex nature of counterinsurgency operations, the lack of
success of Soviet policies in Afghanistan is sometimes attributed to utter incompetence on
the part of both military and political leaders. Counterinsurgency requires a delicate
balance of both political and military efforts. While the military aspect of counterinsurgency
operations is crucial, complementary political progress is necessary for success. Highly
developed cooperation between military, intelligence and political actors is essential for
lasting gains. This coordination was lacking in the Soviet effort, and disconnects between
military and political actions led to efforts that did not result in the synergy necessary for
counteracting persistent insurgency movements.
Nevertheless, many aspects of the Soviet political and military campaign held
promise. My research and analysis show that, although the Soviets were at times quite
severe in their actions, they did not rely solely on military might and conventional power to
achieve their goals; they attempted to develop effective military and political
counterinsurgency initiatives. This paper will identify and analyze those aspects of the
Soviet counterinsurgency that were effective, and put them in the context of
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counterinsurgency theory, noting where Soviet policies were consistent with accepted
counterinsurgency approaches. These aspects of the Soviet effort are often overlooked.
This paper has three major parts organized into four chapters. First, is a discussion
of counterinsurgency theories, and placement of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan into
that context. Second, is an overview of the Afghan insurgency and Soviet involvement in the
region in the late 1970s and 1980s. And third, is an examination of the Soviet
counterinsurgency strategy. I divide the counterinsurgency effort into two broad categories:
non‐military and military. The non‐military category includes analysis of Soviet initiatives
in politics, social programs, programs for propaganda, and economic assistance. The
military category includes analysis of Soviet strategy, tactics, and force structure. I pay
particular attention to the aspects of the Soviet campaign that adhered to accepted
principles of counterinsurgency as outlined by theorists and practitioners, and indicated
effective efforts on the part of Soviet leaders. My analysis of this topic will rely on the
literature of counterinsurgency theory, declassified U.S. and Soviet documents, and personal
accounts of Soviet‐Afghan war veterans.
Examination of what the Soviets did effectively in Afghanistan is an area that has
received little attention in literature on the Soviet‐Afghan war. Understanding the effective
elements in the Soviet counterinsurgency effort provides a balanced view of the conflict and
a more nuanced perspective on counterinsurgency in general. In a time when
counterinsurgency is a highly relevant and politically charged topic, it is vital to have an
accurate analysis of the Soviet counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.
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Chapter 1. Counterinsurgency Theory
“Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its governance as legitimate. Insurgents use all available tools… to overthrow the existing authority…. Counterinsurgents, in turn, use all instruments of national power to sustain the established or emerging government” – U.S Army and Marine Counterinsurgency Manual.3
The dynamic nature of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies is highly complex, as every
expert is quick to note. Moreover, this inherent complexity and the accelerated pace of
events and modern communications make it very difficult to propose viable generalizations
or establish any hard and fast rules in counterinsurgency. In the recently published US
Army and Marine Counterinsurgency Field Manual, an entire section is devoted to the
paradoxes of counterinsurgency, impressing the reader with the elusiveness of an effective
strategy in this form of irregular warfare.4 Given the resurgent interest in the subject, it is
important to remember that the popularity of counterinsurgency scholarship has waxed
and waned as a result of many political and institutional factors. Surprisingly little was
written on the topic after the 1960s; there were even movements that limited its study
within the United States military. In the United States some posit that squelching the study
of counterinsurgency was part of a reflexive reaction to the war in Vietnam – a way of
avoiding entanglement in similar conflicts in the future. 5 The notion that the study of
counterinsurgency begets misadventures in counterinsurgency warfare recurs in the United
States and abroad, and is a subtle, though important, factor in militaries’ formulation and
implementation of counterinsurgency strategy both in western countries and in Russia.
3 Nagl, J., Petraeus, D., & Amos, J. (2007). The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1‐3. 4 Nagl, J., Petraeus, D., & Amos, J. (2007). The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1‐148‐1‐157. 5 Eliot, C., Crane, L. C., Horvath, L. J., & Nagl, L. J. (2006, March‐April). Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency. Military Review , 49‐53. Also see: Cassidy, R. M. (2006). Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. London: Praeger Security International, 99.
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Independent of institutional and scholarly interest in the subject, however,
governments continue to find themselves embroiled in irregular wars6 and in need of
methods for conducting counterinsurgency warfare. In the case of the United States and the
Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the need for counterinsurgency expertise was not sufficiently
anticipated. Large militaries primarily trained for conventional war are often obliged to
learn (and relearn) the complex craft of counterinsurgency ‘on the job’.
The study of counterinsurgency has become especially relevant in the current day. Not
only do the conflicts facing the United States and NATO necessitate renewed focus on the
topic, but unprecedented developments in technology and dynamic changes in world
ideologies change the very nature of the subject itself. As I will discuss below in greater
detail, the principles discussed by authorities such as Callwell, Lawrence, Thompson,
Trinquier and Galula do not fully address the realities of today or those of tomorrow. As is
often repeated in relation to counterinsurgency, ‘If it works today, it is obsolete’.7 The
insurgency and counterinsurgency in the 1980s in Afghanistan represent an important step
in this progression toward modern realities. Many phenomena that distinguish modern
insurgencies from their antecedents began to reveal themselves in the mountains and
deserts where the mujahedeen fought against the Soviet 40th army.8
In this section I will outline the main elements of insurgency and counterinsurgency as
put forth by historical authorities as well as by modern scholars and practitioners. I will
address the main debates and developments in the field. With this basic foundation it will
be possible to place Soviet efforts in Afghanistan into the broader context of insurgency and
counterinsurgency, allowing a clearer and more fruitful analysis of the conflict.
In reading about counterinsurgency, it is interesting to note that most authors on the
subject have significant personal experience in irregular warfare dealing with insurgencies
and counterinsurgencies. John Nagl writes that “The best writings on counterinsurgency 6 ‘Irregular warfare’ is one of the many terms used to describe non‐conventional war i.e. war that does not comprise two regular armies seeking to defeat one another, but rather a larger regular army pitted against a smaller, less‐organized guerilla‐like opponent. Other common terms are limited war, revolutionary war, fourth generation war, guerilla war, and small war. 7 This quotation is attributed to Bernard Fall. 8 The 40th Army refers collectively to the Soviet troops deployed to Afghanistan in the 1980s.
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share with the best sex manuals the fact that their authors generally have some personal
experience of their subject matter”.9 Divergence of opinion among authors with comparable
experience in the field is a testament to the highly variable, and at times subjective, nature
of conducting counterinsurgency campaigns.
Two major schools of thought on counterinsurgency are: populationcentric and enemy
centric. The former stipulates that winning the support of the local population must be the
first priority. Once the support of the population has been won through the provision of
physical security and social and economic opportunities, the insurgent forces will cease to
be relevant; at this point, one can easily eradicate whatever part of the insurgency that has
not already withered away. Experts of the mid‐20th century, such as David Galula and Roger
Trinquier, subscribe to this approach to varying degrees. The principles of population‐
centric strategy are currently widely accepted in the field.
Enemy‐centric counterinsurgency theory maintains that engaging and destroying the
enemy should be the main focus of effort, and that after this has been accomplished, other
needed developments will proceed naturally. This approach has its roots in imperial and
colonial wars, such as those carried out by Russia, Britain and France in the 18th, 19th and
early 20th centuries. The character of enemy‐centric counterinsurgency generally tends to
be closer to that of conventional war in that it emphasizes fighting more than winning
‘hearts and minds’. The principles of enemy‐centric counterinsurgency are far less popular
today than those of population‐centric counterinsurgency due to their sometimes‐severe
character, and due to powerful arguments for population‐centric strategies.10
In the context of many new developments in technologies, ideologies and the
geopolitical landscape, a new ‘hybrid’ approach to counterinsurgency is also emerging. This
approach, discussed by experts such as David Kilcullen, requires a highly adaptive posture
in counterinsurgency that employs the principles of both enemy and population‐centric
9 See Nagl’s foreword to this edition of Galula’s book: Galula, D. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International. 10 High profile officers such as General David Petraeus, Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl and others subscribe to the population‐centric approach. This approach has largely been accepted in the U.S. government – at least in its rhetoric.
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strategies depending on the situation. This pragmatic counterinsurgency approach further
emphasizes the need for military institutions to cultivate an ethos of learning and
adaptability.11
EnemyCentric Counterinsurgency
Colonel C.E. Callwell’s treatise, Small Wars, is a classic enemy‐centric counterinsurgency
manual, and is still relevant to those with preference for this school of counterinsurgency
theory. While current scholars tend not to accept Callwell’s ideas wholesale, those who
favor the enemy‐centric approach support many of the principles he sets forth.12 Callwell
formulated his ideas in an era when large powers projected their power around the globe
with a heavy hand. Small Wars, first published in 1896, was his most famous work, and is
one of the most substantial treatises that espouse an enemy‐centric approach to
counterinsurgency. An officer in the British Army with experience combating insurgents in
Afghanistan and elsewhere, Callwell does not express the sensitivity for the population so
carefully detailed in other manuals for counterinsurgency. Changes in press coverage and
geopolitics explain some of these differences; nevertheless, many principles that he sets
forth were still supported after his death in 1928 and in the current day.
Callwell phrases the essence of counterinsurgency as such: “The enemy must not only
be beaten. He must be beaten thoroughly”.13 This remains the core of the enemy‐centric
approach to counterinsurgency. Callwell states that the small war differs from the
conventional one in that “The mere expulsion of the opponent from ground where he has
thought fit to accept battle is of small account; what is wanted is a big casualty list in the
11 Most theorists and practitioners would agree that the adaptability of the military in counterinsurgency entails including civilian institutions and actors in the effort. Even the harshest enemy‐centric approach includes wise and concerted political policies that are necessary for overcoming an insurgency. 12 This is evident in the following article: LTC Gentile, G. P. (2007, September). Eating Soup With A Spoon. Retrieved July 2, 2009, from Armed Forces Journal: http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/09/2786780 13 Callwell, C. C. (1990). Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers. London: Greenhill Books, 151.
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hostile ranks”.14 Callwell is primarily concerned with finding ways to engage the enemy in
battle and not with securing the population’s compliance. Generally, adherents to the enemy
centric approach maintain that the larger power plays to its advantage by seeking out battle
with the insurgent so that it can utilize its superiority in firepower, troop numbers and
discipline.
Callwell asserts that decisiveness and violence of action by the counterinsurgent will
win the support of those who are wavering and looking to align themselves with the
strongest side. Callwell details the methods of bringing the fight to the enemy, laying out a
framework for dividing the territory so that a relatively autonomous, local unit is
responsible for a particular geographical area.15 Callwell also emphasizes the idea of
encircling the enemy’s flank to prevent his retreat and maximize the casualties inflicted.16
When the enemy refuses to fight and continues to elude capture, Callwell prescribes the
destruction of villages, crops and the appropriation of livestock and other goods: “If the
enemy cannot be touched [on the battlefield]… he can be touched through his pocket”.17
These harsh measures are aimed at crushing resistance quickly and avoiding a prolonged
conflict, which introduces problems for the counterinsurgent in terms of supply and care for
troops in long deployment.
Callwell’s approach embodies the main points of the enemy‐centric theory of
counterinsurgency: finding, engaging and destroying the enemy. It is interesting to note that
Callwell continuously includes cases from the Tsarist military’s actions in Central Asia to
illustrate his points. He quotes the famous general Mikhail Skobelev to articulate the
necessity of quick and powerful action against the insurgent, “Do not forget that in Asia he is
14 Callwell, C. C. (1990). Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers. London: Greenhill Books, 151. 15 This principle of dividing area is also used in the population‐centric approach, but the intent of the forces in each section is different. The emphasis on enveloping movements for fighting against guerrilla forces is echoed by later writers who promoted kinetic approaches to counterinsurgency; it was also a significant element in Soviet counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. 16 Callwell, C. C. (1990). Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers. London: Greenhill Books, 152. 17 Callwell, C. C. (1990). Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers. London: Greenhill Books, 40. Soviet forces in Afghanistan adopted this approach in the form of an air war on the countryside, designed to destroy the mujahedeens’ sanctuaries and sources of supplies.
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… master who seizes the people pitilessly by the throat and imposes upon their
imagination”.18
Callwell’s take on counterinsurgency is the starting point for many proponents of the
enemy‐centric school of counterinsurgency. Large powers such as Britain and Russia that
waged wars in Central Asia employed many enemy‐centric principles. The enemy‐centric
approach is appealing to those of a more typically ‘military’ mind in the sense that it
includes more kinetic action and actual fighting than the population‐centric school of
counterinsurgency.
Imperial armies did incorporate population‐centric principles as well. No
counterinsurgency campaign can be categorized as strictly enemy or population‐centric. For
example, in the 18th and 19th Centuries, Tsarist forces in the Caucasus and Central Asia
pursued highly kinetic and enemy‐centric tactics aimed at decimating resistance to their
rule, but also worked to co‐opt the local population, and create religious and economic
structures that were acceptable to the populace and designed to preserve stability.19
Counterinsurgencies generally continue to incorporate varying approaches into their
campaign. This can be observed both in the Soviet counterinsurgency in Afghanistan as well
as in current US and NATO operations.
PopulationCentric Counterinsurgency
The enemy‐centric model for counterinsurgency warfare focuses on decisive victories
through the use of military power. The main thrust of the theory is to crush the insurgency
as effectively as possible, usually through military means. It does not exclude the ideas of
winning over the population, but the population is not the main priority. The population‐
centric model for counterinsurgency is more nuanced. According to this theory, the
18 Callwell, C. C. (1990). Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers. London: Greenhill Books, 72. 19 See: Crews, R. D. (2006). For Prophet and Tsar. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Khalid, A. (2007). Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia. Berkeley: University of California Press.
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participation and compliance of the population is the single most important element in
defeating the insurgency. The population‐centric approach does not exclude the use of
military force against the insurgent, but firmly asserts that this is only one piece of the
strategy, and, if relied upon solely, will not produce lasting results.
Population‐centric counterinsurgency theory was significantly developed in the
French army, which acquired substantial experience with irregular warfare in French
colonies in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Military officers returning from these theaters would
share their experiences of foreign cultures with inquisitive ethnologists and other
academics, often gaining insights from the scholars that they found useful for conducting
counterinsurgency operations.20 Two French officers, Marshals Hubert Lyautey and Henri
Gallieni compiled principles of irregular warfare in treatises based on their experiences
fighting small wars in Africa and Asia. Gallieni and Lyautey were instrumental in
establishing the Ecole Militaire Spécialisée dans l’outre‐Mer et l’etranger in 1906, a school
devoted to integrating the study of foreign cultures into training for officers deploying to
theaters of irregular war.21
Gallieni and Lyautey were important figures in the development of population‐centric
counterinsurgency theory in the French Army. Both Gallieni and Lyautey maintained that
excessive reliance on force could be counterproductive in counterinsurgency, as collateral
damage and resulting harm to the army’s public image could undercut important working
relationships with the indigenous population. The population‐centric approach stresses the
need for officers to understand the surrounding culture and complete non‐military tasks
aimed at winning the support of the people. The British officer T.E. Lawrence also held to
this attitude, emphasizing that the officer working in the context of irregular warfare must
learn the culture of the area. Lawrence notes that the only way to influence the indigenous
20 Bore, C. H. (2009, March‐April). Complex Operations in Africa: Operational Culture Training in the French Army. Military Review , 65‐71. 21 Bore, C. H. (2009, March‐April). Complex Operations in Africa: Operational Culture Training in the French Army. Military Review , 65‐71.
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people is through “unremitting study of them”.22 For Lawrence, as well as for others who
tended towards population‐centric counterinsurgency, the ability to comprehend the
human terrain was paramount and understood as the basis for finding ways to convince the
population to withdraw support from the insurgency.
Population‐centric counterinsurgency orients focus away from the goal of destroying
the enemy, establishing the officer’s first priority as the painstaking and careful process of
developing mutually beneficial relationships with the local people. Lawrence comments on
this process in his notes on working with Bedouin tribesmen: “hear all that passes, search
out what is going on beneath the surface, read their characters, discover their tastes and
their weaknesses…. Bury yourself in Arab circles, have no interests and no ideas except the
work in hand, so that… you realize your part deeply enough to avoid the little slips that
would counteract the painful work of weeks. Your success will be proportioned to the
amount of mental effort you devote to it”.23
This intellectual vector in military thinking greatly influenced two prominent French
officers and scholars of the mid 20th century, Roger Trinquier and David Galula, who both
completed important works on counterinsurgency based on combat experience in
Indochina and Algeria in the 1940s and 1950s.24 Whereas the enemy‐centric theory seeks to
capitalize on the counterinsurgent’s fire superiority by finding ways to engage and destroy
the insurgent, Galula and Trinquier argue that such a strategy is ineffective.25 They point out
that the insurgent can generally choose the time and place of such an engagement, waiting
for conditions that will give him the advantage.26 According to Galula and Trinquier, whose
22 Lawrence, T. (1917). The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence. Retrieved July 1, 2009, from http://www.d‐n‐i.net/fcs/lawrence_27_articles.htm 23 Lawrence, T. (1917). The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence. Retrieved July 1, 2009, from http://www.d‐n‐i.net/fcs/lawrence_27_articles.htm 24 See: Trinquier, R. (1961). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International; Galula, D. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International. 25 The enemy‐centric approach is embodied in Callwells statement that it is “necessary… to force him [the insurgent] into decisive action”. Callwell, C. (1977). The Dangers of Guerilla Warfare‐1900. In W. Laqueur, The Guerilla Reader: A Historical Anthology. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 114. 26 Trinquier cites the battle of Dien Bien Phu to illustrate this point. He notes out that that French commanders, who had so persistently sought a conventional battle with the enemy, were defeated when the Viet Minh finally
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theories are now referred to as ‘classical’ counterinsurgency theory, the counterinsurgent’s
power should primarily be employed to protect the civilian population rather than chasing
down the insurgent forces. The shift from offensive to defensive focus, according to Galula,
plays to the counterinsurgent’s strengths. The counterinsurgent will likely fail in hunting
down insurgent forces that are typically very mobile and familiar with the terrain. By
focusing on protecting the population in a more static posture, the counterinsurgent’s
relative immobility is not such a disadvantage and he can rely on superior firepower to
repel attacks.27
More importantly, the primary objective in this model is not the annihilation of
insurgent forces, but the support of the population: “the sine qua non of victory in modern
warfare is the unconditional support of a population”.28 This being the stated goal, military
actions are only important insofar as they help secure the support of the people. Winning
civilian support is outlined as a political endeavor that must be started by the military and
then continued by civilians.29 This endeavor requires that the counterinsurgent convince
the people that his rule is 1) legitimate and 2) that it will provide a better life than the rule
of the insurgent. The persuasion of the population requires traditional military action to
provide security, but relies most on a comprehensive program of non‐military activities.
Such activities include publicizing the counterinsurgent message, supporting political
institutions and developing economic opportunities. As Galula famously repeated, “a
revolutionary war is only 20 percent military action and 80 percent political”.30 It is thus
important that military officers function effectively in non‐military roles; cooperation with
civilian development workers is crucial. Galula posits that a counterinsurgency is “not an
addition but a multiplication of… various programs; they are all essential and if one is nil, engaged them in battle after having amassed superior forces. Trinquier, R. (1961). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 3. 27 See: Galula, D. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 58, 65. Also: Trinquier, R. (1961). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 63. 28 Trinquier, R. (1961). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 6. 29 Galula famously states that counterinsurgency is “20 percent military action and 80 percent political”. Galula, D. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 63. 30 Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 63.
18
the product will be zero”.31
Classical population‐centric theory generally prescribes that the counterinsurgent start
his operations in limited areas where he can concentrate his attention and where he
considers success readily attainable. Once the counterinsurgent has achieved success in
these areas he expands his sphere of influence incrementally. Lyautey coined the term ‘ink
blot’ or ‘ink stain’ to describe this incremental expansion of influence.32 Galula, Trinquier
and others advocate that the counterinsurgent systematically divide territory into zones,
appointing administrative teams for each zone.33 The division of territory implicitly
suggests the decentralized nature of counterinsurgency, where more junior leaders have
more control over the course of events in any given area. The importance of the junior
leader and local solutions to issues in counterinsurgency is echoed by David Kilcullen, who
notes that programs should be specifically oriented to each area.34
Population‐centric counterinsurgency theory would suggest that operations in a given
area proceed in the following general pattern: the counterinsurgent expels the main body of
armed insurgents, establishes posts for maintaining security in the area, makes contact with
and controls the population with the intent of isolating it from the insurgents, gathers
intelligence from the population and uses it to target the insurgent organization, holds
elections and tests new leaders, organizes local defense units, eradicates remaining
insurgents with help of indigenous forces.35 Theorists such as Bernard Fall, Frank Kitson
and Roger Trinquier emphasize other key aspects of vital importance such as:
31 Galula, D. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 61. 32 Hansen, J. (1966). The Case Against "Pacification". International Socialist Review , 27 (4), pp. 131‐136. (Accessed at this URL: http://www.marxists.org/archive/hansen/1966/xx/pacification.htm , on 10 July; this is part of the Joseph Hansen Internet Archive) 33 Trinquier, R. (2006). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 73. Also: Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 63. 34 Kilcullen, D. (2006). TwentyEight Articles: Fundamentals of Companylevel Counterinsurgency, 9. 35 Galula, D. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 55‐56.
19
establishing an apparatus for collecting and handling intelligence, proactively infiltrating
and eliminating active sanctuaries for insurgents, disseminating information in support of
the counterinsurgent’s cause and promoting political and economic progress.36
The population‐centric theory is complex and regularly requires the military to act in
non‐military capacities. The diversity of tasks and the necessity to cooperate with so many
entities make population‐centric counterinsurgency hard to execute successfully.37 In some
ways the military mentality is more comfortable with the offensive nature of the enemy‐
centric approach. Some of the principles of enemy‐centric theory, however, are too harsh to
be viable for many countries in the modern context. For this reason, the principles of
population‐centric counterinsurgency theory are most widely accepted today. Current U.S.
military counterinsurgency doctrine is largely based on the theories of Galula, though
adapted somewhat for current operations.
There is considerable debate about the efficacy of enemy‐centric counterinsurgent
strategy versus that of the population‐centric approach, however. This is a longstanding
debate that is almost inherent to discourse amongst military professionals and theorists
and often rooted in deeply held beliefs about foreign policy and the role of the military.
Some military officers and theorists claim that emphasizing population‐centric
counterinsurgency is a denial of basic truths about the nature of warfare, negatively affects
the capabilities of militaries that should remain ready for conventional battle, and
ultimately leads to long entanglements in conflicts that do not serve greater security needs.
Conclusions vary, ranging from support for more kinetic enemy‐centric counterinsurgency
campaigns to avoidance of counterinsurgency altogether.38
36 The term ‘Active Sanctuary’ is Bernard Fall’s. Fall emphasizes the importance of eliminating such sanctuaries even if they are located within the borders of a nieghboring state. Fall, B. B. (1963). Street Without Joy: Insurgency in Indochina, 194663 (3rd Revised Edition). Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, USA: The Telegraph Press, 357. 37 Any irregular warfare at all is challenging for a regular army. Callwell notes that “Guerilla warfare is what the regular armies always have to dread”. Callwell, C. (1977). The Dangers of Guerilla Warfare‐1900. In W. Laqueur, The Guerilla Reader: A Historical Anthology. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 115. 38 See the following articles for examples of such perspectives: Gentile, G. P. (2007, September). Eating Soup with a Spoon. Retrieved July 2, 2009, from Armed Forces Journal: http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/09/2786780 ; Gentile, G. P. (2008, March‐April). Listen to the Airman. Military Review , 114‐115 ; Gian P. Gentile, "Our COIN Doctrine Removes the Enemy from the Essence of War," 2008, Armed Forces Journal, Army Times Publishing Co. , 3 June 2009
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In response to prevailing support for population‐centric counterinsurgency, some
military theorists, such as Gian P. Gentile and Ralph Peters, point out that many historical
cases routinely used to show the merits of population‐centric counterinsurgency included
many enemy‐centric qualities.39 It is also posited that successes in many cases, such as
during the surge in Iraq, are not necessarily a result of protecting the population, but of
other factors such as reconciliation with key tribes and successful operations against the
enemy.40 Paul Dixon points out that the British counterinsurgency in Malaya – a case used to
argue for population‐centric approaches ‐ included many coercive aspects. Dixon suggests
that winning over ‘hearts and minds’ was not the driving force behind the success in
Malaya, and that coercive measures fundamentally shaped the situation.41 It is argued that
coercive measures are extremely necessary in counterinsurgency and that softer
approaches are often touted for public consumption.
As insurgencies, international politics and the political goals of nations and non‐state
actors evolve and while debates continue, some form of counterinsurgency is unavoidable,
at least in the near term. It is also clear that theories based on past counterinsurgency
experience are not always effective in the context of current realities. Many of the
insurgencies experienced by twentieth century counterinsurgency theorists and
practitioners centered on the insurgents’ efforts at developing their forces sufficiently to
obtain power through military action. Some theorists who work within the framework of
generational warfare, however, claim that fourth generation warfare has introduced an
evolved kind of insurgency. Military action is often only one tool in the hands of insurgents
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/01/3207722; Bacevich, A. (2009, February 2). Raising Jihad. Retrieved July 22, 2009, from National Interest Online: http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20932; Etheridge, E. (2009, March 5). New York Times. Retrieved July 22, 2009, from Why Containment Beats Counterinsurgency: Times Is on Our Side: http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/05/why‐containment‐beats‐counterinsurgency‐time‐is‐on‐our‐side/ 39 According to such writers, the campaigns in Algeria, Malaya and elsewhere were more brutal than corresponding counterinsurgency doctrine suggested. The main point being that doctrine may have dictated one approach, but commanders on the ground routinely resorted to enemy centric practices. This is discussed in the following article: Gentile, G. P. (2009, January). Think Again: Counterinsurgency. Retrieved July 8, 2009, from Foreign Policy: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4631 40 Ralph Peters, "Dishonest Doctrine," December 2007, Armed Forces Journal, Army Times Publishing Co. , 18 June 2009 <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/12/3144330>. 41 Dixon, P. (2009). 'Hearts and Minds'? British Counter‐insurgency from Malaya to Iraq. Journal of Strategic Studies , 32 (3), 353‐381.
21
for shaping the opinions of distant governments and peoples. The war of information is
increasingly the determining factor in asymmetrical conflicts involving major powers.
Victory for the insurgent in this situation is persuading the counterinsurgent’s nation that,
“their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit”.42
Despite the merits or demerits of the generational war paradigm, developments in
world politics and technology affect insurgencies in significant ways. General David
Petraeus acknowledges such developments and their impact on insurgencies, “If you look,
as we did, at what [French military officer] David Galula faced in Algeria, you find,
obviously, that he and his colleagues did not have to deal with a transnational extremist
network enabled by access to the Internet”.43 Many theorists and practitioners maintain
that the highly agile and technologically adept character of modern insurgencies calls for a
hybrid and adaptive approach to counterinsurgency – one that is neither solely population‐
or enemy‐centric. Representative of this trend toward ‘whatever works’ is the attitude
expressed by David Kilcullen, a retired military officer closely working with the United
States military on questions of counterinsurgency. He claims that “my experience has been
that both [enemy‐centric and population‐centric approaches] are applicable in varying
degrees in most insurgencies…. The real art is to "read the battle" and understand how it is
developing, fast enough to adapt. Neither the enemy‐centric nor the population‐centric
approaches are always or universally appropriate…. the correct approach is situation‐
dependent”.44 While Kilcullen cannot be separated from the ongoing debate on
counterinsurgency strategies, many of his views do indicate a shift in the discourse towards
comprehensive solutions that involve elements from a wide range of approaches.
There are certain aspects of counterinsurgency strategy that remain important
regardless of what approach is favored. Using the many tools of the state and not only 42 COL Hammes, T. (2007, May‐June). Fourth Generation War Evolves, Fifth Emerges. Military Review, 14. Targetting the population of policy makers of an occupying nation is not new, however. It was was certainly the case in Vietnam and other insurgencies, though the importance of information campaigns is increasingly obvious now. See, COL Hammes, T. (2007, May‐June). Fourth Generation War Evolves, Fifth Emerges. Military Review , 15. 43 Glasser, S. (2008). Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition. Retrieved July 11, 2009, from Foreign Policy: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4587&page=3 44 Kilcullen, D. (2007, January 27). Two Schools of Classical Counterinsurgency. Retrieved June 19, 2009, from Small Wars Journal: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/01/two‐schools‐of‐classical‐count/
22
military force is crucial. Integrating political, social and economic initiatives in a
coordinated effort is important for addressing the many levels upon which insurgencies
challenge the counterinsurgent’s power. Such aspects include: understanding the local
culture and people, cultivation of networks for intelligence, control of the population,
elimination of active sanctuaries, adopting local solutions through junior leaders,
information campaigns to support the counterinsurgent effort, and development of
governmental and economic structures.
SovietAfghan War and Counterinsurgency
The Soviet counterinsurgency and the Afghan insurgency of the 1980s occupy an
interesting place in the development of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. This conflict
can be viewed as a pivotal step between the traditional insurgencies of the earlier twentieth
century and the more modern insurgencies, which are sometimes categorized as fourth
generation war. Both the mujahedeen insurgency and the Soviet counterinsurgency
included elements of the older paradigm mixed with elements of emerging new forms.
The Afghan insurgency was a movement of the people like many traditional
insurgencies, but did have transnational elements, being significantly affected and
supported by outside funding and the influx of Muslim fighters from around the world.45
While most operations were conducted by Afghan tribesmen who were fighting the Soviet
invader, the insurgency was affected by a globally oriented Islamic ideology that
transcended the particular fight for Afghanistan. While most of the fighting was carried out
by small mujahedeen units and military superiority was not the determining factor in the
struggle between insurgent and counterinsurgent, some insurgent organizations fielded
45 David Kilcullen discusses of ‘traditional’ vs. ‘modern’ insurgences, noting that traditional insurgencies generally aim at controlling a fairly defined nation or territory, while ‘modern’ Islamic insurgencies often seek to control a vastly larger area that is global in proportion. See: Kilcullen, D. (2009). The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. New York, USA: Oxford University Press, Inc, 13.
23
sizable military formations and functioned in ways similar to conventional military units.46
Although the press and the freedom of speech was significantly limited in Soviet Russia,
persistence on the part of the insurgents did affect the will of Soviet policy makers and the
populace through various means.47 Even though the internet was not a factor and insurgent
forces were not able to broadcast victories or messages to the world instantaneously,
propaganda campaigns were conducted throughout the world with the purpose of
attracting funds, volunteers, and broadcasting the insurgent ideology against the Soviets.
Soviet counterinsurgency – as a reaction to the insurgency that contested the
government supported by the Kremlin – was also a synthesis of varying approaches. On the
one hand, Soviet forces adopted many enemy‐centric principles into their strategy: they
sought to engage and kill as many insurgents as possible and went to great lengths to bring
the fight to their enemies. Often unable to apprehend elusive insurgent forces, Soviet forces
routinely decimated crops, livestock, and villages in an effort to weaken insurgent supply
sources and sanctuaries.48 On the other hand, Soviet strategy did include non‐coercive
principles aimed at persuading the population to support their cause. Significant funds were
invested in Afghan infrastructure and education in an effort to build institutions and human
capital. Soviet politicians worked to influence the Kabul government to support reforms
aimed at improving conditions in Afghan society. Soviet leaders supported substantial
propaganda initiatives for promoting and publicizing the message and interests of the Kabul
government. It is interesting to note that earlier Soviet counterinsurgency experience in
Central Asia against the Basmachi movement was characterized by a similar synthesis of
46 Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 58. 47 The effect of the Soviet population on policymakers is evident in a Politburo meeting, in which Gorbachev read letters from Soviet citizens decrying the Soviet war in Afghanistan: Anatoly Chernyaev's Notes from the Politburo CC CPSU Session of October 17, 1985. (2001, October 9). Retrieved from The September 11th Source Books, Volume II: Afghanistan, Lessons from the Last War (The National Security Archive, Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya): http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/r17.pdf 48 Callwell specifically advocates the practice of destroying crops as a means of weakening an insurgency: Callwell, C. C. (1990). Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers. London: Greenhill Books, 40.
24
‘soft’ and ‘hard’ approaches.49
The nature of the Afghan insurgency as an indigenous and international movement with
mixed ideologies and motivations was extremely hard to counteract. The hybrid form of the
mujahedeen movement highlighted the need for a comprehensive, adaptive and tailored
approach to counterinsurgency. The challenge that the Afghan resistance posed to the
Soviet Union vividly underscored the requirement that the counterinsurgent use political,
economic and military measures in good proportion in order to achieve success.
In the following chapters I will show in greater detail where the Soviet strategy
coincided with many of the accepted theories outlined in this chapter, and to what extent
Soviet leaders used the necessary tools of counterinsurgency in the Afghan conflict. As I will
show, many aspects of the Soviet strategy corresponded to the general advice outlined by
experts in counterinsurgency. However, lack of coordination between the various players in
the Soviet effort, disjointed execution, and differing visions of the conflict, the mission and
the strategy led to ineffectiveness despite the promise of many Soviet initiatives.
To set the stage for further analysis, the next chapter provides a brief overview of the
Soviet–Afghan war and the Soviet response to the Afghan insurgency.
49 Oliker, O. (2008, February). Soft Power, Hard Power and Counterinsurgency: The Early Soviet Experience in Central Asia and its Implications (RAND working paper). Retrieved August 25, 2009, from http://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/2008/RAND_WR547.pdf
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Chapter 2. Overview
SovietAfghan War
Centrally located amidst large countries with competing interests, Afghanistan has
often been the location of proxy struggles between rival governments and ideologies.
Afghanistan has seen the armies of Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan and the British
Empire. The interests of Tsarist Russia and the British Empire chaffed at one another in
Afghanistan in the 19th Century – an episode that is popularly known as the ‘Great Game’.
After World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union both projected influence into
Afghanistan, undertaking a variety of projects and aid programs.
During this time American money was supporting various efforts in the country,
such as the Helmand Valley Project, and there were attempts on the part of the United
States to bring Afghanistan under Western influence. Concurrent to these efforts, the Soviet
Union was cultivating a relationship with Kabul based on trade and military aid. In the
period after World War II Afghanistan turned to the Soviet Union for support for a variety of
political and economic reasons. This support came largely in the form of military aid. In this
context, economic and cultural ties between Moscow and Kabul strengthened. Afghan
leaders began to rely more and more on Soviet military supplies and support. Growing
numbers of Afghans travelled to the USSR for education and training ‐ many for military
instruction. For example, in 1979, before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, there were
460 Afghans studying in Soviet military institutions.50 In this way, officers and other urban
elites were increasingly exposed to Soviet life and ideologies, and added new vitality to
progressive socialist urban movements in Afghanistan.
Many of these movements were centered on Kabul University and consisted of
Marxist pro‐Moscow students. In 1965 these groups and others formed the People’s
50 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 17 marta 1979 goda: Ob obostrenii obstanovki v Demokraticheskoi Respublike Afganistan i nashikh vozmozhnykh merakh,” 17 March 1979, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 25, D. 1, Ll. 24.
26
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which was a communist organization with strong
ties to the USSR. In April of 1978, the PDPA wrested control of the government from
Mohammad Daoud Khan in a coup and emplaced Nur Muhammed Taraki as the leader of
Afghanistan. The new regime went ahead with a program of economic and social reform
inspired by socialist‐Marxist ideas. Many of the new initiatives, which related to issues such
as agriculture, landowning, and literacy, were foreign to the majority of the Afghan
population that lived in a society governed by tribal and Islamic traditions. The PDPA
government alienated many segments of the population through ““administrative
inadequacy, as well as…regimentation which did not compensate for the absence of
legitimacy”.51 The PDPA was also severely hindered by an internal division between the
Parcham and Khalq factions.
Opposition movements that worked against the PDPA‐run government had
developed in parallel – in counterbalance ‐ to those of the communists of the PDPA. Men
who would later fight the Soviet Army in the 1980s, such as Ahmad Shah Massoud and
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, had mounted a failed attempt at a coup in July 1975, before Soviet
troops even deployed to the region.52 The armed struggle between the mujahedeen and the
Soviet‐supported PDPA government was a conflict that had been developing for some time
and was not entirely a spontaneous response to the appearance of Soviet forces in
Afghanistan, “The conflict between the communist government and the mujahedeen
resistance was as much a manifestation of political polarization in the country as a struggle
for the liberation of Afghanistan from Soviet occupation. The dominant groups that led the
Afghan resistance represented an old ideological conflict which took shape during the
constitutional period (1964‐73)”.53
51 Dorronsoro, G. (2005). Revolution Unending, Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present. New York: Columbia University Press, 94. 52 Ruttig, T. (2006). Islamists, Leftists and a Void in the Center: Afghanistan's Political Parties and Where They Come From (19022006). Kabul: Konrad‐Adenauer‐Stiftung, 14. 53 Jalalzai, M. K. (1996). Sectarianism and Ethnic Violence in Afghanistan. Lahore: Vanguard Books, Ltd., 74.
27
In the face of growing opposition the PDPA leadership sought to tighten links to the
USSR, and asked for increased military aid, as well as the arrival of Soviet troops.54 Soviet
leaders initially refused these requests, but after significant unrest in the city of Herat and
the murder of Taraki and seizure of power by Hafizullah Amin in September of 1979, Soviet
leadership decided to take military action in Afghanistan. Select special units were already
in the country near Kabul, and in December 1979 Soviet units stormed the presidential
palace, killed Amin and installed Babrak Karmal as president of Afghanistan.
Soviet troops streamed into the country, working quickly to secure provincial capitals
and to quell opposition from the Afghan army and other resistance units. By January 1980,
Soviet troop levels in Afghanistan were over 50,000.55 Initially the Soviet aim was to keep a
low profile, secure main infrastructure and urban centers, and give the Afghan army the
freedom to focus on crushing the resistance. It turned out, however, that the presence of
Soviet troops inspired increased support for the mujahedeen and that the Afghan army
proved incapable of effectively engaging and destroying mujahedeen forces. It soon became
clear that Soviet units would have to undertake most of the combat missions. Soviet troop
levels subsequently increased to 110,000‐120,000 by 1982, which was the level at which
they remained for the duration of the conflict.56
The fighters that opposed Soviet troops were diverse. Among the factions of the
Afghan mujahedeen there was a varying emphasis on Islam, nationalism and other
ideologies. The Russian General Staff reports that in the Afghan resistance in 1982 there
were seven Islamist parties, allied in the ‘Group of Seven’, and three Traditionalist parties,
allied in the ‘Group of Three’.57 The presence of Soviet troops served to overcome many
54 Afghan leaders made multiple requests for Soviet troops to deploy to Afghanistan. The following document is one example: Transcript of Telephone Conversation between Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and Afghan Prime Minister Nur Mohammed Taraki, 17 or 18 March 1979. (2001, October 9). Retrieved August 24, 2009, from The September 11th Source Books, Volume II: Afghanistan, Lessons from the Last War: Russian Documents and Memoirs (The National Security Archive, Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya): http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/r2.pdf 55 McMichael, S. R. (1991). Stumbling Bear:Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan. London: Brassey's (UK), 8. 56 McMichael, S. R. (1991). Stumbling Bear:Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan. London: Brassey's (UK), 13. 57 Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 53. Traditionalist parties, while still consisting of Muslim members, placed less
28
internal divisions in these groups, and inspired support for them with many segments of the
Afghan population. In addition to financial support from the U.S., Europe, China and the
Middle East, many Muslims came to join in the fight against the Soviets. Leaders such as
Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden established organizations and training sites in
Pakistan to facilitate the Muslim world’s participation in the fight against the Soviets. These
foreign fighters did not make a very large impact tactically, but their presence spoke to the
broader themes and implications of the Soviet‐Afghan War. In 1979 Azzam issued a fatwa,
Defense of the Muslim Lands, which formalized Islamic support and encouragement for the
jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Azzam traveled the world ‐ even to Europe and the
US ‐ inspiring audiences with elaborate descriptions of the Afghan jihad in order to win
their monetary and political support.58 The narrative that ensued from this aspect of the
Afghan resistance was important for the broader propaganda campaign and represented a
growing tendency in insurgencies to direct information campaigns towards global
audiences. This manner of information campaign had been a factor for the United States in
the Vietnam conflict as well.59 Despite the large powers that supported the mujahedeen,
however, most fighting was conducted by Afghan combat units organized in the context of
tribe or village.60
Early in the conflict Soviet troops mounted large conventional offensives that
encountered very limited success. Soviet troops, equipment and tactics were ill‐suited for
the terrain and enemy in Afghanistan. As Soviet forces became familiar with the conditions
in Afghanistan, many adjustments were made. It became clear that there would be no quick
victory in Afghanistan and that battling the mujahedeen would take years. The Soviets
attempted to implement a counterinsurgency strategy that involved political and military
emphasis on Islam as a political ideology than Islamists. In their view, Islam was an important component for Afghan government and society, but not a blueprint for it. It should also be noted that factions of the resistance fluctuated often over the course of the conflict, and that this is only a snapshot of the categories of the resistance. 58 In 1986, Azzam and Osama bin Laden even opened an office in Arizona where there was a large Arab community. Coll, S. (2004). Ghost Wars. New York: The Penguin Press, 155. 59 COL Hammes discusses this phenomenon in the following: COL Hammes, T. (2007, May‐June). Fourth Generation War Evolves, Fifth Emerges. Military Review , 15. 60 Rashid, A. (1987). The Afghan Resistance: Its Background, Its Nature, and the Problem of Unity. In K. Rosanne, Afghanistan:The Great Game Revisited (pp. 203‐229). New York: Freedom House, 216.
29
components, but lack of resources and coordination caused these efforts to yield limited
results. Some successes were sustained, however, due to increased use of specialized units
and utilization of KGB‐trained Khad units.61
Increased bombing of the Afghan countryside as an effort to destroy mujahedeen
sources of support resulted in many civilian casualties and millions of refugees both inside
the country and in neighboring Pakistan and Iran.62 Mujahedeen forces, however, were able
to survive due to extensive outside support from a coalition of anti‐Soviet countries. This
support was predominantly funneled through Pakistan. Soviet attempts to close the border
with Pakistan were extensive, but ultimately did not succeed due to long distances,
exceedingly difficult terrain, and lack of sufficient numbers of troops.
Babrak Karmal, who had dissatisfied leaders in Moscow by his unresponsiveness to
recommendations and inability to remedy divisions within the PDPA, was removed from
power in 1986. He was replaced by Mohammad Najibullah, the former head of the Khad.
Najibullah pursued a program of national reconciliation, aimed at widening support for the
government and finding a way to end conflict within the country. This effort was
unsuccessful, as foreign‐backed mujahedeen sought a decisive victory in Afghanistan, and
foreign powers saw continued fighting in Afghanistan as furthering their objective of
weakening the Soviet Union.
The Soviet government, led by Mikhail Gorbachev, increasingly saw the troop
commitment to Afghanistan as an impediment to both foreign and domestic political
objectives. In the context of unsuccessful political initiatives in Afghanistan and lack of a
decisive military victory, Soviet leadership decided to withdraw its troops. Withdrawal was
completed in February of 1989.
61 ‘Khad’ is an Afghan security agency formed along the lines of the Soviet KGB. 62 McMichael, S. R. (1991). Stumbling Bear:Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan. London: Brassey's (UK), 54.
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Soviet Counterinsurgency
The Soviet Union was at a disadvantage going into Afghanistan. Soviet leaders
misunderstood the social and political dynamics of the country’s situation, and entered the
country expecting a relatively quick war against predominantly foreign‐backed fighters.63
Temporary military help, it was hoped, would install a more effective regime, put an end to
foreign meddling and allow the Kabul government to proceed forward with support from
the people.64 Instead, Soviet troops faced an increasingly popular insurgency that had
widespread support throughout the country.
Soviet leaders also lacked a doctrine and a military force suited for
counterinsurgency. This was partly a result of focusing on conventional threats in the
context of the Cold War. As Robert Cassidy notes, large powers are forced to retain high‐
level conventional capabilities to maintain parity with rivals.65 Due to the conditions of the
Cold War, Soviet focus on conventional capabilities was especially strong. The situation in
Afghanistan was considered primarily through the lens of the struggle against the United
States and NATO – Soviet leaders were afraid of ‘losing’ Afghanistan to the influence of the
West. Rumors that President Hafizullah Amin was making overtures to the CIA may not
have been central to the decision to deploy Soviet troops, but represented underlying
63 This misunderstanding is evident in Politburo discussions, in which there is continuing emphasis that Afghan resistance fighters are mostly from Iran and Pakistan, religious fanatics and exploiting class tensions in Afghanistan. In effect, there was an element of denial of the roots of the insurgency that held appeal with large segments of the Afghan population. Also, in at least one instance the border with Pakistan is described as ‘peaceful’ or ‘under control’. In fact the border was exceedingly porous and a central problem. See: “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 17 marta 1979 goda: Ob obostrenii obstanovki v Demokraticheskoi Respublike Afganistan i nashikh vozmozhnykh merakh,” 17 March 1979, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 25, D. 1, Ll. 2, 19. See also: “Vypiska iz protokola No. 149 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 12 aprelya 1979 goda: O nashei dal’neishei linii v svyazi s polozheniem v Afganistane,” 12 April 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 4, Ll. 2. 64 In a meeting of the Politburo on 7 January 1980, Soviet leaders were already discussing how they would be going about withdrawing troops after the issue was complete. As Alexander Liakhovsky notes, this indicates they really did not understand the situation fully. See documentation of this meeting of the Politburo in Liakhovsky’s history of the Soviet‐Afghan War: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 448. 65 Cassidy, R. M. (2006). Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. London: Praeger Security International, 21.
31
concerns of Soviet leaders.66 In a Politburo discussion, Andrei Gromyko demonstrated this
Cold War mentality, arguing that “under no circumstances can we lose Afghanistan…. If we
lose Afghanistan now, it will move away from the Soviet Union, that will be a blow to our
politics”.67 Soviet ideology at the time cultivated a perception that actions in Afghanistan
were in support of workers and peasants, which promoted the underlying assumption that
counterinsurgency was not all that needed, because Soviet policies aligned with the desires
of the ‘people’. Therefore, due to distractions of the Cold war and ideological bias, Soviet
leadership initially did not pay necessary attention to the requirements of conducting an
effective counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.
After the invasion in 1979, the Soviets quickly felt the effects of misreading the
situation. The Kabul regime did not win widespread or enthusiastic support, and Soviet
actions were sharply criticized in the international community. The Soviet army found its
heavy equipment and conventional tactics of little use against irregular forces in challenging
terrain. Continuing support from outside Afghanistan funded a largely Afghan insurgency
that benefitted from open borders between Afghanistan and sanctuaries in Pakistan and
Iran.
Ultimately, the Kremlin was unable to address the causes of the insurgency
adequately. Despite some successes, the Soviet side was unable to outlast and outdo the
mujahedeen in the struggle for Afghanistan. They were not forced to leave due to military
necessity, however. Soviet forces regularly dominated the field, and the stalemate between
the Soviets and the mujahedeen was a result of a combination of factors. The popular
argument that Stinger missiles68 tipped the balance is also problematic. Gorbachev had
66 In a conversation With A.A. Gromyko in 1980, Afghan Foreign Minister mentions the rumor that Amin was a U.S. Agent: “Zapis’ Osnovnogo Soderzhaniya Besedy A.A. Gromyko s Ministrom Inostrannykh Del DRA Sh.M. Dostom 4 janvarya 1980 goda,” 4 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 11, Ll. 2. 67 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 17 marta 1979 goda: Ob obostrenii obstanovki v Demokraticheskoi Respublike Afganistan i nashikh vozmozhnykh merakh,” 17 March 1979, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 25, D. 1, Ll. 3. Gorbachev repeated this sentiment in 1986, when he mentioned in a meeting of the Politburo in reference to Afghanistan, that “it is important that the Americans don’t make inroads there”: “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November 1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 10. 68 Stinger missiles are personal portable surface‐to‐air weapons. The United States made them available to Mujahedeen forces in Afghanistan. The Mujahedeen used them with some success to shoot down Soviet
32
already expressed the need to withdraw from Afghanistan in October of 1985; Stinger
missiles took down the first Soviet helicopter in September of 1986.69 Many accounts imply
that the Soviet side attempted to rely only on brute force to deal with the situation,
mindlessly pursuing ineffective political and military policies, and counting on the
overwhelming might of the Soviet Union to force the desired outcome.70 As I will show, this
is not entirely the case.
As discussed in subsequent sections, Soviet initiatives addressed the ‘three pillars’
of counterinsurgency, that have been outlined by David Killcullen: political, economic and
military.71 Soviet political and military leaders developed a counterinsurgency strategy
covering all these categories, including initiatives aimed at winning the support of the
Afghan population through political means. Brute force and mindlessness did not
characterize the substantial attempts at encouraging strong governmental and social
institutions and a less repressive regime in Kabul. The Kremlin put forth considerable effort
to support unity within the PDPA, and to influence it to broaden its base of support through
active broadcast of a positive and accommodating political message. Soviet initiatives were
also designed to stimulate the Afghan economy as a way to support the government, win
support with the population and sustain military gains.
helicopters. Stinger missiles were widely heralded as making the key difference in the struggle against the Soviets. 69 Record of Gorbachev discussing withdrawal in 1985 is found in Anatoly Chernyaev’s notes of a politburo meeting on 17 October 1985: Anatoly Chernyaev's Notes from the Politburo CC CPSU Session of October 17, 1985. (2001, October 9). Retrieved from The September 11th Source Books, Volume II: Afghanistan, Lessons from the Last War (The National Security Archive, Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya): http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/r17.pdf. Also, Milt Bearden, a CIA officer who worked closely on a project supporting the mujahedeen, writes an account of the first Stinger missile strike in Afghanistan which occurred 25 September 1986: Bearden, M., & Risen, J. (2003). The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB. New York, New York, USA: Random House, 248. 70 There are numerous examples of analyses that ignore the positive aspects of the Soviet counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan. The following are examples: Riedel, B. (2009, May 9). Comparing the U.S. and Soviet Experiences in Afghanistan. Retrieved July 25, 2009, from CTC Sentinel: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel‐Vol2Iss5.pdf . Also, Stephen Blank’s handling of the subject likewise skims over Soviet initiatives that held promise, sharply criticizing Soviet leadership for poor performance in Afghanistan. Many of these criticisms are legitimate, but my analysis will indentify those areas where Soviet leadership worked at good solutions to the situtation: Blank, S. J. (1991). Operational and Strategic Lessons of the War in Afghanistan, 197990. Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, xi‐xvi. 71 Kilcullen, D. D. (2006, September 28). Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency. Retrieved September 1, 2009, from Remarks delivered at U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference: http://www.tamilnation.org/armed_conflict/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf
33
Although initially unprepared, Soviet military leaders worked to adapt the army to
the situation in Afghanistan. Some conventional and harsh tactics did persist. However,
strategy, force structure and tactics were re‐evaluated and adjusted to the conditions in
Afghanistan. Improved and specialized training, changes in military formations,
organization of efforts and increased use of non‐linear tactics were all designed specifically
for the Afghan theater. As I will outline below, these adjustments correspond with the
advice of both classical and modern counterinsurgency theorists and practitioners.
While Soviet leaders pursued many effective policies, there are several factors that
limited their success. First, many of the policies were poorly implemented. For example,
despite significant Soviet pressure on the PDPA and insistence that the party be unified,
internal divisions between Parcham and Khalq factions persisted and severely impeded all
political efforts.72 Likewise, in the military context, new training and tactics were not
sufficient to cultivate a pervasive ethos of initiative and independent action within the
officer corps or instill comfort within motorized rifle troops for working in small units away
from armored vehicles. Second, resources were limited due to political concerns. As
evidenced in the name, the Soviet ‘Limited Contingent’ did not have the numbers to
effectively control all the borders and regions of Afghanistan. Third, lack of coordination
between military and political efforts caused Soviet gains to be consistently reversed. As
General Akhromeev noted in a Politburo session in 1986, “there hasn’t been a military task
that… hasn’t been completed…. our military successes have just not been supported by
political ones”.73 Political initiatives were likewise often left unsupported by military action.
Despite lack of success in implementing policies, claims that the Soviets ignored the
fundamental ideas of counterinsurgency are inaccurate. Many Soviet efforts both in political
and military areas align with the recommendations of counterinsurgency theorists, who 72 In this account of a discussion with Babrak Karmal, it is noted that remedying divisions within the party was stressed as a priority. However, after several years it became overwhelmingly clear that Karmal was perpetuating the problem: “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 4 iyunya 1981 goda: O besede s tov. Babrakom Karmalem,” 4 June 1981 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 60, Ll. 2. 73 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November 1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 8. General Gromov also notes this in his memoir, mentioning that after an area was cleared attempts to hold, and govern the area were typically ineffectual: Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 128.
34
actively stress the importance of political work, information campaigns and non‐
conventional military techniques. Soviet leaders addressed all of these aspects of
counterinsurgency. In the following sections I will examine both military and non‐military
Soviet policies. In the non‐military section I will address political, social, propaganda and
economic programs. In the military section I will examine strategy, force structure and
tactics.
35
Chapter 3. Soviet Counterinsurgency: NonMilitary Aspects
“I repeat again that in the present situation… what will play a main role will be your ability to use political and economic means to attract to your side the widest circles of the population” – Leonid I. Brezhnev to the Afghan leader Nur Muhammed Taraki74
Political Initiatives
There is currently much discussion about the important role of politics and
institution building in counterinsurgency. Many point to the Soviet‐Afghan war as an
example of a government forgetting the importance of non‐military measures in
counterinsurgency. The Soviet military did use severe tactics, such as intensive bombing
campaigns and excessive mine laying. However, many Soviet political initiatives were
consistent with the idea of winning over the population through strengthening political
institutions and processes. While these objectives were not achieved fully, documents show
that Soviet leaders facilitated social initiatives, encouraged Afghan leaders to pursue a
moderate political program, and advocated a conciliatory political approach.
Soviet leaders also actively encouraged Afghan government leaders to adopt policies
aimed at broadening their political base with as many social groups as possible. This
contrasts with popularly held impressions that Soviet policies in Afghanistan were ruthless
across the board. More significantly, this approach, and the explicit and implicit importance
that Soviet leaders assigned to political and social programs is an illustration of effective
elements in the Soviet counterinsurgency strategy. David Galula notes that it is important to
strengthen political institutions, support and test local authorities, encourage and educate
leaders in a political movement and preserve unity of effort with other aspects and entities
in the counterinsurgency campaign.75 Soviet leaders made significant efforts in all of these
74 “Zapis’ Besedy L.I. Brezhneva s N.M. Tarki 20 marta 1979 g. (V besede prinyali uchastie t.t. A.N. Kosygin, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov i B.N. Ponomarev),” 20 March 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 2, Ll. 5. 75 Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 56, 72.
36
areas. Despite some forceful features of Soviet military actions in Afghanistan, it is clear that
Soviet leaders understood the importance of pursuing an effective political program.
Even before committing troops to the region, Soviet leaders worked against the
resistance by employing moderate policies and accommodating as many parts of the society
as possible. In March of 1979, Brezhnev told Taraki, “I repeat again that in the present
situation… what will play a main role will be your ability to use political and economic
means to attract to your side the widest circles of the population”.76 Brezhnev was insistent
that Taraki pursue a comprehensive political and social program in Afghanistan, insisting
that it was imperative to broaden the political support for the PDPA, starting at the
grassroots level.
To this end, Brezhnev advocated the use of socio‐political groups to work with
peasants, workers and women.77 He also suggested the creation of organizations for
working against poverty and other problems in agricultural regions where the PDPA
traditionally had the least support.78 Repressive and harsh measures were discouraged and
winning support within the ranks of religious leaders was emphasized; the Kremlin urged
leaders in Kabul to make it clear that they were friendly to Islam.79 It was also suggested
that increased training go to PDPA members in order to facilitate their political activities.80
In 1980, the Afghan minister of foreign affairs assured Andrei A. Gromyko that work was
being done to achieve unity in the PDPA and to rid the party of corruption and excessive
76 “Zapis’ Besedy L.I. Brezhneva s N.M. Tarki 20 marta 1979 g. (V besede prinyali uchastie t.t. A.N. Kosygin, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov i B.N. Ponomarev),” 20 March 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 2, Ll. 5. 77 “Zapis’ Besedy L.I. Brezhneva s N.M. Tarki 20 marta 1979 g. (V besede prinyali uchastie t.t. A.N. Kosygin, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov i B.N. Ponomarev),” 20 March 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 2, Ll. 2. It is interesting to note here that the Soviets developed similar programs in their counterinsurgency in Ukraine (1944‐1956). See, Potichnyj, P. J. (1987, October 2‐3). Pacification of Ukraine: Soviet Counterinsurgency, 19441956. Retrieved September 13, 2009, from Chronicle of the Ukranian Insurgent Army: http://www.infoukes.com/upa/related/uf.html 78 “Zapis’ Besedy L.I. Brezhneva s N.M. Tarki 20 marta 1979 g. (V besede prinyali uchastie t.t. A.N. Kosygin, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov i B.N. Ponomarev),” 20 March 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 2, Ll. 2. 79 “Zapis’ Besedy L.I. Brezhneva s N.M. Tarki 20 marta 1979 g. (V besede prinyali uchastie t.t. A.N. Kosygin, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov i B.N. Ponomarev),” 20 March 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 2, Ll. 3. 80 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 149 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 12 aprelya 1979 goda: O nashei dal’neishei linii v svyazi s polozheniem v Afganistane,” 12 April 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 4, Ll. 10.
37
violence.81 These assurances, whether or not they represented actual progress in Kabul,
underscore the Kremlin’s pressure on the Afghan government to make positive changes.
Understanding Pakistan’s influential role in the Afghan resistance, Soviet leaders
made specific recommendations to open talks with Islamabad to limit interference and to
normalize the situation of Afghan refugees in that country.82 In the first months of the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan, the Central Committee was very insistent that Afghan
government leaders be proactive in creating and publicizing a political program. In May of
1980, the Central Committee of the CPSU discussed the need for “Afghan leadership to
articulate a comprehensive program of political stabilization”.83 Soviet recommendations
included an accelerated process for creating a constitution, and the inclusion of tribal
representatives in political processes.84 Soviet leaders also continued to voice the need to
reach out to religious leaders and other socio‐economic classes, which were not naturally
inclined to side with the PDPA.85 It was also suggested to isolate radical elements within
these segments of the population.86
Incorporating tribal and religious leaders was a particularly important aspect of the
political program. David Kilcullen mentions this point as well, noting that “influential local
tribal leaders and village chiefs – regardless of whether they formally support the
government – are the key”.87 The Soviet advice to isolate the radical elements within these
81 “Zapis’ Osnovnogo Soderzhaniya Besedy A.A. Gromyko s Ministrom Inostrannykh Del DRA Sh.M. Dostom 4 janvarya 1980 goda,” 4 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 11, Ll. 2. 82 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 195 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 8 maya 1980 goda: O predlozheniyakh po politicheskomu uregulirovaniu v svyazi s Afganistanom,” 8 May 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 8, Ll. 3‐4 (v Prilozhenii I; in Appendix I of this document). 83 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 195 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 8 maya 1980 goda: O predlozheniyakh po politicheskomu uregulirovaniu v svyazi s Afganistanom,” 8 May 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 8, Ll. 2 (v Prilozhenii I; in Appendix I of this document). 84 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 6. 85 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 6. 86 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 6. 87 Kilcullen, D. (2009). The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. New York, USA: Oxford University Press, Inc, 69.
38
categories is consistent with Galula’s admonition that the counterinsurgent “isolate the
population as much as possible… from the guerillas”.88
The Soviet‐promoted goal was to strengthen the Kabul government by broadening
its political base, and to curb violence through “establishing contacts and talks with the
leaders and elders of the most warring tribes in the DRA89 in the search of ways to achieve…
a compromise”.90 In talks with Babrak Karmal in 1981, Soviet leaders continued to
emphasize the importance of strengthening Afghan political institutions using the
considerable experience and support from the USSR.91 Andropov underscored the
importance of addressing divisions between the Parcham and Khalq factions within the
PDPA, building a strong army and police force, and fostering greater coordination between
Afghan and Soviet military units.92 Similar political themes continued throughout the
duration of the conflict. In 1986, Andrei Gromyko stressed the need to “get down to the
business of working at political stabilization more actively”.93 Expanding support for the
PDPA was a central theme in the Soviet approach. The need to focus on political initiatives
that concretely improved the lives of rural populations was emphasized and reiterated at
this time.94 In 1986 in a meeting of the Politburo, Gorbachev voiced this sentiment,
88 Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 81. 89 Democratic Republic of Afghanistan 90 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 6. 91 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O dopolnitel’nykh merakh pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v razvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 16 December 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 2. 92 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O dopolnitel’nykh merakh pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v razvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 16 December 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 2. 93 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November 1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 4. At this time, Gorbachev was already leading the USSR towards finding ways to withdraw. He sought political measures to neutralize the situation enough to allow for troop withdrawal. Such proceedings, however, indicate that leaders clearly understood the importance of the political aspects of counterinsurgency and attempted to implement programs in this area. The problem, however, was that military gains were not sufficiently supported by the projection of political influence (General Akhromeev makes this point in this same document ). This was primarily the fault of disjointed coordination between military and political efforts, and the inability of the army to provide security to all areas of the country. It was not the result of ignoring the political aspect of counterinsurgency. 94 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November 1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 89.
39
maintaining that “it is necessary to expand the social base of the [Kabul] regime by
accounting for an effective allocation of political energy”.95
As outlined above, Soviet emphasis on normalizing relations with neighboring
countries and strengthening domestic Afghan political institutions was substantial. These
initiatives are consistent with classical and modern counterinsurgency theory that stresses
the importance of creating conditions that assure the population that the government offers
a better alternative to the rule of the insurgent. The recommendations put forth by Soviet
leaders were well founded and addressed significant obstacles to the success of the Kabul
government. They also illustrate that Soviet leaders understood the importance of the
political component of the counterinsurgency effort.
Social Initiatives
In addition to measures meant to affect Afghan political policies directly, the Soviet
government undertook a broad range of social programs intended for supporting the
Afghan counterinsurgency. Increased support in the areas of education, culture and youth
were meant to help in winning support for the PDPA. Some of these programs had limited
effect, since they were only available to those in areas controlled by the government.
Nevertheless, these programs speak to the Soviet government’s understanding of the softer
elements of counterinsurgency, and incorporation of elements of the ‘hearts and minds’
approach.96
The Soviet Union was active in working to influence Afghan society and culture by
providing materials, infrastructure and opportunities designed to foster social welfare and
gain support for the PDPA. In 1980 Soviet analysis discussed the need for the Afghan
95 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November 1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 10. 96 Broadly used in current discourse, the term ‘heart and minds’ is Field Marshal Sir Gerard Templer’s. It was used to describe the softer elements of counterinsurgency that the British military employed at times in Malaya. See: Dixon, P. (2009). 'Hearts and Minds'? British Counter‐insurgency from Malaya to Iraq. Journal of Strategic Studies , 32 (3), 354.
40
government to undertake programs to increase the influence of the PDPA on youth,
especially students, and create athletic, cultural and other organizations to support
progressive movements in the DRA.97 Soviet leaders also advocated working to stop
discrimination against Shiite Muslims in Afghanistan, hoping that reaching out to this group
would add support to the regime. Other social programs included summer camps in the
USSR for Afghan school children – one particular project provided almost eight hundred
slots per year for summer camp in the USSR.98 In a similar vein, Soviet leaders approved the
creation of eight automobile clubs for the Democratic Organization of Youth of Afghanistan
in 1980.99
With the goal of stimulating Afghan cultural life, the Soviet Union of Journalists,
Union of Writers, Union of Artists, Union of Composers, Union of Directors were each
instructed to present one prize per year to an Afghan citizen in their field.100 Soviet
organizations were also instructed to coordinate the purchase of Afghan art and other crafts
for museums in the USSR.101
Building the human capital and economic potential of the DRA was important to
Soviet leadership, as employment and prosperity were seen as steps toward peace and
stability. Although these goals were not fully achieved, the Soviet government did work to
establish many training and educational opportunities for Afghan citizens. For example, in
1980, the Ministry of Culture was instructed to organize a program for thirty Afghan
97 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 6. 98 TsK KPSS: O khode bypolneniya reshenii TsK KPSS ob okazanii pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v rasvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 4 December 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 19. 99 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 16. 100 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O dopolnitel’nykh merakh pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v razvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 16 December 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 2. 101 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O dopolnitel’nykh merakh pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v razvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 16 December 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 3.
41
citizens per year to study in the USSR.102 In a formal agreement between the USSR and the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan it was specified that in the years 1980‐1982 the USSR
would organize specialized fifteen‐day training programs for groups of up to 25 managers
from the DRA ministry of water resources and energy and the ministry of agriculture and
land reform.103 It was also agreed that fifty agricultural specialists a year (from 1981‐1983)
would attend three‐month training courses.104 Similar programs were implemented for
hundreds of mining, mechanic, driving and manufacturing specialists.105 Training and
educational exchanges continued throughout the conflict. In a 1984 agreement, Afghan
workers were tasked to go to the USSR for specialized construction training.106 In 1985,
technical training in manufacturing was provided for Afghan workers.107 Such training
opportunities were ongoing and were incorporated in many Soviet development projects in
Afghanistan.
In addition to providing numerous training opportunities in the Soviet Union,
Moscow also adopted programs meant to strengthen educational institutions in
Afghanistan. In 1980, a Soviet‐Afghan agreement for the years 1981‐1985 designated that
eighty five instructors from the USSR would come to work in Afghan schools in the fields of
social and economic sciences, engineering and Russian language.108 Soviet help for
producing textbooks in Dari and Pashto, and expertise for creating a chemistry laboratory at
Kabul University was also specified in these agreements.109 The establishment of boarding
102 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O dopolnitel’nykh merakh pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v razvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 16 December 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 2. 103 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1982). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXVI). Moscow, Russia, 98‐99. 104 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1982). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXVI). Moscow, Russia, 98‐99. 105 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1982). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXVI). Moscow, Russia, 98‐99. 106 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1986). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XL). Moscow, Russia, 77‐79. 107 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1987). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XLI). Moscow, Russia, 129‐132. 108 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1982). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXVI). Moscow, Russia, 98‐99. 109 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1982). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXVI). Moscow, Russia, 98‐99.
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schools in Kabul over the course of 1981‐1985 was also included.110 In an agreement
projected for 1986‐1990, the Soviet government agreed to build ten professional technical
schools with a capacity for four thousand students.111 In further support of educational
infrastructure, there were exchanges set up between the Lenin State Library in Moscow and
the libraries of Kabul University, the Kabul Academy of Sciences and the Afghan Historical
Society.112
As illustrated in the programs above, Soviet leadership made significant efforts to
support the counterinsurgency campaign through social programs, supporting numerous
policies and programs for strengthening Afghan political, educational and social institutions
and processes. While success was limited in some areas, it is clear that the Soviet leadership
was aware of the importance of this aspect of counterinsurgency and attempted to make
progress in it. Although some Soviet policies were certainly coercive, Soviet leaders did
incorporate soft approaches into their counterinsurgency effort as well.
Propaganda Initiatives
It has been repeated that counterinsurgency is “20 percent military action and 80
percent political”.113 In his influential work on counterinsurgency, Galula instructs the
counterinsurgent how to proceed in the political sphere. According to Galula, much depends
on the relative strengths and dynamics of either side; for varying cases, he advocates
powering through on force alone or adopting elements of the insurgent’s political platform
in an effort to win the support of the population. Regardless of approach, Galula stresses the
110 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1982). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXVI). Moscow, Russia, 98‐99. 111 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1987). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XLI). Moscow, Russia, 129‐132. 112 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 18. 113 Galula, D. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 63.
43
need for the counterinsurgent to declare his political program at an opportune time and in a
way aimed to “take as much wind as possible out of the insurgent’s sails”.114
Winning in information warfare is crucial for the counterinsurgent. Losing this
battle can negate gains made in other areas of the counterinsurgency. Colonel Thomas X.
Hammes makes this point, noting that the insurgent can potentially circumvent military
means by targeting “the minds of the enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy’s
political will…. [which] when properly employed can defeat greater economic and military
power”.115
In the case of Afghanistan, influencing the opinions of three broad categories of people
was important for determining the course of the conflict: first, the Soviet population and
leaders who formed policy and bore the burdens of the conflict; second, the international
powers that backed the mujahedeen, and whose support was important for sustaining the
insurgency; and third, the Afghan population itself, which had to decide whether to side
with the Kabul government or the mujahedeen. Soviet leadership worked diligently in the
area of information and propaganda to target all of these groups.
In many respects propaganda work came naturally to the Soviets, as the USSR was a
country based on the ideology of revolution, and had utilized propaganda campaigns
extensively in its history. In the Afghan context, Soviet experience both in domestic and in
foreign propaganda was very useful.116 Soviet leaders often referred to these historical
examples while working with the Afghan government. While it is clear that, for a variety of
reasons, the political message of the PDPA did not inspire the broad support that was
desired, it is undeniable that the Soviet government pursued substantial measures in this
area. In discussing these efforts, I will focus on two categories: propaganda initiatives
114 Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 72. 115 Hammes, C. T. (2008). Information Operations in 4GW. In T. Terrif, A. Karp, & R. Karp, Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict (pp. 200‐208). New York, New York, USA: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 200. 116 Soviet leaders took into account experiences in Eastern European countries such in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria when approaching the situation in Afghanistan. This is evident in the following document: “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 6.
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focused on the Afghan population, and propaganda initiatives directed at the international
community and Soviet population.
Propaganda Within Afghanistan
Even before the invasion in 1979, the Soviets were very active in Afghanistan and aware
of the importance of propaganda. A Soviet analysis of the situation in the spring of 1979
criticized Afghan PDPA members for being outdone by the ‘counter‐revolutionaries’, whose
work was “much more active and on a larger scale than the work conducted by party
members”.117 After the deployment of Soviet troops, Soviet leaders made it even more of a
priority to supply the Kabul government and the PDPA with all the tools necessary to
spread their message and compete in information warfare both domestically and in the
international arena. As noted in 1980 in a resolution of the Secretariat of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), “with the permission of the
CPSU…Soviet ideological institutions began to provide operational help to the PDPA in
propaganda… aimed at counteracting the anti‐afghan campaign in the UN and in the media
abroad”.118 In 1981, the Soviet government passed a resolution On the Support for the
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan in Propaganda Work.119
Development of the propaganda effort was a central aspect of the USSR’s relationship
with the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).120 The Soviets worked hard to develop
newspapers, journals and radio stations that supported the Kabul government. Radio, in
117 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 149 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 12 aprelya 1979 goda: O nashei dal’neishei linii v svyazi s polozheniem v Afganistane,” 12 April 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 4, Ll. 6. 118 TsK KPSS: O khode bypolneniya reshenii TsK KPSS ob okazanii pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v rasvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 4 December 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 19. 119 TsK KPSS: O khode bypolneniya reshenii TsK KPSS ob okazanii pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v rasvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 4 December 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 19. 120 Democratic Party of Afghanistan (DRA) was the title given to Afghanistan by the PDPA after the Saur Revolution in 1978.
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particular, was emphasized both by Afghan and Soviet government leaders due to the high
rate of illiteracy in Afghanistan.121 As early as March 1979, president Taraki asked Leonid
Brezhnev for help in creating capabilities for a radio station in Afghanistan.122 A few days
later, Yuri Andropov repeated the need to supply the Afghans with means for radio
broadcasting.123 In January 1980 Soviet officials approved the building of a radio station in
the region of Kabul, allocating ten million rubles for the job and agreeing to send equipment
and specialists to facilitate the project.124 In December of 1980 Soviet leaders approved the
distribution of megaphone and loudspeaker assemblies to all administrative zones in
Afghanistan as a way to facilitate spreading information.125 The Soviet government also
made efforts to broadcast radio programs from nearby Central Asian republics in
Afghanistan. In 1981, Soviet leaders approved the broadcast of programs in Uzbek for the
benefit of listeners in Afghanistan.126
Moscow also ordered the support of other forms of media. In one instance, the Soviet
media agency Tass was tasked with sending materials and equipment for creating a dark
room and photo studio for the Afghan news agency Bakhtar.127 Initiatives in television were
discussed between the USSR and Afghanistan as well. In a 1980 resolution of the Secretariat
of the Central Committee there were conversations regarding the relay of broadcasts from a
Tajik TV studio to Afghanistan.128 In the same year, the film “Conspiracy Against the
Republic” was filmed with Soviet help in Dari and Pashto, clearly for government use as a 121 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 149 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 12 aprelya 1979 goda: O nashei dal’neishei linii v svyazi s polozheniem v Afganistane,” 12 April 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 4, Ll. 11. 122 “Zapis’ Besedy A.N. Kosygina, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinova, B.N. Ponomareva s N.M. Taraki 20 marta 1979 g.,” 20 March 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 3, Ll. 12. 123 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 17 marta 1979 goda: Ob obostrenii obstanovki v Demokraticheskoi Respublike Afganistan i nashikh vozmozhnykh merakh,” 17 March 1979, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 25, D. 1, Ll. 24. 124 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: Ob okasanii tekhnicheskogo sodeistviya Demokraticheskoi Respublike Afganistan v stroitel’stve radioveshchatel’noi srednevolnovoi radiostantsii moshchnost’iu 1000 kVt,” 29 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 32, D. 20, Ll. 2,3,11. 125 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O dopolnitel’nykh merakh pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v razvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 16 December 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 4 (Under subheading “Sovet Ministrov SSSR: Rasporyazhenie”). 126 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 13. 127 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 14. 128 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 16.
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propaganda tool.129 An agreement between the two countries for 1983 established
cooperation on creating three TV studios in Afghanistan.130 Several Afghan newspapers
were set up under Soviet guidance. Khambastegi was created in 1980, based on the Soviet
newspaper “Socialism: Theory and Practice”, and had a circulation of 3000 copies.131
‘Iunost’, a youth newspaper, was also created in 1980 and had a circulation of 10,000
copies.132
Soviet programs were also formulated for the purpose of training Afghan specialists in
the skills necessary for media and propaganda operations. The Soviet Union sent many
advisors and trainers in journalism to help strengthen Afghan capabilities. This had been an
ongoing effort for many years but intensified after the April Revolution and the subsequent
Soviet invasion.133 For example, from November 1980 to February 1981 ten Afghan media
interns (five in radio and five in television) were sent to the USSR for training.134 The Soviet
government also directed leading press agencies to send personnel to train their
counterparts in Afghanistan. Editors from the newspapers Pravda, Izvestia, and
Komsomolskaya Pravda were each ordered to send a representative to train and advise
cadres in the Afghan newspapers Pravda Aprelskoi Revolutsii, Khivad and Znamya
Molodyozhi.135
Soviet political leaders also discussed the promotion of journalism amongst Afghan
students, working out plans to send professors in Journalism from the USSR to Kabul
129 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 16. 130 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1985). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXIX). Moscow, Russia, 212. 131 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 14. 132 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 14. 133 A document in 1976 on sending of Soviet personnel to Afghanistan to advise on propaganda is an example of this relationship: “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: Sovet Ministrov SSSR, Rasporyazhenie noyabrya 1976 g.,” November 1976 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 27, D. 27, Ll. 9. Of course, personnel exchange with Afghanistan increased after the Soviets committed troops to the country. 134 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 13. 135 Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O dopolnitel’nykh merakh pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v razvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 16 December 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 1.
47
University.136 The Ministry of higher education was directed to send professors to work
directly with the PDPA on journalism, clearly indicating that the subject was understood as
a tool for use in the political context.137
Substantial amounts of media and propaganda materials were sent from the USSR to
Afghanistan to explain and spread the message of the PDPA. In 1980, the publishing house
‘Plakat’ was instructed to send 50,000 rubles worth of flyers and other publications in Dari
and Pashto.138 The newspaper Novosti was directed to publish a series of brochures in Dari
and Pashto that explained the principles of domestic and foreign policy of the DRA, with the
specific instructions that they be oriented towards the ‘average’ Afghan.139 In October of
1980 a Soviet news agency created the textbook “Course in the Basics of Politics” in Pashto
and Dari.140 The textbook “Guidebook of a Party Worker” and “Political Parties of the World”
were also created around the same time.141
Soviet leaders persistently advised their Afghan counterparts in propaganda, reminding
them to be sure to broaden their base of political support through engaging key segments of
the Afghan population. The Soviet intention was that the PDPA explain their platform in
terms understandable and compelling to the average Afghan. This dovetails with David
Galula’s point that the counterinsurgent should avoid abstract policies that do not interest
the population, and that it is important for the counterinsurgent to ascertain what the
people really want, and then promote corresponding policies.142
136 Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O dopolnitel’nykh merakh pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v razvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 16 December 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 2. 137 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 15. 138 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O dopolnitel’nykh merakh pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v razvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 16 December 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 2. 139 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O dopolnitel’nykh merakh pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v razvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 16 December 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 2. 140 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 14. 141 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 14. 142 Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 72.
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Soviet leadership pushed this same recommendation with the Afghan government. One
example is Soviet advice that PDPA members articulate clearly to Afghan peasants that they
receive land due to the reforms of the PDPA, and that this land will remain with them only if
the government remains strong.143 For the purpose of continuing to explain the Kabul
government’s policies, the publication Novosti published 10,000 of each of the following
brochures in Dari and Pashto: “Domestic Politics of the DRA”, “Stories about the Reforms”
and “Speeches of Babrak of Karmal”.144 One Soviet document refers to the number of copies
of varying pamphlets, books and other publications sent from the USSR to Afghanistan at
290,00 in 1979, and at 720,000 in 1980.145
These Soviet‐PDPA programs came in the context of an active propaganda campaign on
the part of the mujahedeen. As General Gromov recounts in his memoirs, there was “active
anti‐Soviet propaganda, which was conducted amidst the whole population in Afghanistan.
In every village and small city they set people against us”.146 It was of vital importance to
convince the Afghan people that the Kabul government meant well and would bring them
good things.147 This objective was not fully achieved, but certainly strived for as evidenced
by the many programs enumerated above.
143 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 149 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 12 aprelya 1979 goda: O nashei dal’neishei linii v svyazi s polozheniem v Afganistane,” 12 April 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 4, Ll. 9. 144 TsK KPSS: O khode vypolneniya postanovleniya TsK KPSS ‘O dopolnitel’nykh merakh pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v rasvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty’,” 4 November 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 23. 145 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 14. 146 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 117. 147 The following article includes a case of the U.S. general McChrystal spreading his message in hopes of winning the support of the population. In a translated message he said that “As commander of the International Security Assistance Force, nothing is more important than the safety and protection of the Afghan people”. This is an illustration of the need to broadcast a message. The importance was the same for the Soviets as it is now for U.S. forces. Leaders in both cases were aware of the real effects that information could have on their mission: Farrel, S., & Oppel, R. A. (2009, September 4). NATO Strike Magnifies Divide on Afghan War. Retrieved September 4, 2009, from The New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/05/world/asia/05afghan.html
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Propaganda Directed at the International Community and Soviet Population
International propaganda surrounding the conflict in Afghanistan cannot be separated
from the realities of the larger Cold War. The war in Afghanistan was yet another reason for
the United States and other countries to discredit the Soviet Union, and, in turn, a reason for
the Soviet Union to strike back.148 This was an expected aspect of international relations at
the time.
This propaganda struggle was also a battle for legitimacy and global sympathy for which
both the mujahedeen and the Soviet‐backed PDPA were vying. The Soviets were seeking to
gain tolerance for their actions in Afghanistan in the international community; they were
also interested in sustaining support for the effort within the USSR. The mujahedeen were
seeking to erode the will of the Soviet leaders and people, to gain sympathy and funds
internationally, and to win support within the Afghan populace. Success or failure in the
propaganda struggle would have major consequences for both sides.
The politics of Pakistan and Iran and the larger powers working with them had a
very real effect on the Soviet counterinsurgency effort. Mujahedeen forces made use of
these governments’ finances, equipment and sanctuaries. The Soviet population also played
an important role in the Soviet counterinsurgency. Although living in a society of restricted
press and having limited effect on government processes, the Soviet population was the
source for the conscript 40th Army deployed in Afghanistan, and the sentiments of the
people did ultimately influence Soviet policymakers.149 Winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of
these audiences, therefore, would be a significant advantage in the struggle for Afghanistan.
In discussing evolved insurgencies in the context of fourth generation warfare, Colonel
Hammes highlights the importance of international information campaigns even in localized 148 In a declassified U.S. government memo from 1979, President Carter clearly outlines U.S. propaganda goals against the Soviet Union in the context of Afghanistan: White House Memo of 3 July 1979, President Carter on Situation in Afghanistan (accessed from CSPAN.Org, Declassified 25 June 1999). (1979, July 3). Retrieved August 29, 2009, from http://www.c‐span.org/PresidentialLibraries/Content/Carter/CarterAfghanistan.pdf 149 Anatoly Chernyaev's Notes from the Politburo CC CPSU Session of October 17, 1985. (2001, October 9). Retrieved from The September 11th Source Books, Volume II: Afghanistan, Lessons from the Last War (The National Security Archive, Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya): http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/r17.pdf
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conflicts, noting that a wide variety of international institutions and networks can spread a
political message quickly throughout the world, and with great consequences.150 Soviet
strategy took into account various international institutions when considering the
information campaign for Afghanistan, placing great importance on achieving success in
this area.
Soviet leaders repeatedly discussed the Afghanistan situation in the context of the
global arena and their standing vis‐à‐vis competing powers. This is illustrated in a letter
from Leonid Brezhnev to Fidel Castro in march of 1980: “You are right, Fidel, that in the
current complicated circumstances, there is an opportunity for Cuba to move towards
implementing a more active attempt… to support international security. This is even more
important, because the imperialistic powers try to place all causes of international tension
in Afghanistan, using it to distract attention away from their own dangerous activities”.151 In
a conversation with a western reporter in 1981, the Soviet representative expressed the
government stance and prevailing understanding of the situation at the time, “literally
everyday in the US there is spread new fabrications about the foreign policy of the USSR,
and this is done not only by the press, but even more by official representatives of the
administration”.152
During the war in Afghanistan Soviet analysts would often mention that the United
States and China saw the situation simply as an opportunity to hurt the USSR and promote
the spread of anti‐Soviet sentiments around the globe.153 The Soviets viewed such countries
to be uninterested in stabilizing Afghanistan, and focused primarily on inflicting damage on
150 Hammes, C. T. (2004). The Sling and the Stone. St. Paul, MN, USA: Zenith Press, 212. 151 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 187 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 10 marta 1980 goda: O nashei dal’neishei vneshnepoliticheskoi linii v svyazi s Afganistanom i ob otvete na obrashchenie F. Kastro,” 10 March 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 5, Ll. 6 (v Prilozhenii I; in Appendix I of this document). 152 “TsK KPSS: O besede s rukovoditelem amerikanskoi kompanii ‘Taim‐Laif’,” 22 October 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 76, D. 31, Ll. 2‐3. 153 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 2.
51
the Soviet Union.154 Afghan leaders felt themselves to be victims of propaganda aimed at
weakening their government as well. In a conversation with A. N. Kosygin on 20 March
1979, President Taraki complained that “Pakistani propaganda twisted our programs
regarding social freedoms for women… and turned to politics of sabotage…against us”.155
This battle for propaganda, of course, was conducted with greater global political objectives
in mind, but it was also an important aspect in insurgency and counterinsurgency. As I have
noted above, the information battle is vital in counterinsurgency: the insurgent wins if he
can convince the counterinsurgent’s population or policymakers that the pursued “strategic
goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit”.156 The
counterinsurgent must therefore attempt to thwart such an information campaign. In the
context of the Soviet‐Afghan war, the Soviet Union had to counteract attempts conducted by
a broad and powerful coalition of countries.
Accordingly, Soviet leaders undertook substantial measures in propaganda directed
toward international audiences. These strategies included exploiting the differences
between the allies in NATO and hindering the development of ties between the United
States and China in an effort to weaken solidarity on the question of Afghanistan.157 Also,
there were initiatives to gain support for the Soviet Union amongst the leaders of Socialist
countries and other large socio‐political organizations.158 The Central Committee of the
CPSU sent letters of explanation of the Afghanistan situation to communist affiliated
organizations all over the world; in one document forty‐six such organizations are listed as
154 This sentiment is clear in the following meeting of the Politburo: “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November 1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 4. 155 “Zapis’ Besedy A.N. Kosygina, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinova, B.N. Ponomareva s N.M. Taraki 20 marta 1979 g.,” 20 March 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 3, Ll. 5. 156 COL Hammes, T. (2007, May‐June). Fourth Generation War Evolves, Fifth Emerges. Military Review , 14‐21, 14, 29. 157 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 3. 158 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 2‐3.
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recipients of such a letter.159 The Soviets also sought to court Middle Eastern countries in
hopes of preventing Islamic movements from assuming an anti‐Soviet posture.160
In 1980 the Soviet government encouraged the Kabul regime to publicize their
political platform because it “would be timely from the perspective of… having an effect on
the positions of countries that are participants in the… session of ministers… of Islamic
governments”.161 The support for anti‐American elements in Iranian foreign policy was also
encouraged, as it would potentially weaken support for the US‐backed opposition
movement in Afghanistan.162 It was also noted that it would be helpful to discredit pro‐
mujahedeen leaders in the Afghan émigré community, as well as highlight the destructive
effects of US and Chinese‐backed fighters in Afghanistan.163 The effort to uncover and
discredit foreign support for the Afghan insurgency had been part of policy since the
beginning of the conflict. Even before the invasion, top Soviet leaders agreed that an
element of their Afghan strategy would be “preparing materials, revealing meddling in
Afghanistan’s affairs on the part of Pakistan, Iran, the U.S., and China, and publicizing these
materials through a third party”.164
Soviet ambassadors received explicit instructions about how to present the issue of
Afghanistan. These instructions urged them to point out that Soviet and Afghan cooperation
against insurgent groups was consistent with article 51 of the UN’s charter, which supports
159 “Vypiska is protokola No. 177 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 27 dekabrya 1979 goda: O nashikh shagakh v svyazi s razvitiem obstanovki vokrug Afganistan,” 27 December 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op14, D. 33, Ll. 26 (this list comes at the end of the document under the heading: “Spisok kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii nesotsialisticheskikh stran, kotorym napravlyaetsya pis’mo TsK KPSS”). 160 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 4. 161 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 195 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 8 maya 1980 goda: O predlozheniyakh po politicheskomu uregulirovaniu v svyazi s Afganistanom,” 8 May 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 8, Ll. 2 (v Prilozhenii I; in Appendix I of this document). 162 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 4. 163 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 4‐5. 164 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 17 marta 1979 goda: Ob obostrenii obstanovki v Demokraticheskoi Respublike Afganistan i nashikh vozmozhnykh merakh,” 17 March 1979, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 25, D. 1, Ll. 12.
53
the right of individual or collective self‐defense in the case of an attack.165 The Soviet
representative at the United Nations was explicitly ordered to thwart all attempts at
including the issue of Afghanistan in the daily agenda.166 A list of explanations and
arguments was provided in case the matter was accepted for formal discussion.167 In such a
circumstance, it was to be emphasized that Soviet troops were in Afghanistan only for the
purpose of helping the government and people of Afghanistan against outside aggression in
accordance with the Soviet‐Afghan treaty of 1978, and that these troops would leave as
soon as the threat subsided.168
In 1980, the Central Committee of the CPSU gave special instructions for lobbying
the Soviet perspective on Afghanistan at a conference of the Inter‐Parliamentary Union in
response to anti‐Soviet bias in the organization.169 Afghan representatives were advised to
send a letter of protest to the Union’s chair, declaring such discussions to be meddling in
internal Afghan affairs.170 Overall, the Soviet leadership supported the propaganda
campaign on all fronts. In a document of the Central Committee of the CPSU a plan was
outlined to “continue the broad publication of counter‐propaganda materials of Soviet and
foreign authors, that expose the falsifications of the western media”.171
165 Charter of the United Nations. (n.d.). Retrieved August 11, 2009, from UN Website: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml 166 “Vypiska is protokola No. 177 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 27 dekabrya 1979 goda: O nashikh shagakh v svyazi s razvitiem obstanovki vokrug Afganistan,” 27 December 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op14, D. 33, Ll. 9 (v Prilozhenii 3; in Appendix 3 of this document (a letter to the representative in NY). 167 “Vypiska is protokola No. 177 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 27 dekabrya 1979 goda: O nashikh shagakh v svyazi s razvitiem obstanovki vokrug Afganistan,” 27 December 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op14, D. 33, Ll. 9 (v Prilozhenii 3; in Appendix 3 of this document (a letter to the representative in NY). 168 “Vypiska is protokola No. 177 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 27 dekabrya 1979 goda: O nashikh shagakh v svyazi s razvitiem obstanovki vokrug Afganistan,” 27 December 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op14, D. 33, Ll. 15 (v Prilozhenii 6; in Appendix 6 of this document (“O propagandistkom obespechenii nashei aktsii v otnoshenii Afganistana”). 169 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O merakh protiv obsuzhdeniya na 67‐I Konferentsii Mezhparlamentskogo soyuza proekta rezolyutsii, soderzhashchei antisovetskoi I antiafganskoi napravlennosti,” 9 September 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 43, D. 31, Ll. 1. 170 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O merakh protiv obsuzhdeniya na 67‐I Konferentsii Mezhparlamentskogo soyuza proekta rezolyutsii, soderzhashchei antisovetskoi I antiafganskoi napravlennosti,” 9 September 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 43, D. 31, Ll. 3. 171 “Perechen’ svedenii, razreshaemykh k otkrytomu opublikovaniu, otnositel’no deistvii ogranichennogo kontingenta sovetskikh voisk na territorii DRA (v sootvetsvii s Postanovleniem TsK KPSS P206/2 7.6.85g.),” 25 June 1985 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 11, D. 103, Ll. 5.
54
Media coverage of the Afghan conflict was tightly controlled by Soviet leaders, who
were interested in cultivating a positive image of the war in the USSR and abroad. Soviet
government officials approved various restrictions and guidance for the portrayal of events
in Afghanistan. This guidance was clearly aimed at shaping the opinions of the Soviet
population. As noted above, retaining the Soviet people’s support for the war was important
for leaders whose policies entailed continuing financial expenditures and human sacrifice.
Central committee documents specify that Soviet troops were to be portrayed
primarily in their daily activities and training alongside their Afghan counterparts;
describing Soviet troops providing medical help to Afghans was specifically mentioned.172
Stories, pictures and other mention of PDPA party members and government officials
meeting with Soviet troops were also encouraged.173 Describing the danger of surprise
attacks on Soviet and Afghan units that were conducting routine activities was encouraged
in order to show the destructive nature of the opposition movement.174 Description of the
heroism and sacrifice of Soviet soldiers was also to be emphasized, as were award
ceremonies, though discussion of actual combat was discouraged.175 Soviet press sources
were also directed to accentuate the constructive nature of the presence of the Soviet
troops: depictions of Soviet troops building and protecting economic infrastructure were
encouraged.176 The Soviet government also encouraged stories and reports about Soviet
aircraft and other vehicles disbursing goods and services to local populations.177
172 “Perechen’ svedenii, razreshaemykh k otkrytomu opublikovaniu, otnositel’no deistvii ogranichennogo kontingenta sovetskikh voisk na territorii DRA (v sootvetsvii s Postanovleniem TsK KPSS P206/2 7.6.85g.),” 25 June 1985 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 11, D. 103, Ll. 2‐3. 173 “Perechen’ svedenii, razreshaemykh k otkrytomu opublikovaniu, otnositel’no deistvii ogranichennogo kontingenta sovetskikh voisk na territorii DRA (v sootvetsvii s Postanovleniem TsK KPSS P206/2 7.6.85g.),” 25 June 1985 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 11, D. 103, Ll. 2. 174 “Perechen’ svedenii, razreshaemykh k otkrytomu opublikovaniu, otnositel’no deistvii ogranichennogo kontingenta sovetskikh voisk na territorii DRA (v sootvetsvii s Postanovleniem TsK KPSS P206/2 7.6.85g.),” 25 June 1985 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 11, D. 103, Ll. 3. 175 “Perechen’ svedenii, razreshaemykh k otkrytomu opublikovaniu, otnositel’no deistvii ogranichennogo kontingenta sovetskikh voisk na territorii DRA (v sootvetsvii s Postanovleniem TsK KPSS P206/2 7.6.85g.),” 25 June 1985 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 11, D. 103, Ll. 2. 176 “Perechen’ svedenii, razreshaemykh k otkrytomu opublikovaniu, otnositel’no deistvii ogranichennogo kontingenta sovetskikh voisk na territorii DRA (v sootvetsvii s Postanovleniem TsK KPSS P206/2 7.6.85g.),” 25 June 1985 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 11, D. 103, Ll. 3. 177 “Perechen’ svedenii, razreshaemykh k otkrytomu opublikovaniu, otnositel’no deistvii ogranichennogo kontingenta sovetskikh voisk na territorii DRA (v sootvetsvii s Postanovleniem TsK KPSS P206/2 7.6.85g.),” 25 June 1985 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 11, D. 103, Ll. 3.
55
These restrictions were clearly meant to preserve positive impressions of the
situation in Afghanistan amongst the Soviet people. In a 1981 meeting of the Politburo, Yuri
Andropov was careful to adopt measures downplaying Soviet combat losses, advising
against too many memorials and mentioning that notifications to the families of fallen
soldiers “ought to be brief and as standard as possible”.178 Soviet leaders allowed only
limited discussion of the sacrifice of Soviet soldiers in the media. The press was authorized
to report only one account of a soldier wounded or killed per month.179
Soviet leaders pursued numerous initiatives in the area of information warfare,
aimed at various audiences that influenced the outcome of the Afghan conflict. While these
measures did not necessarily result in the overall success desired by the Kremlin, it is clear
that the Soviets were diligent in their efforts in propaganda as a part of counterinsurgency
strategy. These efforts indicate that the Soviets were not relying on force alone, but were
cognizant of the need to win support by means of persuasion.
Economic Initiatives
“The majority of Afghans simply want security, peace, and prosperity and will swing to support the side that appears most likely to prevail and to meet these needs” – David Kilcullen180
The counterinsurgent’s main goal is to win over “the country’s people and their
belief in and support of their government”.181 As noted earlier, this support must be earned
through a comprehensive and coordinated effort, pursued with tact and consideration for
the culture and conditions of each part of the country. Counterinsurgency theorists often
178 Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU 31 June: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 544. 179 “Perechen’ svedenii, razreshaemykh k otkrytomu opublikovaniu, otnositel’no deistvii ogranichennogo kontingenta sovetskikh voisk na territorii DRA (v sootvetsvii s Postanovleniem TsK KPSS P206/2 7.6.85g.),” 25 June 1985 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 11, D. 103, Ll. 3. 180 Kilcullen, D. (2009). The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. New York, USA: Oxford University Press, Inc.,66. 181 Sepp, K. I. (2005, May‐June). Best Practices in Counterinsurgency. Military Review , 9.
56
divide the aspects of counterinsurgency into various categories. Economic aid and
development is an important category in almost every theory.182 Initiatives in economic aid
and development represent an essential tool for winning support for a counterinsurgency,
and sustaining military and political gains. Areas that have been cleared of insurgents and
are administered by the central government, but remain impoverished, are likely to revert
back to insurgent control.183
Like most aspects of counterinsurgency, economic aid must be carried out in a
thoughtful and systematic manner to have the lasting effect that is desired. Both short‐term
relief and long‐term programs must take place to foster the stabilization that is so
important for the counterinsurgent to provide to the population.184As David Kilcullen
writes, economic initiatives cannot be separate from political goals: economic assistance
must be provided in such a way that it motivates the population to support the government
over the insurgency.185 This means that economic initiatives must meet immediate needs as
well as provide for future prosperity. As will be outlined below, Soviet economic initiatives
in Afghanistan were considerable and included elements designed for addressing these
issues.
Soviet leaders understood the importance of supporting economic growth in
Afghanistan. This is seen in documents from the Central Committee that note the
importance of the “establishment of a normal economic situation in the country… and of
improving the economic situation of the working class in the city and in the country… [and
182 For works that divide counterinsurgency efforts into various ‘pillars’ or areas, see: Kilcullen, D. D. (2006, September 28). Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency. Retrieved September 1, 2009, from Remarks delivered at U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference: http://www.tamilnation.org/armed_conflict/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf. Also: McFate, P. J., & Jackson, A. (2006, January/February). The Object Beyond War: Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition. Military Review , 56‐69. 183 Such situations occurred in Afghanistan. For example, it was reported in a meeting of the Politburo that mujahedeen‐controlled areas often enjoyed a better supplies (from Pakistan) than government‐controlled areas did. This kind of situation clearly made it less likely that the population would place confidence in the Kabul government. See: “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November 1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 89. 184 Kilcullen, D. D. (2006, September 28). Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency. Retrieved September 1, 2009, from Remarks delivered at U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference: http://www.tamilnation.org/armed_conflict/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf, 6. 185 Kilcullen, D. (2009). The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. New York, USA: Oxford University Press, Inc., 67.
57
the] balanced, mutually beneficial cooperation between the government and private
sector”.186 Soviet leaders understood the need to integrate economic initiatives with
political considerations, the importance of which is also noted by David Kilcullen. This
understanding was clearly expressed in Soviet government analysis even before the
invasion in 1979, which noted the need “to examine… the questions of…economic aid to
Afghanistan…[and] which [kind of aid] would best facilitate the strengthening of the
political positions of the revolutionary‐democratic regime”.187 In an attempt at gaining
support and assuring the population of their goodwill and the bright prospects of siding
with the government, Soviet leaders attempted to display the prosperity of Central Asian
republics as an example of success by referring “to the achievements in socio‐economic
development of the Central Asian republics over the years of Soviet rule”.188 The intentions
and understanding of Soviet leaders regarding the need to stimulate the Afghan economy
did not translate into success in all cases. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership made
substantial efforts to stimulate the Afghan economy in a range of industries, focused on
developing infrastructure, exploiting natural resources, and developing the skills of Afghan
cadres in order to make use of increased economic capabilities.
There are multiple sources that provide a characterization of the levels of economic
support, each with their statistical qualities and characteristics. The data used in this paper
cannot be considered an exhaustive or integrated record of Soviet economic aid during this
time period, but they clearly support the proposition that both the intention and the
implementation of Soviet policies in Afghanistan attempted to complement military efforts
with non‐military programs. One of these sources is the record of Soviet formal agreements
published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.189 The general proposals and the specific
186 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 7. 187 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 149 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 12 aprelya 1979 goda: O nashei dal’neishei linii v svyazi s polozheniem v Afganistane,” 12 April 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 4, Ll. 9. 188 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 149 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 12 aprelya 1979 goda: O nashei dal’neishei linii v svyazi s polozheniem v Afganistane,” 12 April 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 4, Ll. 11. 189 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1981‐1990). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXV‐XLIV). Moscow, Russia.
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projects indicate the breadth of the economic and political goals envisioned by the Soviet
and Afghan governments. Graphic 1 in Appendix I shows the proposed levels of support for
various categories of economic projects. For multi‐year agreements and projects, an
estimated average allocation of proposed funds is used. However, the actual disbursements
varied as is seen in other data sources.190
Over the course of the Soviet‐Afghan war, amounts of Soviet economic assistance to
Afghanistan were at levels far above those that had existed during the decades‐long
relationship between the two countries.191 According to one source, disbursed economic
assistance from 1970‐1974 totaled 96 million dollars; this jumped to a total of 467 million
dollars from 1980‐1984.192 See Appendix I, Graphic 2 for a graphical representation of this
substantial increase in economic aid. This trend indicates a deliberate effort by the Soviet
Union to use economic measures in the Afghan counterinsurgency effort.
A letter from the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.I. Ryzhkov, to
the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, M.S. Gorbachev provides an
additional snapshot of Soviet economic expenditures in Afghanistan.193 According to this
document, non‐military economic expenditures from the USSR to Afghanistan increased
from 453 million rubles in 1986 to 1258 million rubles in 1987.194 This source also indicates
that average Soviet daily expenditures (military and non‐military combined) in Afghanistan
steadily increased from 1984 to 1987, climbing from 4.3 million rubles in 1984 to 14.7
million rubles in 1987.195 Categories of this assistance included aid intended to stimulate
Afghan economic productivity by providing increased prices on Afghan exports bought by
190 Bach, Q. V. (2003). Soviet Aid to the Third World: the Facts and Figures. Sussex, England: The Book Guild Ltd. 191 Afghanistan received aid from the Soviet Union beginning in 1921. Military aid, trade in natural resources, and support for infrastructure development continued on up through the Soviet‐Afghan war: Bach, Q. V. (2003). Soviet Aid to the Third World: the Facts and Figures. Sussex, England: The Book Guild Ltd, 83. 192 See: Bach, Q. V. (2003). Soviet Aid to the Third World: the Facts and Figures. Sussex, England: The Book Guild Ltd, 136 (Appendix V). 193 “Spravka: O raskhodakh SSSR v Afganistane,” 8 January 1988, in: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 758. 194 “Spravka: O raskhodakh SSSR v Afganistane,” 8 January 1988, in: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 758. 195 “Spravka: O raskhodakh SSSR v Afganistane,” 8 January 1988, in: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 758.
59
the USSR, such as gas, wool and other goods (see Appendix I, Graphic 3 for a graphical
representation of the statistics from this document).196
As discussed above, both long and short‐term economic initiatives are important in
counterinsurgency. Recent U.S. experience in Iraq has illustrated the importance of finding
this balance between large‐scale initiatives and those designed to induce more immediate
economic stimulation.197 Overemphasis of large‐scale projects can result in the neglect of
issues important for inspiring grassroots support for the counterinsurgent. In order to win
this support, the counterinsurgent must not only develop the economy at high levels, but
also provide employment opportunities and basic goods and services. Soviet government
officials understood the need to provide immediate and noticeable improvement to the
Afghan economy. An analysis of the Central Committee mentions the need, “to focus Afghan
leaders on the development… of those branches of the economy, which would help solve
social problems [and] provide for the employment of the population”.198 Soviet leadership
did follow through on this point to some extent, providing large amounts of staple foods and
other goods to Afghanistan over the course of the war. However, as General Liakhovsky
recounts, Soviet troops themselves suffered from shortages in supplies, as many goods were
intercepted in the provinces en route to their destinations.199 This, of course, made
providing the Afghan population with necessary goods problematic. Nevertheless, General
196 “Spravka: O raskhodakh SSSR v Afganistane,” 8 January 1988, in: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 758. This kind of assistance had been in place since before the Soviet invasion. For example, Soviet documents show that in March 1979 the price of gas sold by Afghanistan to the Soviet Union was raised in order to give the Kabul government extra funds. See: “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 17 marta 1979 goda: Ob obostrenii obstanovki v Demokraticheskoi Respublike Afganistan i nashikh vozmozhnykh merakh,” 17 March 1979, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 25, D. 1, Ll. 5. 197 As illustrated in the experience of the U.S. in Iraq, it is easy for a disconnect to develop between those in the field who see where economic aid ought to be applied and those who decide where that aid actually goes. Those farther away from the field tend to support larger projects, while those in the field tend to support those projects which produce jobs quickly for the local population. While both kinds of projects are necessary, it is fruitless to limit efforts to large economic initiatives that do not benefit local citizens concretely, thus securing their support for the government. General Colin Powell is quoted as repeating that ‘the ‘field’ is always right’, meaning that the instincts of those on the ground ought to be heeded: Mines, K. W. (2006, September 28). Economic Tools in Counterinsurgency and Postconflict Stabilization: Lessons Learned (and Relearned) in al Anbar, Iraq, 200304. Retrieved September 4, 2009, from Foreign Policy Research Institute: http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20060928.military.mines.economictoolscounterinsurgency.html 198 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 149 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 12 aprelya 1979 goda: O nashei dal’neishei linii v svyazi s polozheniem v Afganistane,” 12 April 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 4, Ll. 9. 199 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 757. Also see: Bach, Q. V. (2003). Soviet Aid to the Third World: the Facts and Figures. Sussex, England: The Book Guild Ltd, 84.
60
Liakhovsky notes that the Soviet military command organized the disbursement of basic
goods, such as flour and kerosene, which “did improve people’s lives to some extent”.200
Overall, however, due to strained supply lines and limited control over the countryside,
initiatives to improve employment or stimulate local economies were not widespread in
Afghanistan. This was a significant weakness of the Soviet economic program.
Published agreements between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan during the period
of the Soviet‐Afghan war include numerous programs and generous credits aimed at
stimulating Afghanistan’s economy. To illustrate the overall trend of Soviet programs
throughout Afghanistan, a sampling of programs from the following categories will be
discussed below: natural resources, construction, agricultural development and training.
The use of natural resources was an important category in Soviet‐Afghan economic
initiatives. In an agreement totaling covering the years 1979‐1984 and totaling 270 million
rubles, there were projects for construction of a mining operation in Ainak, an oil refinery,
and oil wells in Angot, Akdarya and Kashkari.201 In another agreement signed in 1988, plans
were set to enhance the natural gas industry, to include projects for exploration and
construction of facilities.202 See Appendix I, Graphic 4 for a graphical representation of funds
allocated to this sector of the economy during the Soviet‐Afghan war.
Construction, improvement and maintenance of infrastructure was an aspect of
most project agreements. For example, an agreement for the years 1979‐1984 included
construction and improvement of an airport in the region of Kabul, and six other airports in
northeast Afghanistan.203 Another agreement for 1981‐1985 included plans for the
construction of three professional‐technical schools.204 In an agreement signed in 1979,
200 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 756‐7. 201 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1981). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXV). Moscow, Russia, 191‐195. 202 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1990). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XLIV). Moscow, Russia, 268‐271. 203 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1981). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXV). Moscow, Russia, 191‐196. 204 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1983). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXVII). Moscow, Russia, 93‐94.
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plans were agreed upon for the construction of seven tractor‐manufacturing facilities.205
Included in this same agreement were initiatives to promote the use of modern agricultural
methods.206 See Appendix I, Graphic 5 for graphical representation of projects in
construction and agriculture.
Most projects included exchange and training of Afghan workers. Soviet specialists
were routinely sent to Afghanistan, and Afghan workers were also hosted for training in the
USSR. One typical project, for 1980‐1984, included provisions for creating five training sites
in Afghanistan, the hosting of 350 Afghan workers per year for three month training
sessions in the USSR, and the arrival of 115 Soviet specialists to work as instructors in
Afghan institutions.207 This aspect of Soviet economic assistance was very widespread –
there were numerous opportunities for Afghans to study in the USSR and many Soviet
specialists were sent to Afghanistan as trainers.208
Soviet aid to Afghanistan’s economy in the form of economic credits, unremunerated
assistance and training was substantial during the Soviet‐Afghan war. Soviet leaders hoped
that stimulating the Afghan economy would increase support for the PDPA government and
decrease support for the Afghan resistance. Despite many promising elements in this
component of their program, however, the potential of economic initiatives was greatly
limited by other aspects of the counterinsurgency situation in Afghanistan. Wide‐ranging
programs in rural areas were unrealistic due to lack of government influence throughout
the country. Centralized decision‐making and poor mechanisms for integrating civil and
military operations resulted in economic programs that were not supported by military
actions, and vice versa. Nevertheless, it is clear that Soviet leaders understood the
importance of economic tools for counterinsurgency and worked at implementing measures
in this area. In the latter stages of the Soviet incursion, Soviet leaders came to an
205 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1981). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXV). Moscow, Russia, 195‐198. 206 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1981). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXV). Moscow, Russia, 195‐198. 207 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1981). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXV). Moscow, Russia, 197‐198. 208 Many of these training opportunities are listed in this paper’s sections on propaganda and social initiatives.
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accommodation by using the U.N. as a channel of distribution. This is evident in some of
the large multi‐year plans where half of the allocations were handled through the U.N.209
Increased allocations are seen at the end of the Soviet military involvement. The relation
between non‐military initiatives and military actions is worthy of more study. The analysis
in this paper indicates a broad range of Soviet non‐military and military efforts. The latter is
discussed in the following chapter.
Chapter 4. Soviet Counterinsurgency: Military Aspects
“The military servicemen themselves, who were in Afghanistan, believed that they were fulfilling the duty of protecting the southern boundary of their homeland and that they were acting on behalf of the Afghan people. After all, the 40th Army was tasked with a peacekeeping mission – to facilitate the stabilization of the situation in the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]” – Major General Liakhovsky210
Decentralization
Zones of Responsibility
Conducting a successful counterinsurgency requires maintaining a balance between
coercion and persuasion, coordination between military and civilian entities and a unified
effort carried out simultaneously by commanders across a region. It is necessary for
military leadership to understand the effect of its actions, when to share responsibilities
with civilian or host nation groups and how to instill unity of effort across the entire
undertaking. Many counterinsurgency experts, including Roger Trinquier, David Galula and
Kalev Sepp, maintain that counterinsurgency campaigns should be managed by one
209 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1990). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XLIV). Moscow, Russia, 278‐281. 210 Liakhovsky, A. (1995). Tragedia i Doblest' Afgana. Moscow: GPI Iskona, 617.
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executive.211 One executive overseeing the counterinsurgency is meant to facilitate progress
without confusion, and to coordinate all efforts effectively so that they complement one
another. Diffuse leadership generally precludes orderly progress of this sort. In the current
day, the United States military tries to incorporate this concept in its own
counterinsurgency operations. General David Petraeus in Iraq, and now General Stanley
McChrystal in Afghanistan are examples of leaders given substantial latitude in managing
efforts across military and civilian agencies.212
One of the weaknesses of Soviet counterinsurgency in Afghanistan was the lack of
decisive leadership and vision for the campaign. Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov,
Konstantin Chernenko, and Mikhail Gorbachev were variously too feeble, fleeting or
uncommitted to manage the situation in Afghanistan effectively.213 Soviet military leaders,
regardless of their abilities or vision for the campaign, were tied to these administrations, as
they had to approve plans through Moscow.214 This process was cumbersome, and, as
Afghanistan veteran General Bogdanov notes, “limited the independence and initiative of
the army command”.215 Bogdanov also writes that the centralization of the Soviet command
structure gave Afghan leaders the ability of ceding too much responsibility to the Soviets for
failures and overall planning.216 This structure and institutional ethos were not optimal in a
211 See: Trinquier, R. (1964). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 73. Also: Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 61. Also: Sepp, K. I. (2005, May‐June). Best Practices in Counterinsurgency. Military Review , 8‐12. 212 The following article outlines the high expectations placed on military leaders and the extent to which they answer for the overall counterinsurgency effort. In Afghanistan, newly appointed Gen. McChrystal is expected to make significant progress, but also afforded substantial resources: Chandrasekaran, R. (2009, August 17). Pentagon Worries Led to Command Change. Retrieved August 20, 2009, from The Washington Post: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2009/08/16/AR2009081602304.html 213 In 1986 Gorbachev expressed the opinion that the Soviet military involvement should end in “one year – maximum two years”. This short time indicates the Gorbachev was not committed to a genuine counterinsurgency effort, and simply wanted to get out quickly for political reasons: “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November 1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 3. 214 General Bogdanov, Gromov and Liakhovsky all describe the process of approving plans through the various levels of Soviet leadership. See: Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 19791989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 93‐4. Also: Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 243‐4. Also: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 492. 215 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 19791989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 94‐5. 216 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 19791989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 94‐5.
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conflict where empowering host‐nation forces and timely responses to local situations and
were highly important.
While having one leader in charge of the overall effort is important,
counterinsurgency experts such as Galula, Trinquier and Kilcullen also note that it is
important to divide a given region into zones of responsibility, allowing subordinate leaders
to manage each zone independently in promoting the campaign’s overarching intent. Both
Galula and Trinqueir maintain that the commander of a zone should have authority on
operations and programs therein, even over more senior officers in matters directly
regarding his area of responsibility.217 The idea is that officers in the districts have the
perspective needed to produce counterinsurgency efforts that correspond closely to local
conditions. This is crucial, since the overarching counterinsurgency strategy must be
implemented specially for each locale, as insurgencies tend to be “local… and are mosaic‐
like”.218 David Kilcullen emphasizes this point in his writings, urging that counterinsurgency
is best conducted locally, arguing that ‘one size does not fit all’ across many regions.219 This
concept is especially relevant in Afghanistan where diverse ethnicities and tribes make one
region decidedly different from another. For example, initiatives for co‐opting Sunni
Pashtun tribes in Kunar province, would be ill suited for the Shia Hazaras of Bamyan
province.
The Soviet command did work to incorporate the concept of regional zones and
localized efforts. In the summer of 1980, prompted by Soviet leadership, Afghanistan was
divided into eight military‐political zones of responsibility.220 A representative of the PDPA
Central committee and Revolutionary Council was appointed to each zone to oversee
military and political initiatives in the area. These representatives were tasked with
217 Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 65. Trinquier, R. (1961). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 73. 218 Teamey, K., & Sweet, L. J. (2006, September‐October). Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency. Military Review , 24‐29. 219 Kilcullen, D. (2006). TwentyEight Articles: Fundamentals of Companylevel Counterinsurgency, 9. 220 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 69.
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coordinating the activities of the Khad, Sarandoy221 and Soviet and Afghan military units.222
The Soviets augmented zone administrations with their own representatives from the
Central Committee of the CPSU, KGB and Soviet army.223 Afghanistan’s area was further
divided into twenty‐one smaller ‘regime zones’224, which were divided again into smaller
components (uchastki).225
Uchastki included a guard post of about 20‐25 men, as well as Afghan government
representatives.226 This structure resembles the one used by the French in Algeria, who
divided that territory into six wilayas, and subsections within each wilaya.227 Trinqueir uses
this example as an illustration of effective division of area for counterinsurgency strategy.
One example of the local approach to counterinsurgency created in conjunction with local
commands was the use of pro‐government defense committees to work at the city, village,
street and neighborhood level.228 These committees were responsible for monitoring the
appearance of newcomers and tracking the general mood of the population.229 As noted by
U.S. forces in Iraq, local self‐defense personnel “provide great military value… and could
easily pick out those who did not belong”.230
221 Sarandoy is the Afghan police force. 222 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 69. 223 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 509. 224 The term in Russian is rezhimnaya zona. 225225 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 533. 226 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 19791989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 98. 227 Trinquier, R. (2006). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 57. 228 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 73. 229 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 73. 230 Koloski, A. W., & Kolasheski, J. S. (2009). Thickening the Lines: Sons of a Iraq, A Combat Multiplier. Military Review , 89 (1), 41‐53. It is worth noting that the development of local self‐defense units in Iraq coincided with a troop surge that reinforced many of the positive results of the program. The Soviet forces in Afghanistan did not benefit from such a troop increase, one of the reasons their successes were reversed.
66
Role of Junior Officers
As noted above, it is very important that counterinsurgency operations correspond
closely with political and military conditions at the local level. This often means affording
lower‐level officers increased responsibility and autonomy. As is true in any
counterinsurgency, the implementation of strategy rests on the shoulders of soldiers and
their junior officers. Roger Trinquier made special mention of this point in his book on
counterinsurgency, noting that “guerrilla warfare is a war of lieutenants and young
captains”.231
The Soviet army was at a disadvantage in this respect, because its command
structure was highly centralized.232 Robert Cassidy notes that armies have a tendency to
prepare for “the last good war”.233 In the Soviet case this tendency created a rigidly
conventional mentality that was primarily focused on large engagements based on the
experience of World War II. A centralized command structure was well suited for the large
European battles envisioned by Soviet leaders, but the outcome was an institutional culture
that tended to discourage junior officers and NCOs from taking the initiative. In Afghanistan,
centralized command was a hindrance, because the rugged terrain and the nature of the
enemy demanded timely and independent decisions on the part of company commanders
and platoon leaders, as well as their NCOs. Junior leaders had heightened influence in the
Afghan theater, as most missions were conducted by battalion‐sized units or smaller, and
they often had unique knowledge of local conditions.234
The Soviet command did make adjustments to decentralize its structure as it
became clear that successful operations required independent‐thinking officers.
Commanders at the regiment and battalion level were given increased responsibility and
231 Trinquier, R. (2006). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 74. 232 Cassidy, R. M. (2006). Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. London: Praeger Security International, 49. 233 Cassidy, R. M. (2006). Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. London: Praeger Security International, 49. 234 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 19791989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 185.
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autonomy in operations. This came in the form of added firepower and assets assigned to
the battalion level to support smaller units in a wide variety of situations.235 This was
referred to as the reinforced battalion.236 Also, starting in the first few years of the conflict,
military leaders at the zone level were given increasing authority to conduct operations
independently.237 This was an indication that the Soviet command understood the
importance of encouraging autonomous action at all levels.
One account of a Soviet senior lieutenant in 1982 illustrates the importance of
junior leaders taking the initiative. Having been ordered to conduct a flanking maneuver,
lieutenant Zelenskiy lost radio contact with his commanding officer and subordinates. At
this point, the mission stalled and eventually had to be aborted. In this situation, both the
senior lieutenant and his platoon leaders needed to react independently. The confusion
after losing radio contact illustrates the broader theme that junior officers were
unaccustomed to functioning without the guidance of officers above them.238 In another
instance, an officer in charge of a convoy escort is criticized for insufficient pre‐mission
rehearsals and preparations; the fact the officer is criticized for this deficiency suggests that
junior officers and NCOs were not sufficiently relied upon to take responsibility for such
tasks. Lester Grau correctly points out that NCOs should be responsible for such
preparations, allowing officers to focus on other critical tasks.239
In response to such issues, Soviet leaders worked to develop the officer corps by
establishing increased training opportunities for officers before and during deployment. In
January of 1981, Defense Minister Ustinov issued a plan that included a section on training;
the section’s main focus was the incorporation of combat experience into military training
235 Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 35. 236 Bodansky, Y. (1982‐3). The Bear on the Chessboard: Soviet Military Gains in Afghanistan. World Affairs , 145 (3), 283. 237 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 69. 238 Grau, L. (1991). The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. Washington, DC, USA: National Defense University Press, 17. 239 Grau, L. (1991). The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. Washington, DC, USA: National Defense University Press, 138‐9.
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and the development of mountain and desert training programs.240 In 1982, an expanded
training program was created, focusing on developing the skills and knowledge necessary
for effective leadership in Afghanistan’s irregular war conditions.241 Officers spent more
time learning to coordinate assets assigned to their unit – a very relevant skill, since more
assets were being allocated to junior officers in order to facilitate independent action.242 On
June 2nd of 1983 directive number 15/085 ordered the implementation of measures for
enhanced training for officers.243 This was initially conducted at military academies, but
later moved to a site near Tashkent, Uzbekistan.244 Officer training battalions increased in
1984 and 1985, and included the study of mujahedeen tactics and training for independent
actions.245 In addition to this, officers went through an intensive course upon arrival to
Afghanistan that focused on key skills for planning and combat. There were training
segments aimed to help officers develop initiative, independence and creativity in mission
planning and execution.246 Developing the NCO corps was acknowledged as important as
well, and NCOs were increasingly included in training with commissioned
officers.247Integrated training was important for heightening unit teamwork.248
In the final analysis, the Soviet military was unable to fully transition from its
centralized and conventional military culture, and create an ethos effective for Afghanistan.
Robert Cassidy notes, however, that such cultural change in a military institution often
240 This is found in a declassified document included in the appendix of General Alexander Liakhovsky’s history of the Afghan war: “Plan meropriyatii po povysheniu effektivnosti boevykh deistvii sovetskykh i afganskikh voisk v DRA, obobshcheniu i rasprostraneniu ikh boevogo opyta i sovershenstvovaniu oruzhiya na yanvar’ – mart 1981 goda,” 8 January 1981 (Secret), accessed in: Liakhovsky, A. (1995). Tragedia i Doblest' Afgana. Moscow: GPI Iskona, Appedix 3. 241 Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 45. 242 Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 45. 243 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 541. 244 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 541. 245 Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 44. Also: Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 19791989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 267. 246 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 542. Also: Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 45. 247 Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 46. Also: Liakhovsky, A. (1995). Tragedia i Doblest' Afgana. Moscow: GPI Iskona, 193. 248 In translating discussions between Russian and U.S. generals at a Harvard Kennedy School conference in 2008, I noted that the principles of training NCOs remains a topic of interest for Russian military professionals, as this area of the Russian army continues to need improvement. Russian officers were very interested to learn about the organization of this training in the United States Army.
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occurs over long periods of time, up to ten years – more time than the 40th Army spent in
Afghanistan.249 Nevertheless, as I have outlined above, Soviet military leaders pursued
many effective policies, attempting changes to better structure their force for the mission in
Afghanistan.
Limiting Outside Support for the Insurgency
It is hard to overstate the significance of outside support for insurgencies. Military
and political counterinsurgency initiatives, no matter how well formulated or executed, can
have limited effect on an insurgency if it is sustained by substantial support from outside
sources. Bernard Fall, Roger Trinquier and others discuss this issue in their works on
counterinsurgency.250 Both Fall and Trinquier assert the importance of limiting outside
support and the active targeting of enemy supply sources and sanctuaries with the use of
guerilla tactics (even if these supply sources and sanctuaries are in other countries).
Outside support was a central issue in the Soviet‐Afghan experience. This is evident
in a letter from Leonid Brezhnev to Fidel Castro that “On our end we are for political
normalization, but genuine normalization, aimed at… the effective and guaranteed cessation
of aggression an all forms of interference in the matters of Afghanistan”.251 General Gromov
writes that the question of patrolling Afghanistan’s borders was the first item of discussion
in the morning meetings of the 40th Army’s headquarters.252
Not only was outside support an incendiary geopolitical issue, it had a great effect
on the mujahedeen forces. Weapons, ammunition and fighters from Iran and Pakistan were
249 Cassidy, R. M. (2006). Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. London: Praeger Security International, 38. 250 See: Fall, B. B. (1963). Street Without Joy: Insurgency in Indochina, 194663 (3rd Revised Edition). Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, USA: The Telegraph Press, 357‐362. Also: Trinquier, R. (2006). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 79‐81. 251 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 187 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 10 marta 1980 goda: O nashei dal’neishei vneshnepoliticheskoi linii v svyazi s Afganistanom i ob otvete na obrashchenie F. Kastro,” 10 March 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 5, Ll. 3 (v Prilozhenii I; in Appendix I of this document). 252 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 220. Also see: A report on 7 April 1980 for the Central Committee of the CPSU, Situation inside Afghanistan and the Role of Soviet Troops: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 452‐454. Also, a document of the Central Committee of CPSU, On Foreign Interference in Internal Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA): Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 466‐467.
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important logistical supports for the Afghan resistance. This became especially true after
the Soviets commenced increased aviation strikes on mujahedeen‐friendly areas within
Afghanistan, destroying many domestic bases of support.253 It is also important to note that
the outside support extended to the mujahedeen was considerable – as high as hundreds of
millions of dollars per year ‐ coming from the United States, China, Saudi Arabia and other
wealthy nations.254
Many in the United States saw the situation in Afghanistan as an opportunity to
deliver a defeat to the Soviet Union. This is confirmed by Milt Bearden, a CIA officer in
charge of a support program for the mujahedeen, who recounts that CIA director William
Casey told him to ‘go over there and win’.255 Afghan war veteran Major General Liakhovsky
saw the outside support for the mujahedeen as a mean‐spirited campaign perpetrated by
those with deep hatred for Russia, considering CIA director William Casey the incarnation of
the devil, and noting pointedly that his efforts helped support the rise of Osama bin
Laden.256
Soviet leaders understood that eliminating outside support would severely weaken
the mujahedeen. Bernard Fall writes, “A guerrilla force’s logistical requirements may be
simpler than that of a large regular force, but it has some rock‐bottom needs which must be
filled through outside support, or it dies”.257 Accordingly, significant time and effort was
devoted to condemning outside support for the Afghan insurgency and coaxing foreign
countries to end their activities. In 1980 Brezhnev authorized the withdrawal of certain
units from Afghanistan with the expressed intent of using this move to win greater
253 In a report to the Minister of Defense in April 1986, General Varennikov discusses increasing the aerial targeting of mujahedeen sanctuaries: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 648‐9. 254 Coll, S. (2004). Ghost Wars. New York: The Penguin Press, 65. 255 Bearden, M., & Risen, J. (2003). The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB. New York, New York, USA: Random House, 214. 256 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 683‐4. 257 Fall, B. B. (1963). Street Without Joy: Insurgency in Indochina, 194663 (3rd Revised Edition). Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, USA: The Telegraph Press, 359.
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cooperation from Pakistan and Iran and the ceasing of their support for the mujahedeen.258
This did not bring the desired results.
Sealing the borders of Afghanistan by military means was an exceedingly difficult
task. Roger Trinquier notes that frontier borders are a tough issue for the counterinsurgent;
Afghanistan is a particularly difficult case due to difficult terrain and ethnic factors.259 When
asked in 1979 why the border was not more closely controlled, President Taraki replied
that “We are unable to do it due to the absence of the necessary means. Besides this, closing
the Afghan‐Pakistani borders would evoke dissatisfaction on the part of both Afghan and
Pakistani Pashtuns and Baluchis, which maintain close family ties, and it would ultimately
hurt the prestige of the current government in Afghanistan”.260 These same issues continued
throughout the war. Supplies and personnel entered Afghanistan through difficult mountain
passes, in small caravans of pack animals, and over a long border unrecognized by tribes on
either side. In a Politburo meeting in 1986, General Akhromeev noted this issue saying that
“Soviet soldiers are working to seal the border [with Pakistan], but they are unable to close
off all channels, through which supplies come across”.261 This task was so difficult, and the
border so porous, that it was noted in a Politburo meeting that mujahedeen‐controlled
areas often had better supplies (which came from Pakistan) than government‐controlled
areas that supposedly had access to the resources of the Afghan state.262
Trinquier stresses the importance of working to combat outside support through
closing borders to illicit traffic and attacking enemy bases in the fashion of guerilla
fighters.263 The Soviet strategy in Afghanistan followed both these points of
258 “Vypiska is protokola No. 200 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 19 iyunya 1980 goda: O meropriyatiyakh v otnoshenii Afganistan,” 19 June 1980 (Top Secret), in Arkhiv Prezidenta RF, F. 3, Op. 82, D. 176, Ll. 9‐17 (accessed in Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 455). 259 Trinquier, R. (2006). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 79. 260 “Zapis’ Besedy L.I. Brezhneva s N.M. Tarki 20 marta 1979 g. (V besede prinyali uchastie t.t. A.N. Kosygin, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov i B.N. Ponomarev),” 20 March 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 2, Ll. 8. 261 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November 1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 8. 262 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November 1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 89. 263 Trinquier, R. (2006). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 81.
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recommendation, indicating sound elements of strategy on the part of Soviet leaders. Soviet
leaders were discussing this issue from the beginning of the occupation. In April of 1980 a
report to the CPSU mentioned the need for Soviet and Afghan forces to control Afghanistan’s
borders to protect the country from outside threats.264 Vasiliy Mitrokhin notes that KGB
leaders “insisted on the complete… sealing of the borders with Pakistan, Iran, China”.265 To
this end, five thousand additional forces were emplaced on patrol duty, carrying out
ambushes and otherwise intercepting mujahedeen caravans.266 In May of 1980, additional
border troops were emplaced in the key areas bordering Pakistan and China; these troops
were successful in securing a four hundred kilometer stretch of the border, closing off
sixteen passes and routes into Afghanistan.267 In 1981, Andropov authorized intensification
of efforts against enemy caravans. Five additional border troop brigades were assigned as a
second line of intercept against the mujahedeen in 1981 by the order of Defense Minister
Ustinov.268 These forces, as well as KGB special units, set ambushes and mined paths used
by the enemy.269 These measures were substantial enough to prompt Babrak Karmal to say
that, “Now, that in the name of saving the Afghan revolution the Soviet Union has taken such
a serious step, the fates of our nations have indeed merged together”.270
264 A report on 7 April 1980 for the Central Committee of the CPSU, Situation inside Afghanistan and the Role of Soviet Troops: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 452‐454. 265 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 68. 266 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 68. 267 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 68. 268 This is found in a declassified document included in the appendix of Alexander Liakhovsky’s history of the Afghan war: “Plan meropriyatii po povysheniu effektivnosti boevykh deistvii sovetskykh i afganskikh voisk v DRA, obobshcheniu i rasprostraneniu ikh boevogo opyta i sovershenstvovaniu oruzhiya na yanvar’ – mart 1981 goda,” 8 January 1981 (Secret), accessed in: Liakhovsky, A. (1995). Tragedia i Doblest' Afgana. Moscow: GPI Iskona, Appedix 3. 269 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 68. 270 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 69.
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Efforts to close the borders of Afghanistan and limit support for the Afghan
resistance continued for the duration of the conflict. Operation ‘Curtain’ began in 1984, and
consisted of increased patrolling and ambushing of mujahedeen caravans.271 This effort, in
revamped form, was renamed ‘Barrier’ in 1987.272 Special forces and KGB special units were
increasingly used for these tasks.273 General Gromov notes that in 1985 two spetsnaz
brigades were assigned to reinforce the effort to close off the border with Pakistan.274
Teams of helicopters were also used to patrol from the air, and would land with search
crews to inspect caravans.275 Trinquier’s point that “with the methods of modern warfare,
we must carry the war to the enemy” is echoed by Bernard Fall, who asserts that infiltrating
enemy sanctuaries is necessary for undercutting an insurgency.276 The Soviets actively
pursued this approach as well, cultivating agent networks and conducting special
operations in Pakistan.277
Soviet efforts to close the border and limit insurgent supply processes did bring
some success. Alexander Liakhovsky notes that in many regions in 1985 the mujahedeen
“were deprived of large supply bases… military supplies, provisions, [and] medical
equipment”.278 Shortages in supply were so intense at times that mujahedeen leadership
organized special units specifically for maneuvering caravans past Soviet troops and into
Afghanistan.279 Despite all the measures undertaken by the Soviets and their moments of
271 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 521. 272 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 521. 273 Major General Luchinsky’s account of this operation mentions this increased use of specialized units. See: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 521. 274 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 199. 275 Russian General Staff (translated and edited by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress). (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 218‐219. Also: Everett‐Heath, J. (1992). Helicopters in Combat. New York, New York, USA: Arms and Armour Press, 130. 276 Trinquier, R. (2006). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 81. Also: Fall, B. B. (1963). Street Without Joy: Insurgency in Indochina, 194663 (3rd Revised Edition). Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, USA: The Telegraph Press, 357. 277 Many such operations directed at Pakistan and other countries are outlined in the following document: Mitrokhin, V. (2004, April). KGB Active Measures in Southwest Asia in 198082 . Retrieved May 24, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (document is in translation). : http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=3FF29963‐ABFA‐30E0‐344EE1596C121EDF&sort=Subject&item=Soviet%20Union,%20relations%20with%20Afghanistan&print=true 278 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 644. 279 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 205
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efficacy, Afghanistan’s borders were still crossed by mujahedeen reinforcements and
supplies throughout the conflict.280 The enduring sanctuaries in Pakistan and influx of
support were major reasons the mujahedeen were able to withstand the Soviet army, and
persist in spite of military defeats. The Soviet strategy regarding the borders and
mujahedeen caravans clearly shows, however, that substantial attempts were made to
address this problem. The Soviet command simply did not have enough troops to complete
the task.
Monitoring the Population
Whether one approaches counterinsurgency from the population‐centric or enemy‐
centric approach, or somewhere in between, monitoring the population remains a vital
element in the counterinsurgency effort. Monitoring and controlling the population helps
the counterinsurgent limit contacts between the insurgent and the population. If the
counterinsurgent is successful in limiting these contacts, this becomes a significant blow to
the insurgent’s support system.281 Monitoring the population is also a vital element in
intelligence gathering; in the context of counterinsurgency, understanding the mood of the
population is often as important as accessing more classified information about the
enemy.282 Roger Trinquier maintains that establishing strict curfews, issuing census cards
and conducting broad ranging searches and interrogations are necessary for controlling the
280 General Akhromeev makes this point in the following document, expressing that even large numbers of Soviet troops are “unable to seal all channels across which supplies cross the border”, implying that there were just too many routes: “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November 1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 8. 281 David Galula notes the importance of isolating the population from the insurgency, placing it in his ‘Strategy of Counterinsurgency. See: Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 55‐56. 282 Teamey, K., & Sweet, L. J. (2006, September‐October). Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency. Military Review , 24‐29.
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population and isolating it from the insurgency.283 Soviet forces implemented all of these
measures.
Afghan war veteran and historian Major General Alexander Liakhovsky notes that
all males over the age of thirteen were required to register with the Soviet authorities
overseeing the area; it was required to carry documentation of this registration at all
times.284 Curfews were maintained, as well as a mandatory registration process for any
visitors or supplies entering the area.285 General V.A. Bogdanov notes that curfews were
typically set for eleven pm and that the implementation of a personal identification
document was completely new for Afghanistan.286 It was also necessary for Afghan citizens
to receive special permission to host non‐family members in their homes.287
Law enforcement and intelligence agencies played an important role in monitoring
the population. KGB‐trained Afghan law‐enforcement and security agencies were built up to
significant numbers. In a meeting of Soviet leaders in 1986, General Akhromeev mentioned
that there were 115,000 Afghan police troops and 20,000 Khad and other agency forces.288
Training local law enforcement and participating in police work is vital to the
counterinsurgent, even though it is not traditionally a role played by the military. Trinquier
notes that in counterinsurgency “Police action will… be actual operational warfare”.289
Security agencies conducted extensive search and interrogation operations in areas where
the Kabul government projected its influence.290 Vasiliy Mitrokhin notes that these agencies
helped create some two hundred self‐defense units that acted in support of the government,
283 Trinquier, R. (2006). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 38‐41. 284 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 532. 285 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 532‐3. 286 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 19791989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 96. 287 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 532‐3. 288 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November 1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 8. 289 Trinquier, R. (2006). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 41. 290 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 83.
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providing agents and information.291 For example, in the first quarter of 1983 Afghan
government agencies were using eight hundred agents that had infiltrated insurgent
groups.292 Their information directed government forces in 140 air strikes and 360 local
attacks.293 These forces also conducted many search operations to locate and destroy
insurgent organizations.
While the Soviets had a sound strategy in this area in many respects, they did not
project influence into enough of the country to see the benefits of these measures. Lack of
troops, poor infrastructure and Afghanistan’s rural society made it very difficult to
sufficiently control the peaceful Afghan population and isolate them from the
mujahedeen.294
One of the reasons that Soviets had difficulty projecting their influence throughout
the country was that their forces were too few and spread too thinly. Soviet forces were
often spread out in small remote outposts, having as many as 862 guarded objectives
manned by some 20,200 troops.295 In order to address this problem, the Soviet command
tried to consolidate forces and efforts in specific areas, as it was clear that relatively low
troop levels precluded effective control of the entire country.296 Soviet leaders started with
more peaceful regions in northern Afghanistan, establishing good surveillance of the
291 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 83. 292 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 83. 293 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 83. 294 Trinquier notes that insurgents are typically most vulnerable in towns, and difficult to counteract in more rural areas. Afghanistan, being mostly rural, was a difficult place to wage a counterinsurgency: Trinquier, R. (2006). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 60. Also, the following article about current missions in Afghanistan illustrates the role that poor infrastructure plays in complicating efforts to project influence throughout the country: Dreazen, Y. J. (2009, March 4). U.S. Strategy Hinges on FarFlung Outposts. Retrieved March 5, 2009, from The Wall Street Journal: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123611818947423107.html 295 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 19791989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 98. Also, for an interesting description of conditions in U.S. outposts in Afghanistan, see: Chivers, C. (2008, November 9). G.I's in Remote Outposts Have Weary Job, Drawing Fire. Retrieved August 7, 2009, from The New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/world/asia/10outpost.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 296 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 73.
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population, local self‐defense watch groups, and promoting economic and social
initiatives.297 It was envisioned that sustained success in these regions would spread
incrementally through the country.298 The attempt at consolidating aligns exactly with the
recommendations of classical and modern counterinsurgency theorists. Starting efforts in
the more peaceful areas follows the paradigm of the ‘ink blot’, a term used by Marshal
Hubert Lyautey as a metaphor for the slow spread of the counterinsurgent’s influence
throughout a region. The Soviets’ strategy in this respect also dovetails with David
Kilcullen’s recommendation that the counterinsurgent “start from secure areas and work
slowly outwards”.299 David Galula also promotes this method of incrementally spreading
control over the country as well, noting that “Order having been re‐established in the area,
the process may be repeated elsewhere”.300 In modern‐day Afghanistan, U.S and NATO
forces are encountering issues similar to those that faced the Soviets: there are not enough
troops to provide adequate security over the entire country. Counterinsurgency experts are
advocating consolidation of efforts in key areas in similar fashion to the Soviet strategy
described above.301 In a report on Afghanistan from June 2009, experts recommended that
the military “focus available forces where the fewest number of government and coalition
troops can protect the greatest number of Afghans. This will require the coalition to depart
some areas it currently occupies”.302
As outlined above, Soviet forces did adopt sound strategy aimed at controlling the
population and concentrating their resources on defined areas. The Soviets, however, were
unable to implement these measures effectively or broadly enough to see overall success.
297 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 73. 298 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 73. 299 Kilcullen, D. (2006). TwentyEight Articles: Fundamentals of Companylevel Counterinsurgency, 5. 300 Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 56. 301 For interesting overview of current strategy regarding outposts, and the perspectives of various experts, see: Dreazen, Y. J. (2009, March 4). U.S. Strategy Hinges on FarFlung Outposts. Retrieved March 5, 2009, from The Wall Street Journal: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123611818947423107.html 302 Exum, A. M., Fick, N. C., Humayun, A. A., & Kilcullen, D. J. (June 2009). Triage: The Next Twelve Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Center for a New American Security, 16.
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Units and Training
As it became increasingly apparent that the Soviet army was ill‐suited to the conditions
in Afghanistan, the Soviet command worked to restructure the force to be more effective.
One area of adjustments involved changes to units and training. Early on in the Soviet
occupation it became clear that motorized rifle units of conscript soldiers were not well
suited to the tough guerilla fighting and infantry tasks necessary to engage and destroy the
mujahedeen in difficult terrain.303 The Soviet military suffered not only from an overall lack
of troops in Afghanistan, but also from a lack of qualified troops. Overall, it became clear
that mobile, highly trained, and fit troops were needed to carry out the difficult missions
required in Afghanistan. As a result, the Soviet command expanded the use of elite units, re‐
oriented the mission and use of motorized rifle troops, and changed military training to
better prepare soldiers for duty in Afghanistan. While these adjustments were well thought
out, institution‐wide change was difficult to achieve.
The Soviet command’s shift towards the use of elite units aligns with classical
counterinsurgency theory. David Galula, who is often cited regarding the need to win over
the support of the population, did not exclude the use of military force. He advocates the
need for elite units that are “highly mobile and lightly armed”.304 These mobile units,
according to Galula, should be used to engage the enemy, while other static units should
provide security for key infrastructure and population centers. Roger Trinquier promotes a
similar concept of ‘interval troops’ and ‘intervention troops’, mobile units that are tasked
with engaging the enemy and operating freely throughout a region; interval troops
303 The Russian General Staff notes that despite the lack of training doctrine for a conflict like the one in Afghanistan, it was clear early on training had to be restructured: Russian General Staff (translated and edited by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress). (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 43. 304 Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 65.
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functioned in larger units and in a more defined area than the intervention troops.305 Soviet
airborne troops were similar in concept to Trinquier’s interval troops, while the Soviet
special forces (spetsnaz) corresponded loosely to intervention units.
Soviet troop levels were low for the mission in Afghanistan; this was most felt when
trying to hold territory already cleared in large operations. Trinquier designated this task
for what he calls ‘grid troops’. Soviet forces or Afghan government units were often too few
to effectively maintain security after the bulk of Soviet forces left. For this reason, tactical
successes were often reversed because insufficient resources were expended on securing
gains.306
Soviet military leaders learned early in 1980 that the situation in Afghanistan would
require more effort than initially anticipated. General Gromov writes that Soviet casualties
in January of 1980 were a sharp reminder to the Soviet Command that it would be
necessary to view the situation in Afghanistan as nothing less than a war.307 The types of
units employed in Afghanistan were shifted accordingly.
Soviet leaders quickly learned that heavy equipment and tanks were not effective
against the Afghan insurgency. The Soviet command therefore relegated many heavy armor
units to static security and fire support units; lighter armored vehicles were used to
accompany and transport infantry near to their mission objectives.308 In 1980, many tank
units were being sent back to the USSR and replaced by lighter troops, reducing their
numbers by over half.309 For example, in July 1980, two tank regiments and an anti‐aircraft
brigade were sent back to the USSR.310 The Soviet command replaced many of the reserve
305 Trinquier, R. (1961). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 63. 306 General Gromov mentions this pattern in his memoir, noting that even pro‐Soviet provincial leaders had little ability or motivation to be proactive in political work in the countryside: Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 128. Also, the operations in Nangarhar province by Tora Bora in 1981 are an illustration of this pattern. For detailed description and accounts see the following: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 504. 307 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 119. 308 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 19791989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 98. 309309 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 540. Also: Blank, S. J. (1991). Operational and Strategic Lessons of the War in Afghanistan, 197990. Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 73. 310 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 540.
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troops that had been mobilized for the invasion. General Gromov recounts that in 1980
many units were filled with as much as 80% reservists, which made conducting challenging
combat missions very difficult.311 Soviet leaders quickly began to fill the ranks of the
Limited Contingent with specialists and full‐time soldiers in an effort to position the Limited
Contingent for a more substantial and active role in Afghanistan.312
Despite limited resources and initial miscalculations, the Soviet Command did come to a
good understanding of the units necessary for the tasks at hand in Afghanistan. As I will
outline in this section, mobile units were expanded and trained for the specifics of
Afghanistan’s conflict. For example, Major General Luchinsky recalls that the difficult task of
intercepting and ambushing mujahedeen caravans coming from Pakistan came to be
conducted almost solely by spetnaz and other specialized forces.313 In an official letter
describing the situation in Afghanistan, General Varennikov mentions the need for
specialized quick reaction forces to respond to situations around the country.314 Such units
were increasingly used for challenging missions against the mujahedeen. This shift aligned
with the principles of counterinsurgency theory outlined above.
With each passing year airborne and air assault troops were increasingly used in
Afghanistan.315 Parachute jumps were not conducted in Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain,
but insertion by helicopter was necessary for many of the tactics employed by the Soviets.
Extreme terrain often made air landings the only way to emplace troops swiftly enough to
block and intercept mujahedeen forces. Airborne troops were not the only troops that were
air landed; motorized rifle troops were also used in this manner. The increased use of
airborne troops had more to do with their level of training and mentality than parachuting
capabilities. The Soviet army had significantly developed training and selection for airborne
311 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 118. 312 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 118. 313 The mission described here concerns the zone ‘Zavesa’ or ‘Curtain’, which was formulated in 1984 and was aimed at sealing the border with Pakistan. For Luchinsky’s full remarks see: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 521. 314 “Nekotorye itogi boevykh deistvii v provintsiyakh Kunduz i Takhar v avguste 1988 g.,” 1 September 1988 (Secret), in Arkhiv generala armii V.I. Varennikova (accessed in: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 728). 315 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 273.
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units since World War II, and as a result the quality of soldier was much higher in these
units than in others. Soviet airborne units were akin to United States Army Ranger units in
terms of training and mindset. Airborne units chose from top‐quality conscripts when
augmenting their units. General Gromov notes that airborne troops went through
specialized and very rigorous training.316 The contrast between airborne soldiers and those
of other units was very noticeable. One Soviet conscript recounts that:
“A landingassault brigade differs from a motorized rifle regiment in that it has more people who also have better training and more specialization. Their assignments are more serious and strict than for the regular units. Many of these fellows were good athletes and some even knew karate”.317 The Soviet command increasingly relied on these tougher troops to conduct combat
operations in Afghanistan. Missions in Afghanistan were exceedingly difficult. Soldiers had
to carry 30‐40 kilograms of weight, and missions often lasted for several days.318 Soldiers
would typically lose 7‐10 kilograms of body weight after a week in the field, and after longer
missions would require medical help.319 These conditions made it very difficult for average
conscripts to remain combat‐effective in the field.
This shift in strategy and the contrast between the troops was evident to Afghan
insurgent forces as well. A Pakistani officer, who spent time in Afghanistan with the
mujahedeen notes that, “The paratroop (air assault) units fought much more aggressively….
In the months following my arrival the Soviets committed more Special Operations Forces
to the conflict…. I noticed there was a high proportion of paratroops in the Soviet order of
battle, indicating that these units would play a key role in offensive sweeps…. This was
invariably the case”.320
Soviet leaders also relied heavily on spetsnaz and KGB special units for missions
against the mujahedeen. These troops, even more than airborne, were trained to engage
Afghan insurgents on their own terms. General Gromov writes that the officers and soldiers
316 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 274. 317 Alexiev, A. (1988). Inside the Soviet Army in Afghanistan. RAND. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 29. 318 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 494. 319 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 495. 320 Yousaf, B. M., & Adkin, M. M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story. London: Leo Cooper, 56.
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of these units had “fantastic military and physical training”, and worked to receive good
intelligence through establishing ties with the local population.321 KGB units, such as ‘Grom’
(literally trans.: ‘thunder’) and ‘Zenit’ (literally trans.: ‘zenith’) proved themselves during
operations in Kabul at the start of the invasion in 1979. In 1980, Andropov approved the
expansion of such units to one thousand people.322 At this time, two additional units –
‘Kaskad’ and ‘Omega’ – were established.323 In July 1981 the Politburo approved the
creation of yet another such specialized group – ‘Vimpel’ – to augment Soviet Special Forces.
These units maintained very rigorous selection processes; Soviet Special Forces troops
were not only physically and tactically superior to regular forces, but were often trained in
foreign languages and cultures.324 The capabilities of these units are similar to those of
French SAS units, which were assigned experts in Arabic language and culture, and noted as
being successful in counterinsurgency in Algeria for this reason.325
Soviet special units participated in many offensive and intelligence operations, even
creating groups of Afghan fighters who posed as mujahedeen.326 Vasiliy Mitrokhin reports
that there were eighty‐six such groups by January of 1983.327 Similar groups had success in
other counterinsurgencies. General Crook, who fought in the American Indian wars of the
19th century, is known to have planted teams of friendly Apaches into hostile areas in order
to foment confusion and conflict.328 The Selous Scouts of Rhodesia were another indigenous
outfit used in counterinsurgency with great success: they were credited with more than two 321 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 199‐200. 322 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 531. 323 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 531. 324 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 531. 325 Cassidy, R. M. (2006). Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. London: Praeger Security International, 160. 326 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, February). The KGB in Afghanistan Geographical Volume 1 (translation from The Mitrohkin Archive). Retrieved March 12, 2009, from Cold War International History Project: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=CDE50D78‐CB01‐8B7A‐D4E5A68856CA3CD9&sort=Subject&item=Soviet%20Union,%20relations%20with%20Afghanistan&print=true . Also: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 530. 327 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, February). The KGB in Afghanistan Geographical Volume 1 (translation from The Mitrohkin Archive). Retrieved March 12, 2009, from Cold War International History Project: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=CDE50D78‐CB01‐8B7A‐D4E5A68856CA3CD9&sort=Subject&item=Soviet%20Union,%20relations%20with%20Afghanistan&print=true 328 Cassidy, R. M. (2006). Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. London: Praeger Security International, 159.
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thirds of insurgent casualties within Rhodesia.329 Concrete information regarding particular
actions of specialized Afghan units is scarce, but the concept of employing such forces is one
that has historically been beneficial to the counterinsurgent.
The Soviet command worked hard to improve training both for elite and for regular
troops. At the time of the invasion, even spetsnaz forces had very little specialized mountain
training or equipment. This was obviously a significant disadvantage for an army waging
counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.330 General Gromov writes that the skills previously
taught for mountain warfare were ineffective in Afghanistan, and clearly of use only in
European areas.331 Directive No. D‐314/3/00655 of the General Staff ordered the creation
of special mountain warfare battalions.332 In addition, programs in mountain and convoy
operations were instituted in 1980 for cadets and current motorized rifle troops. These
programs were run by trainers chosen because of their combat experience in
Afghanistan.333 Training sites were established in Central Asian areas near Termez,
Ashkabad, Almaty and Fergana, since conditions in these areas were closer to actual
conditions in Afghanistan than sites deeper within Russia.
In 1981, Defense Minister Ustinov formally directed Soviet troops to enhance
training programs based on combat experience in Afghanistan, and top leaders were
scheduled to visit Afghanistan in order to better understand the relevant conditions and
issues.334 The Soviet military community increasingly studied tactics for irregular warfare
and mountain and desert conditions. The appearance of articles on such topics in Soviet
329 Cassidy, R. M. (2006). Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. London: Praeger Security International, 159‐160. 330 General Gromov notes that lack of preparedness for mountain warfare was a recurring theme in the Soviet Army: Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 126. 331 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 123. 332 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 541. 333 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 541 334 This is found in a declassified document included in the appendix of Alexander Liakhovsky’s history of the Afghan war: “Plan meropriyatii po povysheniu effektivnosti boevykh deistvii sovetskykh i afganskikh voisk v DRA, obobshcheniu i rasprostraneniu ikh boevogo opyta i sovershenstvovaniu oruzhiya na yanvar’ – mart 1981 goda,” 8 January 1981 (Secret), accessed in: Liakhovsky, A. (1995). Tragedia i Doblest' Afgana. Moscow: GPI Iskona, Appedix 3.
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military journals reflected this shift in focus.335 In October of 1985 specialized officer
training was implemented specifically to prepare officers for Afghanistan. The training
included classes on Afghan political and cultural aspects, mountain warfare and
autonomous and independent action.336
Starting in 1984, basic training for recruits was substantially improved and
lengthened (in 1984 it was lengthened to three months, in 1985 it was lengthened to five
months).337 Training incorporated more and more concrete tasks necessary in Afghanistan,
such as night missions and mountain actions – one source notes that 40% of training time
was conducted in a mountain environment.338 Soldiers were trained in tactics like bounding
overwatch and encircling movements.339 Training included challenging field exercises and
special emphasis on key specialties, such as sniper skills and the use of the AGS‐17 (an
automatic grenade launcher).340
Not only did newly developed training programs stress the tactics of irregular
warfare and the need for creative and independent solutions to combat challenges, they
addressed the acceptance of reasonable risk.341 Accepting risk is a key aspect of
counterinsurgency success, as willingness to accept risk often translates into greater
security in the long run. For example, Soviet motorized troops that instinctively stayed close
to road‐bound armored vehicles actually became more vulnerable targets. Accepting risk by
relying less on large fortifications or armor units actually meant greater overall safety.
Many counterinsurgency experts make this point, which is just as relevant today as it was
for the Soviets. David Kilcullen summarizes the concept well in the following excerpt:
335 Here is a sampling of such articles that appeared around the time the Soviet command was beginning to adjust for a counterinsurgency: Vertoletchiki. (1982). Sovetskoe Voennoye Obozrenie (8), 13. Also: Riazanov, L. (1983). Takticheskie Uchenie v Gorakh. Sovetskoe Voennoe Obozrenie (9), 18‐21. Also: Shevchenko, N. (1982). Tekhnicheskoy Obespechenie Obkhodiashchego Otriada. Sovetskoe Voennoe Obozrenie (9), 37‐39. Also: Sidorenko, R., & Moskalev, V. (1983). Po Gornomu Variantu. Sovetskoe Voennoe Obozrenie (1), 22‐24. Also: Vorobyev, I. (1983). Sovremennyi Boj: Voprosy i Otvety 'Kogda v boevom poriadke sozdaetsya obkhodiashchii otriad? Sovetskoe Voennoe Obozrenie (5), 21. 336 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 19791989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 267‐9. 337 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 19791989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 268. 338 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 19791989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 269. 339 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 19791989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 269. 340 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 19791989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 269. 341 Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 45.
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“Movement on foot, sleeping in local villages, night patrolling: all these seem more dangerous than they are. They establish links with the locals, who see you as real people… not as aliens who descend from an armored box. Driving around in an armored convoy and daytripping like a tourist in hell degrades situational awareness, makes you a target and is ultimately more dangerous”.342 This concept is often hard to promote in large armies, however, as they tend to be more
reluctant in taking risks in the context of counterinsurgency than in familiar conventional
combat.343
The burden on the Soviet military’s training system was considerable. Each year
40,000 to 50,000 soldiers had to receive basic training in order to maintain troop levels.344
In addition to casualties, there was significant turnover in personnel, as soldiers and NCOs
had limited service requirements; after time in training, their combat tours lasted eighteen
to twenty‐one months.345 Not only was this a significant strain on the Soviet training system,
it meant that Soviet soldiers were consistently less experienced than their opponents, since
Soviet combat veterans were routinely replaced by inexperienced recruits. Afghan
resistance fighters, of course, did not rotate out and became increasingly experienced in
fighting the Soviets.346
In the face of these challenges, however, the Soviet command pursued very
promising ideas in terms of unit organization and training. The initiatives outlined above
indicate that Soviet leaders understood the kinds of units and training necessary for success
in Afghanistan. Limited troops and institutional inertia, among other factors, prevented
these changes from having the broad effects the Soviet command desired.
342 Kilcullen, D. (2006). TwentyEight Articles: Fundamentals of Companylevel Counterinsurgency, 4. 343 Foust, J. (2009, March 27). Pakistan: Now or Never? Retrieved July 1, 2009, from REUTERS: http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2009/03/27/guest‐contribution‐afghanistans‐garrisons/ 344 Russian General Staff (translated and edited by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress). (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 44. 345 Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 43. 346 This continues to be a challenge in the current day for U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan. In a recent interview, Admiral Mullen noted that Afghan fighters were showing “a level of sophistication that has improved each year”: Bender, B. (2009, August 26). Top Officer Offers a Dire Assessment on Afghanistan. Retrieved August 26, 2009, from Boston.com: The Boston Globe: http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2009/08/26/top_officer_offers_a_dire_assessment_on_afghanistan/
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Intelligence
Without good intelligence, a counterinsurgent is like a blind boxer wasting energy flailing at an unseen opponent.347
Soviet intelligence activity and efforts were at substantially high levels during the
Afghan conflict. Over the course of the decades‐long Soviet‐Afghan relationship, intelligence
services regularly worked with Afghan politicians and security organs to monitor and
influence the situation. In this sense, the Soviets were ahead in the counterinsurgency effort,
already having intelligence personnel in the country. Months before the invasion, KGB
presence was increased in Afghanistan and a special information and analysis group was
formed.348 In March of 1979 the Politburo passed a resolution to send even more advisors to
various departments of the Afghan government.349 As noted in an earlier section, the ability
to monitor and understand an insurgency is the first step to combat it. While mechanisms
for intelligence were not perfect, the Soviets put considerable energy into this area.
Soviet leaders made distinct efforts at managing the many working parts of the
counterinsurgency campaign and the intelligence component in particular.
Counterinsurgency experts generally agree that this coordination in intelligence gathering
is very important. In the counterinsurgency context, much information is gathered by
combat units in the course of their other operations and passed to multiple destinations.350
The diffusion and disconnectedness of separate data flows makes it difficult to organize,
347 Eliot, C., Crane, L. C., Horvath, L. J., & Nagl, L. J. (2006, March‐April). Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency. Military Review , 49‐53. 348 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 16. 349 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 16. 350 Teamey, K., & Sweet, L. J. (2006, September‐October). Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency. Military Review , 24‐29.
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analyze and transform raw intelligence into useful information. It requires adequate
coordination between agencies and personnel. Soviet intelligence understood this aspect of
the counterinsurgency. In 1981, Soviet leaders established a special committee responsible
for coordinating intelligence‐related entities, activities, and information.351 General Gromov
notes that the 40th Army’s command established the practice of daily meetings of
intelligence personnel from the various agencies in order to “sort and analyze… information
together”.352 Such cooperation was crucial for making good use of intelligence and applying
it to the counterinsurgency effort.
Counterinsurgency experts uniformly advise that the creation of host‐nation
intelligence and law enforcement agencies is vital for the counterinsurgency effort. From
the beginning of the conflict, Soviet leaders supported development of the Afghan security
apparatus. This is evident in proceedings of the CPSU in which improving Afghan police and
intelligence is a recurring theme.353 The KGB was fairly effective in creating an Afghan
security apparatus consisting of the Khad, Sarandoy and other agencies.354 In January of
1980 an excerpt from a Politburo protocol noted that Moscow ought to carry out a
“program… of necessary assistance for all lines of work of the security organs, of interior
affairs and police, both in the center and in the provinces”.355 Afghan personnel were
trained on the territory of the Soviet Union as well as in Kabul.356 The Khad functioned in all
29 provinces of the country, and rapidly expanded as the war continued. From January
351 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 69. 352 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 267, 353 “Obstanovka vnutri Afganistana i rol’ sovetskikh voisk,” 7 April 1980 (Top Secret), in Arkhiv Presidenta RF, F. 3, Op. 82, D. 176, Ll. 9‐17 (retrieved from: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 452.) 354 The Khad was formed on the template of the KGB and the Sarandoy was the Afghan police organization. Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 472. 355 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 7. 356 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 83.
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1980 to 1982 its staff increased from 700 to 16,650.357 In 1986 General Akhromeev put the
numbers of Khad and other security agencies at 20,000 and the number of the Sarandoy at
115,000.358 According to Vasili Mitrokhin’s notes, the Khad and Sarandoy had a network of
9,500 informers, and searched thousands of homes in an effort to locate and quell insurgent
activity.359 For example, Mitrokhin reports that 9,600 homes were searched in an operation
in February of 1981 in Kabul.360
With the help and training of the KGB, Afghan security units apprehended and
interrogated many insurgents. One account mentions the capture of the leader of the
organization “Islamic Society of Afghanistan”, who reportedly gave the names of 825
people.361 It was reported that twelve members of this organization were subsequently
recruited and used as informers.362
KGB and Khad agencies went to great lengths to spread disinformation and turn
mujahedeen groups against each other. Soviet efforts were often centered on attempts to
exploit tribal and ethnic rivalries amidst the insurgency.363 Special units of Afghans, posing
as insurgents, worked to instigate conflict in the ranks of the mujahedeen or engage them
357 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 83. 358 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November 1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 8. 359 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 83. 360 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 83. 361 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 83. 362 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 83. 363 Plans to establish contacts with opposition groups in order to co‐opt and divide them is discussed in a meeting of the Politburo in 1980: “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 6‐7. Also, Vasiliy Mitrokhin details a particular instance of the KGB exploiting divisions within the insurgency, when they recruited a Shia Muslim Said Hussein sha Masrur: Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 89.
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by surprise. By 1983 there were eighty‐six such groups.364 Afghan security agents also
worked to co‐opt resistance units, and convince them to work with the Afghan government
forces. One example of such an operation occurred in 1981, when the ‘Kaskad’ unit near
Herat co‐opted Khozhd Shir‐Aga Chungar, the leader of an insurgent unit.365 He began to
work for government forces, eventually came to control forty‐eight villages, and
participated in numerous operations with Soviet special forces.366
Afghan security services functioned in Pakistan as well, as this was a major platform
for the mujahedeen. Bernard Fall notes that the only way to eliminate such insurgency
sanctuaries is to infiltrate them, which is precisely what the KGB and Khad worked to
accomplish.367 By some reports the Afghan foreign intelligence service had 107 agents in
Pakistan.368 In 1980, anti‐Hekmatyar369 pamphlets were distributed in the Peshawar
region.370 Thousands of other pamphlets, written in Dari and Pashto, were distributed in
refugee camps by the Kabul government.371 The KGB and Khad routinely planted articles in
the foreign press, condemning outside support for ‘terrorist’ groups in Afghanistan and
supporting the Kabul government.372 Moscow worked hard to support Kabul’s information
364 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, February). The KGB in Afghanistan Geographical Volume 1 (translation from The Mitrohkin Archive). Retrieved March 12, 2009, from Cold War International History Project: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=CDE50D78‐CB01‐8B7A‐D4E5A68856CA3CD9&sort=Subject&item=Soviet%20Union,%20relations%20with%20Afghanistan&print=true 365 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 90. 366 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 90. 367 Fall, B. B. (1963). Street Without Joy: Insurgency in Indochina, 194663 (3rd Revised Edition). Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, USA: The Telegraph Press, 357. 368 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 86. 369 Gulbudin Hekmatyar was one of the most powerful mujahedeen leaders and a rival of Ahmed Shah Masoud. 370 Pamphlets were also aimed to discredit other leaders such as M. Nabi and S. Mojadeddi: Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 87. 371 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 87. 372 Such instances are detailed in the earlier section on propaganda.
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campaign, funding newspapers and allocating funds for creating radio stations.373
Counterinsurgency calls for intelligence work and personnel at lower levels than in
conventional warfare; local knowledge of the people becomes as important as classified
information in this context.374 The Soviets did work to position intelligence personnel
throughout Afghanistan. Each military‐political zone was assigned KGB and Khad
representatives.375 General Gromov notes that most commanders cultivated their own
networks of intelligence agents, and that spetsnaz units were especially effective in this
area.376 He also mentions that the Soviet command quickly understood the kind of
intelligence work that was most useful in the context of Afghan counterinsurgency, noting
that Soviet leaders “came to the conclusion that effective and painstaking work with the
local population brought results….therefore we established this as a practice and required
commanders at all levels to continually increase the numbers of their agents and
informers”.377 Officer training increasingly emphasized the skills needed to understand
mujahedeen groups and gain intelligence about them through working with the local
population; this included instruction on Afghan cultural and political themes.378
The KGB and Khad placed great emphasis on learning about and disrupting the
Afghan insurgency. However, the mujahedeen had an overwhelming advantage in the area
of intelligence, as sympathizers from the population could readily provide information on
troop movements and mujahedeen informers infiltrated many Afghan units.379
Nevertheless, the Soviets did make considerable efforts in this area.
373 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: Ob okasanii tekhnicheskogo sodeistviya Demokraticheskoi Respublike Afganistan v stroitel’stve radioveshchatel’noi srednevolnovoi radiostantsii moshchnost’iu 1000 kVt,” 29 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 32, D. 20, Ll. 1‐3. 374 Grau, L. W. (2004, July‐August). Something Old, Something New: Guerillas, Terrorists, and Intelligence Analyis. Military Review , 42‐29. 375 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 509. 376 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 200, 264. 377 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 264. 378 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 19791989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 271 379 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 121.
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Tactical Adjustments
“The Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in the Republic of Afghanistan… significantly expanded the theory and practice of combat in mountainousdesert terrain” – Frunze Military Academy380
When the Soviet military invaded Afghanistan in 1979 its operations and tactics
were rooted in military thought that was fundamentally influenced by the conventional
warfare of World War II and by preparations for combat against western armies.381 The
counterinsurgency experience against the Basmachi fighters and later in Ukraine and other
Eastern European countries during and after World War II had been put aside by the Soviet
military to focus on larger conventional threats.382 These earlier counterinsurgency
experiences were not incorporated into doctrine for the Soviet Army, but had many
similarities to the Soviet experience in Afghanistan.383 Soviet commanders initially used
conventional tactics in Afghanistan, and had very limited success.384 The kinds of operations
that were taught and trained in Soviet military universities and training sites were not
effective against the mujahedeen or in Afghanistan’s terrain.385 Over the course of the war,
380 Grau, L. (1991). The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. Washington, DC, USA: National Defense University Press, Foreword xxvii. 381 Cassidy, R. M. (2006). Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. London: Praeger Security International, 49. 382 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 490. 383 In Ukraine (1944‐1956), for example, Soviets employed a broad range of tactics and measures against the insurgency, similar to the their later actions in Afghanistan. Just like in Afghanistan, the Soviets fighting the Ukrainian insurgents initially relied on the Red army for conducting operations, but later began to rely increasingly on specialized NKVD units. Tactics, such as cordon and search, combing and raids were employed. Soviets encouraged the use of indigenous ‘self‐defense units’ and groups posing as insurgents, meant to foment confusion and distrust. Political instruction and propaganda were a central aspect of this campaign. Like in Afghanistan, the Soviet emphasis on intelligence was substantial. While these cases are not identical, Soviet security forces and political entities exhibited many similar reactions and mechanisms in both cases. See: Zhukov, Y. (2007). Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter‐insurgency: The Soviet Campaign Against the Ukranian Insurgent Army. Small Wars and Insurgencies , 18 (3), 439‐466. Also: Potichnyj, P. J. (1987, October 2‐3). Pacification of Ukraine: Soviet Counterinsurgency, 19441956. Retrieved September 13, 2009, from Chronicle of the Ukranian Insurgent Army: http://www.infoukes.com/upa/related/uf.html. 384 One example of the Soviet unpreparedness for irregular combat was illustrated in June 1980, when an entire motorized battalion was caught in a mujahedeen ambush, unable to effectively react and maneuver and subsequently wiped out. See, McMichael, S. R. (1991). Stumbling Bear:Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan. London: Brassey's (UK), 11‐12. 385 General Gromov notes this in his memoir, writing that Soviet tactics for many situations proved ineffective in Afghanistan, and obviously good only for actions in the European theater: Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 122‐3.
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however, the Soviet command did adjust and did introduce new tactics and training that
were more effective against the mujahedeen.
Ultimately, adjustments in the Soviet tactical approach shifted emphasis from heavy
sophisticated equipment functioning in a conventional linear fashion towards lighter mobile
units executing non‐linear tactics. These tactics required a more decentralized command
structure, enhanced assets given to battalion and company‐level commanders and junior
leaders who would take initiative in decision‐making. The nature of combat and the terrain
itself made functioning in large units very difficult, and therefore necessitated lieutenants
and NCOs taking independent action.
The subsections below will include the following sample of tactical and operational
areas in order to illustrate Soviet adjustment to conditions in Afghanistan: the
bronnegruppa, enveloping detachment, ambush, convoy security techniques and
equipment.
Bronnegruppa Concept
The implementation of the bronnegruppa concept was an important tactical
innovation in the Afghan theater. The bronnegruppa (literally translated: ‘armor‐group’)
was a small reserve formation of four to five armored vehicles that would advance behind a
forward group of infantrymen. The bronnegruppa was used to provide immediate fire
support to infantry units that moved forward into difficult terrain.386 The development and
use of the bronnegruppa came in response to problems experienced by motorized rifle
troops, and indicated that Soviet military leaders understood the tactics needed in the
counterinsurgency against the mujahedeen. Motorized rifle troops tended to remain close
to their armored vehicles, reluctant to venture out as light infantry in combat against
386 General V.A. Bogdanov notes that the abundance of terrain impassable to vehicles forced the Soviet command to adjust to a formation which allowed motorized infantry to function away from their vehicles: Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 19791989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 187.
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Afghan insurgents. This tendency to stay near the perceived safety of armored vehicles
actually made Soviet troops more vulnerable as it limited their mobility, making them easy
targets and preventing them from inflicting damage on the mujahedeen.
The bronnegruppa concept mitigated some of these problems by placing soldiers
away from the vehicles, but maintaining the firepower and transportation capability of the
armored vehicle nearby. The bronnegrupppa factored into a broad range of Soviet combat
operations. An operation aimed at destroying resistance strongholds in the Panjshir region
illustrates the bronnegruppa’s use and effectiveness. On the May 17th 1982, after extensive
aviation strikes, Soviet motorized rifle troops and Afghan infantry proceeded through the
valley working to control the heights to either side and destroy any enemy encountered.
The bronnegruppa moved forward on the valley floor providing covering for the infantry.387
In this instance the use of the bronnegruppa provided fire support, and also facilitated the
effective functioning of infantry away from the vehicles.
Bronnegruppas were also frequently used as independent elements.388 The
bronnegruppa was employed to provide fire support for outposts along roads and near
other objectives. General Gromov mentions this in his description of road security outposts,
noting that particularly vulnerable locations would be reinforced by bronnegruppa
formations or other armored vehicles.389
The bronnegruppa was useful as transportation, and used take infantry troops
between mission objectives and bases. In an ambush conducted against a mujahedeen
supply caravan in March 1986 near Khanabad, a bronnegruppa transported troops close to
the objective and remained nearby in order to provide fire support if necessary. After the
successful completion of the ambush, the bronnegruppa arrived to transport the unit back
387 Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 79. 388 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 19791989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 187. 389 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 120.
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to the base camp. At this time, the bronnegruppa helped destroy another small group of the
enemy that was discovered near the ambush site.390
In its supporting role for the infantry the bronnegruppa was also regularly used to
block and encircle the enemy. One mujahedeen commander recounts the experience of
being cut off by Soviet armored vehicles as part of a cordon and search operation. While
some of the Afghan resistance escaped, the blocking movement of the bronnegruppa helped
the operation result in the destruction and capture of hundreds of mujahedeen fighters.391
The bronnegruppa was an effective tactical concept developed by the Soviets. The
bronnegruppa helped retain Soviet fire superiority, but avoid the negative effects of
centering tactics on heavy and immobile equipment. The bronnegruppa helped the Soviet
infantry function the way that it needed to – on foot and out against the mujahedeen – but
provided the extra advantage of covering fire and quick transport when needed.
Enveloping Movements
The use of enveloping and blocking techniques was part of a shift towards increased
use of non‐linear tactics against the mujahedeen. Mujahedeen groups were usually small
and mobile and could readily retreat and avoid destruction by Soviet linear formations.
Enveloping movements were necessary to bring the fight to the enemy. The cordon and
search was basic tactic that used enveloping and blocking techniques, though blocking
elements played an important role in a variety of operations. Soviet tactics in this area align
with David Galula’s emphasis that “The destruction of the insurgent forces requires that
they be localized and immediately encircled”.392
390 Grau, L. (1991). The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. Washington, DC, USA: National Defense University Press, 178. 391 Jalali, A. A., & Grau, L. W. (2001). Afghan Guerilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahedeen Fighters. St. Paul, Minnesota, USA: MBI Publishing Company, 356. 392 Galula, D. (1964). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 72, 94.
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The cordon and search was used to capture or kill the enemy in a specific area.
Soviets would encircle the objective, placing blocking units at strategic points, then sweep
or comb through the area using ground forces to locate and engage the enemy. When the
Soviets entered Afghanistan in 1979, the cordon and search was not considered a form of
combat, since this tactic is not very applicable to conventional engagements. The cordon
and search and the use of blocking techniques was incorporated into doctrine as an
adjustment to combat in Afghanistan.393
The cordon and search was typically conducted in two phases. First, blocking units
were emplaced to encircle the enemy. Blocking units were inserted by helicopter or by
ground vehicles. Soviet units adopted the practice of dismounting transport a distance away
from their ultimate positions in an effort to avoid detection.394 Second, forces would arrive
to the objective and begin sweeping the area.
Major Gukalov recounts a typical block and sweep operation conducted in the Kunar
province. Airborne troops were emplaced undetected as blocking units along escape routes
from the targeted village. When the sweeping force moved through the village, a small
detachment of mujahedeen fighters attempted to stall their advance to allow the main
mujahedeen force to escape; the blocking units intercepted the fleeing mujahedeen.395
Even when operations were well executed, the terrain in the Afghan theater
sometimes made it hard to seal off all escape routes. Mujahedeen Commander Haji Abdul
Qader recounted a large Soviet cordon and search operation from which his forces were
able to escape. His fighters were able to proceed undetected by Soviet blocking forces along
a dry irrigation canal.396
The cordon and search proved a highly effective development in Soviet tactics.
When executed properly, Soviets encountered success. Blocking forces were the crucial 393 Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 106. 394 Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 108. 395 Grau, L. (1991). The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. Washington, DC, USA: National Defense University Press, 9. 396 Jalali, A. A., & Grau, L. W. (2001). Afghan Guerilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahedeen Fighters. St. Paul, Minnesota, USA: MBI Publishing Company, 260.
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component of these operations. When they were detected, emplaced hastily, or
uncoordinated with sweeping forces, mujahedeen forces were often able to escape with
minimum casualties. In Afghanistan’s difficult environment, the incorporation of non‐linear
tactics, such as cordon and searches with the use of blocking techniques shows the
adaptation of the Soviet command to the conditions in the Afghan theater.
Ambushes
As the Soviet Limited Contingent adjusted its operational approach to the Afghan
theater, emphasis was placed on many tactics used by the mujahedeen themselves.
Ambushes are one example of such a tactic. Afghan insurgents routinely harassed and
damaged Soviet forces through the use of this tactic, but Soviets also used ambushes
effectively against the mujahedeen.
Intercepting mujahedeen supply caravans and other troop movements were
primary aims of Soviet ambushes. The influx of ammunition, weapons and fighters across
the border from Iran and Pakistan was a vital resource for the Afghan insurgency. Borders
with Pakistan and Iran were extremely long and in highly challenging terrain, making it
difficult to control movement in an out of the country. The Soviet command was well aware
of the situation and correctly identified it as one of the main reasons that the insurgency
was so resilient. Even in 1979, Soviet leaders were keen on closing the Afghan borders. In a
meeting between Presidents Brezhnev and Taraki, Brezhnev said, “Despite…the sending of
thousands of people from Iran and Pakistan, your borders with these governments are
virtually open, and it seems that even now they are not closed? I will say plainly….this needs
to be remedied”.397 Soviet leaders implemented several measures, including a system of
guard outposts and intercept operations aimed at ambushing caravans moving through
border regions. As confirmed in an account by Major General Luchinsky, guard posts along
397 “Zapis’ Besedy L.I. Brezhneva s N.M. Tarki 20 marta 1979 g. (V besede prinyali uchastie t.t. A.N. Kosygin, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov i B.N. Ponomarev),” 20 March 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 2, Ll. 5.
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the border were notoriously ineffective, and Afghan caravans often moved by them with
great ease.398 Ambush missions had greater success in apprehending the incoming caravans.
Beginning in 1984, operation ‘Curtain’ (later renamed ‘Barrier’ in 1987) was
conceived to intercept and destroy enemy supplies and personnel coming in from
Pakistan.399 A significant number of troops were devoted to the operation; units generally
conducted 30‐40 ambushes per month.400 While motorized rifle and other infantry troops
regularly carried out ambushes, such operations were increasingly assigned to airborne, air
assault and spetsnaz troops as the conflict continued.401 These troops were more highly
trained and better equipped to conduct this kind of operation.
Surprise was vital for the success of ambushes. After designating the spot of the
ambush based on intelligence, troops would typically be inserted by helicopter or other
vehicle ten to thirty kilometers from the planned ambush site, approaching by foot and
often at night to avoid detection. Soviets would use decoy ambush teams to draw attention
away from where the real ambush was being prepared.402 One veteran recounts that
helicopters would often make several landings, but disburse troops only at one spot in
order to misdirect enemy intelligence.403 Ambushes would typically be carried out by
platoon or company‐sized troop elements, armed with AGS‐17s, heavy‐caliber machine
guns and mines.404 Aviation and armored fire support was made available for such
operations as well.405 Over the course of the conflict, it became clear that increased
helicopter availability was necessary for spetsnaz units, so the Soviet command assigned
398 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 521. 399 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 521. 400 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 521. 401 Major General Luchinsky’s account of ‘Curtain’ indicates that most units conducting ambush missions were spetsnaz or other specialized troops: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 521. 402 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 519. 403 Gusinov, T. (2002, March‐April). Soviet Special Forces (Spetnaz): Experience in Afghanistan. Military Review , 105‐107. 404 General V.A. Bogdanov notes that more ambushes were conducted by platoons than companies: Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 19791989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 185. 405 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 519.
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independent helicopter units exclusively for spetsnaz operations.406 When ambush teams
remained undetected they were generally successful.
For example, on the night of 13 February 1984, lieutenant S. Kozlov lead a successful
ambush in Kandahar province, resulting in the destruction of 47 enemy troops and
significant munitions and equipment.407 A former spetsnaz soldier noted that ambushes
were more successful the closer they were set to the mujahedeen destination base camp or
distribution area. Close to camp, the Afghans’ security was often more relaxed and the
group more consolidated. It was also important to intercept caravans before they reached
the base camp, because it became much more difficult to track and locate groups carrying
supplies after they were distributed at a base camp.408
Increased use of ambushes was part of a larger shift in Soviet tactics in Afghanistan.
While they were tactically successful, overall lack of troops and insufficient control of the
country prevented the Limited Contingent from benefitting from many tactical successes.
Nevertheless, implementation of the ambush in operations showed that Soviet leaders
understood how to engage the mujahedeen tactically. US and NATO forces continue to
employ ambushes against insurgents in Afghanistan.409
Convoy Security Techniques
Maintaining supplies for Soviet forces in Afghanistan was a formidable logistical
task. Main supply routes stretched between Termez‐Kabul‐Jalalabad, Termez‐Puli Khumri‐
Kunduz, and Kushka‐Shindand‐Kandahar. Supplies were transported in convoys along
many kilometers of poorly maintained roads between Soviet posts. This presented an
opportunity for the mujahedeen to hurt Soviet forces by hitting supply lines, placing mines 406 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 201. 407 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 526. 408 Gusinov, T. (2002, March‐April). Soviet Special Forces (Spetnaz): Experience in Afghanistan. Military Review , 105‐107. 409 For an interesting account of an U.S. ambush in Afghanistan, see the following article: Chivers, C. J. (2009, April 16). Turning Tables, U.S. Troops Ambush Taliban With Swift and Lethal Results. Retrieved August 2, 2009, from The New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/world/asia/17afghan.html
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and attacking unexpectedly at times and locations of their choosing.410 It was necessary for
Soviet forces to adapt tactics to address these vulnerabilities. Throughout the conflict it
remained a struggle for Soviet forces to protect their supply lines, but they did take
measures to improve in this area. In 1981, the Defense Ministry issued an order to improve
convoy security by further developing security tactics, and engineer unit support.411 Main
security practices included: establishing permanent security outposts along routes,
employing motorized rifle troops to provide security, tasking sapper units to clear roads,
using helicopters escorts, emplacing infantry units on key terrain to prevent enemy from
approaching to key routes.
There were 326 permanent outposts emplaced for the purpose of protecting critical
supply routes.412 General Gromov describes the process of planning the locations of these
outposts, which was carried out by highly trained groups of officers of different specialties,
many of whom had extensive graduate degrees.413 These groups conducted comprehensive
analysis of terrain and provided recommendations for outpost locations.414 Some 13,000
troops were tasked to man these posts, working to intercept and deter mujahedeen groups
from ambushing convoys.415 Guard posts ranged in size – platoon or company‐sized ‐ and
typically rotated personnel every three to six months.416 The posts were typically ringed
with mines and barbed wire; other physical defenses and amenities were largely the result
of the inventiveness of the soldiers – some outposts even had improvised Russian banyas
(Russian bath house).417
410 General Gromov mentions this in his memoir, noting that the mujahedeen had “their own… method – they, as a rule, attacked where they were least expected”. Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 120. 411 This is found in a declassified document included in the appendix of General Alexander Liakhovsky’s history of the Afghan war: “Plan meropriyatii po povysheniu effektivnosti boevykh deistvii sovetskykh i afganskikh voisk v DRA, obobshcheniu i rasprostraneniu ikh boevogo opyta i sovershenstvovaniu oruzhiya na yanvar’ – mart 1981 goda,” 8 January 1981 (Secret), accessed in: Liakhovsky, A. (1995). Tragedia i Doblest' Afgana. Moscow: GPI Iskona, Appedix 3. 412 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 534. 413 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 120. 414 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 119. 415 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 534. 416 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 533. Also: Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 120. 417 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 19791989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 97.
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Life in outposts was dreary and often boring; units were often isolated and poorly
supplied. General Gromov describes how Soviet soldiers would have to “literally gnaw into
the mountain, making trenches….along these [trenches]…the soldier… was often exposed to
the enemy”.418 This duty, however, was critical for maintaining Soviet force presence in
Afghanistan, and the Soviet command created specialized training for manning outposts.419
On routes without a sufficient network of guard posts, the process for providing convoy
security unfolded in similar fashion to other tactical operations.
Using motorized rifle troops mounted in BMPs (light armored fighting vehicle) or
BTRs (also a light armored fighting vehicle, different make) was a common way to provide
security for convoys.420 Helicopters were available for air support if needed and often
escorted convoys of particular importance or along especially vulnerable segments of the
route.421 Reconnaissance elements or air assault units were at times employed to occupy
key terrain near routes.422 This allowed Soviet forces to intercept mujahedeen attempts at
ambushing or approaching convoy routes.423 Engineer troops were used routinely to clear
roads for mines, and were in high demand during the Afghan conflict.424 Engineer units
were also responsible for addressing problems such as water crossings and impassable
roads due to rock‐slides or avalanches, etc.425 This was a crucial task, as convoys were
especially vulnerable when stopped at obstacles. Mujahedeen would create such obstacles
in order to halt vehicle columns and then attack.426 Gromov notes that in the early stages of
the war, Soviet columns were especially unprepared for ambushes and obstacles set by the
mujahedeen; later, Soviets learned to carry special charges for blowing through obstacles
418 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 120. 419 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 19791989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 276. 420 Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 286. 421 Everett‐Heath, J. (1992). Helicopters in Combat. New York, New York, USA: Arms and Armour Press, 126. 422 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 123‐4. 423 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 123‐4. 424 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 123. 425 Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 248. 426 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 123.
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and reestablishing a roadbed to minimize time that vehicles were halted.427 Engineers
organized into groups to help forces proceed through routes, some tasked specifically to key
bridges or other objectives, some moving with convoys.428
While the tactics developed for protecting convoys were effective, these tactics were
not always executed successfully. Limited numbers of light infantry troops, engineers and
available helicopters precluded the consistent implementation of the security measures
discussed above. Moreover, Soviet officers were unaccustomed to the concept of defending
supply lines against an enemy functioning all around them, and would make mistakes in this
area.429
Equipment
“The weapons, equipment, and protective equipment determined the combat effectiveness of the LCOSF [Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces] in Afghanistan” – The Russian General Staff430
Understanding the dynamics of the political, social and military situation is vitally
important in the complex environment of counterinsurgency.431 The necessity of accurately
reading the situation and adapting appropriately applies to the lowest details of the
counterinsurgency campaign. As shown in numerous cases, even the smallest cultural or
political blunder, or hint of it, can have significant effects on the effort as a whole.432 The
details of counterinsurgency often determine success or failure. This principle is extremely
relevant to the individual soldier in his personal weapons and equipment. 427 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 123. 428 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 123. 429 This analysis is partially drawn from Lester Grau’s commentary on Russian military accounts, and partly from my own anlaysis of them. Grau, L. (1991). The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. Washington, DC, USA: National Defense University Press, 149. 430 Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 42. 431 Kilcullen, D. (2009). The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. New York, USA: Oxford University Press, Inc, 13. 432 T.E. Lawrence emphasizes such attention to detail in his writings on dealing with insurgency. Lawrence, T. (1917). The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence. Retrieved July 1, 2009, from http://www.d‐n‐i.net/fcs/lawrence_27_articles.htm
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Counterinsurgency, while very different from conventional war, is still war, and the
soldier’s arms and equipment are of utmost importance in the overall effort.
The key role played by the most basic aspects of equipment was clearly illustrated
in the Soviet army’s earliest operations in Afghanistan. From boots to truck engines, there
were many glitches in the Soviet war machine.433 As noted earlier, the Soviet Army was
primarily trained for conventional conflict with NATO forces in the European theater. As a
result, many aspects of Soviet equipment were poorly suited to the extreme climates and
terrain of Afghanistan. In addition, operations in Afghanistan were the first real action the
military had seen in some time, and there was equipment untested outside of field
exercises. It has even been speculated that Defense Minister Ustinov agreed to deployment
of troops in Afghanistan partly because it was an opportunity to test the military’s latest
equipment.434
Soviet military staff and supporting officers reacted well to the problems with
equipment. There was significant adjustment of the use and design of weapons systems and
other gear to function more effectively in unconventional counterinsurgency warfare.
While the 40th Army did suffer from some problems in supply and other logistics, ineffective
equipment was replaced or improved upon, and weapons and equipment engineers
regularly visited Kabul to meet with military officials, continually improving existing
models.435 General Gromov writes that the innovations and adjustments made to Soviet
equipment to better orient it to the conditions in Afghanistan “had a worth that was
impossible to overstate”.436
Heavy weapons and advanced technology are not the decisive tools in
counterinsurgency. While technology and superior firepower help in many situations,
counterinsurgency is won by the application of intelligent strategy and its execution by
433 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 494. 434 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 540. 435 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 538, 540. Also: Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 149‐50. For discussion of Soviet logistical problems see: Blank, S. J. (1991). Operational and Strategic Lessons of the War in Afghanistan, 197990. Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 48. 436 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 150.
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infantrymen. This has been illustrated in conflicts before and after the Soviet‐Afghan war.437
Regardless of what counterinsurgency strategy is employed, infantrymen almost always do
the crucial work of engaging the enemy and assuring that he stays away once defeated.
Against a highly agile foe that melts in and out of the population and tough terrain, highly
sophisticated weaponry and equipment is seldom useful.438 Light infantry units are needed
in large numbers. The Soviet’s increasing use of airborne and air assault troops in
Afghanistan is a testament to this inevitability.439
The 40th army found that much of its heavy equipment proved ineffective in the
mountainous Afghan terrain.440 Many artillery pieces could not tilt to large enough angles to
engage mujahedeen targets perched on bluffs high above windy roads. Tanks and the BMP‐
1 armored personnel carriers were too unwieldy and had guns also hard to aim at high
targets. There were problems with mines and minesweeper systems.441 Laser range finders
malfunctioned. Tank and other vehicle parts were vulnerable to sand and extreme
temperatures. Mine blasts tore readily through the BMP‐1, BMD‐1,BTR‐60PB and BTR‐70
and usually resulted in the death of those inside.442 Engines for vehicles such as the BTR‐
60B and the BTR‐70 lacked the power sufficient for mountain driving, and many high‐
performance aircraft functioned poorly in the Afghan theater as well.443
437 Ali A. Jalali and Lester W. Grau provide an interesting analysis of the role of military technology in examination of the battle of Maiwand between British and Afghan forces in the 1880s. Jalali, A. A., & Grau, L. W. (2001). Expeditionary Forces: Superior Technology Defeated. Military Review , 81 (3), 71‐83. 438 In describing actions in the Panjshir region, General Gromov notes that Soviet infantrymen that were climbing in rough terrain and far from vehicles were often equipped with the same weapons as the mujahedeen: Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 183. Also, for thoughtful analysis of technology in warfare see: Grau, L. W. (1997). Bashing the Laser Range Finder With a Rock. Military Review , 77 (3), 43. Robert Cassidy also makes the argument that the use of sophisticated technology is a hindrance in counterinsurgency: Cassidy, R. M. (2006). Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. London: Praeger Security International, 55. 439 Large numbers of US light infantry units deploy to Afghanistan currently as well; the environment and enemy call for this just as much now as in the 1980s. In addition, at various junctures in Iraq, US tank units and other specialties found themselves conducting infantry‐like tasks. Even without mountains, counterinsurgency is best conducted ‘light’, whether the force is engaging the enemy or patrolling an area. 440 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 537; Also see, Oliker, O., Grissom, A., & Johnson, D. E. (2008). In the Middle of the Fight: An Assessment of MediumArmored Forces in Past Military Operations. Santa Monica, CA, USA: RAND Corporation, 92‐95. 441 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 537. 442 Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 37. 443 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 538.
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Soviet military cadre reacted effectively to such deficiencies by employing new
equipment. For example, newer vehicles were introduced, such as the BMP‐2 and the BTR‐
80 in 1985.444 The BTR‐80’s guns could be tilted higher than previous models, allowing for
the engagement of aerial targets or those in steep or urban terrain. Soviet crews were
known to protect the BTR with makeshift screening and rubber sheeting around the
wheels.445 The BTR‐80 also improved upon earlier designs by including hatch doors on the
side, which increased the speed with which soldiers could dismount.446 This configuration
was more effective for reacting quickly to ambushes or other situations.
Heavy firepower was less emphasized, and some infantry units were equipped with
the AGS‐17 on the BMP‐2 armored personnel carrier, an automatic grenade launcher that
was useful in engagements against an enemy that did not generally use tanks or other
armored vehicles.447 The AGS‐17 could also be used independent from a vehicle with a
three‐man crew. Soviet forces used this weapon extensively in infantry operations such as
raids and sweeps. Capable of firing grenades up to 1700 meters, the AGS‐17 was useful for
suppressing the enemy and stopping his advance.448 The BMP‐1’s usual 73mm cannon was
replaced by a 30mm automatic cannon on the BMP‐2 with increased aiming angle.449
Machine guns were outfitted with enhanced sights to engage targets at longer range. The
ZSU 23‐4 was a weapon system that proved helpful in the Afghan theater. Technically an
anti‐aircraft unit, this four‐barreled system could elevate its aim almost vertically and was
effective against forces as far away as 2500 meters.450
444 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 537. Also: Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 36. 445 Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 37. 446 Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 36. 447 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 121. 448 Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 41. 449 Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 37. 450 Russian General Staff. (2002). The SovietAfghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 38.
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Varying Kalashnikov rifles were used in the Afghan theater, including the AKM‐74,
which was often used with an attached grenade launcher (PG‐15).451 The majority of Soviet
forces ultimately moved to the AK‐74 5.45mm rifle from the 7.62mm variation. The AK‐74
was more effective for the counterinsurgent as it was lighter, and had less recoil, facilitating
accuracy at long ranges.
The use of Soviet aircraft was also adjusted for counterinsurgency. Soviet
adjustments mirrored David Galula’s argument that counterinsurgent forces are most
benefited by helicopters and slow assault planes.452 Soviet forces employed helicopters in
more in Afghanistan than they ever had before and they proved highly effective.453 As
mujahedeen gained anti‐aircraft capabilities, tactics such as night flights and low altitude
nap‐of‐the‐earth flying were introduced.454 High‐speed planes were replaced with the Su‐25
(nicknamed the grach, or in English the frogfoot), a subsonic aircraft designed for providing
close air support.
The Soviet staff understood the need for a lighter more mobile force for
counterinsurgency. While changes were not made as fully or quickly as might have been
desired, the nature of weapons and vehicle modifications indicated that Soviet military
leaders where attempting to reshape their force for the situation in Afghanistan. The 40th
Army suffered from some of the same backups and supply issues that plagued the rest of the
USSR; many soldiers did not receive the benefit of improved equipment. Nevertheless, in
the area of equipment and weapons, Soviet military leaders did exhibit adaptability and an
understanding of counterinsurgency.
451 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 538. 452 Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 21. 453 Turushev, A. (2004). Osobennosti Primenenia Podrazdelenij i Chastej 40‐j Armii V Afganistane. Afganistan: Uroki Istorii i Sovremennost' (pp. 21‐25). Omsk: Omskaia Akademia, MVD Rossii. 454 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 539. Also: Everett‐Heath, J. (1992). Helicopters in Combat. New York, New York, USA: Arms and Armour Press, 127.
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Conclusion
This work does not seek to rewrite the Soviet counterinsurgency in Afghanistan into
a success. There were many weaknesses in the Soviet effort. It is clear that Soviet leaders
entered into the conflict with an inaccurate understanding of Afghanistan’s social and
political realities, and without full appreciation of the resources required to support the
Kabul government against the Afghan insurgency. Soviet leaders were not anticipating the
need for such a long and comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign after the initial
invasion.
Coordination between military and non‐military efforts was lacking. Soviet military
leaders and politicians blamed each other for failures in Afghanistan. For example, in one
meeting of the Politburo, Gorbachev expressed frustration at the military establishment,
remarking that military leaders are “doing poorly at learning in this war”.455 In the same
meeting General Akhromeev explained that “our military successes have just not been
supported by political ones”.456 These two viewpoints illustrate a civil‐military disconnect
that undercut many Soviet efforts in Afghanistan. Indeed, political efforts and institutions
did not support many of the advances made by Soviet forces, and resulted in frequent
reversals of Soviet military gains.457 Soviet political concerns limited the overall number of
troops allocated for the counterinsurgency, which made it difficult to achieve country‐wide
stability and closed borders with Iran and Pakistan. Considerable and unwavering foreign
support implemented across these borders was a fundamental strength of the insurgency.
Furthermore, at critical junctures, when increased efforts and resources may have resulted
in very significant gains, Soviet political leaders backed off from their commitment to the
counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. For instance, after a brief attempt at conducting a
counterinsurgency, Gorbachev pursued political and military policies primarily as a way to
455 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November 1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 3. 456 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November 1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 8. 457 Such reversals were also the result of a lack of troops. Not having enough troops to remain in areas for providing static security made them easy for mujahedeen forces to reclaim.
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expedite disengagement and not as a part of an enduring counterinsurgency effort.458
Compounding Soviet problems, divisions within the PDPA persisted throughout the conflict
and were a hindrance to political progress.
Despite mistakes and setbacks, however, the Soviets effectively bolstered the PDPA
government that in 1979 was in a precarious political and military situation. The Soviet
command used political, military and economic initiatives to support this government for
nine years in a country where terrain, infrastructure and society are highly unfavorable for
foreign powers. And while the Kabul government lost control of many Afghan provinces
after Soviet withdrawal, it remained in power for three years until 1992.459 Admittedly,
after the withdrawal the subsequent situation was the result of many factors not all relating
to Soviet involvement. Nevertheless, the Kabul government’s endurance indicates the
presence of effective elements in the Soviet counterinsurgency.
Many of these elements correspond to accepted classical and modern
counterinsurgency theory. Analysis of primary documents, memoirs and military events
shows that Soviet leaders conducted active counterinsurgency efforts in the political,
economic and military sphere. Many such programs were designed to win over the support
of the Afghan population through persuasion and incentives. Coercion was not the only
Soviet method. Extensive support and counsel in the political sphere, development of social
programs and promotion of economic initiatives illustrate that Soviet leaders appreciated
the need to win the support of the population by means other than force.
Soviet military efforts, sometimes described as rigid and unbendingly conventional,
were greatly adapted for the Afghan theater. This thesis has illustrated that military leaders,
though hindered by an army conventional in structure and mindset, took many concrete
steps to adapt their force and tactics for counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Heavy armor
and unwieldy weapons systems were replaced by lighter variations for the fight against the
458 Gorbachev was soon quite committed to expediting withdrawal as evidenced in the following document: “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November 1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 3. 459 The Soviet Union continued to provide considerable support to the Kabul government after the withdrawal in 1989.
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mujahedeen. Non‐linear tactics and new techniques were taught and implemented with
some success. Soviet leaders decentralized the Afghan battlespace by dividing the theater
into regime zones, and giving increased autonomy and assets to regiment and battalion
commanders and their subordinates. Expanded and enhanced training was designed to
encourage independence and creativity in junior leadership. Substantial development of
intelligence capabilities and population monitoring were also strong aspects in the
campaign. These adjustments show that Soviet military leaders understood the nature of
counterinsurgency and the need to adapt their force for non‐conventional tasks.
Recognizing the effective elements of the Soviet counterinsurgency is important for
a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the Soviet‐Afghan war and
counterinsurgency more broadly. Soviet failures in Afghanistan were a result of flawed
strategy and poor execution, but were also the result of the extreme difficulty of the task
itself. Labeling the Soviet strategy in Afghanistan as categorically flawed is an
underestimation of the complexity inherent in counterinsurgency conflicts.
Misapprehending this reality can lead to imprecise and biased evaluations of the Soviet
campaign and the nature of counterinsurgency.
Inaccurate assessments of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan can foster both over‐
and under‐estimation of the difficulties of counterinsurgency. Considering the Soviet efforts
utterly narrow‐minded and rigid can lead to the view that counterinsurgency is easy,
provided that one simply avoids the ‘gross mistakes’ of the Soviet forces. Conversely,
overlooking Soviet gains and overstating their problems can lead to the view that success in
counterinsurgency (in Afghanistan or elsewhere) is virtually unattainable.
Studying the Soviets in Afghanistan, therefore, has implications for those
considering the limitations and possibilities of large powers caught in the dynamics of
counterinsurgency. Understanding the elements of the Soviet strategy that held promise,
even if they were not fully or successfully implemented, provides a more nuanced
understanding of the challenges and questions counterinsurgency presents.
Many of these same challenges and questions are facing the United States today.
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Appendix I. Statistics of SovietAfghanistan Credit/Aid Agreements
Graphic 1. NonMilitary Aid Levels in SovietAfghan Formal Agreements
Source: Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1981‐1990). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXV‐XLIV). Moscow, Russia. Note: 1. This graph represents funding levels under formal agreements for economic assistance
and development programs. All projects have been grouped under the major categories shown in the graph; also, funds associated with multi‐year and multi‐category projects have been allocated appropriate to project category and approximately average yearly allocation based on the duration of the agreement. This graph does not represent the final disbursements which depended on a variety of conditions.
2. I thank and acknowledge Alexander P. Doohovskoy for his valuable assistance in creating the graphics that appear in the appendices.
0
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Non‐Military Aid Levels in Soviet‐Afghan Formal Agreements
Training/Education
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Construction
Energy,Oil,Natural Gas
110
Graphic 2. Soviet Economic Aid Disbursements to Afghanistan
This graph is based on data from Quintin V.S. Bach’s book, Soviet Aid to the Third World: the Facts and Figures.460
460 Bach, Q. V. (2003). Soviet Aid to the Third World: the Facts and Figures. Sussex, England: The Book Guild Ltd, 153‐156 (Appendix VII).
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25019
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Soviet Economic Aid Disbursements to Afghanistan
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Graphic 3. Soviet Economic Aid and Expenditures in Afghanistan
This graph is based on data from a document published in Alexander Liakhovsky’s book, Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana.461 461 “Spravka: O raskhodakh SSSR v Afganistane,” 8 January 1988, in: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 758. ‘GKES’ stands for ‘Gosudarstvennyi komitet soveta ministrov po vneshnim ekonomicheskim svyazyam’ (Government Committee Counsil of Ministers on Foreign Economic Affairs).
0
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Soviet Economic Aid and Expenditures in Afghanistan
1986
1987
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Graphic 4. SovietAfghan Agreements on Energy, Oil, Natural Gas
Source: Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1981‐1990). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXV‐XLIV). Moscow, Russia.
0
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Soviet‐Afghan Agreements Energy,Oil,Natural Gas
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Graphic 5. SovietAfghanistan Agreements on Agriculture, Construction
Source: Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1981‐1990). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXV‐XLIV). Moscow, Russia.
0
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Soviet‐Afghanistan AgreementsAgriculture and Construction
Agriculture
Construction
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Appendix II. Map of Afghanistan
115
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