SECOND DRAFT HARVARD UNIVERSITY

JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

Winning the Long War: Applying the US Governments Smart Power in Current and Future Conflicts

by Colonel John Tien, USA Lieutenant Colonel Todd Desgrosseilliers, USMC Lieutenant Colonel Gwyn Armfield, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

Advisor:

John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massaschusetts Not for distribution or citation without the permission of the authors. Draft as of April 7, 2008

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DisclaimerThe views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with regulations, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.

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ContentsPage TITLE PAGE .................................................................................................................................. 1 Disclaimer ....................................................................................................................................... 2 Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................ 3 Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................ 4 Preface (Acknowledgments) and Abstract Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 10 Introduction to Smart Power and its Role in Fourth Generation Warfare .............................. 14 Chapter 1..Lieutenant Colonel Todd Desgrosseilliers, USMC................................. 19 Chapter 2..Lieutenant Colonel Gwyn Armfield, USAF ........................................... 42 Chapter 3..Colonel John Tien, USA ......................................................................... 61 Overall Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 81 Biographies and Chapter bibliographies ....................................................................................... 84 CITATIONS AND ENDNOTES.................................................................................................. 93

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SECOND DRAFT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Winning the Long War: Applying the US Governments Smart Power in Current and Future Conflicts Authors: Lieutenant Colonel Todd S. Desgrosseilliers, USMC; Lieutenant Colonel Gwyn Armfield, USAF; Colonel John Tien, USA Thesis Question: Why is the United States Government struggling in its efforts to defeat radical Islams ideology in the Long War? Thesis: A better understanding of warfares new demands will drive a willingness to adopt a smart power an effective combination of hard and soft power grand strategy to adapt to them. In turn, this grand strategy will force major changes in how we organize, train, equip, and educate military and civilian personnel and how we organize and employ these forces in current and future conflicts. Discussion: Americas public standing in the world is possibly at its lowest point in its 231 year history. As a result, foreign policy experts, media leaders, and academics are looking for a new framework. Who will send the next long telegram? Who will be the new Mr. X? What will and should be the new driving principles for how America acts abroad? Based on their on-the-ground experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the three authors from three different military services believe that Smart Power provides that answer. Smart Power, however, is conceptual and thus, amorphous. Usefully, it can be applied to any action taken from what civilian and military personnel do on a street corner in Iraq to what the Secretary of State says in a speech in Paris. However, there are gaps in real world applications of how it has worked abroad. The three authors will fill one of those gaps with real-world examples of what smart power can do on those foreign street corners. Perhaps more importantly, they offer conclusions and recommendations on what and how the United States Government should move ahead in certain programs to enable grand strategy as America deals with its struggle against Islamic radicalism. In short, they agree that the United States Government should optimize Americas smart power and embody core democratic values in its foreign policy objectives particularly once in conflict and preferably, prior to conflict. Lieutenant Colonel Todd Desgrosseilliers, United States Marine Corps. During the second half of the last century modern warfare stirred with corresponding political, economic, social, and technological developments - evolving from an industrial-based to an information-based activity. This evolutionary process produced sharp changes in the way the United States opponents conduct war in this century. The latest shift - fourth generation warfare - is both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas. It is a fight against non-state actors and their murderous ideology. The United States Governments current approach to this emerging generation of warfare lacks a proper grand strategy and places too much emphasis on the enemys physical destruction. Lieutenant Colonel Desgrosseilliers explores how while killing committed opponents remains an important result in warfare, the decisive battle in fourth generation warfare is the moral element, not the physical element, and its center of gravity is the information environment. Its struggle is further enhanced by a failure of other elements of United States national power diplomatic, information, and economic to capitalize on tactical successes to generate lasting strategic results. Ultimately, victory in fourth generation warfare is more about undermining the enemys messages by persuading and convincing moderate populations than it is about killing and destroying the extremists. Victory is effective strategic communications. Lieutenant Colonel Gwyn Armfield, United States Air Force. The Center for Strategic and International Studies Smart Power Commission found that combining hard and soft power, when and if it occurs happens either at a relatively low level or at the very highest levels of government. 1 Lieutenant 4 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT Colonel Armfield explores how to combine the hard power of the United States Department of Defense and the soft power of the United States Department of State to fill a gap in the United States governments ability to synchronize efforts at the regional level. Understanding this issue begins with understanding the differences between State and Defense. As the two major players in United States foreign policy, State and Defense, share nothing alike. With vastly different cultural genomes, wildly disparate budgets and personnel strength and organizational structures with no similarities, State and Defense are not designed to interoperate. However, the current fight, likely to continue for a generation, will demand that these instruments of hard and soft power evolve rapidly to meet the critical needs of America. Lacking an inter-agency Goldwater-Nichols type reform, progress can still be made toward filling the gap of coordination at the regional level using current structures and authorities. Great examples of bottom-up interagency success exist at United States Central Commands Executive Steering Committee (ESC) where various agencies work together to find appropriate authorities to deal with pressing issues in the Middle-East. This is but one example where state and defense work interdependently to conduct the nations mission in a Joint Interagency Coordination Group construct. Solutions also exist to mitigate other issues such as Defense overreach into development aid and States lack of effective operational leaders to direct such projects. Colonel John Tien, United States Army. Colonel Tien uses his tactical experiences from 2006-2007 in Iraq to demonstrate how nation-building at the tactical level was and will continue to be a useful application of the United States governments smart power in Iraq. Colonel Tien admits, however, that the United States. military can advance smart power applications only so far and that the United States government should and must adapt its civilian deployment capacity in order to leverage the United States governments full smart power capabilities in Iraq and other future such scenarios. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies Commission on Smart Power, more thought should also be put into sequencing and integrating hard and soft power instruments, particularly in the same operating theater. Some elements of this approach are already occurring in the conduct of ongoing counterinsurgency, nation building, and counterterrorism operations tasks that depend critically but only partially on hard power.2 In an attempt to defeat Al-Qaedas efforts to win over the people, Colonel Tiens battalion used a variety of effective nation-building operations to improve the life of the average Iraqi and demonstrate that Americas ideals of good governance, lawful civil society, and economic prosperity were indeed a better choice for the Iraqi people than what Al-Qaeda was offering. He uses the Iraqi cities of Tal Afar and Ramadi as case studies to show not only what can be done, but also to show what must change in order to fully apply all levers of the United States government. For Colonel Tiens US Army Soldiers on the ground in Iraq, they faced the issue of hard and soft power integration every day. For instance, in the same neighborhood that a company commander ordered a massive cordon and search to capture a known suicide bomber, that same twenty-eight year old captain exhibited amazing public diplomacy one month later in establishing a highly effective neighborhood council. For these United States service members, it meant becoming more of a statesman and less of a soldier. As The Economist so aptly put it in describing todays Soldier, the model soldier should be less science-fiction Terminator and more intellectual for the graduate level of war, preferably a linguist, with a sense of history and anthropology. 3 Shared Conclusions: The United States Government is struggling in its efforts to defeat radical Islams ideology because, in Iraq and elsewhere, it is in the midst of a fourth generation conflict that it is trying to win with second and third generation military strategy and tactics. The decisive battle in this new generation of warfare is the moral element, not the physical element, and its center of gravity is the information environment.

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SECOND DRAFT The United States government needs a grand strategy. The Center for Strategic and International Studies Smart Power Commission outlines a strategic framework that can defeat opponents in fourth generation warfare. It focuses on five critical areas: 1. Developing and integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives drawing on both hard and soft power. 2. Attracting foreign populations toward American objectives and helping them build capable democratic states. 3. Complementing U.S. military and economic might with greater investments in soft power enablers such as: Alliances, partnerships, and institutions. Global development. Public diplomacy. Economic integration. Technology and innovation. 4. Provide the things that foreign populations and their governments want but cannot get without American leadership. 5. Defeating the terrorists narrative that the United States is weak-willed and hardhearted. The United States government should establish this grand strategys moral element by using the principles and ideals embodied in U.S. Constitution and Declaration of Independence as its foundation. This leaves the principal challenge to advocating and abiding the ideals embodied in them, while it demonstrates respect for the culture and achievements of its allies, potential adversaries, and the populations of actual adversaries. John Boyds three-part approach is necessary to form this foundation: 1. With respect to the United States: Live up to its ideals. Eliminate flaws in the system. Emphasize cultural traditions, experiences, and unfolding events that build-up harmony and trust. 2. With respect to its adversaries: Publicize their harsh statements and threats to highlight that its survival is always at risk. Reveal mismatches between their professed ideals and how their government actually acts. Acquaint their population with its philosophy and way of life to show that the mismatches of their government do not accord with any social value based on either the value or dignity of the individual or on the security and well being of society as a whole. 3. With respect to uncommitted and potential adversaries: Show respect for their culture. Bear them no harm. Reward harmony with common causes. Demonstrate that it will not tolerate nor support those ideas and intentions that work against its culture and fitness to cope. While military application of coercive power is often necessary to achieve a certain level of security, to succeed in fourth generation warfare, the United States should temper its effects by blending hard power with other attractive elements of national power in a comprehensive smart power grand strategy. 6 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT A true smart power grand strategy requires a highly flexible, inter-agency command system that can coordinate across multiple national agencies and address international issues with results-oriented solutions. This currently does not exist. The United States government lacks a comprehensive strategic communications plan to support a grand strategy to defeat the enemy. A comprehensive strategic communications plan is essential to integrate strategic objectives with operational and tactical actions. Strategic communications are essential to undermine the opponents center of gravity in fourth generation warfare. The United States Department of State must decentralize from Washington, D.C. by opening the stovepipes connecting hundreds of separate embassies to the state mother ship in DC. The United States Department of Defense must incorporate State into the Geographic Combatant Commanders policy development and decision making to increase the chance for a holistic engagement plan. Recent efforts to combine State and Defense with United States Africa Command are a good step but still falls short of providing a single United States regional decision maker. State and Defense must use available resources and authorities to regroup and form regional teams to focus on regional issues. Only then, will the strategic recommendations from the Smart Power Commission translate into enhanced influence for America. Defense and State must also look at how to manage a limited pool of expertssuch as direct hiring of retiring mid level experienced military officers as Foreign Service Officers. The United States government currently has ample authorities to employ the interagency effectively but it cant be micromanaged from Washington, D.C.--where the solutions to regional issues will always have a bias toward solving Washington, D.C. problem of the day. Current and past economic stimulus programs are failing to achieve economic development in Iraq especially during the military surge from March 2007 to present. In order to truly scale any successes in Operation Iraqi Freedom and other future conflicts in the global war on terrorism, the United States government must increase its civilian capacity to deliver other elements of our national power to post- and pre-conflict areas.

Shared Recommendations: Develop a smart power grand strategy to ensure all elements of national power are effectively employed on the battlefield. (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic): o Bridge the gap between theory and practice adopt a grand strategy founded on the moral element that employs smarter organized, integrated, and trained military forces. o Build forces that possess the capability to blend hard and soft power to seize the initiative in the information environment and exploit inconsistencies in opponents messages and actions. Eliminate bureaucratic hierarchies by de-centralizing soft power enablers and establishing interagency capabilities down to the battalion level: o Local language capabilities. o Public diplomacy skills. o Information collection and dissemination capabilities. o Micro-economics enabling capabilities. Combine these with a mature, inter-agency force that demonstrates: o Proficiency employing precision munitions combined with close combat fighting skills. 7 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT o Willingness to conduct dismounted patrolling combined with civil affairs skills. o Sharp instincts tied to a beat cop mentality. o Sturdy professionalism. o Self-discipline. o A solid moral compass. Develop strategic communications plans and training programs to develop skills that enable consistent engagement from the strategic to the tactical level. Therefore, strategic communications must: o Adopt a strategic communications plan to publicize through all available information outlets a smart power grand strategy that coincides with U.S. national values and principles aligned with broader national security policy, strategic objectives, and actions: o Stress the importance of a free, independent and non-biased press by enabling local commanders to promote and support through micro-financing local radio, television, and print media. o Provide interagency capabilities that enable local commanders to stress the importance of human rights, religious freedom, and social justice through local media campaigns that counter the terrorist message. o Provide interagency capabilities that integrate this message with local actions that provide security and connect to local interests. Create greater interagency interdependence and integration not cooperation and interoperability - that enables public diplomacy and strategic communication to utilize all instruments of national power and the most current research data: o Disrupt or neutralize the jihadist message by expanding local language radio, television, and print media as an integral part of local security operations. o Create results-based information capabilities that connect strategic objectives to tactical actions while it avoids instituting more effort-based bureaucracy in Washington D.C. or hierarchy in operational units. o Expand its use of Internet that extends down to local populations not just elite audience and key opinion-makers. Focus on target audiences that support the terrorist personnel systems and advance its ideology through self-interest: o Increase foreign language capabilities to enable tactical units to engage local populations. o Demonstrate and communicate American principles and values through smart power applied from the strategic to tactical levels in the Long War. o Win the decisive moral element through actions based upon a virtue ethic. Communicate this fact through all media. Expand existing resident and non-resident professional education programs and training venues to create professional interagency relationships. These programs should also include professionals from media outlets. Collaborate for success at the regional levelUnited States governmental regional leaders must talk to each other on a frequent, deliberate basis. Develop an effective regional planning/execution capability enabling Combatant Commanders and Assistant Secretaries of State to work together as peers Recognize State has no effective regional coordination capabilityWashington, D.C. headquarters will always provide solutions for Washington, D.C. problems 8 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT o National Security Council role is that of coordinatorleverage NSPD-44 and Department of Defense 3000.05 to conduct regional strategic planning sessions at National level delegate operational details to Combatant Commanders and Assistant Secretaries of State for action and hold them accountable o Synchronize authorities from State, Defense and other agencies: Mission based authority integration brings together synergistic use of Title 10, 50, 22 and other United States Code authorities and capabilities to meet the unique blend of challenges necessary for smart power to work Structurally Model on United States Central Commands Executive Steering Committee best practicesstreamline access from regional level decision makers to National Security Council o Daily meetings of senior regional leaders must be the norm Leverage daily secure video teleconferences for senior leaders and staffs Do not underestimate public embarrassment as a motivator Develop State Departments operational planning and execution capability o Operationalize State Department: Department of Defense has filled this planning/action gap and now needs to handover this mission to State but State must develop capable leaders to take this torch Personnel cross-flow: Enable separating/retiring military service members with unique diplomatic and development skills to cross over to State as Foreign Service Officers. This will increase the Foreign Service Officer ranks with operational planning experience that along with traditional Foreign Service Officer experience will accelerate capability growth. Model after current active duty to guard/reserve programs like the Air Forces Palace Chase Make Iraq / Afghanistan interagency duty (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) the fast track to leadership. Foreign Service Officers serving in these challenging posts should be fast tracked ahead of others Increase personnel staffing by at least 10% in the departments of United States Agency for International Development (USAID), State, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture so that: (1) we can continue to man brigade-level embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ePRTs); (2) create similar ePRTs for battalions that have large (greater than 500,000 population) civilian footprints; and (3) enable greatly increased USAID presence and microfinance programs at the local level. Change the way we view economic development in Iraq and other post- and pre-conflict areas especially in terms of USAID microfinance capability and reach. For Iraq, two billion dollars versus the current $100 million allocated is needed to truly transform Iraqs local economies and create the irreversible momentum needed in the next two years in Iraq. Fund and establish the Civilian Reserve Corps, Standby civilian force, and Active Response Corps. Legislation is currently pending in Congress with $250 million requested in the 2009 Presidents budget. The current plan calls for 250 in the Active Response Corps, 2000 in the Standby, and 2000 in the Civilian Reserve Corps. 4 We must appropriate and authorize these programs immediately for the current conflicts and similar scenarios in the future. Future United States interventions in to post conflict situations must consider the local populace, their needs, and their views. As Nye and Armitage say, rather than unintentionally provoke a clash of civilizations, Americas purpose should be to promote the elevation of civilizations and individuals. 5 9 SECOND DRAFT

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INTRODUCTIONAmericas public standing in the world is possibly at its lowest point in its 231 year history. As a result, foreign policy experts, media leaders, and academics are looking for a new framework. Who will send the next long telegram? Who will be the new Mr. X? What will and should be the new driving principles for how America acts abroad? Based on their on-the-ground experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the three authors from three different military services believe that Smart Power provides that answer. Smart Power, however, is conceptual and thus, amorphous. Usefully, it can be applied to any action taken from what civilian and military personnel do on a street corner in Iraq to what the Secretary of State says in a speech in London. However, there are gaps in real world applications of how it has worked abroad. The three authors will fill one of those gaps with real-world examples of what smart power can do on those foreign street corners. Perhaps, more importantly, they offer recommendations on what and how the United States government should move ahead in certain programs to enable grand strategy as America deals with its struggle against Islamic radicalism. In short, the United States government should optimize Americas smart power and embody core democratic values in its foreign policy objectives particularly once in conflict and preferably, prior to conflict. While military application of hard power is needed to achieve a certain level of security, this should be combined with soft power to win the long war of ideas. In the recent CSIS Commission on Smart Power, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Richard Armitage state, Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft powerToday, victory depends on attracting foreign populations to our side and helping them to build capable, democratic states. 6 Secretary Robert Gates agrees and in particular, has called for a review of how much we resource and where we apply those smart power resources. On November 27, 2007, he said in Manhattan, Kansas:

My message is that if we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of national power both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and apply all of the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad. In short, based on my experience serving seven presidents, as a former Director of CIA and now as Secretary of Defense, I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use "soft" power and for better integrating it with "hard" power. One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: economic 10 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more - these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success. Accomplishing all of these tasks will be necessary to meet the diverse challenges I have described. 7 Understanding the context of the struggle we are in, of course, is critical. America is locked in a struggle, but the enemy is defining the battlefield. In the pages that follow, the three authors will examine the application of smart power based on their experiences in the current conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and more broadly the long war against radical Islamic jihadism. Their experiences, however, should be viewed through the prism not of irregular warfare or even the current label of the global war on terrorism. Instead, military officers and Americans in general, should understand that America is locked in a struggle against ideas. Unfortunately, the United States is currently dealing with a global environment in which it is at a significant disadvantage in terms of being able to win in this struggle given which we are fighting, where we are fighting, and how we are fighting. The conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and throughout the globe now and in the future, are not military or even purely insurgency revolutions, but are religious, political and social upheavals. In todays current parlance, we are fighting in what William Lind calls fourth generation warfare. Lind said, all over the world, citizens of states are transferring their primary allegiance away from the state to other things: to tribes, ethnic groups, religions, gangs, ideologies and so on. The first three generations of warfare were conventional and even when they were unconventional in tactics; the heart of the matter was the survival or destruction of a state. In fourth generation warfare, the war is fought not only on the ground of a nation-state, but also in the boundless world of ideas, moral, political, and social. Fortunately, if applied correctly, smart power can and should be the theoretical paradigm that we take on as a government and a nation in our attempt to ultimately be victorious on todays fourth generation warfare battlefield. So far, fourth generation warfare has defied an operational construct. Therefore, success in warfares next evolution means the United States must win the decisive battle at the strategic and tactical levels of war while it re-defines warfares operational art. It must do this by bridging the gap between theory and practice adopting a grand strategy founded on the moral element that employs smarter organized, integrated, and trained military forces. It must build forces that possess the capability to blend hard and soft power to seize the initiative in the information environment and exploit inconsistencies in its

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SECOND DRAFT enemys messages and actions. This will create an informed combination of its coercive and attractive powers that morally undermines its enemys purposes and eliminates their causes. Adding to this debate, U.S. Air Force Colonel (ret) John Boyd identified three complementary levels of war that the United States must consider: the physical, the mental, and the moral. He said that what works for you on the physical and sometimes mental level often works against you on the moral level. In todays conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and our struggles to identify ourselves relative to Islamic radicalism, America is well positioned to win at the tactical level through physical domination and to a lesser extent the mental level. However, because the United States government committed itself to war physically on the tactic terrorism - and not morally through its words and deeds on those who committed the act on 9/11 it is losing the war at the moral level. The moral level, however, is the decisive victory. Each of the authors has fought on these fourth generation warfare battlefields, physically, mentally, and morally. They will show that smart power can be translated usefully into real accomplishments on the ground, but more importantly, can be used to guide our operational and strategic polices in the United States government. In the first chapter, United States Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Todd Desgrosseilliers explores why the United States Government is struggling in its efforts to defeat radical Islams ideology. Primarily this struggle is because it lacks a proper focus of effort. In Iraq and elsewhere, the United States is in the midst of a fourth generation conflict that it is trying to win with second and third generation military strategy and tactics. This difficulty is further enhanced by a failure of other elements of U.S. national power diplomatic, information, and economic to capitalize on tactical successes to generate lasting strategic results. Based upon his experience in Iraqs Al Anbar Province from 2004-2007, he believes a better understanding of warfares new demands will drive a willingness to adopt a smart power grand strategy to adapt to them. This grand strategy in turn - will force major changes in how the United States trains and educates its military and civilian personnel and how it organizes and employs these forces in current and future conflicts. The United States must win hearts and minds by convincing local populations that it can protect them and persuading them its success and their success is linked and mutual. Ultimately, success means the United States government must regain the initiative in the information environment by incorporating its hard and soft tactical actions into smarter and more effective strategic communications. In the second chapter, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Gwyn Armfield will then examine the operational level projection of smart power. Colonel Armfield was a special operations unit commander 12 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT in United States Central Command from 2005-2007 in addition to eight years of inter-agency counter terrorism experience. He examines how to translate smart power from theory to practice at the regional level where it is needed most. His chapter is about combining the power of State and Defense to work at the regional level despite vastly different cultural genomes, wildly disparate budgets, personnel strengths and organizational structures with no similarities. The current fight, likely to continue for a generation, demands that these instruments of hard and soft power evolve rapidly to meet the critical needs of America. Specifically, the chapter explores the need for State to fill a major gap between their mother ship headquarters in Washington, D.C. and the hundreds of United States embassies throughout the world. The expansion of States soft power at this regional level is necessary to balance the monolithic hard power presence of the Defense Departments regional commanders. Colonel Armfield recommends specific actions to restore balance enabling smart power planning and implementation to work with a regional approach. The United States government currently has ample authorities to employ the inter-agency effectively but it cant be micromanaged from Washington, D.C.--where the solutions to regional issues will always have a bias toward solving Washingtons problem of the day. However, State and Defense must use available resources and authorities to regroup and form teams that focus on regional issues. Only then, will the strategic recommendations from the Smart power Commission translate into enhanced influence for America. In the last chapter, U.S. Army Colonel John Tien will use his tactical experiences from 2006-2007 in Iraq to demonstrate how nation-building at the tactical level was and will continue to be a useful application of the United States governments smart power in Iraq. Colonel Tien admits, however, that the United States military can advance smart power applications only so far and that the United States government should and must adapt its civilian deployment capacity in order to leverage the United States governments full smart power capabilities in Iraq and other future such scenarios. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies Commission on Smart Power, more thought should also be put into sequencing and integrating hard and soft power instruments, particularly in the same operating theater. Some elements of this approach are already occurring in the conduct of ongoing counterinsurgency, nation building, and counterterrorism operations tasks that depend critically but only partially on hard power.8 In an attempt to defeat Al-Qaedas efforts to win over the people, Colonel Tiens battalion used a variety of effective nation-building operations to improve the life of the average Iraqi and demonstrate that Americas ideals of good governance, lawful civil society, and economic prosperity were indeed a 13 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT better choice for the Iraqi people than what Al-Qaeda was offering. He will showcase the efforts of several Soldiers and officers in his battalion in two very distinct regions of Iraq: Tal Afar in Nineveh Province and Ramadi in Al Anbar Province. He will use these two Iraqi cities as case studies to show not only what can be done, but also to show what must change in order to fully apply all levers of the US Government. Perhaps most importantly though, the response to his battalions use of smart power from the Iraqis, officials and the everyday man on the street, were as the Smart Power Commission would have hoped: welcomed by the moderate Islamic factions and eventually. Colonel Tien concludes that while the United States military has helped fill the vacuum created by the lack of on-the-ground qualified United States governmental development/assistance experts, there are many reforms within the United States government that we should undertake immediately to include increased staffing to the embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams, initial staffing and funding of the Civilian Reserve Corps, increased staffing and support to the Active Response Corps, and initiating and supporting more bottom up economic reform especially through microfinance programs. Clearly from the three authors experiences and recommendations, this is not an easy struggle to win, but it is a struggle we must win. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. said, To win the war on terrorism, the United States will have to show as much skill in the future in wielding its soft power as it has shown in the past in wielding its hard power. 9 As officers who have led battalion-level organizations in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, we realize that the final element of victory must come from sources of power other than the military and in particular, from what America is uniquely able to offer in the way of values, ideas and hope. Prior to examining the three officers treatment of smart power in their strategic, operational, and tactical contexts, it is useful to understand more concretely what smart power is and how it fits within the newest evolution of warfare.

An Introduction to Smart Power and its Role in Fourth Generation Warfare

Todays central question is not simply whether we are capturing or killing more terrorists than are being recruited and trained, but whether we are providing more opportunities than our enemies can destroy and whether we are addressing more grievances than they can record. 10 CSIS Smart Power Report

The world expects the United States to behave like a great power in its relationships with other nations. Its prudent leadership is expected and is essential to ensure peace and prosperity for most nations within the international community. This international leadership responsibility means that its national 14 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT posture must reflect confidence and strength as well as the hope embodied in its national values and founding principles. This is not an argument for triumphalism or belligerence, but neither should it leave any doubt that other nations or organizations can violate the United States interests, security, and rights as a nation without consequences. This approach will not cause other nations to love the United States, but a policy of consistency and fairness will promote dignity and generate respect dignity and respect is the mortar that binds enduring relationships and sustains the strong alliances necessary to defeat terrorism. Duncan MacInnes, Principal Deputy Coordinator for the Bureau of International Information Programs in the U. S. State Department, made the following statement about the importance of national values during testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities:

During the Cold War, we fought a traditional enemy in the USSR and our tools included traditional public diplomacy tools such as educational exchanges, publications, and mainstream media. These tools are still very effective at winning hearts and minds, but are not sufficient by themselves. Our themes to win the war of ideas against communism stressed our core values our dedication to liberty, democracy, freedom of speech and religion, and free markets and our opposition to intellectual coercion, and political and economic oppression. These principles remain relevant and powerful today, but we need to continue to develop new tactics to counter an elusive and decentralized non-state foe [that] uses the Internet and new technologies to spread its ideology of violence. 11 Why not start the process with a grand strategy properly constructed to win the decisive moral battle? A smart power grand strategy will provide a blueprint that will enable American values on the ground to attract moderate populations to our side while it provides the security to build capable, democratic governance. According to Joseph S. Nye, Jr. of Harvard University, Soft Power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or paymentsWhen our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced. 12 He adds that soft power uses a different type of currency to engender cooperation an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values." 13 A nations soft power attraction - rests on three resources: 14 1. Culture. 2. Political values. 3. Foreign policy. Contrarily, hard power coercion - uses base human elements as its medium; fear and selfinterest: 1. Force, threat of force. 15 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT 2. Economic sanctions. 3. Payments. These all provide hard power its employment. While military application of coercive power is often necessary to achieve a certain level of security, to succeed in fourth generation warfare, the United States should temper its effects by blending hard power with other attractive elements of national power in a comprehensive smart power grand strategy. In the recent Center for Strategic and International Studies Commission report on smart power, Joseph Nye and Ambassador Richard Armitage state, Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft powerToday, victory depends on attracting foreign populations to our side and helping them to build capable, democratic states. 15 This means the United States must invest in the global good by providing things that other nations cannot get without United States leadership. This strategy includes five critical areas: 16 1. Developing and integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives drawing on both hard and soft power. 2. Attracting foreign populations toward American objectives and helping them build capable democratic states. 3. Complementing U.S. military and economic might with greater investments in soft power enablers such as: a. Alliances, partnerships, and institutions. b. Global development. c. Public diplomacy. d. Economic integration. e. Technology and innovation. 4. Provide the things that foreign populations and their governments want but cannot get without American leadership. 5. Defeating the terrorists narrative that the United States is weak-willed and hard-hearted. If the United States complements its military and economic might with a greater emphasis on soft power, it can begin to construct a grand strategy framework it needs to tackle the emerging challenges presented by international terrorism: 1. Small, adaptable, networked, transnational, non-state actors versus large, inflexible, bureaucratic, international nation-states. 2. No purely military solution. 16 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT 3. Purely military solution is desired by terrorist organizations. 4. Use of terrorist attacks as a legitimate form of warfare combined with globalization of martyrdom. 5. Use of the ungoverned information environment to deliver existential moral message that transcends nation-state loyalties. Re-gaining the moral advantage in the Long War requires adopting a moral basis for the United States grand strategy. It needs a grand strategy that governs the United States governments actions in warfare that is consistent with its espoused values and principles. History demonstrates that unilateral military action tends to produce a backlash in domestic and international opinion. Americas pre-eminent grand strategist Colonel John Boyd U.S. Air Force (ret) recommended adopting a unifying vision as a moral basis for any grand strategy to avoid unintended consequences of what others may view as an aggressive foreign policy. The Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution present this vision for the United States. Using these documents as its foundation leaves the principal challenge to United States grand strategy to advocating the ideals embodied in them, while it demonstrates respect for the culture and achievements of its allies, potential adversaries, and the populations of actual adversaries. Boyd suggested a straight-forward, three-part approach: 17 1. With respect to the United States: a. Live up to its ideals. b. Eliminate flaws in the system. c. Emphasize cultural traditions, experiences, and unfolding events that build-up harmony and trust. 2. With respect to its adversaries: a. Publicize their harsh statements and threats to highlight that its survival is always at risk. b. Reveal mismatches between their professed ideals and how their government actually acts. c. Acquaint their population with its philosophy and way of life to show that the mismatches of their government do not accord with any social value based on either the value or the dignity of the individual or on the security and the well being of society as a whole. 3. With respect to uncommitted and potential adversaries: a. Show respect for their culture. 17 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT b. Bear them no harm. c. Reward harmony with common causes. d. Demonstrate that it will not tolerate nor support those ideas and intentions that work against its culture and fitness to cope. Information and associated information systems are essential to integrate these activities into a comprehensive strategic communications plan to defeat the enemy. Although intended to work against other nation-states, this moral basis for grand strategy will also limit the support for terrorist adversaries. Its success depends upon the United States ability to uphold its moral element and to use the information environment deliver its important messages. A true smart power grand strategy requires a strategic overhaul of the United States government from its current Cold War hierarchy to align resources to meet these new challenges. The most important change for a successful strategy will require interdependence among and within governmental agencies. This interdependence is particularly critical between and within the stove-piped and institutional cultures that represent the elements of United States national power diplomatic, information, military and economic. A true smart power strategy requires a highly flexible, inter-agency command system that can coordinate across multiple national agencies and address international issues with results-oriented solutions. This requirement will successfully abandon the ineffective, inter-operability, spirit of cooperation mindset that undermines joint and inter-agency operations and contributes to the United States failures its current conflict. Most importantly it will drive organization, training, and funding to focus more on results and less on effort from the strategic to the tactical level in the Long War. A smart power strategy more focused on results and less on process and procedure is better suited for a new generation of warfare against a highly adaptive and results-oriented enemy.

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CHAPTER 1: The Moral Advantage in Fourth Generation Warfare: Smart Power, Strategic Communications, and Winning the Decisive Battle in the Long War.

Lieutenant Colonel Todd Desgrosseilliers, USMC When I was a young officer, I was taught that if you have air superiority, land superiority and sea superiority, you win. Well, in Vietnam we had air superiority, land superiority and sea superiority, but we lost. So I realized there is something more to it.Colonel John Boyd, USAF (Ret)

During the second half of the last century modern warfare stirred with corresponding political, economic, social, and technological developments - evolving from an industrial-based to an informationbased activity. This evolutionary process produced sharp changes in the way the United States opponents conduct war in this century. The latest shift - fourth generation warfare - is both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas. It is a fight against non-state actors and their murderous ideology. The United States Governments current approach to this emerging generation of warfare lacks a proper grand strategy and places too much emphasis on the enemys physical destruction. While killing committed opponents remains an important result in warfare, the decisive battle in fourth generation warfare is the moral element, not the physical element, and its center of gravity is the information environment. So far, fourth generation warfare has defied an operational construct. Therefore, success in warfares generation-x means the United States must win the decisive battle at the strategic and tactical levels of war while it re-defines warfares operational art. It must do this by bridging the gap between theory and practice adopting a grand strategy founded on the moral element that employs smarter organized, integrated, and trained military forces. It must build forces that possess the capability to blend hard and soft power creating smart power. Effective strategic communications can then seize the initiative in the information environment to exploit inconsistencies in its enemys messages and actions. Effective strategic communications combined with actions that incorporate all elements of national power will create an informed combination of Americas coercive and attractive powers that morally undermines its enemys purposes and eliminates their causes. 21st Century warfares rapidly changing conduct is further complicated by amorphous opponents like Al Qaeda - who transfer their primary allegiance away from their nation-state. With an enormous bureaucracy and a highly centralized structure designed to defeat the military forces of other nation-states, 19 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT this makes it difficult for the United States military alone to subdue non-state actors that conduct illegal warfare through terrorism. Abut Ubeid Al-Qurashi, writing in 2002 to encourage Al Qaeda members in Afghanistan after the U.S. launched Operation Enduring Freedom demonstrates that this fact is not lost on Americas enemies: Fourth Generation Wars haveproven the superiority of the weaker powerThis forecast did not arise in a vacuumfourth-generation wars have already occurred andthe superiority of the theoretically weaker party has already been proven; in many instances, nation-states have been defeated by stateless nations[America] is baffled by fourth-generation warfare 18 The United States Government is struggling in its efforts to defeat radical Islams ideology because, in Iraq and elsewhere, it is in the midst of a fourth generation conflict that it is trying to win with second and third generation military strategy and tactics. This difficulty is further enhanced by a failure of other elements of U.S. national power diplomatic, information, and economic to capitalize on tactical successes to generate lasting strategic results. This chapter will use a case study to explain how a better understanding of warfares new demands must drive a willingness to adopt a grand strategy using the smart power concept to adapt to them. Specifically it will demonstrate how this understanding, in turn, will compel the United States government to focus more on strategic communicationsmoving it into Colonel Boyds war with something more to it.

A New Generation of Warfare ExploredThe first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establishthe kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature. comprehensive. Carl von Clausewitz, On War This is the first of all strategic questions and the most

A smart power grand strategy is best applied to fourth generation warfare because neither offers purely military solutions for success. This means that other elements of national power diplomatic, information, and economic must combine to support or in many cases - lead military actions. Unlike the three previous generations of warfare, fourth generation warfare is not a result of a revolution within the military. 19 It is a political, social, and moral revolution: a crisis of nation-state legitimacy. On one side its participants seek to destroy the nation-state, on the other side is an effort to preserve or restore the nation-state. 20 20 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT Properly applied fourth generation warfare uses the moral element to collapse one side internally rather than emphasizing the physical destruction of its military forces or wartime resources. While previous generations were two-sided conflicts between nation-states, fourth generation warfare is often a many-sided struggle where many different entities enter the fray. Strategic targets include: 1. International and domestic support for the war. 2. Hearts and minds of local populations. 3. All networks available in the information environment. Tactical strengths include: 1. Local language capabilities. 2. Public diplomacy skills. 3. Information collection and dissemination capabilities. 4. Micro-economics enabling capabilities. 5. Willingness to conduct dismounted patrolling combined with civil affairs skills. 6. Proficiency employing precision munitions combined with close combat fighting skills. 7. Sharp instincts tied to a beat cop mentality; 8. Sturdy professionalism. 9. Self-discipline. 10. A solid moral compass and a virtue ethic. Fourth generation warfares asymmetric nature places high importance on correctly identifying the enemys center of gravity in the Long War it resides within the information environment. In spite of this the Ancient Greek historian Thucydides conclusions about warfares nature in his treatise The Peloponnesian War remain constant. Warfare is still driven by the interaction of power, interests, and passions and states still act out of fear, honor, and self-interest. Furthermore, although fourth generation warfare may have turned Clausewitz theory of Trinitarian warfare 21 and wars conduct on its head, his ideas about its governance remain constant. 22 It is still dominated by uncertainty, chance, danger, and physical effort. So, while some elements of warfare remain constant throughout history its conduct changes. Since 1648 and the Peace of Westphalia, its conduct has changed in response to corresponding political, economic, social, and technological developments in society as a whole. Today, success means adapting to or better yet anticipating changes in wars conduct. In the Long War, success means winning the decisive battle which resides in fourth generation warfares moral element by eliminating the information environment as the enemys center of gravity.

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SECOND DRAFT Connecting Words and Deeds: 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines in Habbaniyah, Iraq 2006-2007

The world doesnt fear a new idea. It can pigeonhole any idea. But it cant pigeonhole a new experience. D. H. Lawrence, The White Peacock

Given the generational shift in warfare the question we should ask ourselves is what can be done? I opened the previous section with a quote from Carl von Clausewitz stressing the importance of judgment in statesmen and military commanders to establish the kind of war they are fighting. Aristotles observation on reasoning that a small mistake at the beginning becomes a big one at the ends holds true in warfare as well. The failure of second generation strategy and tactics in Iraq and Afghanistan provide ample support to this statement. The first step to success in the current generation of conflict is to evaluate the strategic, operational, and tactical requirements accordingly. We must acknowledge that this generation of warfare like other elements in the modern world - exists within the information environment. This makes information a significant source of strength for the side that uses it best. Also, we must understand that a fourth generation adversarys goal is the destruction of the nation-state. Therefore, removing all the elements of a nation-states national powerlike the United States did in Iraqonly works in the enemys favor. The next step is to understand and draw lessons from the relatively few cases throughout history where nation-state sponsored military forces succeeded in preserving or restoring another nation- states security, governance, and economic integration. In his book, The Changing Face of War, Martin van Creveld demonstrates that most wars since 1945 have been conflicts where insurgents have won meaning of course that most nation-state restoration projects failed in their efforts. However, this does not mean that counter-insurgent forces need to resign themselves to failure. It does mean that we should throw overboard 99 percent of the literature on counterinsurgency, counter-guerrilla, counterterrorism, and the like. Since most of it has been written by the loosing side, it is of little value. 23 Harvard Professor Kalev Sepps Military Review article, Best Practices in Counterinsurgency and Australian Army Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullens research paper Twenty-eight Articles are two examples of valuable and comprehensive fourth generation warfare research.

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Successful Emphasis on intelligence Focus on population, their needs, and security Secure areas established and expanded Insurgents isolated from population Single authority Effective, pervasive psychological operations Amnesty and rehabilitation for insurgents Police in lead; military supporting Police force expanded, diversified Conventional military forces re-oriented for counterinsurgency Special Forces, advisors embedded with indigenous forces Insurgent sanctuaries denied

Unsuccessful Primacy of military direction Priority to kill-capture enemy vice engaging population Battalion-size operations as the norm Military units concentrated on large bases for protection Special Forces focused on raiding Advisor effort a low priority in personnel assignment Building, training indigenous army in image of selves Peacetime government processes Open borders, airspace, coastlines

Table 1 Successful and Unsuccessful Practices 24

Professor Sepp undertook a study of fifty-three 20th Century insurgencies to draw lessons from successes and failures in this common type of conflict. His lessons, outlined in Table 1, provide successful and unsuccessful practices drawn from his research. 25 These practices directly apply to battalion-level operations in a fourth generation environment and present some useful principles for fourth generation warfare at its tactical level. His successful efforts draw on a combination of both hard and soft power whereas his unsuccessful efforts draw heavily on hard power and military direction. Since tactical efforts cannot succeed on their own results, their ultimate value rests in their link to strategic objectives. Clearly, successful efforts relied on a blending of coercive and attractive power; whereas unsuccessful efforts primarily focused on hard power and an insurgent forces physical destruction. Lieutenant Colonel Kilcullen linked various counterinsurgency theories with tactical fundamentals, techniques, and procedures familiar to many military personnel. His twenty-eight articles, listed in Table 2, provide some tactical fundamentals drawn from his professional study of counterinsurgency and personal experience in these fourth generation environments throughout his career as an officer in the Australian Army. These articles directly apply to company-level operations in a fourth generation environment. They provide some useful principles for fourth generation warfare at the tactical level and also recognize the value of combining hard and soft power for success. The key role assumed by the information environment is highlighted in Articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 11, 13, 18, 19, 21, 23, and 25. Out of 28 articles, eleven - or 44 percent - involve effects in the information environment. Its hard to imagine

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SECOND DRAFT a successful outcome without effective strategic communication - along with the plans, resources, and capabilities to make it work. Twenty-Eight Articles Article 1 Know your Turf Article 2 Diagnose the Problem Article 3 Organize for Intelligence Article 4 Travel light and harden CSS Article 5 - Organize for Interagency Operations Article 6 Find a Political/Cultural Advisor Article 7 Train the Squad leaders and trust Them Article 8 Rank is Nothing Talent is Everything Article 9 Have a game plan Article 10 Be There Article 11 Avoid Knee-Jerk Responses to First Impressions Article 12 Prepare for Handover from Day One Article 13 Build Trusted Networks Article 14 Start Easy Article 15 Seek Early Victories Article 16 Practice Deterrent Patrolling Article 17 Be Prepared for Setbacks Article 18 Remember the Global Audience Article 19 Engage the Women; Beware the Children Article 20 Take Stock Regularly Article 21 Exploit a Single Narrative Article 22 Local Forces should Mirror the Enemy Not Us Article 23 Practice Armed Civil Affairs Article 24 Small is Beautiful Article 25 Fight the Enemys Strategy Not his Forces Article 26 Build your own Solution Only Attack the enemy When he Gets in the Way Article 27 Keep Your Extraction Plan Secret Article 28 Whatever Else Your Do Keep the initiative

Table 2 Twenty-Eight Articles 26

Used as a case study for tactical analysis, the Marine Corps infantry battalion I led from January 2006 to June 2007 adopted the successful principles and the twenty-eight articles outlined by Sepp and Kilcullen to form our concept of operations for our deployment to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. We also drew lessons from other units deployments to Anbar Province through the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System and the Center for Army Lessons Learned and incorporated these into our pre-deployment training plans. Our goal was to identify best practices and adapt these into the current situation for the area of Iraq where we were planning to operate. We deployed to Iraqs Al Anbar Province in June 2006 and were assigned responsibility for the area between East Ramadi and West Fallujah along 36 kilometers of the Fallujah-Ramadi Road. We remained there until we departed in February 2007. 27 The region locally known as Habbaniyah included about 45,000 Iraqi citizens and was mostly rural with some small villages and one urban area 24 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT Khalidayah - with about 25,000 Iraqi citizens. The rest lived in or near smaller villages spread throughout our assigned area. In Iraq, we entered a fourth generation environment. We were a second generation organization that was well-prepared for the physical confrontation, but were only partly prepared for the decisive moral engagement. We lacked: foreign language capabilities; public diplomacy skills; information collection

Figure 1

and dissemination capabilities; micro-economics capabilities; civil affairs capability. We recognized the change in wars conduct before we deployed to Iraq andalthough we acknowledged we would lack some of the unique skills required for successdeveloped a concept for operating that ultimately enabled us to accomplish part of our mission. Figure 2 and figure 3 are the front 25 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT and back of a pocket card we developed to represent our vision for success. We carried these and used them in our pre-deployment training in the United States and in our combat patrol briefings in Iraq to keep us focused on our mission turning a stable, secure, democratic country over to an elected and effective Iraqi government. Our overarching concept was to prepare ourselves for the next battlefield. Over 50 percent of the battalions personnel completed at least one other deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. This top to our

Figure 2 Vision For Success (Front)

pillars was designed to promote learning within the unit and avoid a this is how we did it last time mentality. Our goal was to become a learning organization that placed value on initiative tempered by wisdom - and to avoid a reactive approach to challenges from the enemy. Assisted by Sepp and Kilcullens research, we understood that our actions must transmit a basic respect for human rights and a concern for the dignity of individual Iraqi citizens. We understood that legitimate, honest, well-trained, and robust indigenous police forces that supported good governance were the keys to success. Therefore, put an Iraqi capability on it was our first and main pillar -- supporting the Iraqi military and Iraqi police 26 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT and developing governance became our main effort. This meant that our best personnel - including our operations officer, best company commander, and key enlisted leadership who were not replaced - went to augment the three Military Transition Teams that supported the 1st Iraqi Army Divisions Third Brigade and the Police Training Team located at Camp Habbaniyah. The absence of effective Iraqi Police Forces and any form of governance in our assigned area meant that we needed to work closely with the Iraqi Army units stationed with us to provide security along with other basic needs like water and electricity. We also needed to help local citizens create legitimate governance that connected them to the Provincial capital in Ramadi. Our goal was to create a stable secure environment for the Iraqi people. This meant we practiced armed civil affairs while we marginalized the enemy forces operating in our area. We fought the enemys strategynot his forces by responding with precise and devastating force when attacked; capturing those who were about to attack us; and maintaining the initiative through a robust strategic communications effort. We sought to morally undermine the enemy, convince them to stop fighting, and become part of a peaceful resolution to the local situation. Those who would not defect or surrender, were either captured or killed in combined operations with the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, and a group of unarmed concerned local citizens (formed in November 2006) that called themselves Thawar al Anbar (Anbar Revolutionary Fighters). The first pillar highlighted the importance of mentoring and coaching as well as training and operating with indigenous forces while doing no harm to noncombatants and the local infrastructure. The key to success was building a stable and secure environment that was ensured by legitimate Iraqi security forces. This understanding eliminated some of the stigma that our forces carried as invaders and occupiers in Iraq. Our concentration on the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police forces maintained our focus on the moral element critical to success in a fourth generation environment. The second pillar acknowledged the necessity to fight the enemy. The fourth generation environment meant we would face an enemy that hides among the local population. So we adopted an instinct-based mentality common among street-fighters. A large part of the moral element was convincing the local population that we could protect them from the terrorists. Our superior combat power meant that the enemy would avoid prolonged battles with us. Therefore, when we were attacked, we needed to win this 10-second street fight by relying on three Principles of War: security, surprise, and unity of command. We used a guardian angel concept that drove our planning to avoid making uncovered moves on the battlefield and forced us to examine the second and third order effects of killing and destroying the enemy a collateral damage assessment. Often, avoiding collateral damage or deescalating violence became more important than killing the enemy. We tempered our desire to fight the enemy with tactical patience using intelligence to fight him on ground that we chose. This 27 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT acknowledged fourth generation warfares unique environment where success is moral and often counterintuitive because it is primarily about persuading and convincing the moderate populations that you can protect them and that you have their best interests in mind - killing and destroying the extremists is secondary to these primary concerns.

Figure 3 Vision for Success (Back)

The third pillar recognized that the goal of our enemy was to destroy the creation of a stable and secure nation-state in Iraq and supported our goal to restore the rule of law and legitimate governance. Our national values of freedom, justice, and respect for human dignity served as a foundation for our actions and provided a framework for fighting an amoral enemy. We saw the information environment as the center of gravity as we struggled to deliver our message and undermine that of the enemy. Over a period of several months of trial and error, effective information operations (actually strategic communications) enabled us to compete in the decisive battle for the moral element -- collapsing the enemy internally rather than exclusive focus on physically destroying his forces. 28 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT The back of the card directly addressed the moral element in the fourth generation conflict we expected to encounter in Iraq. These ideas formed the essence of our strategic communications efforts. Applying Colonel John Boyds idea of adopting a unifying vision as a moral basis to avoid unintended consequences of what others may view as aggressive behavior, we locally applied his idea of grand strategy. We looked at behavior with respect to ourselves; with respect to our adversaries; and with respect to the uncommitted and/or potential adversaries. We examined the types of people we would see in Iraq - from their perspective. We thought they would see themselves as either insurgent - against the Iraqi government and coalition forces; indifferent neither for nor against either side; or innocent caught somewhere in the middle with no means to protect themselves from either side and unable or unwilling to leave the area. We hoped to win the hearts and minds of the last two types with tactical actions that convinced them that we could protect them and strategic communications that persuaded them that we had their best interests in mind. We thought they would view us in three ways: 1. How we treat them. 2. How we protect them. 3. How we compensate them. Without going to deeply into cultural anthropology, we tried to treat them in a way that was consistent with their culture as we understood it. We relied heavily on Raphael Patais book, The Arab Mind as reference for our conclusions. We thought the Iraqi people placed high value on humility and a sense of personal honor and pride. We addressed this by resolving to treat the indifferent and the innocent with dignity and respect and adopting restraint in the use of force whenever these types of people where involved in a given situation. For ourselves we adopted an ethic a process that leads to a moral outcome - that emphasized conduct based upon the virtues of prudence, courage, temperance, and justice. For us, justice meant truthfulness; temperance meant restraint; courage meant fortitude; and prudence meant wisdom. Our Battalion Chaplain, U.S. Navy Lieutenant John Anderson, was instrumental in developing these concepts and worked closely with me and the units various commanders and senior enlisted personnel to deliver them to the men. We also borrowed heavily from James Toners excellent book on this subject, Morals under the Gun: The Cardinal Virtues, Military Ethics, and American Society, to create a pamphlet on Virtue Ethics for the battalions leadership to use as a reference to train themselves and the men. Military ethical and moral training should focus on developing moral behavior in its noncommissioned officers and commissioned officers through a practical understanding and application of virtue ethics. Character development based upon personal integrity augmented with simple pocket cards 29 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT like the one identified in figure 4 and figure 5 are sufficient to insert virtue into their daily training routine. Treating others with dignity and respect, following the Golden Rule, and a willingness to learn about other cultures goes further toward overcoming cultural boundaries than any amount of cultural sensitivity. Certain human actions are preceded and caused by what Thomas Jefferson called operations of the mind. Visible behavior often springs from invisible traits generally attributed to a persons moral compass. Harvard Professor Lawrence Kohlberg does an excellent job of demonstrating that moral behavior is not automatic in humans. It is learned and often requires enforced learning to make it habit part of individual character in humans below the age of 20 years. The majority of my battalion was

Figure 4 Virtue Ethics Card (Front)

Figure 5 Virtue Ethics Card (Back)

below this threshold. It is not too much to hope that enforced behavior patterns can alter the moral attributes of an individuals character. Free-play exercises laced with ethical challenges that are part of tactical decision-making and mission accomplishment create an environment where virtue and ethics become part of individual leadership placing a focus on combat effectiveness instead of combat readiness. We used these cards during our deployment to Iraq in 2006 and 2007. They were carried as pocket items throughout the battalion and used during combat patrol briefings to reinforce these virtues and remind everyone their importance for our success. This approach enhanced our ability to engage the local Iraqi population because our actions increased our moral effect standing in stark contrast to the immoral effect of the terrorists. Finally, we thought they would view us in how we compensate them for what we do; what we dont do; and for what we use. This principle is fully articulated in Mao Tse-Tungs classic book on revolutionary guerrilla warfare, On Guerrilla Warfare, in his three rules and eight remarks 28 : Rules: 1. All actions are subject to command. 2. Do not steal from the people. 30 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT 3. Be neither selfish nor unjust. Remarks: 1. Replace the door when you leave the house. 2. Roll up the bedding on which you have slept. 3. Be courteous. 4. Be honest in your transactions. 5. Return want you borrow. 6. Replace what you break. 7. Do not bathe in the presence of women. 8. Do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest. We viewed the enemy as an opponent in warfare. In a fourth generation environment this meant we need to positively identify them first. Since our ethic our approach to achieving a moral outcome in specific situations was based upon a virtue of justice, we went to the just war traditions jus in bello concepts of discrimination and restraint. These concepts complimented the published Rules of Engagement (ROE) that focused on legal not moral outcomes on the battlefield based upon the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Our focus was on disrupting or neutralizing not destroying the enemy in an attempt to gain the initiative and destroy their will to fight. We measured our effectiveness in terms of numbers of enemy who defected, surrendered, or were captured, or killed in that order of priority. The entire concept relied upon excellent intelligence (specifically human intelligence) that enabled us to gain the initiative over our Arabic-speaking, unprincipled, unrestrained, and amorphous enemy. An important and frustrating fact about fourth generation warfare is that the enemy does not identify itself by wearing uniforms, but uses advantages afforded by operating covertly and blending in with the civilian population as a weapon. This becomes particularly challenging for a conventional force with a different culture and language. It is only intelligence collected by people who are as familiar with the environment as the enemy hiding in it that is useful. The ability to speak the local language is as important as fighting skills. Unfortunately, with slightly more than a dozen interpreters for an average of 65 patrols per day (most of these were dismounted patrols) we were ill-equipped for this task. It is a tribute to the virtue and resourcefulness of my men that in spite of the immense language barrier they were able to play a key role in developing an Iraqi Police force and operate on a daily basis with Iraqi security forces in our area. Ultimately, by December 2006, we succeeded in transitioning almost 70 percent of our assigned area to the Iraqi governments control where it remains to date. Effective strategic communications are a critical requirement in an environment where the moral element is the decisive battle. 31 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT Second generation military organizations are poorly suited for this human resource-oriented form of information gathering activity. The intelligence resources that did exist were usually consolidated one or two levels above the battalion in tactical fusion cells and seldom provided quality intelligence in a timely manner. Our battalion had seven trained intelligence personnel for a task force that ranged from 1200-1700 personnel (two officers and five enlisted personnel). These seven personnel supported a task force operating from 15 patrol bases and combat outposts that were spread over 300 square kilometers. Effective strategic communications requires an ability to quickly analyze information and pre-empt or counter the enemys messages. An intelligence capability at the company-level is essential to maintain the initiative in battle for the moral element and to eliminate the information environment as an enemy center of gravity. We gained success through the courage, initiative, intellect, and team work that resided within the battalion. As the battalions engagement efforts continued in our area, we built a wide network of information sources that enhanced our local intelligence. However, this activity took several months to produce results and was constantly hampered by a shortage of skilled intelligence analysts and interpreters. 29 With no other ability within the battalion to speak Arabic, patrols were often reduced to using pictures and other pointy-talky cards to communicate with the locals. Information collectedFigure 6 Combined operations overcame language barriers and increased security

was analyzed at the battalion-level or higher. This meant delays in action while we processed information

into intelligence. More interpreters or, better yet, a genuine attempt to teach Arabic to a small portion of the battalions Marines and Sailors would have provided a critical capability to allow us to gain the initiative in our strategic communications efforts. The human intelligence collection capability is not enough to win in this environment. Winning means that sturdy professionalism and self-discipline, economic development, and good governance, must augment and support accurate and timely intelligence. These activities combined with an effective communication strategy that unapologetically explained why our second pillar often dominated our actions. A solid moral compass and an application of the Golden Rule will overcome cultural barriers. The key for us was to avoid the sharp shift from killing to kindness... 30 that arises from impatience and poor discipline and makes one appear hard-hearted on one extreme and weak-willed on the other. 32 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT Over time, our operational concept enabled us to de-escalate violent confrontations, increased our ability to apply the principles of discrimination and restraint, and provided the local Iraqis with the hope essential to win the decisive moral battle in a fourth generation war. This fact makes smart power --

developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit that draws on both hard and soft power -useful in a fourth generation environment because often success depends as much on ethically and morally attracting local populations and helping them to create, preserve, or restore capable democratic nation-states as it does on killing the enemy. Winning hearts and minds is about security and calculated self-interest. Winning hearts is about persuading people that the United States military can protect them without destroying their value systems and cultures. It must in fact have genuine respect for their value systems and cultures to win their passive or active support. This means military forces must enter into the fray with an understanding of how local value systems and cultural norms interact with their own values and culture. Friction will exist when a non-traditional culture interacts with a traditional culture. They key to success in finding common ground and building upon that foundation through engagement. This engagement must have a moral basis and our actions must highlight ethical conduct. Winning minds is about convincingFigure 7 Engagement is the foundation. Local Mayor accompanied by Iraqi Police, LtCol Desgrosseilliers and an interpreter meet with local citizens in front of a medical clinic in Modiq, Iraq

people that the United States Governments success is equivalent to their success. Conversely, the United

States Government must also believe that a foreign populations concept of success is equivalent to its success. Strategic communications that presents a coherent grand strategy directly linked to tactical actions is essential to deliver this message. International and domestic media outlets play a critical role in this process as well. The center of gravity in this war is the information environment. The United States government must improve its strategic communications if it expects to match its potential in a battle of ideas with its capability in the battle of arms.

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SECOND DRAFT Regaining the Information InitiativeMore than four centuries ago, Niccolo Machiavelli advised princes in Italy that it was more important to be feared than to be loved. But in todays world, it is best to be both. Winning hearts and minds has always been important, but it is even more so in an information age. Information is power, and modern information technology is spreading information more widely than ever before in history 31 Joseph S. Nye Jr.

Ive said throughout this paper that the information environment is the center of gravity in fourth generation conflicts. It is the center of gravity because it is a significant source of strength to the enemy. The way to eliminate a center of gravity in warfare is to attack it indirectly. The United States government must do this by winning the battle for the moral element on the ground and by capturing this success with effective strategic communications. It should adopt a strategic communications plan that focuses on influencing attitudes, behaviors, and perceptions of the three major groups outlined in a smart power grand strategy: its own population, the populations of its allies and potential enemies, and the populations of its current enemies. Winning this battle means it must emphasize strategic communications in the same way that it does with intelligence enabling strategic communications to drive operations. This means changing its organization without creating additional bureaucracy and fighting the battle of ideas with efficiency, initiative, and imagination. Since 1996 Al Qaeda under its leader Osama bin laden has grown into a network of likeminded individuals, apparently all Muslim but of many different nationalities, that links together groups in as many as sixty countries. 32 As an organization it pursues an ideology that excels in fourth generation warfare because its strategy includes very effective strategic communications. For them winning is about delivering their message while it makes the United States foreign policy appear aggressive and anti-Muslim. The fourth-century Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu noted that all warfare is based upon deception. Terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda are skilled at delivering deceptive messages to a global audience that increases its popular support. The Al Qaeda network draws its strength from the uncensored, unmediated, immediate, and international information environment. They incorporate all forms of inexpensive information technology that communicate through satellites provided by their enemies to deliver their deceptive message to an online Umma. In his book, The Secret History of Al Qaeda, Abdel Bari Atwan points out in great detail that fully functional terrorist groups today require four essential components: members, a leader, a religious guide, and information technology. 33 The strategic message of radical Islamist groups is ideologically-driven claiming to represent a totalitarian, trans-national, and often comprehensive social revolutionary movement. Their call is to unify 34 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT the entire Muslim world through a strict interpretation of their faith -- Islam. Terrorist groups like AlQaeda are well-versed in using and manipulating the media to deliver their message through statements like this one issued on April 24, 2002;

By Means of this document we send a message to America and those behind it. We are coming, by the will of God almighty, no matter what America does. It will never be safe from the fury of Muslims. America is the one who began the war, and it will loose the battle by the permission of God almighty. 34 Al Qaeda defends its call for violence through three arguments 35 : 1. Proponents of non-violent response to the United States are corrupt, ignorant and/or hypocritical, and therefore are not credible religious mediators. This is contrasted with the scientific, independent and religiously authentic interpretation of the jihadi Salafis. 2. The United States is waging a war against Islam. Therefore, violence is defensive jihad that is incumbent upon all Muslims. 3. There is no unconditional prohibition against killing civilians in Islam. In Fact, civilians can be purposely targeted under certain conditions, and these conditions are met in the current climate. Al-Qaeda maintains a laundry list of injustices that the West exerted on the larger Muslim world throughout history. These are military, religious, political, economic, and cultural influences that provide sources for humiliation. 36 According to its leader, Osama bin Laden, Al Qaedas objective is not to create a battle between al-Qaeda and the U.S., but use this clash to generate a war of Muslims against the global Crusaders. 37 In the terminology of jihad, it plans to eliminate moderate Muslims and overthrow secular and moderate Muslim governments the near enemy - while they create an existential clash with the West the far enemy. Noted author and veteran CIA counterterrorism expert Michael Scheuer correctly identifies the forces that Osama bin Laden represents and leads are united by an ever-deepening hatred for the impact of U.S. foreign policy in the Muslim world. Unqualified support of Israel, a half-century of protecting and nurturing Muslim police states, and a military presence in Muslim lands 38 Due to the United States governments actions over the past 30 years, this message resonates and connects with a totalitarian religious vision similar to Communist or Fascist ideology that cannot allow alternative value systems to exist in areas they want to control for their own purposes. They deliberately and effectively use the information environment to facilitate their own version of grand strategy by disseminating their own attractive views through several mediums. In a 1997 interview with CNN journalist Peter Arnet, Osama bin Laden stated the following:

Peter Arnett: What are your future plans? Bin Laden: Youll see them and hear them in the media, God willing 39 . 35 SECOND DRAFT

SECOND DRAFT He also stated in another interview with the media, We realize that successful journalistic work is one of the most important weapons which our nation is armed in its current battle. Osama bin Laden provides not only his version of a moral argument but often backs up full and favorable media coverage with a substantial cash incentive. 40 In his testimony before the United States Congress on November 15, 2007, Dr. Michael Doran, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Support to Public Diplomacy stated;

the war we are fighting today is an information war -- a global conflict of perception. When al-Qaida launched its attacks on 9/11 its primary goal was not to cripple the United States, but to create a perception of American weakness and vulnerability among key audiences. Similarly, when terrorists launch IED attacks in Iraq today, we see them expending great effort to capture the event so that it can be posted on the Internet, often within hours. The spectacle of the attack is as important to them sometimes more important than the destructive effect itself. 41 Global terrorism expert and CNN producer Peter Bergen