SEPARATIST MODEL: COMPARE AND CONTRAST BETWEEN THE MALAY MUSLIMS OF SOUTHERN THAILAND

AND THE MOROS OF SOUTHERN PHILIPPINE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial

fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

General Studies

by

JAMES M. VANG, MAJOR US ARMY M.S., Webster University, St. Louis, Missouri, 2003

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2013-01

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Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT The majority of conflicts around the world involve some type of internal warfare including insurgency. Most of these are separatist insurgencies. Typically, these insurgencies lack the size of population to try and overthrow the government. Instead, they seek to maintain the identity of the group, its culture, and religion. When such groups feel that their identity is severely threatened, they may use violence to try to change government policy and operations. Success for a separatist insurgency is obtaining institutionalized protection of its identity through negotiated settlement, semi-autonomy, autonomy, or full independence. This thesis identified four factors that generally must be present for separatist insurgents to achieve that success in protecting the group identity. These four factors are identity, ressentiment, mobilization, and will. These four factors were the basis for examining separatist insurgencies by comparing and contrasting the Malay Muslims of southern Thailand and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) of the Philippines. The Thai Malay Muslim insurgency has stalled and any serious challenge to the Bangkok government diminished due its inability to organize effectively and define its political objectives. However, recently the Thai government has started a dialogue with one insurgent group in Malaysia. The MILF’s stronger organization and clearer objectives led to negotiations with the Philippine government. Of the two, the MILF insurgency has had more international attention and pressure. The four factors are indicative of the relative success of these two separatist insurgencies.

15. SUBJECT TERMS Separatist insurgncy, identity, Thai Malays, MILF.

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major James M. Vang Thesis Title: Separatist Model: Compare and Contrast Between the Malay Muslims of

Southern Thailand and the Moros of Southern Philippine Approved by: , Thesis Committee Chair Stuart D. Lyon, M.P.A. , Member Joseph G. D. Babb, Ph.D. , Member William J. Maxcy, M.A. Accepted this 14th day of June 2013 by: , Director, Graduate Degree Programs Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

iii

ABSTRACT

SEPARATIST MODEL: COMPARE AND CONTRAST BETWEEN THE MALAY MUSLIMS OF SOUTHERN THAILAND AND THE MOROS OF SOUTHERN PHILIPPINE, by James M. Vang, 76 pages. The majority of conflicts around the world involve some type of internal warfare including insurgency. Most of these are separatist insurgencies. Typically, these insurgencies lack the size of population to try and overthrow the government. Instead, they seek to maintain the identity of the group, its culture, and religion. When such groups feel that their identity is severely threatened, they may use violence to try to change government policy and operations. Success for a separatist insurgency is obtaining institutionalized protection of its identity through negotiated settlement, semi-autonomy, autonomy, or full independence. This thesis identified four factors that generally must be present for separatist insurgents to achieve that success in protecting the group identity. These four factors are identity, ressentiment, mobilization, and will. These four factors were the basis for examining separatist insurgencies by comparing and contrasting the Malay Muslims of southern Thailand and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) of the Philippines. The Thai Malay Muslim insurgency has stalled and any serious challenge to the Bangkok government diminished due its inability to organize effectively and define its political objectives. However, recently the Thai government has started a dialogue with one insurgent group in Malaysia. The MILF’s stronger organization and clearer objectives led to negotiations with the Philippine government. Of the two, the MILF insurgency has had more international attention and pressure. The four factors are indicative of the relative success of these two separatist insurgencies.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to personally thank my committee chair, Mr. Stuart D. Lyon, for his

invaluable support, patience, guidance, and mentorship in making this academic endeavor

a significant experience. I am also grateful to the rest of the committee members, Mr.

William J. Maxcy and Dr. Joseph G. D. Babb for their support and assistance on the

research. Their sharing of experience and knowledge provided me with a broader

perspective in dealing with the subject matter.

Thank you to all the staff at the Fort Leavenworth’s Combined Arms Research

Library for their research assistance, flexibility, and agile support; all the while in a

temporary location and relocating. I want to personally thank Ms. Susan L. Fowler for

her help with obtaining copyright privileges. Last but not least, I am most grateful to Ms.

Karen Wallsmith for all her assistance with the thesis. I would not have been able to

complete this undertaking without all of their assistance.

Lest it be forgotten, I would like to thank my wife, Kaz, and my son, Alexander,

for being supportive to this worthy endeavor. Their understanding and patience

contributed in no small measure to the realization of this work.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ............ iii

ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................................v

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... vi

ACRONYMS .................................................................................................................... vii

ILLUSTRATIONS .......................................................................................................... viii

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................1

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................15

CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................................27

CHAPTER 4 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS ON SOUTHERN THAILAND MALAY MUSLIMS ..........................................................................................................37

CHAPTER 5 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS ON MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT ..............................................................................................................................48

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................59

Conclusions ................................................................................................................... 59

GLOSSARY ......................................................................................................................63

REFERENCE LIST ...........................................................................................................65

vi

ACRONYMS

ARMM Autonomous Regions in Muslim Mindanao

BRN-C Barisan Revolusi Nasional–Coordinate (National Revolution Front–Coordinate)

COIN Counterinsurgency

MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MNLF Moro National Liberation Front

vii

ILLUSTRATIONS

Page Figure 1. Separatist Model ..............................................................................................29

Figure 2. Patani Region ...................................................................................................37

Figure 3. Moro Islamic Liberation Front Areas ..............................................................48

viii

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Counterinsurgency is not just thinking man’s warfare—it is the graduate level of war.

― Special Forces Officer in Iraq, 2005, U. S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency

The majority of conflicts around the world involve some type of insurgency.

Since 1996, of the 40 conflicts, 16 were separatist insurgencies (Spencer 1998, 18). Many

countries have come about as a result of a separatist insurgency. For example, East Timor

broke away from Indonesia in 1999, Kosovo away from Serbia in 2008, and South Sudan

away from Sudan in 2011 (Spencer 1998, 19). Separatism is a form of insurgency. These

insurgencies are common everywhere around the world. Almost every continent has had

some kind of separatist insurgency. Spencer states, “It is difficult to determine just how

widespread separatist [insurgencies] have become” (Spencer 1998, 29). In North

America, these separatist insurgencies have taken place in Canada, Mexico, and the

United States. In Africa, they occurred in Algeria, Mali, Nigeria, and Angola. In Europe,

they took place in Balkans (Spencer 1998, 29). These conflicts are unavoidable and will

continue to propagate into the next millennia.

Movement in this study is defined as either a passive or active political

organization aimed at obtaining insurgent political goals. Some characteristics of a

movement are: core members serving as part of or as the nucleus; sporadic violence and

not a central or planned activity; common ideology; personnel are primarily politically

focused. Some examples are the Quebec, Canada; Scotland, United Kingdom; and

Catalonia, Spain. Insurgency is defined by United States Army Field Manual 3-24 as “an 1

organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and

legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority

while increasing insurgent control” (Department of the Army 2006, 1-1). The

distinguishing feature of an insurgency from a movement is its armed militant

organization and orientation to violence as well as criminal, illegal activity. The

Department of Defense definition is mainly focused on national insurgencies seeking the

overthrow of the national government and addresses that most dangerous threat; the more

common type of insurgency in this study is only partially addressed. The rest of the study

will focus on separatist insurgency, which are those organizations that have armed groups

that engage in illegal and violent activities.

This study is only focused on separatist insurgencies, which are those insurgent

groups that seek greater autonomy or to break away from the rest of the country.

Separatist insurgency is a distinct form of revolutionary warfare where insurgents are not

trying to overthrow the government, but seek to maintain the identity of the group, its

culture, language, and religion. Typically, these insurgencies state that they seek to break

away from the government to achieve independence. However, some separatist

insurgencies do not necessarily want to achieve independence because of the heavy

burdening responsibilities and costs associated with being a separate country (Spencer

1998, 29). Instead they may settle for autonomy or semi-autonomy. Success in a

separatist insurgency is defined as obtaining the desired institutionalized protection or

autonomy; that protection may be obtained by a negotiated settlement, official autonomy,

or even independence. Every inhabited continent has these types of conflicts which

generally seek some aspect of separatism.

2

States normally have many means to deal with these insurgencies. They usually

employ internal diplomatic (political) measures, police, and military forces to counter

insurgent violence and address grievances as required. Often, though, these states may

not have the necessary or adequate capacity, let alone know-how, to properly resolve

these types of conflicts. Insurgents also suffer similar challenges as they must be able to

organize and articulate their demands in order to find a resolution of their grievances.

This gap in states’ ability to resolve these types of separatist insurgencies and their

increasing prevalence throughout the world has the potential to impact global power

brokers such as the United States. As the world further becomes more interconnected

through globalization, more and more countries will have national or regional interests in

areas that have these types of conflicts. An examination of separatist insurgencies may

provide better understanding into these conflicts as well as shape policy. Currently, the

United States’ policies and doctrine generally deal with separatist insurgencies by

declaring it as an internal issue and encourage a peaceful resolution of the conflict

(Department of the Army 2006, 1-1). Any kind of involvement would only be as

advisors, trainers, or support to the stability of the state government. This kind of support

can be better guided based clearer understanding.

This study aims to increase the understanding of separatist insurgencies by

identifying and developing the successful factors of such an insurgency type. After that

identification, these factors will be applied, compared, and contrasted in two continuing

separatist insurgencies, the Malay Muslims of southern Thailand and the Moro Islamic

Liberation Front (MILF) on the southern island of Mindanao in the Philippines. As a

separatist insurgency strives to achieve its political aspirations, what is success

3

specifically for these two insurgencies? There is a ceiling of possible recruits for their

insurgency. It is not necessarily about winning autonomy or gaining statehood. The

ambitious endstates may be a goal for the Thai Malays and Mindanao Muslims but

ultimately they are willing to settle for less. According to well known ethnic group

experts, Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, this type of insurgency is “a distinction

between peoples who want separation or autonomy from the states that rule them” (Gurr

and Harff 1994, 21). The primary research question is what current factors determine a

successful separatist insurgency. Some of the secondary research questions that will be

addressed in later chapters are about how success is measured, about what success will be

for each of these cases, and what internal and external support are necessary for that

success, and how organized are these insurgencies to achieve success.

Ethnicity is a significant factor to consider in both of these insurgencies. It is

defined as a collective ancestry, which usually carries innate traits used for basing ethnic

identity and affiliation such as a common religion, customs, language, race, kinship, and

assumed blood ties. The group shares a common sense of belonging and affiliation

through kinship bonds and forms of tribalism, parochialism, or communalism

organizations (Bowman 2006, 3). Group members are born into their specific ethnic

group. Separatist insurgencies have their own political goals. However, those goals could

be achieved more easily by framing the conflict as ethnic in nature.

After addressing group composition, some background is needed on insurgency

by highlighting military doctrine and some of the notable counterinsurgency (COIN)

publications as a basis for study. Two other widely used or known references in dealing

with insurgencies are the Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and David Galula’s

4

Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Though Field Manual 3-24,

Counterinsurgency, is oriented on the Army, its strategy specifically focuses on the

military as a whole; it is also older than the joint publication and is authoritative, taking

precedence over the Army manual. These two publications are mentioned here to provide

some contextual background information as to why not much information is provided on

how to deal with separatist insurgencies. Neither manual defines a separatist insurgency

clearly.

Joint Publication 3-24 says, “Insurgency is the organized use of subversion and

violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing

authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2009, I-1).

The doctrine manual further says ends, scope, and core grievances are three of the most

important aspects of an insurgency. The only section that mentions a separatist movement

is in section I-1 on change. The manual points out that “many insurgencies center on

forcing the Host Nation (HN) into significant political or economic change. This change

can have multiple forms. Change can include issues such as political processes, religious

practices, or secession of a region.”

While in David Galula’s Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, the

closest definition is a revolutionary war as primarily an internal conflict, although

external influences seldom fail to bear upon it. Revolution, plot (or coup d’état), and

insurgency are the three ways to take power by force. A revolution is characterized as an

unplanned and unforeseen cataclysm, which can be scrutinized afterwards (Galula 2006,

2). A plot is the clandestine action of an insurgent group directed at the overthrow of the

top leadership in its country. Because of its clandestine nature, a plot cannot and does not

5

involve the masses. Separatist is defined as creating a new political group or faction out

of an existing political group within a “sovereign” country (McHenry 2007, 10). This

new group would have constitutional authority equivalent to that of the existing group. In

both the Thai Malays and Moros Muslims, it refers to seeking to create a new state out of

an old state. This may be their politically stated goal but realistically, they are willing to

negotiate for anything short of it so long as their identity, culture, language, and religion

are protected. They also consist of a large collective that occupy a large territory with a

common ethnicity, religion, or language (McHenry 2007, 11). Its membership is

exclusively natives, geographically concentrated, and composed of polarized ethnie with

shared values and views; not dependent on cause or convincing. These two sources will

be the basis of the defined scope of analysis of the Thai Malay and Moros separatist

insurgencies.

Some relevant assumptions used in this study to derive observations are based on

what conditions exist currently in these two areas of focus and that they will remain the

same for the foreseeable future. Though relevant and current information may be

included, the study will not aim to be all inclusive of recent changes in both Thailand and

the Philippines. Some assumptions used on the Malay Muslim study are; that the

conditions in Thailand stay relatively stable in the near future, the Malaysian

government’s attitude toward conflict stays the same, and Islamic extremists still do not

have an influential foothold on the insurgency. Additionally, support for the Thai Malay

Muslims maintains its status quo. On the other hand, some assumptions on the MILF

study include no change in political conditions of their organization, and support and

6

recognition of the MILF in the Philippines does not change. The secondary sources used

are substantially accurate. These assumptions are necessary to ensure study continuance.

This study is limited to a specific time period and focuses on certain key points in

each insurgency. The primary time frame for this study is from September 11, 2001 to

April 1, 2013. The author will primarily focus on specific and key information needed

and will only follow a chronological analysis for some of the history. Some of this

information may not cover both insurgencies evolution over such a large span of time.

Some background information on the two ethnic groups that will set the

conditions for understanding the derivation of the factors necessary for a successful

separatist insurgency, and application of the hybrid separatist model factors in later

chapters. Historical perspectives and chronology will be covered here and not in later

chapters. The format for the overview is significant historical or key events, key players

or organizations roles, and government’s policies that contributed to enflaming the

insurgency. The first overview is the Thai Malay Muslim followed directly by the MILF.

Several significant historical and key events contributed to the root cause of the

Thai Malay Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand. The current southernmost region of

Thailand was not originally part of its territory. The Thai government took control of the

area after the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 from the British and divided it into seven

provinces to control the region and Muslims (Melvin 2007, 12; Yegar 2002, 93). This

area was previously known as Patani. It was an independent kingdom until 1786 when

Siam (modern-day Thailand) recaptured it. Known previously as the Kingdom of

Langkasuka, its name changed to the kingdom of Patani in the 14th century. At that time,

it was the trade center of Asia and Europe (Islam 1998, 443). Hinduism and Buddhism

7

were practiced until the 15th century. The religion of Islam spread throughout the area

between the 12th and 15th centuries with trade activities. The King of Patani himself

converted to Islam and made it an Islamic state in 1457 (Islam 1998, 443).

Four of the key events demonstrate the relationship between the Thai Muslim

Malays in the south and the Thai government. Generally, over the first five decades the

Thai Malays suffered from the Thai government’s oppressive policies (Melvin 2007, 1).

In 1948, the government declared a state of emergency, an act that reinforced the

southern Thai Muslim perception of the Thai nation as an “alien state” (Islam 1998, 446).

Another key contributory event to the insurgency was the Dusun Nyiur incident in which

Haji Sulong, President of the Islamic Religious Council, was arrested in the late 1940s

which led to violence between the Thai police and the Thai Malay Muslims

(Aphornsuvan 2004, 9). The third and fourth events are contemporary ones and most

important to current attitudes. On April 28, 2004 there was a stand-off at the Krue-Se

Mosque in southern Thailand and on October 25, 2004 after demonstrations at Tak Bai,

over 100 men were arrested and then suffocated due to being stacked on top of each other

while being transported by truck (Melvin 2007, 2). Overall, the incidents reinforced

current attitudes of distrust and resentment towards the government; this added to the

desire of the people to separate from the Thai state and government.

Some key players or organizations have played a crucial role in impacting the

Thai Malay Muslim insurgency. The first person that may have played a key role to the

insurgency resurgence is former Prime Minister Thaksin. His policies while prime

minister exacerbated the insurgency when it was at its lowest point between 2004 and

2005. Thaksin changed out personnel in the South as well as key military leaders in

8

southern Thailand in 3 years (Melvin 2007, 30). The next person is Haji Sulong who

made seven demands of the Thai government in response to its assimilationist policies.

(1) the ‘appointment of a single individual with full powers to govern the four [Patani] provinces . . . this individual to be local-born in one of the four provinces . . . and to be elected by the people;’ (2) 80% of government servants in those provinces to profess the Muslim religion; (3) Malay and Siamese to be the official languages; (4) Malay to be the medium of instruction in the primary schools; (5) Islamic law to be recognized and enforced in a separate Muslim court other than the civil court; (6) any revenue and income derived from the four provinces to be utilized within them; and (7) the formation of a Muslim Board. (Islam 1998, 444)

The quote above highlights Sulong’s demands of the Thai government and shows the

degree of their grievances as well as his courage to face persecution, which inspired other

Thai Malay Muslims to follow. Following him is Tengku Abdul Jalal, who in 1959

formed an underground organization, Gurr and Harff (or Patani National Liberation

Front), supported by traditional aristocrats as well as the religious elite (Liow 2006, 30).

The various Patani organizations are: the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (or

National Revolution Front-Coordinate) (BRN-C), Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Kongres,

Patani United Liberation Organization, Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani (or Patani

Islamic Mujahidin Movement), and the Islamic Liberation Front of Patani. The most

powerful is the BRN-C. Though the Thai Malays may share some similarities with the

Malays of Malaysia, Malaysians do not necessarily see eye to eye on the insurgency

(Yegar 2002, 178). Minimal international reaction towards the violence in southern

Thailand has also played a crucial role. So far there has not been any evidence showing

that the Indonesian terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah, Al Qaeda, and others have had any

hold or influence in southern Thailand (Abuza 2011, 27). The insurgency seems faceless

because many of the attacks have gone unclaimed by any of these organizations; even if

it was done by one or more of them. The Barisan Revolusi Nasional (or National 9

Revolution Front) has signed an agreement with the Thai government to hold talks

(Sithraputhran and Grudgings 2013, 1). Hopefully, this group can step up and become the

single central entity the Thai Malay Muslims need.

The Thai government’s policies have also contributed to the insurgency.

Historically, the government implemented measures to weaken the Islamic identity of the

people through Siamese Law, requiring all children to attend Siamese primary schools

(Islam 1998, 443). Mandatory integration by the government created serious resentment

and led to violence. Nevertheless, many Thai Malay Muslim groups tried politically to

demand a change in the Thai government’s policy. The government replaced the Islamic

Shariah and traditional laws with Siamese Law (Islam 1998, 443). In 1921, the

government changed laws requiring all children to attend Thai primary schools and

institutions with secular education and Thai language (Melvin 2007, 13). Additionally,

the seven provinces were reorganized into three provinces, Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat,

as well as replacing the local rulers with Thai governors. These changes led to the loss of

political power of the traditional aristocrats. The government then passed the Thai

Customs Decree prohibited the “wearing of sarongs, the use of Malay [Muslim] names

and the Malay language,” which angered the Thai Malay Muslims (Islam 1998, 444).

Eventually, the provincial and local governments came under the direct control of

Bangkok. These policies were designed to integrate Thai Malay Muslims into Thai

society but only made them more resentful. The government’s approach changed with

every new regime. In 1961 the Thai Customs Decree was repealed allowing pondok

schools to continue provided they offered both secular and Islamic education. The Thai

Malay Muslims were also allowed to keep Muslim names (Islam 1998, 447). Special

10

privileges were also given to Muslims including admissions to the universities and

government bureaucracy, the establishment of National and Provincial Councils for

Islamic Affairs, study tours to Bangkok for Muslims at government expense, and the

creation of the position of chularajmontri, or state councilor, for Islamic Affairs (Melvin

2007, 14). Finally, the government initiated massive economic projects to construct

roads, schools, colleges, and universities in the Muslim majority provinces. Rubber

plantation owners were given incentives to replace old trees with a high-yield variety.

Not all of these government programs were viewed positively by Muslims. Instead, many

perceived such measures as tricks of the Thai government to penetrate their culture,

economy, and society. Even with the new accommodation policies, the guerilla

operations continued (Islam 1998, 448). The government’s policy failed to empower

moderate Muslim leaders. The reforms were not adequate enough to resolve conflict. The

conflict was not a priority for the government. Stability in Thai politics can help the Thai

government implement and sustain a comprehensive policy towards resolving the conflict

in the south (Abuza 2011, 26).

The MILF has had many significant historical and key events which contributed

to their insurgency in southern Philippines. Some significant historical events prior to the

MILF are provided in order to give the larger Moros perspective. One significant event

that spawned the Moro insurgency was the 1968 Jabaidah massacre which led to the

formation of the Muslims (Mindanao) Independence Movement (Liow 2006, 10). This

opened the doors for other Muslims to organize into groups. The group soon broke apart

when many of its followers believed some were coopted and its top leaders were offered

high positions in the government (Islam 1998, 449). Those that left formed the militant

11

Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Due to hostilities, martial law was instituted in

1972 and the MNLF had to move underground. Another key event for the Moro

insurgency was the Tripoli Agreement, December 23, 1976 (IHS Jane’s 2012, 24). This

event brought the legitimacy of their cause to the international Muslim community and

garnered the Organization of the Islamic Conference and Muslim states’ involvement.

The most significant event to the MILF was their formation in 1977 when they split from

the more secular MNLF. In 1986, the Philippine government established the Autonomous

Regions in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) as a measure of its willingness to address the

insurgency (Islam 1998, 450). However, only four of the 13 provinces were granted

autonomy. Through talks and negotiations, the MNLF and Philippine government in

1996 agreed to form Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development under

MNLF for 3 years (IHS Jane’s 2012, 2). In 1997, the government entered into formal

peace talks with MILF and on July 18, 1997, both sides came into Agreement for the

General Cessation of Hostilities (Islam 1998, 451; IHS Jane’s 2012, 29). From 1997 to

2000 the MILF expanded of its camps and civilian populations under its control (IHS

Jane’s 2012, 24). After more than four decades of hostilities, both the MILF and

Philippine government agreed to a Malaysian mediated talk on April 24, 2012 regarding

the “10 Decision Points on Principles,” in which a “sub-state” would be established to

replace the ARMM for ethnic Moro Muslims in Mindanao (IHS Jane’s 2012, 10). This

agreement led to other negotiations. On August 5, 2011, President Benigno Aquino III

met directly with MILF chairman Ebrahim el Haj Murad in Tokyo to try to negotiate

peace with the country's main insurgent groups (IHS Jane’s 2012, 10). These sessions

were followed up in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur throughout mid-2012 and

12

resulted in the Philippine government and MILF agreeing to the terms of a preliminary

framework peace agreement on October 7. The framework agreement was successfully

signed during a ceremony in Manila on October 15 (IHS Jane’s 2012, 10). These

significant events spanned almost one generation to arrive at what seems to be a fragile

agreement.

Many key MILF players and organizations have played a crucial role in their

insurgency. Nur Misuari was credited with leading the first organization, the MNLF,

through this insurgency. His differences with some of his followers drove Salamat

Hashim, supported by ethnic Maguindanaos and Muslims from Mindanao, to split from

the more secular MNLF. The next key player is MILF leader Murad Ibrahim, Salamat's

long time deputy and vice-chairman for military affairs. Ebrahim el Haj Murad assumed

leadership of the organization upon his death (IHS Jane’s 2012, 2). Murad was a student

in Mindanao when he quit joining the MNLF at the age of 22. He also trained in Libya as

one of “Batch 300,” before returning to central Mindanao (IHS Jane’s 2012, 21). A key

organization and player that is still a factor in this insurgency is the MILF splinter faction

the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, under the leadership of rogue MILF

commander Ameril Umbra Kato. Not much is known about the control or influence the

Moros has over the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters. Lastly, these personnel have

worked hard to resolve this conflict: Philippine President Benigno Aquino III, Muslim

states, and Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak. All of these key players and

organizations have contributed to resolving the MILF insurgency in southern Philippines.

The Filipino government’s policies have also contributed to the insurgency. The

Filipino government, like the colonial administration before it, passed laws legitimizing

13

its expropriation of lands traditionally owned by the Muslim population for resettlement

projects and plantation agriculture (Islam 1998, 448; Liow 2006, 7). The government

designed a “control model” to integrate and assimilate the Moros (Islam 1998, 452). The

government’s repressive measures encouraged the migration of Christian population into

Mindanao. By the 1960s, many Moros lost their lands to the influx of Catholic settlers

from northern and central Philippines which made the Moros a minority (Liow 2006, 7).

These policies contributed to the violent clashes between Catholics and local Muslims

over terms of the natural and mineral resources’ exploitation for the benefit of northern

Philippines (IHS Jane’s 2012, 8). The government thought that by diminishing the wealth

of the Moros, their nationalist movement would collapse in the long run. The policy only

made the Moros more aggressive (Islam 1998, 452). All these policies and laws by the

Philippine have contributed to the MILF insurgency.

The basis of this study is determining what factors contribute to successful

separatist insurgencies by examining two models, in order to derive four common factors

and arrive at a new, third model of separatism to apply to the Thai Malay Muslims of

southern Thailand and the MILF of southern Philippines. These two models were chosen

for their expertise and specific articulation of separatism. The study is focused on finding

what success means to separatist insurgencies that say they are seeking independence or

statehood but really would settle for protection of their identity, religion, culture, and

language. The study aims to expand knowledge of where military doctrine and policy gap

exists for addressing these types of conflicts.

14

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Separatist insurgencies are one category of insurgencies. These types of conflicts

are predominantly common around the world, although many sources do not have a

prescribed way to deal with it other than declaring it is simply, an internal state issue.

Within the group of insurgencies there are sub-categories. One of these sub-categories is

labeled a separatist insurgency. This study aims to increase the understanding of

separatist insurgency by identifying and examining the current factors of these types of

conflicts by comparing and contrasting the two insurgencies of the Malay Muslims of

southern Thailand and the MILF of the southern Philippines. A separatist insurgency is a

distinct form of revolutionary warfare where insurgents are not trying to overthrow the

government, but seek to break off a geographical area and form their own governance

over it. As an insurgency strives to achieve their endstate, what current factors determine

success for a separatist movement?

This chapter will lay out trends on separatism and highlight the most pertinent

scholarly journals used for this research. A review of some of the experts in the areas of

separatism illustrates some patterns, similarities, and differences among the different

sources. The chapter concludes with details of two sample models of separatist

insurgency that will serve as the basis behind the third model for the two case studies in

chapter 3. Though many sources were cross referenced, these reviews only highlight

pertinent and relevant sources.

Another key term utilized in this chapter to help characterize separatist

insurgencies is “ethnie.” Ethnie is defined as a collective of members sharing common 15

traits such as language, religion, customs, institutions, laws, folklore, architecture, dress,

food, music and arts, and color. Some characteristics include distinguishing culture and

identity separating them from outsiders, history, shared memories, traditions, and even

geographic location of the group (Smith 2009, 25-26; Lyon 2013, 1-5). This term may

help clarify the ambiguity of these types of insurgencies.

Some categorizations of separatist groups will provide background information as

the scope is narrowed to these two ethnic groups. This will further elaborate on the

dynamics of ethnic separatist insurgencies. Separatist insurgencies have different distinct

categories of people involved depending on their motivations. The four types of groups

are categorized by authors Gurr and Harff as ethnonationalists, indigenous, communal

contenders, and ethnoclasses. The two categorization types that best describe the two

ethnic groups most accurately in this study of separatist insurgency are, ethnonationalists

and indigenous categories (Gurr and Harff 1994, 20). While the communal contenders

and ethnoclasses groups, which stride for “greater access or participation within existing

states” do not describe nor mirror these study groups and will not be explained in detail.

In this research, the focus is on ethnonationalists and indigenous groups.

The ethnonationalist groups are independent and want to reestablish their own

state, while an indigenous group primarily seeks to ensure the protection of traditional

lands, resources, and culture (Gurr and Harff 1994, 18). Ethnonationalist groups are large

and regionally concentrated ethnies that live within the boundaries of one state; their

modern political movements are directed toward achieving greater autonomy or

independent statehood. Most groups’ historical traditions of autonomy or independence

are used to justify these contemporary demands. In some cases autonomy was lost

16

centuries ago. More than 80 groups of people identified supported movements to

establish greater political autonomy (Gurr and Harff 1994, 24). Thirty of these groups

fought wars for national independence or for unification with kindred groups elsewhere

since the end of World War II. Aspiring nationalists live in the third world, such as the

southern Sudanese, the Palestinians and Kurds in the Middle East, and the Tibetans.

These groups have fought some of the modern world’s most persistent wars of secession,

but few have won political independence. These types of “wars for national independence

attract military and political support from nearby states, stimulate similar movements in

adjoining countries, and are the main source of international refugees” (Gurr and Harff

1994, 19). Major international powers contained these struggles through diplomatic

support of negotiations, delivering humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping forces.

The other type is an indigenous group that is concerned about autonomy issues

but differ from ethnonationalists (Gurr and Harff 1994, 20). They are the descendants of

the original inhabitants of conquered or colonized regions. Most live close to the land as

subsistence farmers, herders, or hunters. Few had political organization, identity, or

purpose. They faced severe political and economic pressures. Many outsiders have

conquered and ruled over them without their consent resulting in the loss of traditional

lands and resources to settlers and developers (Gurr and Harff 1994, 26). Their goal is the

protection of their language and way of life from what their advocates call ethnocide, the

destruction of their culture or culture genocide, and seek to regain as much control as

possible over their lands and resources. These descriptions are generally broad and are

not meant to be an exact mold of the Malay and Moro Muslim insurgencies. It is only a

categorization.

17

In almost every journal or resource available on this topic, there is a historical

background provided on both the Malay Muslims of southern Thailand and the MILF of

the southern Philippines. History is inherently very significant to both case studies and

compliments the rationale for these two insurgencies. Many sources shared similarities in

explaining the scope of the insurgencies as well as offering perspectives on differences

and similarities of both insurgencies. Some sources, though, are somewhat outdated such

as Moshe Yegar’s, Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the

Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar and William M.

Carpenter and David G. Wiencek’s Asian Security Handbook: An Assessment of

Political-Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region. These general overviews provided

adequate background information but are not as relative to the current operational

environments of these areas. Others such as Pierre Le Roux’s, “To be or not to be. . . .:

The Cultural Identity of the Jawi (Thailand)” and Astri Suhrke’s, “Loyalists and

Separatists: The Muslims in southern Thailand” offered different and diverging

perspectives on the insurgency. Overall, these sources demonstrated a pattern of external

perspective on these two insurgencies.

In “The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of

the Philippines,” Syed Serajul Islam provides a background on the Malay and the Moro

Muslims in Mindanao. This article is most pertinent to this study. It also compares and

contrasts separatist insurgencies in the Philippines and southern Thailand. He outlines

what motivational factors contribute to the insurgencies, what the government has done

to address the insurgent’s grievances, why the MILF insurgency in Mindanao is

succeeding while the BRN-C in southern Thailand is not, and what factors dictate

18

success. He believes the Moros are relatively successful because they experienced severe

socioeconomic and political deprivations. Islam also explains key organizations involved

in the insurgencies. He defines a strong organization as achieving both domestic and

foreign support. In both the Patani and Mindanao cases, religion initially helped to form a

separate identity but ultimately religious unity did not make a substantial difference to the

relative success or failure of these movements. Rather, it was the magnitude of the state’s

socioeconomic and political intrusions and its repression of minorities that seem to have

had much to do with the success of a separatist movement. Islam believes the problem

with the Patani Muslim insurgency is that the people are not severely deprived enough by

the Thai state; as a result they lack a strong cohesive organization and external supports.

Additionally, the Thai policy of integration through accommodation and development

may have some limited impact. His perspective is also shared by others and contradicted

by some.

The second article, “The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in

Violence, COIN Operations, and the Impact of National Politics”, by Zachary Abuza, is a

study from The Institute for National Strategic Studies, which is a research center for The

National Defense University. The study provided insights into the violence of an

insurgency that engulfed the three southern-most provinces in Thailand. Abuza

summarizes the violence with numbers dead and what means were used. His assessment

was that the overall level of violence was influenced more by insurgent calculations,

about the optimum amount of violence needed to advance their political goals than by

improved capabilities of the security forces. Abuza also points out the human rights

abuses by security services with blanket immunity under the Emergency Decree, which

19

continues to instill mistrust among the local population. Moreover, as long as violence is

contained in the deep south, the insurgency will remain a low priority for the new Thai

government, which was focused on national political disputes and is reluctant to take on

the military by pursuing more conciliatory policies toward the south. He believes that low

level violence is likely to continue. The author also provides recommendations for United

States policy in Thailand in relation to this insurgency.

The third article by Dr. Neil Melvin, “Conflict in Southern Thailand Islamism,

Violence and the State in the Patani Insurgency,” seeks to unravel these different strands

of the Patani conflict and to shed light on its dynamics. He warns that the insurgents are

gaining the upper hand and it will be hard to stop the conflict from escalating. Dr. Melvin

believes the insurgency is strengthening and calls for the international community to

intervene, besides the expressions of concern that have already come from Thailand’s

neighbors.

The last two articles are a shift from the Patani to the Mindanao Muslims, to

provide background information on the Mindanao Muslim in the southern Philippines.

The first article called “The Philippines: Counter-insurgency vs. counter-terrorism in

Mindanao” by International Crisis Group, discusses the risk of counter-terror directed

against the Abu Sayyaf Group inadvertently pushing them into the arms of the broader

insurgencies in Mindanao, the MILF and MNLF. The group recommended the United

States and the Philippines revive mechanisms to keep these conflicts apart and refocus on

peace processes with these groups. It also points out the impact if this peace process does

not lead to a peace agreement by the time the International Monitoring Team mandate

ended in August that hostilities could quickly resume. However, a coordination cell,

20

called the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group, helped facilitate between the Philippines

government and the MILF to share intelligence on terrorists and avoid accidental clashes,

while government forces pursued the Abu Sayyaf Group. It helped force the Abu Sayyaf

Group’s core group, including Kadaffy Janjalani and Abu Solaiman, to Sulu, where they

were killed. Finally, the group sees the way ahead as a mean of depriving transnational

extremists of refuge and regeneration while building confidence with insurgents and

strengthening moderates among them. The group argues this mechanism needs to be

strengthened and expanded.

The last article, “The Philippines: A New Strategy for Peace in Mindanao?” by

the International Crisis Group covers the Pilipino government’s experimentation with a

creative but risky strategy to bring peace to Mindanao. The group explained the

government’s three goals: good governance in the ARMM through a two year reform

program; bringing separate discussions with two insurgencies, the MNLF and the much

larger, better armed MILF together; and hammering out the territory and powers of a

future Moro sub-state in peace talks with the MILF. The group thought two scenarios

seemed most likely. In one, the MILF remains on the sidelines while the two year

caretaker regional administration tries to clean up the ARMM. By including the MNLF

among its appointees, the Aquino government would make good on its promise to

implement the 1996 agreement and permit it to claim some responsibility for progress

made. A final settlement with the MILF would be worked out afterwards. In the second

scenario, the government might try to involve the MILF in the ARMM government

sooner. In the negotiations, the insurgent organization has long proposed that it run an

interim administration until a new, larger, and more autonomous sub-state is created. The

21

emerging strategy appears to be an attempt to ensure that any future agreement on the

territory and powers of an expanded autonomous region would be both legitimate and

enforceable. The article proposes many resolutions for the way ahead on the conflict.

Though there is much written about insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, not

much is written about the separatist insurgencies of these two areas. Even though

categorically it is an insurgency, the separatist insurgency is distinct from others and has

not been adequately defined or thoroughly explored. Military doctrine and expert COIN

authors lightly touch this subject. The majority of references commonly use historical

references for both the Malay Muslims and MILF, providing background or basis of their

conflict. Additionally, the majority of the journals written on the subject do not point to

one single entity or organization that is in charge of the movement in southern Thailand.

On the other hand, most resources clearly note what organization represented the

southern Philippine insurgency. The focus of this study is determining current factors of

separatist insurgencies using two models that most ideally represent and share similarities

with these two insurgencies, to build a third hybrid model consisting of current factors for

the separatist model to compare and contrast these two insurgencies. This is the basis for

the separatist model in chapter 3.

The first model is Metta Spencer’s separatist model. In Metta Spencer’s

Separatism: Democracy and Disintegration, he defines and outlines these separatist

examples. Spencer also cites reasons, characteristics, and factors that contribute to a

successful separatist movement. This model outlines the sources of National Separatism

as: (1) emotional resentment, (2) the justified resistance of victims, (3) propaganda

orchestrated for political gain, (4) the power of a dominant ethnic group, (5) economic

22

motivations, (6) preservation of a threatened culture, and (7) commitment to

modernization. Spencer defines emotional resentment, the first part of the model, as

“social psychology of nationalism as rooted in an emotional sentiment-including the envy

of a rival community, even when the feeling is irrational and baseless” (Spencer 1998, 2).

He also uses the French term ressentiment categorizing and encompassing forms of

resentment or hostility. In this study, resentment is defined as hostility one identifies as

the cause of one’s frustration and assigns blame for one’s frustration. An example of this

can be deep rooted resentment, envy and hatred towards the government for past

discriminatory policies or exploitations. While the second part, justified resistance of

victims, is described as groups rebelling after suffering prolonged violations of their

human rights and the denigration of their language, culture, or religion. The third part of

this model is propaganda orchestrated for political gain. An example of this is, political

leaders stirring up intergroup hatred by propaganda campaigns for their own purposes.

The fourth part is the power of a dominant ethnic group. This is nationalistic hatreds to

the primacy of an ethnic group in a multicultural state that refuses to share power or

privilege on a more egalitarian basis. The fifth part of the model is economic motivations.

In this part, the separatist group is portrayed as economically deprived and exploited by

the richer part of the population. In part six, separatists believe rightly or mistakenly that

they must win independence in order to preserve their religion, language, culture, or other

traditions. Lastly, the group’s commitment to modernization is the desire to establish a

regime that unifies all ethnic or religious communities.

The second model is Boyle’s and Englebert’s separatist model. The model is

based on four factors: (1) economics, (2) cultural heterogeneity, (3) nature and dynamics

23

of the political system, and (4) circumstances. An examination of these factors

demonstrates many similarities and differences with other models. This model’s factors

broadly characterize this type of insurgency.

The first factor is economics. This factor of secession is as an intrinsic part of

civil conflicts. Separatist regions are different from the rest of the country in terms of

wealth, physical or human capital, or natural resources endowment. Economic policies

from the central state in relation to its regions may affect the costs and benefits of

allegiance or exit. Additionally, a country’s overall income level and its economic rate of

growth may contribute to the separatist propensity of its constituent groups. Regional

income and wealth inequalities also influence secession motivations. According to Boyle

and Englebert, poorer regions may feel a greater sense of grievance and blame the state

for their failure to develop, or they may fear competition with their neighbors. Poorer

minorities may also find rebel activity relatively more attractive. Conversely, richer

regions may also become more confident about their future viability as independent

countries or more aware of their group identity. Separatism is often believed to arise from

a “perception of economic injustice,” which leads a region to reassess the “relative cost

or benefits of belonging to a national union” (Bookman 1992, 39). This is one factor that

may influence separatists.

The second broad category of this model is cultural heterogeneity. Ethnic,

linguistic and religious heterogeneity is frequently argued to promote secessions.

Government repression of certain cultural groups, even in relatively homogeneous

national environments, also encouraged militants to seek their own political fortunes.

Whether ethnic, linguistic, or religious, numerous scholars have posited that cultural

24

pluralism within a country will increase the number of secessionist claims. Ethnic

diasporas may also contribute to separatist sentiment as they tend to keep grievances

alive, offer irredentist support, magnify beliefs in ethnic purity, and provide funding to

local organizations. This is a second indicator of separatism.

The third type of factors deals with the nature and dynamics of the political

system. The focus is on the political characteristics of entire countries, and not merely the

separatist region. Dynamics are unleashed by democratization, discrimination, state

failure, and changes in the international environment. The politics of neighboring states

and their willingness to support insurgencies would also alter the costs and benefits of

separatist activism. Finally, having once had a separate existence as a state, or currently

being a separate administrative unit (state, province, etc.), the group may well promote a

distinct identity and a desire to “realize” one’s political destiny. Heterogeneity by itself is

not enough, but groups will opt out when in real danger. When the central state is

weakened, overthrown or collapsed, its ability to resist and prevent a secessionist drive is

greatly reduced. The logic is twofold. Seeing state provided security as a benefit to

members of the state, the group expects that the erosion of this benefit will be conducive

to separatism. In the separatism game, though, there are two actors: the rebels and the

government. This is the third factor that may impact separatism demands.

The last remaining factor deals with circumstances for separatism. They address

specific structures of countries, such as their age, size, and geographical features. The

younger a country, the less likely it is to have already passed through the growing pains

of nation building and national integration. Thus, the more vulnerable it may be to

dismemberment. For example, a positive effect of being a “new state,” that is, one within

25

the first two years of its existence, is the onset of civil wars. In countries whose land

masses are non-contiguous and territory is separated by other countries or by water may

see their distant component turn more vulnerable to centrifugal forces. The larger a

country and its population, the greater its potential for break-up. If other factors are the

same, larger populations are more likely to be diverse. There are indications that a

positive association exists between population size multiplied by ethnic heterogeneity and

state partitions. Indeed, the greater the country’s overall population, the more likely each

ethnic group is to be large in absolute terms and reach the minimal threshold of size for

collective action. They believe that there are scaled benefits for distinct communities to

belonging to the state as it increases their social, economic, and educational

opportunities. Therefore larger countries offer greater benefits of belonging and should be

less likely to produce separatist movements. While this refers to country size more than

to population size, these two dimensions should correlate. If both hypotheses are right,

they could partly cancel each other out. This is the fourth factor of the Boyle and

Englebert separatist model.

Based on the characteristics of these two models as well as other sources, the third

hybrid model will contain and integrate some key dominant or prevalent components that

are salient to the analysis of separatist insurgencies. These factors generally indicate key

aspects of a separatist insurgency. Description of this hybrid model follows in the next

chapter.

26

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Separatist insurgencies are a subset of insurgency and are commonly found

around the modern world. This type of insurgency is not clearly addressed in United

States national policies or military doctrine. A separatist movement entails only a

political movement; whereas a separatist insurgency encompasses both a military and

political component, with violence as a principal planned activity. Separatist insurgencies

generally declare their aim to be autonomy or independence from the government due to

grievances based on differences in ethnicity, culture, and religion. A separatist insurgency

differs in that its goal is not the overthrow of the central government but is centered on

identity and protecting its group survival in that identity. Achievement of the protection

of the identity can be achieved by negotiated settlement as well as some form of

separation. They are willing to live within another ethnic group as long as their identity is

protected and is not perceived to be threatened. Success in a separatist insurgency is

defined as obtaining institutionalized protection or autonomy and may include complete

independence. This study aims to answer what current factors contribute to successful

separatist insurgencies. This chapter combines key components of several known models

to describe key factors that make up successful separatist insurgency. Using these metrics

as benchmarks, the study will provide a hybrid model from the two examples in chapter

2. These two examples were chosen to be the basis for this study because they were most

comprehensive in researching separatist models. Based on these two models, the study

will provide its own model for success.

27

The study is based on two models of separatism to provide means to compare and

contrast. These two models were chosen for their specific focus, expertise, and

articulation on separatism. The first model is Metta Spencer’s separatist model which

uses these seven factors: (1) emotional resentment, (2) the justified resistance of victims,

(3) propaganda orchestrated for political gain, (4) the power of a dominant ethnic group,

(5) economic motivations, (6) preservation of a threatened culture, and (7) commitment

to modernization. The second model used is Boyle and Englebert’s separatist model. This

model outlines four factors that contribute to successful insurgency. These four factors

are: (1) economics, (2) cultural heterogeneity, (3) nature and dynamics of the political

system, and (4) circumstances. Our hybrid model characterizes four factors: (1) identity,

(2) resentment, (3) mobilization, and (4) will. The identity factor was obtained from both

models. Resentment comes from both Spencer’s and Boyle and Englebert’s model.

Though, the latter only has some components. It is defined as a categorization of hostility

directed at the cause of one’s frustration. This can be deep rooted resentment, envy and

hatred. The mobilization factor is taken from well known authors in this field of study:

Professor Islam, Ted Gurr, Joseph Liow, and Metta Spencer. The “will” factor is derived

from both models. These factors are listed in order of importance and represent what

most experts on the subject all predominantly point out. Though there are many other

factors from other frameworks or models, these four factors historically are found in most

successful insurgencies. The sequence is significant because a successful separatist

insurgency must possess one factor or an equivalent capability, in order to shift to the

next factor in stair-step capability building. The factors are designed to be flexible and

only explained sequentially. This helps demonstrate the required flexibility and capability

28

of these types of insurgencies. These critical factors are needed for a successful separatist

insurgency.

Figure 1. Separatist Model Source: Created by author.

The separatist model considers key points from the two other models mentioned

above as well as other known models. This third model has four broadening

characteristics that a separatist insurgency must have. These groups generally are

concentrated in a geographic area, have a common culture, religion, and identity. They

usually did not move into the area but are natives to it and have a historical attachment to

that specific land. Separatist insurgencies do whatever is necessary to survive as a body

and continue their political agenda. It is not a national insurgency but a geographically

29

concentrated ethnic separatist insurgency. That agenda may change to adapt to the

international and internal political environment. Religion is another consideration that

may have an effect on achievement of its endstate. The insurgency may need to

disassociate with certain groups to avoid being targeted by their enemies in order to

maintain its own survivability. It may have to align with other groups. Additionally, they

may even be willing to make compromises to welcome more people outside of the core

ethnic personnel. Most negotiations between both the government and the separatist are

not done in good faith. Sometimes these countries involved in negotiations may have

higher national interests and political factors involved in their decision cycle than just

resolving an internal conflict. The insurgent group may only negotiate under the auspices

of ulterior motives. Many key points were considered for deriving this separatist model.

The first critical factor is the group’s identity. Its identity is a force for unifying

people. The people of the group are usually polarized and share a common religious

affiliation, as well as membership in a clan, tribe, or ethnic group in pursuit of their

political interests. Renowned author Ted Robert Gurr describes the identity of separatists

as:

[A]ny collectivity of individuals occupying a common territory. It may or may not be characterized by a common ethnicity, religion or language. Its identity as a group is distinguished from other groups by the centrality of its support for the separatist objective. Its membership is in flux depending upon the impact of events and the persuasiveness of separatist leaders. In addition to support for separatism, the separatist identity may entail a variety of other beliefs supportive of the objective. (Gurr 1993, 10)

Groups whose core members share a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on

cultural traits and ways that matter to them and to others with whom they interact. They

have a common history, experiences or myths, religious beliefs, language, ethnicity,

30

region of residence, and customary occupation. They also have a common perception that

separates them from other groups. The group’s identity is further reinforced by cultural,

economic, and political differences with others. For instance, treat a group differently, by

denial or privilege, and they are more likely to become more self-conscious about their

common bonds and interests (Gurr 1993, 3). They also believe attempts at integration

with dominant groups compromise their identity and ability to pursue greater self-

determination.

According to the United States Army’s COIN doctrine, “some movements may be

based on an appeal to a religious identity, either separately from or as part of other

identities” (Department of the Army 2006, 1-8). Key components of this factor are:

prevalence in modern insurgencies, combined military approach, dual military and

political hierarchy, community’s involvement with insurgency as a whole, and recruiting

(Department of the Army 2006, 1-8). This is the most important factor in a separatist

insurgency. The group’s identity, religion, culture, and language are the foundation of its

struggle. This factor drives the group to pursue the insurgency’s political goals. The

identity of its members is the primary reason why they are doing what they are doing.

Additionally, it is the inspiration and motivation for the insurgency. This factor is critical

to the insurgency because it is the core of their insurgency. The people share this

commonality. Their interests may be in political, economic, or social inequality. Here,

discrimination can have a significant positive effect (Boyle and Englebert 2006, 31). The

insurgencies’ common identity unifies its entire people under one political direction and

purpose. This common political agenda represents the majority of the people. Ensuring

common goals, messages, information, and targeting maximizes their efforts. Though

31

Muslims are commonly divided by Sunni, Shia, and other sects; the interpretation and

implementation of Shariah Law; the specific leaders followed by a group united in faith,

they do not always share the same methodology and means to pursue their goals (Yusuf

2007, 21). The group’s identity contributes to its ability to communicate effectively the

people’s will with one voice and direction to attain its ultimate endstate, it is important to

the long-term success of a separatist insurgency. These insurgencies must be able to win

not only its people but also those whom are geographically co-located, regardless of

differences. Some insurgent groups may need other ethnic groups to be strong enough to

fight the government; even though they may some differences.

The second factor in this model is resentment (Spencer 1998, 16). This factor’s

categories include the group’s belief or perception that the majority of the people or the

national government is a threat and cannot be trusted as well as “suppressed feelings of

envy and hatred (existential envy) and the impossibility of satisfying these feelings”

(Spencer 1998, 16). The group perceives that its way of life is threatened by the

government. Separatist expert and author Metta Spencer best describes this belief as

“what all separatist movements have in common is only a conviction that the existing

political order is illegitimate and that their group has been assigned to a lower status than

it deserves” (Spencer 1998, 15). Whether it is oppressive policies, economic or political

discrimination, or resentment, the people believe they are disadvantaged and

marginalized (Spencer 1998, 16). Some examples of this are a government’s institution of

assimilationist policies forcing integration into majority of populace, forced into a

government provided education system instead of the group’s own system, restrictions on

religious practice and language, restrictions on dress wear, and discrimination. This factor

32

is critical to the insurgency because it provides motives for the group to take action.

These motives do not need to be logical or defendable (Spencer 1998, 16). Without this

factor, the insurgency is hollow and meaningless; people will not be motivated enough to

care beyond benefits to themselves. For example, the Quebec separatist movement in

Canada demonstrated resentment because people willingly accepted greater costs in order

to alleviate their feeling as well as perception of humiliation and lack of power to govern

themselves (Spencer 1998, 16). In the words of Spencer, perception “is a subjective state

of mind not necessarily based on anything substantive” (Spencer 1998, 16). Authors

Boyle and Englebert highlighted another example of the power of emotional belief,

stating that it includes possessing a “perception of economic injustice,” which allows the

group to reassess “relative cost or benefits of belonging to a national union” (Boyle and

Englebert 2006, 4). The group’s perceived threat is crucial to the insurgency regardless of

its logic.

The third factor of this model is mobilization (Islam 1998, 451; Gurr 1993, 68;

Spencer 1998, 10). This type of insurgency must be able to mobilize its core group.

Mobilization activities include political mobilization as in propaganda, recruitment, front

and covert party organization, and international activity. These are intended to weaken

government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy.

Violence in terrorist acts and guerrilla warfare may also play a role (Boyle and Englebert

2006, 13). This key factor is crucial to gaining political and social legitimacy. Both

insurgents and counterinsurgents seek to win popular support for their cause by trying to

sustain that struggle while discouraging support for their adversaries. The means to

mobilize popular support are: (1) persuasion, (2) coercion, (3) reaction to abuses,

33

(4) foreign support, and (5) apolitical motivations (Department of the Army 2006, 1-8).

Its political leaders must be able to recruit and expand its power base. Its people must

clearly know and support the insurgency and vice versa in order to survive, grow, and

counter government COIN operations. Mobilization is defined as the act of assembling

and increasing unarmed membership and support as well as forming armed groups and

supplying them. This capability allows the organization to exist. According to Boyle and

Englebert the ability of an insurgency’s leaders to mobilize populations, convincing them

to “buy into” the rhetoric, is the driving force in the insurgency (Boyle and Englebert

2006, 7). These factors are critical to maintaining the cause from one generation to

another as well as to win the people’s support. Recruiting new people may include the

use of schools as a base of recruiting, criminal activity to intimidate and influence the

populace, garnering external support for the insurgency, a charismatic leader, and an

organization structure to support the insurgency. These components enable people,

internally and externally, to believe in and follow its goals. The insurgency must also

align all its sub-groups and avoid splintering into factions with diverging agendas.

Support is critical to separatist insurgencies (Boyle and Englebert 2006, 14). It must have

support from its own people and people outside of the organization (ICG 2008, 3).

Whether it is financial, military, or sympathy, this support is crucial to gaining non-lethal

means such as popularity, political, educational, religious, or even social strength.

Support is critical to sustain the insurgency. Strong support also legitimizes the cause and

gains political validity in the eyes of locals as well as the international community (ICG

2008, 2). Whether through lethal or non-lethal means, resources allow the group to

execute its political and military desires. These insurgencies require continued resources;

34

a determinant to the group’s ability to effectively attain endstates. It can also influence

group stability. This factor can be ideas, human capacity to change and adapt, capital,

technology, a mechanism ensuring insurgency continuity from one generation to another,

natural resource, personnel numbers, or any means to leverage an advantage over the

government. Having a natural resource located in the same geographic location as the

insurgency can be a factor for leveraging with the government (Boyle and Englebert

2006, 38). These resources can be used to bargain with the central government to obtain

the means to achieve political objectives even if they may be controlled and exploited by

the government until a change is made.

The insurgency’s will is the last factor but is just as important as any other factor

to this model (Boyle and Englebert 2006, 19; Spencer 1998, 22). The group must have

this factor to execute and endure the insurgency in the long run. Characteristics of this

factor are: the group’s willingness to sacrifice, endure hardship, flexibility, amenability to

changing political environments, and suffering. This factor is critical to the insurgency

because a separatist insurgency will encounter challenges that test the group’s will,

commitment, and its resilience to withstand losses politically and militarily. The group’s

ability to stomach defeat and ensure continuity is important to maintain the insurgency.

There will also be cases where communities and their leaders must be willing to pay a

substantial price in human life for their demands (Boyle and Englebert 2006, 19). For

example, Chechnya’s independence insurgency following the collapse of the Soviet

Union led to civil war “costing 80,000 to 120,000 lives” (Spencer 1998, 22). There must

be a balance between loss aversion to ensure survival of the group and necessary losses to

35

achieve political and military objectives. A group’s ability to harness this capacity is one

strong determinant of its success over the long run.

A successful separatist insurgency encompasses and integrates relative aspects of

these four factors. All factors are key indicators to a successful insurgency. Integration of

all four factors is critical to leveraging power against the government. Only by being

recognized by the separatist population as a legitimate organization that possesses the

means to threaten and influence public as well as international opinion to pressure the

government, can these insurgencies be successful. The separatist population believes this

organization is legitimate because it can achieve their political ambitions. By themselves,

these factors can be facets of any movement and cannot amount to an effective

insurgency toward achieving success. Each insurgency is regionally different and may

require adjustments to fit its needs and conditions but ultimately these components are

necessary in some fashion to attain success.

This model will help establish a baseline for comparison and contrast between the

Thai Malays in chapter 4 and the Moros Muslims in chapter 5. The separatist model will

also determine which insurgency most aligns with these four factors required for success

of identity, resentment, mobilization, and will.

36

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS ON SOUTHERN

THAILAND MALAY MUSLIMS

Figure 2. Patani Region Source: Neil J. Melvin, Conflict in Southern Thailand: Islam, Violence and the State in the Patani Insurgency (Bromma, Sweden: CM Gruppen, 2007), V.

This chapter will be focused on the application of the separatist model from the

previous chapter to the Malay Muslim insurgency, to provide contrast and comparison

37

between the Muslim struggles in southern Thailand and the Philippines as well as to

address the secondary research questions. The corrected name for the Muslim group

examined in this chapter is Malay which is different from Thai Malays. The key point of

the chapter is to discuss the Malay Muslims of southern Thailand through the model’s

factors of identity, resentment, mobilization, and will. The questions addressed here

include some initial answers to the thesis about why the southern Malay Muslims are

unsuccessful so far as separatists, what international factors are necessary for their

success, and how well organized are they to achieve success.

The Malay Muslim insurgency of southern Thailand possesses a unique group

identity. The group consists of a polarized populace sharing three commonalities that

separates them from the Thai population: Malay ethnicity, Muslim religion, and Patani

historical identity (McCargo 2008, 4). The Malay people also share a culture and

language, and are territorially concentrated in the deep southern Thai provinces of Yala,

Pattani, and Narathiwat (Rahimmula 2004, 55; Liow 2006, 25). Professor Liow believes

the Malay resistance remains “insular [and] based exclusively on Malay identity” (Liow

2006, 26). Furthermore, their identity is clarified by Imtiyaz Yusuf, the Religion

Department Head at Assumption University in Bangkok, Thailand correcting the name

for the group in this insurgency:

In Thailand, there are two types of Muslims: ‘assimilated and unassimilated.’ The assimilated are ethnic groups of Muslim Siamese, Thai-Malays, Haw Chinese, Bengalis, Arabs, Pathans, Punjabis, and Samsams. The unassimilated are known as the Malay who resides in the deep southern provinces of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat. (Yusuf 2007, 4)

According to Yusuf the reason for this is their strict “adherence to ethnicized religious

identity and attachment to concepts of nayu (race), baso language and agama (Islam)”

38

(Yusuf 2007, 4). Based on this clarification, the Malay Muslims will be addressed by

their correct name throughout the rest of the study. The Malay’s identity is tied to their

religion. Yusuf believes, in Thailand, “religion functions along ethnic lines; a Malay is a

Muslim, a Thai is a Buddhist, and a Chinese either a Christian or Taoist (Buddhist)

syncretic. Thus ethnoreligious constructs shape identities” (Yusuf 2007, 3-4). Malays of

southern Thailand perceive their identity in ethnic and religious terms. It is a matter of

fact that they place strong emphasis on the ethnic aspect of their adherence to the religion

of Islam. The Malays of the South give primacy to their ethnic identity and view their life

experience from within the context of the local practice of the agama of Islam. Thus the

ritual, mythic (narrative), experiential (emotional), ethical and legal, social, material, and

political dimensions of life are all interpreted and perceived through the lenses of ethnic

identity. With such a perspective, ethnicity is the defining characteristic of a group’s

identity, which sets it apart from others in its own and other’s eyes (Yusuf 2007, 8). They

do not see themselves as Thai nor accept the concept of being part of a national identity.

Yusuf describes them as:

[U]nassimilated Muslims of the South who contest this concept of national identity by pressing on the difference of ethnicity, language, and religion. The reason being that traditionally, ethnicity, language, and religion have served as important determinants of identity, whereby to be a Malay means to be Muslim only, just as being a Thai means being Buddhist only (Yusuf 2007, 4).

The Malays of southern Thailand are in Yusuf’s description “entrenched in traditional

construction rejecting the legitimacy of the secularized Buddhist polity . . . leading . . . to

their demand for recognition of language, religion and culture by majority polity” (Yusuf

2007, 5). They view national integration as threatening their own cultural disintegration

(Yusuf 2007, 8). They also “recoil from outsiders (even other Muslims) unless they are

39

members of the same ethnic group or speak the Melayu language, one has to “masuk

Melayu”-become a Malay to be accepted as a Muslim” (Yusuf 2007, 9). Yusuf believes

southern Muslims have a different lifestyle and beliefs from that of Muslims in the other

parts of the country. They are suspicious of outsiders due to their history and view other

Muslims in other parts of Thailand as “insufficiently devout and too deeply insinuated

into Thai society (McCargo 2008, 5). For example, identity, nationalism, and history are

rooted deeply in the psyche of southern Muslims (Yusuf 2007, 9). Cultural, communal,

and identity are predominantly why the Malay insurgency exists. It is at the heart of the

struggle. According to Joseph Chinyong Liow, Assistant Professor at the Institute of

Defense and Strategic Studies in Singapore:

[T]he historical roots of rebellion, which can be traced back to popular resistance to Thai rule on the part of a Malay Muslim population that sought to preserve its cultural and linguistic practices against assimilationist exercise of ‘nation-building’ in the face of the denial of education, economic, and employment opportunities to the Malay Muslim centered around demographics and history. Southern Thailand has 80 percent ethnic Malay and share a common religion of Islam. (Liow 2006, 25)

The Malay identity plays a crucial role in providing motivation for the insurgency.

The Malay Muslim resentment towards the Thai government has further enflamed

the insurgency. It may be real or not, but the Malay people have the perception that their

identity, culture, religion, and language are threatened by the Thai government. For

example, though now repealed, Thailand at one time required all Muslim children to

attend Thai primary schools and prohibited the “wearing of sarongs, the use of Malay

names and the Malay language” (Islam 1998, 443). Additionally, the government

replaced the Islamic Shariah and traditional adat laws with Siamese Law (Islam 1998,

443). The Malay elites feel oppressed by not having adequate representation in the Thai

40

political process. The Malay middle class are predominantly integrated into Thai working

class society. However, the lower class Malays generally remains “unassimilated.” Their

concerns are not represented “locally” in the government. The lack of a Malay Muslim

political party, high level representation, or seating in the government all deepens their

resentment (McCargo 2008, 83). For instance, these perceptions were strengthened by the

forced realignment of the original seven provinces into three, Pattani, Yala, and

Narathiwat, as well as replacing the local rulers with Thai governors (Islam 1998, 444).

Furthermore, the security policies and economic corruption contributed to the situation.

The overly abusive handling of security violations by the military and police further

exacerbated resentment. Poor handling of difficult situations includes the Kuching Rupa

hostage incident where two Buddhist teachers were taken hostage and eventually killed

because of mishandling by the police and military (McCargo 2008, 130). The Deep South

provinces have also experienced slower economic development than its other neighboring

provinces and that of northern Malaysia (Melvin 2007, 18; Islam 1998, 452). Whether

intentional or not, the Malays have ingrained in their psyche a perception that the Thai

majority cannot be trusted and poses a threat to their identity, which has deepened the

distrust for many generations.

The Malay Muslims’ mobilization will impact the insurgency’s sustainability. The

Malays’ primary means of recruiting is through the Islamic schools (Liow 2006, 29).

These schools also have “study groups” of older students and adults which they can also

leverage. These groups are also connected with the “paramilitary training in the guise of

extracurricular sporting” (Liow 2006, 31). Young, impressionable, naïve, and

economically challenged young men are recruited from these schools. Most of them

41

joined because of their friends or got caught up in the emotions or disillusionment

(McCargo 2008, 135-137). The insurgency’s decentralized nature lacks overarching

leadership or an amir or spiritual leader to play a role in their mobilization. One example

is the other schisms in the Malay community, such as the dispute between the majority

Sha’afi sect and the growing community of Wahhabis who are pushing for autonomy.

Another is the dominant insurgent group, the BRN-C, which seems unwilling to either

share power or negotiate (until recently). Additionally, many different factions in the

insurgency marginalize its mobilization efforts (Islam 1998, 453). Without a single strong

dominant organization, the insurgency has suffered the second-order impact of repeated

failures to unify, mobilize, and rally the entire Malay populace, and even less success in

gaining support from Muslims outside southern Thailand. One symptom of this as

described by Aphornsuvan:

[A]n inherent weakness in the ethnic nationalist movement, arising from the existence of several aspiring elite groups such as traditional leaders and younger educated generations. Each group [seeking] to legitimize their elite status in the communities, thus constitutes a major factor contributing to factional disunity and weakness in the ethnic nationalist movements which developed. (Aphornsuvan 2004, 7)

Professor Islam from the International Islamic University in Malaysia shares a

similar opinion on the Malay’s mobilization efforts, “The Patani Muslim independence

movement failed to mobilize such support either internally or externally” (Islam 1998,

454). They are politically divided by groups of moderates, Islamists, secularists, and

extremists (Islam 1998, 447). For example, though the Malays have been able to achieve

some level of mobilization, their various organizations can have a negative impact. This

impact may limit the insurgency’s ability to only mobilize certain factions of the

unassimilated Malay populace. These organizations include the BRN–C, Barisan 42

Revolusi Nasional Kongres, Patani United Liberation Organization, Gerakan Mujahidin

Islam Patani, and the Islamic Liberation Front of Pattani. However, the Patani United

Liberation Organization, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Kongres, and the Islamic

Liberation Front of Pattani are seen as “pretenders” to the cause by some and have no

local influence or structure. While BRN-C and Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani has

local power to influence events through its militant wings, only the BRN-C has a political

wing. These two groups realize they are not winning, but they are also not losing, which,

in an insurgency, is often enough. In achieving their short-term objectives they have

made the region ungovernable, planted distrust between the populace and the state,

neutralized political rivals in the Muslim community, and have begun to force their

constituents away from the secular institutions of the Thai state (Abuza 2011, 20).

Even though the insurgent Malays have some tangible and intangible support

linkages, they do not have enough of what is needed for a complete mobilization. These

support connections were established by the old separatist group. They established

international support connections with countries such as Egypt, Syria, and Malaysia

(Liow 2006, 44). However, the new militant groups do not have the same support and are

connected to the old group only by history but not through any form of structure

(McCargo 2008, 173).

Some Thai government regimes have promised soft power to try to diffuse the

conflict but so far the Malays have yet to see that come to fruition. Though the Malays

were able to attain some level of support from Malaysia, they were not as effective in

reaching out and expanding to the Malay populace in Malaysia to gain greater popular

support and recognition of their struggle. A neighboring country’s support is a key

43

ingredient and influencing factor to an insurgent cause (Boyle and Englebert 2006, 14).

Additionally, the predominant Muslim Wadah political group tried to win political

support for Malays through the Thai political system but failed to secure a ministerial seat

in the government (McCargo 2008, 71). The Malays also tried to politically align

themselves with Thai political parties that were sympathetic to their cause (Yusuf 2007,

16). However, internal party politicking within these groups only further diluted the

Malays’ interests and made no political impact for their cause. There were other means of

support to the insurgency; though it may be minimal. Even though the Malays do not

require much tangible support to maintain their insurgency, some economic support is

available from the region’s rubber and natural resources. However due to corruption and

distance from Bangkok, even this economic development plan has minimal benefit to the

Malays in the south.

International reaction is a significant factor to their mobilization. Its response or

the lack of it towards the violence in southern Thailand plays a crucial role in the

insurgency strategy and the Thai government’s policy. The insurgency does not have

enough international support to influence the Thai government in their favor. The lack of

strong international response illustrates to the Malays that they don’t have a strong

sympathetic international audience. At the same time, it also says that the Thai

government can get away with human rights abuses and the world will not say anything.

Regionally, the Malaysian government never considered fighting Thailand; however, it

did give some tacit support to the Malay Muslims. Despite its ethnic and religious

sympathies for the Malays, Malaysia has national interests that are more important than

supporting the insurgency (Islam 1998, 454). Other external groups are also not able to

44

offer much support. The Indonesian terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah does not yet hold

influence in Thailand. The MILF in the Philippines is preoccupied and unable to assist.

Al Qaeda has not yet had any presence in southern Thailand. In author Abuza’s opinion,

“no one else in the region would gain from supporting the insurgents” (Abuza 2011, 27).

The insurgency lacked an institutionalized system for resource support to expand

its political aspirations that can sustain its mobilization. Though the various Malay

organizations received some level of tangible and intangible support from external

sources, the Malays do not have a unified and consolidated system to harness this support

and channel it to other functions for furthering their political cause. However, some

funding is provided to private Malay educational institutions from Saudi Arabia, the

United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan (Chalk 2008, 13). They also have some support at

the local village levels as well as through criminal activity. There is not enough known

about the depth of these organizations to find their capabilities to conduct other political

operations. Additionally, there is too much ambiguity into which of these organizations

are legitimate. Furthermore, there are unclear lines of support to this insurgency due to

the lack of groups claiming responsibility for attacks (Bajoria and Zissis 2008, 5).

The Malay Muslims’ insurgency possesses—will—that maintained the

insurgency in southern Thailand over the past four decades. The groups inside the

insurgency are averse to a heavy loss of life. They cannot afford to do so; their survival is

dependent on it. At the same time, some Malay groups demonstrated their willingness to

make necessary sacrifices through their militant actions. The insurgency has endured the

government’s oppression and hardship for many decades. The Malays appear to be

flexible as needed to the changing Thai government instability. They have also

45

collectively withstood much suffering and humiliation such as the Krue-Se Mosque and

Tak Bai incidents. The Thai authorities may have resolved these individual incidents but

lost the overall COIN battle for Malay acceptance of their legitimacy. This factor is

critical to the movement because a separatist insurgency will encounter challenges that

test the group’s will and its resilience to withstand losses politically and militarily. The

group’s ability to stomach defeat, survive, and ensure continuity is important to maintain

the movement.

Examining the secondary research questions will assist in answering the main

objective for this paper. The first secondary question is about why the southern Malay

Muslims are unsuccessful. Some factors that contributed to their failures include internal

disagreements, inability to unite their different factions into one organization, and

factionalized groups. They differed in their orientation from the traditional aristocrats and

were also divided among themselves between Islamists and secularists. Both groups

believe in armed conflict to achieve their political goals. Both groups functioned

independently without coordination. The Thai government's policy of integration and

assimilation was moderated by effective socioeconomic and political moves that have

lessened support for the Malay insurgencies’ more violent responses.

The second question is about how well organized they are to achieve success. The

Malay Muslim insurgency has been ineffectively going on since the early 1900s with

some shape or form of political and military activity but lacking complete components.

The Malay Muslims were not as well organized as other separatist insurgencies such as

the MILF. They did not mobilize effective support for their cause both internally and

46

externally. The Malay insurgency did not have a strong organization which made it

difficult to galvanize support of the Malay Muslims.

Even though the Malay Muslim insurgency had potential for success in this

model, perhaps even more so than the MILF, it does not. The Malay Muslim insurgency

seemed to have had more advantages and favorable conditions but due to a multitude of

factors it failed to capitalize on those opportunities. As the insurgency evolves with the

addition of new groups, a different and uncertain dynamic variation is introduced. All key

players involved in the conflict are trying to ascertain what these militant groups are. The

operational environment has changed as a result. However, many of those involved are

still holding onto the same mindset and views of the old historical insurgency, further

reducing resolution of this conflict.

47

CHAPTER 5

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS ON MORO

ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT

Figure 3. Moro Islamic Liberation Front Areas Source: IHS Jane’s, “Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),” Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, October 16, 2012, http://www.janes.com/products/janes/security/ terrorism-insurgency-intelligence-centre/world.aspx (accessed June 7, 2013), 4.

In this chapter, the separatist model in chapter 3 is applied to the MILF

insurgency to provide contrast and comparison between the Muslim insurgencies in

southern Thailand and southern Philippines, as well as address the secondary research

questions. The focus for this chapter is on the MILF of the southern Philippines

48

discussing its movement through the model’s factors of identity, resentment,

mobilization, and will. The questions addressed here with some initial answers to the

thesis are: why is the MILF successful, what international factors are necessary for

success, and how well organized are they to achieve success?

Unlike the Malay Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand, the Moro insurgency

completed one full cycle of the separatist model and is currently on its second iteration

with the MILF. The MNLF, its predecessor, sufficiently met the four factors required for

successful separatist movement and completed one cycle culminating with a peace

settlement in September 1996, in which MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari came to power as

overseer of the four provinces of the ARMM (IHS Jane’s 2012, 29). The MILF splintered

from MNLF in disagreement with the settlement and demanded complete independence

and the establishment of an Islamic state in Mindanao. This began the second sequence of

the separatist cycle. The MILF are following the same cycle the MNLF went through

with the Philippine government.

The first factor in this cycle deals with identity. The Moros are a geographically

concentrated minority with a common religion, language, culture, and identity. In

Mindanao, many in the populace have cross-cutting relationships, including Muslims,

non-Muslim indigenous peoples, secularists and non-secularists (Liow 2006, 9).

However, it also seems the MILF is a polarized section of the Muslim populace. They

differ from other Moro groups because of their firm non-secular belief. The majority of

their people apparently seem to share one political agenda. This orientation has earned

them an “ethno-nationalist insurgency, fighting for self-government of the Bangsamoro

people, not against unbelievers and persecutors of Muslims worldwide” (ICG 2008, 3).

49

Their insurgency narrative has Islam as the focal point of their identity and consciousness

which the political community centers on as the foundation for their struggle (Liow 2006,

13). The MILF’s defined identity helped shaped its insurgency and contributed to its

evolution through the separatist model.

The second factor of the cycle is resentment. The primary grievances the MILF

has with the Filipino government are: expropriation of Muslim lands for resettlement

projects and plantation agriculture, integration and assimilation of the Moros, exploitation

of Muslim natural and mineral resources for the benefit of the northern Philippines (Islam

1998, 448; Liow 2006, 7; Islam 1998, 452; IHS Jane’s 2012, 8). The Moros perceived

they were marginalized by the Spanish, American, and Filipino governments (Liow 2006,

8). Additionally, their frustrations with the government’s discriminatory and oppressive

policies combined with the perception of threat to their culture and identity led to the

insurgency. Though land and other policies initiated grievances for the movement, their

biggest grievance may be their differences with the Philippine majority.

The third factor of the cycle is mobilization. The MILF successfully mobilized its

people. The Moro movement was able to successfully mobilize mass support both

internally and externally (Islam 1998, 451). Even a MILF official believed its

organization could not survive without “external support” (Liow 2006, 18). Whether it is

tangible or intangible, this factor is crucial to gaining non-lethal intangible means such as

popularity, political, or even social support. Some examples of support the MILF

received included seven areas: financial, political, military, economic, educational,

religious, and social. They had support from internal and external sources encompassing

all seven realms in some shape or form. The MILF benefited from educational teachings,

50

military assistance from other countries, and political support from outside organizations

and countries such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference and other countries of

the same religion.

Internally, the MILF became popular amongst the local people. They were

organized, and the Moro populace gave wholehearted support. Secondly, they attracted

the attention of its strong neighbor, Malaysia, as well as other Muslim countries. The

movement developed a cordial relationship with Malaysia which led to the Malaysian

government’s intervention to pressure the Philippine government to negotiate with the

Muslim movement (Islam 1998, 455). Another factor that heavily weighed on the

Philippine government was the fact that large numbers of Filipinos were employed in

Malaysia and remittances contributed to the Philippine economy (Islam 1998, 455).

The organization has a command and control structure as well as a hierarchy for

implementing operations. This includes six standing committees of Information,

Intelligence, Dawah (proselytization), Foreign Affairs, Education, and Finance. They

have a three branched governing structure similar to that of many countries, namely the

executive, legislative, and judiciary. The executive consists of the Central Committee and

the Jihad Executive Council (IHS Jane’s 2012, 15). The Secretariat runs the day to day

affairs of the Central Committee. There are three vice-chairmen for military affairs who

are in charge of the military wing [Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces], internal affairs,

and political affairs who serve underneath him (IHS Jane’s 2012, 16). The legislative

branch, the Majlis al-Shura, founded in 1991 provides consultation to the ruling body of

the MILF and represents the ulamas (Muslim clergy) and different sectors of society

(IHS Jane’s 2012, 16). The judicial branch is the Supreme Islamic Court. This system has

51

a three tiered judiciary branch of the MILF and handles criminal and civil cases. Though

the organization still faces challenges with rogue actors, MILF leadership is still in

control of the organization (IHS Jane’s 2012, 16). Though it may have many sub-

organizations, their common goal seems to outweigh their differences.

The Moros are territorially concentrated sharing many commonalities which made

it easier to mobilize along ethnic lines. Such influencing and recruiting requires minimal,

if any, convincing or coercion. They also have internal capability to arm themselves. The

MILF has about 11,000 to 12,000 combatants with slightly over 9,000 firearms, with the

Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces strength at some 15,000 personnel (IHS Jane’s 2012,

15). MILF claims to have six divisions of roughly 20,000 members. Their strength of

numbers highlights their capability to mobilize. Nevertheless, the group’s extensive

grassroots support means that the reservoir of potential fighters remains very large,

although not everyone joins exclusively for religious or ethnic purposes. According to

Ishak Mastura, a senior official in the ARMM government, interviewed by Jane’s. “Some

young people have no option but join the movement. To them, it is often the only job

available in the area” (IHS Jane’s 2012, 15). The Armed Forces of the Philippines also

share this assessment that the MILF could easily mobilize an additional 8,000 to 10,000

fighters if required. They have also mobilized other units like the Bangsamoro Internal

Security Force, MILF's police service (IHS Jane’s 2012, 15). Key leaders of the

organization include Ghazali Jaafar, vice-chairman for political affairs; Mohagher Iqbal,

MILF's chief peace negotiator; Von Al-Haq, chair of MILF's Coordinating Committee on

Cessation of Hostilities and head of MILF intelligence; Jun Mantawil, the Peace Panel

Secretariat; and Muhammad Ameen, the Central Committee's Secretariat (IHS Jane’s

52

2012, 22). These entities further legitimize their cause in the eyes of the Moros, fellow

Muslims, and the international community. MILF are able to further mobilize

organizations for youth, the ulema (Muslim clergy), and women to establish a political

parallel government structure (IHS Jane’s 2012, 18). These key leaders within MILF

oversee the shadow government structure of the MILF, appoint local political leaders and

liaise with a number of front organizations. The Central Committee's Dawah

(missionary) committee runs religious affairs, and sharia or Islamic law is implemented

by the Bangsamoro Internal Security Force. MILF has also been able to garner economic

mobilization such as the Bangsamoro Development Agency, the economic development

arm of the MILF run by the Bangasmoro Development Council (IHS Jane’s 2012, 18).

This superstructure of organizations made MILF a key player through its numbers,

recruiting, and power base expansion. Its people clearly know and support the movement

to survive, grow, and defeat government COIN operations over the long-term.

The MILF is well funded. According to Jane’s it receives roughly 20 percent from

illegal activity and 80 percent comes from “other sources” such as donations (IHS Jane’s

2012, 19). These funds come from foreign Islamist religious groups, charities and other

forms of non-governmental organizations. These funds also include development projects

sponsored by international donors and implemented by the MILF’s Bangsamoro

Development Agency or the numerous non-governmental organizations linked to the

group. Many of these major donors’ indirect contributions include the European Union

with roughly more than $12.8 million USD (United States Dollars) in Mindanao for

development and the World Bank’s Mindanao Trust Fund for Reconstruction and

Development. A large amount of the money is externally from “sympathizers” in Europe

53

and Australia, and derived from legal channels to support social, religious, and

educational programs. A large amount of money comes from the United Arab Emirates

via a bank in New York. Additionally, MILF runs a number of front companies and

leases out logging and mining concessions. Many MILF leaders have business ventures,

and the group also engages in protection rackets. MILF also relies heavily on

contributions from the Bangsamoro diaspora community in Sabah, Malaysia, and the

Middle East (IHS Jane’s 2012, 19).

Other resources that the MILF leverages are natural resources, weapons, and

people. They are the regional land owners who exploit its natural resources. Weapons

ownership is woven into the fabric of Moro culture and MILF can easily augment its

arsenal in time of war. MILF also exploited networks with other Islamic organizations for

weapons from the Middle East. It has also received weapons donations from Vietnam,

Malaysia, and North Korea (IHS Jane’s 2012, 20). The Moros are also a group that is

well connected with others that share similar views. This significant element supplies it

their most important resource of power.

The fourth factor of the cycle is—will. The Moros have maintained the

insurgency for over four decades. They have sacrificed, suffered, and endured much in

pursuit of their political ambitions. The willingness of the Moros to engage in this

persistent, and at times virulent, conflict with the Philippine government; as well as

encounter challenges, tested the group’s will and its resilience to withstand losses. The

group’s ability to survive and maintain hierarchal continuity demonstrates the strength of

the movement. The Moros’ strong morale and determined willingness significantly

contributed to the insurgency.

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A thorough application of the separatist cycle model to the MILF case answers

the first secondary research question as well as determines the main objective for this

paper: why the MILF is successful. From earlier chapters, success was defined as not

necessarily achieving independence, gaining statehood, or autonomy but rather protecting

self-identity, culture, language, and religion. This ambitious endstate of independence

may be a stated goal for the Mindanao Muslims but ultimately they are willing to accept

terms less than that so long as their identity, religion, language, and culture are

safeguarded and they share in political power and control of their resources. The Moros

movement has been relatively successful because it has been able to influence the

Philippine government into negotiations (Islam 1998, 451). It has also achieved semi-

regional autonomy from the Tripoli Agreement and the revised Manila October 15

Sub-state Agreement (Islam 1998, 449; IHS Jane’s 2012, 10). Professor Islam believes

that the Moros’ “severe socioeconomic and political deprivations” directly contributed to

their organization’s success (Islam 1998, 455). Additionally, they were led by a strong

organization, capable of sustaining the group’s momentum from one generation to

another and achieving both “domestic and foreign support” (Islam 1998, 455).

The second question is: What international factors are necessary for success? The

MILF also benefited from the ground work and achievements made by the MNLF. The

Moros had support from several external organizations. The Organization of the Islamic

Conference, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation with members including Libya,

Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and Somalia, visiting and supporting them. Their recognition lead

to the Tripoli Agreement signed on December 23, 1976, which helped create an

autonomous region in Mindanao consisting of 13 provinces and nine cities. Muslim

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countries consequently came forward with direct help for the Moros. The MNLF was

given formal recognition by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (Islam 1998,

455). Externally, the Moros obtained support from the international community, the

United Nations, and Amnesty International. Muslim countries and organizations also

helped the Moros directly. According to Dr. Islam, these “countries urged the Philippine

government to negotiate with the MNLF's representatives; Manila could not ignore this

request because 80% of the country’s oil, as well as a huge amount of foreign exchange

from Filipino overseas workers, came from the Middle East” (Islam 1998, 455). A

delegation of four foreign ministers from Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and Somalia

visited the Philippines to discuss the situation of the Muslims there with the Marcos

government. This contributed in the MNLF reducing its demand for complete

independence to autonomy. The MILF was also a beneficiary of the 1996 peace accord

between the government and the MNLF (IHS Jane’s 2012, 3).

The third secondary question is: How well organized is the MILF to achieve

success? The political make up and landscape of the Philippines is diverse and very

dichotomous. Many parties with different agendas and means to pursue them litter the

Luzon political arena. The major Islamic insurgent groups in the southern Philippines are

Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement, a

breakaway group of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Abu Sayyaf Group, Jemaah

Islamiyah, Rajah Sulaiman Movement, Misuari Renegade—Breakaway Group, and the

Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters. Of all these groups, the MILF is currently the

most dominant and most influential. These groups’ inability to unite for a common

purpose contributed to the long struggle of the Muslims of southern Philippines.

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The Philippine government initially saw the MILF as a radical splinter of the

MNLF, and focused on both its military and diplomatic efforts. The MILF grew steadily,

particularly through its control of the mosques in central Mindanao. It doubled in size

when 5,000 to 6,000 MNLF combatants rejected the 1996 peace accord and joined the

MILF. By 1999 to 2000, the MILF controlled vast swathes of central Mindanao, where it

established Islamic based governing structures (IHS Jane’s 2012, 2). The Moro

movement successfully mobilized mass support both at home and abroad. It is the most

well organized group. Though MILF has rogue belligerents, the Philippine government

still pursues negotiations with the MILF (IHS Jane’s 2012, 2). Nonetheless, strong

organization has always provided a cohesive force in the Moro liberation movement.

The Moro insurgency repeated the separatist cycle a second time but will

probably settle for much less than independence. Like the majority of ethnic movements,

what is publicly stated and what is feasibly achievable are not the same. These

movements usually will settle for whatever ensures the protection of their culture,

identity, language, and religion. They realize it is critical to avoid significant personnel

losses since people are their most valuable resource. Having a strong and large population

base is critical to maintaining power. Most of these organizations are successful because

they are also flexible to adapt to their environment. The model provides for an

overarching base of necessary factors for a successful separatist movement. These factors

point out significant differences and similarities between this Moro movement and the

next one in southern Thailand. They also indicate what factors work for one movement

vice another and which did not work, as well as its effectiveness and why not.

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The MILF is one organization that illustrates the model’s factors. Like the MNLF

before it, it has negotiated with the Philippine government for peace short of full

independence or autonomy, settling for a legal sub-state status (IHS Jane’s 2012, 10). At

the end of the day, it is symptomatic of human nature. The leadership and its people are

getting old and tired of fighting. The founding leader Salamat Hashim passed away in

2003. The Moros want to keep or attain something even if it is short of their ultimate

goal. Whatever that something is, it is at least something they can pass on to future

generations.

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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

This study has produced a model containing four factors that were derived from

two primary sources and other materials. The two primary sources are Metta Spencer’s

Separatism: Democracy and Disintegration and Katharine Boyle and Pierre Englebert’s

The Primacy of Politics in Separatist Dynamics. Other key influences are Ted Robert

Gurr’s Minorities at Risk, Duncan McCargo’s Tearing Apart the Land, David Galula’s

Counterinsurgency Warfare and Moshe Yegar’s Between Integration and Secession: The

Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western

Burma/Myanmar. These sources provided predominant insights and trends for historical

insurgencies that have been successful in producing this model.

The four factors are the answer to the primary research question: what current

factors determine a successful separatist insurgency? They are identity, resentment,

mobilization, and will. They should be indicative of the likelihood of success. Success in

a separatist insurgency is obtaining institutionalized protection or autonomy; anything

less than independence. However, even if they are all present in a separatist insurgency it

may not necessarily lead directly to achieving success or political aspirations. In addition,

these four factors may not be sufficient for all insurgencies to incorporate. They may

need other factors tailored to their type of conflict and area. These other factors may

significantly influence the outcome including economic conditions, external stakeholders,

and key individuals in the country. On the other hand, some insurgencies may possess all

the factors as well as sophisticated support structures, but they may not achieve their 59

objectives. The separatist model points out possible patterns for success but is still

challenged by the complexities of human dynamics involved in these types of conflicts.

The model’s four factors was then applied to two separatist insurgencies, the

Malay Muslims in southern Thailand and the Moros of the southern Philippines. These

two insurgencies have several similarities and some very distinct differences. The

similarities are that both share a common religion, concentrated geographically in their

respective areas where they are natives, and they are an ethnic minority as part of a major

ethnic group. Their persisting grievances and pursuits of self determination include

disputes over ancestral land, socio-economic opportunities, and exclusion from

participation in the political processes and lack of recognition by the state. Consequently,

some members within these Muslim minority groups feel threatened and may take up

arms against the state. They both share longstanding sociopolitical grievances and

economic marginalization as well as victimization (Liow 2006, 7). Both groups also rely

on international support, whether tangible or intangible. These two groups share much in

common but the differences between them are significant.

These two insurgencies have many more differences than they do similarities. In

Thailand, it appears that the “identity of the separatists remains unclear” which has

contributed to serious problems in negotiations and COIN operations by the Thai

government. The MILF, on the other hand, is the highly organized regional counter-state

in Mindanao. This difference is clearly demonstrated in the widely different conflict

resolution processes for the two groups. In Thailand, several groups have attempted to

communicate sketchy demands to local Malay Muslim community leaders, but no group

has emerged to claim responsibility which indicates decentralized and disparate

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provocations. Though the BRN-C seems to be the most influential group in the Malay

Muslim insurgency, there is not one group that speaks for all other groups and interests

(Liow 2006, 42). However, with the MILF, the Philippine government has engaged in

negotiations. Furthermore, Thailand has no systematic and sustained articulation of the

Islamic blueprint for separatism. The Malay Muslim insurgency is exclusive (polarized)

while the Moros acceded to non-Muslims (cross cutting) (Liow 2006, 26). The southern

Thai conflict is organized around ethnic while the Moros is religious oriented. They also

have no institution of mass support. Conversely, the Moros stress importance of

education and proselytization (Liow 2006, 16). The Malay education system is under the

purview of central government while the MILF system is not. Additionally, there is no

strict student indoctrination for Malay students (Liow 2006, 33). These two groups’

differences highlight the important role of critical factors and distinguish the MILF

insurgency from the Malay Muslim insurgency.

The first case study of the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand demonstrates that

the factors are valid but point out that their insurgency may not lead to success. The

model’s factors possess sufficient agility to describe this unique type of conflict in

southern Thailand; however, their insurgency is ineffective in utilizing them. The factors

point out, with some accuracy, the Malays ambiguous political situation and group

dynamic. Furthermore, the model categorized generally the vagueness and variations of

the Malay insurgency. Even though the insurgency did not have any of these factors

sufficiently, the Malay Muslims still obtained a signed agreement for the two sides to

hold talks hosted by Malaysia (Sithrapthran and Grudgings 2013, 1). The southern

Thailand case study illustrates the model’s brittleness.

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The second case study of the MILF in southern Philippine demonstrates that the

factors are valid and indicates that their insurgency lead to success. The MILF’s

insurgency possesses sufficiently the four factors. The factors were more consistent with

the MILF’s insurgency. The factors more accurately described the MILF’s organization.

These factors may explain their success of reaching a settlement based on greater

autonomy in Mindanao rather than full independence, but would continue to pursue its

goal of secession through peaceful and legal political means. This case verifies that these

factors may indicate success when instituted in an insurgency.

Both case studies together demonstrate, that possessing some or all of separatist

model factors cannot guarantee success. They are only general indicators based on

historically successful insurgencies. The composition of the group and the environment

involved in an insurgency is unique and therefore these factors may or may not be

applicable. Merely recognizing four factors does not suffice for these types of separatist

groups. There is a missing critical element. In studying ethnic separatist insurgencies, it is

important to understand the complete story—not just who they are and why they turn to

violence, but how they define who they are and utilize this notion of membership and

identity to mobilize towards political goals. This model’s four factors have been shown to

provide some current trends of insight into separatist insurgent groups in Southeast Asia.

Further study is recommended into exploring other factors. There are many other

complexities and factors such as economics that could potentially help refine these types

of conflicts. Additionally, more current research is needed into these two conflicts. Both

conflicts are evolving and changing with new people.

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GLOSSARY

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Mindanao island group composed predominantly of Muslim provinces: Basilan, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi.

Bangsa. Malay term for nation. Moro Muslim adopted prefix to link with their identity forming a new nation called Bangsamoro land.

Bangsamoro Internal Security Force (BISF). The MILF's police service.

Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA). MILF’s economic development arm.

Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM). A breakaway group of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

Cross cutting. Collective of people or groups that share a common goal or purpose consisting of different beliefs, identity, and background.

Ethnie. A collective of members sharing common traits such as language, religion, customs, institutions, laws, folklore, architecture, dress, food, music and arts, and color.

Insurgency. An organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.

Insurgent. People and groups actively battling the government.

Malay Muslim (Thai Malays). Muslims geographically concentrated in deep southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, Thailand.

Militant. Group that uses violence or military means to achieve political objectives.

Mindanao. Second largest and easternmost island in the Philippines; only area of the Philippines with a significant Muslim presence.

Moro. Indigenous Muslims in southern Philippines. Spanish label given to Muslim resistors from southern islands of Mindanao.

Movement. A passive or active political organization aimed at obtaining insurgent political goals.

Polarized. Ethnic group with sharing common identity, belief, language, culture, and religion.

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Ressentiment. It is the French word for “resentment” (fr. Latin intensive prefix ‘re’, and ‘sentir’ “to feel”). Ressentiment is a sense of hostility directed at that which one identifies as the cause of one’s frustration, that is, an assignment of blame for one’s frustration. The sense of weakness or inferiority and perhaps jealousy in the face of the “cause” generates a rejecting/justifying value system, or morality, which attacks or denies the perceived source of one’s frustration. The ego creates an enemy in order to insulate itself from culpability.

Terrorist. A person who uses terrorism in the pursuit of political aims.

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