Winning the Long War:

Applying the United States Governments Smart Power in Current and Future Conflicts

Colonel John Tien, USA Lieutenant Colonel Todd Desgrosseilliers, USMC Lieutenant Colonel Gwyn Armfield, USAF 28 May 2008 Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government National Security Program

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of Harvard University, the United States Government, or the Department of Defense.

2008 Colonel John Tien, USA Lieutenant Colonel Todd Desgrosseilliers, USMC Lieutenant Colonel Gwyn Armfield, USAF

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Contents

Page

PREFACEI

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY..IV

Chapter 1 - Introduction ..1

Chapter 2 - Smart Power and its Role in Fourth Generation Warfare,

Lieutenant Colonel Todd S. Desgrosseilliers USMC .6

Chapter 3 - The Moral Advantage in Fourth Generation Warfare:

Smart Power, Strategic Communications,

and Winning the Decisive Battle in the Long War,

Lieutenant Colonel Todd S. Desgrosseilliers USMC..................14

Chapter 4 - InterDependent Smart Power at the Regional-Level,

Lieutenant Colonel Gwyn Armfield, USAF............39

Chapter 5 - Showcasing Americas Smart Power through Nation-Building

at the Local-Level: Accomplishments and Limitations,

Colonel John Tien, USA..59

Chapter 6 - Conclusion 83

ENDNOTES.....85

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....93 BIOGRAPHIES OF AUTHORS 101

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List of Tables Table 1 Successful and Unsuccessful Practices............17

Table 2 Twenty-Eight Articles......18

Table 3 Comparison of State and Defense Departments Personnel and

Budget..............44

Table 4 FY 2007 Tal Afar District Budget ..63

List of Figures Figure 1 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines Vision for Success Card (Front)...20

Figure 2 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines Vision for Success Card (Back)22

Figure 3 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines Virtue Ethics Card (Front)24

Figure 4 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines Virtue Ethics Card (Back).....24

Preface Our experiences in the Global War on Terror encouraged us to propose to understand

modern warfare as it applies to our current and possible future conflicts. Strategy is complicated

- similar to three-dimensional chess. We found it challenging to limit our examination of smart

power as a strategy for fourth generation warfare to the scope of this paper. Our conclusions

probably oversimplify a very complex topic. Our intention is not to minimize the importance of

the kinetic aspects of our trade, but to provide possible alternatives to augment physical

destruction for a specific environment that harbors an amorphous enemy.

In our research we found that warfare has evolved from an industrial-based to an

information-based activity. This evolution has produced a generational change in warfare. The

United States Government is struggling in its efforts to defeat radical Islamist ideology because,

in Iraq and elsewhere, it is in the midst of a fourth generation conflict that it is trying to win with

second and third generation tactics and strategy. Its current approach places too much emphasis

on the enemys physical destruction. The decisive battle in this new generation of warfare is the

moral element, not the physical element, and its center of gravity is the information environment.

So far, fourth generation warfare has defied an operational construct. Therefore, success in this

new generation of warfare means the United States must win the decisive battle at the strategic

and tactical levels of war. Our thesis states that the United States Government has been slow to

adapt to the worlds new threats and challenges. We believe the U.S. military should counter the

enemy at its own game by optimizing Americas smart power and embody core democratic

values in all that we do once in conflict and preferably, prior to conflict. Emerging operational

concepts that support it should include more interagency interdependence within the joint

operational environment. Unfortunately, this mentality does not influence the contemporary

employment alternatives on the battlefield.

A Cold War hierarchy and organization is not relevant in a world where we are engaged

in a continuous war against terrorism being fought through a series of limited engagements.

Today, a smart power strategy comes closer to relevance. Throughout this process of

examination, one question consistently came to our collective consciousness: Why does our

Nation consciously avoid combining capabilities to create a more interdependent and balanced

interagency and joint force? We propose to answer these questions - using our tactical

experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan as the foundation - to take the strategic idea of Smart Power

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as articulated by Harvard Professor Joseph Nye and provide operational perspective to make a

concrete and specific movement toward implementing his theory in the Long War.

We would like to acknowledge Lieutenant General Tad Olestrom USAF (ret) and

Professor Joseph Nye for their guidance during this papers research and development, for their

assistance in forming our thoughts, and in preparing the papers content. We would also like to

thank Marie Danziger for her assistance refining and focusing our topic. Finally, we would like

to thank Professor Peter Bergen for providing valuable feedback on our drafts to improve the

finished document.

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Executive Summary

Title: Winning the Long War of Ideas: Applying Americas Smart Power in Current and Future Conflicts Thesis: While the United States Government has been slow to adapt to the worlds new threats

and challenges, the U.S. military should now counter the enemy at its own game by optimizing

Americas smart power and embody core democratic values in all that we do once in conflict and

preferably, prior to conflict.

Thesis Question: How should the United States Government Operationalize the strategic

concept of Smart Power to current and future conflicts?

Discussion: Americas public standing in the world is possibly at its lowest point in its 231 year

history. As a result, foreign policy experts, media leaders, and academics are looking for a new

framework. Who will send the next long telegram? Who will be the new Mr. X? What will and

should be the new driving principles for how America acts abroad? Based on their on-the-ground

experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the three authors from three different military services

believe that Smart Power provides that answer. Smart Power is the result of combining

persuasive hard power with soft power that attracts or entices others to a desired end state.

Smart Power, however, is conceptual and thus, amorphous. The authors offer pragmatic steps on

how the United States Government can quickly Operationalize Smart Power for America to

succeed in the struggle against Islamic radicalism. This is an umbrella paper focusing on three

areas:

1) How to regain the initiative in the information environment by incorporating its hard

and soft tactical actions into smarter and more effective strategic communications.

2) How to synchronize State and Defense Departments efforts at the regional level.

3) How nation-building at the tactical level will continue to be a useful application of the

United States governments smart power in Iraq.

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Summary of Chapters and Recommendations:

The Moral Advantage in Fourth Generation Warfare: Smart Power, Strategic

Communications, and Winning the Decisive Battle in the Long War by Lieutenant Colonel

Todd Desgrosseilliers, United States Marine Corps. During the second half of the last century

modern warfare stirred with corresponding political, economic, social, and technological

developments - evolving from an industrial-based to an information-based activity. This

evolutionary process produced sharp changes in the way the United States opponents conduct

war in this century. The latest shift - fourth generation warfare - is both a battle of arms and a

battle of ideas. The United States Governments current approach to this emerging generation of

warfare lacks a proper grand strategy and places too much emphasis on the enemys physical

destruction. Lieutenant Colonel Desgrosseilliers explores how while killing committed

opponents remains an important result in warfare, the decisive battle in fourth generation warfare

is the moral element, not the physical element. Its center of gravity is the hearts and minds of

foreign and domestic populations. However, in an Information Age these are greatly influenced

through the information environment. The Long War is further handicapped by a failure of other

elements of United States national power diplomatic, information, and economic to capitalize

on tactical successes to generate lasting strategic results. Ultimately, success in fourth

generation warfare is more about undermining the enemys messages by persuading and

convincing moderate or indifferent populations than it is about killing and destroying the

extremists. Victory resides in linking words and deeds through effective strategic

communications. Therefore the United States Government must:

Adopt a Grand Strategy that coincides with U.S. national values and principles that aligns broader national security policy, strategic objectives, and links strategic and

tactical messages and actions.

Focus on the decisive, moral element to win hearts and minds by adopting a virtue ethic that augments and develops conscience (moral integrity), rules of common

morality, and codes of professional ethics. Link words and deeds by incorporating

this ethic into all messages and actions.

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Incorporate - down to the battalion-level within the Department of Defense - all elements of the information environment and corresponding resources under a

Strategic Communications Section.

Legislate greater interagency interdependence and integration not cooperation and inter-operability - that enables public diplomacy and strategic communication to

utilize all instruments of national power and the most current research data to disrupt

and neutralize its enemies messages.

Interdependent Smart Power at the Regional Level by Lieutenant Colonel Gwyn Armfield,

United States Air Force. The Center for Strategic and International Studies Smart Power

Commission found that combining hard and soft power, when and if it occurs happens either at

a relatively low level or at the very highest levels of government.1 Lieutenant Colonel Armfield

explores how to combine the hard power of the United States Department of Defense and the soft

power of the United States Department of State to fill a gap in the United States governments

ability to synchronize efforts at the regional level. Understanding this issue begins with

understanding the differences between State and Defense. As the two major players in United

States foreign policy, State and Defense, share few similarities. With vastly different cultural

genomes, wildly disparate budgets and personnel strength and organizational structures with no

similarities, State and Defense are not designed to interoperate. However, the current fight,

likely to continue for a generation, will demand that these instruments of hard and soft power

evolve rapidly to meet the critical needs of America. Lacking an interagency Goldwater-

Nichols type reform, progress can still be made toward filling the gap of coordination at the

regional level using current structures and authorities. Great examples of bottom-up interagency

success exist at United States Central Commands Interagency Task Force for Irregular Warfare

where various agencies work together to synchronize appropriate authorities to obtain holistic

effects (kinetic and non-kinetic) in the Middle-East for our nation2. This is but one example

where state and defense work interdependently to conduct the nations mission in a Joint

Interagency Coordination Group construct. Solutions also exist to mitigate other issues such as

Defense overreach into development aid and States lack of effective operational leaders to direct

such projects:

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Collaborate for success at the regional levelUnited States Governments regional leaders must talk to each other on a frequent, deliberate basis. Develop an effective

regional planning/execution capability enabling COCOMs and Assistant Secretaries of

State to work together as peers

Decentralize State Departments operational planning/execution capability to the regional level

Showcasing Americas Smart Power through Nation-Building at the Local-Level:

Accomplishments and Limitations by Colonel John Tien, United States Army. Colonel Tien

uses his tactical experiences from 2006-2007 in Iraq to demonstrate how nation-building at the

tactical level was and will continue to be a useful application of the United States governments

smart power in Iraq. Colonel Tien admits, however, that the United States military can advance

smart power applications only so far and that the United States government should and must

adapt its civilian deployment capacity in order to leverage the United States governments full

smart power capabilities in Iraq and other future such scenarios. According to the Center for

Strategic and International Studies Commission on Smart Power, more thought should also be

put into sequencing and integrating hard and soft power instruments, particularly in the same

operating theater. Some elements of this approach are already occurring in the conduct of

ongoing counterinsurgency, nation building, and counterterrorism operations tasks that depend

critically but only partially on hard power.3 In an attempt to defeat Al-Qaedas efforts to win

over the people, Colonel Tiens battalion used a variety of effective nation-building operations to

improve the life of the average Iraqi and demonstrate that Americas ideals of good governance,

lawful civil society, and economic prosperity were indeed a better choice for the Iraqi people

than what Al-Qaeda was offering. He uses the Iraqi cities of Tal Afar and Ramadi as case

studies to show not only what can be done, but also to show what must change in order to fully

apply all levers of the United States government. For Colonel Tiens U.S. Army Soldiers on the

ground in Iraq, they faced the issue of hard and soft power integration every day. For instance, in

the same neighborhood that a company commander ordered a massive cordon and search to

capture a known suicide bomber, that same twenty-eight year old captain exhibited amazing

public diplomacy one month later in establishing a highly effective neighborhood council. For

these United States service members, it meant becoming more of a statesman and less of a

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soldier. As The Economist so aptly put it in describing todays Soldier, the model soldier should

be less science-fiction Terminator and more intellectual for the graduate level of war,

preferably a linguist, with a sense of history and anthropology.4

Colonel Tien concludes that the US Government must:

Increase personnel staffing by at least 10 percent in the departments of United States Agency for International Development (USAID), State, Justice, Treasury, Commerce,

and Agriculture so that: (1) we can continue to man brigade-level embedded Provincial

Reconstruction Teams (ePRTs); (2) create similar ePRTs for battalions that have large

(greater than 500,000 population) civilian footprints; and (3) enable greatly increased

USAID presence and microfinance programs at the local level.

Change the way we view economic development in Iraq and other post- and pre-conflict areas especially in terms of USAID microfinance capability and reach. For Iraq, two

billion dollars versus the current $100 million allocated is needed to truly transform

Iraqs local economies and create the irreversible momentum needed in the next two

years in Iraq.

Fund and establish the Civilian Reserve Corps, Standby civilian force, and Active Response Corps. Legislation is currently pending in Congress with $250 million

requested in the 2009 Presidents budget. The current plan calls for 250 in the Active

Response Corps, 2000 in the Standby, and 2000 in the Civilian Reserve Corps.5 We must

appropriate and authorize these programs immediately for the current conflicts and

similar scenarios in the future.

Chapter 1 - Introduction - Applying the United States Governments Smart Power in Current and Future Conflicts

Todays central question is not simply whether we are capturing or killing more terrorists than are being recruited and trained, but whether we are providing more opportunities than our enemies can destroy and whether we are addressing more grievances than they can record.

CSIS Smart Power Report

Americas public standing in the world is possibly at its lowest point in its 231 year

history. As a result, foreign policy experts, media leaders, and academics are looking for a new

framework. Who will send the next long telegram? Who will be the new Mr. X? What will and

should be the new driving principles for how the United States Government acts abroad? Based

on their on-the-ground experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the three authors from three

different military services believe that Smart Power provides that answer.

Smart Power, however, is conceptual and thus, amorphous. Usefully, it can be applied to

any action taken from what civilian and military personnel do on a street corner in Iraq to what

the Secretary of State says in a speech in London. However, there are gaps in real world

applications of how it works for the United States abroad.

The three authors will fill one of those gaps with real-world examples of what Smart

Power can accomplish on those foreign street corners. Perhaps, more importantly, they offer

recommendations on what and how the United States Government should move ahead in certain

programs to enable U.S. grand strategy as it moves forward in the Long War. In short, the United

States Government should optimize its smart power and embody core democratic values in its

foreign policy objectives particularly once in conflict and, preferably, prior to conflict.

While military application of hard power is needed to achieve a certain level of security,

the United States Government should combine this with soft power to succeed in the war of

ideas. In the recent Center for Strategic and International Studies Commission on Smart Power,

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Richard Armitage state, Smart power means developing an integrated

strategy, resource base and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and

soft powerToday, victory depends on attracting foreign populations to our side and helping

them to build capable, democratic states.6

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Secretary Robert Gates agrees and in particular called for the United States to review

resources allocated to its smart power and how it applies it at home and abroad. On November

27, 2007, he said in Manhattan, Kansas:

My message is that if we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of national power both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and apply all of the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad. In short, based on my experience serving seven presidents, as a former Director of CIA and now as Secretary of Defense, I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use "soft" power and for better integrating it with "hard" power. One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more - these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success. Accomplishing all of these tasks will be necessary to meet the diverse challenges I have described.7

Understanding the context of the struggle we are in, of course, is critical. The United States is

locked in a struggle, but the enemy is defining the battlefield.

In the pages that follow, the three authors will examine the application of Smart Power

based on their experiences in the current conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and more broadly the

Long War against terror and other threats. The reader, however, should not view their

experiences through the prism of irregular warfare or even the current label of the Global War on

Terrorism. Instead, military officers and Americans in general, should understand that ultimately

the United States of America is locked in a struggle against ideas.

Unfortunately, the United States Government is currently dealing with a global

environment with an internal Cold War mindset that puts it at a significant disadvantage of

winning this struggle. This must change. The conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and throughout the

globe now and in the future, are not military or even purely insurgency revolutions, but are

religious, political, and social upheavals. In todays current parlance, we are fighting what

William Lind calls fourth generation warfare.

Lind said, all over the world, citizens of states are transferring their primary

allegiance away from the state to other things: to tribes, ethnic groups, religions, gangs,

ideologies and so on. The first three generations of warfare were conventional and even when

2

they were unconventional in tactics; the heart of the matter was the survival or destruction of a

state. In fourth generation warfare, the war is fought not only on the ground of a nation-state, but

also in the boundless world of ideas - moral, political, and social. Fortunately, if applied

correctly, Smart Power can - and should - form the theoretical paradigm that the United States

Government assumes in its bid for victory on todays fourth generation warfare battlefield.

So far, fourth generation warfare defies an operational construct. Therefore, success in

warfares next evolution means the United States must win the decisive battle at the strategic and

tactical levels of war while it re-defines warfares operational art. It must do this by bridging the

gap between theory and practice adopting a grand strategy founded on the moral element that

employs smarter organized, integrated, and trained military forces. It must build forces that

possess the capability to blend hard and soft power and to seize the initiative in the information

environment to exploit inconsistencies in its enemys messages and actions. This will create an

informed combination of its coercive and attractive powers that morally undermines its enemys

purposes and eliminates their causes.

Adding to this debate, U.S. Air Force Colonel (ret) John Boyd identified three

complementary levels of war that the United States must consider: the physical, the mental, and

the moral. He said that what works for you on the physical and sometimes mental level often

works against you on the moral level. In todays conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in our

struggles to identify ourselves relative to Islamist radicalism, the United States Government is

well positioned to win at the tactical level through physical domination and to a lesser extent the

mental level. However, because the United States Government committed itself to conduct war

physically on the tactic terrorism - and not morally through its words and deeds on those who

committed the act on 9/11 it is losing the war at the moral level. The decisive victory, however,

resides in the moral element.

Each of the authors has fought on these fourth generation warfare battlefields, physically,

mentally, and morally. They will show that the United States Government can usefully translate

smart power into real accomplishments on the ground, but more importantly, it can serve as a

strategic, operational, and tactical guide to United States Governmental polices and actions.

In the first and second chapters, United States Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Todd

Desgrosseilliers explores why the United States Government is struggling in its efforts to defeat

radical Islamist ideology. Primarily the United States Government conflates this struggle

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because it lacks a proper focus of effort. In Iraq and elsewhere, the United States is in the midst

of a fourth generation conflict that it is trying to win with second and third generation military

strategy and tactics. It lacks a grand strategy to disable organizations like Al Qaeda and its

leader Osama bin Laden. This difficulty is further enhanced by a failure of other elements of

U.S. national power diplomatic, information, and economic to capitalize on tactical successes

to generate lasting strategic results.

Based upon his experience in Iraqs Al Anbar Province from 2004-2007, he believes a

better understanding of warfares new demands will drive a willingness to adopt a Smart Power

grand strategy to adapt to them. This grand strategy in turn - will force major changes in how

the United States trains and educates its military and civilian personnel and how it organizes and

employs these forces in current and future conflicts. The United States must win hearts and

minds by using its smart power to convince local populations that it can protect them and

persuade them its success and their success is linked and mutual. Ultimately, success means the

United States Government must regain the initiative in the information environment by

incorporating its hard and soft tactical actions into smarter and more effective strategic

communications.

In the third chapter, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Gwyn Armfield examines Smart

Powers operational level. He served a special operations unit commander in United States

Central Command from 2005-2007 in addition to eight years of experience in interagency

counter terrorism. He examines how to translate Smart Power from theory to practice where the

United States Government needs it most at the regional level. His chapter is about combining

the power of the State Department and the Department of Defense to work at the regional level

despite vastly different cultural genomes, wildly disparate budgets, personnel strengths, and

dissimilar organizational structures.

The current fight - likely to continue for a generation - demands that these hard and soft

power instruments rapidly evolve to meet the United States Governments critical requirements

in the Long War. Specifically, the chapter explores the State Departments need to decentralize

operations and fill a major gap between their mother ship headquarters in Washington, D.C.

and the hundreds of United States embassies throughout the world. The State Department must

expand its soft power at the regional level to balance the Defense Departments combatant

commanders regional and monolithic hard power presence.

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Lieutenant Colonel Armfield recommends specific actions to restore balance - enabling

smart power planning and implementation to work with a regional approach. The United States

Government possesses ample authorities to effectively employ the inter-agency, but it cannot

micromanage it from Washington, D.C. where the solutions to regional issues will always

maintain a bias toward solving the problem of the day inside the beltway. However, the State

Department and the Department of Defense must use available resources and authorities to re-

group and to form teams that focus on regional issues. Only then will the strategic

recommendations from the Smart Power Commission translate into enhanced influence for

America and for the international community.

In the last chapter, U.S. Army Colonel John Tien uses his tactical experiences from 2006-

2007 in Iraq to demonstrate how nation-building at the tactical level was and will continue as a

useful application of the United States Governments Smart Power in Iraq. Colonel Tien admits,

however, that the United States military can advance Smart Power applications only so far.

Therefore the United States Government must adapt its civilian deployment capacity to leverage

the United States Governments full Smart Power capabilities in Iraq and other similar future

scenarios. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies Commission on Smart

Power, more thought should also be put into sequencing and integrating hard and soft power

instruments, particularly in the same operating theater. Some elements of this approach are

already occurring in the conduct of ongoing counterinsurgency, nation building, and

counterterrorism operations tasks that depend critically but only partially on hard power.8

In an attempt to defeat Al-Qaedas efforts to win over the people, Colonel Tiens

battalion used a variety of effective nation-building operations to improve the life of the average

Iraqi and to demonstrate that the United States Governments ideals of good governance, lawful

civil society, and economic prosperity provided a better choice for the Iraqi people than what Al-

Qaeda was offering them. He will showcase the efforts of several Soldiers and officers in his

battalion in two very distinct regions of Iraq: Tal Afar in Nineveh Province; and Ramadi in Al

Anbar Province. He will use these two Iraqi cities as case studies to show not only what the

United States Government can do, but also to show what must change to fully apply all levers of

the United States Government. Perhaps most importantly though, the response to his battalions

use of Smart Power from local government officials and the everyday man on the street, were -

as the Smart Power Commission hoped - welcomed by Iraqi societys moderate factions.

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Colonel Tien concludes that while the United States military helped fill the vacuum

created by the lack of on-the-ground qualified United States Governmental

development/assistance experts, there are many reforms within the United States Government

that it should undertake immediately to include: increased staffing to the embedded Provincial

Reconstruction Teams; initial staffing and funding of the Civilian Reserve Corps; increased

staffing and support to the Active Response Corps; as well as initiating and supporting more

bottom-up economic reform especially through microfinance programs.

Clearly from the three authors experiences and recommendations, this is not an easy

struggle to win, but it is a struggle we must win. Harvard Professor Dr. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. said,

To win the war on terrorism, the United States will have to show as much skill in the future in

wielding its soft power as it has shown in the past in wielding its hard power.9

As officers who have led battalion-level organizations in Operation Iraqi Freedom and

Operation Enduring Freedom, we realize that victorys final element resides within sources of

power other than the military. Particularly, it will come from what the United States

Government is uniquely able to offer in the way of international leadership, democratic and

moral principles, values, ideas, and hope. Prior to examining the three officers treatment of

smart power in their strategic, operational, and tactical contexts, it is useful to possess a more

concrete understanding of smart power is and how it fits within warfares evolution.

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Chapter 2 - Smart Power and its Role in Fourth Generation Warfare

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establishthe kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War

The world expects the United States to behave like a great power in its relationships with

other nations. Its prudent leadership is expected and is essential to ensure peace and prosperity

for most nations within the international community. This international leadership responsibility

means that its national posture must reflect the confidence and the strength as well as the hope

embodied in its national values and its founding principles. This is not Pollyannaish wishful

thinking; nor an argument for triumphalism or belligerence, but neither should the United States

Government leave any doubt that other nations or organizations can violate its interests, security,

and rights as a nation without consequences. This approach will not cause other nations to love

the United States, but a policy of consistency and fairness will promote dignity and generate

respect dignity and respect is the mortar that binds enduring relationships and sustains the

strong alliances necessary to defeat international terrorism.

Duncan MacInnes, Principal Deputy Coordinator for the Bureau of International

Information Programs in the U. S. State Department, made the following statement about the

importance of national values during testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives

Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and

Capabilities:

During the Cold War, we fought a traditional enemy in the USSR and our tools included traditional public diplomacy tools such as educational exchanges, publications, and mainstream media. These tools are still very effective at winning hearts and minds, but are not sufficient by themselves. Our themes to win the war of ideas against communism stressed our core values our dedication to liberty, democracy, freedom of speech and religion, and free markets and our opposition to intellectual coercion, and political and economic oppression. These principles remain relevant and powerful today, but we need to continue to develop new tactics to counter an elusive and decentralized non-

7

state foe [that] uses the Internet and new technologies to spread its ideology of violence.10

Why not start the process with a grand strategy properly constructed to win the decisive

moral - battle? A Smart Power grand strategy will provide a blueprint that will enable American

values on the ground to attract moderate populations to our side while it provides the security to

build capable governance. According to Joseph S. Nye, Jr. of Harvard University, Soft Power

is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or paymentsWhen

our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced.11 He adds

that soft power uses a different type of currency to engender cooperation an attraction to

shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values."12 A

nations soft power attraction - rests on three resources:13

1. Culture.

2. Political values.

3. Foreign policy.

Contrarily, hard power coercion - uses base human elements as its medium; fear and

self-interest:

1. Force, threat of force.

2. Economic sanctions.

3. Payments.

These all provide hard power its employment. While military application of coercive

power is often necessary to achieve a certain level of security, to succeed in fourth generation

warfare, the United States should temper its effects by blending hard power with other

attractive elements of national power as part of a comprehensive Smart Power grand strategy.

In the recent Center for Strategic and International Studies Commission report on Smart

Power, Joseph Nye and Ambassador Richard Armitage state,

Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft powerToday, victory depends on attracting foreign populations to our side and helping them to build capable, democratic states.14

8

This means the United States must invest in the global good by providing things that

other nations cannot get without United States leadership. This strategy includes five critical

areas:15

1. Developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve

American objectives drawing on both hard and soft power.

2. Attracting foreign populations toward American objectives and helping them

build capable democratic states.

3. Complementing U.S. military and economic might with greater investments in

soft power enablers such as:

a. Alliances, partnerships, and institutions.

b. Global development.

c. Public diplomacy.

d. Economic integration.

e. Technology and innovation.

4. Provide the things that foreign populations and their governments want but cannot

get without American leadership.

5. Defeating the terrorists narrative that the United States is weak-willed and hard-

hearted.

If the United States complements its military and economic might with a greater

emphasis on soft power, it can begin to construct a grand strategy framework it needs to tackle

the emerging challenges presented by international terrorism:

1. Small, adaptable, networked, transnational, non-state actors versus large, inflexible,

bureaucratic, international nation-states.

2. No purely military solution.

3. Purely military solution is desired by terrorist organizations.

4. Use of terrorist attacks as a legitimate form of warfare combined with globalization of

martyrdom.

5. Use of the ungoverned information environment to deliver existential moral message

that transcends nation-state loyalties.

Re-gaining the moral advantage in the Long War requires adopting a moral basis for the

United States grand strategy. It needs a grand strategy that regulates the United States

9

Governments actions in warfare to ensure they remain consistent with its espoused values and

principles. History demonstrates that unilateral military action tends to produce a backlash in

domestic and international opinion. Americas pre-eminent grand strategist Colonel John Boyd

U.S. Air Force (ret) recommended adopting a unifying vision as a moral basis for any grand

strategy to avoid unintended consequences of what others may view as an aggressive foreign

policy.

Colonel Boyd highlights that its Declaration of Independence and Constitution present

this vision for the United States. Using these documents as its foundation leaves the principal

challenge to United States grand strategy to advocating the ideals embodied in them, while it

demonstrates respect for the culture and achievements of its allies, potential adversaries, and the

populations of actual adversaries. Boyd suggested a straight-forward, three-part approach:16

1. With respect to the United States:

a. Live up to its ideals.

b. Eliminate flaws in the system.

c. Emphasize cultural traditions, experiences, and unfolding events that

build-up harmony and trust.

2. With respect to its adversaries:

a. Publicize their [terrorists] harsh statements and threats to highlight that

their [the terrorists] survival is always at risk.

b. Reveal mismatches between their [terrorists] professed ideals and how

their government [terrorists] actually acts [act].

c. Acquaint their [foreign] population[s] with its [terrorists] philosophy and

way of life to show that the mismatches of their government [message and

actions] do not accord with any social value based on either the value or

the dignity of the individual or on the security and the well being of

society as a whole.

3. With respect to uncommitted and potential adversaries:

a. Show respect for their culture.

b. Bear them no harm.

c. Reward harmony with common causes.

10

d. Demonstrate that it will not tolerate nor support those ideas and intentions

that work against its culture and fitness to cope.

Boyds approach assumed a relationship between nation-states in an international

community. We can modify this with respect to its adversaries to apply to terrorists with equal

relevance. Information and associated information systems are essential to integrate these

activities into a comprehensive strategic communications plan to defeat the enemy. Although

intended to work against other nation-states, this moral basis for grand strategy will also limit the

support for terrorist adversaries. Its success depends upon the United States ability to uphold its

moral element and to use the information environment to connect words and deeds and to deliver

its important messages.

A Smart Power grand strategy is best applied to fourth generation warfare because

neither offers purely military solutions for success. This means that other elements of national

power diplomatic, information, and economic must combine to support or in many cases -

lead military actions. Unlike the three previous generations of warfare, fourth generation

warfare is not a result of a revolution within the military.17 It is a political, social, and moral

revolution: a crisis of nation-state legitimacy. On one side its participants seek to destroy the

nation-state, on the other side they want to preserve or restore the nation-state.

Properly applied fourth generation warfare uses the moral element to collapse one side

internally rather than emphasizing the physical destruction of its military forces or wartime

resources. While previous generations were two-sided conflicts between nation-states, fourth

generation warfare is often a many-sided struggle where many different entities enter the fray.

Strategic targets include:

1. International and domestic support for the war.

2. Hearts and minds of local populations.

3. All networks available in the information environment.

Tactical strengths include:

1. Local language capabilities.

2. Public diplomacy skills.

3. Information collection and dissemination capabilities.

4. Micro-economics enabling capabilities.

5. Willingness to conduct dismounted patrolling combined with civil affairs skills.

11

6. Proficiency employing precision munitions combined with close combat fighting

skills.

7. Sharp instincts tied to a beat cop mentality.

8. Sturdy professionalism.

9. Self-discipline.

10. A solid moral compass and a virtue ethic.

Fourth generation warfares asymmetric nature places high importance on correctly identifying

the enemys center of gravity in the Long War it resides within the hearts and minds of

foreign and domestic populations. The advent of the Information Age and technology that

ensures a globally-connected world means this center of gravity resides within the information

environment. This makes strategic communications the ability to influence attitudes,

perceptions, and behaviors a critical capability to ensure this center of gravity becomes a

significant source of strength for the United States and not its enemies.

In spite of this change the Ancient Greek historian Thucydides conclusions about

warfares nature in his treatise The Peloponnesian War remain constant. Warfare is still driven

by the interaction of power, interests, and passions and states still act out of fear, honor, and self-

interest. Furthermore, although fourth generation warfare may have turned Clausewitz theory of

Trinitarian warfare and wars conduct on its head, his ideas about its governance remain

constant.18 It is still dominated by uncertainty, chance, danger, and physical effort. So, while

some elements of warfare remain constant throughout history its conduct changes. Since 1648

and the Peace of Westphalia, its conduct changed in response to corresponding political,

economic, social, and technological developments in society as a whole. Today, success means

adapting to or better yet anticipating changes in wars conduct. In the Long War, success

means winning the decisive battle which resides in fourth generation warfares moral element.

A true Smart Power grand strategy requires a strategic overhaul of the United States

Government from its current Cold War hierarchy to align resources to meet these new

challenges. The most important change for a successful strategy will require interdependence

among and within governmental agencies. This interdependence is particularly critical between

and within the stove-piped and institutional cultures that represent the elements of United States

national power diplomatic, information, military and economic. A true smart power strategy

requires a highly flexible, inter-agency command system that can coordinate across multiple

12

national agencies and address international issues with results-oriented solutions. This

requirement will successfully abandon the ineffective, inter-operability, spirit of cooperation

mindset that undermines joint and inter-agency operations and negates some of the United

States success its current conflict. Most importantly it will drive organization, training, and

funding to focus more on results and less on effort from the strategic to the tactical level in the

Long War. A smart power strategy more focused on results and less on effort, process, and

procedure is better suited for a new generation of warfare against a highly adaptive and results-

oriented enemy.

13

Chapter 3 - The Moral Advantage in Fourth Generation Warfare: Smart Power, Strategic

Communications, and Winning the Decisive Battle in the Long War

When I was a young officer, I was taught that if you have air superiority, land superiority and sea superiority, you win. Well, in Vietnam we had air superiority, land superiority and sea superiority, but we lost. So I realized there is something more to it. Colonel John Boyd, USAF (Ret)

During the second half of the last century modern warfare stirred with corresponding

political, economic, social, and technological developments - evolving from an industrial-based

to an information-based activity. This evolutionary process produced sharp changes in the way

the United States opponents conduct war in this century. The latest shift - fourth generation

warfare - is both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas. It is a fight against non-state actors and

their murderous ideology. The United States Governments current approach to this emerging

generation of warfare lacks a proper grand strategy and places too much emphasis on the

enemys physical destruction. While killing committed opponents remains an important result in

warfare, the decisive battle in fourth generation warfare is the moral element, not the physical

element, and the hearts and minds of foreign and domestic populations is the center of gravity.

In an information age, the hearts and minds reside in the information environment - a collection

of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, circulate, or act on information.

So far, fourth generation warfare has defied an operational construct. Therefore, success

in warfares Generation-X means the United States Government must win the decisive battle at

the strategic and tactical levels of war while it re-defines warfares operational art. It must do

this by bridging the gap between theory and practice adopting a grand strategy founded on the

moral element that employs smarter organized, integrated, and trained civilian and military

forces. It must build forces that possess the capability to blend hard and soft power creating

smart power. Effective strategic communications - the ability to influence attitudes, behaviors

and perceptions of foreign and domestic populations - can then seize the initiative in the

information environment to exploit inconsistencies in its enemys messages and actions.

Effective strategic communications combined with actions that incorporate all elements of

14

national power will create an informed combination of the United States Governments coercive

and attractive powers that morally undermines its enemys purposes and eliminates their causes.

21st Century warfares rapidly changing conduct is further complicated by amorphous

opponents like al Qaeda - who transfer their primary allegiance away from their nation-state.

With an enormous bureaucracy and a highly centralized structure designed to defeat the military

forces of other nation-states, this makes it difficult for the United States military alone to subdue

non-state actors that conduct illegal warfare through terrorism. Abut Ubeid Al-Qurashi,

writing in 2002 to encourage al Qaeda members in Afghanistan after the U.S. launched

Operation Enduring Freedom demonstrates that this fact is not lost on Americas enemies:

Fourth Generation Wars haveproven the superiority of the weaker powerThis forecast did not arise in a vacuumfourth-generation wars have already occurred andthe superiority of the theoretically weaker party has already been proven; in many instances, nation-states have been defeated by stateless nations[America] is baffled by fourth-generation warfare19

The United States Government is struggling in its efforts to defeat radical Islamist

ideology because, in Iraq and elsewhere, it is in the midst of a fourth generation conflict that it is

trying to win with second and third generation military strategy and tactics. This difficulty is

further enhanced by a failure of other elements of U.S. national power diplomatic, information,

and economic to capitalize on tactical successes to generate lasting strategic results. This

chapter will use a case study to explain how a better understanding of warfares new demands

must drive a willingness to adopt a grand strategy using the smart power concept to adapt to

them. Specifically it will demonstrate how this understanding, in turn, will compel the United

States Government to focus more on strategic communicationsmoving it into Colonel Boyds

war with something more to it.

Connecting Words and Deeds: 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines in Habbaniyah, Iraq 2006-2007

The side that knows when to fight and when not will take the victory. There are roadways not to be traveled, armies not to be attacked, walled cities not to be assaulted.

Sun Tsu The world doesnt fear a new idea. It can pigeonhole any idea. But it cant pigeonhole a new experience. D. H. Lawrence, The White Peacock

15

Given the generational shift in warfare the question we should ask ourselves is what can

be done? I opened the previous chapter with a quote from Carl von Clausewitz stressing the

importance of judgment in statesmen and military commanders to establish the kind of war they

are fighting. Aristotles observation on reasoning that a small mistake at the beginning becomes

a big one at the ends holds true in warfare as well. The failure of second generation strategy and

tactics in Iraq and Afghanistan provide ample support to this statement.

The first step to success in the current generation of conflict is to evaluate the strategic,

operational, and tactical requirements accordingly. We must acknowledge that this generation of

warfare like other elements in the modern world - exists within the information environment.

This makes information a significant source of strength for the side that uses it best. Also, we

must understand that a fourth generation adversarys goal is the destruction of the nation-state.

Therefore, removing all the elements of a nation-states national powerlike the United States

did in Iraqonly works in the enemys favor.

The next step is to understand and draw lessons from the relatively few cases throughout

history where nation-state sponsored military forces succeeded in preserving or restoring another

nation- states security, governance, and economic integration. In his book, The Changing Face

of War, Martin van Creveld demonstrates that most wars since 1945 have been conflicts where

insurgents have won meaning of course that most nation-state restoration projects failed in

their efforts. However, this does not mean that counter-insurgent forces need to resign

themselves to failure. It does mean that we should throw overboard 99 percent of the

literature on counterinsurgency, counter-guerrilla, counterterrorism, and the like. Since most of

it has been written by the loosing side, it is of little value.20 Harvard Professor Kalev Sepps

Military Review article, Best Practices in Counterinsurgency and Australian Army Lieutenant

Colonel David Kilcullens research paper Twenty-eight Articles are two examples of valuable

and comprehensive fourth generation warfare research.

16

Successful Emphasis on intelligence Focus on population, their needs, and

security Secure areas established and expanded Insurgents isolated from population Single authority Effective, pervasive psychological

operations Amnesty and rehabilitation for

insurgents Police in lead; military supporting Police force expanded, diversified Conventional military forces re-oriented

for counterinsurgency Special Forces, advisors embedded with

indigenous forces Insurgent sanctuaries denied

Unsuccessful Primacy of military direction Priority to kill-capture enemy vice

engaging population Battalion-size operations as the norm Military units concentrated on large

bases for protection Special Forces focused on raiding Advisor effort a low priority in

personnel assignment Building, training indigenous army in

image of selves Peacetime government processes Open borders, airspace, coastlines

Table 1 Successful and Unsuccessful Practices21

Professor Sepp undertook a study of fifty-three 20th Century insurgencies to draw lessons

from successes and failures in this common type of conflict. His lessons, outlined in Table 1,

provide successful and unsuccessful practices drawn from his research.22 These practices

directly apply to battalion-level operations in a fourth generation environment and present some

useful principles for fourth generation warfare at its tactical level. His successful efforts draw on

a combination of both hard and soft power whereas his unsuccessful efforts draw heavily on hard

power and military direction. Since tactical efforts cannot succeed on their own results, their

ultimate value rests in their link to strategic objectives. Clearly, successful efforts relied on a

blending of coercive and attractive power; whereas unsuccessful efforts primarily focused on

hard power and an insurgent forces physical destruction.

17

Twenty-Eight Articles

Article 1 Know your Turf Article 2 Diagnose the Problem Article 3 Organize for Intelligence Article 4 Travel light and harden Logistics Article 5 - Organize for Interagency Operations Article 6 Find a Political/Cultural Advisor Article 7 Train the Squad leaders and trust

Them Article 8 Rank is Nothing Talent is

Everything Article 9 Have a game plan Article 10 Be There Article 11 Avoid Knee-Jerk Responses to

First Impressions Article 12 Prepare for Handover from Day

One Article 13 Build Trusted Networks Article 14 Start Easy Article 15 Seek Early Victories Article 16 Practice Deterrent Patrolling Article 17 Be Prepared for Setbacks Article 18 Remember the Global Audience Article 19 Engage the Women; Beware the

Children

Article 20 Take Stock Regularly Article 21 Exploit a Single Narrative Article 22 Local Forces should Mirror

the Enemy Not Us Article 23 Practice Armed Civil

Affairs Article 24 Small is Beautiful Article 25 Fight the Enemys Strategy

Not his Forces Article 26 Build your own Solution

Only Attack the enemy When he Gets in the Way

Article 27 Keep Your Extraction Plan Secret

Article 28 Whatever Else Your DoKeep the initiative

Table 2 Twenty-Eight Articles23

Lieutenant Colonel Kilcullen linked various counterinsurgency theories with tactical

fundamentals, techniques, and procedures familiar to many military personnel. His twenty-eight

articles, listed in Table 2, provide some tactical fundamentals drawn from his professional study

of counterinsurgency and personal experience in these fourth generation environments

throughout his career as an officer in the Australian Army. These articles directly apply to

company-level operations in a fourth generation environment. They provide some useful

principles for fourth generation warfare at the tactical level and also recognize the value of

combining hard and soft power for success. The key role assumed

by the information environment is highlighted in Articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 11, 13, 18, 19, 21, 23, and

25. Out of 28 articles, eleven - or 44 percent - involve effects in the information environment.

18

Its hard to imagine a successful outcome without effective strategic communication - along with

the plans, resources, and capabilities to make it work.

Used as a case study for tactical analysis, the Marine Corps infantry battalion I led from

January 2006 to June 2007 adopted the successful principles and the twenty-eight articles

outlined by Sepp and Kilcullen to form our concept of operations for our deployment to Iraq in

support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. We also drew lessons from other units deployments to

Anbar Province through the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS) and the Center for

Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and incorporated these into our pre-deployment training plans.

Our goal was to identify best practices and adapt these into the current situation for the area of

Iraq where we were planning to operate.

We deployed to Iraqs Al Anbar Province in June 2006 and were assigned responsibility

for the area between East Ramadi and West Fallujah along 36 kilometers of the Fallujah-Ramadi

Road. We remained there until we departed in February 2007. The region locally known as

Habbaniyah - included about 45,000 Iraqi citizens and was mostly rural with some small villages

and one urban area Khalidayah - with about 25,000 Iraqi citizens. The rest lived in or near

smaller villages spread throughout our assigned area.

In Iraq, we entered a fourth generation environment. We were a second generation

organization that was well-prepared for the physical confrontation, but were only partly prepared

for the decisive moral engagement. We lacked: sufficient foreign language capabilities;

cultivated public diplomacy skills; sufficient information analysis capabilities; micro-economics

capabilities; and a results-oriented civil affairs capability. We recognized the change in wars

conduct before we deployed to Iraq andalthough we acknowledged we would lack some of the

unique skills required for successdeveloped a concept for operating that ultimately enabled us

to accomplish part of our mission. Figure 1 and figure 2 are the front and back of a pocket card

we developed to represent our vision for success.

We carried these cards as pocket items and used them in our pre-deployment training in

the United States and in our combat patrol briefings in Iraq to keep us focused on our mission

turning a stable, secure, environment - based upon the rule of law - over to an elected and

effective Iraqi government. Our overarching concept was to prepare ourselves for the next

battlefield. Over 50 percent of the battalions personnel completed at least one other deployment

to Iraq or Afghanistan. This top to our pillars was designed to promote learning within the unit

19

Figure 1 Vision for Success Card (Front)

and avoid a this is how we did it last time mentality. Our goal was to become a learning

organization that placed value on initiative tempered by wisdom - and to avoid a reactive

approach to challenges from the enemy. Assisted by Sepp and Kilcullens research, we

understood that our actions must transmit a basic respect for individual rights and their collective

culture and traditions as well as a concern for the dignity of individual Iraqi citizens. We

understood that legitimate, honest, well-trained, and robust indigenous police forces that

supported good governance were the keys to success. Therefore, put an Iraqi capability on it

was our first and main pillar -- supporting the Iraqi military and Iraqi police and developing

governance through civil affairs activities- became our main effort. This meant that our best

personnel - including our operations officer, best company commander, and key enlisted

leadership who were not replaced - went to augment the three Military Transition Teams that

supported the 1st Iraqi Army Divisions Third Brigade and the Police Training Team located at

20

Camp Habbaniyah. As the Battalions main effort, our civil affairs officer accompanied me on

patrols every day until he was wounded by an enemy sniper and medically evacuated from Iraq

(like the rest of our wounded, he was not replaced).

The absence of effective Iraqi Police Forces and any form of governance in our assigned

area meant that we needed to work closely with the Iraqi Army units stationed with us to provide

security along with other basic needs like water and electricity. We also needed to help local

citizens create legitimate governance that connected them to the Provincial capital in Ramadi.

Our goal was to create a stable secure environment for the Iraqi people.

This meant we practiced armed civil affairs while we marginalized the enemy forces

operating in our area. We fought the enemys strategynot his forces by responding with

precise and devastating force when attacked; capturing those who were about to attack us; and

maintaining the initiative through a robust strategic communications effort. We sought to

morally undermine the enemy, convince them to stop fighting, and become part of a peaceful

resolution to the local situation. Those who would not defect or surrender, were either captured

or killed in combined operations with the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, and a group of unarmed

concerned local citizens (formed in November 2006) that called themselves Thawar al Anbar

(Anbar Revolutionary Fighters).

The first pillar highlighted the importance of mentoring and coaching as well as training

and operating with indigenous forces while doing no harm to noncombatants and the local

infrastructure. The key to success was building a stable and secure environment that was

ensured by legitimate, indigenous, security forces. This understanding eliminated some of the

stigma that our forces carried as invaders and occupiers in Iraq. Our concentration on the Iraqi

Army and Iraqi Police forces maintained our focus on the moral element critical to success in a

fourth generation environment.

The second pillar acknowledged the necessity to fight the enemy. The fourth generation

environment meant we would face an enemy that hides among the local population. So we

adopted an instinct-based mentality common among street-fighters or hunters. A large part of

the moral element was convincing the local population that we could protect them from the

terrorists. Our superior combat power meant that the enemy would avoid prolonged battles with

us. Therefore, when we were attacked, we needed to win this 10-second street fight by relying

on three Principles of War: security, surprise, and unity of command. We used a guardian

21

angel concept that drove our planning to avoid making uncovered moves on the battlefield and

forced us to examine the second and third order effects of killing and destroying the enemy a

collateral damage assessment. Often, avoiding collateral damage or de-escalating violence

became more important than killing the enemy. We tempered our desire to fight the enemy with

tactical patience using intelligence to fight him on ground that we chose. This acknowledged

fourth generation warfares unique environment where success is moral and often counter-

intuitive because it is primarily about persuading and convincing the moderate populations that

you can protect them and that you have their best interests in mind - killing and destroying the

extremists is often secondary to these primary concerns.

Figure 2 Vision for Success Card (Back)

The third pillar recognized that the goal of our enemy was to destroy the creation of a

stable and secure nation-state in Iraq and supported our goal to restore the rule of law and

22

legitimate governance. Our national values of freedom, justice, and respect for human dignity

served as a foundation for our actions and provided a framework for fighting an amoral enemy.

We saw the information environment as the center of gravity as we struggled to deliver our

message and undermine that of the enemy. Over a period of several months of trial and error,

effective information operations (actually strategic communications) enabled us to compete in

the decisive battle for the moral element -- collapsing the enemy internally rather than exclusive

focus on physically destroying his forces.

The back of the card we used to outline our vision for success (Figure 2) directly

addressed the moral element in the fourth generation conflict we expected to encounter in Iraq.

These ideas formed the essence of our strategic communications efforts. Applying Colonel John

Boyds idea of adopting a unifying vision as a moral basis to avoid unintended consequences of

what others may view as aggressive behavior, we locally applied his idea of grand strategy. We

looked at behavior with respect to ourselves; with respect to our adversaries; and with respect to

the uncommitted and/or potential adversaries.

We examined the types of people we would see in Iraq - from their perspective. We

thought they would see themselves as either insurgent - against the Iraqi government and

coalition forces; indifferent neither for nor against either side; or innocent caught somewhere

in the middle with no means to protect themselves from either side and unable or unwilling to

leave the area. We hoped to win the hearts and minds of the last two types with tactical

actions that convinced them that we could protect them and strategic communications that

persuaded them that we had their best interests in mind.

We thought they would view us in three ways:

1. How we treat them.

2. How we protect them.

3. How we compensate them.

Without going to deeply into cultural anthropology, we tried to treat them in a way that

was consistent with their culture as we understood it. We relied heavily on Raphael Patais

book, The Arab Mind as reference for our conclusions. We thought the Iraqi people placed high

value on humility and a sense of personal honor and pride. We addressed this by resolving to

treat the indifferent and the innocent with dignity and respect and adopting restraint in the use of

force whenever these types of people where involved in a given situation.

23

For ourselves we adopted an ethic a process that leads to a moral outcome - that

emphasized conduct based upon Aristotles classical virtues of character - prudence, courage,

temperance, and justice. For us, justice meant truthfulness; temperance meant restraint; courage

meant fortitude; and prudence meant wisdom. Our Battalion Chaplain, U.S. Navy Lieutenant

John Anderson, was instrumental in developing these concepts and worked closely with me and

the units various commanders and senior enlisted personnel to deliver them to the men. We also

borrowed heavily from James Toners excellent book on this subject, Morals under the Gun:

The Cardinal Virtues, Military Ethics, and American Society, to create a pamphlet on Virtue

Ethics for the battalions leadership to use as a reference to train themselves and the men.

Military ethical and moral training should focus on developing moral behavior in its non-

commissioned officers and commissioned officers through a practical understanding and

Figure 4 Virtue Ethics Card (Back)

Figure 3 Virtue Ethics Card (Front)

application of virtue ethics. Character development based upon personal integrity augmented

with simple pocket cards like the one identified in figure 3 and figure 4 were sufficient to insert

virtue into their daily training routine. Treating others with dignity and respect, following the

Golden Rule, and a willingness to learn about other cultures goes further toward overcoming

cultural boundaries than any amount of cultural sensitivity training.

Certain human actions are preceded and caused by what Thomas Jefferson called

operations of the mind. Fourth generation warfares requirement for successful counter-

insurgent forces to disburse into small tactical units across a wide area means creating identities

in inter-group leadership is crucial for success. The strategic corporal must understand and

24

execute

s

d.

ral

d the innocent or indifferent noncombatants that stemmed from

three so

rtue

nstead

he

ess. This

approac ed

o; and for what we use. This principle is fully articulated in Mao Tse-Tungs

classic book on revolutionary guerrilla warfare, On Guerrilla Warfare, in his three rules and

eight rem

actions are subject to command.

e the house.

the commanders intent with initiative and an understanding of how the big picture

applies to individual actions.

Visible behavior often springs from invisible traits generally attributed to a person

moral compass. Harvard Professor Lawrence Kohlberg does an excellent job of demonstrating

that moral behavior is not automatic in humans. It is learned and often requires enforced

learning to make it habit -part of individual character in humans below the age of 20 years ol

The majority of my battalion was below this threshold. Our goal was to develop ingrained mo

habits to guard against the corrupting influence of power - what Professor Joseph Nye calls

the dangers of ego-centered intuitionism24 We hoped to use this to build on a general

sense of moral obligation towar

urces: a sense of conscience; obligatory individual rules of common morality; and our

professional code of ethics.25

We felt it was not too much to hope that enforced behavior patterns can alter the moral

attributes of an individuals character. Free-play exercises laced with ethical challenges that are

part of tactical decision-making and mission accomplishment create an environment where vi

and ethics become part of individual leadership placing a focus on combat effectiveness i

of combat readiness. We used these cards during our deployment to Iraq in 2006 and 2007.

They were carried as pocket items throughout the battalion and used during combat patrol

briefings to reinforce these virtues and remind everyone their importance for our success. T

expected end-state was to develop intuitions to help leaders make appropriate decisions in a

complex environment where the moral element played a decisive role in our succ

h enhanced our ability to engage the local Iraqi population because our actions increas

our moral effect standing in stark contrast to the immoral effect of the enemy.

Finally, we thought they would view us in how we compensate them for what we do;

what we dont d

arks:

Rules: 1. All2. Do not steal from the people. 3. Be neither selfish nor unjust.

Remarks: 1. Replace the door when you leav

25

2. Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.

. Replace what you break.

r

d

initiative and destroy their

will to

e

by operating

covertl

65

a

cceeded

Iraqi governments control where

it rema

3. Be courteous. 4. Be honest in your transactions. 5. Return what you borrow. 67. Do not bathe in the presence of women. 8. Do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest. 26

We viewed the enemy as an opponent in warfare. In a fourth generation environment this

meant we need to positively identify them first. Since our ethic our approach to achieving a

moral outcome in specific situations was based upon a virtue of justice, we went to the just wa

traditions jus in bello concepts of discrimination and restraint. These concepts complimente

the published Rules of Engagement (ROE) that focused on legal not moral outcomes on the

battlefield based upon the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Our focus was on disrupting or

neutralizing not destroying the enemy in an attempt to gain the

fight. We measured our effectiveness in terms of numbers of enemy who defected,

surrendered, or were captured, or killed in that order of priority.

The entire concept relied upon excellent intelligence (specifically human intelligence)

that enabled us to gain the initiative over our Arabic-speaking, unprincipled, unrestrained, and

amorphous enemy. An important and frustrating fact about fourth generation warfare is that th

enemy does not identify itself by wearing uniforms, but uses advantages afforded

y and blending in with the civilian population as a weapon. This becomes particularly

challenging for us - a conventional force with a different culture and language.

It is only intelligence collected by people who are as familiar with the environment as the

enemy hiding in it that is useful. The ability to speak the local language is as important as

fighting skills. Unfortunately, with slightly more than a dozen interpreters for an average of

patrols per day (most of these were dismounted patrols) we were ill-equipped for this task. It is

tribute to the virtue and resourcefulness of my men that in spite of the immense language

barrier they were able to play a key role in developing an Iraqi Police force and operate on a

daily basis with Iraqi security forces in our area. Ultimately, by December 2006, we su

in transitioning almost 70 percent of our assigned area to the

ins to date. Effective strategic communications are a critical requirement in an

environment where the moral element is the decisive battle.

26

Second generation military organizations are poorly suited for this human resource-

oriented form of information gathering activity. The intelligence resources that did exist were

usually consolidated one or two levels above the battalion in tactical fusion cells and seldom

provided quality intelligence in a timely manner. Our battalion had seven trained i

personnel for a task force that ranged from 1200-1700 personnel (two officers and five enlisted

personnel). These seven personnel supported a task force operating from 15 patrol bases and

combat outposts that were spread over 300 square kilometers. Effective strategic

communications requires a

ntelligence

n ability to quickly analyze information and pre-empt or counter the

enemy

enemy center of gravity.

We gained success through the courage, in

within the battalion. As the battalions engageme

as

ith

we

process

ood

combined with an effective communication strategy that unapologetically explained why our

s messages. An intelligence capability at the company-level is essential to maintain the

initiative in battle for the moral element and to eliminate the information environment as an

itiative, intellect, and team work that resided

nt efforts continued in our area, we built a wide

network of information sources that enhanced

our local intelligence. However, this activity

took several months to produce results and w

constantly hampered by a shortage of skilled

intelligence analysts and interpreters.27 W

no other ability within the battalion to speak

Arabic, patrols were often reduced to using

pictures and other pointy-talky cards to

communicate with the locals. Information

collected was analyzed at the battalion-level or

higher. This meant delays in action whileCombined operations overcame language barriers and increased security

ed information into intelligence. More interpreters or, better yet, a genuine attempt to

teach Arabic to a small portion of the battalions Marines and Sailors would have provided a

critical capability to allow us to gain the initiative in our strategic communications efforts.

A human intelligence collection capability is not enough to win in this environment.

Winning means that sturdy professionalism and self-discipline, economic development, and g

governance, must augment and support accurate and timely intelligence. These activities

27

second pillar often dominated our actions. A solid moral compass and an application of the

Golden Rule will overcome cultural barriers. The key for us was to avoid the sharp shift from

killing to kindness.28 that arises from impatience and poor discipline and makes one appear

hard-hearted on one extreme and weak-willed on the other.

As Michael Walzer points out in his book Arguing about War, our measure of success

was entirely relative. We looked for a decline in attacks and in their scope; the moral collapse in

our enemies; the appearance of informers and defectors from their ranks; the appearance of

opportunists to our side; silence from the enemys supporters; and a growing sense of safety

among ordinary Iraqis.29 Over time, our tactical operating concept enabled us to de-escalate

violent confrontations, increased our ability to apply the principles of discrimination and

restraint, and provided the local Iraqis with the hope essential to win the decisive moral battle in

a fourth generation war. This fact makes smart power --

developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool

kit that draws on both hard and soft power -- useful in a

fourth generation environment because often success

depend l

serve, or

on

d

he

their own

light

ents

s as much on ethically and morally attracting loca

populations and helping them to create, pre

restore security and capable governance as it does

killing the enemy.

Winning hearts and minds is about security an

calculated self-interest. Winning hearts is about

persuading people that the United States military can protect them without destroying their

value systems and cultures. It must in fact have genuine respect for their value systems and

cultures to win their passive or active support. This means military forces must enter into t

fray with an understanding of how local value systems and cultural norms interact with

values and culture. Friction will exist when a non-traditional culture interacts with a traditional

culture. They key to success in finding common ground and building upon that foundation

through engagement. This engagement must have a moral basis and our actions must high

ethical conduct. Winning minds is about convincing people that the United States Governm

success is equivalent to their success. Conversely, the United States Government must also

believe that a foreign populations concept of success is equivalent to its success. Strategic

Engagement is the foundation. Local Mayor accompanied by Iraqi Police, LtCol Desgrosseilliers and an interpreter meet with local citizens in front of a medical clinic in Modiq, Iraq

28

communications that presents a coherent grand strategy directly linked to tactical actions is

essential to deliver this message. International and domestic media outlets play a critical role in

this process as well. The center of gravity in this war is the information environment. The

nited States Government must improve its strategic communications if it expects to match its

ability in the battle of arms.

Regain

U

potential in a battle of ideas with its cap

ing the Information Initiative

More than four centuries ago, Niccolo Machiavelli advised princes in Italy that it was more important to be feared than to be loved. But in todays world, it is best to be b

oth. Winning hearts and minds has always been important, but it is

te to the stormy present. The

ur case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall

ptions of the

three m tions

iet

h

arts and minds

ment.

even more so in an information age. Information is power, and modern information technology is spreading information more widely than ever before in history. Joseph S. Nye Jr.

The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequaoccasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As oourselves, and then we shall save our country. Abraham Lincoln, 1862

The way to eliminate a center of gravity in warfare is to attack it indirectly. The United

States Government must do this by winning the battle for the moral element on the ground and

by capturing this success with effective strategic communications. It should adopt a strategic

communications plan that focuses on influencing attitudes, behaviors, and perce

ajor groups outlined in a smart power grand strategy: its own population, the popula

of its allies and potential enemies, and the populations of its current enemies.

As the distinguished British historian Michael Howard astutely notes that a serious

campaign against terrorists and insurgents requires secrecy, intelligence, political prudence, qu

ruthlessness, covert actions that remain secret, and above all infinite patience. Howards

requirements are all lost in a media-stoked tumult for immediate results.30 Fighting fourt

generation enemies is unlike other wars because it is fundamentally a battle for he

at home and abroad. Today, much of this battle occurs in the information environ

Winning this battle means the United States Government must organize strategic

communications in the same way that it does with intelligence enabling strategic

29

communications to drive operations. Howard also points out that nation-states can eliminate

terrorist threats only if public opinion - at home and abroad supports their government in

regarding terrorists as criminals rather than heroes.31 This is not a call for a propaganda

but a genuine, systematic effort to use the information environment to undermine the messages

and actions of Americas enemies with cold hard facts - truth. This means changing

machine,

its

organiz

nks

ry

ke

s its

,

ation to eliminate information stovepipes without creating additional bureaucracy. This

will enable it to fight the battle of ideas with efficiency, initiative, and imagination.

Since 19