soviet foreign policy and the invasion of czechoslovakia: a theory and a case study

Soviet Foreign Policy and the Invasion of Czechoslovakia: A Theory and a Case StudyAuthor(s): David W. PaulSource: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Jun., 1971), pp. 159-202Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013548 .

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Soviet Foreign Policy and the Invasion of Czechoslovakia:

A Theory and a Case Study

DAVID W. PAUL

Princeton University (Political Science)

Understanding the process of Soviet foreign policy-making can sometimes be a frustrating challenge. The impatient observer who prefers generalizations or polemics to the pains- taking and often dull task of analyzing policy will not readily find the answers he is seeking. Those who seek a handy typecast explaining Soviet foreign policy as that of a classic imperialist nation (or, conversely, that of a satiated, status-quo power) will suffer from a misconception born of oversimplification. Those who attempt to explain the USSR's policy as a direct product of the official Marxist-Leninist ideology will only confuse motivation with rationalization. There is no simple approach which will immediately enlighten the policy-making process. Soviet foreign policy, like that of most other nation-states, is a product of both domestic and external factors; it is based on rational, calculated motives to an indeterminate degree and on nonrational, often spontaneous, motives to a similarly indeterminate degree; it is neither totally predictable nor hopelessly whimsical, neither perfectly constant nor endlessly fluctuating.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: This paper was originally prepared for a graduate seminar at Princeton, under the direction of Charles F. Hermann. Thanks are due to my wife, Bobbi, and to Stephen Hoffmann for their help in ironing out some of the subsequent problems.

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[160] INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

The literature to date on Soviet foreign policy is certainly not wanting for quantity.' However, only in recent years have scholars who focus on internal processes as determinants been taken very seriously.2 As the post-Khrushchev collective leadership has become more and more entrenched, scholarly attention has become increasingly focused on the curious and heavily veiled inner workings of the Soviet system. For collective leadership brought with it a foreign policy which has at times yielded some clues as to the nature of the Soviet internal political system.

It is, then, an assumption of this article that, while Soviet foreign policy must naturally respond to events in the international arena, external events alone cannot determine Soviet policy. This article attempts to link external and internal determinants in a meaningful way, in terms of a theory derived from a comparative framework. It seeks to isolate the most important policy-determining variables and to define their interrelationships. Lastly, it explores possible ways of applying the theory to specific policy decisions and discusses in detail one such application, a study of the decision to invade Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

The Context: A Crude Theory of Soviet Foreign Policy

The overarching framework for this outline derives from a pattern of sets, or clusters, of variables as described by James N. Rosenau (1966) and modified by Charles F. Hermann.3 The sets represent five generic types of factors which affect or

1 See, for example, Triska and Finley (1968) for an ambitious discussion of the various agencies' roles, and London (1965) for some comparisons. Another comparative treatise which presents some inferesting arguments is Brzezinski and Huntington (1964); many of their assumptions explored in that work, unfortunately, have become highly questionable since the fail of Khrushchev.

Two historical treatments are very useful: Ulam (1968) is scholarly and comprehensive, and Dinerstein (1968) combines compactness with lucid analysis.

For a provocative treatment of a fascinating period, see Shulman (1963), and, for a dissenting opinion, see Tucker (1963: ch. 2).

2 One of the first, and still one of the best, discussions of internal determinants is Aspaturian (1966). A more recent, and more theoretical, discussion is Dallin (1969).

3 Modifications were suggested by C. F. Hermann in his seminar on comparative foreign policy, Princeton University, 1968-1969.



Paul / SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA [1611

determine the nature of foreign policy. Four of the sets are composed of variables which operate within the polity in question; the fifth (the systemic variable cluster) relates to the external environment in which a foreign policy must function. The four domestic clusters are idiosyncratic, organization of government, elites and interest groups, and social system and political environment.

The core variables

The idiosyncratic cluster refers specifically to the peculiar personal attributes of a leader or leaders, the human and often nonrational factors of the individual's personality, background, and outlook. In the past, such factors were far more important to the making of Soviet foreign policy than they are today. Especially during the Stalin period, and to a lesser degree in the Khrushchev period, the personality of the leader weighed heavily upon the decision-making process. In Stalin's case, one man wielded almost unchallenged authority, while Stalin's successor, Khrushchev, operated under the restrictions of a sometimes resistant Presidium majority.4 Since Khrushchev's fall, however, there has been no clearly predominant leader in the Soviet Union. Brezhnev and Kosygin occupy the top positions in the Party and governmental structures, respectively, but neither has any unambiguous preponderance within the eleven-man Politburo, which essentially functions as a genuinely collective decision-making body.5 In this context, idiosyncratic factors are very difficult to identify; it seems that the likeliest

4 Some excellent treatments of the role of the Soviet leader are to be found in the following: Deutscher (1966); Crankshaw (1966); Linden (1965); and Tucker (1963: ch. 7).

5 The eleven members are Leonid I. Brezhnev (Secretary-General), G. I. Voronov, Andrei P. Kirilenko, Aleksei N. Kosygin, Kirill T. Mazurov, A. J. Pel'she, Nikolai V. Podgorny, D. S. Polyansky, Mikhail A. Suslov, Aleksandr N. Shelepin, and P. I. Shelest. Soviet protocol since Khrushchev has consistently dictated that the Politburo members' names be officially listed in (Cyrillic) alphabetical order, a cryptographic indication of their self-conscious equality.

Recent Kremlinological analysis by Sidney Ploss suggests that Brezhnev has attained a position of some personal preeminence, but the evidence does not justify the popular conclusion that Brezhnev "rules Russia." (See, e.g., Time's extravagant cover story of May 4, 1970, for a sampling of such immoderate conclusions.)



[162 ] INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

role they may play is through the ability of an individual leader, at any given moment, to define and articulate policy, to mold ideas and words persuasively so as to bring the eleven men to a comfortable agreement on a policy issue. Personality, background, and many other factors combine to influence the idiosyncratic variable. In sum, the idiosyncratic factor must naturally remain at work, even in the post-Khrushchev collective era, although it is probably of limited importance in determining policy.

The organization-of-government cluster includes no more than what its name implies: the peculiarities of the decision- making structure itself which influence the nature of policy. In the Soviet Union, the concentration of supreme policy-making power within the Communist Party, and within the Party the absolute concentration of important decision-making power in the Politburo, is presupposed. Between the Party and the government there is something of a functional bifurcation; the Party controls personnel appointments, makes important policy decisions, and acts as a national watchdog over all official activities, while the governmental institutions as such are concerned with the elaboration and implementation of day-today processes, including the task of administering the technical affairs of state planning.6

The Party Politburo, invested by custom with the supreme decision-making power in questions of foreign policy, is composed of men who, because of their backgrounds, connec- tions with specific interest groups, and desire to enhance their individual power statuses, represent certain constituencies or certain specific value preferences which are always in a state of potential rivalry, and sometimes conflict, over vital policy issues. Although the Politburo members are drawn principally from the ranks of the Party, they are compelled by the increasing complexity of modem society to represent rather specialized interests, a tendency which draws them into natural alliance with the particular segments of Soviet society which

6 By "govemment" here is meant the administrative structure, from the Council of Ministers down through the Ministries and their subordinate agencies. See Triska and Finley (1968), and Fainsod (1963).



Paul / SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA [163]

they "represent." Kosygin, as head of government, must be sensitive to the needs of running the everyday affairs of the state and the economy; Suslov, the Party's chief theoretician, must try to guard the "purity" of the country's politics; Shelepin, as head of the All-Union Council of Trade Unions, must cater in some way to his constituency; and CPSU Secretary-General Brezhnev must reconcile all the various interests while remaining attuned to the inner workings of the Party structure and its personnel. Thus the primary decision- making power resides in the Politburo, but other sources of influence are not without representation on that supreme body.

A further element in the organization-of-government cluster is the USSR's information network, an element of obvious importance. In the Soviet case, there are special factors working on this variable. For the information which reaches Politburo members is rarely straightforward and completely candid; rather, it is often colored by the ideologically distorted views of official reporters, and in many instances the information passed on to Moscow is doctored en route to make it correspond to what the leaders wish to hear. (It has been said, for example, that Stalin's favorite sources of information purposely tailored their reports to match the leader's expectations, thereby ingratiating themselves with him by confirming his opinions and saving themselves from dire consequences which might have ensued from their contradicting Stalin's beliefs.) Today the dispersal among several agencies of responsibility for reporting external events acts, to some degree, as a check on this type of information distortion. The competition among such separate sources as Soviet Embassies abroad and Foreign Ministry desks in Moscow, K.G.B. (international secret service) agents and the Moscow K.G.B. office, the Defense Ministry and its intelligence agency, and the information sections of the CPSU Central Party Apparatus, tends to diminish the distortion of news from outside.7 Nevertheless, the intelligence system has its short- comings, and the accuracy of reports remains a major variable in the making of policy.

7 For a more detailed discussion of the information system, see Triska and Finley (1968: ch. 2).



1 641 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

The third set of variables is that of elites and interest groups; it is in the overlapping of this cluster with the governmental power structure that we find the most important determinant of Soviet foreign policy. The pressures of all important interest groups are aimed at the Politburo, directly or indirectly. Of course, interest-group pressure is not openly recognized in the USSR; the official credo excludes "factions" in the Party and state structures. But the existence of interest groups is a fact, and such groups operate constantly in their own unofficial way, "lobbying" through individual members of the Politburo and lining up on one side or another of every controversial issue.8

The impact of interest groups upon foreign policy is often related to allocations of the state budget. Groups such as the professional military establishment and managers of heavy industry generally favor "hard-line" policies which tend to channel funds into their areas, while such groups as the governmental bureaucracy and managers of light industry prefer to see budgetary allocations directed away from the support of "hard-line" foreign policies and into consumer goods pro- duction. But budgetary matters are not the sole contributor to interest-group rivalry and Politburo dissensus. Just as human predilections differ one from another universally, so also do Soviet individuals, including Politburo members, hold their own personal opinions as to what constitutes "correct" policy, both in theory and in practice; and the leaders' separate mental processes become merged, perhaps on a level beneath con- sciousness, with the interests of their constituencies. The result is the ever-present potential for policy rivalry and Politburo dissensus.

As long as the various members of the Politburo remain more or less equal in decision-making authority, the potential for dissensus will exist. Each member will push his particular case, hoping thereby to represent his constituency (protecting his own power base in so doing) and promote his own prestige

8 See Aspaturian (1966: 212-287) and Slusser (1967). For more general discussions of the interplay among leaders, interest groups, power, and policy, see Skilling (1966) and Ploss (1969).



Paul / SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA [ 165]

among his colleagues. Since the Politburo exercises supreme authority in the foreign policy field, the reconciliation of these potential disharmonies is the single most important variable in the policy-making process. It is this variable which determines policy and action, and all other core variables influence policy through this central element.

The fourth variable cluster is that of the social system and political environment. This cluster includes a complex set of societal and political factors, many of which overlap with those in other clusters. Involved in this cluster are elements associated with the country's "political culture," in the sense of the term as used by Pye and Verba (1965), Barghoorn (1966), and others, a detailed discussion of which would far exceed the capacity of this article. Nevertheless it is necessary to point out some societal factors of particular importance to foreign policy, such as the role of ideology versus that of other factors, and the relative freedom of Soviet leaders from public pressure.

As for ideology, it must be noted that Soviet ideology is flexible to a certain degree, frequently debated even among the leaders, and often adjusted to accommodate policy already adopted. Ideology often yields in the policy process to other forces: the impulsion of "Russian" national policy traditions (such as the drive to the sea) or the immediate demands of great-power status (such as the ideologically improbable alliance with Egypt). Yet the pervasiveness of Soviet Communist ideology continues to make it a factor demanding analysis. Ideology serves, at the minimum, to justify foreign policy and, at the maximum, as a general guide to decision-making. Somewhere between these "extremes," ideology undoubtedly conditions the personal outlooks of Soviet leaders, sometimes in divergent ways, and thus overlaps with the idiosyncratic personality factor.

The leadership's freedom from public (i.e., overt or mass) pressure is a well-known fact. Due to the centuries-old tradition of authoritarian politics in Russia and the general public apathy which this tradition has bred, Soviet leaders are quite free to carry on the business of governing without having to worry about public interference. The type of massive dissent expressed



[1661 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

in the United States toward the government's policy in Southeast Asia would be unthinkable in Russia.9

One rather intangible variable which might be included in the fourth cluster is a sympathy shared by the people and their leaders, a feeling of pride in the nation's hard-gained industrial achievements and desire to preserve and further the well-being of the state, a sentiment colored by horrible memories of wartime devastation and optimistic promises of a future utopia. This composite factor plays an immeasurable role in the conscious and subconscious workings of the policy-makers' minds. It tends to "conservatize" foreign policy, to restrain inclinations toward adventurism or cold war confrontation. As such, it is a factor which must be acknowledged, however elusive it may seem.

The most "independent" of the variables fall within the fifth cluster, that of purely external influences upon foreign policy (the systemic cluster). This cluster is second in importance only to the creation of consensus in the Politburo, for Soviet foreign policy tends to be reflexive and ad hoc rather than initiative and programmed. Three closely related variables condition the impact of external events upon the making of policy: the degree to which national security is perceived to be threatened-directly, indirectly, or ambiguously; the degree to which the world environment is perceived to be positively or negatively affected-that is, the relationship between an external event and world peace; and Soviet prestige considerations, including the Russian leaders' self-image as foremost inspiration to revolutionary movements the world over. These systemic variables, listed here in the order of their relative importance, will receive detailed treatment below.

Interrelationships among the variables Again, the critical variable is the ability of the Politburo

members to reconcile any differences and to reach a consensus 9 The dispatch with which literary and other personalities who demonstrated

publicly against the Czech invasion were carted away is an illustration, although a curious inversion of this was the apparent impact of world opinion upon the recent Leningrad "skyjacking" trials; public external pressure, in this case, affected Soviet internal policy much more than domestic public pressure tends to affect Soviet foreign policy.




concerning the proper action on specific issues. This consensus is the link between all other core variables and policy; the other core variables directly or indirectly influence the building of Politburo consensus. These relationships are illustrated in Figure 1. The box at the bottom (Ability of Top Leaders to Agree . . .) represents the critical variable; it is the only one directly connected to the "output," or POLICY box. All other variables relate to the "output" through the critical variable. Thus, to read the diagram, one proceeds from any of the "lesser" variable boxes, starting from the top box (External Threat . . .), through the bottom box to the "output" box. For example: the greater the external threat to the security of the Soviet state (top box), the greater the ability of the leaders to agree (bottom box), hence the greater the chances of a firm, quick response to the external stimulus. In the case of a negative variable relationship, the diagram must be read like this: the greater the leaders' rivalry for power (box just above bottom box), the less likely the ability of top leaders to agree on policy, hence the less likely is policy to be a firm, quick response.

The establishment of Politburo consensus as the critical variable leads us to the following hypothesis concerning the nature of policy:

Proposition 1.0: The greater the ability of the Politburo to reach consensus, the more quickly and resolutely action will be taken, and the firmer the policy will tend to be.

This hypothesis should not be startling, for it is obvious that a collective decision reached without any member's having to compromise will have the firm backing of all. This hypothesis now leads us to a corollary, which allows for the possible absence of an early consensus:

Proposition 1.1: Inability to reach a consensus readily on firm action, and the resulting deferment of decision, will tend to make policy cautious, defensive, and noninterventionary-unless and until external events force a crisis decision upon the leaders.

This, in turn, leads us to a further hypothesis concerning the nature of a policy decision made in the context of a crisis:




| External Threat to | _: ~~~~~~Security of Soviet State

Recognizable_

, Foreis t ource + +

+ y + r

ISuspicious Reliability and View of Similarity of . Enemy Information Reports _f P _ _t_t

Ambiguous Content \

l of Too t -Pervasive 00

Firm,

qui,ck response to

l l ~~~~~~Constraint of\ Domestic Needs\

PolM cy A

, Desire to + " t

defermety of Toedecisiton wille ten tob oeipusv,ls

cautious, and m"outporue ofeanr inteenctionatr Inaturt

dociecisio

Proposition 1.2:~~~~fo Deisonstaer inacinteresit-rupto ruhnbh

defermety of Toedecisiton Agree tedtoenoeiplsv,ls

catos "the more"ote greate"n F intervencrtionactr: indvuatuetal wlte

dirctinsfiiflsnc




To illustrate these points, we might draw a contrast between Soviet policy toward the Czechoslovak reform government during 1968 and Soviet policy toward Rumania since about 1962. In both cases, the Soviets were confronted by client states which, in one degree or another, essentially defied Mos- cow's attempts at domination and even acted against the interests of the Soviet Union. In their relations with Rumania, the Russians have been constrained by such external considerations as the dispute with the Chinese and world prestige interests, but it is probable that an ongoing internal discussion has been taking place regarding the policy to be followed. At any rate, Soviet policy toward maverick Rumania has been cautious and noninterventionary-no doubt in large part due to the Ru- manian leaders' facility at keeping their "deviation" under control and their avoidance of provoking the Soviets into a state of alarm.1 0 The Soviet leaders went through a period of cautious hesitancy concerning the reform government in Czech- oslovakia before events in that country took on a radical character, shattering Soviet confidence in the stability of the socialist order and provoking the decision to intervene militarily.

These two examples suggest that the most important determinant of the Politburo's ability to reach consensus is the external variable, specifically the level of perceived threat to Soviet or Warsaw Pact security. A hierarchy of categories corresponding to levels of threat can be approximated and will be described shortly. Two qualities which lend an additional dimension to the external threat variables are clarity and imminence: clarity, that is, of the source of the threat, and imminence of the threat, both as perceived by the Soviet leaders. Hence a vital conditioning factor is the efficiency of the information network (see discussion above), for it is the information network which most directly links the external- event variable with the making of consensus in the Politburo.

10 For the Rumanian independence movement to 1965, refer to Fischer-Galati (1967). For some further insights and an account of the 1965-1968 period, see Paul (1968).




Whether or not other variables are of any salience depends on the level and imminence of the perceived threat. On a continuum ranging from "clear and imminent direct threat to the national security" to "no threat to the national security," the salience of other core variables will vary inversely-that is, from nil to predominant, concerning their effect on the making of consensus in the Politburo. The following hypotheses concern the external threat and the salience of other core variables:

Proposition 2.0: The greater the perceived level of threat and the more clearly recognizable the source thereof, the more readily will consensus be formed among Politburo members.

Proposition 2.1: The more imminent and direct the threat to the USSR itself, the fewer core variables will be of salience in the forming of consensus.

Proposition 2.2: The less clear and direct the threat to the USSR, the more will be the divergence of Politburo opinions, the less similarity there will tend to be among information reports, and the more consideration will be given to domestic factors.

Figure 2 refers to the relationships outlined above. The vertical line running from "+" at the top to "0" at the base represents the continuum level of threat to the Soviet Union. To the left of the vertical line are the hierarchized categories of relative threat posed by a specific event or situation in the systemic environment. (Conceivably, more specific gradations within each of these categories might be determinable.)

To the right of the vertical line are the core variables which have some degree of salience regarding the formation of a Politburo consensus under the external-threat conditions which appear to the left of the continuum. (Note that, pursuant to proposition 2.1 above, the farther down the vertical line one moves-that is, the farther away from "clear, imminent direct threat" one gets-the more numerous are the salient factors bearing upon the decision-making process.) The variables have been listed within each external-threat category in what may be considered an approximate, by no means inflexible, descending order of likely salience.




Relative Level of Threat "+" Salient Core Variables

Clear, imminent direct threat (Consensus automatic; reliability of infor- to Soviet Union mation is assumed; other variables of zero

salience)

Direct threat to alliance Information reliability system from without View of enemy

(Other variables of no likely salience)

National security of Soviet Information reliability Union indirectly View of enemy threatened Preservation of society

Leaders' power rivalry Individual's persuasiveness

Alliance system threatened Information reliability from within Ambiguous ideology

View of enemy Leaders' power rivalry Individual persuasiveness Domestic demands

Peaceful environment is Preservation of society affected Information reliability

View of enemy Leaders' power rivalry Domestic demands Group pressures Ambiguous ideology Individual persuasiveness

Prestige and world Preservation of society revolution Domestic demands

View of enemy Ambiguous ideology Information reliability Leaders' power rivalry Group pressures Individual persuasiveness

No threat to USSR All variables of potential salience national security

"0"

FIGURE 2




The specific meanings of the categories and relationships are elaborated in the following discussion.

Clear, imminent direct threat to the Soviet Union. The category is rather self-explanatory, but examples might be a declaration of war against the USSR, an ultimatum, a blockade, or clear reports of a surprise attack. In any of these situations, the collective leadership would immediately rally to the defense of the homeland. A decision regarding the action to be taken would be quickly reached, and the response would be firm.

Direct threat to any Warsaw Treaty Organization member from without. Any of the above actions aimed at one or more of the WTO member states (Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany). Policy consensus would not be formed quite as readily as in the case of a direct threat to the USSR; the Politburo members would probably give the matter some discussion before taking action, checking their respective information reports against those of their comrades and analyzing the motives of the enemy ("information reliability" and "view of the enemy"). Nevertheless, the critical nature of such a threat would necessitate rather prompt and decisive action, and no domestic political variables would intervene in the decision-making process.

National security of the Soviet Union indirectly threatened. Any external development which has potential relevance to Soviet defense capabilities, or which lends itself to ambiguous interpretations concerning the impact upon Soviet security interests; developments having an adverse effect (or one so perceived) on the systemic "balance of power." Examples: the development of a new weapon by the West, the movement of former "neutrals" into the Western camp, or (questionable) an American attack on Communist China.

This category is less clear-cut than the two preceding. Again, the reliability of information and the view of the enemy are very important; both of these variables contribute to the Soviet leaders' knowledge (or perception) of the nature and seriousness of the threat and the motives of the party posing the threat.




The desire not to jeopardize the Soviet homeland ("preservation of society") will restrain the leaders in their choice of response to the threat-at least until the seriousness of the threat is clearly ascertainable. If there is a sharp difference of opinion within the Politburo, individual leaders may try to rally interest-group support behind their particular positions ("leaders' power rivalry") in an attempt to gain personal prestige within the elite ranks; for this and other reasons, "individual persuasiveness" may enter as a significant factor. Other variables are not likely to be of importance.

Alliance system threatened from within. Any change occurring within the WTO which adversely affects the military and political cohesion of the bloc; any development perceived to have such a destabilizing effect. Historical examples include the "Polish October" of 1956 (the least extreme), the Hungarian Revolt of the same year (the most extreme), and the Czecho- slovak reform crisis of 1968 (of which more later).

Four of the five variables included in the preceding category appear here, for much the same reasons. "Preservation of society" does not enter as a salient factor, since policy action in response to an intrabloc challenge would hardly threaten to erupt into war; none of the "junior partners" in the alliance is strong enough to fight the USSR, and an intervention by the West would be highly unlikely. Two "new" variables do enter into this category, however: "ambiguous ideology" and "domestic demands." The former has to do with the doctrinally indeterminate and controversial nature of socialist international relations, the latter with the pressure of certain "home-front" interest groups for concentration of attention (and finances) on domestic (in preference to international) priorities.

Peaceful environment is affected. The occurrence or possi- bility of international war anywhere in the world (with the possible exception of South America), the degree of threat relative to the probability of Soviet involvement which, in turn, is contingent upon Soviet special interests in the area and upon



[ 174 J INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

American involvement. Historical examples abound: Vietnam, India-Pakistan (the 1965 conflict), and the recurrent Middle East crises.

Here it becomes more difficult to specify single determinants; the issues are less vital to Soviet security and more susceptible to controversy than those mentioned earlier. Perhaps the most significant consideration is "preservation of society," or the desire not to be drawn into a world war for a relatively unimportant cause; other variables of high importance are ''view of enemy" and "information reliability." "Leaders' power rivalry" may contribute to disharmony in the Politburo; "domestic demands" and "group pressures" may influence some or all of the decision-makers, and the "ambiguous ideology" which guides the leaders may not be of help to them. Lastly, "individual persuasiveness" (that is, of one or more leaders) may affect the viewpoint of wavering colleagues.

Prestige and world revolution. Any events perceived to have an impact upon the Soviet Union's "world prestige" which do not fall under any of the above categories, such as the question of support for active or dormant "national liberation movements" and foreign Communist parties. Examples include the Cuban Revolution before 1959, current Latin American insurrection movements, and policy toward Black African states.

The same variables active in the previous threat category would tend to be active in this category. The differences in relative importance are slight. The ideological variable has been upgraded (i.e., from its position in the previous category) because of the intermittent controversiality of the "wars-of- national-liberation" debate, and especially because of the ideological sensitivity of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Applying the Theory: Some Thoughts

We will now proceed to a detailed case study analyzing the foregoing analytic scheme-namely, an analysis of the decision to intervene militarily to stifle the reformist policies of the



Paul / SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA [ 175]

Czechoslovak regime in August 1968. The methodology used to study this decision was, briefly, a data analysis of elite attitudes as reflected in their official newspapers. It was found that through selective reading of several papers-Pravda for the Party Central Committee, Izvestiya for the Council of Ministers, and so on-some discernible trends were found in these elite groups' attitudes toward the Dubcek regime. The trends varied with the specific interest group, suggesting dissensus among the top ranks of the elite stratum. This elite dissensus, in turn, suggested a corresponding dissensus within the Politburo, and further deductions were drawn concerning the timing of the intervention, the reasons for the decision, and other aspects of the case.

The Czech problem fell neatly into the category of threat-"alliance system threatened from within." The method of data analysis fitted the situation quite well; the issue was discussed in the elite press organs, and it was possible to follow what appears to have been a debate within the leadership during the spring and summer of 1968. If the Czech question is indeed representative of policy issues within the "alliance system" threat category (and there is no obvious reason why it should not be), then it seems probable that similar data analysis techniques can be devised to apply the theory to other situations within this threat category.

This is probably not true for all of the remaining categories of systemic threat, however. A few comments follow.

Clear, imminent direct threat to the USSR. The data analysis technique is hardly relevant to this type of situation. In the first place, there would be little time, between recognition of the threat and the need for a decision, for discussing the issue. Therefore, there would not be an observable discussion of the question in the press. Secondly, Politburo consensus would most likely be automatic on the action to be taken; the nature of the threat is such that ambiguity in its interpretation is precluded. Thus, there is negligible chance of any detectable dissensus and no likelihood of differing press attitudes.




Direct threat to a Warsaw Pact ally from an external source. As in the above case, this situation cannot be examined by data analysis. The only two salient variables (see Figure 2) conditioning consensus formation are the Soviet view of the enemy and the reliability of information. The former is not accurately reflected in the press; a fuller account of the historical and psychological factors involved must be taken through some other means. The latter, as we have said above, cannot be adequately observed in the press, due to the intricate network of official and semi-official reports which make up the Soviet information system. And in any event, the time lag between the receipt of information and the necessity for decision is likely to be too short to allow any sort of public discussion.

National security indirectly threatened. In some cases, it is likely that press analysis could be useful under this sort of circumstance. For example, the threat posed by the known development of a new weapon or delivery system on the part of the Western powers would undoubtedly lead to a very detailed discussion within the Party, government, and military elites, and it is probable that some general treatment of the issue would appear in the press organs of the elite groups concerned.

In other, more sensitive, cases, it is not certain that a discussion would take place in the press. If the United States were to attack China, for example, the Soviets might feel some potential threat to their eastern borders, and they might feel some ideological obligation to come to China's assistance. (The latter is likely to be a controversial issue in which factions divide on interest-group lines.) But it is questionable whether the Soviets would long defer a decision, and a reading of elite opinion in the press might prove to be an esoteric challenge beyond the divining powers of even the most skilled Kremlin- ologist; for while there would surely be commentary, the question is so sensitive that the true nature of the commentary might be completely obscured in contradictory jargon. Never- theless, the hypothetical event of a U.S. attack on China might yield some usable data.




Peaceful environment affected. This is a form of policy issue which would probably lead to an enlightening study of divergences in elite-group interests. A particular aspect which might be observable is the controversy between the military/ heavy industry interests and the light industry/consumer goods alliance. Press data in this area are promising.

Prestige and world revolution. This category is potentially rich in possibilities for data analysis. The question of support for "wars of national liberation," for example, is an ongoing theoretical problem which receives continuous treatment both in the daily press and in the theoretical journals such as Kommunist and Voprosy filosofii (Problems of Philosophy). There would be little difficulty in determining elite attitudes.

Summary

The theory outlined above is neither comprehensive nor infallible. It is a modest attempt to enumerate the most essential variables which must be considered in studying Soviet foreign policy. These include elements taken from each of the Rosenau-Hermann variable clusters. In addition, the core variables have been arranged into a coherent and, hopefully, meaningful pattern of interrelationships. Further study may confirm or refute the reliability of the propositions offered above. The theory awaits further refinement.

A Case Study of the Critical Variable

The Czechoslovak crisis, January 6 to August 21, 1968

During a plenary session of the Czechoslovak Communist Party's Central Committee, held January 3 to 5, 1968, Party boss Antonin Novotny' was replaced by the head of the Slovak Communist Party, Alexander Dubcek, as First Secretary. The reasons for Novotny's removal were quite clear at the time. Novotny was a living symbol of obsolete dogmatism in a restless society. The nation's economy had been faltering for several years, and economic reforms promised since 1965 had not yet



[ 1781 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

passed beyond the planning stage. The gradual removal of Novotn'-he lost only his position as First Secretary in January, was dropped from the Presidium in March, and was deprived of his Party membership on May 30-was meant to eliminate this top-level obstruction to reform. The choice of Dubcek for the highest Party post seems to have been the result of a compromise between the hard-liners and the most progressive elements; Dubcek was a quiet and unassuming individual, a diligent and efficient worker, and a dedicated Communist who had received his political training in the Soviet Union.

In the ensuing months, however, Dubcek and his closest associates (who included Premier Oldiich Cernik, National Assembly President Josef Smrkovsk', President Ludvik Svoboda, and chief economic reformer Ota Sik) set about to implement a far-reaching program of political, economic, and social reforms which created a startling momentum of change. Within this new atmosphere, previously quiescent popular forces were released which seemed, at least to the orthodox observers in the neighboring socialist countries, to be chal- lenging the Party's rule in Czechoslovakia and, by implication, the military and political stability of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.1 1

Ivan Svitaik (1968), a Czech intellectual intimately involved in the 1968 events, divides the reform period into three seasons.12 The "Winter Period," beginning with the January plenum and ending with the removal of censorship in March, was characterized by experimentation; it was during this time that the shape of the new regime's program was assuming its definition, criticisms of past policies were occurring openly and frequently, and, in a moment of symbolic contemporaneity,

1 1 In the atmosphere of candor and openness which prevailed in Czechoslovakia between January and August, Western newspaper reporters were able to cover the day-to-day developments with accuracy uncommon to news reporting from within Communist countries. See, for example, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Times (London) during this period.

12 For more detailed discussions, see Lowenthal (1968) and Skilling (1968). A very sensitive book-length account by a returned emigre is Zeman (1969). The impact of the Czech crisis upon Soviet foreign policy is discussed provocatively by Windsor and Roberts (1969).



Paul / SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA [ 1791

arch-Stalinist General Jan Sejna defected from the army and left the country. The "Spring Period" saw the growing involvement of many people in the democratization process-the unfettered discussion of previously unmentionable subjects, such as the 1948 death of Jan Masaryk, and the formation of local political clubs-and the total expulsion of Novotny. The "Summer Period" set in sometime in June and was characterized by the emergence of genuine conflicts between the Party and some vocal, nonofficial groups who now thought the Party was moving too slowly; it was a period of rapid momentum during which the now-famous "2000 Words" were published by intellectuals who had moved much farther down the path of radical reform than had the government." 3 It was the heady exuberance of the Czechoslovak political atmosphere during the "Summer Period" and the passing, finally, of political initiative from the Party to the masses which upset the confidence of the leaders of Moscow, East Berlin, Warsaw, Budapest, and Sofia- and convinced them that the virus in Prague had to be stopped lest it spread to their own countries or separate the Prague regime from the defense alliance.1 4

Several conferences between the Soviet leaders and their allies took place in July and August, the most important of which were the Soviet-Czechoslovak confrontation at Cierna- nad-Tisou and the WTO Political Consultative Committee meeting in Bratislava. At these conferences, it seems, the Czechoslovak leaders were given a last chance to reassure their allies of the Prague regime's stability and fidelity; it was an appeal which Dubcek and his colleagues apparently lost. The five-nation invasion of Czechoslovakia began early on the morning of August 21.

These events, then, constituted the external stimuli to which the Soviet leadership had to respond. The purpose of the exercise described below is to examine the attitudes of several

13 A translation of the "2000 Words" statement appears in East Europe 17 (August 1968): 25-28.

14 For a remarkably transparent illustration of the hysterical urgency felt among the orthodox forces within the Warsaw Treaty Organization, see Baran'ski (1968). General Baran'ski's article is discussed again later.




important elite groups in the Soviet Union in response to the evolving situation in Czechoslovakia during three significant periods in 1968.1 5 Several assumptions run throughout this exercise: First, the important elite groups' attitudes followed differing lines of development between January and August, and these lines can be detected by selectively reading the official newspapers which represent the respective elites. Second, the elite attitudes thus expressed reflect the positions of different individuals on the Politburo, each of whom more or less represented his "constituent" elite group's wishes on the supreme body. Third, therefore, any differences seen in the papers reflect an absence of consensus in the Politburo. Fourth, greater or lesser concern, or hostility, expressed toward the Czech leadership in the Soviet papers represents greater or lesser concern over the perceived threat as seen in Moscow.

Further, a hypothesis was derived from the general theory outlined above in this article, relating to the indecisiveness of the Soviets during most of the Czechoslovak reform program. The slowness of the Soviet leadership to decide upon intervention, it is proposed, was due to two factors: (1) the unclear nature and source of the perceived threat to socialist-bloc stability; and (2) either dissensus among, or inconsistency within, the important Soviet elite groups, resulting in the inability of the Politburo members to reach an early agreement on firm action.

Thus, the immediate purposes of this exercise are to establish evidence of such dissensus or inconsistency, to draw some inferences concerning the Soviet interpretations of the threat, and to explore the policy implications.

The elite groups chosen for analysis were the Communist Party, through its newspaper Pravda; the governmental bureaucracy, through the paper Izvestiya, the military establishment, through Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star); the Central Council of Trade Unions, through Trud (Labor); the economic and

15 The inspiration for this exercise was the author's interest in an article by Angell, Singer, and Dunham (1964). Some of the methodology used here was suggested by that used in their analysis. A similar methodology has been used by Lodge (1969) in his highly interesting and pertinent study.



Paul / SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA [ 1811

technical elite, through Sovetskaya Torgovlya (Soviet Trade); and the literary-cultural elite, through Literatumaya Gazeta (Literary Gazette). These groups were chosen because of their assumed importance in Soviet society and because of the ready access of the author to the representative newspapers.

The periods chosen for examination were January 6-16, 1968, a period immediately following the appointment of Dubcek and including the first session of the National Assembly of the year; May 8-18, 1968, midway through the "Spring Period," including the anniversary of Czechoslovakia's liberation from the Nazis in 1945, and embracing a detailed public announcement of specific reforms by the Prague government; and Aligust 11-21, 1968, the eleven days immediately prior to the invasion.

Each newspaper issued during the eleven-day periods was perused to find and code articles relating to Czechoslovakia. Of the nondaily papers, Sovetskaya Torgovlya is issued three times a week, and each edition appearing within the time periods was read. In the case of Literatumaya Gazeta, a weekly, three papers were read for each time period: January 10, 17, 24; May 8, 15, 22; and August 14, 21, 28.

All articles of a political nature relevant to events in Czechoslovakia and to Soviet-Czechoslovak relations were coded according to the one dominant attitude expressed in each. Thus, each article was assigned either a plus (+) for favorability, a zero (0) for neutrality or ambiguity, or a minus (-) for hostility or disapproval expressed toward the Czecho- slovak regime.

Articles assigned a "+" chiefly expressed explicit or implicit endorsement of Czech policy, approval of events within Czechoslovakia, or references to (or quotes from) Czechoslovak speeches, articles, press releases, or interviews. Articles assigned a "O" included those which merely reported relevant news in a neutral tone; this category also includes routine expressions of Soviet-Czech friendship, those formal well-wishes which are customary in socialist diplomacy but which have no real significance beyond their conformity to ritual. Finally, the category coded "-" included articles expressing any degree of



[ 182] INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

disapproval or hostility, whether explicit or implicit, toward the Czechoslovak regime, or expressing criticism of events occurring in, or articles published in, Czechoslovakia; this category also included articles explicitly or implicitly linking events in Czechoslovakia with Western interference or provocation.

It was found during the exercise that the data obtainable from Literatumaya Gazeta and Sovetskaya Torgovlya were too scarce to be of any value in determining the attitudes of the elites represented. This is because neither of the publications functions as a major source of international news. Literaturnaya Gazeta, as a weekly compilation of literary works and criticism, often features articles discussing literary trends in other countries; a small number of articles treating politically relevant events in Czechoslovakia did appear, but not enough to justify a generalization about the journal's editorial view. Sovetskaya Torgovlya is concerned almost exclusively with economic and commercial affairs, and it devoted very little attention to events in Czechoslovakia. The statistics for these two papers will be included in the ensuing charts, but for all practical purposes we can avoid discussing them in terms of relevance to elite opinion.

First period: January 6-16: During the first period, 26 relevant articles were discovered. They are broken down by attitude type and newspaper in Table 1.

TABLE 1

Codea

+ 0 - Total

Pravda 4 4 1 9 Izvestiya 3 4 0 7 Krasnaya Zvezda 3 1 1 5 Trud 3 2 0 5 Sov. Torgovlya 0 0 0 0 Lit. Gazeta 0 0 0 0

Totals 13 11 2 26

a. See specific meanings of code in discussion above; "+" indicates favorable, "O" neutral, "-" negative comments.




The data for this period are rather scarce. Nevertheless, it is possible to observe some general trends. In the first place, the papers express a cautious optimism toward the new regime in Prague, with thirteen favorable, eleven neutral/ambiguous, and only two negative articles. Trud showed the most favorable attitude; two of its three favorable articles were openly enthusiastic about the results of the Czech Party Plenum. One comment which accompanied Trud's (January 6, 1968: 1) report of the Plenum, and which did not appear in any of the other papers, was this: "The work of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. was completed in a spirit of full unity and solidarity, consistent with the revolutionary traditions of the C.P.C. and the greatness of the problems in the present period." All four dailies published an official biography of Dub6ek as released by Ceteka, the Czechoslovak press agency. This is significant, for the biography stressed Dub6ek's faithful service to the Communist cause and also his Party training in the Soviet Union, factors which must have been reassuring to the Soviets.

The two negative comments appeared in Pravda (January 15: 4) and Krasnaya Zvezda (January 12: 3), warning about West German revanchist ambitions concerning the Sudetenland. The fact that the latter article was chiefly concerned with Soviet fears about "neo-Nazism" in the FRG possibly means that the reference to the Sudetenland (which is in Czechoslovakia) was only incidental; nevertheless, with only a slight stretch of the imagination it can be considered a sort of admonition aimed indirectly at the Prague government, warning the Czechs not to be "misled" by Bonn's "new eastern policy." The two articles were very similar, and whether or not their appearance signified the first misgivings among the military and Party elites about the new Czechoslovak regime cannot be determined. It is interesting, however, that Krasnaya Zvezda during this time failed to report any information about the National Assembly session in Prague, January 10-1 1, other than a terse announcement of its opening (January 12: 3).1 6 It is often the case in

16 This contrasts with Izvestiya which carried a front-page report of the decisions



[ 184] INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

Soviet newspapers that the failure to report an important news event means that the paper's editors (and here, the military elite) intend thereby to show disapproval. The implications are interesting; it is conceivable that further examination of the early months of 1968 might evince more conclusive evidence that the military elite (and possibly Pravda) were already developing some doubts about Dub6ek.' 7

Middle period: May 8-18: This period saw a flood of articles dealing directly or indirectly with Czechoslovakia. A total of 103 articles appeared; a breakdown of the attitudes can be seen in Table 2.

The middle of May was a very confused period in Czechoslovakia, and this confusion is reflected in the Soviet press. Of the 103 relevant articles, no fewer than 75 fall into the neutral/ambiguous category. There are no clear patterns of favorability or unfavorability in any of the papers.

The large number of neutral items is explained by the fact that May 8 marked the anniversary of the defeat of the Germans in 1945 and Czechoslovakia's liberation. Many of the neutral items, therefore, correspond to articles or reports having to do with the celebration of the anniversary-congratulatory

TABLE 2

+ 0 - Total

Pravda 4 22 3 29 Izvestiya 5 11 4 20 Krasnaya Zvezda 4 21 1 26 Trud 3 13 4 20 Sov. Torgovlya 0 7 0 7 Lit. Gazeta 0 1 0 1

Totals 16 75 12 103

taken by the Assembly on January 13, and Pravda, which carried the same report on January 12 and added an implicit endorsement.

17 A recent study by Edward Warner, formerly of Princeton's Center of International Studies, suggests that this is not the case, that the Soviet military elite was, in fact, rather slow to exhibit any consistent signs of displeasure with the reform government in Prague.




messages, visits of dignitaries in each other's capitals, and the ubiquitous (and almost certainly staged) friendship rallies. The ritualistic nature of all these phenomena obscures the expres- sion of Soviet feelings and renders analysis difficult. It may be that there is an indeterminate degree of genuineness in the felicitations. On the other hand, it may be that in this particular case there is a subtle element of implicit chiding meant for Czechoslovakia; for the reminders that it was the Soviet Army which liberated Czechoslovakia in 1945 are ever-present, especially in Krasnaya Zvezda. That the message was not completely lost on the Czechs is indicated in a quote by President Svoboda (May 11: 3), not surprisingly given some fanfare in the pages of the Soviet military paper: "Our people will never forget [the Soviet Army's importance to us]. If we forget this, we will die. You can live without us, but we cannot without you." Another twist was given the congratulatory message in the pages of Trud (May 9: 1) where the well-wishes of the Soviet All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions to its counterpart in Prague were recorded, including the following passage: "from the bottom of our hearts we wish you, dear comrades, success in the implementation of the decisions of the XIII Congress of the C.P.C." The irony in that sentence lies in the fact that the Thirteenth Congress met in 1966; the Soviet Trade Unions Council was pointedly endorsing policy decisions made during the Novotny era!

Because of the ambiguity of these well-wishes, it might be instructive to look at a subanalysis of the May data, omitting all articles relating to the anniversary celebration (see Table 3).

Another difficulty in coding arose from the TASS dispatch about the meeting of Party leaders from the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and East Germany in Moscow on May 8. It is impossible to guess wrongly as to why these five people met on that date and in that place; they met to discuss the events in Czechoslovakia. Similarly, it is known why the remaining two WTO countries were not represented: Czecho- slovakia was the subject of discussion, hence was not invited; and Rumania's Nicolae Ceausescu was vehemently opposed to the idea of meddling in the affairs of a sovereign state-hence he



1861 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

TABLE 3

+ 0 - Total

Pravda 4 8 3 15 lzvestiya 5 4 4 13 Krasnaya Zvezda 4 10 1 15 Trud 3 8 4 15 Sov. Torgovlya 0 4 0 4 Lit. Gazeta 0 1 0 1

Totals 16 35 12 63

either was not invited or refused to attend. Yet the knowledge of these facts cannot be reflected in the coding of the TASS dispatch which appeared in each of the four dailies, for the wording of the dispatch was quite neutral, and it was so treated in the coding. While the business of the meeting, according to TASS, concerned "an exchange of opinions" (Communist euphemism for an argument) on "urgent problems of the international situation and the world communist and workers' movement," we must withstand the temptation to assign any but a neutral interpretation on the basis of the report itself (Pravda and Trud, May 9: 1; Izvestiya and Krasnaya Zvezda, May 1: 1).

The appearance of a few strongly critical articles and editorials clearly distinguishes the May period from that of January. The strongest among them was a terse and caustic TASS communique which was published in Pravda, Izvestiya, and Trud. The brief statement contained a great deal of bitterness, for it expressed a vigorous condemnation of current "speculation" about the 1948 death of Czech Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk. Soviet involvement in the mysterious affair was explicitly denied, while "those who circulate [lies concerning Soviet involvement]" were excoriated as "enemies of socialist Czechoslovakia" who "obviously hope to stir up anti-Soviet sentiments among politically unstable people" (Pravda, May 8: 5; Trud, May 8: 3; Izvestiya, May 9: 4). The wording is doubly uncomplimentary, for not only are certain elements of both Czech and Western speculation attributed to class enemies, but




an open insult is aimed at the Czechs and Slovaks, who are called "politically unstable people."

An example of a somewhat less direct, but no less strong, article was one written by V. Stepanov and carried by Izvestiya on May 11. The article said that the forces of imperialism, especially those in the United States, are hungrily watching "the 'democratization' or 'liberalization' of public life" in "the Central and Southeast European countries." Still avoiding specific reference to Czechoslovakia, although the implication could not be clearer, the article warns that the imperialists "count on influencing some people in the socialist countries who are insufficiently steadfast in their moral, ideological and political attitudes" and goes on to say that such people do indeed exist (Stepanov, 1968: 2-3; italics added). Here we have the same slap at the Czechoslovak people as above, only muted through indirectness; the references to imperialist influence are direct, and an implicit twist of irony is no doubt intended in the use of quotation marks about the words "democratization" and "liberalization."

An interesting comparison of "friendly" references is that of guest articles in Pravda and Izvestiya on May 9. Pravda printed an article by President Ludvik Svoboda of Czecho- slovakia, entitled "Friendship Strengthened in Struggle" (May 9: 4). The title is a clue to the content; Svoboda (who has, incidentally, been a consistent favorite of the Soviets because of his role as a pro-Russian general during World War II) wrote on the occasion of Czechoslovakia's liberation anniversary and devoted most of his article to praise for the wartime cooperation between the USSR and the Czechoslovak resistance movement. Svoboda gave little space to current affairs and only briefly referred to "serious errors" in his government's past practices. In contrast, Czech premier Oldnich Cernik (1968: 4-5), writing in Izvestiya, not only paid the expected tribute to Soviet paternalism but also dealt in detail with the reform program in his country. Izvestiya, it seems, was giving Cernik a forum for the presentation of the Czechoslovak case at a time when grave doubts were developing in Moscow about the Prague



188] INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

regime's loyalty. The title of the article-"Our Path Is the Path of Socialism"-would seem to confirm this impression.

The middle period, then, is one of mixed Soviet feelings. The tendency is toward neutrality, yet there are indications of deep concern with events in Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, there are hopeful expressions of friendship, perhaps representing a form of "fraternal" warning to the Czechs to moderate their democratization program and constrain the impulses of the people toward spontaneous action. The mixed feelings prevail among all the elite groups studied; no coherent "factions" as such can be identified during this time.

Third period: August 11-21: A clear pattern of hostility is visible during the ten days leading up to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The seventy relevant articles are broken down in Table 4.

The most obvious differences between this period and that in May are the increase in articles expressing hostility and the sharp decrease in those expressing amity. But a second, and, as will be argued later, highly significant difference is the disparity between the pattern of Izvestiya and those of the other papers.

Of the four major dailies, only Izvestiya carried an article which could be coded in the "friendly" category. This was a lead editorial on August 13, entitled "Fidelity to Leninism." The sympathies expressed in the editorial are not without

TABLE 4

+ 0 - Total

Pravda 0 8 12 20 lzvestiya 1 9 3 13 Krasnaya Zvezda 0 12 6 18 Trud 0 8 6 14 Sov. Torgovlya 0 0 1 1 Lit. Gazeta 1 0 3 4

Totals 2 37 31 70a

a. No articles were coded which were written after the invasion took place; this includes the announcements carried in each paper concerning the invasion. (The announcement appeared in the Aug. 21 edition of Pravda, Izvestiya, and Krasnaya Zvezda, in the Aug. 22 edition of Trud and Sovetskaya Torgovlya, and in the Aug. 28 edition of Lit. Gazeta.




ambiguity. Much of the column is devoted to the charge that, even though the Bratislava and Cierna conferences dealt a resolute blow to those who wished to see dissension within the WTO, nevertheless "the imperialist and all other anti- Communist forces are not abandoning their hopes for the success of their attempt to diminish the leading role of the working class and the communist parties and to create a breach in the unity of socialist cooperation." However, the overriding tone of the editorial is optimistic, for the writer is persuaded that "Lenin's prediction has been true, that no matter how much the imperialist bourgeoisie rants and raves, the victory of the new, socialist, order is inevitable." Thus the editorialist manages to maintain a hopeful tone throughout and concludes by saying that "the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism" live today "in the achievements of the peoples of the socialist countries and in the successes of the world communist movement."

This is not to say that Izvestiya was sympathetic to the Czechs. For there were in this period three unfriendly articles. Among them was one entitled "Poisoned Pens," which takes a journalistic swing at nearly everyone, from the Czechs to the Chinese. A relatively mild rebuke is aimed at "individual journalists" in Czechoslovakia, "like, for example, L. Vesely," who had published reports insinuating that the Prague leadership had made costly concessions at Cierna and Bratislava. But, interestingly, the harshest diatribe is reserved for Chinese and Albanian editors, who fall under attack for their polemics against the Cierna and Bratislava meetings (August 17: 3). Thus it is that this, the most severe Izvestiya reference to Czecho- slovakia in August, is muted by the simultaneous attention to "imperialists," on the one hand, and "dogmatists," on the other.

The mildness of Izvestiya's rebukes is in direct contrast to the severity with which Pravda viewed the situation in mid- August. Three very strong, very direct articles appeared in the official Party paper, one on August 16, one on August 18, and one on August 19. The first was a lengthy column by Yurii Zhukov (1968: 4) which aimed chiefly at the Western press but included unmuffled charges of collusion between forces within




Czechoslovakia and Western imperialists. The second article, entitled "Insolent Attacks by Reactionaries" (Pravda, August 18: 4), was the strongest, reporting "an intensification of subversive activities aimed by antisocialist forces against the Czechoslovak Communist Party and the foundations of the socialist system in Czechoslovakia." It referred to "the out- rageous shenanigans of certain groups in Prague," implying a breakdown of order, and stated that some of the "reactionary elements" expressed their demands "written in two Western European languages in addition to Czech"-a clearly implied charge of outside influence-and added, further on, that these elements are "encouraged from abroad by imperialist reaction." The third article, entitled "Once More About the Letter from Czechoslovak Workers," was a report from two Pravda corre- spondents in Prague, who charged that certain "patriotic and internationalist" individuals were being harassed in Czecho- slovakia, and that Czech officials were doing nothing to prevent this (August 19: 4).

The final instance of disparity between Pravda and Izvestiya is in the lead editorial of each on the eve of the invasion, August 20. Neither makes direct mention of Czechoslovakia, and both deal in theoretical terms with the consistent danger of West German revanchism. But the tone of the two editorials is not the same. Izvestiya stressed that the Bratislava Declaration forcefully reasserted the socialist nations' determination to withstand all threats from the outside and referred in general slogans to the omnipresent danger posed by the existence of NATO; it was an editorial which could have appeared on any day in the last several years, mild and unhysterical, indirect and devoid of obvious relevance ("The Key to European Security," Izvestiya, August 20: 1). The Pravda editorial, on the other hand, spoke in imminent terms, stressed the current "sharp exacerbation of the ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism," and spoke of "desperate efforts" which were being made to erode the fabric of Marxism-Leninism."8 The Pravda

18 "Front of uncompromising struggle," Pravda, August 20: 1. (Note: this editorial and the Pravda articles mentioned above can be examined in an English translation in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 20, No. 33).



Paul / SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA [191 ]

editorial, while indirect and general, was more immediate in its relevance and more alarmist in its tone than was the Izvestiya editorial.

The other two dailies followed a pattern more similar to that of Pravda than of Izvestiya. Trud, on August 13, published a column by one "International Observer" which is an excellent example of the strong polemic whose lack of direct references to Czechoslovakia in no way obscures the meaning; as such, it deserves to be quoted at some length:

Continuing its psychological subversion against individual socialist states, the machinery of imperialist propaganda is now being stoked up to its full power for the purpose of slandering the results of the meeting in Bratislava. Newspapers and broadcasts are filled with spurious assertions about a "temporary truce" and "inevitable disagreements." The imperialist press is predicting "a new aggravation of relations." As they say, a hungry hen dreams of feed [italics added].

A further, more severe, article published by Trud, entitled "Insolent Reaction," was a report concerning a plot against the head of the Czechoslovak state militia; Trud (August 21: 1) said that such a report could be taken as a crank rumor were it not that "a whole series of other factors concretely bound up with this" had been taking place in Prague, a clear indication of Trud's anxiety over the apparent breakdown of authority in the Czech capital.

The strongest article to appear at any time in the periods examined was published by Krasnaya Zvezda on August 14, exactly a week before the invasion. The article was written by one General W. Baranski (1968), Deputy Chief of the Polish General Staff. According to General Baranski, the stability of Europe was currently in extreme doubt, due to the imperialist threat in general and the revanchism of Bonn's "New Eastern Policy" in particular. Therefore, the situation in Czechoslovakia seemed especially alarming. The General declared that "the intensification of negative, dangerous phenomena" in Czecho- slovakia "calls forth. . . our readiness to give support and assistance to the Party and Czechoslovak people, fully realizing that our international responsibility is a common one and that




even a partial weakening of one important link in our defense system weakens the whole system." The General continued:

Revisionism is the chief internal danger.... Revisionism ... means first and foremost the undermining of the principal foundations of our defense, and it means attacks on the Warsaw Pact and allegations that some other, better way exists to safeguard the security of the people.

The publication of General Baran'ski's article reflected the hysteria felt among the Russian military elite; that it was not taken as a portent of Soviet intentions by the Czechs and most Western observers at the time seems, in retrospect, hard to believe.

Of the four major dailies, then, only Izvestiya showed any inconsistency. It is a fascinating inconsistency, occurring as it did right up to the invasion. The government paper clearly stood alone, diverging from the attitude patterns of the other papers in the following ways:

(1) Izvestiya published one article which can be interpreted as midly friendly to the Czechoslovaks; the other papers did not.

(2) Only three of thirteen articles in Izvestiya were basically unfriendly in tone; this is in contrast to Pravda's ratio (12/20), Krasnaya Zvezda's (6/18), and Trud's (6/14).

(3) Of Izvestiya's three unfriendly articles, two were indirect and relatively mild, and the third was a qualified and ambivalent criticism of "individual journalists"; each of the three other dailies featured at least two very strong, direct, and alarmist articles.

For these reasons, it seems reasonably safe to conclude that the government elite, as represented by the editors of Izvestiya, did not share the panic over the situation in Czechoslovakia felt by the Party, the military elite, and the trade unions' hierarchy. The implications of this on policy and the decision-making process in the Politburo are discussed below, but it is already evident that a dissensus of sorts during this ten-day period has been uncovered.

Conclusions Derived from the Exercise

Table 5 reproduces the statistics explained above, arranged here to show trends of attitude data as found in each paper.



Paul / SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1193]

TABLE 5

Krasnaya Pravda Izvestiya Zvezda

+ 0 - + 0 - + 0 -

January 4 4 1 3 4 0 3 1 1 May 4 8 3 5 4 4 4 10 1 August 0 8 12 1 9 3 0 12 6

Sovetskaya Literaturnaya Trud Torgovlya Gazeta

January 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 May 3 8 4 0 4 0 0 1 0 August 0 8 6 0 0 1 1 0 3

(Note that the May statistics include only the subanalysis-i.e., excluding the anniversary articles.)

The first conclusion is that the opinions of four of the elites can be determined. Pravda's articles indicate that the Soviet Party's general outlook in January was neutral to favorable. The government's outlook (as in Izvestiya) was similarly neutral to favorable. The trade union elite and the military leaders both registered a majority of favorable comments, although Krasnaya Zvezda's (January 12: 28) unfavorable deviation discolors the January data somewhat. The reason for the general favorability shown by the papers cannot be inferred directly from the articles, but it is probable that the Soviets were giving the relatively unknown Dubcek the benefit of doubt as he assumed his new office. After all, Dubcek's loyalist background and the orthodox manner in which he attained office-purely through the Party processes-seemed to fit him for his role.

By May, all four elite groups had misgivings about the Prague regime, but no single group could be considered consistently unfavorable. The large number of formal congratulatory messages confuse the overall picture of Russian opinion. An interesting phenomenon was Krasnaya Zvezda's apparent tendency toward friendliness (four favorable references, only one unfavorable). This is quite possibly a spin-off from the military nature of the anniversary, a temporary



194J INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

warming of the generals' hearts at the memory of the glorious victory in 1945. Another interesting feature of the May period is Trud's hostile commentaries. Somewhere in the intervening months since January, the USSR's trade union leadership lost some of its earlier warmth toward Dubcek. But the concurrent appearance of friendly references in Trud indicates an inconsistency of attitude on the part of the trade unions similar to that among the other elites.

By mid-August, all the elites except the government were hostile toward the Czechoslovak regime. A majority of the references in Pravda were unfavorable or even malicious, somewhat less than a majority in Trud and Krasnaya Zvezda. Izvestiya showed an inconsistency similar to that of May, with a large majority of neutral references. The conclusion is that the top ranks of the government bureaucracy, including Premier Kosygin, still held ambivalent feelings toward the Czechoslovak leaders and, if we carry the inference further, must have had grave doubts about intervening.

If this is true, then a second conclusion is suggested- namely, that the weight of the government's opposition proved insufficient to prevent the decision to occupy Czechoslovakia. If the ambivalence in Izvestiya's columns did indeed represent the government's reluctance to approve the invasion, Kosygin (possibly with President Podgorny), representing the government on the Politburo, was in the minority. Because of the importance of the question and the need for unity behind such a serious step as military intervention, it is likely that, instead of simply being outvoted by the interventionist majority, the minority was pressured by the others into giving reluctant assent to the invasion plans. An interesting footnote to this is the fact that, once the invasion took place, Izvestiya stepped into line and adopted essentially the same editorial policy toward Czechoslovakia as that of the other papers.' 9 That is, once the decision was implemented, the government (and Kosygin) assumed responsibility for the decision equally with the other power groups.

19 This can be seen in a comparative reading of the four major dailies in the period immediately after the invasion, beginning with the August 21 issue of Pravda, Izvestiya and Krasnaya Zvezda, and the August 22 issue of Trud.




Concerning the reliability of Soviet information sources, it is much more difficult to judge the influence of this variable on the decision. The evidence is apparent only in the TASS dispatches published verbatim by the press organs; these tended to be neutral throughout the periods examined. But the published TASS dispatches were, it can be assumed, only a small component in the total volume of official and nonofficial reports received in Moscow. It may be possible, in another type of study, to learn more about the reports which did filter through, but there would always be a very large number (probably a majority) of reports which would never be available to the outside world in any form.

Thus we can only speculate about the accuracy of information reports as a whole. It seems likely that the further the Prague reform program went, the more reports about it were received in Moscow; there were undoubtedly more reports reaching the Soviet leaders in August than in May and more in May than in January. The reports in January were probably neutral and confined to cautious communications about the leadership changes and policy discussions. By May, a vast array of reports must have been coming in. And in August we can assume that the majority of the reports were unfavorable, many of them alarmist. But these tenuous speculations do nothing to explain the underlying reasons for any variation in the accuracy of the reports; this factor remains beyond the bounds of the present inquiry.

Having drawn these preliminary conclusions, we can now return to the hypotheses stated earlier in this article and test them against the evidence offered in this section.

Politburo consensus and the nature of policy

Let us review some of the hypotheses suggested in the first part of this article:

Proposition 1.0: The greater the ability of the Politburo to reach consensus, the more quickly and resolutely will action be taken, and the firmer the policy will tend to be.



1961 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

Proposition 1.1: Inability to reach a consensus readily on firm action, and the resulting deferment of decision, will tend to make policy cautious, defensive, and noninterventionary-unless and until external events force a crisis decision upon the leaders.

Proposition 1.2: Decisions taken in a crisis situation brought on by the defennent of decision will tend to be more impulsive, less cautious, and more of an interventionary nature than will other decisions.

Proposition 1.0 relates consensus-building to the prompt- ness and firmness of policy decision. Our assumption is that the Politburo's decision to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia was not made until after the Cierna and Bratislava meetings.2" If this is the case, it took the Politburo almost seven months to understand the implications of Dubcek's ascendancy for Czechoslovak policy and Warsaw Pact solidarity, to agree on a firm line of policy vis-ai-vis the new Prague regime, and to decide upon a concrete course of action. The first of these problems, understanding the implications, may or may not have taken the Soviets seven months. They must have had suspicions that Prague's policy was in for a change immediately upon Dubcek's election; the reform program's general nature was clear by the time of Novotny's removal from the Presidium and General Sejna's defection, and open criticism of at least some of the Czech liberalization's effects was appearing in the Soviet press

20 This assumption might be verifiable by means of a comprehensive data analysis of Soviet newspapers through late July and early August. Richard Lowenthal (1968: 21) has concurred to the extent that he feels the final, irrevocable decision to invade was made sometime between August 10 and 17. Lowenthal, however, disagrees with the conclusions I have drawn concerning the suddenness of this decision; he says (1968: 14), somewhat inconsistently, that the "basic policy decision to occupy Czechoslovakia. . . must have been taken at the end of June." The Cierna and Bratislava meetings, according to Lowenthal, represented a "stay of execution"; that is, the sentence had been decided upon, and the condemned man was now making his last public utterance.

Lowenthal's interpretation, though, does not quite explain why the Soviets and their closer allies went to so much trouble to pressure the Czechoslovaks into attending the meetings. My argument is that these meetings were held because there were important people of Politburo rank who did not want to invade, even though contingency plans for such action had, no doubt, been worked out as early as late May (prior to the joint Warsaw Pact operations on Czech soil). There were surely high-ranking Soviet officials who pressed for armed intervention long before the decision was made, but these people gained the upper hand in the Politburo only after Cierna and Bratislava.




by mid-May (see above). The general line of Soviet policy seems to have taken some shape by May; the general policy was to try to persuade the Czechoslovak leaders to moderate or postpone their reforms and to restrain the masses' impulses toward independence, through measures which would include the reimposition of censorship. Several alternative methods of persuasion must have been considered throughout the spring and summer, and it must have been apparent to at least some of the Soviet leaders by early summer that diplomacy and intimidation would not work. But a preponderance of top-level Soviet opinion was not convinced of the necessity to use military force until after the Cierna and Bratislava meetings, and Premier Kosygin probably was not persuaded by the time of the invasion itself. Throughout the spring and summer, the Polit- buro, unable to reach consensus on a firmer course of action, essentially opted for the one course acceptable to all members: diplomatic and journalistic pressure (see proposition 1.1, above).

The deferment of decision in Moscow increased the Prague leaders' confidence in their independence from Soviet control. The radical turn of events in the "Summer Period" produced a crisis atmosphere within the Warsaw Treaty Organization; it is known that the mood of such top priority Soviet allies as Ulbricht and Gomulka was bordering on hysteria.2 1 And it is quite possible that these allies' influence on specific Soviet Politburo members was strong enough to represent a heavy factor in the decision. (One such vulnerable Politburo member may have been PMtr Shelest, whose native Ukrainian Republic had undergone some unrest in recent years over the domination of ethnic Russians in the Ukraine. It has been speculated- although not proven-that there was a good deal of sympathy among the Ukrainian masses for the reform government in Prague, which was seen as a manifestation of national revolt against the Russians.) At any rate, the resulting panic in the

21 Newsweek of August 26, 1968, reported that Ulbricht expressed his anxiety over the Czechoslovak reforms to his allies thus: "If things in Prague . . . continue as they are, then we are all done for."




Kremlin forced the Soviet leaders into the impulsive decision of August (see proposition 1.2.)

External threat and the salience of other variables

Again, it is time to reconsider some further hypotheses suggested earlier:

Proposition 2.0: The greater the perceived level of threat and the more clearly recognizable the source thereof, the more readily will consensus be formed among Politburo members.

Proposition 2.1: The more imminent and direct the threat to the USSR itself, the fewer core variables will be of salience in the forming of consensus.

Proposition 2.2: The less clear and direct the threat to the USSR, the more will be the divergence of Politburo opinions, the less similarity there will tend to be among information reports, and the more consideration will be given to domestic factors.

These propositions are not directly verifiable through the data analysis exercise described in this case study, but some "educated guesses" can be made regarding them.

The external threat was perceived to be high but neither direct nor imminent. The level of threat corresponds to that represented by the category "alliance system threatened from within" as described above (p. 173). The salient variables bearing upon Politburo consensus under these circumstances were (in approximate order of descending importance) information reliability, ideological ambiguity, Soviet view of the enemy, power rivalry among leaders, individual persuasiveness, and pressure of domestic demands. Briefly, the importance of these factors: First, the significance of the information-reporting network has been discussed and requires no further comment. Second, the ambiguity inherent in Marxism-Leninism made it possible for the Czechoslovak leaders, especially the shrewd Party man Dubcek, to weave intricate dialectical arguments to defend their program; this contributed to the Soviets' ideological confusion. Third, the Soviet view of the enemy naturally led the Russians to suspect imperialist meddling and to assume that a possible long-range repercussion of the reform govern-




ment was the slipping of Czechoslovakia out of the "anti- imperialist" camp. Fourth, that power rivalry played a significant role is difficult to establish, but it can certainly be assumed that the individual Soviet leader who proposed the "correct" solution to the problem would gain in effective power, while anyone who proposed something unworkable or ideologically unacceptable would lose influence; therefore, one reason for the deferment of decision might have been mutual hesitation to speak out, even in the privacy of Politburo sessions, lest an individual say the wrong thing and alienate his peers. Fifth, the role of personal persuasiveness is also hard to determine, but it is probably closely related to the power-rivalry factor and probably was of some importance. Finally, the pressure of domestic demands could well have been a significant cause of Kosygin's reluctance to approve the invasion; as the Politburo member most closely attuned to the problems of internal planning, Kosygin may have considered the relative importance of forcing Czechoslovakia into submission as secondary to the USSR's domestic problems.

The nature of the threat, if not altogether distinct, was becoming clear throughout the spring and summer. The threat was to the orthodoxy of the socialist order in Czechoslovakia and, indirectly, to the stability of Czechoslovakia's neighboring states, in the form of a potential "spillover" effect upon the Polish and East German populaces,2 2 and to the stability of the Warsaw Pact defense alliance. The specific source of the threat also became clear in the course of time. At first the Soviets had preferred to blame the Czechoslovak "deviation" on imperialist meddling and antisocialist "reactionaries" rather than on the reform program which itself was a product of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. During the course of the spring and summer, it became apparent that genuine, loyal Communists in Prague were actually allowing their subjects a degree of freedom unprecedented in Communist societies; the Party's ultimate control over political affairs in the country seemed to be

22 The open support within Czechoslovakia for the antigovernment riots in Poland by students and intellectuals in the spring of 1968 could not but have been seen by the Polish leaders as clear evidence of just such a dangerous "spillover."




slipping. Therefore, some action had to be taken, or so most Soviet leaders thought; Dubcek and his colleagues had to be persuaded or forced to reassert Party authority and to stop the momentum of internal developments. In the long run, the personnel of the reform government would have to go, but for the time being it was essential to reimpose Party authority by some means.

If all the Soviet leaders agreed that something had to be done (which seems probable, since all elite newspapers carried articles critical of events in Czechoslovakia in both the May and the August samplings), they were probably not all in agreement that a measure as drastic as military intervention was necessary to reverse the direction of policy in Prague. That the latter is probable can be seen in, first, the slowness with which the decision to intervene was made following the perception of a threat and, second, the differences in the August data concerning the elite groups' attitudes. By August, a predominant majority of Politburo members felt that there was no choice but to go ahead with the invasion; moreover, the position of the minority had by this time become so unpersuasive that the interventionists finally had their way.

Summary

By mid-August, most of the ambiguity of the threat posed by the Czechoslovak reform program had been resolved among the preponderant majority of Soviet Politburo members. Yet there remained two factions within the top ranks of the Russian leadership, divided by differing opinions about the importance of the threat to Soviet security and differing conceptions of how best to combat the threat. After months of indecision and much internal debate, external events in the form of the radical "Summer Period" and the Prague regime's unwillingness to stem the tide of reform convinced most Soviet leaders that drastic action was necessary. These leaders banded together under the force of the perceived necessity and pressured the oppositionist faction (led possibly by Kosygin) into tacitly agreeing with the



Paul / SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA [201 ]

decision to invade. The implementation of the decision then drew both factions together in a show of solidarity.2 3

Postscript

The developments of the 24th Congress, CPSU, lend credence to the argument that Brezhnev has now emerged as "Number One" in Soviet politics. Brezhnev's personal rise will undoubtedly strengthen the role of the idiosyncratic variable in the Politburo's policy-making, and the enlargement of the Politburo with several Brezhnev proteges will probably make it easier for the General Secretary to pass his programs. The collective body remains intact, however; time will tell to what extent Brezhnev has in fact achieved preeminence, but in the meantime we should not expect a dramatic change in the mechanics of Soviet policy-making.

REFERENCES

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ASPATURIAN, V. V. (1966) "Internal politics and foreign policy in the Soviet system," in R. B. Farrell (ed.) Approaches to Comparative and International Politics. Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press.

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23 This author takes issue with the Brzezinski-Huntington theory (1964: 202 ff.) that the sequence of policy-making in the Soviet Union is initiation-decision- persuasion-execution. In the case of the decision to invade Czechoslovakia, initiation took the form of multiple ideas which were discussed (overlapping the persuasion phase?) for several months before a decision was made and implemented. There then followed what may be seen as a fifth phase of assuming joint responsibility in the justification of the policy before a wider audience (both domestic and foreign). The position of the minority (Kosygin) can best be described as resigned rather than persuaded.



[202] INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

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soviet foreign policy and the invasion of czechoslovakia: a theory and a case study

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