Prior to being captured in 2003, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed the mastermind

behind the 9/11 attacks, offered to invest $200,000 in an export firm in exchange

for access to the intermodal containers used by the firm to ship garments to Port

Newark in the New York-New Jersey harbor complex. This deal did not go through

but the intent behind it was clear. America’s ports were targets for a terrorist attack.

If an attack on an American port were to occur it could potentially cause tens of

thousands of deaths and injuries while crippling global trade. According to the Rand

Corporation and the losses would range from $45 billion to more than $1 trillion.

(Rand Paraphrase Rpp1220) Lawmakers took this threat seriously and decided that

the best way to stop such an attack like that from happening would be to use

preventative tactics to keep dangerous intermodal containers away from U.S. ports

to begin with. This led to congress to “Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11

Commission Act of 2007, unilaterally introducing a 100% scanning requirement for

US-bound maritime cargo at export, to be implemented by 1 July 2012,”

(sec_2010_131_EN). However while seemingly 100% scanning might make sense to

American politicians. Many Individuals representing the private business sector

think that while security needs to be improved, 100% scanning is not the answer.

They argue that while they can see why proponents might think 100% scanning is

wise based on the scanning of similar transportation methods. The complexity of

shipping makes 100% scanning unfeasible from an implementation standpoint.

While the current trend by government official is to look at how to achieve a

greater number of shipping containers can be scanned. Our research shows

evidence that the superior approach to mitigating the risk of another should rather

be how to improve methods to identify a suspect container before it reaches a U.S.

port. While at the same time limiting any disruption to international trade. This

question then leads to further questions that need to be solved such as the

following. What are the indicators that make for a container at risk of being used as

a weapon? Can technology be used to find patterns that can be observed to find out

which a containers were sent to the U.S. with the intent to cause it harm? In addition

to this can technology be used to better manage the security risk of a containers

being tampered with between when it loaded at its port of origination to when it is

unloaded at its port of destination in the United States?  It is our belief that I.T. is

capable now of answering these questions by establishing a better system for

identifying these shipping containers as being a threat and monitoring them

effectively until they are fully discharged in America.

Proponents of the 100 percent mandate have pointed to the supposed success of the air cargo mandate, which mandated 100 percent screening of air cargo. Besides the fact that 100 percent screening was implemented only for domestic cargo—screening of U.S.-bound international cargo proved much more difficult—and that a significantly greater volume of cargo transits through the maritime supply chain, another critical difference is that the air cargo security mandate called for the 100 percent screening of all cargo, whereas the maritime cargo mandate calls for 100 percent scanning….. While screening calls for cargo to be assessed for risk on the basis of contents, origin, and other attributes, scanning means that each of the approximately 11.6 million maritime cargo security containers entering U.S. ports each year must be physically scanned. With many maritime cargo increasingly containerized in recent decades, typical maritime cargo containers often measure some 40 feet in length. One key issue regarding maritime cargo screening is, therefore, one of scale. While the basic technology exists to effectively screen cargo containers, the expanded technology necessary to perform this function on large containerized cargo largely does not. (Heritage 2/2012)

Current Issue

About 90 percent of the cargo that is transported to the United States comes

in the form of shipping containers. There are literally thousands of containers that

enter each the over 300 ports in the United States daily. The revenue earned from

the shipping and handling of these containers not only contributes to the local

economy of the ports they enter. They also contribute significantly to the national

economy as well. (Rand source for paraphrase) This fact adds to the paradox of the

lack of an effective national security plan that could be the difference between

having effective security for containers that would allow for normal trade levels to

continue. This in turn indicates one of the larger, more significant issues in shipping.

Are their any cost effective options to improve the security systems used by

America’s ports from the threat of a shipping container based terrorist attack that

will not disrupt international trade. (Rand source for paraphrase)

This issue of trying to mitigate the risk to America’s ports while maintaining

their current level of economic viability is far from new. Before 9/11 very little

emphasis was placed on the threat of a container being used to smuggle a WMD into

America because of the fear that over regulating shipping might affect negatively

affect the international trade. The reason’s giving that over securing would lead to a

loss of business and could negatively affect international commerce worldwide.

However, the lack of overall planning prior to 9/11 has led to this current political

environment post 9/11 of overcompensation where politicians are recommending

overly restrictive regulations. The idea that 100% scanning will deter terrorist

attack more than a well thought system to that approaches and mitigates the risk of

an attack is a extremely costly error waiting to happen. Historically, one of the

reasons that 100% scanning was not required was that the perceived greatest

threat to the security of goods in containers had only been an issue due to problems

such as smuggling and/or theft. Legislators understood that simply stopping

containers with illegal goods would not stop smugglers from brings drugs into the

country (http://www.rand.org/commentary/2012/07/06/RAND.html).

However, after the attacks in America on September 11 many countries

around the world began to realize how at risk they were by lacking the security of

their ports truly was. This realization led to millions of dollars being invested into

developing technology to assisting the protection and security of our ports. Yet, this

planning has not extended itself to improving the approach to risk management that

ports had to take to shipping containers. So the approach the government took was

to ask for 100% scanning in spite of the fact that the technology to do it did not

exist, nor that when the idea of 100% scanning had been found lacking when it came

as a smuggling deterrent already. The main hindrance to container security is the

reality that it is simply not possible to screen every single container entering the

United States. Currently only 5% of cargo sent to the U.S. is actually screened. An

example of how inefficient that is can be seen when this policy is applied to

American ports. A port such as Long Beach that sees 1.7 million containers a year

yet randomly scans less than a 100,000 is a year.

In addition to the scanning of 5% of containers, currently the container

security system that is most widespread through shipping is based upon following

federal protocols created in 2002 known as the Maritime Transportation Security

Act (MTSA 2002). The MTSA’s main goal was to protect the maritime infrastructure

of the U.S. (such as ports and waterways). However a byproduct of this act was the

creation of a chain of responsibility that helped deter terrorist attempting to attack

the U.S. port through a shipping container. The concept of the chain of responsibility

is that similar to the concept of incoterms While incoterms states at what part of

transport a person is responsible to pay for the cost of shipping. The security chain

of responsibility states at what part of shipping is someone responsible to document

what is in a shipping container and where has it gone. The chain consists of the

Company Security Officer (CSO), the Vessel Security Officer (VSO), and the Facility

Security Officer (FSO) who work together to better document and track shipping

containers. In 2006 the Safety And Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port act created

the Container Security Initiative (CSI) whose purpose was to identify or investigate

shipping containers that could pose a security threat to the U.S. However as stated

earlier, due to the sheer levels of shipping containers entering the U.S., even these

additional regulations allow many containers to come into the United States

unchecked. The CSI would be the system most likely to be directly affected by a

change in scanning rules since it current mode of operation is to scan a container at

the dock when it considered a risk. “CSI is a security program administered by the

US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), an agency which falls within the

Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The program, announced in January 2002,

uses rules-based software to identify containers bound for the US that are “at risk”

of being tampered with by terrorists. A key input to this system is the container’s

shipping manifest, which contains information about the container’s sender,

recipient, and contents” (WP20090501)

Another system for the detecting suspicious cargo is the cooperative

program started by homeland security in joint partnerships with individuals in the

shipping industry that formed a Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-

TPAT). The C-TPAT is a voluntary program between the U.S. government and the

private shipping sector to maintain & improve the overall security of the global

supply chain of shipped goods. The overall focus of this system is based on

prevention of dangerous materials reaching American shores. A major aspect of this

security system is the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) defined by the United

States Coast Guard as “the effective understanding of anything associated with the

maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment”.

MDA Also acts as a key component for other maritime security measures for the

Container Security Initiative. In addition to this MDA is complimentary to the

Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) that relies on individuals in

the private sector to accept responsibility for following the security protocols of the

United States on any items placed into a container at different parts of the

containers transportation.

Currently the MDA is focused on the implementation of Maritime change

Detection. Maritime change detection focuses on ways to recognize “anomalies from

established trends and patterns." (Munson 2009)  For example a ship will load 200

intermodal containers from ABC Company and its consigned to XYZ Company in the

U.S.A.  The cargo will then be declared as textiles. What happens now is homeland

security will run a background check on the ship. Homeland security will look for

certain details about the ship. They will look for anything unusual or suspicious. For

example does the ship have an historic relationship with that American port? Does

this ship have a history of dealing with textiles? If not they may be considered

suspicious. If yes, then further questions might be asked. Does the company usually

move in this lot size? Is this the normal container size usually moved in? They will

analyze the MARSEC (Maritime Security) levels of the ports that the cargo came

from to see what level of risk the port of origination is. (Munson 2009)  Homeland

security will then track all the statements and look for anomalies in the pattern for

that particular cargo to see if they can look for things that just stand out as not being

normal. These background checks are done on continuous basis. Of the several

layers of checking that are done to find a suspicious container, the most significant

is the 24-hour manifest rule that requires shippers to tell homeland security what

they are carrying in their intermodal containers at least 24 hours before it arrives.

In addition to this, there are spot checks that involve physically opening the

container in a foreign country before they are shipped to the United States along

with suspicious containers being scanned for radiation prior to them reaching the

United States Shores.

However the flaw to all of the systems discussed so far is of course what

would happen if a container was shipped with a possible WMD and it didn’t stand

out due to it being transported in an intermodal container that the MDA did not

consider as being a suspicious intermodal container. If anyone in the responsibility

chain notice anything odd about the container the results could be a WMD entering

America undetected. The common denominator to all the systems discussed so far

is that they are all too susceptible to human error. If one or two people involved in

the maintaining the sanctity of this system fails in their security duties, a dangerous

container can easily reach American shores. When you consider how vulnerable of

ports are to shipping containers containing smuggled contraband or drugs the odds

of these system being successful long term to stopping a dangerous container from

reaching an American port seem bleak.

It might be due to this fear of human error that the scanning of intermodal

containers for is exceedingly becoming a hot topic when it comes to the security of

the U.S. ports. Many lawmakers conceptually believe that it would make sense to

scan all intermodal containers coming into the United States to verify if it contained

any dangerous materials (such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) shipped to

America with the purpose to cause us damage. Then from their point of view this

decision to implement 100% scanning would make sense due to it fulfilling the

requirements contained in the SAFE Port Act signed into law in Oct. 2006. In

addition, the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 recommended the implementation of

100% scanning, which was signed into law in August 2007. The new 9/11

Commission Act of 2007 went further by amending the SAFE Port Act to say: “A

container that was loaded on a vessel in a foreign port shall not enter the United

States (either directly or via a foreign port) unless the container was scanned by

nonintrusive imaging equipment and radiation detection equipment at a foreign

port before it was loaded on a vessel also mandate scanning.”

(http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109hr4954enr/pdf/BILLS-109hr4954enr.pdf)

The new system in place would operate thusly.

(wp-2009 page 28)

So while the 100% scanning of an intermodal container on paper might seem

like an effective security measure when it was put together by congress and signed

into law, there are however several significant issues that would hinder the

implementation. The most important one would be in box number 2 in the graph

above. Primary inspection at the Gate/Quay would add significantly to the overall

cost of time and money prior to the cargo even being put into transit. After that

would be the fact that reliable technology to fulfill this goal doesn’t exist. Lastly the

often not mentioned fact that foreign countries might consider this scanning a

barrier to trade with America because the proposal would have containers be

scanned prior to being placed on a vessel at port of origination heading for the

United States. As Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano described 100% as,

“A Significant and negative impact on trade capacity and the flow of cargo…. Systems

to scan contanors cannot be purchased, deployed or operated at ports overseas

because ports do not have the physical characteristics to install such a system”.

(

https://www.bimco.org/en/News/2012/06/27_100_pct_container_scanning_deferred_unti

l_2014.aspx) Nor would it likely be possible to install such a system on American

shores either. As has been discussed earlier CSI is the current process in which

containers thought to be at risk of containing unknown dangerous materials is

scanned. “Current CSI protocol, which relies on more sensitive equipment to scan

high- risk containers in a centrally-located government operated inspection facility,

would face significant hurdles were it to be scaled up to scan more than a small

fraction of US-bound container traffic….it is possible to support passive radiation

detection and NII of no more than 5% of US-bound traffic at the smaller port and no

more than 1.5% of US-bound traffic” (page 7 Wp20090501)

As of June 7, 2012, the Homeland security committee amendments bill

known as “Ensuring Scanned Containers Arrive in Ports Efficiently Act of 2012”

(http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/02/maritime-cargo-port-security-and-

the-100-percent-screening-mandate) only pushed the goal from 100% scanning to

implemented from 2012 to 2014 however the base flaws with a 100% scanning

prerogative still exist. The initiative still requires the United States to buy and install

scanners after reaching agreements with host nations on the terms for placing the

scanning equipment but did not specify who would pay the full cost for the

procedure. Charterer would still pay for their cargo to be scanned or would the

United States pay the cost. Also, if the time needed to scan all the cargos affected the

schedule for the shipment of goods going to other countries would the United States

be liable for time (and money) lost? Or even who would be liable for the cost of

late/expired cargo if the scanning equipment at a port ceased to function? According

to European Commission staff report, it would cost at least 10% more to ship goods

to the U.S.A. from Europe if the mandate were instituted and everything ran

smoothly. When all the cost associated with instituting a security strategy of

scanning of 100% of all inbound intermodal containers is aggregated, it becomes

clear that the cost of instituting it would far exceed the mere price of the scanners

themselves. In addition to this while the current generation of PVT scanner that are

very good at detecting radiation from materials such as ceramic tile. They are not

very good at sensing highly enriched uranium or shielded uranium. Meaning the

technology needed to make 100% scanning a truly effective deterrent to illegally

transporting dangerous radioactive materials doesn’t even exist yet. This in turn

would make it even more expensive to try to implement this plan the way it is

currently designed.

(Rand 2005)

Mandating 100% would likely lead companies to have to adjust for the new

cost of exporting and importing goods globally. They would likely be forced to

change which countries they import goods from and which ports they use to ship

the goods to America. This could lead to unintended changes in the global supply

chain overall and even then due to the lack of technology required it could not

guarantee improved global security. However it would likely cause a decrease the

global supply chain’s overall efficacy.

These questions of who will pay for 100% scanning of containers and how

much it will eventually cost the cargo owner to implement that plan is why it is

opposed by the Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA). The RILA whose

members include some of the largest retail companies in the world such as Apple

(AAPL), Costco Wholesale (COST), Home Depot (HD), Nike (NKE), Target and Wal-

Mart stores (WMT) have been vocal critics of the 100% scanning of containers

policy. The group’s vice-president for supply chain policy, Kelly Kolb say’s “It’s not

effective or feasible to scan every container that meets [American] shores. RILA

does however support the current programs requiring shippers to send cargo

manifest to Homeland Security 24 hours before a container leaves a foreign port.

However simply maintaining the current security system is not the answer

for securing America’s ports either. The current situation still does have security

problems associated with it. The major one being that Homeland security is really

not as secure as they think. The Navy and the MDA focus primarily on vessel

tracking and intelligence. As stated before, with the MDA focusing solely on the

ports and containers alone. The MDA takes the risk of being ineffective if a

dangerous container does not stand out as being abnormal. Also the current system

does not focus on the ship’s crew or passengers at specific times and places. The

MDA belief is that automated systems can recognize pirates or terrorists. The

current system if focused on tracking ships, not so much investigating what the ship

is doing actually doing at sea. Relying on suspicious behavior or anomalies might

not be the ideal technique. Anomalies at sea are never necessarily important and

most of the time does have a reasonable excuse. It is possible terrorists recognize

the fact that homeland search for anomalies, and make a special effort for their

container not to be identified as an anomaly or unusual the whole system will not

function properly and dangerous materials might reach a U.S. port.  All recent

maritime terrorist activity involved no anomalies in the ships position. As was

stated at the beginning of this paper a known terrorist was trying to buy into an

established export firm because they had already established a normal shipping

route that ended in Newark, New Jersey. On the other hand anomalies that do show

up could be normal occurrences such as a ship going to a new port for the first time

that could be caused due to new owners, new management, or the ship handling a

different type of cargo. New Security rules are needed for the importation of goods

transported by sea in intermodal container, however they have to be made not to

impose any unneeded difficulties in the shipping of goods on while being effective

on a global scale since America cannot force the whole world’s supply chain to slow

down in an attempt to keep itself safe.

FUTURE

As has been stated earlier, the SAFE Port Act is calling for the replacement of United

States current system of deterrence for terrorist attacks by the shipping container

with one that relies on the 100% scanning of containers. Since 2006 several

business associations nationally (including the National Retail Federation) that rely

of transportation of goods for their business operations have been against the

implementation of this new 100% of all containers. They argue that 100% scanning

before entering the country is impracticable and costly. These opponents to 100%

scanning also point to the facts that it would likely trigger foreign government to

look upon the SAFE port act as being an unofficial barrier to trade. “The Study on the

Impact of Security Measures on the EU Economy and Trade Relations focused on

estimating the investment and operational costs required to implement 100%

scanning in European ports. The study has shown that the great majority of EU ports

are not prepared to implement 100% container scanning. Neither the terminal

operators nor the customs authorities would be ready to bear the additional costs.”

(Sec 2010) In addition to business leaders, some United States politicians don’t

support 100% scanning either.

Ironically enough even with all this opposition to the SAFE Port act, it wasn’t

these complaints that eventually led to the congress to decide to replace the SMART

Port Act with a newer law. This law contained several key provisions that altered

the SAFE Port Act that became effective immediately after passing. While the SMART

Port Act overturned one of the more controversial provision in “The SAFE Port Act”

that would require background checks of foreign investments into American port

infrastructure it continued to call for 100% scanning.

“The Act, among other things, changed the Exon–Florio Amendment 50 U.S.C. app 2170 to require the executive branch to perform a 45-day investigation of each foreign investment deal unless the Secretary of Transportation and the head of the lead agency on the transaction jointly agree that there is no threat to national security. Other important provisions require stricter review of container security and foreign port assessments. (http://nationalsecuritylawbrief.com)

The SMART port security Act of 2012 reorganized key parts of the SAFE port act,

which became law in 2007 however it did not take into account once again of the

infeasibility of 100% scanning. This in turn set in motion that the implementation of

the SAFE port act 100% scanning that 9/11 commissions recommended, which

included that contentious provision that all US-bound containers will be scanned at

the port of origin (regardless of affect on international trade) starting in July 2012.

While there is within the SAFE Port Act, a clause that allows for the Homeland

Security Secretary to grant waivers to shipments coming from specific ports. Under

the conditions that to this day are somewhat vague. Homeland Security passed a

version that allows DHS to recognize other countries trusted scanning and security

programs and allows the United States Coast Guard to recognize other governments

threat assessments included.

On July 23, 2012 Lloyds List released an article claiming that illicit arms

traders step up use of containers, arms traffickers are turning to global maritime

containers as the means to transport deadly cargo across the high seas and into

busy active ports. This ultimately can very well persuade the DHS to highly consider

passing the bill in 2014 for 100% scanning of all containers coming into US ports.

The key components that comes with the shipping of containers including speed and

efficiency, not to mention the added plus of anonymity granted by the millions of

containers that come in and out of ports on a daily basis, are the same reasons that

this form of supply trade is becoming increasingly popular and attractive with illicit

gun traffic traders.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute found through an

earlier report in the year that arms proliferation networks are increasingly adopting

the same techniques that have been pioneered by some drug trafficking

organizations that have come to understand the logistics operations within the

global supply chain and has completely utilized the use of sealed shipping

containers. The containers are being carried on board vessels owned by major

mainstream shipping companies engaged in day-to-day, innocent, legal trade, so

providing an extra layer of respectability for traffickers to camouflage their

activities and remain off the radar of the proper authorities. A very important piece

to this situational awareness is the effect that the most cost effective method of

dealing with these traffickers is that when they are confronted by well-resourced

and coordinated surveillance operations supported by international agreements

such as the United Nations Arms Embargoes and counter-narcotics conventions, the

traffickers ultimately begin to lose the opportunities and confidence to continue to

move their wares across the ocean and into major ports.

We propose that companies combine this tracking technology to the chain of

responsibility enacted by the Maritime Transportation Act (MTSA 2002). By better

equipping the Vessel Security Officer with this mobile scanning technology a VSO

can go about the ship scanning for containers for any of the aforementioned threats.

This could allow for a greater number of scanning and in lieu of potentially slowing

down international trade allow for the current levels of speed for the transportation

of goods. In addition to this we believe that shipping companies and charterers

should begin to use Container Security Devices (CSD) on their shipping containers.

CSD Now while this system would still be a certain level of risk for the crews of ships

and all containers would not. What we propose is that instead

Recently the private market has produced some solutions that could

potentially be proactive in protecting containers while not hindering international

commerce if instituted. In 2006, Powers International Inc. located in Belmont, North

Carolina announced today that was testing a joint international project to

demonstrate its SeaCure Satellite System (SCSS) container security solution in an

international shipping trial. RFID usage for global container transportation is not

conducive but satellite communication is good for the following reasons; A satellite

system using either low earth orbit (LEO) constellations or a high-altitude

geosynchronous satellite transmits data differently, but the vendors' systems will

work anywhere in the world that they have coverage.

There are some flaws to this system. 1 being that there is an almost

guarantee that not all countries will agree to allowing RFID or satellite tracking of

their containers. Therefore it would be wise to maintain the current versions of

security systems such as MARSEC that makes designations between the threat levels

of Cargo depending on its point of origin. If anything the current system of

designating risk by point of origin might assist in this tracking technology becoming

more widespread quicker. If it becomes known to charters and freight forwarders

that using this technology on their container will lessen the odds of their cargo

being stopped for inspection in spite of the point of origin from shipping being

somewhere with a dubious MARSEC rating. Therefore, satellite applications are not

critically impaired by regional differences and are useful for global container

security.

The benefit of the use of a satellite system is that it could communicate in

real time or nearly real time depending on the satellite system used. Satellite-

equipped containers could then likewise utilize these sensors, but the benefit of it

being that a satellite system could be programmed to immediately warn its users of

changes to a cargo container giving them an opportunity to investigate the container

themselves or warn port authorities of the fact they might have a dangerous

container on their ship. Satellite applications even also allow for remote unlocking

of the doors because of the variety of data that can be sent. Finally, satellite offers

redundancies in notifying the user of problems encountered during the

international movement of the container. If instituted correctly containers could be

laden in sight of an MDA trained (so as to ensure the cargo was legal when placed in

the container) dockworker, secured and then placed under satellite supervision. If

anyone tried to tamper or open the containers prematurely, the satellite monitoring

it could warn An RFID user either on the ship or the port of destination and they

would know to scan the container using the already setup scanning assets for

dangerous material.

The more data that the RFID collects prior to the container reaching an

American port the more likely that a suspect container can be identified before it

could cause any damage. That information alongside the MARSEC and MDA will

allow for a much more thorough review of a containers contents prior to it reaching

a port. This in turn is why the RFID technology is in many ways the best option at

the moment. It could be incorporated into the system already in operation and in

turn adds another layer of container security.

Transition

The transition by the United States into incorporating better tracking

technology into their current maritime security systems such as MARSEC (Maritime

Security) and the MDA (Maritime Domain Awareness) as a way to improve it ability

to secure shipping containers has been slow. While these programs currently rely

on recognizing signs of suspicious behavior by a shipping containers route or point

of origin as a way to identify possible terrorist attacks, prior to them reaching an

American port. The United States historically has been slow to be more proactive in

the forms of security and risk management when it comes to creating a system of

protecting shipping containers. While many shipping experts will admit that

MARSEC and the MDA have been effective so far in stopping WMD from reaching

American port through shipping containers. Simply relying on a system of

procedures based on noticing suspicious signs on a container as an early warning

system has a very real potential of failure. All it would take is for a terrorist to ship a

WMD through the normal shipping protocols and it could bypass the system set up

due to not being inconspicuous enough. Detection of suspicious

containers cannot be based on only one maritime aspect, such as cargo’s

movement. Recent events of Maritime related terrorism show that unusual behavior

cannot be the only determining factor in threat assessment. No unusual or

suspicious behavior was found in the attacks on the USS Cole, or bombing of

the SuperFerry 14 bombing in the Philippines where terrorists killed 116 people by

hiding explosives in a Television set.

The alternative plan to relying on the MARSEC and the MDA that is often

touted by politicians, that the United States should adopt a container/shipping

security plan based upon scanning 100% is unrealistic. Unfortunately 100%

scanning has already been made into law by the 9/11 act that had a provision in it

that altered the SAFE Port Act to require that inspections happen at ports that

included scans for radioactive materials. There are several problems with this law

that make 100% scanning at docks not just pointless but unrealistic as well. The first

being that the law states that scan’s must take place on the dock. Even if dangerous

material was found at a dock and made inoperative before it could hurt someone or

destroy something. The disruption to the docks operation for a single day due to it

could potentially be in the 100’s of million. In addition to this the technology needed

to perform 100% scanning efficiently does not exist, and even if it had. The United

States would likely be unable to pay for it anyway. The reason being that Congress

did not propose a bill that would cover the cost of installing these hypothetical

scanners in the SAFE Port act. Finally the last reason that 100% is an unrealistic goal

is because it would require that docks across the world to carry the equipment

needed to scan containers 100%. For that to happen would mean that the United

States would have to impose its safety regulations on the world, which is politically

impossible to do.

It is for those reasons that the 100% scanning of containers mandate is

opposed by the Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA), whose members include

Apple (AAPL), Costco Wholesale (COST), Home Depot (HD), Nike (NKE), Target and

Wal-Mart stores (WMT). The group’s vice-president for supply chain policy, Kelly

Kolb says, “It’s not effective or feasible to scan every container that meets our

shores”. Even in the face of all this extensive critique from business leaders and

politicians. The 100% scanning requirement has only had the 100% scanning

provision deadline pushed back to 2014.

Recently the private market has produced some solutions that could

potentially create a solution that can be realistically proactive while not hindering

business if instituted. In 2006, Powers International Inc. located in Belmont, North

Carolina announced today that was testing a joint international project to

demonstrate its SeaCure Satellite System (SCSS) container security solution in an

international shipping trial.

RFID usage for global container transportation is not conducive but satellite

communication is good for the following reasons; A satellite system using either low

earth orbit (LEO) constellations or a high-altitude geosynchronous satellite

transmits data differently, but the vendors' systems will work anywhere in the

world that they have coverage. Therefore, satellite applications are not critically

impaired by regional differences and are useful for global container security. In

addition to this the Department of Defense has been testing this type of technology

for security reasons since 2008. “research will prove the feasibility of developing a secure,

satellite-enabled, radio frequency identification (RFID) system for verifying the location of and

tracking in-transit items without disclosing the location or nature of the communications to

unintended individuals.” (http://www.sbir.gov/sbirsearch/detail/303063)

The benefit of instituting of a satellite system/RFID into the current security

systems is that it could communicate in real time any potential risk to whoever is

responsible for security at whatever point it is in its transportation. If and when any

of these containers would set off an alarm due to it being tampered with, the

corresponding person on the chain of responsibility (the VSO, FSO, or the CSO)

would know that they would have to put that container through further testing. If

instituted correctly containers would be laden in sight of an MDA trained (so as to

ensure the cargo was legal when placed in the container) dockworker, secured and

then placed under satellite supervision. If anyone tried to tamper or open the

containers prematurely, the satellite monitoring it could warn An RFID user either

on the ship or the port of destination and they would know to scan the container

using the already setup scanning assets for dangerous material. Satellite

applications even also allow for remote unlocking of the doors because of the

variety of data that can be sent. Finally, satellite offers redundancies in notifying the

user of problems encountered during the international movement of the container

The more data that the RFID collects prior to the container reaching an American

port the more likely that a suspect container can be identified before it could cause

any damage. That information alongside the MARSEC and MDA will allow for a much

more thorough review of a containers contents prior to it reaching a port. This in

turn is why the RFID technology is in many ways the best option at the moment. It

could be incorporated into the system already in operation and in turn adds another

layer of container security. Instituting this program would take time. Containers

would have to outfitted with the technology needed, and the individuals who would

be in charge of maintaining this system would have to be trained in the proper

procedures for loading and unloading cargo as well as how to go about scanning

containers that might pose a risk of being a WMD. However the time and money

needed to achieve this would likely be far less and much more feasible than trying to

continue to implement 100% scanning of all containers that come to ports located in

the United States. What we have described here is improvement of a system that

while already being effective had the flaw of being to vulnerable to human error. By

following the suggestions made in this paper on adding more tracking technology to

that system in theory the need for scanning could be eliminated and the threat to

ports lessened significantly. “This strategy requires a combination of different

technologies with traditional control methods and risk management based on

reliable and adequate information. The improvement of cargo and container

integrity during the whole transport cycle is another key layer where modern

technology such as sealing, tracking and tracing, positioning or scanning technology

can help.” (Sec_2010 pg 14)

In addition to this another step that should be taken to ensure more security

of America’s shipping ports should be America transitioning its views on security as

being from a singular national point of view to being more collaborative global point

of view. International shipping is a global trade and shipping containers will travel

around the world due to this fact

National policies will, however, be ineffective unless they are supported by enhanced international cooperation to guarantee their coherence and compatibility. Terrorists will focus attention to 'the weakest links' in the international supply chain; it is a joint responsibility of the international community to strengthen all elements of the supply chain in order to diminish the chance of an attack.…. The idea is to address the security of the international supply chain as a global and complex challenge, and to offer a range of global security options which, if implemented together, form a more effective and flexible multi- layered risk management strategy.” (Sec 2010 pg 14)

By forming international partnerships and alliances, the United States along

with its international allies. Can work far more effectively together to lessen the risk

of global commerce being used as transportation route of terror than any singular

country can hope to work towards this goal alone. This goes along with the goal of

superior tracking of containers. Just because a container might be transported to

and from foreign ports doesn’t mean that it shouldn’t still be observed so as to keep

the risk of being tampered at a minimal.