self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence
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Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence. Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud. Self-Deception. Gur & Sackeim’s (1979) definition An individual: holds two contradictory beliefs holds them simultaneously is unaware of holding one of the beliefs - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Self-deception as self-signaling:a model and experimental evidence
Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud
Self-Deception
Gur & Sackeim’s (1979) definitionAn individual: holds two contradictory beliefs holds them simultaneously is unaware of holding one of the beliefs is motivated to remain unaware of that
belief
Motivational Bias Explanation There is no conscious intention to self-
deceive. Instead, an individual makes judgments based on unconscious motivations.
Examples Self-serving bias
Attributing successes to internal factors, and failures to external factors
Confirmation bias Tendency to interpret events (our own actions) in
ways that confirm our beliefs
Self-Signaling Theory
Our choices affect our beliefs A choice not only causes an action, it
also expresses a belief Levels of Belief
Deep belief State belief Experienced belief
Self-Signaling Theory Levels of Belief
Deep belief Stated belief Experienced belief
If stated belief does not match deep belief, then there is attempted self-deception
If experienced belief is equal to stated belief, it is a successful self-deception.
Self-Signaling vs Motivational Bias Motivational bias does not account for
three characteristics of self-deception Defensiveness associated with challenged
beliefs The special significance of beliefs about the
self You wouldn’t state that someone was guilty of
self-deception if they were convinced the moon landing wasn’t real
Self-deception can fail A bias should necessarily alter belief
The Self-Signaling Formal Model
Bodner & Prelec (1995) Model of non-causal motivation
Three primary assumptions1. There exists a characteristic that is
personally important2. This is not possible to introspectively
evaluate3. It can be examined through one’s actions
The Formal Model of Self-Signaling
V(x, θO) = u(x, θO) + λ∑θu(x,θ)p(θ|x)
The Self-Signaling Formal Model
x = the action or outcome θO = the “deep” belief about some characteristic θ = the experienced belief about some characteristic λ = the individual’s level of self-deception
V(x, θO) = u(x, θO) + λ∑θu(x,θ)p(θ|x)
The total utility of an action is equal
to
the generated utility of an action, plus
the diagnostic utility of an action
Diagnostic Utilityλ∑θu(x,θ)p(θ|x)
This must account for two emerging paradoxes1. The static state paradox
The ability to hold two opposing beliefs Explained by our two separate terms, θO and θ
2. The dynamic paradox The ability to remain unaware of a held belief To explain this, there must be two variants of self-signaling
Face-value Rational
Diagnostic Utility
λ∑θu(x,θ)p(θ|x)
Face-value Our knowledge of θO is a probability distribution, p(θ) p(θ|x) = our inferred value of θO given the action x
This is derived with the assumption that our action is to solely provide maximum outcome utility
“By choosing x I demonstrate deep beliefs such that x maximizes standard expected utility given these deep beliefs”
Diagnostic Utilityλ∑θu(x,θ)p(θ|x)
Rational Inferences about motivation are exactly the same as in
an interpersonal scenario Only paradoxical if action and belief are inconsistent
As such, belief θ influences the action x, and action x derives belief θ
Not ignorant of diagnostic utility and so can be mitigated rationally. This variation is through λ
The Formal Model Revisited
x = the action or outcome θO = the “deep” belief about some characteristic
V(x, θO) = u(x, θO) + λ∑θu(x,θ)p(θ|x)
The total utility of an action given the deep belief of a characteristic is equal to
the outcome utility of an action given a deep belief, plus
The diagnostic utility of an action, as determined by susceptibility of self-deception, the utility of an action given an experienced belief, and the change in our experienced belief given that action
The Experiment
Purpose
Designed to induce self deception in individuals, where self deception has a cost.
Designed to examine failed self deception, where the subject is aware of their own attempted self deception.
Design
Female rated symbols Male rated symbols
Phase one
85 subjects view 100 Korean symbols.
The subject classifies the symbol as male or female and then rates their confidence on a 5 point scale.
Subjects are awarded $0.02 for every correct classification.
Phase Two
The subjects are asked to predict the gender of a symbol, then they are shown the symbol and asked to confirm or reject their prediction.
Again subjects rate their confidence. $0.02 are awarded for every correct
prediction and correct guess.
$40.00 bonus
In Phase two a $40.00 bonus is awarded to 3 individuals in two different groups.
In the first test group it is awarded to the subjects with the highest number of correct post – prediction classifications.
In the second group it was awarded to the subjects with the highest rates of correct predictions.
“In the absence of self-signaling the subject will categorize the sign as male if, and only if the probabilityof male is greater
than .5. Withself - signaling, one has to factor in the diagnostic utility of selecting male.”
The subjects desire for their prediction to be accurate prompts them to self deceive.
This deception makes the subject less likely to correctly confirm or reject their prediction.
Application of the Formal Model
Stated simply: A subject will choose a confirmatory response if
there is more total utility in a confirmatory response We know there is no optimal outcome utility, so we
must examine the individual components of the equation
V(x=m, θO) - V(x=f, θO) > 0The total utility of a
confirmatory response minus
The total utility of a disconfirming
response
Is great than zero
Application of the Formal Model
c(θOm - θO
f) +
λa(E(θm|x=m) - E(θm|x=f))
The reward for choosing correctly * (the deep belief that the character is male - the deep belief that the character is female)
The degree of self-deception * the reward for correct anticipation * ((The experienced belief that the character is male given that you choose male) – (The experienced belief that the character is male given that you choose female))
Outcome Utility Diagnostic Utility
What does this mean?
λa(E(θm|x=m) - E(θm|x=f)) Face-value
As mentioned earlier, in this system x implies θm, therefore, self-deception occurs
Rational Given rational discounting of (E(θm|x=m), the
effect may be diminished, but will always be positive. There will always be confirmatory self-deception to some arbitrary degree.
Results The inconsistent responses give a baseline for
subject error. There are proportionately more self deceptive
classifications than the error baseline. The effect is greater in the anticipation group.
Results Red: Anticipation
bonus Green:
Classification bonus
At p=.001 27% of the subjects in classification group, and 45% of people in the anticipation group are self deceptive.
Results
Looking at individual changes in confidence between phase one and two: Moderately self deceptive individuals show an
increase in confidence following confirmation. +2.11
High self deceptive individuals show a decrease in confidence following disconfirmation. -1.76
It is expected that a confirming response will decrease confidence.
Results
Figure 3 shows that confirmation gives a confidence boost at moderate rates.
Results
High self deception correlates with fast response time, implying a suppression of evidence.
Discussion
Discussion Self-deception can be induced when a large,
financial award is offered People who have statistical bias achieve higher
confidence by self-deception – to a point Moderate self-deception possibly related to
increased self-esteem and mental health Many participants exhibited a statistical bias This model can be applied to intrapersonal self-
deception as well as interpersonal deception
Two Agents An actor An observer Evolutionary explanation
It is easier to deceive others in a mental state that is ignorant of the individual’s true beliefs
Goal-setting argument Two mental structures are required for successful
goal setting: one to choose which actions to take, one to evaluate and reward the self for performance.
Alternative explanations
Perceptual bias Motivationally biased perception of characters
Does not explain faster response time and is confounded by randomized presentation of stimuli
Priming Exposure to one’s prediction makes that gender
more salient during the selection phaseDoes not explain effects seen in scaling of incentive
Applications
How far does the model extend? Confirmation bias Denial Cognitive dissonance More?