sia root cause analysis linda ohler. msn, rn, cctc, faan qapi and regulatory manager, george...
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SIA Root Cause Analysis
Linda Ohler. MSN, RN, CCTC, FAANQAPI and Regulatory Manager, George Washington University, D.C
Cassandra Smith Fields. MSN, MBA, RNAdministrative Director Transplant, Phoenix Children’s Hospital, Phoenix, AZ
Tim Stevens. BSN, RN, CCTCTransplant Administrator, Providence Sacred Heart Medical Center &
Children’s Hospital, Spokane, WA
Lessons learned from Reviewing Program RCA’s
Objectives
Differentiate Root Cause Analysis from Morbidity and Mortality Reports
Describe three challenges in defining and implementing RCAs in transplant programs
Analyze the demonstration of a Root Cause Analysis
AgendaOverview
Root Cause Analysis (RCA) and SIA evaluation
RCA’s in the hospital and the transplant center
Sample RCA Tools
Case Study
Other Methods for RCA
Performance Improvement Tools
OVERVIEW
Motto for Root Cause Analysis
If you lose the patient or lose the graft….do not lose the lesson
Thomas E. Hamilton
Director, Survey & Certification
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
What’s in a Name?Morbidity and Mortality Review
Surgeon Summary
Case Review
Causal Analysis
Root Cause Analysis
RCA & SIA Evaluation
What does CMS ask for in an SIA?
Review the program’s causal analysis of patient deaths and graft failures during the most recent 36-months. The in-depth analysis should include at a minimum:
SIA RCA Requirements The factors associated with these deaths and graft
failures as well as an analysis of other adverse events that the Independent Peer Review Team considers relevant to the causal analysis of the graft or patient survival outcomes data
Review the transplant program’s own analysis of the root causes of the deaths or graft failures to evaluate the thoroughness and comprehensiveness of the analysis and the identification of all systemic factors, including, but not limited to, human factors, technical issues, equipment factors, communications systems, and policies and procedures missing or not followed
Evaluation of any trends or patterns in the factors associated with the deaths or graft failures
RCA Contributing Factors Analysis of program activities across all three phases
(pre, during, and post) of transplantation including: Staffing levels and training: Numbers and skills across
disciplines sufficient to adequately meet the needs of patients;
Patient selection criteria: The content, its application and efficacy, and the program’s adherence to its selection criteria;
Donor selection criteria: The content, its application and efficacy, and the program’s adherence to donor selection criteria;
Wait-list management: Effectiveness of policies and procedures, obtaining updated evaluations, routine candidate follow-up, and review of candidate status changes;
RCA Contributing Factors Surgical protocols: Effectiveness of protocols and systems
to develop policies and protocols (i.e. are there effective systems to research and base practices on current practice evidence);
Multi-disciplinary care: Evaluate if care is provided in a multi-disciplinary manner allowing input from all specialty areas during all three phases of transplantation and including but not limited to – transplant surgeons, physicians, transplant coordinators, transplant administrator(s), nurse(s), social worker(s), dietitian(s) and pharmacist(s) and other important disciplines such as anesthesia and cardiology;
Program’s policies and procedures: Analysis of program policies, procedures, and protocols to identify possible opportunities for improvement; and,
Post-transplant follow-up: Assess whether post-transplant follow-up care is provided in a safe, timely, and effective manner.
Contributing Factors by Discipline
Discipline Phase Reference
Contributory Factors / Root causes
MD/Surgeon/SWTC/FC/Pharm
Referral/Eval/Waitlist/Peri/
Post
Policy/ProcedureGuid
eline/Benchmark
Missing require-ment
Patient
Individual Staff
Team and/or Com-
mittee
Out-side
Source
Educa-tion and
training
Equip-ment /
Resource
Communi-cation
Working Conditio
n
Organizational and
strategic
Contributing FactorsCase # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Donor ID
Date of Transplant
Recipient Initials
Communication
Immunosuppression
Donor Selection
Recipient Selection
Waitlist Mgmt
Surgical Protocols/Technical
Infection
Follow Up Care
Psychosocial
Policies and Procedures
VAD
RCA’s in the hospital and the transplant center
The Alphabet Soup Sentinel Events
Adverse Events
Safety Event
Near Miss
Serious Safety Event
Start at the beginning
COP’s for TransplantX102 (b) Standard: Adverse Events
A Transplant Center must establish and implement written policies to address and document adverse events that occur during any phase of an organ transplantation case. These policies must address the process for the identification, reporting, analysis, and prevention of adverse events
(Interpretive Guideline) Adverse event means an untoward, undesirable, and usually unanticipated event that causes death or serious injury, or the risk therof
The Big 4Serious medical complications or death caused
by living donation
Unintentional transplantation or organs of mismatched blood types
Transplantation of organs to unintended recipients
Unintended transmission of infectious disease to a recipient
X103 (2) The transplant center must conduct a
thorough analysis of and document any adverse event Interpretive Guideline: A “thorough analysis” is
expected to include (but are not limited to): A description of the key facts of the event..the
severity of the event, and how the patient was affected
A review of whether or not similar events have occurred
An analysis of related systems and processes that contributed to the events occurrence..Human Factors, Environment, Equipment, Policies, Procedures, Organizational
X104And must utilize the analysis to effect
changes in the transplant center’s policies and practices to prevent repeat incidents
Focused QAPI goes on to ask the following: Are there written adverse event (AE) policies and
procedures specific to transplant?
Are AE’s evaluated according to policies and procures?
Can transplant staff describe what is meant by an adverse event (AE) in transplant?
Can transplant staff explain how and/or to whom they report an adverse event (AE)?
Does the hospital/program employ methods, in addition to staff incident reporting, to identify possible adverse events?
Can the program provide evidence that adverse events identified through staff reports are being addressed?
Focused QAPI continued:Does the written AE policy address the
following communication and reporting structures?: For each organ type Staff reporting and communication methods within
the transplant program and hospital Process for disclosure of AEs to the patient/family Process and timeline for reporting adverse events
to required public, state and federal agencies Is there evidence that the transplant program has
adopted policies supporting a non-punitive approach to staff reporting of events and situations they consider unsafe?
Focused QAPI continued: Does the written policy address/categorize the severity of
events that are tracked and analyzed?
Does the program have a defined analysis method/process for AE? Who What Actions taken to prevent similar events Method for follow up
Describe which method(s) will be utilized to analyze AE?
Has the program/hospital conducted any causal analyses in the past 24 months?
Did the analysis of the adverse event address all appropriate areas across the continuum of care?
Now ask yourself the following: Is death and graft loss within the first year an
Adverse Event?
Should these events be subject to the same level of analysis as the Big 4?
If you are subject to an SIA – how will you ensure that your deaths and graft losses have a “root cause analysis”
Then do your research:
What is your organization’s Safety Event, or Incident Reporting Policy?
Read the definitions
Common Definitions Safety Event: A deviation from generally
accepted practice or process that includes near misses, precursor safety events and serious safety events
Near Miss: A deviation in generally accepted practice that passes through error detection barriers and does not reach the patient because it is caught by a detection barrier designed into the system or by change or barrier not designed into the system, sometimes referred to as a Good Catch or Close Call
Common Definitions ContinuedPrecursor Safety Event: A deviation from
generally accepted practice or process that reaches the patient and causes no harm, no detectable harm, minimal temporary harm or minimal permanent harm
Serious Safety Event: A deviation from generally accepted practice or process that reaches the patient and causes harm that includes moderate temporary harm, severe temporary harm, moderate permanent harm, severe permanent harm and death
Common Definitions ContinuedSentinel Event: An unexpected occurrence
involving death or major permanent loss of limb or loss of function (including recognized complications) such as serious sensory, motor, physiological or psychological injury, or the risk thereof, not related to the natural course of the patient’s illness or underlying condition and not present on admission, requiring continued treatment or lifestyle change
Safety Event
Near Miss
Precursor Safety Event
Serious Safety Event
Sentinel Event
Death of a Living Donor
Unintentional transplant of a B Liver into an O recipient
Transplant of organs to unintended recipients
Transmission of Rabies to a recipient from a deceased donor
Death of a tx recipient in the OR
Loss of a kidney graft at day 265
Tools to analyze and review eventsApparent Cause Analysis: A limited investigation
of an event that may be performed instead of a root cause analysis that identifies inappropriate acts and detects weaknesses in systems and processes and results in implementation of remedial corrective actions
Common Cause Analysis: An aggregating analysis of safety events to identify process or cultural problems leading to events. The goal is to identify elements that contributed to the known events and select behavior-based expectations and error prevention techniques for staff to reduce human error and safety events
Tools ContinuedProtected Case Review: A conference held
under case review protection where a case is presented and discussed for the purpose of education and system improvement
Root Cause Analysis: Process for identifying the factors that underlie variation in performance that focuses primarily on systems and processes, not on individual performance. The analysis identifies potential improvements in theses processes or systems that would tend to decrease the likelihood of such events in the future or determines, after analysis, that no such improvement opportunities exist
RCA’s allow us to: Implement a corrective action
Track the change
Determine if the change is effective
Demonstrate the effective change is sustainable
Establish a system to prevent the problem from occurring again
Challenges with using RCA’s Hospital policy often prescribes when an RCA
methodology can be utilized
Done in accordance with Joint Commission guidance and hospital policy – very labor intensive and time consuming
Requires the time and effort of hospital resources
Morbidity and Mortality
Morbidity refers to the state of being diseased or unhealthy within a population
Mortality is the term used for the number of people who die within a population
A retrospective review of a case evaluating the physiologic and pathologic causes of either death or illness
M&Ms report on a single case Discussion among colleagues States what you think may have happened Usually does not involve a comprehensive data analysis
RCA’s for transplantMay or may not be a sentinel event
Should always be more than an M&M
Utilizes components of the RCA methodologies
May not require reporting to TJC
Is not discoverable
Must be doable
Suggestions The Big 4
Sentinel Events and referred to Hospital for full RCA Hedge on transmission of disease?
Death of a transplant recipient in the OR Serious Safety Event Quality will direct methodology – probably protected
case review or some level of RCA
Death or graft loss within the first year post transplant Serious Safety Event? Defined Apparent Cause Analysis tool specific to
transplant with MDT review
Be Reasonable UCLA
Liver Expect 27 graft losses in adults and 4 in peds Expect 16 patient deaths in adults and 1.5 in peds
Kidney Expect 12 graft losses in adults and .79 in peds Expect 3.7 patient deaths in adults and 0 in peds
Heart Expect 3.42 graft losses in adults and .56 in peds Expect 2.97 patient deaths in adults and .62 in peds
Lung Expect 5.62 graft losses in adults Expect 4.98 patient deaths in adults
Plus pancreas and intestine
If your Observed Events are increasingBefore you become O>E
Start converting the graft losses and/or death analysis to a more robust RCA process
If you are going to flag Go back and do the more robust RCA process on
all graft losses and/or deaths in the cohort
Always, always Track your events in QAPI and evaluate for trends
Root Cause Analysis
What are the goals of RCA?
Determine the best approach to preventing adverse events Not a tool for punishment
of individuals Avoid culture of blame Build a culture of safety.
Identify what can be done to prevent the adverse event or near miss from occurring again
Measure and track outcomes based on changes made.
Important concepts in RCAAvoid culture of blame
Focus on systems issues
Lessons learned: if you lose the patient/graft, do not lose the lesson
Three Common Mistakes: Assuming!
Assuming you know what the problem is without seeing what is actually happening.
Assuming you know how to fix a problem without finding out what is causing it.
Assuming you know what is causing the problem without confirming it.
Demonstration of an RCA
The Joint CommissionROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS AND ACTION PLAN FRAMEWORK TEMPLATE
Template has 24 analysis questions
Provides a template for answering the analysis questions
Aids organizing the steps in a root cause analysis. Not all questions will apply in every case and there may be findings that emerge during the course of the analysis.
Be sure however to enter a response in the “Root Cause Analysis Findings” field for each question #
For each finding continue to ask “Why?” and drill down further to uncover why parts of the process occurred or didn’t occur when they should have.
Significant findings that are not identified as root causes themselves have “roots”.
Case Report
September 2010
35 year old mother of 3, healthy until this event. Allergies to Vancomycin and Heparin.
Two weeks after birth of third child she experience severe chest pain and was taken to a local hospital
Diagnosis was dissection of 3 coronary arteries
Put on by pass but could not come off
Placed on Impella pump and transferred to a hospital with a heart transplant program.
9/12 Implanted with BiVad Required 51 units of PRBCs, 3 units platelets and cryo and 14 units of
FFP
9/23 Listed for heart transplantation
Time Line
9/24/2010 Began vaginal bleeding
9/27 D& C done followed by bilateral uterine artery embolization, intrauterine balloon and partial hysterectomy on 10/16
11/26 discharged home, Bilirubin 4.6
1/18/2011 admitted for fibrin in pump, on heparin, discharged in 11 days on Coumadin
2/2 admitted for anemia, GI bleed, Coumadin adjusted
2/15 admitted for fibrin in pump
4/18 admitted for GI Bleed 5/9 admitted for GI bleed 8/18 admitted for GI bleed, 3
units PRBC 12/15 admitted for GI bleed 3/30/2012 Bilirubin rising 7-
8, Renal insufficiency, PRA 98% Heart offer. Donor and recipient crossmatch negative
3/31/2012 transplant (12 hours in surgery)
Time Line
Heart transplant complications 31 units PRBC, 8 Cryo, 60 platelets, 19 FFP 15 minutes of circulatory arrest
Induced hypothermia Difficulty extracting VAD due to adhesions 3rd chest surgery in 18 months
Wound dehiscence, muscle flap Dialysis required starting on day 4 post op Day 9 developed multiple DVTs, positive urine culture Hypotensive, required vasopressors
Developed dry gangrene of both feet Day 26 trached/respiratory failure MSOF 6 weeks post transplant CT of head revealed CVA Patient expired
Most pertinent TJC questions
What were the factors involved?
Length of time on pVAD
?Possible right heart failure (elevated liver enzymes, ascites)
Renal insufficiency
Fibrin clots in VAD
Blood transfusions during implant of pVAD
Multiple blood products during transplant
15 minutes of Circulatory arrest
Immunocompromised
Infections post transplant
Persistent Hypotension requiring vasopressors
Dialysis post transplant
5 Whys
What is the real problem? What is the root cause? Ask why 5 times
Purpose –to discover the root cause
Why did heart transplant surgery require 15 minutes of circ arrest? Surgeons unable to visualize anatomy Severe bleeding during removal of pVAD On coumadin for 18 months Tissue growth around device
Cells adapt to device and grow around it
5 why’s Why was she on a pVAD for 18 months?
Why was she not sent to another facility? Why was she not put on a TAH? Was she still a transplant candidate?
Why did she develop a fungal infection?
Root CauseLength of time on pVAD
Patient selection
Corrective Action Plan
Writing a corrective action plan
Action 1Length of time on pVAD
Not able to control due to availability of suitable hearts for transplantation
Consider transferring complex patients to a larger heart transplant program
Change from pVAD to TAH*
Action 2Patient selection
Develop risk assessment tool Present risk assessments on each patient referred for heart
transplantation Monitor risks for each patient listed for one year to determine
effective use of risk assessment tool Was she still a transplant candidate?
Tracking Demonstrate Sustainability
Tracking ChangesCollect data on changes in action plans
Audit
Analyze and report
Demonstrate sustainability Run Chart
Assuring Effective ChangesAction steps are designed to prevent or correct problems
through the RCA process
Must provide a sound rationale if no changes are made to policies, protocols or procedures/practice
Change must be communicated to staff when implemented Need to maintain documentation of this communication Must measure changes to demonstrate sustainability
Remember QAPI is a continuous process
Tools for performance improvement
Tools for Improving problemsFailure Modes and Effective Analysis (FMEA)
Cause and effect More prospective in prevention
Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, Control (DMAIC)
Plan, Do, Study/Check, Act (PDSA)
Performance Improvement ToolsFlowcharts
Cause and Effect Diagram Fishbone Pareto Chart
PDCA
Created by Shewhart in the 1930s
Popularized by Deming first in Japan in the 1950s.
At the core of all quality systems.
The foundation for A3
IHI Model for Improvement
Any Questions?