Soft Power Core – RSZ 2015

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Uniqueness

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Soft Power High – CultureUS is still a soft power leader – unmatched cultural and value influenceNye and Bremmer, 15 (OG Joseph S. Nye, Distinguished Service Professor, Harvard Kennedy School of Government at the Council on Foreign Relations, as well as a total badass, interview with Peter Zeihan and Ian Bremmer, 3-4-2015, "Charting the Next American Century", CFR, http://www.cfr.org/united-states/charting-next-american-century/p36194#ER, DA: 7-8-2015)

BREMMER : This kind of leads in to one big question, which we haven't talked about, and frequently doesn't get in to these conversations, which is where's the role for American values, and is there one. How much is that in this emerging world order getting undermined, in your view,

and what should we think about from the American perspective in how important or not, some of the critical values that have built the American century will be going forward? NYE : This is what I think is

crucial, which is the United States has a soft power through its values. Not by ramming them down other countries

throats, not by invading Iraq, and trying to turn them in to a democracy, but by attracting others. And if you ask what other society in the world today has an ability to attract people, it's hard to see anybody competing with the

United S tates. Why is it that there are 270,000 Chinese students in the United States? Why did Xi Jinping's daughter go to

Harvard and graduate last year? There's still something about our society and values which does attract, and it's not like the 1930s where you had, with Hitler's Germany, a whole ideology trying to attract people to a totally different way of

thinking, or Stalin's Communist way of thinking in the Cold War, trying to attract people. That doesn't exist anymore. There are lots of fragmented options like ISIS—and that's a real danger in the Middle East, I'm not denying it—but in the universal set of values, I don't know of anybody , or any country, or entity, that has as much soft power as the United States.

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Soft Power High – Laundry ListUS is unmatched – economic, cultural, technological, and political dominanceBev, 12 (Jennie S. Bev, regular columnist to Forbes Indonesia, The Jakarta Post, and Strategic Review, Associate Partner of Fortune PR Indonesia and based in Northern California, 5-23-2012, "The Power of American "Soft Power"", Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/85broads/2012/05/23/the-power-of-american-soft-power/#ER, DA: 7-7-2015)

Almost four years since the beginning of the Great Recession, signified by the implosion of the financial industry and the

fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the U nited S tates is recovering. In fact, some sectors have grown to new heights. Thus, a “declining USA” is no more than a myth. This myth is likely to continue for a while despite the recession officially ending in June

2009 as the high unemployment and on-going foreclosure crisis have cloaked significant economic improvements. In the last four years, declinism and declinists have been spreading paralyzing dystopian analyses. Combine this with Nouriel “Dr. Doom” Roubini’s “the perfect storm” forecast in 2013 and you probably would become even more paralyzed. Daniel Gross’ best-selling book Better, Stronger, Faster released in May 2012 is an exception. It is probably one of the first books that presents encouraging facts in this recovery period rather than discouraging views of America’s future. The mammoth has gotten back up, but it is always the memory of one’s fall that lingers in mind. We all remember that one fateful day when we attended the 341(a) bankruptcy hearing to meet creditors and not the thousands of days of financial stability. Just like we all remember vividly the day our loved one was buried six-feet under when he died and not the beautiful decades he shared his life with us. Failure and losing hurt, thus they are recorded for eternity in our long-term memory. It is just how our brain works, thanks to millions of years of evolution. The world was so shocked with the fall of USA, that its gradual rise hasn’t yet created a lasting mental

image. Good news, American “soft power” is more powerful than any fiscal policy and political maneuver . Joseph Nye of Harvard University Kennedy School of Government says “soft power” refers to the ability to get through attraction rather than coercion or payments. By “to get” it means to receive favorable treatments based upon attractiveness of a country’s culture, ideals, and policies. For instance, inspired by TV series about medical doctors, some children in Taiwan aspire to study medicine at an American university.

Infatuated by the idea of a fair trial, an Indonesian dissident aspires to become a lawyer. “Soft power” can be hardcore power. And the American brand is still the best out there . Also, thanks to low US dollar value, a record 62 million foreign tourists visited USA in 2011. In 2010, some 1.04 million immigrants applied for permanent residency,

following 1.13 million in the previous year, which reflects the world’s insatiable faith in the US brand. The people of the world still believe that the USA is the place to visit, to reside, and to prosper. US brands, such as automobile giants Buick, GM,

and Ford, continue to grow outside of the USA. US brands continue to influence socio-political-economic wellbeing of people of the world: Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube are vital in demonstrations and social unrests. US brands continue to serve people’s mobility and communication: Apple, Microsoft, CISCO, Oracle, and Boeing. People of the world is a market of seven-billion, and most of them have occasionally consumed black soda drinks called Coca-Cola and Pepsi.

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Soft Power High – A2 China US comparatively higher – most recent studies in key regionsChiu 13

{Joanna, Foreign affairs correspondent, “US Beats China in Soft Power Stakes,” South China Morning Post, 7/19, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1285275/africa-and-latin-america-admire-chinese-majority-dont-welcome-their#THUR}

China has worked to strengthen its economic presence in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America during the past decade, but while the majority of people in both regions appreciate the influx of Chinese science and technology, most are not impressed with the spread of Chinese ideas and customs. Meanwhile, America enjoys a soft power advantage over China among Latin Americans and Africans. The appeal of US soft power is generally stronger today than it was during the final years of the Bush administration. These are the findings of the largest-scale global survey of views on China conducted by the Pew Research Centre’s Global Attitudes Project. Pew focused its questions on Chinese “soft power” in six sub-Saharan African nations and seven Latin American nations from March 2 to May 1, this year, as China is now one of the

largest trading partners in many African and Latin American countries. Three-quarters of respondents in Africa and Latin America admire Chinese scientific and technological advances. However, in only three of the 13 countries surveyed in

Africa and Latin America do more than half think it is good that Chinese ideas and customs are spreading in their

country. Andrew Small, an analyst at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, said: “China’s soft power has often been oversold and the survey demonstrates that while China is widely seen as an economic partner across the

developing world, this does not translate into the spread of Chinese ideas, culture, or values. Unlike America or

Europe, China is still a relatively unfamiliar and distant power in Africa and Latin America, even if its economic growth

and technological prowess is admired. Attitudes to Chinese business practices in Latin America illustrate the mixed economic impact that China has there too, though the real nervousness about growing Chinese power is among its neighbours rather than further afield - where its military reach is still very limited.”

Chinese soft power low and swamped by alt causes Nye 13

{Joseph, Harvard Professor, “What China and Russia Don’t Get about Soft Power,” FP, April, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power#THUR}

When Foreign Policy first published my essay "Soft Power" in 1990, who would have expected that someday the term would be used by the likes

of Hu Jintao or Vladimir Putin? Yet Hu told the C hinese Communist Party in 2007 that China needed to increase its soft power, and Putin recently urged Russian diplomats to apply soft power more extensively. Neither leader, however, seems to have understood how to accomplish his goals. Power is the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one wants, and that can be accomplished in three main ways -- by coercion, payment, or attraction. If you can add the soft power of attraction to your toolkit, you can economize on carrots

and sticks. For a rising power like China whose growing economic and military might frightens its neighbors into counter-balancing coalitions, a smart strategy includes soft power to make China look less frightening and the balancing coalitions less effective. For a declining power like Russia (or Britain before it), a residual soft power helps to cushion the fall. The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to

them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority). But combining these

resources is not always easy . Establishing , say, a Confucius Institute in Manila to teach Chinese culture might help produce soft power, but it is less likely to do so in a context where China has just bullied the

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Philippines over possession of Scarborough Reef. Similarly, Putin has told his diplomats that "the priority has been shifting to the literate use of soft power, strengthening positions of the Russian language," but as Russian scholar Sergei Karaganov noted in the aftermath of the dispute with Georgia, Russia has to use "hard power, including military force, because it lives in a much more dangerous world ... and because it has little soft power -- that is, social, cultural, political and economic attractiveness." Much of America's soft power is produced by civil society -- everything from universities and foundations to Hollywood and pop culture -- not from the government. Sometimes the United States is able to preserve a degree of soft power because of its critical and uncensored civil society even when government actions -- like the invasion of Iraq -- are otherwise undermining it. But in a smart power strategy, hard and soft reinforce each other. In his new book, China Goes Global, George

Washington University's David Shambaugh shows how China has spent billions of dollars on a charm offensive to increase its soft power. Chinese aid programs to Africa and Latin America are not limited by the institutional or human rights concerns that

constrain Western aid. The Chinese style emphasizes high-profile gestures. But for all its efforts, China has earned a limited return on its investment. Polls show that opinions of China's influence are positive in much of Africa and Latin America, but

predominantly negative in the U nited S tates, Europe, as well as India, Japan and South Korea.

China soft power will not overtake US soft power in the long runNye 14 (Joseph Nye is a professor at Harvard and author of ‘Is the American Century Over?, 3-25-2015, "The American century will survive the rise of China," Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/48c84460-d250-11e4-ae91-00144feab7de.html)

Any effort at assessing American power in the coming decades should take into account how many earlier efforts have been wide of the mark. It is chastening to remember how wildly exaggerated US estimates of Soviet power in the 1970s and of Japanese power in the 1980s were. Today some see the Chinese as 10ft tall and proclaim this “the Chinese century”. China’s size and relatively rapid economic growth will bring it closer to the US in terms of its power

resources in the next few decades. But this does not necessarily mean it will surpass the US in military, economic and soft power. Even if China suffers no big domestic political setback, many projections are simple linear extrapolations of growth rates that are likely to slow in the future. Moreover, economic projections are one dimensional. They ignore US military and soft power advantages, such as the desire of students around the world to attend US universities. They also overlook China’s geopolitical dis advantages in the Asian balance of power, compared with America’s relations with Europe, Japan and India, which are likely to remain more favourable. It is not impossible that a challenger such as China, Europe, Russia, India or Brazil will surpass the US in the first half of this century but it is but not likely.

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Soft Power High – A2 Culture/Values

American values/culture retain power despite hypocrisy – empirics prove it’s effective – and hey, at least we’re not China Nye and Bremmer, 15 (Joseph S. Nye, Distinguished Service Professor, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Council on Foreign Relations, total badass, interview with Peter Zeihan and Ian Bremmer, 3-4-2015, "Charting the Next American Century", CFR, http://www.cfr.org/united-states/charting-next-american-century/p36194#ER, DA: 7-8-2015)

(UNKNOWN ): Dick Gerwin. I'm concerned about the use of the term "American Values." I think it goes to those

folks at NSA who are excellent, who work for the country. I think it goes to the dysfunctional Congress, and its dysfunctional executive imposed by the dysfunctional Congress. I think it goes to the question of our military exercises, activities over the last several decades.

I think it goes to the lack of universal health care. It's pretty hard to see how this country's going to support what I regard as, "American Values" from the 18th century, and even more recently from the Marshall Plan, and how it's going to attract others in the world. BREMMER: To hone that question, maybe, let's say... no, no, seriously. To what extent is the perception of hypocrisy of the United States on core values, whether it be a democratic election, or whether it be a free market or whether it be the support of human rights, or all the things that you just implied. To what extent does it make it much less plausible and feasible that the United States has the

ability to use that piece of soft power effectively internationally? NYE : Well I think that's true , but it's not new . And if you look at—let's go back, take South Korea, which is today a vibrant and functioning democracy. If we took South Korea in the mid 1970s it was a pretty nasty dictatorship, and we were throughly embed with the Park regime. And so, at the point, there was enormous accusations of hypocrisy, properly, and hypocrisy undercuts your soft power. It's a great solvent of soft power. It's absolutely true, but it's not new. I mean, you could think of lots of cases, look at Chile. Look at Chile in the

1970s at what we did there. You could think of many cases where our, where what we proclaim in terms of speeches that presidents give on fourth of July, and what we've done, don't fit. There is hypocrisy. When I answered the

question, and when you deal with values, you're talking about levels of abstraction and so forth, so I don't disagree

with some of the concerns that Dick just raised, but when I answered the question earlier about values, it's still largely true that the United States is associated with certain values related to freedom and democracy and we don't practice them as

well as we should, but if you ask people, "Would you rather have an American world, or a Chinese world?" in

terms of a dominant power which is illustrating or imposing values, I think that more would probably prefer an American value . I think if you ask, "How did Korea turn out the way it did?"—it had a lot to do with, not the policies of the

day, but the long run impact of our values. Now there's—over time, there were some policy changes at the edge. We did help to save

Kim Dae-jung (ph) and we intervened to save him and so forth. So there are some particular cases, but more to the point is all those young Koreans who were educated in American universities and went back actually believed some of the stuff they learned. And if they'd been educated in Beijing, or Moscow, I think they would have gone back with different ideas.

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Soft Power High – A2 FergusonDoesn’t kill soft power – backlash is temporary and short-lived – and countries would hammer us anywaysGray, 14 (Steven Gray, 8-20-2014, "Ferguson, whataboutism and American soft power", Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/08/20/ferguson-whataboutism-and-american-soft-power/#ER, DA: 7-8-2015)

Two days ago Roger Cohen wrote the following in the New York Times: The magnetism of Silicon Valley may suggest that the United States, a

young nation still, is Rome at the height of its power. American soft power is alive and well. America’s capacity for reinvention, its looming self-sufficiency in energy, its good demographics and, not least, its hold on the world’s imagination, all suggest vigor. Cohen goes on to fret about the waning of U.S. geopolitical power, but let’s stay on the soft

power side of things. The events in Ferguson, Mo., have given rise to a new wave of “whataboutism,” a term coined by the Economist to describe Russia’s tendency to respond to criticisms of its policies with tu quoque replies of “what about Iraq?” or “what about race relations in America?” Events in Ferguson have caused whataboutism to go global. As Robin Wright notes in the Wall Street Journal a whole bunch o’ authoritarian states have seized on Ferguson to criticize the United States: The U.S. investment of billions of American dollars to promote democratic values around the world has been undermined by the racial unrest in Ferguson. “US can’t tell other countries to improve their

records on policing and peaceful assembly if it won’t clear up its own human rights record,” Amnesty International tweeted this week. Several countries that have faced severe criticism in the State Department’s annual Human Rights Report are now boldly engaging in a kind of diplomatic touché-to-you in their condemnation of the U.S. Some may be expected from autocratic regimes. But the crisis in Ferguson undermines the moral high-ground that the U.S. has long claimed. Robert Mackey provides even more detail in the New York Times: While the unrest has also shocked American observers and foreign correspondents from other Western democracies — including British and German reporters who have been struck by the “sounds of battle” andendured arrest — some of the most strident criticism of the police violence in Ferguson has come from authoritarian nations where the police are often venerated and dissent is scarcely tolerated. Coverage that echoes the broadcasts from Moscow has also appeared on Iran’s state-run Press TV, in reports about the use of force “to suppress protests in Ferguson,” that also make no mention of how demonstrations are dispersed in Iran…. Not to be outdone, a spokesman for Egypt’s foreign ministry, Badr Abdel-Atti, told the official news agency MENA on Tuesday that his country was “closely following” the protests in Ferguson. According to the state-owned Ahram Online, Egypt “called on U.S. authorities to exercise restraint and deal with the protests in accordance with U.S. and international standards.” The statement came just days after the first anniversary of the massacre of

hundreds of peaceful protesters by the same military-backed government. So how big if a deal is this for American foreign policy and the promotion of American democratic values? Is Ferguson yet another blow to America’s waning hypocritical power? There are some reasons for real concern. It was The New Republic’s indispensable Julia Ioffe who first observed the application of whataboutism to Ferguson — and she found it very sobering: Watching the riots in Ferguson, Missouri, it’s hard not to wince… at our foolish idea of our country. Russian police arrested journalists at protests, not American cops. And, even if the chances are higher that heads will roll here for something like this than in Russia, it’s hard not to notice one thing: Even at the height of the race riots in Moscow, at the height of the crackdown on the opposition, even the Russian police did not use rubber bullets. And, like it or not, this is what the world is seeing, the world to which we strive to be an example. Another issue is that that Amnesty International has “sent delegates to support and observe a community in the middle of a crisis” in the United States for the first time. Given that the Ferguson PD has conducted itself in a manner that makes the Hazzard County police look like comparative beacons of professionalism, I fear that both Amnesty and the global media

will continue to have plenty of fodder for further reporting. But there are three important caveats to this. The first is that this kind of tu quoquery doesn’t necessarily last all that long when it comes to foreign affairs . If I had told you a decade ago that the United States would be conducting airstrikes in Iraq with the approval of just about every NATO and Middle East ally, and

that Germany was considering supplying arms to the Kurds in Iraq, you would have laughed pretty hard. As I have argued elsewhere, even gigantic policy clusterf**** don’t dent American influence all that much . The second is that the basic feature of

whataboutism is that even if Ferguson hadn’t gone global — which it has — authoritarian leaders would have seized on some other flaw in the United States to hype . I mean, when Foreign Affairs produces this cover, it’s easy to remember that

Ferguson is just the latest blemish on a country that has plenty of political blemishes: The final and most important point is that, as bad as things have been in Ferguson over the past week, they can get better . Indeed, they were getting better at the end of last week until the Ferguson PD played the “How Can We Release Information In The Most Inflammatory Manner Possible?” game.

The comparative advantage of countries that have democracy and the rule of law is their resiliency to negative political shocks like what happened in Ferguson. If the legal system does its job and adjudicates

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exactly what happened to Michael Brown, if the political system nudges some alterations of police tactics, and if civil society groups manage to

filter out anarchists from peaceful protestors, then the political narrative will look much better six months from now.

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Soft Power Low – Torture

CIA torture undercuts US credibilityLord, 14 (Kristin Lord, President and CEO of IREX, a global education and development NGO, 12-23-2014, "Soft Power Outage", Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/23/soft-power-outage/#ER, DA: 7-7-2015)

The release of a long-awaited report by the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the CIA’s secret detention and interrogation program dealt yet another blow to the United States’ moral authority and its credibility as a defender of human rights around the globe. It also begs the question: How much damage must the United States suffer before it learns to take soft power more seriously and, finally, learn to use it more proactively? To understand the immediate damage done to U.S. influence, look no further than the commentary surrounding the report’s release. According to the Washington Post, the state-run Chinese news

service Xinhua editorialized that “America is neither a suitable role model nor a qualified judge on human rights issues in other countries,” while a pro-government television commentator in Egypt observed, “The United States cannot demand human rights reports from other countries since this [document] proves they know nothing about human rights.” The Islamic State and other extremists joined the propaganda gold rush. One tweet, quoted in a report from the SITE Intelligence Group, pointed to the audacity of the United States lecturing Muslims about brutality, adding, “Getting beheaded is

100 times more humane, more dignified than what these filthy scumbags do to Muslims.” Such reactions are galling and they do real harm to U.S. credibility . But the fault lies not with those who released the report, as some critics argue, but with those who permitted and perpetrated acts of torture, those who lied about it to America’s elected representatives, and those who

willfully kept the president and senior members of the Bush administration in the dark. Their actions undermined not only American values, but also American influence and national security interests. In the words of a former prisoner of war, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), the actions laid out in the Senate report “stained our national honor” and “did much harm and little practical good.”

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Soft Power Low – ValuesLack of value influence undermines US influenceLagon, 11 (Mark P. Lagon, International Relations and Security Chair at Georgetown University's Master of Science in Foreign Service Program and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the former US Ambassador-at-Large to Combat Trafficking in Persons at the US Department of State, Sept/Oct 2011, "The Value of Values: Soft Power Under Obama", World Affairs Journal, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/value-values-soft-power-under-obama#ER, DA: 7-7-2015)

One irony of the Obama presidency is how much it relies on hard power. The president came into office proposing a dramatic shift from George W. Bush’s perceived unilateralism, and most of his predecessor’s hard-edged counterterrorism tactics and massive deployments in wars abroad. Yet after three years, Obama has escalated forces in Afghanistan, embraced the widespread use of unmanned drones to kill terrorists at the risk of civilian casualties, kept Guantánamo open, and killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in a thoroughly unilateral

fashion. What he hasn’t accomplished to any great degree is what most observers assumed would be the hallmark of his approach to

foreign affairs—a full assertion of the soft power that makes hard power more effective. His 2008 campaign centered on a critique of

President Bush’s overreliance on hard power. Obama suggested he would rehabilitate the damaged image of America created by these excesses and show that the United States was not a cowboy nation. Upon taking office, he made fresh-start statements, such as his June 2009 remarks in Cairo, and embraced political means like dialogue, respectful multilateralism, and the use of new media, suggesting that he felt the soft power to change minds, build legitimacy, and advance interests was the key element missing from

the recent US approach to the world—and that he would quickly remedy that defect. Yet President Obama’s conception of soft power has curiously lacked the very quality that has made it most efficacious in the past—the values dimension. This may seem odd for a leader who is seen worldwide as an icon of morality, known for the motto “the audacity of hope” and his

deployment of soaring rhetoric. Yet his governance has virtually ignored the values dimension of soft power, which goes beyond the tradecraft of diplomacy and multilateral consultation to aggressively assert the ideals of freedom in practical initiatives. The excision of this values dimension renders soft power a hollow concept. The

Obama presidency has regularly avoided asserting meaningful soft power, particularly in its relations with three countries

—Iran, Russia, and Egypt—where it might have made a difference not only for those countries but for American interests as well.

His reaction to the challenges these countries have posed to the US suggest that it is not soft power itself that Obama doubts, but America’s moral standing to project it .

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Soft Power Low – Foreign PolicySo Po Low – incoherent Obama foreign policy (Ukraine, SCS, Syria, Iran, Israel, Climate change), low econ, simultaneous hard power declineRobbins 5/29

{James S, syndicated foreign affairs columnist, Senior Fellow in National Security Affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council, former special assistant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Ph.D. Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Professor at National Defense University and Marine Corps University, “Obama's West Point Speech Exposes his Foreign-Policy Failures,” Washington Examiner, 2014, http://washingtonexaminer.com/obamas-west-point-speech-exposes-his-foreign-policy-failures/article/2549082#THUR}

President Obama promised a powerful speech on national-security policy on Wednesday to the graduates of the United States Military

Academy. Instead, the chief executive reinforced the notion that in an increasingly dangerous world, he is in over his head . Obama's principal argument was that U.S. national security must not be based solely on military power, and that America cannot go it alone in the world. But this was no grand revelation; every recent president has believed the same thing. Even George W. Bush, falsely criticized for unilateralism, assembled a larger international coalition than any Obama has put together. Sign Up for the Politics Today newsletter! At West Point this week, the president claimed he was responding to unnamed “critics who think military intervention is the only way for America to avoid looking weak.” However,

our real challenge is not the appearance of weakness, but the reality of fading U.S. global power and leadership . Obama said that “by most measures, America has rarely been stronger relative to the rest of the world.” But what measures did he have in mind? The U.S. share of global gross domestic product is declining , as is America's share of global defense spending. The Army is cutting troops and the Navy sheds ships . Obama is unilaterally dismantling America's nuclear arsenal as other nuclear powers modernize. The intelligence community suffered the worst

counterintelligence failure in history, thanks to Edward Snowden. Adversary states no longer fear the United States , and friendly states no longer trust us . And, while 15 years ago, the U.S. confidently projected an era of space dominance, we are now reduced to begging Moscow for rockets . America's adversaries understand the nature of this decline far better than the president . When “masked men occupy a building in Ukraine,” Obama intoned, “it is America that the world

looks to for help.” But why did these Russian-backed thugs think they could get away with it in the first place? And can the people of occupied Crimea still expect Obama to come to their rescue with more than a hashtag? The president also mentioned China's aggressive moves in the South China Sea, but rather than chastising Beijing he chose to blame Congress for not acting faster on the Law of the Sea Convention. He maintains with “every fiber of [his] being” that America is an exceptional nation, but only to the extent that the U.S. conforms to the norms imposed by other countries. Obama wants the United States to focus more on soft power, but his diplomatic efforts leave much to be desired. He claimed success in ongoing negotiations regarding the Iranian nuclear program, even as Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said that those who support continuing the negotiations are traitors and jihad will continue until the U.S. is destroyed. He said the United States would increase support for rebels in Syria but skipped over the chemical weapons “red line” debacle that ruined his credibility. In his speech,

Obama didn't even bother to mention the Israeli-Palestinian train wreck that has humbled both his secretaries of State. The president brought up his pet cause of global climate change, another issue on which he has failed to build international consensus. And he reiterated his intention to close the detainee facility at Guantanamo Bay, which he promised to do

his first day in office. At this rate, Gitmo will close when the remaining detainees die of old age . Ironically, Obama can point to more success through using force rather than diplomacy . His most noteworthy achievements - killing Osama bin Laden and dismantling the core al Qaeda network through drone strikes - were kinetic and mostly unilateral. Few would argue that, as American global military clout declines, it makes sense to shift emphasis to other elements of national power. But Obama has yet to

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demonstrate that he is capable of managing a complex, multifaceted global strategy . He has no strong track record of success even by his own metrics. Maybe he should stick to drones.

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Saudi Soft Power HighSaudi Arabia has tons of soft power – oil, cultural influence, and regional partnershipsGallarotti and Al-Filali, 12 (Giulio Gallarotti, Professor of Government and Tutor in the College of Social Studies at Wesleyan University, AND Isam Yahia Al-Filali, General Director of Alryadah, a Jeddah-based consultation firm, specializing in strategic planning and different aspects of knowledge economics, “Saudi Arabia’s Soft Power”, International Studies 49(3&4) 233–261, http://isq.sagepub.com/content/49/3-4/233.abstract#ER, DA: 7/8/2015)

When people are asked the question what is the source of Saudi Arabia’s power, who would cite factors other than oil? This equation of Saudi power exclusively with its oil wealth is mistaken. Historically, a principal and the most consistent source of Saudi power at the domestic, regional and global levels has not been revenues from oil, but the cultural power that inheres in a Kingdom that is both the capital of the Muslim and Arab worlds. This soft power accounts for as much, if not more, of Saudi influence than even oil itself. To a large extent, this power explains why Saudi Arabia has remained stout in the face of the shock waves of the Arab Spring. This soft power also accounts for much of the leverage that the Kingdom enjoys in its region and the world at large. Ultimately, of course,

Saudi Arabian power is grounded in both the hard power of its oil wealth and the soft power of its cultural importance. Hence, the Kingdom is endowed with extensive smart or cosmopolitan power (that is, the synthesis of soft

and hard power). Events in the Middle East and North Africa have confronted Saudi Arabia with some of its

greatest challenges as a nation due to its strong ties with the countries in the region and the Saudi’s special eminence among

the people of those countries. The political landscape has been transformed by popular movements calling for freedom, social justice and economic opportunities. The serious economic and political turbulence that confronts the region does not promise to abate anytime soon because of relentless resistance from the old regimes and the fledgling nature of the new political orders

that continue to establish themselves. Saudi Arabia, given its special place among these nations, is at the centre of this regional transformation. In the greater sphere of global relations, Saudi Arabia faces a critical and uncertain future with the limitations of an oil economy, the US re-engaging from Iraq, and the controversy over a nuclear Iran . On

the domestic front, Saudi Arabia too has to continue to modernize and prosper in the face of myriad political,

economic and social challenges. Never has the need for a resolute continuation of the use of its hard and soft power been more pronounced in

order for Saudi Arabia to effectively confront its domestic and international challenges. But while much has been said about its hard power, far too little attention has been paid to the role of Saudi soft power. This article is an attempt to analytically balance the

power ledger. It assesses the modern day international, regional and domestic challenges facing Saudi Arabia and analyzes how the nation’s soft power can be employed to effectively deal with those challenges. Section I identifies the general theoretical foundations of soft power. Section II takes an inventory of Saudi Arabia’s principal sources of international and domestic soft power. Section III analyzes the potential of this soft power as a means of confronting the Kingdom’s most pressing challenges and problems. Section IV offers brief concluding remarks.

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China Soft Power High / US Soft Power LowChinese soft power high and rising RELATIVE to the US – all metrics and ability to spin eventsLeitch 14

{Simon, Lecturer in IR specializing in East Asian politics and Chinese cultural influence (Griffith University), Ph.D. in IR, “China’s Growing Influence: The Role of its Soft Power,” Alochonaa, 2/3, http://alochonaa.com/2014/02/03/chinas-growing-influence-the-role-of-its-soft-power/#THUR}

The rise of China has become one of the most discussed features of international politics in the 21st century, and policymakers and media pundits around the world are involved in an unending debate about the near-term and long-term significance of China’s return to great power status. Analysts are captivated by China’s growing military potential, its cyber-weapons, its space program, its assertive nationalism and its growing economic leverage over its neighbors and trading partners. These are all interesting issues to be sure, but an underrated element of China’s rise has been its rising “soft power” assets. For most academics to have soft power means having the ability to persuade others to want what you want, or to attract them to your cause through the strength of your argument or legitimacy of your actions. Of course, bribes and threats are a form of power often used in international politics (and often used by China) but threats and brides are sometimes clumsy weapons to use. By crafting and advertising policies in such a way as they appear legitimate to outsiders, and by

cultivating a positive national image, a state can operate with fewer barriers, less resistance and less resentment. Chinese soft power has grown rapidly in

recent years. Thirty years ago China’s only friends in the West were those seeking to use China as a counterweight to

Soviet ambitions in Asia, or those members of the radical left who were duped into believing that communism was liberation. Today the story is different. Global public opinion surveys continue to show that China is perceived fairly favorably by large swathes of the world’s populace, from the Asia-Pacific to Africa and Europe. China has garnered cooperation from a diverse group of states in

areas such as trade, tourism, education and infrastructure development, and Chinese statesmen are sure to be given a warm welcome in almost any foreign capital. These developments are both causes and effects of Chinese soft power .

Beijing has been working on enhancing its soft power for many years and is equipped with increasingly well-oiled soft power machinery . By opening China to tourism, foreign students and journalists whilst at the same time restricting

foreign access to “approved” places the PRC has been able to present its best face to the world. With a tightly controlled state

media and highly disciplined and knowledgeable spokespersons, the information flow out of China is carefully monitored, filtered and disseminated

with the aim of projecting a positive image of China and the ruling regime. Foreign journalists and academics who propagate negative images of China are denied access for the future, and though such Chinese policies may themselves blur the lines between hard and soft power they do,

in the end, contribute enormously to soft power assets by altering how it is permissible to discuss China in

international society. Whereas Western politicians and journalists seem perfectly happy to label Kim Jong-un or various Iranian leaders as dictators, the government in Beijing has acquired a measure of legitimacy unheard of for a nominally communist state. The coming of the digital age, marked by greater computerization and the mass utilization of the internet, has had important consequences for the

exercise of soft power. Although Beijing has been adept at digital censorship it is important to note how Beijing has embraced the internet and new media to promote its message. Through translated press releases and dedicated foreign language broadcasts the PRC has challenged negative interpretations of its policies, advertised the positives of China’s development, reached out to

foreign constituents and argued its position in international disputes. Beijing now employs professional lobbyists in foreign

capitals and it has been effective in promoting its self-serving version of history (to both foreign and domestic audiences) in a way few other major states can . China paints itself as a victim of foreign aggression, and has helped perpetuate an influential discourse about China’s traditional culture and foreign policy which provide a convenient justification for its lack of democratization and territorial claims alike. As China has grown more powerful and the United States has staggered under the weight of financial and political stagnation, the

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PRC has begun to offer itself as an alternative model of government for others to emulate, and as an alternative to the United

States as a great power partner. China’s veto powers in the UN and its growing importance as both market and supplier make it a valuable ally, and it is unsurprising that many states, particularly authoritarian regimes, see a partnership with China as a way of loosening the grip of liberal-democratic powers over the international system. If China wants the United States and its allies to

loosen their grip on the international system, so too do many others. By presenting its foreign policy as a quest for sovereignty, non-interference, anti-hegemonism and economic development, whilst at the same time giving legitimacy to corrupt,

authoritarian regimes, Beijing has made others realize that they want what Beijing wants .

China’s rise huge – trades off with Western soft power – via economic strength and deception over human rightsDebono 13

{James, chief planning reporter for MaltaToday, syndicated foreign affairs columnist, “[ANALYSIS] The Rise of China’s Soft Power,” MaltaToday, 9/17, http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/29948/the-rise-of-china-s-soft-power-20130917#.U5E1xvldXT9#THUR}

"By buying companies, exploiting natural resources, building infrastructure and giving loans all over the world, China is pursuing a soft but unstoppable form of economic domination ." This is the sombre picture painted by

Spanish journalists Juan Pablo Cardenal and Heriberto Araujo, authors of The Silent Chinese Conquest. They warn that Beijing's unlimited financial resources will enable China to erode the competitive edge of Western firms , kill jobs in

Europe and America and blunt criticism of human rights abuses in China. Now Malta is welcoming a state-owned Chinese company to invest a considerable sum of cash in the ailing state utility, Enemalta. Given its €800 million in debt, much of it

guaranteed by the government and piling onto its enormous national debt bill, the Maltese business community has welcomed the news with open arms . The Greens claim the company, whose subsidiary is a renewable energy firm, is looking for a foothold in the EU to undercut the solar panel market. Nationalist leader Simon Busuttil has echoed these concerns and tried to pooh-pooh Labour's

embrace of privatisation. But should China's rise from the ashes of Maoist revolution into global domination preoccupy the Maltese? As analysts Kevin Yao and Alan Wheatley point out, while China's flood of keenly priced manufactured goods has hollowed out jobs in advanced and emerging nations alike, this has also helped cap inflation,

making an array of consumer goods affordable for tens of millions of people for the first time. One case in point is solar panels, which became more accessible thanks to cheap Chinese labour . But it is this unfair competition which risks eroding workers' rights in

Europe, thanks to the low cost alternative from China. Chinese investment has been crucial in offering emerging nations and

their cash-starved economies new opportunities for growth, and a greater independence from the U nited S tates and European multinationals. To a certain extent, China has changed the rules of the game , but on the other hand the rise of its own middle class offers an opportunity for Western countries to enter the market for luxury and high-tech goods.

Even if we lose Chinese soft power is low, HUGE squo push – That momentum means US decline inevitableXinhua 14

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{“China to Promote Cultural Soft Power,” Via China Daily, 1/1, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-01/01/content_17208354.htm#THUR}

BEIJING -- President Xi Jinping has vowed to promote China's cultural soft power by disseminating modern

Chinese values and showing the charm of Chinese culture to the world. Efforts are needed to build China's national image, Xi said when delivering a speech at a group study session of members of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central

Committee on Monday. China should be portrayed as a civilized country featuring rich history, ethnic unity and cultural diversity, and as an oriental power with good government, developed economy, cultural prosperity, national unity and

beautiful mountains and rivers, Xi said. China should also be marked as a responsible country that advocates peaceful and common development, safeguards international justice, and makes contributions to humanity, and as a

socialist country which is open, amicable, promising and vibrant. At the session, Xi called for efforts to promote advanced socialist culture, deepen reform in the cultural system, and enhance people's cultural creativity , moves that he

believed will raise China's overall cultural strength and competitiveness . In order to build a solid foundation

for the nation's cultural soft power, China needs to deepen the reform in its cultural system, promote socialist core values and

push forward the cultural industry. He stressed more publicity for modern Chinese values, or socialist values with Chinese

characteristics. The publicity and interpretation of the Chinese Dream should be integrated with such values, Xi noted. The Chinese Dream means the Chinese people's recognition and pursuit of values, the building of China into a well-off society in an all-round way and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, he said. The Chinese Dream also means that every Chinese will realize his own dream in fulling the Chinese Dream, the highest common factor for the unity of the Chinese nation, and the sincere aspirations of the Chinese nation to

contribute to the mankind's peace and development, Xi added. To show charm of the Chinese culture to the world, Xi said it was important to accommodate Chinese cultural inheritance with contemporary culture and a modern society.

Mass media, groups and individuals should play their roles in displaying the charm to the world, he added. To strengthen China's soft power, the country needs to build its capacity in international communication,

construct a communication system,better use the new media and increase the creativity, appeal and credibility of China's publicity , Xi said. "The stories of China should be well told, voices of China well spread, and characteristics of China well explained," the President said.

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China Soft Power High – A2 Impossible BC RegimeDemocracy and human rights perception irrelevant to Chinese Soft PowerLeitch 14

{Simon, Lecturer in IR specializing in East Asian politics and Chinese cultural influence (Griffith University), Ph.D. in IR, “China’s Growing Influence: The Role of its Soft Power,” Alochonaa, 2/3, http://alochonaa.com/2014/02/03/chinas-growing-influence-the-role-of-its-soft-power/#THUR}

Most analyses of Chinese soft power believe that China’s regime is a liability to its soft power, and insinuate that

democracy is a key element of soft power. Similarly, it is often thought that Chinese soft power is undermined by Beijing’s relations with dictators and human rights abusers. This is wrongheaded for a number of reasons. First, China’s soft power is often directed towards undemocratic regimes or states that have greater concerns

than Chinese suffrage, and it has successfully attracted them . Second, China’s government appears to have built legitimacy perfectly well to international audiences irrespective of its lack of democracy or high levels of corruption. Which of the following figures was last able to meet President Obama in the Oval Office; the Dalai Lama or the President of the PRC? If that is not extending legitimacy then the concept is too vague to quibble about it further.

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China Soft Power LowChinese soft power is nonexistent – polling data, influence isn’t political, slowing growth, territorial claims, corruption, IPR concerns, social issues – best studies showSchmitt, 14 (Gary J. Schmitt, co-director of the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at AEI and the director of AEI’s Program on American Citizenship, executive director of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board during President Ronald Reagan’s second term, 6-19-2014, "A hard look at soft power in East Asia", AEI, http://www.aei.org/publication/a-hard-look-at-soft-power-in-east-asia/#ER, DA: 7-6-2015)

China. China, the other East Asian great power, is no less interested in soft power.[7] In recent years, there has been a virtual explosion of articles in Chinese journals discussing the utility of soft power. For example, in 1994, there were only a handful of pieces written on the topic; in 2008, there were more than 600. Nor was this interest only academic. Chinese President Hu Jintao made a very public

pronouncement in 2007 about China’s need to enhance its soft-power efforts. China’s soft-power campaign has a number of elements to it. Among the most prominent is the establishment of Confucius Institutes on university and

secondary-school campuses around the world. The underlying assumption behind the program is that China will become more appealing if more people come to understand the country’s culture and can read and speak Chinese. Between 2004 and 2007, a new institute was opening every four days. With more than 300 institutes already, the goal is to have 1,000 operating by the decade’s end. Other parts of China’s program include having a relatively open door for foreign students to study in China, hosting world fairs and the Olympics, setting up English-speaking China Central Television bureaus around the world, flooding major newspapers with China Daily inserts, and, perhaps most importantly, providing a national development model, the Beijing Consensus, as an alternative to the Washington Consensus, which was put forward by American and European-created entities like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. “Former Chinese president Hu Jintao

made a very public pronouncement in 2007 about China’s need to enhance its soft-power efforts.” In spite of these efforts , China,

too, has seen only marginal improvement in its image globally. Analyzing a variety of polling data over the past decade , American sinologist David Shambaugh concludes that “China’s global image remains mixed and the majority of the world is very ambivalent about China’s rise .”[8]In a Pew Research Center poll released in mid-2013, for instance, China was still clearly seen in a less favorable light than the United States.[9] Only in the Middle East was that not the case. And among the major states of East Asia, the difference in favorability between the United States and China

remained substantial. Why the gap between China’s efforts at soft power and the results? First, although there is much to admire in Chinese civilization, this does not necessarily mean one is attracted to Chinese government or policies .[10] The fact that one might admire Greece as the birthplace of democracy and philosophy hardly means one

would look to the Greek government today as a model of governance. Second, Chinese foreign aid predominantly takes the form of

loans or assistance that require the recipient country to use Chinese companies and labor to carry out a specific project.

The nations on the receiving end are happy to get the assistance, but they are under no illusions about Chinese intentions. As one Pew polling director noted: “[G]lobal publics believe China also wields its power in a self- interested manner. These views feed the perception that the People’s Republic has yet to become , in the

words of former US diplomat and World Bank President Robert Zoellick, a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the international system.”[11] Third, both inside and outside of China, there is a sense that China’s continued progress depends on significant changes to its existing development model. China’s economic growth appears be slowing as it

hits the middle-income trap, and it suffers from substantial problems in the areas of demographics , the environment , and social cohesion and corruption . As a result, optimism that China’s leaders had discovered a unique formula for how a nation might rapidly rise, and that they continue to do so without increased

liberalization, has waned considerably . Moreover, the attractiveness of “the China market” has diminished as problems with intellectual property rights, rising labor costs, and domestic protectionist measures continue to plague foreign investors. As the World Bank’s China 2030 report succinctly notes, “After more than 30 years of rapid growth, China has reached another turning point in its development path when a second strategic, and no less fundamental, shift is called

for.”[12] The fact that, according to several reports, a favored reading of senior Politburo members in late 2012 was Alexis de Tocqueville’s L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution—a book that details the disaster that befell the French government as the population’s “rising expectations,”

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among other things, were not met—suggests doubts even among Chinese elite over how sustainable the Chinese model is.[13] And, finally, China’s more assertive behavior toward its neighbors—in the South China and East China

Seas and along the Indian-Chinese border—and its continuing military buildup have undercut its “peaceful rise” narrative with countries in the region and with the United States. Former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s admonition to his countrymen that China should “maintain a low profile” and “hide our capacities and bide our time” has been replaced, it seems, with the China

Dream.[14] Combined with the strategic uncertainties that arise from China’s system of closed decision making, Beijing’s hard power policies have created a dynamic in which its soft-power efforts have been less effective than they might otherwise have been .

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Russia Soft Power LowRussian soft power low and swamped by alt causes Nye 13

{Joseph, Harvard Professor, “What China and Russia Don’t Get about Soft Power,” FP, April, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power#THUR}

When Foreign Policy first published my essay "Soft Power" in 1990, who would have expected that someday the term would be used by the likes

of Hu Jintao or Vladimir Putin? Yet Hu told the Chinese Communist Party in 2007 that China needed to increase its soft power, and Putin recently urged Russian diplomats to apply soft power more extensively . Neither leader, however, seems to have understood how to accomplish his goals. Power is the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one wants, and that can be accomplished in three main ways -- by coercion, payment, or attraction. If you can add the soft power of attraction to your toolkit, you can economize on carrots and sticks. For a rising power like China whose growing economic and military might frightens its neighbors into counter-

balancing coalitions, a smart strategy includes soft power to make China look less frightening and the balancing coalitions less effective. For a declining power like Russia (or Britain before it), a residual soft power helps to cushion the fall. The soft power of a

country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to

them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority). But combining these

resources is not always easy . Establishing, say, a Confucius Institute in Manila to teach Chinese culture might help produce soft power,

but it is less likely to do so in a context where China has just bullied the Philippines over possession of Scarborough Reef. Similarly, Putin has told his diplomats that "the priority has been shifting to the literate use of soft power, strengthening positions of the Russian language," but as Russian scholar Sergei Karaganov noted in the aftermath of the dispute with

Georgia, Russia has to use "hard power , including military force, because it lives in a much more dangerous world ... and because it has little soft power -- that is, social, cultural, political and economic attractiveness."

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Topic Internal Links

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NSA Hurts Soft PowerPublic surveillance erodes soft power – undercuts diplomacy and destroys influence with key nationsJohnson, 14 (Joe Johnson, teaches strategic planning for public diplomacy at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, consults on government communication and technology after a career in the United States Foreign Service, 1/21/2014, "Soft Power and Nosey Uncle Sam", Public Diplomacy Council, http://www.publicdiplomacycouncil.org/commentaries/01-21-14/soft-power-and-nosey-uncle-sam#ER, DA: 7-6-2015)

Last year’s revelations about United States electronic surveillance delivered a body blow to America’s soft power, with no detectable public reaction from America’s diplomats. After President Obama’s speech, the United States can begin a more robust dialogue on the subject – if public diplomacy leaders take action . The President’s remarks last Friday at the Justice Department were directed to his fellow citizens, but they acknowledged the interest of foreigners in this subject – an element that has been missing up to now in our national debate. The propriety of U.S. signals intelligence gathering was hardly on the radar screen when I was

active in PD. But now, what foreign publics and their leaders think about it matters. · In Europe at least, details about NSA collection programs as described in documents purloined and publicized by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden

have eroded public trust in the U.S. as a defender of freedom . · Such a basic problem of perception makes it more difficult for U.S. diplomats to advance on a range of issues, from promoting democracy to advancing trade negotiations . · Germany’s Angela Merkel, Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff and others were forced to react to revelations that their phones had been tapped, personalizing and sensationalizing the issue and awakening an ever-present anti-Americanism worldwide . · The witting and unwitting involvement of American information technology firms damaged their reputations and it may be eroding their global market share. Google and its

kin have been a key positive element of the United S tates' image and soft power, not to mention its balance of trade. ·

Challenges to the current governance of the Internet, conducted by the U.S.-based ICANN and founded on open access to

information, spread beyond Russia and China to include nations like Brazil. This will come up at the International

Telecommunications Union conference next October in Korea, where nations are already challenging U.S. control of the Internet. Trust , an anti-American narrative , and concrete national interests . This would seem to call for active involvement by public

diplomacy. In the heat of Snowden’s first revelations last spring and summer, public diplomacy officers had no talking points beyond defensive press guidance. The issue was too hot, and might easily leak into Washington’s hyper-politicized environment.

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NSA Hurts Influence/AlliancesNSA surveillance tanks hard and soft power, alliances – makes diplomacy ineffectiveQuinn, 13 (Adam Quinn, Senior Lecturer in International Politics at University of Birmingham, 10-28-2013, "Obama's soft power a hard sell after NSA revelations", Conversation, http://theconversation.com/obamas-soft-power-a-hard-sell-after-nsa-revelations-19572#ER, DA: 7-6-2015)

For presidents, like sports team managers, the tough weeks tend to outnumber the jubilant. But even by the standards of an unforgiving job,

Barack Obama could be forgiven for feeling unusually buffeted of late. Many of the blows have come on the domestic front, with the all-consuming stand off of the government shutdown segueing into frantic efforts to defend and repair the roll-out of Obamacare amid

charges of fatal technological incompetence. But if he were tempted to seek solace in the autonomy of foreign policy –

as modern presidents have been wont to do – there has been little consolatory triumph to be found. In August and September,

he was caught in a mighty tangle over Syria, threatening military strikes over its chemical weapons use before being hamstrung

first by Britain’s refusal to join the charge and then by the reluctance of his own Congress. The legacy of that mess continues to work itself out in unpredictable ways, such as increasingly public tensions between the US and Saudi Arabia, hitherto one of its more solid allies. Though the eventual Russian-orchestrated deal to remove Syria’s chemical weapons was a

respectable one given the circumstances, the episode as a whole spoke of an America straining to translate its power into influence , or to maintain a united front among its friends. Now the rolling scandal over National Security Agency

surveillance, triggered by the mass leak of secrets by Edward Snowden, has entered another phase of intensity, this time centred on Europe. Revelations that the US tapped the phone of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, operated numerous “listening posts” on European soil, and sucked up vast quantities of communications data from millions

of citizens across Europe have broken in the press. Public expressions of displeasure have been forthcoming,

including a European Union statement. Taken together, these vignettes of public dissention will be enough to make many ask the question: is the US losing its influence even over its allies? Is this just a tricky moment for a particular

president, or harbinger of a broader trend? Global shift First, the necessary caveats: enduring alliance relationships resemble long marriages, in that the mere presence of moments of strain, or even audible arguments, cannot be taken as evidence of imminent separation. Looking back over the longer-term history of America’s relations with its allies, episodes such as the Vietnam War,

the “Euromissile” crisis of the 1980s, and the controversial interventions in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, demonstrate that sharp differences of opinion and conflicting priorities are no radical new state of affairs . And however unhappy they may be with their recent treatment, it is not obvious that countries such as Germany, France or Saudi Arabia have anywhere to go if they did decide the time had come to tout for alternative alliance partners. It is not entirely clear how European annoyance might manifest in ways that have practical importance. It is true they have it in their power to threaten progress on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership process, but it is not clear that such an action would harm the US more than Europe itself. In short, even if they are disgruntled, necessity may ultimately

prove a sufficient force to help them get over it. The reason present friction between the US and its allies carries greater weight, however, is that it arises in the context of a global shift in power away from the US and its established allies and towards new powers. The prospect of “American decline” in terms of relative international power is the focus of a great deal of debate over

both substance and semantics. But the central fact is that even the part of the US’s own intelligence apparatus charged with long-term foresight regards it as established that within 20 years the world will have transitioned from the “unipolar” American dominance of the first post-Cold War decades to a world in which multiple centres of power must

coexist. The centre of economic gravity has already shifted markedly towards Asia during the last decade. This certainly does not mean any single new power is about to rise to replace the US as a hegemonic force. Nor does it mean the US will be going anywhere: the scale of its existing advantages across a range of fronts – military, economic, institutional – is sufficiently great that it is

assured a prominent place at the table of whatever order may come. What it does mean is that Americans must presently be engaged in thinking carefully about how best to leverage their advantages to retain the maximum possible influence into the future . If they cannot continue to be first among equals in managing the world order, they will wish at

least to ensure that order is one that runs in line with their own established preferences. Soft power Many of those who are optimistic

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about the ability of the US to pull off this project of declining power without declining influence place emphasis on two

things: the extent to which the US has soft power due to widespread admiration for its political and cultural values, and the extent to which it has locked in influence through the extent of its existing networks of friends and allies. Even if these advantages cannot arrest America’s decline on harder metrics, if played properly they can mitigate its consequences and secure an acceptable future. Shoring up support from like-minded countries such as those of Europe ought to be the low-hanging fruit of such

an effort. So the current problems do harm on both fronts . It will be difficult to maintain the allure of soft power if global opinion settles on the view that American political discord has rendered its democracy dysfunctional at home, or that its surveillance practices have given rein to the mores of a police state. And it will be harder to preserve American status through the force of its alliances if its politicians' economic

irresponsibility (for example, publicly contemplating a default on American national debt) or scandals over surveillance or drone strikes

alienate their public or cause their leaders to question the extent to which they really are on the same side as the US. Obama’s day-to-day foreign policy struggles should not be simplistically taken as signs of collapsing American influence.

But if the long-term plan is to carefully manage relative decline so as to preserves maximum influence,

episodes such as those his country has faced since August do nothing to boost the prospects of success.

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A2 Surveillance Hurts Soft PowerUS soft power is high despite surveillance – it’s irrelevant to overall opinion – direct polling data vis-à-vis ChinaPew, 2014 (Pew Research Center, U.S., JULY 14, 2014, "Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, but Limited Harm to America’s Image", Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project, http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/global-opposition-to-u-s-surveillance-and-drones-but-limited-harm-to-americas-image/#ER, DA: 7-10-2015)

Revelations about the scope of American electronic surveillance efforts have generated headlines around the world over the past year. And a new Pew Research Center survey finds widespread global opposition to U.S. eavesdropping and a decline in the view that the U.S. respects the personal freedoms of its people. But in most countries there is little evidence this opposition has severely harmed America’s overall image . In nearly all countries polled, majorities oppose monitoring by the U.S. government of emails and phone calls of foreign leaders or their citizens. In contrast, Americans tilt toward the view that eavesdropping on foreign leaders is an acceptable practice, and they are divided over using this technique on average people in other countries. However, the majority of Americans and others around the world agree that it is acceptable to spy on suspected terrorists, and that it is unacceptable to spy on American citizens. Another high-profile aspect of America’s recent national security strategy is also widely unpopular: drones. In 39 of 44 countries surveyed, majorities or pluralities oppose U.S. drone strikes targeting extremists in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Moreover, opposition to drone attacks has increased in many nations since last year. Israel, Kenya and the U.S. are the only nations polled where at least half of the public supports drone strikes.

Despite these misgivings about signature American policies, across 43 nations, a median of 65% express a positive opinion about the U.S. And these overall ratings for the U.S. are little changed from 2013. Moreover, President Obama is still largely popular internationally – across 44 nations, a median of 56% say they have confidence in him to do the right thing in world affairs. And, while Obama no longer has the same high levels of popularity that he enjoyed immediately after his election in 2008, there has been very little change in his appeal over the past year. The biggest declines in his ratings since last year are found in two nations where the U.S. has listened to the private phone conversations of national leaders: Germany (from 88% confident in 2013 to 71% confident now) and Brazil (69% in 2013, 52% now). Obama’s favorability is also down considerably in Russia, reflecting recent tensions over the crisis in Ukraine. Only 15% of Russians currently express confidence in the American president, down from an already low 29% in 2013. U.S. favorability has also declined dramatically – just 23% of Russians say they have a favorable opinion of the U.S., less than half of the

51% registered in last year’s survey. In spite of the unpopularity of U.S. spying and its use of drones, America also remains more popular globally than China, its principal rival in world affairs . A median of 49% of the publics

surveyed hold a positive view of China. And the U.S. is still considered the world’s top economic power, although this is less true today than it was before the Great Recession. However, looking to the future, a median of 50% of those surveyed in both 2013 and 2014, up from 41% last year, see China eventually supplanting America as the dominant world superpower. But China’s rising power also generates its own anxieties, especially in its immediate neighborhood. In particular, there are strong concerns in Asia that territorial disputes between China and its neighbors will lead to military conflict. More than seven-in-ten in the Philippines, Japan, Vietnam, South Korea and India say this is a concern. And two-thirds of Americans agree, as do 62% in China itself. These are among the major findings of a new survey by the Pew Research Center, conducted in 44 countries among 48,643 respondents from March 17 to June 5, 2014. The survey also finds that in most nations, young people are more favorable than their elders toward both the U.S. and China. The Snowden Effect Disclosures by former National Security Administration (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden about NSA spying revealed the U.S. government’s vast capacity to intercept communications

around the world. The Snowden revelations appear to have damaged one major element of America’s global image: its reputation for protecting individual liberties. In 22 of 36 countries surveyed in both 2013 and 2014, people are significantly less likely to believe the U.S. government respects the personal freedoms of its citizens. In six nations, the decline was 20 percentage

points or more. Still, the U.S. has a relatively strong reputation for respecting personal freedoms compared with the other major nations tested on the survey. A median of 58% believe the American government respects individual liberties, while 56% say this about France, 36% about China, and only 28% say it about the Russian government.1 And

while the Snowden revelations have harmed aspects of America’s image, overall ratings for the U.S. remain mostly positive. Globally, the U.S. has a higher favorability rating than China. This is especially true in Europe – across the seven European Union nations surveyed, a median of 66% express a favorable opinion of the U.S., while just 39% feel this way about China.

The U.S. is also considerably more popular in Latin America, while both countries receive mostly high marks in Asia and

Africa. The Middle East is the clear exception. China’s favorability in the region is not especially high, but is higher than that for the U.S. Anti-Americanism has been common in many Middle Eastern nations throughout the Obama presidency, as was the case during the

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George W. Bush era. And again this year some of the lowest ratings for the U.S. are found in the region. Only 19% of Turks and 12% of Jordanians offer a favorable opinion of the U.S., and at 10% Egypt gives the U.S. its lowest rating in the survey.

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Soft Power Good (SPG)

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SPG – Laundry ListsLeveraging effective US soft power is key to prevent a laundry list of existential scenarios, including terrorism, disease, proliferation, alliances and genocideLagon, 11 (Mark P. Lagon, International Relations and Security Chair at Georgetown University's Master of Science in Foreign Service Program and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the former US Ambassador-at-Large to Combat Trafficking in Persons at the US Department of State, Sept/Oct 2011, "The Value of Values: Soft Power Under Obama", World Affairs Journal, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/value-values-soft-power-under-obama#ER, DA: 7-7-2015)

Despite large economic challenges, two protracted military expeditions, and the rise of China, India, Brazil, and other

new players on the international scene, the U nited S tates still has an unrivaled ability to confront terrorism , nuclear proliferation , financial instability , pandemic disease , mass atrocity , or tyranny . Although far from omnipotent, the United States is still, as former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called it, “the indispensible nation.” Soft power is crucial to sustaining and best leveraging this role as catalyst . That President Obama should have excluded it from his vision of America’s foreign policy assets—particularly in the

key cases of Iran, Russia, and Egypt—suggests that he feels the country has so declined, not only in real power but in the power of example, that it lacks the moral authority to project soft power. In the 1970s, many also considered the US in decline as it grappled with counterinsurgency in faraway lands, a crisis due to economic stagnation, and reliance on foreign oil. Like Obama, Henry Kissinger tried to manage decline in what he saw as a multipolar world, dressing up prescriptions for policy as descriptions of immutable

reality. In the 1980s, however, soft power played a crucial part in a turnaround for US foreign policy. Applying it, President Reagan sought to transcend a nuclear balance of terror with defensive technologies, pushed allies in

the Cold War (e.g., El Salvador, Chile, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines) to liberalize for their own good, backed labor movements opposed to Communists in Poland and Central America, and called for the Berlin Wall to be torn down—over Foggy Bottom

objections. This symbolism not only boosted the perception and the reality of US influence, but also hastened the demise of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. For Barack Obama, this was the path not taken. Even the Arab Spring has not cured his acute allergy to soft power. His May 20, 2011, speech on the Middle East and Northern Africa came four months after the Jasmine Revolution emerged. His emphasis on 1967 borders as the basis for Israeli-Palestinian peace managed to eclipse even his broad words (vice deeds) on democracy in the Middle East. Further, those words failed to explain his deeds in continuing to support some Arab autocracies (e.g., Bahrain’s, backed by Saudi

forces) even as he gives tardy rhetorical support for popular forces casting aside other ones. To use soft power without hard power is to be Sweden. To use hard power without soft power is to be China. Even France, with its long commitment to

realpolitik, has overtaken the United States as proponent and implementer of humanitarian intervention in Libya and Ivory Coast. When the American president has no problem with France combining hard and soft power better than the United States, something is seriously amiss.

Soft power is key to international cooperation – that solves disease, terrorism, and warmingNye 08 (Joseph S. Nye Jr., created the theory of “soft power,” distinguished service professor and former dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, PhD in Political Science from Harvard, 3/7/08, http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/51/9/1351)

Etzioni is correct that a successful policy of security first will require the combi- nation of hard and soft power. Combining the two instruments so that they reinforce rather than undercut each other is crucial to success. Power is the ability to get the outcomes one wants. In the past,it was

assumed that military power dominated most issues, but in today’s world, the contexts of power differ greatly on military, economic, and transnational issues. These latter problems, including everything from climate change to pandemics to transnational terrorism , pose some of the greatest challenges we face today, and yet few are susceptible to purely military solutions. The only way to grapple with these problems is through

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cooperation with others, and that requires smart power—a strategy that combines the soft power of attraction with the

hard power of coercion. For example, American and British intelligence agencies report that our use of hard power in Iraq without sufficient attention to soft power has increased rather than reduced the number of Islamist terrorists throughout the

past 5 years. The soft power of attraction will not win over the hard core terrorists but it is essential in winning the hearts and minds of mainstream Muslims,without whose sup- port success will be impossible in the long term.

Yet all the polling evidence suggests that American soft power has declined dramatically in the Muslim world. There is no simple military solution that will produce the outcomes we want . Etzioni is clear on this and highly critical of the failure to develop a smart power strategy in Iraq. One wishes, however, that he had spent a few more pages developing one for Iran.

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SPG – HegSoft power & perception is key to effective leadership – builds alliances, checks counter-balancing, maintains domestic supportJervis 09 (professor of international politics at Columbia University. (Robert, Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective, World Politics Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009)

To say that the system is unipolar is not to argue that the unipole can get everything it wants or that it has no need for others. American power is very great, but it is still subject to two familiar limitations: it is harder to build than

to destroy, and success usually depends on others’ decisions. This is particularly true of the current system because of what the U.S. wants. If Hitler had won World War II, he might have been able to maintain his system for some period of time with little cooperation from

others because “all” he wanted was to establish the supremacy of the Aryan race. The U.S. wants not only to prevent the rise of a peer competitor but also to stamp out terrorism, maintain an open international economic system, spread democracy throughout the world, and establish a high degree of cooperation among countries that remain

juridically equal. Even in the military arena, the U.S. cannot act completely alone. Bases and overflight rights are always needed, and support from allies, especially Great Britain, is important to validate military action in the eyes

of the American public. When one matches American forces, not against those of an adversary but against the tasks at hand, they often fall short. Against terrorism, force is ineffective without excellent intelligence . Given the international

nature of the threat and the difficulties of gaining information about it, international cooperation is the only route to success .

The maintenance of international prosperity also requires joint efforts, even leaving aside the danger that other countries could trigger a run on the dollar by cashing in their holdings. Despite its lack of political unity, Europe is in many respects an economic

unit, and one with a greater gdp than that of the U.S. Especially because of the growing Chinese economy, economic power is spread around the world much more equally than is military power, and the open economic system   could easily disintegrate despite continued unipolarity. In parallel, on a whole host of problems such as   aids, poverty, and international crime (even leaving aside climate change), the unipole can lead and exert pressure

but cannot dictate . Joint actions may be necessary to apply sanctions to various unpleasant and recalcitrant

regimes; proliferation can be stopped only if all the major states (and many minor ones) work to this end;

unipolarity did not automatically enable the U.S. to maintain the coalition against Iraq after the first Gulf War; close ties within the West are needed to reduce the ability of China, Russia, and other states to play one Western country off against the others. But in comparison with the cold war era, there are fewer incentives today for allies to cooperate with the U.S. During the earlier period unity and close coordination not only permitted military efficiencies but, more importantly, gave credibility to the American nuclear umbrella that protected the allies. Serious splits were dangerous because they entailed the risk that the Soviet Union would be emboldened. This reason for avoiding squabbles disappeared along with the USSR, and the point is likely to generalize to other unipolar systems if they involve a decrease of threats that call for maintaining good relations with the superpower. This does not mean that even in this particular unipolar system the superpower is like Gulliver tied down by the Lilliputians. In some areas opposition can be self-defeating. Thus for any country to undermine American leadership of the international economy would be to put its own economy at risk, even if the U.S. did not retaliate, and for a country to sell a large proportion of its dollar holding would be to depress the value of the dollar, thereby diminishing the worth of the country’s remaining stock of this

currency. Furthermore, cooperation often follows strong and essentially unilateral action. Without the war in Iraq it is not likely that we would have seen the degree of cooperation that the U.S. obtained from Europe in combating the Iranian nuclear program and from

Japan and the PRC in containing North Korea. Nevertheless, many of the American goals depend on persuading others, not coercing them . Although incentives and even force are not irrelevant to spreading democracy and the free market, at bottom this requires people to embrace a set of institutions and values. Building the world that the U.S. seeks is a political, social, and even psychological task for which unilateral measures are likely to be unsuited and for which American military and economic strength can at best play a supporting role. Success requires that others share the American vision and believe that its leadership is benign.

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SPG – TerrorismSoft power is critical to eliminating terrorism – it’s key to coalition building, legal institutions, and stemming recruitmentCSR, 14 (this text is a paraphrased transcript of a roundtable seminar of security experts by the CSR; these security experts include Fatma Ceren Yazgan, Deputy Director General for Security and Intelligence Affairs at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Heidi Meyer, Political Advisor to the Commander of NATO Allied Land Command; and David Blose, political analyst at LANDCOM. “The Role of Diplomacy and Soft Power in Combatting Terrorism: Concepts, Fighting Methods and Case Studies”, Center for Strategic Research Workshop Report, http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/workshop_reports/04-Diplomacy_Soft_Power_Report.pdf#ER, p. 5-7, date is not given but the pdf was published 9/4/2014, DA: 7/9/2015)

Mrs. Fatma Ceren Yazgan , Deputy Director General for Security and Intelligence Affairs at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

expressed that diplomacy and the criminal justice system have key roles in combatting terrorism . The United Nations

Charter and the Council of Europe agreements which set the international legal framework for combatting terrorism have been drawn up through negotiations carried out between various countries through diplomatic channels . As every country has a different set of regulations, diplomacy is the most fundamental instrument to ensure convergence between these regulations and develop a common understanding in the fight against terrorism. Mrs. Yazgan pointed out that although there is no definition for terrorism provided by the United Nations, there

are decisions in this direction. She said that even though States lack confidence in each other, they tend to cooperate as they perceive threats. Such a process occurred after 2001. Turkey could not obtain sufficient support in the fight against terrorism from the international community before that date. Additionally, PKK terrorism was often considered as a matter of human rights in multilateral platforms. Although Turkey might have had past deficiencies in its legal framework for criminal justice, this does not change the fact that PKK is a terrorist organization. Turkey also adopted soft power elements as fundamental political instruments to fight against the PKK without alienating its Kurdish citizens in any way. For example expressions like “Kurdish terrorism” have never been used. She also stated that the European Union

listed the PKK as a terrorist organization in 2002 as a result of the post- 2001 threat perceptions. Underlining the importance of international cooperation and experience-sharing in the fight against terrorism, Yazgan reminded that the Global Counterterrorism Forum, co-chaired by Turkey and the United States, was established with the participation of 29 countries and the

European Union in 2011. The main objectives of the forum are to strengthen the fight against terrorism by sharing experiences and reinforcing the criminal justice approach. Educational and collaborative projects are planned to be carried out through the “Fund” established under the Forum. Radicalization continues to exist in Western Europe despite all countermeasures. Terrorist organizations in Syria have strengthened also taking advantage from the current economic crisis environment. Although al-Qaeda lost its power in Afghanistan, the ideology influenced by this organization has gained ground in the Middle East. In this context, Turkey will continue to share its experiences through both NATO and its individual initiatives. Organizational Structure of the United States Department of State in use of Soft

Power Heidi Meyer , Political Advisor to the Commander of NATO Allied Land Command (LANDCOM), pointed out that the U.S. Department of State has been trying to organize in the field of soft power since 2010 and taken serious decisions to that end; U.S. President Barack Obama instructed to mainly employ soft power elements instead of armed forces in the fight against terrorism, thus a document titled “the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review” was produced as the first institutional step in this direction in 2010. This document draws a framework on how to shape foreign policy on soft power and aims to create a consistent capacity for civilians against terrorist threats. Accordingly, different units at the Department of State with the same purpose gathered under the so-called “J Bureau”. She

expressed that the “J Bureau” has been created since threats are multifaceted today, thus strategies could be developed in a coordinated way; bilateral and multilateral diplomacy could be conducted and efforts and practices could be carried

out to increase the capacity of resident partners in different regions of the world. Stating that “J Bureau” allows to create a versatile, robust and integrated fighting system, Meyer expressed that the aim is to develop cooperation between all the institutions and agencies within the state and collaborative work culture between diplomats and other

government employees and to fight against terrorism in an integrated structure . She also added that efforts

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aimed at maintaining civil security and reducing poverty and unemployment are being exerted via USAID and

similar organizations with a view to narrowing social grounds where terrorist organizations could gain footholds, taking into account that ideological and military presence of terrorist organizations is not limited to a single country. Brain

Washing Activities of the Terrorist Organisations towards the Youth and Possible Measures to be Taken David Blose , political analyst at LANDCOM, stated that defining the fight against terrorism should have priority. Otherwise the instruments used in combatting terrorism cannot achieve their goals. It is necessary to have good command of the cultures of the societies providing a base for the terrorist organizations and in

this way local actors can be incorporated into the efforts. Pointing out to the fact that terrorist organizations have developed their sphere of influence and activity areas at a great pace, Blose expressed that these organizations deployed in different regions of the world spread their ideology thanks to the educational programs developed especially towards the youth. Soft power instruments used by states in combatting terrorism are implemented more effectively by terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda; schools and madrasas in countries

such as Pakistan and Syria are put to use to brainwash the youngsters and these threats exist also in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia.

While the process of the Arab Spring is expected to be an opportunity to promote the values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law, terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda expanded their bases by spreading the belief that they are protectors and securers of justice. Sabotage the educational programs of the respective states; the main activities of terrorist organizations to be emphasized and fought against, which could be seen as an iceberg, are the educational programs they provide for the children and young people in order to spread their ideology .

Soft power key to stop terrorismNye, 03 (Joseph S. Nye Jr., Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003)

THE WILLINGNESS of other countries to cooperate in dealing with transnational issues such as terrorism depends in part on their own self-interest, but also on the attractiveness of American positions. Soft power lies in the ability to attract and persuade rather than coerce. It means that others want what the United States wants, and there is less need to use carrots and sticks. Hard power, the ability to coerce, grows out of a country’s military and economic might. Soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies. When U.S. policies appear legitimate in the eyes of others, American soft power is enhanced. Hard power will always remain crucial in a world of nation-states guarding their independence, but soft power will become increasingly important in dealing with the transna tional issues that require multilateral cooperation for their solution.

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SPG – India RelationsUS soft power is key to US-India relations – influence makes the partnership resilient and effectivePande, 12 (Aparna Pande, Director, Initiative on the Future of India and South Asia, 5-17-2012, "U.S.-India: A Soft Power Tie That Binds", Hudson Institute, http://www.hudson.org/research/8941-u-s-india-a-soft-power-tie-that-binds#ER, DA: 7-9-2015)

While the Atlantic partnership will always remain important for the United States, it is the United States’ ties with India that will be the “defining partnership” of the twenty-first century. Ties with India are the result of more than two decades of efforts by Indian and American leaders, and they will remain steady despite ups and downs because they rest on an underpinning not only of hard power but of soft power . India is one of the fastest growing economies in the world today, and American companies aim to benefit from the Indian economic boom. Bilateral trade today stands at over $50 billion and American foreign

investment in India is approximately $16 billion. The potential for collaboration in the fields of science and technology between the U.S. and India has grown exponentially. The removal of Indian defense and space organizations from the “entity list” will

help forge partnerships between companies in both countries. The security dimension of the U.S.-India partnership is equally critical with deepening military-to-military ties, counter-terrorism cooperation, defense sales and a common desire to defend the

domains of cyber and outer space. American policymakers tend to view their ties with India not just in the bilateral context

but in the broader global context. India and the U.S. are both status quo powers that seek inclusive security architecture not only for Asia, but beyond. During their visits to India, both President Barack Obama and Secretary Hillary Rodham

Clinton have repeatedly emphasized their desire that India build deeper strategic and economic ties with its

East and South East Asian neighbors. The two countries share a similar outlook with respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Indian discussions of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan have helped crystallize a certain school of Indian thinking which views robust U.S. engagement in the region as conducive to Indian security. Also, while skeptical of American support for Pakistan, most Indian strategists agree that American absence from

Afghanistan and Pakistan is harmful to Indian interests. While hard power is critical in international relations, it is soft power that ensures relationships between countries withstand the vagaries of politics and crises . During the

Cold War, India had a hard power-based relationship with the Soviet Union. While there will always be a hard power component to India’s relationship with the U.S., it is the strengthening of the soft power relationship that is critical . In a recent book titled China’s Nightmare, America’s Dream: India as the Next Global Power, a former American diplomat,

William Avery, argues that like the United Kingdom, the United States and India too share the ideals of democracy, human rights, rule of law and free markets. To this we should add pluralism and an open society. That the United States seeks a long-term, people-to-people relationship is demonstrated in the way high-level visits are structured. Secretary Clinton’s trips have included visits to non-governmental organizations as well as interactive media appearances. President Obama held a town hall meeting with students during his 2010 visit to India. During the 1950s and 60s, when American leaders and policymakers visited India, the focus of attention was India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his cabinet colleagues; the opposition parties were rarely paid much attention. With the rise of coalition politics during the 1990s and the importance of political parties, including those in opposition, American officials and leaders made it a point to broaden their interaction. Not only does this reflect a desire to reach out to the larger population, but it reflects an understanding of internal media dynamics. There has been an attempt to go beyond the federal government with the rise in power and importance of regional players in Indian politics. In each of her last three trips to India, Secretary Clinton has made it a point to visit a key regional capital in addition to New Delhi—Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkata. The visit to Mumbai was important not only because the city is India’s financial capital, but also to express solidarity with the residents of the city who have suffered repeatedly at the hands of terrorists. The United States consulate in Chennai has the distinction of issuing the largest numbers of American visas of all the consulates in India. Both Chennai and Kolkata are important for domestic politics: the parties in power in these states are mercurial allies of the Congress party—and for foreign policy—politics in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal affects India’s ties to Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. There is a similar regionalization on

the American side—an increasing number of American states are building independent economic ties with their counterparts in India. A consistently favorable rating of the other country in polling data demonstrates that there is a genuine desire in both countries for better ties. According to the Gallup American Favorability Toward Countries poll, India has had a consistently high ranking—72 percent (2011) and 75 percent (2012)—which places it just below allies like Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, France, Japan and Germany. According to Pew Global Attitudes Project 2011, the number of Indians (41 percent) and Americans (49 percent) who have a favorable view of the other country is very similar. Also, 10 percent of Indians and 14 percent of Americans have an unfavorable view of the other. The two countries seem to have come a long way from the Cold War era and the days of

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President Nixon. In early May 2012, Secretary Clinton went on what is most likely her last trip to India as secretary of state. In her four years as secretary, Ms. Clinton has traveled to India almost every year. The last three American presidents have also made it a point to visit India once

during the course of their presidency. While there is a still a long way to go, the relationship between the United States and India has the potential of becoming another Entente Cordiale, a special relationship.

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Defense

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A2 War – GeneralSoft power doesn’t solve war – Ukraine and previous Russian examples prove, realism/hard power dominate foreign affairs, only civil society (not government) can leverage it, terrible track record, Obama doesn’t know how to operationalize Cecire 14

{Michael, Black Sea regional analyst and an associate scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute's Project on Democratic Transitions, former visiting scholar Columbia University's Harriman Institute, MPA (Penn), bachelors in cultural anthropology (VCU), “The Limits of Soft Power,” 4/1, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-limits-soft-power-10163?page=2#THUR}

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has already punctured much of the prevailing foreign-policy thinking that had become pro forma in Washington and Europe. In particular, the notion that Western unilateral disarmament can somehow be balanced or

compensated for with less tangible forms of influence—soft power—has much to answer for in this ongoing crisis. By now, it is clear

that Moscow’s actions in Crimea strongly demonstrate the sharp limits of soft power , especially one that appears

to have been decoupled from hard power, the traditional final arbiter of interstate relations . Ukraine is not merely a geopolitical setback, but a symptom of a misplaced faith in the potency of postmodern soft power as foreign policy plan A through Z. Ukraine’s rapid transformation from homo Sovieticus–ruled kleptocracy to inspiring popular revolution to the latest victim of Russian imperialism has been astonishing. In the span of mere weeks, Ukraine’s political cleavages have been magnified as the faultline of a tense geopolitical contest between the Euro-Atlantic community and a revanchist, increasingly militant Russia. In the Western scramble to come to terms with the new threat landscape—let alone formulating an effective, unified response—Crimea has almost certainly already been lost. Meanwhile, Russia seems poised to expand its writ into other areas of

eastern Ukraine just as it aggressively probes Euro-Atlantic readiness in the Baltic, Turkey, and the Caucasus. In Washington, defense and administration

officials appear resigned—if only unofficially—to Russian control over Crimea (if not eastern Ukraine) and are digging in for the long haul. How did we get here? Among the ideologues, the answer lies in the foreign policies of the current or previous administrations. On the right, President Obama’s “reset” and subordination of foreign policy to domestic issues is the obvious cause. And on the left, President Bush’s wars have given the Kremlin the perfect moral justification. But the reality, like many things, is hardly one sided. Partisans decrying President Obama’s “weakness” appear to ignore that the administration's response to Russia’s occupation of Crimea is already far more muscular than President Bush’s reaction to the Russian invasion of Georgia 2008. And conversely, some of the left’s bizarre use of a war they supposedly opposed to equivocate on the invasion of a sovereign state by corrupt autocracy is as

self-contradictory as it is troubling. The likelier culprit is not so intimately tethered to the tribalisms of American politics, though ideology inevitably has

played a role. Instead, the Western political class has become intoxicated with the notion that soft power, now the highly

fashionable foreign-policy instrument of first resort, can compensate for—or in some ways replace altogether—diminished hard power. If the late 1990s was the heyday for liberal internationalism by airpower, the late 2000s saw an analogous consensus congregate around soft power. Soft power is supposed to describe the latent factors—values, economy, culture and the like—of a state, entity or idea to persuade or attract. This contrasts with its more recognizable

counterpart, hard power, which is based on the more traditional principle of coercion. There is little doubt that soft power is a real and fundamentally important phenomenon in the conduct of international relations. Contributions from scholars like Joseph Nye and Giulio

Gallarotti have made a compelling case that soft power is a powerful geopolitical signifier; but what began as a keen observation had morphed into a cottage industry looking to leverage soft power into a foreign-policy panacea . In an illuminating

2011 paper published by the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College, University of Reading (U.K.) political scientist Colin S. Gray rightly acknowledges the merits of the soft-power thesis while articulating its practical limitations, particularly in the

policy arena. “While it is sensible to seek influence abroad as cost-effectively as possible, it is only prudent to be modest in one's expectations of the soft power to be secured by cultural influence,” cautions Gray. Indeed, soft power’s attraction and

subsequent embrace by the foreign policy elite had as much to do with its usefulness as a substitute for “hard power” as its salience as an idea. But while hard and soft power can be complementary, Gray observes that soft power can in no way compensate for military power . “Sad to say,” laments Gray, “there is no convincing evidence suggesting an absence of demand for the threat and use of military force.” Sad, indeed. However, events in Ukraine have exposed the stark limits of soft power in a way that no analysis ever could. There is no small irony in the fact that Russia’s forceful military intervention into Ukraine was preceded by a grinding, if superficially velveted, tug of war between Moscow and the West over Ukraine’s integration with two competing soft-power “vehicles”—the EU and the Moscow-led Customs Union-cum-Eurasian Union. It was

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Yanukovych’s abandonment of Ukraine’s pledge to sign an Association Agreement with the EU—following intense Russian coercion—that protests began again in

earnest. Yanukovych’s turn to brutality eventually precipitated his toppling, Russia’s military intervention, and now Crimea’s annexation. The idea of soft power as operational policy should be buried. While there is some government role in propagating and wielding

soft power—public affairs, policy making, and, yes, sometimes psychological operations—the real business of soft power is exists well outside of the domain of the state . In reality, the track record of operationalizing soft power has been, to date, abysmal . Russia is a case in point. Moscow repeatedly sought to revise the post-Cold War order through a variety of projects that might normally be filed as soft-power initiatives: then president Dmitry Medvedev’s repeated attempts to reorient the European security architecture; the Kremlin obsession with making the ruble an international reserve currency; the formation of the Russia-led Customs Union in 2010; and the

(now likely stillborn) plans to establish the Eurasian Union. And yet, in the end, Crimea was forcibly seized by men with guns. Indeed, the truer currency of power remains the ability to coerce . Fatigue from disastrous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan elevated expectations that soft power could supplant a beleaguered and overstretched U.S. military. Why,

indeed, would the U.S. opt for coercion when civilizational persuasion could do the trick? Pro-West people power in Eurasia seemed to bolster the case for operationalized soft power after the “color revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Yet the longer-term results were unpredictable at best and disastrous at worst . Over time, it has become increasingly apparent that soft power is perhaps less an instrument to wield than a favorable wind at our backs . The crisis with Russia has laid bare the limits of soft power as well as the continued relevance of hard power—even in “postmodern” Europe. While the Obama administration should be credited with being among the few Western governments to offer a

relatively serious response to the Ukraine crisis, the White House overall still seems uncomfortable with the difficult but very real role that hard power necessarily plays in establishing and policing a U.S.-led, liberal normative order. This must change with the

new circumstances established by Russian revanchism. Western values can only be propagated and upheld with the ultimate

guarantee of hard power. And if the West is not prepared to enforce its values with tangible consequences, then

perhaps we should abandon the pretense of a rules-based international system and cease the cruel practice of giving hope where there is none to be had . Soft power is here to stay, but its moment as a diplomatic instrument has long since gone . Because, in reality, it was never really much more than an illusion of what we wished the world to be rather than the one that exists.

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A2 War / A2 TerrorismSoft power fails – can’t prevent conflict or convince hostile actorsShah, 14 (Ritula Shah, 11-19-2014, "Is US monopoly on the use of soft power at an end?", BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-29536648#ER, DA: 7-8-2015)

But the limits of soft power are also apparent everywhere. If you look back across the period since the end of the Cold War,

the US has actually deployed rather a lot of "hard power" around the world; two wars in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo and

Afghanistan and the current airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, to name a few and not to mention the use of drones. In all these cases, soft power wasn't enough to avert a conflict or military intervention . Also, as Prof Nye concedes, soft power can only work when people are receptive to the messages it's peddling. So the movies may help to spread a US vision of what a free, democratic life might look like, but only if the people watching, recognise the importance of those values to them. It seems unlikely that the violent jihadists of Islamic State will be persuaded to abandon their anti-Western vision .

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A2 Genocide/Human Rights/Misc

***Re-tag and re-highlight this card based on whatever you’re trying to use it for – this ev can be used to answer Iran, North Korea, human rights abuses, genocide, proliferation, Russian expansion, and China rise

states aren’t deterred from ((human rights abuse)) by soft power alone – empirics showHolmes, 09 (Kim R. Holmes, Ph.D., Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, assistant secretary of state under Bush, 6-1-2009, "Sustaining American Leadership with Military Power", Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/06/sustaining-american-leadership-with-military-power#ER, DA: 7-9-2015)

The Limits of Soft Power To witness the consequences when policymakers and politicians believe that hard and soft power are disconnected, one need look no further than Europe. The Europeans--many of whom believe that the peace that has broken out on their continent is the model for a post-sovereign world order--have become convinced that the anarchic order of the Westphalian system of nation-states can be breached through the exercise of soft power alone. In their view, bridging the often hardened differences between states and shaping their decisions requires only negotiation and common understanding. Many liberals are now pressing the

U.S. government to adopt this vision, but the futility of this approach can be seen everywhere, from the failure of negotiations to deter both Iran and North Korea from their nuclear programs over the past five years--a

period in which their efforts have only matured--to the lackluster response to Russia's invasion of Georgian territory.

Whether it is states like Iran and North Korea that believe a nuclear weapons program is central to regime survival, or human-rights abusers like Sudan, Burma, and Zimbabwe, or rising powers like China, which continues to use its military to emphasize its sovereignty in the South China Sea, diplomacy alone has not been enough to bring about change in a direction that is favorable to America's interests . At times, America and its leaders have also been guilty of this type of strategic myopia. After applying pressure on North Korea so

diligently in 2006, the Bush Administration relaxed its posture in early 2007, and North Korea concluded that it was again free to backslide on its commitments. Two years later, this weak diplomatic approach, which the Obama

Administration continued even after North Korea's April 5 missile test, has only brought North Korea to believe that it can get away with more missile tests and nuclear weapons detonations. And so far, it has.

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A2 RussiaUS soft power fails in Russia-too much reliance on Hard PowerSeib, 09 (Director of the USC Center on Public Diplomacy, Philip Seib is a Professor of Journalism and Public Diplomacy and Professor of International Relations, “Toward a New Public Diplomacy”, pg. 72-73)

American soft power has lost its influence in Russia for two principal reasons . First, since the early l990s Russia has been neglected by the U.S. government. Second, Russia, after addressing tremendous challenges and

transformations in its post-Soviet development, since 2003 has tried to diminish any U.S. impact on Russia’s internal politics to avoid destabilizing effects in Russian society. Why did once mighty U.S. public diplomacy fail to influence

Russia? Given that hard power dominates in U.S.-Russia relations today, can we regard American public diplomacy as a failure? Seeking reasons for the ineffectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy efforts, many researchers considered the

successful U.S. soft power experience during the cold war. However, the cold war model of public diplomacy cannot be implemented today. In the bipolar world the United States had one ideological “enemy,” so it aimed the mightiest informational weapon and hard power resources at one target. What about today? America needs to spread public diplomacy activities around the world, because

strategically important regions are elsewhere: Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, China, the European Union.... The list is long. This post-cold war world, “engaged in a vast remapping of the relationship of the state to images, messages, and information within its boundaries,” demands new methods and principles of fulfilling state policies, including public diplomacy. Global net society made world leaders, policy makers, media, and nonofficial actors develop sophisticated strategies to create spheres of influence and markets for loyalties in

the highly competitive information space. In the “global village,” without information boundaries and strong ideological barriers, the implementation of effective public diplomacy is increasingly difficult . The Internet and new media have complicated public diplomacy because they require special skills to define and find target audiences in a very fragmented

communication field. Further, failures in strategic communication between nations occur because of transformations in geopolitics and increasing rivalry of great powers. In a fast-changing multicivilizational world or, as

the Economist said, a “neo-polar world, in which old alliances and rivalries are bumping up against each other in new ways,”° public diplomacy’s ability to influence a target state is difficult. It makes sense to analyze U.S. public diplomacy through the prism of U.S.—Russian relations since the crucial historical point—the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The euphoria at the end the 1980s stimulated by

freedom and convergence with the West has evaporated. Russia has entered a new decade that had been one of the most painful and desperate periods in its history. When Vladimir Putin called the collapse of the Soviet Union the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century, he did not mean he was nostalgic for the Soviet Empire, as many Westerners interpreted this statement. As Stephen F. Cohen noted, “No one in authority anywhere had ever foreseen that one of the twentieth century’s two superpowers would plunge,

along with its arsenals of destruction, into such catastrophic circumstances.”11 Ideological and economic decay after the end of the Soviet Union deprived Russia of its status and identity; people felt themselves disoriented and humiliated, many of them, including among the Russian intelligentsia, suffered from poverty. Western ideas promoted by United States and other Western public diplomats seemed elusive for the majority of disappointed Russians, who “experienced a collective inferiority complex.”2 It was the time of the next turn in the Russian mass consciousness, which shaped Russia’s skeptical attitude toward Western ideas and democracy. Instead of a wealthy Western society, the nation, recently a superpower, plunged into severe depression and ideological turmoil.

Nevertheless, in 1991—1993, a majority of Russians (approximately 70 percent) held positive views about the United States.’3 That was the appropriate moment for U.S. soft power to help Russia to recover from the post-Soviet fever.

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A2 Democracy/Human RightsSoft power doesn’t solve human rights or democracy – many examples.Krauthammer, Pulitzer-Prize winning syndicated columnist, 2008 (Charles, National Review, July 11, Lexis Academic)

This in foreign policy establishment circles is called "hard power." In the Bush years, hard power is terribly out of fashion, seen as a mere obsession of cowboys and neocons. Both in Europe and America, the sophisticates worship at the altar of "soft power" -- the use of diplomatic and moral resources to achieve one's ends. Europe luxuriates in soft power, nowhere more than in l'affaire Betancourt in which Europe's repeated gestures of solidarity hovered somewhere

between the fatuous and the destructive. Europe had been pressing the Colombian government to negotiate for the hostages. Venezuela's Hugo Chavez offered to mediate. Of course, we know from documents captured in a daring Colombian army raid into Ecuador in March -- your standard hard-power operation duly denounced by that perfect repository of soft power, the Organization of American States -- that Chavez had been secretly funding and pulling the strings of the FARC. These negotiations would have been Chavez's opportunity to gain recognition and legitimacy for his terrorist client. Colombia's President Alvaro Uribe, a conservative and close ally of President Bush, went instead for the hard stuff. He has for years. As a result, he has brought to its knees the longest-running and once-strongest guerrilla force on the continent by means of "an intense military campaign (that) weakened the FARC, killing seasoned commanders and prompting 1,500 fighters and urban operatives to desert" (Washington Post). In the end, it was that campaign -- and its agent, the Colombian military -- that freed Betancourt. She was, however, only one

of the high-minded West's many causes. Solemn condemnations have been issued from every forum of soft-power fecklessness -- the EU, the U.N., the G-8 foreign ministers -- demanding that Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe stop butchering his opponents and step down. Before that, the cause du jour was Burma, where a vicious dictatorship allowed thousands of cyclone victims to die by denying them independently delivered foreign aid, lest it weaken the junta's grip on power. And then there is Darfur, a perennial for which myriad diplomats and foreign-policy experts have devoted uncountable hours at the finest five-star hotels to deplore the genocide and urgently urge relief. What is done to free these people? Nothing. Everyone knows it will take the hardest of hard power to remove the oppressors in Zimbabwe, Burma, Sudan, and other godforsaken places where the bad guys have the guns and use them. Indeed, as the Zimbabwean opposition leader suggested (before quickly retracting) from his hideout in the Dutch embassy -- Europe specializes in providing haven for those fleeing the evil that Europe does nothing about -- the only solution is foreign intervention.

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A2 TerrorismCan’t solve terrorism – can’t win the hearts and mindsKroenig et al ‘9 (Matthew, assistant professor in the Department of Government at Georgetown University and a research affiliate with The Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University, Melissa McAdam, Ph.D. student in the UC Berkeley Political Science Departmen, Steven Weber, Professor of political science @UC Berk, “Taking Soft Power Seriously,” 39-46 AM)

The United States has also sought to apply soft power to counter ideological support for terrorism. Again,

despite a concerted effort by the United States, global support for terrorist ideology shows no sign of abating and, according to some measures, may be increasing. The inability of the United States to counter ideological support for terrorism can be attributed to an environment hostile to the application of soft power. The societies to which the United States has targeted its message lack a functioning marketplace of ideas and the U.S. message is not credible to the target audience. For these reasons, the application of soft power has been an ineffective tool for countering ideological support for terrorism, despite the importance of individual attitudes as a driver of terrorist behavior. In the 2005 National Defense Strategy, the United States presented a threepronged strategy for winning the War on Terror.77 The first two elements of the strategy, attacking terrorist networks and defending the homeland, were definitively in the realm of hard power. The third and, according to many Pentagon officials, the most important

element of the strategy, however, was “countering ideological support for terrorism.”78 As part of this soft power strategy, the United States declared its intent to “Support models of moderation in the Muslim world by helping change Muslim misperceptions of the United States and the West.”79 Furthermore, the United States vowed to “delegitimate terrorism and extremists by e.g., eliminating state and private support for extremism.”80 The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism continued the theme of ideological combat stating that “from the beginning, [the War on Terror] has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas. Not only do we fight our terrorist enemies on the battlefield, we promote freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorists’ perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule.”81 According to the strategy, “winning the War on Terror means winning the battle of ideas.” The United States also singled out state sponsors of terror for its soft power campaign and declared that it desired “to make clear that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate so that terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide: behavior that no respectable government can condone or support and all must oppose.”82 These were serious statements of policy objectives. To isolate state-sponsors of terrorism, President Bush encouraged states to choose a position “either with us or against us in the fight against terror."83 A special task force on “strategic communications” was set up at the

Defense Science Board that argued that “the United States is engaged in a generational and global struggle about ideas.” 84 The Board concluded that, “policies will not succeed unless they are communicated to global and domestic audiences in ways that are credible and allow them to make informed, independent judgments.”85 To show the level of commitment the Bush administration made to the task of public diplomacy, President Bush appointed his trusted public relations manager, Karen Hughes, as Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy. 86 Under Hughes’s leadership, the State Department established regional media hubs

offering U.S. spokespeople with language capabilities to speak on America’ behalf in media outlets throughout the Middle East.87 The United States Government also increased the budget for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. agency responsible for dispensing foreign aid, by 60%, from 5 billion in 1998 to 8 billion in 2003.88 The United States funded a variety of pro-American media in the Muslim world including H1 magazine, Radio Sawa, and the Al Hurra television station. 89 Furthermore, the United States established reeducation facilities, such as the “House of Wisdom” in Iraq, to teach moderate Muslim theology to detainees captured in the War on Terror.90 Despite this widespread effort to communicate throughout the Muslim world, the United States, to date, has largely failed in its effort to

apply soft power to its advantage in the War on Terror. The War on Terror will probably be a “generational struggle,” but it is nevertheless troubling that after a sustained multi-year effort to counter ideological support for terrorism, the United States has made real progress on very few of its stated objectives. The United States has, since 9/11, avoided a major terrorist attack, and while the causes of this can be debated, it is not likely the result of a waning of terrorist ideology globally as is evidenced by the string of attacks in other

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parts of the world. In recent years, terrorists have carried out attacks in: Algeria, Great Britain, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Russia, Spain, and other countries.91 Despite heavy pressure from the United States in the form of hard and soft power, states still support terrorism and Al Qaeda has even reconstituted terrorist training camps in South Asia. 92 Terrorist ideology continues to flourish globally with the help of the Internet.93 The low public opinion of the United States in the Muslim world, often thought to be one of the factors contributing to terrorism against the United States, has not improved in recent years. In fact, a recent study found that people’s “attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy

actually worsened slightly since they started listening to Radio Sawa and Al Hurra.”94 Few observers believe that U.S. efforts to combat Al Qaeda have been effective. In a recent worldwide poll, survey respondents in 22 out of 23 countries reported that the U.S.-led war on terror has not weakened Al Qaeda.95 The U.S. failure to use soft power effectively in the War on Terror is even more pronounced in some of the most important countries. In Egypt and Pakistan, for example, 60% and 41% of the respective publics possess either positive or mixed views of Al Qaeda.96

According to Doug Miller, chairman of the international polling firm Globescan, “The fact that so many people in Egypt and Pakistan have mixed or even positive views of al Qaeda is yet another indicator that the US war on terror is not winning hearts and minds.”97 Why has the United States failed in its effort to use soft power to counter ideological support for terrorism? Part of the reason is that the United States has not been able to compete in a functioning marketplace of ideas in most of the societies where a threat of jihadi terrorism exists. In the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the United States acknowledges that “terrorists recruit more effectively from populations whose information about the world is contaminated by falsehoods and corrupted by conspiracy theories. The distortions keep alive grievances and filter out facts that would challenge popular prejudices and self-serving propaganda.”98 In other words, many countries of the Middle East and the broader Muslim world lack a functioning marketplace of ideas. They are disproportionately authoritarian. 99 These governments often take measures, generally for the purposes of domestic stability,

that have the effect of preventing meaningful competition in their domestic marketplace of ideas. Foreign media content containing ideas about democracy and freedom are filtered.100 Domestic political opponents are prevented from expressing views that challenge the government.101 Radical religious groups, extremist parties, and fundamentalist madrassas are supported to shore up the legitimacy of secular regimes.102 Domestic problems are externalized and blamed on an “imperial” United States.103 The lack of a functioning marketplace of ideas in this region contributes to the pervasiveness of conspiracy theories in the region from private households to the highest levels of government.104 Due in part to these phenomena, public opinion of U.S. foreign policy is lower in the Middle East than in any other world region.105 The inability of the United States to communicate in this region is aptly described by Norman Patizz, an American media entrepreneur, who notes that “there is a media war going on [in the Muslim world] with incitement, hate broadcasting, disinformation, government censorship, self-censorship, and

America is not in the race.”106 Another limiting factor on the United States effort to counter ideological support for terrorism is the logic of persuasion. U.S. efforts to communicate directly with the Muslim world have been thwarted by a lack of credibility. Expert messengers are more persuasive than non-experts, but U.S. government officials are hardly qualified to discuss the intricacies of Muslim theology and the consistency, or lack thereof, of terrorism with the teachings of the Koran. U.S. strategists have recognized this and sought to adjust strategy appropriately, aiming to communicate through surrogates whenever possible.107 Attempts to channel a message through third parties face a number of challenges however. The audiences that the United States targets in the Middle East generally know which media outlets receive U.S. support and, accordingly, discount the messages that they receive from those sources. In a recent study on the effectiveness of U.S. supported media in the Middle East, a Jordanian student wrote that “Radio Sawa

serves US interests and helps it spread its control over the world and to serve Zionist interests.”108 A student from Palestine wrote that the United States “[spreads] lies and fabricates news” through Television Al Hurra .109 According to Al-

Ahram Weekly, an Egyptian newspaper, Arab youth listen to Radio Sawa, but “they take the U.S. sound and discard the U.S. agenda.”110 The United States efforts at persuasion may have also failed because they fail to speak to the intended audience at an emotional level. Shibley Telhami has described Al Hurra as adopting a style of “detached objectivity” to its coverage of highly controversial political issues. Telhami went on to criticize the futility of a mismatched approach that aims “to be precisely dispassionate while facing a passionate

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audience.”111 As difficult as it may be for the United States to accept, the United States with all of its hard and soft power is not well-

equipped to persuade international audiences about the legitimacy of terrorism as a tactic. There are undoubtedly other factors that helped to discredit the U.S. message on issues of terrorism. The U.S. military intervention in Iraq and the related prisoner abuse scandal at Abu Grhaib, for example, alienated many in the broader Middle East.112 But, these factors only further weakened U.S. credibility; the United States was never in a position to be a persuasive messenger on the subject of terrorism in the Muslim world. In the War on Terror, however, individual attitudes have had an important, though mixed, effect on international political outcomes. Ideas have a critical (but by no means exclusive) impact on individual decisions to join terrorist organization, but attitudes are less important determinants of the state sponsorship of terrorism. Exposure to radical ideology is an important component leading an

individual to become a terrorist. While containing an undeniable ideological component, however, many of the factors that convince people to turn to terrorism are material in origin, not ideational, and, thus, cannot be addressed with soft power tools. Social science research suggests that many factors may contribute to the production of a terrorist. Few opportunities for political participation, low levels of social integration, personal loss, and foreign

occupation are among the variables that have been linked to a higher risk of terrorism. 113 The United States can combat some of these risk factors through the application or withdrawal of hard power, but few of them can be addressed through the application of soft power alone. Despite America’s soft power campaign, the state sponsorship of terrorism also appears to be alive and well and driven by states’ core material interests. Pakistan continues to walk the fine line of allowing terrorists to operate in the tribal regions while making occasional raids against terrorist hideouts to placate the United States.114 And states that can gain through the active support of terrorism as an extension of their national power, such as Iran and Syria, continue to do so.115 The United States has been

unsuccessful, so far, in its attempt to use soft power to counter global ideological support for terror. This failure is due, at least in part, to the absence of the conditions necessary for an effective soft power strategy. Attitudes may be influential in determining the strength of the international terrorist movement, but the United States was unable to participate in debates in key regions in which terrorist ideology flourishes and a lack of credibility further hindered U.S. efforts to change attitudes on important terrorism-related issues.

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Soft vs Hard Power

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A2 Tradeoffno tradeoff – hard and soft power are mutually reinforcingHolmes, 09 (Kim R. Holmes, Ph.D., Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, assistant secretary of state under Bush, 6-1-2009, "Sustaining American Leadership with Military Power", Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/06/sustaining-american-leadership-with-military-power#ER, DA: 7-9-2015)

Contrary to what many politicians and talking heads tell Americans, a false choice exists between what are often referred to as hard and soft power. A country's military resources (its hard power) and the diplomatic tools it uses to persuade others

without resorting to coercion (its soft power) operate most efficiently in tandem. As Teddy Roosevelt famously observed, a nation must "speak softly" with diplomacy while also wielding a "big stick." Just as no country can be expected to

provide security and pursue its interests solely through the use of military power, no country can expect to be taken seriously during high-stakes negotiations without the potential threat of military force to back up its word. The two approaches are not separate tools but mutually reinforcing mechanisms .

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Hard Power k2 Soft PowerHard power’s key to soft power – provides the legitimacy to back up diplomatic commitmentsHolmes, 09 (Kim R. Holmes, Ph.D., Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, assistant secretary of state under Bush, 6-1-2009, "Sustaining American Leadership with Military Power", Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/06/sustaining-american-leadership-with-military-power#ER, DA: 7-9-2015)

The Importance of Sustaining Military Power The consequences of hard-power atrophy will be a direct deterioration of America's diplomatic clout . This is already on display in the western Pacific Ocean, where America's ability to hedge against the growing ambitions of a rising China is being called into question by some of our key Asian allies.

Recently, Australia released a defense White Paper that is concerned primarily with the potential decline of U.S. military primacy and the implications that this decline would have for Australian security and stability in the Asia-Pacific. These developments are anything but reassuring. The ability of the United States to reassure friends , deter competitors , coerce belligerent states , and defeat enemies does not rest on the strength of our political

leaders' commitment to diplomacy; it rests on the foundation of a powerful military . Only by retaining a "big stick" can the U nited S tates succeed in advancing its diplomatic priorities . Only by building a full- spectrum military force can America reassure its many friends and allies and count on their future support.

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Soft Power k2 Hard Power

Soft power key to hard powerNye, 03 (Joseph S. Nye Jr., Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003)

One of Rumsfeld’s “rules” is that “weakness is provocative.” In this, he is correct. As Osama bin Laden observed, it is best to bet on the strong

horse. The effective demonstration of military power in the second Gulf War, as in the first, might have a deterrent as well as a transformative effect in the Middle East. But the first Gulf War, which led to the Oslo peace

process, was widely regarded as legitimate, whereas the legitimacy of the more recent war was contested. Unable to balance American military power, France, Germany, Russia, and China created a coalition to balance American soft power by depriving the United States of the legitimacy that might have been bestowed by a second UN resolution. Although such balancing did not avert the war in Iraq, it did significantly raise its price. When Turkish parliamentarians regarded U.S. policy as illegitimate, they refused Pentagon requests to allow the Fourth Infantry Division to enter Iraq from the north. Inadequate attention to soft power was detrimental to the hard power the United States could bring to bear in the early days of the war. Hard and soft power may sometimes conflict, but they can also reinforce each other. And when the Jacksonians mistake soft power for weakness, they do so at their own risk.

Loss of soft power erodes overall leadershipBlinken, 02 (Antony Blinken, senior fellow at CSIS and former member of the National Security Council, Washington Quarterly, Spring, 2002)

U.S. success in Afghanistan will count for little if the United States loses the global war of ideas. That was has

produced a growing gap between much of the world's perception of the United States and the U.S. perception of itself. If this gap persists, U.S. influence abroad will erode, and the partners the United States needs to advance its interests will stand down. The few real enemies the United States faces will find it easier both to avoid sanction and to recruit others to their cause. The United States remains powerfully attractive. Most people around the world hold a favorable view of the United States, considering it a land of opportunity and democratic ideals while admiring the country's technological and scientific achievements. Millions of the world's citizens

desire to move to, become educated in, do business with, or visit the United States. When people vote with their feet, the United States wins in a landslide. Yet, the United States tends to disregard an increasingly potent mix of criticism and resentment that is diluting its attraction: anti-Americanism.

Soft power is the only way to make leadership effectiveHanna, 02 (Julia Hanna, Kennedy School Bulletin, “Going It Alone,” Spring, 2002, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ksgpress/bulletin/spring2002/features/alone.html)

It’s more than a matter of staying one step ahead of our enemies in a technological game of cat and mouse, he continues. “When the Pan Am flight exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, the cause was a bomb in unaccompanied luggage. “So now the airline employees ask if we packed our bag ourselves. A Mohammed Atta would say, ‘Yes, I packed my bag myself,’ so we’ve created new security procedures. Unfortunately, each

time you find a solution, someone will be looking for a chink in your armor. That dynamic is bound to continue.” Military power is an

essential part of the response, but an equally productive focusing point, Nye continues, would be the cultivation of what

he calls “soft power,” or the ability to advance one’s agenda through attraction rather than coercion. “Soft power arises from our culture,

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values, and policies,” he states. Given its proper weight, soft power can serve as a much-needed balance to our economic and

military might, two examples of “hard power” that can overwhelm and alienate other countries. The thousands of international students who come to study at U.S. institutions are an example of this country’s soft power. Our government’s democratic values and promotion of peace and human rights influence how other countries perceive us. For better or worse, so does the latest Bruce Willis action flick. America’s use of capital punishment and relatively permissive gun control laws undercut its soft power in European countries. While its intangible quality makes soft power much more difficult to use and control, observes Nye, that fact does not diminish its importance. “American pre-eminence will last well into this century, but our attitudes and policies will need to encompass a very different means of meeting challenges and achieving our

goals,” he says. While a strong military presence will continue to be essential to maintaining global stability, it proves less adequate when confronting issues such as global climate change, the spread of infectious diseases, and international financial stability. “We must not let the illusion of empire blind us to the increasing importance of soft power,” Nye cautions. “A unilateralist approach to foreign policy fails to produce the right results, and its accompanying arrogance erodes the soft power that is often part of the solution.”

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Hard Power Key – A2 SoPo is the FutureHard power is key – history shows it’s the most successful tool – you should prefer empiricism because the future is nonlinear and probabilisticGray, 11 (Dr. Colin S. Gray, Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England, April 2011, "Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century", Strategic Studies Institute, p. 1-2, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1059#ER, DA: 7-9-2015)

The main purpose of this analysis is to consider the relevance of military power today as well as for tomorrow. This is a subject that should give one pause before claiming a confident understanding of it. Major trends seem clear enough, but will they continue? The frequency with which history shows a liking for irony suggests that the future context for military power may be unlike that of today, in good part because the contemporary situation

contains features that will be repudiated in the future in some mixture of thought, word, and deed. The course of history assuredly reveals that events must advance from what preceded them, which is why defense analysis , especially if it seeks to peer into the future, must honor chronology . But the chronology of historical narrative may obscure the traps of nonlinearity. What we know for certain about the 21st century is that we know little of detail with total assurance. Moreover, even broad trends that appear to have unstoppable momentum are not to be trusted to deliver on their obvious promise. History must be our guide , if only because nothing else is accessible . Unfortunately, the past as it is interpreted in the history written by historians provides anything but a reliable compass. Argument either by historical analogy, or at the least with illustration by historical anecdote claimed to be pertinent, is the rule, not the exception,

in political discourse.4 This is scarcely surprising, since today is by definition both brief and unstable, while the future by definition is blank. All that is available as an evidential base for our political and strategic guidance is a past that cannot be recovered faithfully, even by those who seek honestly to do so, with the result that the past is mediated by historians. Since many facts do not speak with total clarity for themselves, they have to be interpreted by historians, amateur and professional.5

A factually reliable chronicle of an obviously major episode in the recent past, World War II say, or the Cold War, is easier to assemble than is a theory, or rather an explanation, which makes thoroughly persuasive sense of the subject at issue.

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Solvency/Effectiveness

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Soft Power Fails – Ideological PolarityWe can’t use soft power – everyone has already made up their mindsGray, 11 (Dr. Colin S. Gray, Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England, April 2011, "Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century", Strategic Studies Institute, p. 36-39, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1059#ER, DA: 7-9-2015)

9. The domain for the policy utility of soft power typically is either structurally permissive of easy success, or is unduly resistant to such influence . The third fundamental question about soft power in need of answer can best

be posed in only two words, “So what?” The combined fallacies of misnaming and over-simplification that threaten the integrity and utility of the concept of soft power are more than merely an academic itch that can be scratched into oblivion. The soft power concept is sufficiently

valid intellectually that its contestable evidential base in history and thus its true fragility are easily missed. To explain its logic: soft power resides in the ability to co-opt the willing rather than to coerce or compel the reluctant; American soft power attracts non-Americans because it represents or advances values, ideas, practices, and arrangements that they judge to be in their interest,

or at least to which they feel some bond of affinity. Therefore, the soft power of the American hegemon is some conflation of perceived interests with ideological association (by and large more tacit than explicit) . Full-

blown, the argument holds, first, that America (for example) gains useful political clout if and when foreigners

who matter highly to U.S. national security share important American understandings, values, and preferences. The thesis proceeds in its second step to package this thus far commonsense proposition under the banner of “soft power”; it is now dangerously

objectified, as if giving something a name causes it to exist. Next, the third and most problematic step in the argument is the logical leap that holds that American soft power, as existing reality—what it is, and its effects— can be approached and treated usefully as an instrument of national policy . This is an attractive proposition: it is

unfortunate that its promise is thoroughly unreliable . The problem lies in the extensive middle region that lies

between a near harmony of values and perceived interests and, at the opposite end of the spectrum, a close to

complete antagonism between those values and interests. Historical evidence as well as reason suggest that the effective domain of soft power is modest . The scope and opportunity for co-option by soft power are even less. People and polities have not usually been moved far by argument, enticement, and attractiveness . There will be some attraction to, and imitation of, a great power’s ideas and practical example, but this fact has little consequence for the utility of military force . Indeed, one suspects that on many occasions what might be claimed as a triumph for soft power is in reality no such thing . Societies and their political leaders

may be genuinely attracted to some features of American ideology and practice, but the clinching reason for their agreement to sign on to an American position or initiative will be that the United States looks convincing as a guardian state

and coalition leader. It is not difficult to identify reasons why military force seems to be less useful as a source of security than it once was. But it is less evident that soft power can fill the space thus vacated by the military and economic tools of grand strategy. Soft power should become more potent, courtesy of the electronic revolution that enables a networked global community. The ideological, political, and strategic consequences of such globalization, however, are not quite as benign as one might have predicted. It transpires

that Francis Fukuyama was wrong; the age of ideologically fueled hostility has not passed after all.47 Also, it is not obvious that the future belongs to a distinctively Western civilization.48 It is well not to forget that the Internet is content-blind, and it advertises, promotes, and helps enable bloody antagonism in addition to the harmony of worldview that many optimists have anticipated. It does not follow from all this that the hard power of military force retains, let alone increases, its utility as an instrument of policy. But assuredly it does follow that the historical motives behind defense preparation are not

greatly diminished. Thus, there is some noteworthy disharmony between the need for hard power and its availability, beset as it increasingly is by liberal global attitudes that heavily favor restraint.

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Soft Power Fails – Laundry ListSoft power is useless in practice – doesn’t translate to other countries, we can’t change it, and hard power is key*Really good line: “9. Soft power tends to be either so easy to exercise that it is probably in little need of a policy push, being essentially preexistent, or too difficult to achieve because local interests, or culture, or both, deny it political traction.”

Gray, 11 (Dr. Colin S. Gray, Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England, April 2011, "Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century", Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=1059#ER, DA: 7-9-2015) ***modified for potentially objectionable language

Unfortunately, although the concept of American soft power is true gold in theory , in practice it is not so valuable . Ironically, the empirical truth behind the attractive concept is just sufficient to mislead policymakers and grand strategists. Not only

do Americans want to believe that the soft power of their civilization and culture is truly potent, we are all but programmed by our enculturation to assume that the American story and its values do and should have what amounts to missionary merit that ought to be universal. American culture is so powerful a programmer that it can be difficult for Americans to empathize with, or

even understand, the somewhat different values and their implications held deeply abroad. The idea is popular, even possibly authoritative, among Americans that ours is not just an “ordinary country,” but instead is a country both exceptionally blessed (by divine intent) and, as a consequence, exceptionally obliged to lead Mankind [humanity]. When national exceptionalism is not merely a proposition, but is more akin to an iconic item of faith, it is difficult for usually balanced American minds to consider the potential

of their soft power without rose-tinted spectacles. And the problem is that they are somewhat correct. American values, broadly speaking

“the American way,” to hazard a large project in reductionism, are indeed attractive beyond America’s frontiers and have some utility for U.S. policy. But there are serious limitations to the worth of the concept of soft power , especially as it might be

thought of as an instrument of policy. To date, the idea of soft power has not been subjected to a sufficiently critical forensic examination. In particular, the relation of the soft power of attraction and persuasion to the hard power of coercion urgently requires more rigorous examination than it has received thus far. When considered closely, the subject of soft power and its implications for the

hard power of military force reveals a number of plausible working propositions that have noteworthy meaning for U.S. policy and strategy. 1.

Hard military threat and use are more difficult to employ today than was the case in the past, in part because of the relatively

recent growth in popular respect for universal humanitarian values. However , this greater difficulty does not mean that military force has lost its distinctive ability to secure some political decisions. The quality of justification required for the use of force has risen, which means that the policy domain for military relevance has diminished, but has by no means disappeared. 2. The political and other contexts for the use of force today do not offer authoritative guidance for the

future. History is not reliably linear. To know the 2000s is not necessarily to know the 2010s. 3. The utility of military force is not a fixed metric value, either universally or for the United States. The utility of force varies with culture and circumstance, inter alia. It is not some free-floating objective calculable truth. 4. For both good and for ill, ethical codes are adapted

and applied under the pressure of more or less stressful circumstances, and tend to be significantly situational in practice. This is simply the way things are and have always been. What a state licenses or tolerates by way of military behavior effected in its name depends to a

degree on how desperate and determined are its policymakers and strategists. 5. War involves warfare, which means military force, which means violence that causes damage, injury, and death. Some of the debate on military force and its control

fails to come to grips with the bloody reality, chaos, and friction that is in the very nature of warfare . Worthy and important efforts to limit conduct in warfare cannot avoid accepting the inherent nastiness of the subject. War may be necessary and

it should be restrained in its conduct, but withal it is by definition illiberally violent behavior. 6. By and large, soft power should not be thought of as an instrument of policy. America is what it is, and the ability of Washington to project its favored

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“narrative(s)” is heavily constrained . Cultural diplomacy and the like are hugely mortgaged by foreigners’ own assessments of their interests . And a notable dimension of culture is local, which means that efforts to project American ways risk fueling “blow-back.” 7. Soft power cannot sensibly be regarded as a substantial alternative to hard military power . Familiarity with the concept alone encourages the fallacy that hard and soft

power have roughly equivalent weight and utility. An illusion of broad policy choice is thus fostered, when in fact effective

choices are severely constrained. 8. An important inherent weakness of soft power as an instrument of policy is that it utterly depends upon the uncoerced choices of foreigners. Sometimes their preferences will be compatible with ours, but scarcely less often they will not be. Interests and cultures do differ . 9. Soft power tends to be either so easy to exercise that it is probably in little need of a policy push , being essentially

preexistent, or too difficult to achieve because local interests, or culture, or both, deny it political traction.

10. Hard and soft power should be complementary, though often they are not entirely so. U.S. national style, reflecting the full array of American values as a hegemonic power, has been known to give some cultural and hence political offense abroad, even among objective allies and other friends. Whereas competent strategy enables hard military power to be all, or most of what it can be, soft power does not lend itself

readily to strategic direction. 11. Provided the different natures of hard and soft power are understood—the critical distinguishing factor being coercion versus attraction—it is appropriate to regard the two kinds of power as mutual enablers. However, theirs is an unequal relationship.

The greater attractiveness of soft power is more than offset in political utility by its inherent unsuitability for policy direction and control. From all the factors above, it follows that military force will long remain an essential instrument of policy. That said, popular enthusiasm in Western societies for the placing of serious restraints on the use of force can threaten the policy utility of the military. The ill consequences of America’s much-manifested

difficulty in thinking and behaving strategically are augmented perilously when unwarranted faith is placed upon soft power that inherently is resistant to strategic direction. Although it is highly appropriate to be skeptical of the policy utility of soft power, such skepticism must not be interpreted as implicit advice to threaten or resort to military force with scant reference to moral standards. Not only is it right in an absolute sense, it is also expedient to seek, seize, and hold the moral high ground. There can be significant strategic

advantage in moral advantage—to risk sounding cynical. Finally, it is essential to recognize that soft power tends to work well when America scarcely has need of it, but the more challenging contexts for national security require the mailed fist , even if it is cushioned , but not concealed, by a glove of political and ethical restraint.

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Soft Power Fails – Hard PowerUS soft power is inevitable but fails – countries always default to hard power – empiricsBurnett, 15 (Alistair Burnett, editor of The World Tonight, a BBC News program, 1-8-2015, "China, Russia and the US Juggle Soft and Hard Power", Yale Global Online, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china-russia-and-us-juggle-soft-and-hard-power#ER, DA: 7-8-2015)

LONDON: This year has seen marked resurgence in the use of hard power by states in pursuit of national interests.

The US return to military action in Iraq and direct intervention in Syria, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and

destabilization of eastern Ukraine and China’s assertion of its territorial claims in the East and South China seas are just three examples of major powers turning to force and coercion to achieve strategic aims . Yet, not so long ago, talk in diplomatic, academic and journalistic circles focused on the growing importance of soft power in international relations.

In recent years, governments consider how to boost soft power, investing heavily in tools like international broadcasting

and cultural institutes to win friends abroad. China has spent billions expanding China Central TV’s broadcasts in English and other languages and opening 450 Confucius Institutes around the world teaching Chinese language and culture. It has even invested in trying to create global pop star Jia Ruhan. Russia has expanded its international TV news station, RT. The US continues to fund international broadcasting started during the Cold War. These are all efforts to influence the views of people in other countries, winning them over to a way of thinking so they will

pressure their governments – even in authoritarian states – to fall into line with new policies. The US is considered the world leader in soft and hard power, and there’s no doubt American culture is attractive to many around the world – consider the numbers wanting to migrate there and who wear baseball caps, eat American-style fast food, listen to American music and watch Hollywood

movies. Much of the global attractiveness of the US has little to do with its government , and photographs of anti-American protesters in the Middle East in jeans and T-shirts demonstrate how it’s possible to like American culture and dislike Washington’s policies . But while the US has accumulated a lot of this soft power without having to spend a cent, relying instead on the sheer attractiveness of American society, the government still takes steps to manipulate attitudes. One little publicized effort is how the Pentagon influences its on-screen image through its film liaison office which can save Hollywood

producers millions in special effects by providing hardware and personnel on approved scripts. But do events of the past year suggest that in a world where the global balance of power is shifting and countries really want their own way, they turn to old-

fashioned hard power? Harvard Professor Joe Nye who coined the term “soft power” argues it is not a binary choice. He developed on his original definition of power by identifying a third way states could convince others to do what they wanted – with “smart power” – basically

wielding a mix of hard and soft power. Looking at how the United States, Russia and China have conducted themselves through this

lens shows all three are trying – with varying levels of success – to use smart power. Before using military force in Iraq and Syria against Islamic State, the Obama administration utilized soft power to maximize impact of the use of its hard power. Washington was keen that its intervention was not seen as unilateral action by aggressive Christian states against Muslims, so it portrayed IS as an enemy of fellow Muslims. Washington also emphasizes it intervenes in Iraq at the invitation of Baghdad and has been successful in building a coalition including leading Sunni Arab states to carry out airstrikes in Syria. So far the campaign

has slowed IS down. In Ukraine, Russia’s campaign to take Crimea and destabilize the eastern part of the country has been called hybrid warfare because of its mix of diplomacy, TV and social media propaganda about the threat to Russian speakers from Ukrainian nationalists, and use of irregular and disguised forces designed for ambiguity long enough to achieve Russian objectives. In the case of Crimea, annexed with little fighting, acute observers of Russian policy see this as an effective use of smart power. Stalemate in eastern

Ukraine suggests it may be less effective there. Beijing’s attempt to use smart power has met with mixed results. In the South China Sea, China claims waters also claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. It has spent recent years reassuring neighbors it’s not a threat despite its growing economic and military strength. But, earlier this year, China sent an oil exploration vessel into an area Vietnam also claims leading to clashes between Chinese and Vietnamese ships. Tensions with the Philippines emerged after Chinese ships tried to block Filipino efforts to resupply a garrison of marines on a disputed atoll. The result was anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam,

diplomatic protests by the Philippines, and both countries establishing closer military ties with the United States. The long-term effectiveness of the return to hard power is probably more dependent on the military and economic strength of the United States, Russia and China than their international image . Russia will probably hang on to Crimea because Ukraine is the weaker state and shows no real appetite to get it back. China’s economic preponderance in the South China Sea region means its neighbors, while not rolling over, will probably meet it more than halfway in the resolving the maritime disputes. The US battle with what’s now called IS really goes back to the 2003 Iraq invasion which allowed jihadis to get a foothold in the country by presenting

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themselves as the resistance to infidel invaders. The extremists extended their power to western Iraq and Syria after 2011 when the Syrian civil war broke out and US troops left Iraq. Ultimately, defeating IS depends on a political solution in Syria and an Iraqi government truly inclusive of Sunnis as well as Shias and Kurds. In all these cases though, soft power is being deployed in subtle ways to attract support by trying to “shape the narrative” by portraying rivals and enemies as acting outside shared global norms and values. The United States claims to defend Muslims from the Islamic extremism; Russia says it defends Russian-speakers from Ukrainian nationalists; and China describes itself as a rising, but peace-loving nation. The success of these attempts depends not just on the language and imagery used by officials, but also on whether the media and

other opinion- formers adopt similar language and imagery. Wielding soft and smart power is also complicated because one country’s attractiveness to another is a result of a complex interplay of what a country has to offer and how the offer is perceived. For instance, the United States has appeal in a country like Burma, because many

people there want democratic elections and free speech after decades of repression, while many Pakistanis dislike the United States, regarding it as a country that doesn’t respect their sovereignty while also killing many of citizens in its anti-terror

operations. The increasing use of hard power is partly a result of the changing global balance as other countries take advantage of the relative decline of the U nited S tates to assert their interests. But the difficulties and uncertainties surrounding how to best wield soft power and measure its effectiveness also explain why leaders are still attracted to using familiar hard-power methods , be they airstrikes or economic sanctions .

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Internal Link D – Not GovtUS soft power is inevitable and decided by culture – government policies are irrelevantBev, 12 (Jennie S. Bev, regular columnist to Forbes Indonesia, The Jakarta Post, and Strategic Review, Associate Partner of Fortune PR Indonesia and based in Northern California, 5-23-2012, "The Power of American "Soft Power"", Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/85broads/2012/05/23/the-power-of-american-soft-power/#ER, DA: 7-7-2015)

Almost four years since the beginning of the Great Recession, signified by the implosion of the financial industry and the

fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the U nited S tates is recovering. In fact, some sectors have grown to new heights. Thus, a “declining USA” is no more than a myth. This myth is likely to continue for a while despite the recession officially ending in June

2009 as the high unemployment and on-going foreclosure crisis have cloaked significant economic improvements. In the last four years, declinism and declinists have been spreading paralyzing dystopian analyses. Combine this with Nouriel “Dr. Doom” Roubini’s “the perfect storm” forecast in 2013 and you probably would become even more paralyzed. Daniel Gross’ best-selling book Better, Stronger, Faster released in May 2012 is an exception. It is probably one of the first books that presents encouraging facts in this recovery period rather than discouraging views of America’s future. The mammoth has gotten back up, but it is always the memory of one’s fall that lingers in mind. We all remember that one fateful day when we attended the 341(a) bankruptcy hearing to meet creditors and not the thousands of days of financial stability. Just like we all remember vividly the day our loved one was buried six-feet under when he died and not the beautiful decades he shared his life with us. Failure and losing hurt, thus they are recorded for eternity in our long-term memory. It is just how our brain works, thanks to millions of years of evolution. The world was so shocked with the fall of USA, that its gradual rise hasn’t yet created a lasting mental

image. Good news, American “soft power” is more powerful than any fiscal policy and political maneuver . Joseph Nye of Harvard University Kennedy School of Government says “soft power” refers to the ability to get through attraction rather than coercion or payments. By “to get” it means to receive favorable treatments based upon attractiveness of a country’s culture, ideals, and policies. For instance, inspired by TV series about medical doctors, some children in Taiwan aspire to study medicine at an American university.

Infatuated by the idea of a fair trial, an Indonesian dissident aspires to become a lawyer. “Soft power” can be hardcore power. And the American brand is still the best out there . Also, thanks to low US dollar value, a record 62 million foreign tourists visited USA in 2011. In 2010, some 1.04 million immigrants applied for permanent residency,

following 1.13 million in the previous year, which reflects the world’s insatiable faith in the US brand. The people of the world still believe that the USA is the place to visit, to reside, and to prosper. US brands, such as automobile giants Buick, GM,

and Ford, continue to grow outside of the USA. US brands continue to influence socio-political-economic wellbeing of people of the world: Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube are vital in demonstrations and social unrests. US brands continue to serve people’s mobility and communication: Apple, Microsoft, CISCO, Oracle, and Boeing. People of the world

is a market of seven-billion, and most of them have occasionally consumed black soda drinks called Coca-Cola and Pepsi. The US government has lost its geopolitical epicenter, yet American brands keep the legend alive. And the shift has occurred from public power to private power, from political power to economic power, from hard power to soft power, with the end of the Cold War as the turning point.

US unrivaled – government alt causes irrelevant because SoPo NOT from them and hard power backs it upNye 13

{Joseph, Harvard Professor, “What China and Russia Don’t Get about Soft Power,” FP, April, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power#THUR}

Much of America's soft power is produced by civil society -- everything from universities and foundations to

Hollywood and pop culture -- not from the government . Sometimes the United States is able to preserve a degree

of soft power because of its critical and uncensored civil society even when government actions -- like the

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invasion of Iraq -- are otherwise undermining it. But in a smart power strategy, hard and soft reinforce each other . In

his new book, China Goes Global, George Washington University's David Shambaugh shows how China has spent billions of dollars on a charm offensive to increase its soft power. Chinese aid programs to Africa and Latin America are not limited by the institutional or

human rights concerns that constrain Western aid. The Chinese style emphasizes high-profile gestures. But for all its efforts, China has earned a limited return on its investment. Polls show that opinions of China's influence are positive in much of Africa and Latin America, but predominantly negative in the United States, Europe, as well as India, Japan and South Korea.

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A2 Soft Power SolvencySoft power is non-governmental – attempts to increase it through policies fail and backfireEllwood, 14 (David Ellwood, Senior Adjunct Professor of European Studies at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Bologna Center, 1-9-2014, "'Soft power' and the politics of influence", OUP Blog, http://blog.oup.com/2014/01/soft-power-and-the-politics-of-influence/#ER, DA: 7-8-2015)

Leaving aside its glibness and air of casuistry, the ‘soft power’ concept is fundamentally flawed at just the point where Nye

insists on its usefulness: as a tool of foreign policy. The more states attempt consciously to project the force of example they see in their nations and its ways, the more the rest will see manipulation and propaganda . Two US analysts who commented on the prospects for British foreign policy in a new book (Influencing Tomorrow: Future Challenges for British Foreign Policy, 2013) were happy to say that ‘the BBC may be a more effective tool of British foreign policy than the Royal Navy or the British Army’.

But they also warned against the temptations and risks of leverage: ‘when you reach for the tool of soft power, you find it evaporates in your hand’. In the American case in particular, the temptation seems to be to try to mobilise the charismatic nature of so many successful American inventions and people as though they are resources at the disposal of the state. But they are not ; they are the values and products of that society in the most diffuse sense, and its creative industries in particular, with all their talent for absorbing and re-configuring the inventions of the world then re-launching them

for a global market. Today the experts know that the sources of power in the world are multiplying, and that force is

only one of them. Diffused through so many channels today, soft power is best seen as the influence of culture

in all its forms. Nothing like culture adds value – and values – to power. The key cultural power is the one which most successfully defines the content, direction and pace of change for the rest, and so presents itself as the leading model of modernity in any given era. This was the challenge of America to the world in the 20th century. Now others have

understood this lesson, and are trying to join the competition. Hopefully it’s a contest for diversity, and not for supremacy.

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We Can’t Use ItSoft power fails – it’s unpredictable and we can’t leverage it effectivelyKalathil, 05 (Shanthi Kalathil, Georgetown University, adviser, consultant and speaker on development, democratization and the role of technology in international affairs, was previously a senior Democracy Fellow at the U.S. Agency for International Development, a non-resident Associate at Georgetown’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, and a regular consultant for the World Bank, the Aspen Institute and others, published 2006, “Soft Power, Hard Issues”, Reports of the 2005 Aspen Institute Roundtable on Public Diplomacy and the Middle East and the Forum on Communications and Society, The Aspen Institute, https://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/cands/C%26SSOFTPOWER.PDF#ER, p. 15, DA: 7/9/2015)

Recognizing that soft power rests on a variety of sources is a first step in understanding the issues surrounding

public diplomacy, Nye pointed out at the Forum. If one understands that soft power—and public diplomacy as a component of it—is about attraction, then public diplomacy must involve more than broadcasting a message . For instance, Nye

cautioned, public diplomacy cannot simply be about selling: “ If the policy is terrible, advertising won’t work ,” he observed. Moreover, as Nye put it, soft power can be much harder to wield than hard power, with less predictable results. The U nited S tates is not alone in trying to understand and augment its soft power.

In a preceding discussion on China, many participants concurred that China has successfully boosted its soft power capabilities in recent years. It has done so not through advanced messaging techniques but through strategic engagement on key foreign policy issues of interest to its target countries. In this sense, one can understand that the scope of

soft power goes far beyond the techniques and practices of public diplomacy—and has the potential to be far more influential.

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A2 Smart PowerThis term means nothingSchmitt, 14 (Gary J. Schmitt, co-director of the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at AEI and the director of AEI’s Program on American Citizenship, executive director of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board during President Ronald Reagan’s second term, 6-19-2014, "A hard look at soft power in East Asia", AEI, http://www.aei.org/publication/a-hard-look-at-soft-power-in-east-asia/#ER, DA: 7-6-2015)

The Problem of Definition To start, “smart power” is not an especially helpful term .[1] It is not smart, some say, to depend solely or overly on hard power. It is much wiser to match soft and hard power as appropriate to the problem at hand and do so in such a way that

they reinforce each other’s effectiveness. However, as much sense as this axiom superficially made, the concept itself is really just a new way of talking about what was traditionally and most broadly referred to as “grand strategy.” And it is not at all clear that much is gained by avoiding the more traditional terminology. Indeed, something might be lost. Strategy immediately brings to mind the “means-ends” nexus, whereas in the case of smart power, the focus is often more about the mix of means and less

about what is to be accomplished. Moreover, by calling a policymaker’s mix of hard and soft power “smart,” one is actually prejudging that mix as being sound. And, the truth is, one rarely knows if a strategy is smart—that is,

whether it is effective in accomplishing its ends—for years to come. In short, a complex mix of hard and soft power might on its face look prudent and effective, but in the final analysis is not . “By calling a policymaker’s

mix of hard and soft power “smart,” one is actually prejudging that mix as being sound.”Although there should be some hesitancy in employing the phrase “smart power,” there should probably be less when it comes to using “soft power.” For

one thing, it is a term of art that has had staying power and, as such, has obviously captured an element of power that analysts and policymakers find useful.

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