soviet foreign policy and domestic politics

Soviet Foreign Policy and Domestic PoliticsLeadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy: Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev byJames M. Goldgeier; Khrushchev's Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic CoalitionPolitics by James G. RichterReview by: Daniel S. PappMershon International Studies Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Oct., 1995), pp. 290-293Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/222764 .

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Mershon International Studies Review (1995) 39, 290-293

Soviet Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics REVIEW BY DANIEL S. PAPP

Georgia Institute of Technology

Leadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy: Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gor- bachev. By James M. Goldgeier. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. 263 pp., $45.00 (ISBN: 0-8018-4814-8).

Khrushchev's Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Poli- tics. By James G. Richter. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. 169 pp., $35.00 (ISBN: 0-8018-4866-0).

Even before the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, many scholars and analysts understood that Soviet foreign policy behavior and Soviet domestic politics were integrally interrelated. Often, Soviet foreign policy was a function, not only of the Soviet Union's pursuit of its international objectives and of its responses to external stimuli, but also of the different personalities, beliefs, and perceptions of Soviet leaders, and of the conflicting demands of domestic Soviet political agendas and issues. Conversely, Soviet domestic politics and policies were fre- quently affected by Soviet foreign policy successes and failures.

Although their hypotheses, methodologies, and emphases differ considerably, both James M. Goldgeier's Leadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy: Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev and James G. Richter's Khrushchev's Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics develop arguments that add to the rich analytical tradition that posits an integral relationship between Soviet foreign policy behavior on the one hand and domestic political and policy issues on the other. Despite their differences, Goldgeier and Richter would agree with Alexander Dallin (1966), Carl Linden (1966), Alexander George (1980), and many others, that Soviet foreign policy behavior, Soviet domestic politics and policies, and Soviet leadership perceptions, beliefs, and personalities must be viewed together if Soviet actions in either the foreign policy or domestic realm are to be understood.

In Leadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy, James M. Goldgeier argues that individual Soviet leaders learned from domestic political successes, and that their past successful domestic political strategies and tactics became the precedents for future foreign policy style and behavior. This is not an unreasonable hypothesis, nor is it one that may be applied only to the Soviet leadership. Indeed, the international behaviors of leaders as diverse as Lyndon Johnson (Sidey, 1968:221) and Adolf Hitler (Taylor, 1961:280) have on occasion been attributed to the lessons that they learned in domestic politics. As Goldgeier proposes, "it only makes sense" that as a given leader "learned that his style was successful in one kind of political conflict," he would "continue to use those same strategies and tactics in the foreign policy arena" (p. 33).

Beginning his study from the perspective of psychological analyses of political behavior, Goldgeier examines this hypothesis by first developing typologies of what he calls the "domestic bargaining styles" of Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, and Mikhail Gorbachev. Stressing that their most poignant peri-

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DANIEL S. PAPP

ods of learning probably occurred during succession periods when they were struggling to acquire power, Goldgeier argues that Stalin's style was "to avoid bold commitments while using a highly coercive strategy masked by accommodative gestures;" that Khrushchev "delighted in open confrontation and the use of commitments to keep his adversaries off balance;" that Brezhnev preferred "to accom- modate his adversaries and to preserve his options;" and that Gorbachev "followed Khrushchev's strategy of pressuring his opponents" but avoided "the kind of personal commitments that had become a liability for Khrushchev" (p. 112).

The author presents persuasive arguments to support his typologies, which is fortunate because virtually all of Goldgeier's later analysis hinges on the reader's willingness to accept them. Given the importance that the typologies have in the analysis, however, one wishes that Goldgeier would have spent considerably more time developing them. Entire books have been devoted to the analysis of the leadership styles (Breslauer, 1982; Tucker, 1987) and the politics surrounding the successions of Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev (Linden, 1966; Tatu, 1968). But Goldgeier handles all four in seventeen brief pages. To make his typologies completely persuasive, additional evidence is needed.

After typing the domestic bargaining style of each Soviet leader, Goldgeier analyzes how each behaved during one major and one minor foreign policy crisis or event that took place during his rule. In all eight cases, two for each of the four Soviet leaders, Goldgeier shows that each man pursued strategies and tactics in the foreign policy arena that were consistent with the domestic policy style and behavior established during his rise to power. For example, in Gorbachev's case, Goldgeier examines German unification and the Reykjavik summit. He argues that during German unification, Gorbachev avoided commitments to specific positions even as he continually proposed new deals and attempted to martial public support. This, Goldgeier maintains, fits the same pattern of behavior that he displayed when dealing with rivals over domestic political issues. Similarly, at Reykjavik, Goldgeier asserts that Gorbachev's efforts to throw Ronald Reagan off balance paralleled his domestic political behavior as he attempted to outmaneuver his opponents.

This is admittedly a relatively limited number of cases given the magnitude of Soviet foreign policy activity from Stalin to Gorbachev, and to Goldgeier's credit, he makes no sweeping generalizations on the basis of his evidence. Rather, he wisely and modestly states that his evidence indicates that "we need to understand how domestic political experiences shape decision makers' approaches to international problems" in order "to develop better theories of foreign policy behavior" (p. 125). And Goldgeier is right. Although the research presented in this book adds weight to the argument that there is a linkage between an individual leader's past successful domestic political strategies and future foreign policy style, more research is indeed needed before one can conclude that past successful domestic political strategies became the precedents for future foreign policy style in the Soviet or any other context. Leadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy: Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev is an interesting start in that direction.

Yet, one can quickly predict the potential limits of such studies and identify a host of follow-up questions that will quickly emerge. Is the nature of the linkage between past domestic political success and future foreign policy behavior idiosyn- cratic, dependent on the psyche of in(livi(lual leaders? If so, does that not drive the analyst in the direction of psychological profiles of leaders in order to understand their actions? To what extent does the political system and institutional setting in which a leader operates affect the linkage? And as a leader gains more experience in foreign policy, how quickly and to what extent, if at all, does he or she conclude that domestic policy experiences are, or are not, translatable to the international

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Book Reviews

arena? In short, establishing the extent to which past domestic political successes serve as learning experiences that underlie future foreign policy behavior will continue to be a difficult task.

In Khrushchev's Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics, James G. Richter uses an organizational and political approach rather than a psychological one to study "the link between foreign policy and domestic legiti- macy" (p. 5) and more particularly, to analyze "the impact of international events on bargaining relationships within the [Soviet] leadership" (p. 27). Relying heavily on already published speeches by and public statements of Soviet leaders, as well as recently released Soviet archival and other materials, Richter presents a fascinat- ing picture, not of the impact of domestic politics on Soviet foreign policy behavior, but rather of the impact of foreign policy on Soviet domestic politics during the Khrushchev era.

After detailing his theoretical considerations and methodological approach, Richter examines the entire period of Khrushchev's rule. He does not explore the internal workings of the Kremlin's political machinations in as much detail as either Carl Linden (1966) or Michel Tatu (1968), but his purpose is not the same as theirs. Rather than providing a detailed history of the Soviet Politburo, Richter seeks to examine his hypothesis that Khrushchev needed foreign policy successes to help him build domestic political coalitions so that he could implement the policies he wanted. Nevertheless, even a reader unfamiliar with the vagaries of Politburo politics will develop a good understanding of the infighting that took place in the Kremlin during the Khrushchev years (1953-1964).

Importantly, Richter stresses that both foreign and domestic policy are imple- mented within institutional frameworks that carry certain assumptions. This is an important recognition because, as Richter points out, these institutional assumptions often restrict the range of policies that can be put on the table. To operate effectively within their own institutional frameworks, it is necessary for leaders to build political coalitions. The more radical a policy is that a leader seeks to implement, the more important an effective coalition becomes.

From Richter's perspective, this was particularly important for Nikita Khru- shchev, who sought to implement significant policy changes both domestically and internationally in several policy areas. To do this, Khrushchev needed to maintain international credibility even as he developed domestic support across a spectrum of issues. Unfortunately for Khrushchev, given the degree to which foreign policy successes or failures influenced domestic politics and vice versa, he needed to succeed at both. This was Khrushchev's double bind: if he failed either to maintain international credibility or to develop domestic political support, he would fail at both. Richter provides many examples of this, ranging from the impact of the 1956 Suez and Eastern European crises on Khrushchev's standing in the Politburo to the role that the Cuban Missile Crisis played in internal Kremlin debates about domestic political and economic issues.

The chief weakness of Khrushchev's Double Bind lies in its last few pages when the author applies his methods and tools to the politics of transition in contemporary Russia. The problem is not that the methods and tools are not applicable. Rather, it is that in comparison to the rigor with which Richter undertook his analysis of the Khrushchev years, his analysis of Russian affairs in the 1990s is superficial. Indeed, he devotes only eight pages to it. Rather than conclude with such a hurried analysis in an effort to make the book appear more timely, it would have been better simply to observe that the methods and tools that were used so well in Khrushchev's Double Bind also are applicable to present-day Russian political affairs. A detailed-and ultimately more satisfying-analysis could then have been left to a future work.

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But as a criticism, this is quibbling. Khrushchev's Double Bind and Leadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy are both solid additions to the literature that links Soviet foreign policy behavior with Soviet domestic political affairs. Although they have considerably different hypotheses, employ conflicting methodologies, and empha- size different aspects of foreign policy-domestic politics linkages, both books offer the reader new insight into Soviet foreign policy and domestic political behavior.

References

BRESLAUER, GEORGE W. (1982) Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics. London: Allen and Unwin.

DALLIN, ALEXANDER. (1966) Soviet Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: A Framework for Analysis. Journal of International Affairs 23:250-65.

GEORGE, ALEXANDER L. (1980) "The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making." In The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, edited by Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederick J. Fleron, Jr. New York: Aldine, pp. 165-90.

LINDEN, CARL. (1966) Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni-

versity Press. SIDEY, HUGH. (1968) A Very Personal Presidency: LyndonJohnson in the White House. New York: Atheneum. TATU, MICHEL. (1968) Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin. New York: Viking. TAYLOR, A. J. P. (1961) The Origins of the Second World War New York: Fawcett. TUCKER, ROBERT C. (1987) Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia: From Lenin to Gorbachev. New

York: Norton.

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