should global poverty be a u.s. national security issue? · pdf file13 organizations work...

ECSP REPORT · ISSUE 9 · 200312

The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) was a watershed documentin a number of ways—including its assertion that addressing global poverty is important

to U.S. national security.For example, the NSS Introduction by President George W. Bush stated that, while

poverty does not directly lead to terrorism,“poverty, weak institutions, and corruption canmake weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.” TheNSS went on to highlight the importance of African development for U.S. security as well asto argue that, while freedom “has been tested by widespread poverty and disease…humanityholds in its hands the opportunity to further freedom’s triumph over…these foes,” and that“[t]he United States welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great mission.”

In addition, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell wrote in a separate July 2002 articlethat “sustainable development is a security imperative. Poverty, destruction of the environmentand despair are destroyers of people, of societies, of nations, a cause of instability as an unholytrinity that can destabilize countries and destabilize entire regions.” Yet at the 2002Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development, the United States delegation madelittle mention of either terrorism or how addressing poverty and its attendant issues might fitinto an overall security strategy. The Bush Administration has also been accused in manyquarters of underfunding both its own Millennium Challenge Account initiative as well as theGlobal Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis.

Given these policy tensions, ECSP invited analysts to address whether global povertyshould and can be a U.S. national security issue. Is poverty alleviation crucial to national andglobal security—and if so, which policies should be highlighted? Or would “securitizing”such efforts weaken both the drive against poverty and the drive for security? And canpoverty be linked to anti-terrorism efforts? The commentaries below provide an excellentand overdue entrée into these debates.

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Vincent FerraroVincent FerraroVincent FerraroVincent FerraroVincent FerraroCarol LancasterCarol LancasterCarol LancasterCarol LancasterCarol LancasterPer Pinstrup-AndersenPer Pinstrup-AndersenPer Pinstrup-AndersenPer Pinstrup-AndersenPer Pinstrup-AndersenJeffrey D. SachsJeffrey D. SachsJeffrey D. SachsJeffrey D. SachsJeffrey D. SachsJohn SewellJohn SewellJohn SewellJohn SewellJohn Sewell

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By Vincent FerraroVincent FerraroVincent FerraroVincent FerraroVincent Ferraro

The “Global Poverty Report” issued at theG8 Okinawa Summit in July 2000 noted

that eliminating global poverty “is both amoral imperative and a necessity for a stableworld” (World Bank, 2000, page i). The first

concern is incontestable: global poverty is amoral abomination of the highest order.Indeed, this moral argument motivatesinvaluable personal and non-governmentalbehavior: literally thousands of pr ivate

About the AuthorAbout the AuthorAbout the AuthorAbout the AuthorAbout the Author

Vincent Ferraro is the Ruth C. Lawson Professor of International Politics at MountHolyoke College in South Hadley, Massachusetts, where he has taught courses on worldpolitics, international political economy, and American foreign policy since 1976. He haswritten on issues of global poverty, the debt crisis, and the international trading system.

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organizations work tirelessly and with greateffect to reduce global poverty. But thesepr ivate efforts cannot, by themselves,overcome the problem; nor can such effortsoperate outside of the political and economiccontext maintained by the system of states.States remain the most organized andpowerful agents in the world today, and theirsupport is necessary to alleviate global povertysubstantially.

States, however, are not motivated bymoral concerns for non-citizens—altruism isa rare consideration in the world ofinternational relations. States are obliged toprotect their national interest. So was theGlobal Poverty Report correct that povertyreduction is also a prerequisite for a stableworld? And is that objective compatible withthe national interests of states?

Reformulating National SecurityReformulating National SecurityReformulating National SecurityReformulating National SecurityReformulating National SecurityAt its most basic level, the national

interest has historically been defined instraightforward terms: the territorial integrityof the state and its political autonomy are thesine qua non of statehood. Without these twoattributes there can be no state, and theprotection of territory and autonomy fromforeign threats is therefore the state’s highestpriority.

Global poverty does not obviouslyconstitute a threat to the national interests ofstates defined in these terms. Generally, poorstates are militarily weaker than richer states,and few poor societies can directly challengethe territory or autonomy of rich states.Absent a direct threat from poor states, richstates can and will assert that their resourcesshould be directed toward other issues—generally issues of a more immediate andunambiguous character. The alleviation ofglobal poverty is therefore a low priority formost rich states.

Is this traditional interpretation of thenational interest relevant to today’scircumstances? When Thomas Hobbes firstarticulated the security dilemma of states inthe 17th century, there was no overarchingpower to guarantee the security of states, andeach state had no choice but to develop itsown power for self-protection. In developingthat power, however, every state exacerbatedthe feeling of insecurity in its neighbors, who

would in turn have little choice but to expandtheir power as well. This cycle of escalatingpower and anxiety generated a relationshipamong states that mimicked the classicHobbesian description of those lives livedwithout the protection of a sovereign:“solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short”(Hobbes, page 186).

For years, however, many scholars haveargued for a redefinition of national security,contending that the world has changed

dramatically since Hobbes. For example,Richard Ullman offered this alternativeunderstanding of national security twentyyears ago:

A more useful (although certainly notconventional) definition might be athreat to national security is an actionor sequence of events that (1) threatensdrastically and over a relatively brief spanof time to degrade the quality of life forthe inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatenssignificantly to narrow the range ofpolicy choices available to thegovernment of a state, or to private,nongovernmental entities…within thestate (Ullman, 1983, page 133)

Ullman’s conception does not replace thehistorical definition of national security;rather, it expands that definition to includeless direct, immediate, or intentional threatsto a citizenry. While the Ullman formulationfails to capture the sense of urgency usuallynecessary to induce citizens to pay for thecosts of security, it nevertheless more accuratelyreflects citizens’ actual security interests.

Many states have recognized (at leastrhetorically) this expanded appreciation ofwhat constitutes a threat to the nation. Forexample, President George W. Bush expressedlittle doubt in the 2002 National SecurityStrategy of the United States (NSS) about thechanging nature of threats facing the United

Rich and poor nations are locked together in

a mutual hostage situation.

—Vincent Ferraro

FERRARO, PAGES 12-19


States after September 11:

Defending our Nation against itsenemies is the first and fundamentalcommitment of the FederalGovernment. Today, that task has changeddramatically. Enemies in the past neededgreat armies and great industr ialcapabilities to endanger America. Now,

shadowy networks of individuals canbring great chaos and suffering to ourshores for less than it costs to purchase asingle tank. Terrorists are organized topenetrate open societies and to turn thepower of modern technologies againstus. (NSS, 2002, page 1)

In the aftermath of September 11, fewAmericans would have contested this claim.

But not surprisingly, the NSS analysis ofimmediate threats to the United Statesundermines the traditional definition of thenational interest. By asserting that the tacticof terrorism is to “penetrate” open societies,the NSS suggests that the conventionaldistinction between “foreign” and “domestic”is no longer as useful as it has been in the past.The erosion of that distinction arises fromthe changed circumstances of living in aglobalized world, raising serious questionsabout whether the focus on an exclusive“national” interest remains useful,appropriate, or even meaningful.

Secondly, the 2002 NSS characterizationof the threats posed to the United Statesdeliberately depreciates the conventionalmilitary threats of the past, most likely becausethere are no powerful states at the momentthat seem willing or able to contest Americanpower. The attacks of September 11 did notjeopardize the territorial integrity or politicalautonomy of the United States. What theseattacks did appear to threaten was the qualityof life of American citizens: most specifically,the ability of Americans to live free of fear.In other words, the relatively obvious and

transparent traditional markers for the nationalinterest seem to have been replaced in theNSS by a concern for a more amorphous setof considerations.

The NSS in fact explicitly proclaims thesechanged conditions at its very outset:“Amer ica is now threatened less byconquering states than we are by failing ones”(NSS, 2002, page 1). Curiously, however, whilethe document identifies a rather dramaticchange in the character of the states posingthreats to the United States (from strong toweak), it does not really identify a change instrategy to deal with these new threats. A stateprotects itself from a strong (“conquering”)state by building up the capability to deter,contain, or conquer, and typically thesemeasures include a heavy reliance on militarycapability. But how does a state protect itselffrom a weak (“failing”) state?

One can only answer this question byraising a prior question: what types of securitythreats do poor states pose to powerful ones?

Global Poverty as a Threat to the NationalGlobal Poverty as a Threat to the NationalGlobal Poverty as a Threat to the NationalGlobal Poverty as a Threat to the NationalGlobal Poverty as a Threat to the NationalInterest of Global StabilityInterest of Global StabilityInterest of Global StabilityInterest of Global StabilityInterest of Global Stability

Powerful states have a vested interest inthe stability of the international system, andone cannot overestimate the significance ofglobal order to a powerful state. Through theirpower, these states have shaped the political,economic, and cultural rules and norms thatmaintain the system as a whole and have takensteps to assure that those rules and normsconform to their interests. American foreignpolicy since 1945 is a good example of theprocess: the United Nations system roughlyreflects the republican form of representativedemocracy in the United States, and theBretton Woods system (the InternationalMonetary Fund, the World Bank, and theWorld Trade Organization) defends the rulesof market capitalism.

There have been intentional challengesto this arrangement, most notably by theformer Soviet Union. The United Statesinterpreted this challenge as a national securitymatter of the utmost seriousness, and madestrenuous efforts to reduce the Soviet threat.Since the Soviet collapse in 1991, noorganized state has challenged the Americansystem. Indeed, at the beginning of the 21st

century, that system’s framework seems nearlyuniversal. There are virtually no national

The weaknesses of poor states could

destabilize the entire international system.

—Vincent Ferraro

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economies that exist outside of global markets,and few states fail to pay at least lip service tothe idea of democracy or self-determination.Some analysts have interpreted thesedevelopments as a final triumph for liberalvalues, but such a conclusion is premature. Itis safe to say, however, that at this particularmoment in history, liberal values have attaineda degree of universality that is both distinctiveand powerful.

The United States has a strong self-interestin the perpetuation and maintenance of thissystem, which has as its dominant feature adynamism that is usually referred to asglobalization. About one-quarter of U.S.economic growth in the 1990s was derivedfrom exports, and by virtually any measurethe economic interests of the United Statesare now substantially coupled with the interestsof other economic powers in the world. Thisinterdependence is neither predetermined norhistorically unique. It has, however, heightenedthe importance of global stability as a nationalinterest of those states that are tightlyintegrated into the system.

Poor states are threatening to rich statesbecause the weaknesses of poor states couldbe globalized, thereby destabilizing the entireinternational system. What is new anddifferent about this threat is that, with fewexceptions, it is not an intentional strategy.Poor states are not “enemies” of theinternational system, although theramifications of their condition mayundermine both the system as a whole andthe quality of life in rich states in profoundand potentially catastrophic ways. The threatsposed by poor states are environmental,economic, and political.

Environmental ThreatsEnvironmental ThreatsEnvironmental ThreatsEnvironmental ThreatsEnvironmental ThreatsThe environmental threat posed by global

poverty to the stability of the internationalsystem is obvious, direct, and dangerous. TheNSS, however, mentions this threat only onceand only peripherally. Both rich and poorstates contribute to this stress, and rich statesremain the primary offenders to the globalecosystem. But poor states contribute toenvironmental degradation in particular waysthat reflect their constrained economicchoices. The fundamental difference betweenrich and poor states is that some rich stateslack only the will to address the problem; many

poor states lack both the capability and thewill.

For example, deforestation, a seriousglobal problem, is particularly acute in poortropical countries. The causes of deforestationare directly related to poverty, either becausepoor populations cut down trees to clear landfor agriculture or habitation, or because apoor state cannot resist the short-termeconomic advantages of selling wood productsto rich countries. Even the most stringentdomestic or international regulations cannotprotect the world’s forests as long as poverty

restricts the ability and the will to focus on along-term perspective. The same dynamicapplies to almost every other environmentalissue from global warming to resourcedepletion to water quality.

Poverty imposes a tyranny of the short-term perspective. While there is no necessarytrade-off between economic growth andenvironmental protection in the long run, apoor state needs significant outside resourcesto realize both objectives simultaneously. Thissituation will only worsen over time, as poorerand more populated states become moreintegrated into the global economy and adoptthe industrial techniques of the richer states.We already are witnessing the impact ofChinese industrialization on the availabilityof petroleum, and shall soon witness the effectsof increased Chinese petroleum consumptionon the global environment.

Indeed, the inability of poor countriesto address environmental issues poses a seriousthreat to the quality of life, not just withinthe poorer countries but within r ichercountries as well. If, as many suggest, a globalwarming threatens potentially catastrophicconsequences, then all nations will be affected,not just the people in countries that have beenunable to reduce their emissions ofgreenhouse gases or to protect their forestsserving as carbon sinks. More importantly,even heroic efforts on the part of some

The greatest danger to globalization comes

not from its opponents, but from its erstwhile

supporters.

—Vincent Ferraro



countries to control their emissions will notsubstantially delay a possible disaster if anumber of other countr ies refuse tocooperate.

States that do not include theenvironmental interests of all states within theirunderstanding of their national interest cannotsucceed in defending their national interest.Environmental issues transcend the distinctionbetween global and national interests, almostto the point of rendering it meaningless. Toignore global environmental security is tosacrifice national environmental security.

Economic ThreatsEconomic ThreatsEconomic ThreatsEconomic ThreatsEconomic ThreatsSimilarly, globalization has succeeded in

economically integrating a large number ofcountr ies—rich and poor—into worldmarkets. Proponents of globalization assert thatthe process benefits all who participate, andthere is little question that globalizationstimulates widespread economic activity(Maddison, 1995, page 19). Increased globaleconomic activity, however, has beenaccompanied by a dramatic worsening inglobal income inequality. The OECD studyof the world economy from 1820-1992 andits data on GDP per capita growth led it toconclude that

the overall long run pattern ofincome spreads has been strikinglydivergent…In 1820 the intercountryrange (the distance between the leadcountry and the worst performer) wasover 3:1, in 1870 7:1, in 1913 11:1, in1950 35:1, in 1973 40:1, in 1992 72:1(Maddison, 1995, page 22).

This pattern is increasingly unstable. Highlevels of economic activity are not sustainablein the face of dramatically escalating incomeinequality. As economic activity becomes evermore concentrated and larger populations areexcluded from that activity, there are bothshort- and long-term risks to the globaleconomic system.

The frequent debt crises since 19821

document the short-term risks of this growinginequality between rich and poor states. Thetotal external debt of developing countries in2001 amounted to about $2.3 trillion (WorldBank, 2003, page 221), of which about 40percent was owed to private lenders. These

debts will never be repaid fully, and the richcountries have seemingly accepted thislikelihood. But the debts cannot be completelyforgiven without inflicting ir reparabledamage to the future integr ity of theinternational financial system. Similarly,outright defaults on these loans would perhapsfatally undermine confidence in global capitalmarkets and critically weaken specific bankswith substantial outstanding loans.

Rich and poor nations are thus lockedtogether in a mutual hostage situation. Theeconomic security of rich countries requiresa degree of economic development withinpoor countr ies to insure a sustainedcommitment to some level of debt repayment.The poor countries cannot honor thiscommitment without substantial support fromthe rich. Paradoxically, however, the problemof debt repayment has become so large thatthe rich states are more vulnerable to a defaultby a major debtor than the poor states are atrisk of not being able to repay the debts. Richstates stand to lose more than just the interestpayments on their loans if growing povertyin debtor nations forces a major default.

O’Rourke and Williamson assess thelonger term risk of growing inequality interms of a reaction against globalization itself.In assessing the dismal economic collapse ofthe 1930s, these scholars concluded that:

….a political backlash developed inresponse to the actual or perceiveddistributional effects of globalization.The backlash led to the reimposition oftariffs and the adoption of immigrationrestrictions, even before the Great War.Far from being destroyed by unforeseenand exogenous political events,globalization, at least in part, destroyeditself (O’Rourke & Williamson, 1999,page 287).

The current evidence of such a backlashis suggestive, but inconclusive. There is, ofcourse, a broad-based anti-globalizationmovement. But the greatest danger toglobalization comes not from its opponents,but from its erstwhile supporters.

For example, when the BushAdministration imposed steel tariffs in 2001,the action signaled a rather dramatic changein its stated policy of free trade. The imposition

17

of tariffs was a concession to the Americansteel industry, which had argued thatcompetition from abroad (from both rich andpoor countries) was crippling its viability. Onecan more broadly interpret the action,however, as a decision by the U.S. governmentto transfer the economic weakness of its steelindustry to other states. Similar actions in theareas of trade, capital flows, foreign investment,and immigration are underway in a largenumber of countries in the world. We do notknow the point at which these actions maytranslate into a genuine economic contraction.But states that adopt a sustained commitmentto a policy of contracting demand are actingcontrary to their long-term economicinterests.

A more productive approach would beto stimulate demand for troubled products.There are about two billion people in theworld who cannot participate in anymeaningful way in the global economy. Thereis a clear national interest in deepening theprocess of economic integration to includethe global poor.

Political ThreatsPolitical ThreatsPolitical ThreatsPolitical ThreatsPolitical ThreatsThe NSS discusses to some degree the

political threat posed by the poor. Its argumentis familiar: poor people will resort to violence(either in the form of terrorism or throughother criminal activities like drug smuggling)to change the political and economic systemthat they believe is responsible for theirpoverty. World Bank President JamesWolfensohn also drew an explicit link betweenpoverty and violence in 2001 when he spokeof the war on terrorism:

It is hard to say when the war will bewon. Getting our hands on Osama binLaden or installing a new governmentin Afghanistan will only be the start ofthe process. The war will not be wonuntil we have come to grips with theproblem of poverty and thus the sourcesof discontent. Not just in Afghanistan,but also in the neighboring regions, inmany other countries. This war is viewedin terms of the face of Bin Laden, theterrorism of Al Qaeda, the rubble of theWorld Trade Center and of the Pentagon,but these are just symptoms. The diseaseis the discontent seething in Islam and,

more generally, in the world of the poor(World Bank, 2001).

While this political explanation ofviolence has a grain of truth, overall it is bothmisleading and dangerous. It is misleadingbecause genuinely poor people do notthemselves have the time nor the means topose significant security threats. One of the

greatest ironies of poverty is that being poorconstitutes more than a full-time job: povertydictates almost total attention to subsistenceand no time for either leisure or plotting.Poverty is unquestionably a conditioningfactor in resorting to violence—poverty itselfis a ubiquitous form of violence. But the linkbetween poverty and terrorism is, at best,tenuous. Terrorist leaders are rarely poor.Perhaps poverty may inspire willing footsoldiers for terrorist leaders, but terroristorganizers generally have their own agendaswhich have little to do, except rhetorically,with the alleviation of poverty.

The danger in identifying poverty as acause of political conflict is that states willmore likely respond with military or policeforce to eliminate threats, rather than initiatinga more difficult and complex economicresponse to mitigate the source of those threats.States prefer to exercise their more traditionalrole as provider of physical security insteadof intruding on the market with redistributivemeasures. Politically, it is far easier to passappropriation bills for the military than tofund foreign aid.

Posing the poor as a military threat alsoplays into the hands of the state, which has itsown reasons for retaining and enhancing itsmonopoly on violence. Moreover, this tacticreduces profoundly whatever sympathy thosewho are better off may have for the poor.These outcomes are dangerous. After thecollapse of the Soviet Union, the mission ofthe U.S. armed forces became opaque. Recentattempts to clarify that mission have allcentered around vague and ill-defined threatsfrom: (a) “rogue” or failed states; or (b)

The illusion of hermetically-sealed and self-

reliant security is naïve and dangerous.

—Vincent Ferraro



terrorist groups, all of whose memberspurportedly come from poor states like NorthKorea, Iran, and Iraq. Unquestionably, thesestates and groups have interests in changingthe current global distribution of power. Thatall of these interests are primarily rooted inthe desire to eliminate global poverty isnonsense. The poor are everywhere and theyare numerous. If we allow their very existenceto be used as a justification for increasing thecoercive power of the state, then no action orcapability will be denied to the state. Globalpoverty is undoubtedly a source of greatinstability in the world, but it is probably farbetter and more accurate not to emphasizethat link in military terms.

The real political threat is that thedeepening divide between rich and poor statescreates the illusion of separate worlds, one inwhich genuine cooperation among statesbecomes impossible. Poverty undermines thepolitical legitimacy of the richer states:expressions of concern for political freedomswithin poor states ring hollow as long asdesperate economic conditions fail to elicitconcrete action.

ConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusionThe national interests of states are no

longer “national.” September 11 underscoredthe realities of a globalized world: that securitycan no longer be guaranteed by a strongmilitary, and territorial borders are highlypermeable and increasingly trivial whendefending the quality of life for domesticpopulations. This commentary has examined

Hobbes, Thomas. (1968). Leviathan (edited with an introduction by C.B. Macpherson). London: PenguinBooks.

Maddison, Angus. (1995). Monitoring the world economy, 1820-1992. Paris: OECD.

The national security strategy of the United States (NSS). (2002). Washington, DC: U.S. Government PrintingOffice. [On-line] Available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.

O’Rourke, Kevin H. & Jeffrey G. Williamson. (1999). Globalization and history: The evolution of a nineteenthcentury Atlantic economy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

only three examples of how the nationalinterests of rich states are fundamentallycompromised by the weaknesses of poor states,even in the absence of any intention tothreaten harm. The list could be easilyexpanded to include questions of corruption,disease vectors, migration, and the like. Richstates cannot afford the indulgence ofpretending that poor states are not an integralpart of the world system. The unforgivingimperatives of poverty can no longer be sealedoff from the welfare of all.

A reformulation of the national interestto include global interests is necessary becauseour world scarcely resembles that of 17th

century Europe, when the global populationwas less than a billion, the overwhelminghuman activity was agricultural, and fewpeople ever traveled more than ten miles fromtheir birthplace. Territorial integrity andpolitical autonomy will always be importantto states, but the threats now facing states donot respect or even acknowledge thoseparameters. The processes that have madehuman activity more integrated have led toboth good and bad outcomes, the worst ofwhich was the creation of global poverty andthe explosion of the number of people wholive in these circumstances.

Rich states no longer can ignore thistruth. Hobbes needs to be updated: the life ofstates may still be poor, nasty, brutish, andshort, but it is no longer solitary. The illusionof hermetically-sealed and self-reliant securityis naïve and dangerous.

NotesNotesNotesNotesNotes

1 For example, Mexico in 1982, Mexico again in 1995, several Asian countries in 1997, Russia in 1998, andArgentina in 2002.

ReferencesReferencesReferencesReferencesReferences

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Ullman, Richard. (1983, Summer). “Redefining security.” International Security 8(1), 129-53.

The World Bank et al. (2000, July). “Global poverty report.” G8, Okinawa Summit. [On-line] Available:http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/G8_poverty2000.pdf.

The World Bank. (2001, December 7). Reprint of La Stampa interview of James Wolfensohn. [On-line]Available: http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/jdwint120701b.htm.

The World Bank. (2003, April). Global development finance 2003: Striving for stability in development finance.Washington, DC: The World Bank. [On-line] Available: http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/gdf2003/statappendix/stattoc.htm.

Imagine the following advertisement for AlQaeda: “Wanted: Educated individuals

(preferably with a graduate degree in atechnical field) who have foreign-languageskills (preferably fluency in English) as well asa deep antipathy to their own and others’political leaders. Must be comfortable withviolence and available for training andimportant assignments in foreign countriesduring a period of months or years.”

The terrorists of Al Qaeda were educated,from well-off families, and mostly fromcountries that have long ago graduated fromthe category of the world’s poorest. It wasnot poverty that motivated them. Indeed, wedo not know for certain what led them toterrorism—perhaps disgust with their ownoften-corrupt governments; a sense ofhumiliation by the West; religious fanaticism,boredom, and alienation; or perhaps dimprospects for a fulfilling career. But theirmotivation was not fighting poverty. Nor, asfar as we know, were they reacting to the vastdisparities (both in wealth and in numbers)between the very poor and the very rich eitherin their own societies or in the world at large.The poor do not have the time, the resources,or often even the physical health to get an

education, to experience ennui, or to flyairplanes into tall buildings. For the just overone billion people who each live on $1 perday, it is simply often an exhausting task toget an adequate meal or two every 24 hours.

Poverty does not produce terrorists. Andeliminating poverty—something dearly to bedesired by all civilized beings—is not likelyto eliminate terrorism. Consider some of theworld’s well known terrorist groups in recentyears: the Irish Republican Army; the ETAin Spain; the Red Army and Aum Shinrikyoin Japan; the Bader-Meinhof Gang inGermany; Timothy McVeigh and militiagroups in the United States; Hamas in Israeland Hezbollah in Lebanon; the FARC inColombia; the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka; thePakistanis in Kashmir; and the Chechens inRussia. Few if any of these groups are rootedin poverty or have the goal of its elimination.In some circumstances, reducing povertycould well increase the pool of potentialterrorists—if educated young people who areangry because they lack job or life prospectsbuy into ideologies or religious movementsthat urge them to violence.

This commentary first considers thecauses of terrorism in the world today. Then

PovertyPovertyPovertyPovertyPoverty, T, T, T, T, Terrorism, and National Securityerrorism, and National Securityerrorism, and National Securityerrorism, and National Securityerrorism, and National Security

By Carol LancasterCarol LancasterCarol LancasterCarol LancasterCarol Lancaster


Carol Lancaster is a professor in the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown Universityand a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Global Development. Her public service hasincluded positions as Deputy Administrator of USAID, and Deputy Assistant Secretary ofState for Africa. She is the author of Aid to Africa: So Little Done, So Much to Do (Universityof Chicago, 1999) and Transforming Foreign Aid: U.S. Assistance in the 21st Century (Institutefor International Economics, 2000). She is currently writing a book entitled Fifty Years ofForeign Aid: Policies, Purposes, Results.

LANCASTER, PAGES 19-22


it inquires into the precise relationshipbetween poverty and terrorism. Finally, it askswhat we can do to eliminate terrorism andinsecurity.

Causes of TCauses of TCauses of TCauses of TCauses of TerrorismerrorismerrorismerrorismerrorismThe three elements common to all

terrorism are: (1) a gr ievance that theterrorists are protesting and perhaps tryingto resolve; (2) an ideology or set of beliefsthat identify and explain the grievance andwhat to do about it; and (3) a belief thatterrorism can contribute to that grievance’s

solution. (I am including neither criminal anddrug networks nor warlords in my collectionof terrorists. Although categories may blur attimes, these latter groups operate primarilyfor their own gain rather than to address areal or perceived societal wrong.)

Terrorist grievances are often over land,assets, or other resources—in essence, whoshould control them. Grievances can also beover values—for example, the perception thatan ethnic, religious, or political organizationis encroaching on others’ rights or that asociety is flawed in some fundamental wayand must be reformed. These grievances maybe real (as in Kashmir or Israel) or imagined(as in the case of Timothy McVeigh or AumShinrikyo).

Terrorist ideologies may be based onethnicity, nationalism, relig ion, or theworldview of a charismatic terrorist leader.And terrorists act because they think they canachieve their goals—usually in the hope thatthe state in which they act will be too weakto apprehend them or prevent such acts inthe future.

Poverty and TPoverty and TPoverty and TPoverty and TPoverty and TerrorismerrorismerrorismerrorismerrorismDespite the assumptions often made in

the wake of the attacks of September 11 thatworld poverty was somehow a source ormotivation for those attacks, ter ror istgrievances almost never include poverty.

Others (especially in Europe) argue thatpoverty breeds the discontent that leads toterrorism. This argument is much like oneheard during the Cold War—that poverty breddiscontent and discontent increased the allureof communism, or led to chaos that openedopportunities for communist gains.Eliminating poverty was, therefore, importantto eliminate the causes of discontent, violence,radicalism, and (now) terrorism. But if eitherof these causal chains were true, much of theworld would surely now be communist-dominated or engulfed by terror andviolence.

So the relationship between poverty,terror ism, and ultimately U.S. nationalsecurity is not a simple and direct one. Mightthere be more subtle and indirect ties betweenpoverty in the world and security in theUnited States? Certainly, the vast differencesin wealth, education, health, and life prospectsamong and within countries can feed ageneral sense of social injustice and righteousanger on the part of those—often youth—who are sensitive to such issues. But whilethis sense of social injustice may trigger anti-globalization protests, it does not appear tobe sufficient by itself to promote organizedviolence against symbols of wealth.

In some cases there does appear to be anindirect relationship between poverty and thepoor governance (corruption, exclusion, andrepression) that can lead to civil violence andstate collapse. These conditions, in turn, canspread throughout a region, producingwidespread insecurity and possibly creatinghavens for terrorists or criminals who canorganize and attack targets elsewhere,including in the United States. Theseconditions of civil violence and state collapsedo tend to concentrate in poor countries(especially in Africa) such as Somalia, Liberia,Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo, and Sudan. However, not all casesof civil violence and state collapse occur inthe poorest countries (see Colombia, Algeria,and Chechnya), and not all poor countriessuffer from such violence—suggesting thatpoverty is far from being a direct trigger ofthese problems.

But it may be difficult to holdgovernments accountable in places wherepopulations lack education and information

Not all cases of civil violence and state collapse

occur in the poorest countries, and not all poor

countries suffer from such violence.

—Carol Lancaster

21

and poverty is widespread. Such countries arevulnerable to crime and thuggery, to theevaporation of rule of law and politicalinstitutions, and to the repression of dissidentgroups (which are often ethnically orreligiously distinct)—all factors which mayprovoke internal violence and chaos.Reducing poverty and improving education,health, and the economic well-being of apopulation may, all things being equal, leadto better governance over time and feweropportunities for terror ist or criminalelements to operate in these countries. Butthere is still much we do not know about theinter relationships between poverty,governance, civil violence, and internationalterrorism and criminality.

The risk in justifying U.S. global anti-poverty policies and programs as anti-terrorist or as in the interests of national-security initiatives is that such labeling couldultimately be counterproductive for thosepolicies and programs. If the United Statesspends more on foreign aid to help reducepoverty in the world in order to reduceterrorism and the threat of terrorism fails toabate, support for foreign aid (which can helppromote growth, poverty reduction, and manyother desirable changes) could well erode inCongress and among the public.

So if poverty is not a major or directcause of terrorism, and if eliminating povertywill not eliminate terrorism, is there anythingoutside of military or intelligence options thatthe United States can do to fight terrorism?

Alternative Options forAlternative Options forAlternative Options forAlternative Options forAlternative Options forAddressing TAddressing TAddressing TAddressing TAddressing Terrorismerrorismerrorismerrorismerrorism

Short of the use of force, policymakershave several options for addressing theunderlying conditions that feed terrorism. Thefirst is to address the disparate issues that aretriggering terrorist activities. The UnitedStates and other countries can act as mediatorsfor agreements between governments anddiscontented ethnic, religious, and othergroups (as in the case of Northern Ireland).But such diplomatic efforts take time, energy,and resources—items things in scarce supplyfor United States and other governments.

A second approach is to press andpersuade governments to relax their repressivepolicies, eliminate corruption, open up their

political processes, and finance activities aimedat strengthening the rule of law, civil society,democratic political institutions, and elections.If this sounds like pie in the sky, it was U.S.policy in Central America during the1980s—and that policy now appears to havecontributed to improved security and humanrights in the region. But policies promotingdemocratization and improved governancealso take time, patience, and resources.

A third approach is to help strengthenthe internal security of countries plagued byterrorist activities. It is clear, unfortunately,that no country is immune to such activities—not even the United States with its home-grown, violence-prone groups such as theAryan Nation. When such groups sense thatsecurity is inadequate, they will act. Of course,when a government’s own corruption andrepression has provoked civil violence andterrorism, strengthening the security forcesof that government can exacerbate theunderlying causes of dissent. But fortifyingnational security forces in selective cases canbe an important and effective way to fightterrorism.

One further approach to reducing theunderlying causes of terrorism and insecurityinvolves addressing stalled development insteadof poverty per se. Societies that educate theiryouth but cannot provide them with jobs orthe possibility of fulfilling lives create poolsof vulnerable young men (and in some cases,young women) who can be drawn into

The sprawling Mathare slums in Nairobi, Kenya.

Credit: Africa Alive!/CCP, courtesy of Photoshare.

LANCASTER, PAGES 19-22


Widespread poverty, hunger, andinequality contribute to instability at

the local, national and international levels andcreate national security risks for the UnitedStates. Failure to deal with these problems willrender current military efforts ineffective indealing with the threat of terrorism againstthe United States and other high-incomecountries. It is also ethically and morally wrongthat a large share of the world’s populationsuffers from poverty and hunger in a world asrich as ours. In addition, global poverty andits consequences are a tremendous humanwaste, reflected in reduced economic growthand development for all—poor and non-poor.

No society—national or international—will be secure when material inequalities andmaterial deprivations are as extreme as theynow are. People without hope and with littleor nothing to lose have little stake in the statusquo. They are susceptible to terrorist appeals.As stated by U.S. President George W. Bush:“A world where some live in comfort and

Eradicating Poverty and Hunger as a National Security IssueEradicating Poverty and Hunger as a National Security IssueEradicating Poverty and Hunger as a National Security IssueEradicating Poverty and Hunger as a National Security IssueEradicating Poverty and Hunger as a National Security Issuefor the United Statesfor the United Statesfor the United Statesfor the United Statesfor the United States

By Per Pinstrup-AndersenPer Pinstrup-AndersenPer Pinstrup-AndersenPer Pinstrup-AndersenPer Pinstrup-Andersen

terrorist networks. Algeria is an excellentexample of this problem: while that countryhas made impressive strides in educating itsyoung people, decades of economicmismanagement have resulted in large-scaleyouth unemployment. Other countries in theMiddle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin Americashow similar problems. All they lack aremilitant ideologies that might energize youthswithout purpose to violence. Policies andprograms aimed at steering the educated-but-unemployed young—both in poor and not-so-poor countr ies—toward productive

activities must be part of the strategy againstterrorism. But Western governments anddevelopment agencies are in only the earlieststages of thinking about what these policiesand programs should be.

In sum, the United States should and mustwork to eliminate poverty in the world. ButU.S. policymakers and citizens should not foolthemselves that reducing poverty willeliminate terrorism. Attacking terrorism isanother important task we must address—butit is not the same task as poverty reduction.

plenty while half of the human race lives onless than $2 a day is neither just nor stable”(Office of the Press Secretary, 2001).

We must try to understand the frustration,hopelessness, and anger of the many millionsof people who are poor, hungry, and withoutopportunities to escape poverty. We must thentailor our efforts to assure a stable and secureworld accordingly.

The State of PovertyThe State of PovertyThe State of PovertyThe State of PovertyThe State of Poverty, Hunger, Hunger, Hunger, Hunger, Hunger, and Inequality, and Inequality, and Inequality, and Inequality, and InequalityPoverty, hunger, and inequality cause

serious deprivation for more than 20 percentof the world’s population. More than onebillion people earn less than a dollar a day.Eight hundred million people suffer fromhunger and food insecurity, and one-third ofthe preschool children in developing countriessuffer from malnutrition—causing the deathof 5-10 million of these children every year.

The current level of global effort willmeet neither the World Food Summit goal ofreducing the number of hungry people from


Per Pinstrup-Andersen is the H.E. Babcock Professor of Food, Nutrition and PublicPolicy at the Division of Nutrition, Cornell University. He is also professor of developmenteconomics, The Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University, Copenhagen as well as aDistinguished Professor, Wageningen University, the Netherlands. Pinstrup-Andersen wasalso the 2001 World Food Prize Laureate and past director-general of the InternationalFood Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

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during the next 20 years, and poverty willincreasingly move from rural to urban areas(Rosegrant et al., 2002). The relationshipbetween poverty and inequality (on the onehand) and instability and crime (on the other)is already well known in urban settings, andwell-off residents of these cities have beenspending rapidly increasing amounts ofresources on protection over the last 10 to 20years. For example, some members of SãoPaulo’s upper class have developed “fortifiedenclaves”—pr ivatized, enclosed, andmonitored spaces for residence, consumption,leisure, and work (Caldeira, 2000). But suchbehavior attacks the symptoms rather thanthe causes of social injustice and instability.

Similarly, mobilizing the military inresponse to international terrorism withoutat the same time making major gains in thewar on poverty, hunger, and related humanmisery addresses symptoms rather than causes.As illustrated by the atrocities of September11, it is unlikely that rich societies can insulatethemselves from the consequences of collapsedstates and extreme human misery andhopelessness elsewhere (Gray, 2002).

Globalization is upon us for good or evil.With globalization of information, poor and

800 million to 400 million by 2015 nor theMillennium Development Goal of cutting inhalf by that year the percentage of thepopulation that is hungry. Outside China, thenumber of hungry people in developingcountries increased by 40 million in the 1990s.During the same decade, the number ofhungry people increased in more than one-half of all developing countries—and onlyone-third of these countries experienced animprovement (FAO, 2002). A continuation ofrecent trends will result in more rather thanfewer hungry people in the world outsideChina.

As for global inequality, the richest onepercent of the world’s population earns asmuch as 57 percent of the rest (UNDP, 2002).And relative global income distribution isgetting worse. In 1960, average per capitaincomes in industrialized countries were ninetimes the average per capita income in sub-Saharan Africa. Today, they are 20 timesgreater. Between 1990 and 2000, per capitaincomes increased by close to $5,000 in high-income countries, but by only $40 in low-income countr ies. Per-capita incomesdecreased by about $20 over the same decadein sub-Saharan Africa.

Links to InstabilityLinks to InstabilityLinks to InstabilityLinks to InstabilityLinks to InstabilityThere is much evidence that poverty and

inequality contributes to national instabilityand armed conflict (Messer et al., 2001). Largenumbers of people who are hopeless and havenothing to lose provide the foundation andthe perceived justification for crime, unrest,and other forms of instability—perhaps evenrevolution, and certainly terrorism. Socialinjustice provides the foundation or theperceived justification and passion fordeveloping the infrastructure to supportterrorism. It is true that terrorists generallyare not poor—but they receive theirjustification and support from widespreadhuman misery and hopelessness, and theythrive in collapsed states.

The worldwide urbanization of povertyalso accelerates the risk of instability. Widelydispersed poor people in rural areas are muchless likely to consolidate their power and angerto threaten stability than are highconcentrations of urban poor. The urbanpopulation of developing countries will double

A young boy rummages through adustbin for food in Kenya.

Credit: RUINET, courtesy of Photoshare.

PINSTRUP-ANDERSEN, PAGES 22-27


The richest one percent of the world’s

population earns as much as 57 percent of

the rest.

—Per Pinstrup-Andersen

hungry people in developing countries arebecoming more aware of how the non-poorin the industrialized countries live. Failure todeal with poverty, hunger, and inequality maypush rich countries to adopt measures similarto those adopted by rich people in poorcountries—resulting not only in “cities ofwalls” but “countries of walls.”

The Lack of AccountabilityThe Lack of AccountabilityThe Lack of AccountabilityThe Lack of AccountabilityThe Lack of AccountabilityOne important reason for increased global

instability is that globalization has proceededfaster than the development of appropriateglobal institutions, leading to inter-national accountability problems. Nationalgovernments are generally accountable—if atall—only to national constituencies. However,as globalization proceeds, national policydecisions will have increasing and increasinglysignificant international implications andeffects. Weak international democraticprocesses and poor representation ofpopulation groups in these processes add tothe lack of international accountability, as doesthe fact that many national governments donot represent poor people in their owncountries.

Poor countries are also inadequatelyrepresented in international institutions suchas the WTO and the World Bank. Globalinstitutions to help assure accountabilityof multinational corporations andnongovernmental organizations acrossnational borders are also urgently needed ifglobalization is to reduce poverty, hunger, andglobal instability. Street violence is not aneffective substitute for such institutions.

Lack of international accountability isreflected in other ways. For example, targetsagreed upon in international declarations arenot being met or even taken seriously bymany national governments. An ongoingreview I am currently doing with theInternational Food Policy Research Institute(of targets agreed upon at 23 international

conferences related to food, agriculture,gender, poverty, population, and theenvironment) shows that virtually none of thesegoals is being met.

What to Do?What to Do?What to Do?What to Do?What to Do?First, we need institutional innovation

in the international arena that will helpassure accountability, participation, andempowerment of the poor. We must also dealeffectively with the international spillovers ofnational actions in such areas as trade,environment, health, security, poverty andhunger, labor and capital flows, technology,drugs, and terrorism.

Unilateral behavior by nations isincompatible with mutually beneficialglobalization. The failure of the United States(and other countries) to join the KyotoProtocol on climate change and to ratifyinternational treaties on land mines, theinternational criminal court, chemical andbiological weapons, and nuclear proliferationmakes it very difficult to achieve internationalaccountability by national governments.

This lack of international accountabilityis exemplified by the trade-distortingagricultural policies in the United States, theEuropean Union, and Japan. These policieshave severe effects on developing countries.Tariffs and other import barriers as well asexport subsidies, excessive food aid, and othersurplus-disposing and pr ice-depressingmechanisms limit the access of developingcountries to industrialized country marketsand damage agr icultural markets indeveloping countries. Since 75 percent of theworld’s poor and hungry people reside in ruralareas of developing countries and dependmostly on agriculture (either directly orindirectly), such trade-distorting agriculturalpolicies contribute to the continuation ofpoverty, hunger, and hopelessness.

Agricultural subsidies currently amountto roughly $1 billion per day—of which 80percent is spent in industrialized nations. Thesesubsidies are linked to quantity produced orarea used for production—resulting inexpanded production and further downwardpressures on prices, which in turn lead totrade-distortion. Industrialized nations whowish to transfer income from taxpayers andconsumers to farmers and other rural residentsshould do so in a way that does not distort

25

trade. Alternative approaches include directpayments to rural residents and payments toimprove natural resources and rurallandscapes.

Second, developing countr ies—particularly low-income ones—desperatelyneed to (a) expand investment in the creationof public goods, and (b) improve governance.

The creation of public goods is key tosuccessful pr ivate-sector development,economic growth, and the eradication ofpoverty and hunger in low-income developingcountries. Public investment in agriculturalresearch is especially and urgently needed inthese countries. Productivity increases inagriculture are critical for both povertyalleviation and sustainable management ofnatural resources. Developing countries spendonly 0.6 percent of the value of theagricultural output on agricultural research,compared to 5 percent in the United States.While private-sector agricultural research isgaining increasing importance inindustrialized countries, public investment isneeded to generate the public-goodstechnologies needed for small farmers indeveloping countries.1

Investments are also urgently needed inthe rural infrastructure of developingcountries, particularly but not exclusively forrural roads. The development of commonstandards and measures, enforcement ofcontracts, and a number of other institutionaldevelopments are needed to make privatemarkets work in rural areas. In addition,developing countries desperately need tomake larger investments in health care,education, and clean water.

Such investments in the development ofthe human resource should also beaccompanied by policies to assure access bythe poor to land, credit, and employment.Results from recent research in China andIndia conclude that public investment in ruralroads, agricultural research, and primaryeducation yielded the highest economicreturns as well as the largest impact on povertyalleviation (IFPRI, 2002).

In addition, good governance is ofcritical importance to the eradication ofpoverty and hunger. A move to goodgovernance would include the elimination ofcorruption and the development ofparticipatory decision-making approaches as

well as enhanced political will to deal withthe problems of the poor and hungry. Policiesto assure property rights and to promotecollective action in rural areas are also crucial;such policies help assure that the rural poorhave access to land and other natural resources.

Third, policies and public investments areneeded to help people out of hunger andpoverty in the short run.

Such policies should include targetedsubsidies and safety nets. Low-income peoplehave very little buffer in the face of adversedevelopments such as drought, loss ofemployment, large drops in the prices of thecommodities they produce, and illness. Copingmechanisms—such as credit and savings

institutions, public works, and otherinstitutions—should be designed andimplemented with due consideration toexisting social capital. Successful efforts includemicrocredit schemes for the rural poor inBangladesh and many other developingcountries and food and cash distributionprograms in Mexico and several otherdeveloping countries.

Fourth, development assistance must beexpanded—primarily to assist the poor andhungry to improve their situation, but also toimprove national and international stabilityand to reduce the risk of future terrorism. Asformer U.S. Secretary of State MadeleineAlbright testified recently before the SenateForeign Relations Subcommittee onInternational Operations and Terrorism: “Ourinternational assistance programs are notmoney down a rat hole. They are poison downthe snake hole of terrorism; helping to chokeoff the hatred, ignorance, and desperation ofupon which terrorism feeds.”

More development assistance will alsoexpand mutually beneficial trade. Experiencefrom Southeast Asia shows that rapidlygrowing developing countries provide verystrong markets for U.S. agricultural andnonagricultural goods and services. One canonly begin to imagine how U.S. exports andemployment could benefit from rapid growth

Imagine how U.S. exports and employment

could benefit from rapid growth in Africa.

—Per Pinstrup-Andersen

PINSTRUP-ANDERSEN, PAGES 22-27


Caldeira, Teresa P.R. (2000). City of walls: Crime, segregation, and citizenship in São Paulo. California & London:University of California Press.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas. (1999). Environment, scarcity, and violence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). (2002). Reaching sustainable food security for all by 2020:Getting the priorities and responsibilities right. Washington, DC: IFPRI.

IFPRI. (2002). Achieving sustainable food security for all by 2020: Priorities and responsibilities. Washington, DC:IFPRI.

Messer, Ellen; Marc J. Cohen; & Thomas Marchione. (2001). “Conflict: A cause and effect of hunger.” ECSPReport 7, 1–16.

Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2002). The paradox of American power: Why the world’s only superpower can’t go it alone. New York:Oxford University Press.

Office of the Press Secretary, White House. (2001, July 17). “Remarks by the President to the World Bank.”[On-line]. Available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/07/20010717-1.html.

1 In some cases—such as the rapid expansion of the use of Bt cottonseed in China, India, and South Africa—technology produced by the private sector for use in industrialized countries may be readily adaptable to theproduction by small farmers in developing countries. However, this adaptability is likely to be the exceptionrather than the rule.

ReferencesReferencesReferencesReferencesReferences

NoteNoteNoteNoteNote

in Africa.Unfortunately, when measured as a

percentage of national income, developmentassistance given by the United States trails allother OECD countries. While these countriesagreed many years ago to providedevelopment assistance in the amount of 0.7percent of national incomes, the United Statescurrently provides one-tenth of that level. Thiscorresponds to an annual developmentassistance of $36 for each American citizen.The recent announcement by President Bushto increase development assistance by US$5billion per year—equivalent to a little less than$18 per Amer ican citizen—should bewelcomed, and effort should be made to assurethat these additional funds (if approved byCongress) will be appropriately targeted forthe benefit of the poor and hungry.

Future development assistance must betargeted on improving the human resource,on increasing productivity in agriculture, onimproving rural infrastructure, on access toland, improved governance, and on reducingarmed conflict and instability both nationallyand internationally. Development assistance

should help guide national policies forincreased efficiency and improved socialjustice, and strong efforts should be made tocreate national institutions that correspondto the needs of true internationalaccountability and participation within amore globalized world.

ConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusionMilitary might alone will not eradicate

the threat of terrorism. But removing rootcauses of instability such as poverty, hunger,and social injustice will reduce the risk offuture conflict and terror ism. Dealingeffectively with these issues is also the rightthing to do from both a humanitarian and aneconomic point of view.

If the root causes of instability are noteffectively dealt with, we will need to investincreasing amounts of money to build bothreal and virtual walls around us to protectourselves, much as the rich try to do in SãoPaulo. But no wall will be high enough orstrong enough to assure stability in an unjustworld.

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Paarlberg, Robert L. (2002). Governance and food security in an age of globalization. (2020 Vision for Food,Agriculture, and the Environment 36). Washington, DC: IFPRI.

Pinstrup-Andersen, Per. (2001, 19 October). “Achieving the 2020 vision in the shadow of internationalterrorism.” 2001 World Food Prize Laureate Address, Des Moines, Iowa. Author.

Scott, James C. (1985). Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance. New Haven & London: YaleUniversity Press.

United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). (1996). “Wars against children.” [On-line]. Available: http://www.unicef.org/graca/.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2002). Human development report 2002: Deepeningdemocracy in a fragmented world. New York: Oxford University Press for UNDP.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UHCR). (2000). The state of the world’s refugees: Fifty yearsof humanitarian action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The Strategic Significance of Global InequalityThe Strategic Significance of Global InequalityThe Strategic Significance of Global InequalityThe Strategic Significance of Global InequalityThe Strategic Significance of Global Inequality

By Jeffrey D. SachsJeffrey D. SachsJeffrey D. SachsJeffrey D. SachsJeffrey D. Sachs


Jeffrey D. Sachs is the director of The Earth Institute, Quetelet Professor of SustainableDevelopment, and professor of health policy and management at Columbia University aswell as a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. He is alsoSpecial Advisor to United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan on a group of povertyreduction initiatives called the Millennium Development Goals.

While the United States enjoyed rapideconomic growth during the past 20

years, many poor countries, including someof the world’s poorest in sub-Saharan Africa,experienced a generation of outright declinein living standards. And while pr ivateconsumption-spending per capita in theUnited States rose by 1.9 percent per yearfrom 1980-1998, such spending declined onaverage by 1.2 percent per year insub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2000). Isthere a “strategic significance” to globalinequalities in income levels and economicgrowth? And, if so, which policies might theUnited States pursue to address those strategicconcerns? Focusing on the scope andlimitations of U.S. foreign assistance as a policyinstrument to address global incomeinequalities is illuminating.

The economic success of developingcountries enhances the well-being of theUnited States, which has and should moreactively deploy policy instruments to helpsupport economic success abroad. National

interests in successful economic growth abroadare multifaceted. Some of these interests arebasically economic: the economic success orfailure of developing countries determines thegains from trade and investment that theUnited States reaps in its economic relationswith those countries.

However, the ramifications for the UnitedStates of good or bad economic performanceamong poor countries go beyond directeconomic returns. As a general proposition,economic failure abroad raises the risk ofstate failure as well. When foreign statesmalfunction (in the sense that they fail toprovide basic public goods for theirpopulations), their societies are likely toexperience steeply escalating problems thatspill over to the rest of the world, includingthe United States. Failed states are seedbedsof violence, ter ror ism, internationalcriminality, mass migration and refugeemovements, drug trafficking, and disease.

If poor countries had reliably stable andfunctional state institutions, global poverty

SACHS, PAGES 27-35

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