lecture 7: domestic politics of trade

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Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

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Page 1: Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade

Benjamin Graham

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

Page 2: Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade

Today’s Plan

• Finish last week’s lecture• Domestic Politics of Trade

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

Page 3: Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade

Housekeeping

• Homework 2 due next Tuesday (Feb 14).

• Midterm is February 21– Midterm review guide will go out later this week

– Note: The optional reading is truly optional – not on the exam

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

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Reading Quiz (1)

• Strategic Trade Policy is generally promoted as a response to what?– A) trade sanctions– B) economic sanctions– C) perfect competition– D) imperfect competition

Lecture 6: Barriers to Trade Benjamin Graham

Page 5: Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade

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Quiz (2)• InthePlanetMoneysegment,thetwomaincompetinginterestgroupswere:

• A. Labor unions and candy factory owners• B. Candy producers and sugar beet farmers• C. Lollipop makers and chocolate manufacturers• D. US-based Lollipop producers like dum-dum vs.

retailers like Walmart who import most of their candy

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Quizs (3)• TheEximbank (Export-ImportBank)iscriticizedbecause

a.interestsratesaretoohighb.partsofitsfundsareborrowedfromtheU.S.Treasuryc.itisfundedbytaxingtheU.S.populationd.onlyworkstofinanceinfrastructureprojects

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Quiz (3)• WhatleadtotheprotestsbyFrenchfarmersinthearticleweread?a.RussianbanonEUfoodimportsb.ReducedChinesedemandc.Lowpricesd.Allofabove

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Reading Quiz (4)

• Which of the following statements is accurate:• A. The US provides more protection for domestic sugar producers

than (almost) any other country• B. The US provides less protection for domestic sugar producers

than (almost) any other country• C. Sugar prices in the U.S. are higher than the world price• D. Sugar prices in the U.S. are lower than the world price• E. A & C • F. B & D

Lecture 6: Barriers to Trade Benjamin Graham

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Reading Quiz (3)

• Which of the following were part of Trade Adjustment Assistance provided under the George W. Bush administration?– A. Wage insurance– B. Health insurance– C. Job training– D. A&B– E. B&C– F. All of the Above

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

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Who benefits from tariffs?

• In the country that implements the tariffs, who benefits from tariffs on agricultural goods and textiles?A. Unskilled workers and people who own farmland B. Skilled workers and people who own farmland C. People without farmland land and skilled workersD. People who eat food and people who buy clothes

Lecture 6: Barriers to Trade Benjamin Graham

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Tariffs are also an easy tax handle

Lecture 6: Barriers to Trade Benjamin Graham

• Tariffs as a share of government revenues

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Trade and income distribution

• Free trade makes a country richer in total– But it hurts some people and helps others

• Government redistribution can help even this out and get everyone to support free trade– Tax beneficiaries of free trade, give it to those who lose out– Unemployment benefits, job training, etc.

Lecture 6: Barriers to Trade Benjamin Graham

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Source:Rodrik1998“WhyDoMoreOpenEconomiesHaveBiggerGovernments?

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Trade and income distribution

• What is the effect of trade on inequality?– Depends on who owns the scarce factors– Should (generally) reduce inequality in poor countries and

increase inequality in rich countries• This is empirically muddy

Lecture 6: Barriers to Trade Benjamin Graham

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The effect of tariffs on consumers

• What do tariffs on textiles and agriculture do to prices in the US?– Whom does that hurt?

• What do tariffs on textiles and agriculture do to prices in developing countries?– Whom does that hurt?

Lecture 6: Barriers to Trade Benjamin Graham

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Tariffs vs. subsidies

• Tariffs and subsidies are different in which of the following ways:• A. Tariffs are a much more effective way to protect domestic

importers.• B. Tariffs increase government revenue while subsidies cost the

government money• C. Tariffs raise the prices paid by domestic consumers, subsidies

do not• D. Tariffs hurt domestic consumers, subsidies hurt domestic

taxpayers• E. B, C, and D are all correct

Lecture 6: Barriers to Trade Benjamin Graham

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The Producer Viewpoint

• How does the sugar industry justify US sugar policy?• Doesn’t cost taxpayers anything (tariffs & Quotas instead of

subsidies)• Provides stable prices (no shortages) • Creates jobs• Unfair competition (subsidies) in Mexico & China• Lower prices wouldn’t reach consumers anyway

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

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Concentrated vs. Diffuse Interests

• Concentrated Interest: A small group of people, each of whom care a lot

• Diffuse Interest: A large group of people, each of whom care a little

• In a democracy, concentrated interests often prevail over diffuse interests.

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

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Ricardo-Viner vs Stolper-Samuelson

• Stolper-Samuelson – locally scarce vs. locally abundant factors

• Ricardo-Viner – Exporting industries vs. import-competing industries

• These overlap some, but...• In developing countries, exporting industries are often those that

employ high-skilled workers (i.e. owners of human capital)– Sometimes owners of human capital and physical capital (in the

right industries) benefit more than unskilled workers (in the wrong industries)

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

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Rogowski (1987)

• Predicting political cleavages regarding trade• Owners of locally scarce factors vs. owners of locally abundant factors• Example: “Marriage of Iron and Rye”

– Germany in late 1800s– Capital scarce, land scarce, labor abundant– So industrialists & landed gentry imposed tariffs and repressed labor

• Example: Britain in the late 1800s– Capital and labor abundant, land scarce– Industrialists and labor unite– Push free trade, expand suffrage, reduce power of landed gentry

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

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Interest Groups: Factors of Production vs. Industries

• Labor unions represent owners of labor, i.e. workers• Chambers of Commerce represents owners of capital• Various agricultural lobby groups represent owners of land

• We also see lobbying at the industry-level– For example, when the auto industry lobbies for protection, it is

often both unions and company owners doing the lobbying (i.e. both labor and capital.

– Same with the coal industry -- both miners and mine-owners

• Either way, trade protection happens at the product level

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

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Factors of Production and Interest Groups

• Owners of locally-scarce factors of production often seek protection for products that use that factor intensely

• Import-competing industries also seek protection as industry groups

• Anti-trade interests seek subsidies for domestic production, tariffs on foreign imports, or quotas on foreign imports

• These policies benefit owners of the locally scarce factor of production and import-competing industries

• The policies harm consumers and/or taxpayers across the country• Bonus points if beneficiaries are concentrated in a swing state

– Michigan and Ohio (cars)– Pennsylvania (Steel)– Florida (Sugar)

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

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Who benefits from tariffs on the import of foreign t-shirts into the US?

– A. Unskilled U.S. workers generally– B. Owners of U.S.-based T-shirt manufacturing facillities – C. U.S. Consumers who buy t-shirts– D. Hipster entrepreneurs who buy bulk t-shirts, print snarky

things on them, and resell them– E. A&B– F. A, B, & D– G. All of the Above

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

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But people aren’t “pocketbook voters”

• People generally vote based on their perception of the public good.– How is trade affecting their zip code?

• How do voters feel about foreigners in general? About global integration?

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

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Logic of Trade Protection

• Jobs will be protected– In the protected industry, and in its suppliers and ancillary

industries• Example: Auto parts producers would go under if GM goes

under• Foreign competition is in some way “unfair,”

– Foreign subsidies, or lax labor and environmental laws• Trade displacement has cultural costs as well economic ones

– Protecting “traditional” industries

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

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Industrial Policy

• Industries are hard to start – May only become globally competitive later

• Government’s pick an industry, subsidize it, and protect it– Subsidies and protection are supposed to be temporary– “infant industries”

• The goal: create a globally competitive industry that no longer needs subsidies

• The risks: Governments are bad at “picking winners”– Temporary protections become permanent– What incentive do firms have to wean themselves from

government help?

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

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Japan did it pretty well

• 1950s, Japan exported textiles, low-tech products; by 1970s and 1980s, Japan was exporting cars, ships, etc

• Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI): Selects industries to receive trade protection, R&D subsidies, low interest loans, tax breaks, etc.

• Debates remain, but generally viewed as quite successful

• Many other countries have been much less successful– Lots of corruption

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

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The Story of Airbus

• In the early 1970s Germany, France, Britain, and Spain all chipped in to create a (heavily subsidized) European airplane manufacturing industry– $13.5 billion of direct subsidies in first 20 years

• By the early 1990s, airbus had an operating profit and was starting to pay back government loans

• Worth it? Probably.

• Huge WTO dispute between Airbus and Boeing– But that’s for a later class

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

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The Making of the US Farm Bill

• Subsidies across a variety of crops• Also includes foodstamps, school lunch subsidies, etc.• The Coalition:

– Rural states (crop subsidies)– Urban states (food stamps, school lunch subsidies)

• Domestically, who bears the costs of these subsidies?

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

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Free Trade Agreements: One Way Trade Policy Liberalizes

• Concentrated interests oppose opening US markets to imports defeat the diffuse interests who would benefit– i.e. producers in import-competing industries defeat consumers

• There are also concentrated interests that want access to foreign markets.– Producers in xporting industries

• Free trade agreements harness these concentrated interests in favor of reciprocal free trade agreements– I’ll let your goods in if you let mine in.

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

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The Union Argument Against FTAs

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

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But... this is how they might come around

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

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Free Trade Agreements: Korea

• The Korean FTA was signed in 2007, but was not ratified by the Democrat-controlled Senate’– Main opposition: Labor Unions

• Obama administration renegotiated the deal, got a better deal regarding the Auto industry– Got the United Auto Workers on board– Ratified easily in 2011

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

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Free Trade Agreements: Colombia

• Signed in 2006, but not ratified until 2011– Again, major opposition was US labor unions

• Negotiations focused on improving labor rights in Colombia

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham

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Free Trade Agreements: Terms of Trade?

• In both the Colombia and South Korea cases, the smaller country wanted it more.– The U.S. is Colombia’s largest trading parter, but Colombia

accounts for less than 1% of US trade

• The party that wants a deal more ends up giving up more– For example, South Korea had to let US autos into South Korea 5

years before tariffs will be lifted on Korean autos into the US

Lecture 7: Domestic Politics of Trade Benjamin Graham