se memorandum for mr. henry a. kissinger subject: nssm … · 7119321 department of state...

7119321

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SE

December 1, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGERTHE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: NSSM 112, US Post-Vietnam Policy on Useof Riot Control Agents and Herbicidesin War –

On January 7, 1971, NSSM 112 directed a study of USpolicy options with regard to the future use of riot controlagents (RCAs) and chemical herbicides in war, including theposition which the US would take concerning its under-standing as to the 1925 Geneva Protocol under each policyoption.

Shortly after the issuance of NSSM 112, the Chairmanof the Senate Foreign Relations Committee requested thePresident to reconsider the Administration's position thatthe 1925 Geneva Protocol does not prohibit the first usein war of RCAs and herbicides, indicating that unless therewere some change no further action would be taken by theSFRC at least until the Admiiiistration's announced study onthe post-Vietnam military utility of RCAs and herbicides(NSSM 112) was completed and its results made available.

In response to'your memorandum of June 28, the IPMGprepared and, on August 26, 1971, forwarded for thePresident's consideration its review of the Geneva Protocolsituation and alternative responses with their advantagesand disadvantages. Agency views were subsequently forwardedunder separate cover.

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DECLASSIFIEDPA/HO Department of StateE.O. 12958, as amendedAugust 6, 2007

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Although this review was directed specifically at anexamination of the US interpretation of the Geneva Protocol,the basic issue -- that is, whether or not.. at this time wewish to continue to preserve the option to initiate theuse of RCAs and herbicides in wan -- and the options,evaluations and judgments are substantially the same as inNSSM 112.

The Geneva Protocol study recognized the militaryutility of RCAs and herbicides in various types of militarysituations. However, the IPMG did not at that time havethe benefit of DOD's more detailed analyses which were in •

preparation for the NSSM 112 study. DOD has now providedtheir analyses of the military utility of these agentswhich document more fully the types of uses based onexperience in Southeast Asia and a projection of possibleuses in the future. DOD's analyses substantiate thejudgments on military utility as contained in the Protocolstudy. Although the Geneva Protocol study indicatedpossible political costs within Vietnam, the Saigon Embassywas unable to either confirm or deny any non-militaryeffects of the use of these agents, stating that thisquestion has not been the subject of any systematic study.

The DOD studies do not purport to reflect the viewsof other agencies but all agencies do concur with thestatement of military utility as contained in the GenevaProtocol study and approved by the IPMG. Most important,all agencies agree that DOD's current analyses do notgenerate a need to modify the judgments and evaluationscontained in the Protocol study.

DOD's continuing study of the military utility ofherbicides in Vietnam is expected to be completed inDecember. The study on the ecological and physiologicalaspects of military herbicide use in Vietnam, conducted bythe National Academy of Sciences, will not be completedbefore mid-1973. The National Academy plans to forward apreliminary report to DOD in January of 1972. All these

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studies will be unclassified and will be presented to theCongress. It is expected that these studies will not leadto any changes in the judgments and evaluations containedin the Protocol study. Thus, the basis for making adecision on the RCA and herbicide issue will not be changedfrom the present. (DOD has requested that should thedecision be to retain the option to initiate the use ofRCAs and herbicides in war, a follow-on, longer-rangestudy be undertaken concerning whether or not currentrestrictions on their use should be continued.)

The IPMG concludes that the Protocol study, alongwith the respective agency views, and the attached DODstudies (summaries enclosed), fulfill the requirements ofNSSM 112.

Ronald I. Spiers, ChairmanNSC Interdepartmental

Political-Military Group

Enclosures:

1. DOD Study on Military Utility of Herbicides2. DOD Study on Riot Control Agents3. Selected Examples of RCA Use in Southeast Asia

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CONFIDE ENCLOSURE 1.

DOD STUDY ON MILITARY UTILITY OF HERBICIDES

Summary

The military utility of herbicides has been conclusivelyestablished. Use of herbicides exposed enemy supply,storag,e training and staging sites. This deprivation ofconcealment facilitated defense of fixed US and alliedinstallations, reduced the number and effectiveness ofenemy ambushes, and generally made it more difficult forthe enemy to accomplish his Tactical mission. Use ofherbicides has saved many US and allied lives.

1. A study of the military utility of herbicides inSoutheast - Asia is currently being conducted by theEngineer Strategic Studies Group (ESSG). Although thestudy will not be completed until December, 1971, ESSG hasprovided an interim report covering their field studyconducted in Vietnam during June/July 1971. The studydiscusses the chronology of herbicide use in Vietnam, thecontrols imposed on its use, and the military utility ofsuch use.

2. The preliminary study recognized the difficultyin defining an appropriate index for measuring militaryutility and limits itself to data reported and collectedin the data files of the National Military Command SystemSupport Center.

3. The study identified the following broad range ofpurposes served by the use of herbicides:

a. Observe enemy activity, including movement'of troops and supplies, storage and staging areas.

b. Expose interdiction targets.

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c. Expose enemy to close air support (byremoving cover in areas where contact with enemytroops is, likely).

d. Reduce enemy capability to ambush.

e. Mark targets (creat' readily visible referencepoints in otherwise uniform jungle terrain).

f. Canalizing enemy movement.

g. Route an enemy force' from long-establishedbase areas.

h.• Controlling regrowth in Rome-plowed areas.

Clear _fields of fire for defense of friendlyinstallations. -

j.. Clear river banks to inhibit attacks onshipping and patrol boats.

k. Control vegetation in depot areas.

1. Clear areas around isolated inhabited areas.

Conclusions of'DOD Study:

. Use of herbicides facilitates movement to engagethe enemy and enhances the effectiveness of directfire weapons. Defensively, the security of a forceor installation is aided by improving visibilityaround its perimeter.

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ENCLOSURE 2.

DOD STUDY ON RIOT CONTROL AGENTS

Summary

The option to employ RCAs provides the United Statesan alternative of graduated application of force, permittingmission accomplishment while significantly limiting lossof life and property.

1. The utility of RCAs in the conflict in SoutheastAsia has been thoroughly demonstrated. It has been clearlyestablished that use of these agents in Vietnam made itpossible to accomplish military missions with fewer US andallied casualties, military and civilian, than would other-wise have.been incurred. RCAs proved to be of unique valuein special circumstances where other types of conventionalordnance were ineffective. In neutralizing enemy fortifiedpositions, for example, RCA munitions have proven to be farmore humane than the alternative major expenditure ofconventional munitions.

2. The Services were required to evaluate the utilityof RCAs in furtherance of their missions in Southeast Asia.All Services noted that since the use of RCAs was notspecifically documented; quantitative evaluation wasdifficult. . Without exception, however, the Services statedthat use of RCAs contributed to the accomplishment of theirmissions and in several individual cases it was statedthat use of RCAs was decisive. (Selected examples inEnclosure 3.)

3.. Most uses of RCAs can be categorized as follows:

a. Use involving area denial to unprotectedpersonnel.

1. Denying use of section of trail orroadnet.

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2. Denying *"use of base or firing area.

3. Denying subsequent enemy use offortifications, tunnels, or caves (after initialclearing).

4. Denying use of potential ambush site.

5. Denying use of food cache or food.growing area.

6. Disrupt repair of lines of communication.

b. Use for fire suppression or to cause confusion.

1. In defensive fires around fixed installa-tion.

2. In counter-ambush or counter-sniperrole.

3. To break contact with an enemy.

4. In timely counter-battery fire.

5. In extractions of individuals or smallunits.

(a) Downed aircrew members in SAR:operations.

(b) Reconnaissance teams or longrange Tatrols.

(c) Casualties, (assistance in medicalevacuation).

6. To suppress anti-aircraft fire.

7. To capture prisoners for intelligencepurposes.

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8. In preparation of landing zones.

c. Use to reduce damage or casualties.

1. • When noncombatants are intermixed inthe area of operations.

2. In cities or built-up areas.

d. Use to increase_effectiveness of US operations.

1. In conjunction with conventional weapons.

2. To replace combat units in blockingoperations.

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e. Use as a search weapon.

1. To detect concealed personnel.

2. To clear fortifications, tunnel complexesand caves.

3. To assist in the assault of a fortifiedposition.

4. A DOD study projecting the Southeast Asia experienceto other theatres of operation and intensities of conflictindicates . that RCAs can have Significant utility in manymilitary situations. The situations investigated in theDOD study were these:

(1) Combat in the Middle East against asophisticated force in a warm environment.

(2) Combat against a semi•sophisticated forcein Korea in both cold and warm environments.

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(3) Counterinsurgent operations in LatinAmerica.

(4) Urban combat in Western Europe involvingboth cold and warm environments.

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The conclusions of this , study. have been summarized inthe following matrix showing the degree of utility (ordisutilit) of RCA use in each situation and in eachy geographic area.

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Conclusions:

5. The Joint Chief of-Staff, after analyzing thestudy of RCA use in Southeast Asia and the possibilitiesfor use in other areas and in different levels of conflict,have concluded that:

(1) RCA use in Southeast Asia was effective andsignificantly augmented the US military capability.

(2) RCA use in Southeast Asia frequentlyprevented undue friendly casualties and provided anentrenched enemy the option of surrender.

(3) RCA use in Southeast Asia was often thedecisive factor in , the recovery of downed aircrewswhich were under enemy attack.

(4) In many situations, use of RCAs uniquelyprovides the commander with non-lethal optionsunavailable through any other weapon system.

(5) RCAs Provide an excellent non-lethalalternative to reconnaissance by fire.

(6) RCA would be useful in many types of tacticalsituations in most of the land areas of the world.

(7) RCA use is most effective when employed withsurprise against an unprotected enemy.

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(8) RCA use provides an effective militaryoption which permits the saving of noncombat,friendly, and enemy lives.

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.

MILITARY APPLICATION OF RCA

Restriction of Areas to Personnel 'Trail/RoadnetBase/Firing AreaFortifications/Tunnels/CavesAmbush SiteFood Cache/Growing AreaLine of Communications Repair

Fire SuRnallion/ConfusionDefensive - Fixed.Counter-Ambush/SniperBreak ContactCounter-Battery FireExtract Individuals/UnitsSuppress AA FireCapture Pri.onersPrepare Landing Zones

Reduce Darvtr-e/CasualtiesIntermixed :;oncombatantsCities/Built-up Areas

AAPPENDIX MIDDLE

NU•ER. • LAST

2 .b.(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)

VIII AIX

X

XI AXII

XIII AXIV

XVXVI

2 .d.(1)(2)

Increase Effectiveness of OonsWith Other Conventional WeaponsReplace Blocking Units

XVIIXVIII

A

Search W' -"ionDetect Concealed PersonnelClear Fortifieations;/Tunnels/CavesAssist Assault Fortified Pos.

XIXXX

XXI

A.

B to CD

IV

V

VI

KOREA

AA

LATIN. WES1ZRNAXEAICA Et' RC

AB

B to C

AAB

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*Keyed to paragraph I.

UTII,ITY CODES

CODE .TERM DEFINITION

EFFECTIVE

USEFUL

RCA use provides the commander a measured degree of force whichwould have a marked positive influence on the outcome of the

'isarticular military application. Often considerable lives wouldbe saved by its use. Highly recommended.

RCA use provides the commander a measured degree of force whichwould have a positive influence on the outcome of the particularmilitary application. Recommended.

• INErFECTIVE RCA use has no significant influence on the outcome. Noappreciable saving of lives would be expected.. Not recornler.'led.

COUNTERFROpUCTTVE RCA use has rigative influence in the particular military-application. Not recommended.

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ANNEX

A AA AA B to C

AflAA

AA

AA to C

B BA AB A

B C

B • to CB

BA

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ENCLOSURE 3.

SELECTED EXAMPLES OF RCA USE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

a. "An NVA regiment resisted conventional assaultsfor two days resulting in heavy casualties to twocompanies in spite of air, artillery, and even B-52 attacks.Two helicopter loads of grenades effectively dislodged theenemy and his position was taken in two hours with onlytwo casualties."

b. "Riot control agent a was used extensively andeffectively against an estimated 1000 troops in the vicinityof a survivor. Employment of CS was invaluable to thesuccessful rescue."

C. "CS, combined with smoke, effectively screened anarea concentrated with small arms and automatic weapons andallowed the helicopter rescue of two survivors withoutaircraft damage."

d. "Riot Control Agent in the form of CBU-19, combinedwith other ordnance, contributed to the successful rescueof a downed pilot in an extremely hostile environment. Insuch an area, employment of CBU-19 is an automatic require-ment just prior to the rescue attempt. In addition tocausing temporary incapacitation, the screening propertiesof CS, along with smoke, are considered very effective."

e. "One example of the use of RCA to clear tunnelsand caves took place when 44 enemy who had been pursued ina lively fire fight for nearly a kilometer were finallydriven into a cave. Ten CS grenades were thrown into thecave by a pursuing US platoon. All 44 enemy departed, withno firing. Only one VC was even wounded; he refused tofollow directions. All VC weapons were captured. Theentire platoon was therefore available for interrogation."

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f. "A trooper related that he could recall vividlyjumping off a• helicopter which had put him down within 20meters of an NVA soldier armed with an AK-47 but whofortunately had been completely incapacitated by CS."

g. "During a 17-day period, 13 helicopters receivedhits by enemy ground fire while flying over the Hobo Woodsin III CTZ. Following each incnent airstrikes and artillerywere placed on suspected enemy positions. The enemy wasfiring from well-concealed attacks were ineffective. Inorder to flush the enemy out-of these-positions, CS wasemployed. Subsequent flights over the same area during thenext three weeks were made without a single incident ofenemy ground-to-air fire."-

h. "Helicopters had been receiving sporadic groundfire from a village. Leaflets were dropped over the villagetelling-inhabitants to stop firing at aircraft or suffer theconsequences. Fire continued from the village and newleaflets were dropped telling the people that they were

. warned and must be dealt with unless they left the village.Many villagers heeded the advice and left. NonpersistentCS was then dropped on the village and followed by aground sweep without a shot being fired. Since this employ-ment, no ground fire has been received from this village."

i. "An armored cavalry troop securing an engineerplatoon had been ambushed twice a day for two days in arow. The engineers were removing a Bailey bridge locatedabout five kilometers from the NDP, reached by a single,restricted access route. E158R2 CS canisters were droppedimmediately in front of the troops as they proceeded downthe road. All ground personnel were masked and the columnwas driven through the dense agent cloud. Using thistechnique, not one round was fired at the column in theremaining three days of the operation."

j. "With the increasing frequency of indirect fireattacks, a means was sought whereby rapid counter-battery

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fire could be delivered with minimum effect on noncombatantsin the launch area. Within the capital military district,105mm CS was employed in a counter rocket/mortar role asa method for rapid neutralization of actual or suspectedrocket or mortar locations in short enough time to prevent ••a sicond volley of rockets or prolonged attacks by mortar.In one period, CS rounds were expended during 17 rocketattacks and . not once in any of those attacks was a secondvolley of rockets fired. Agent CS thus allows rapidreaction to enemy initiatives when the launch site is inclose proximity to friendly troops or in densely populatedareas. It has precluded sustained attack by stand-offmeans and has made the introduction of standard 122mm or107mm rocket launchers tactically unsound because of theinability to fire successive volleys and because the rapidresponse permitted by CS use increases the difficulty in

. evacuating the launcher before retaliatory measures aretaken. Although obviously not quantifiable, CS use in thisrole saves innumerable civilian lives."

k. "In i the period immediately after TET 1968 theCommanding General of an ARVN Unit, in an attempt to curtailthe VC resupply effort, decreed that villagers in his areawould not be allowed to transport large amounts of food-stuffs at any one time. He received US support in the formof gunship surveillance. , Within a few days bicycle andscooter riders with large bags of rice slung across thebacks of their bikes were observed. At first a few warninggunship rounds 'across the bouP succeeded in turning themaround; but in very short order, the riders were backagain, this time in addition to the rice they also carried.women , and children; knowing the Americans would not shootto kill, they did not'respond to the warning shots. However,one of the gunners had some CS grenades on board; he droppedthem in front of bicycles, which when they reached the edgeof the cloud, promptly turned around. Word of this neweffective technique apparently was rapidly circulated sincethe traffic of the food transporters immediately declined.".


10 • "One unit had received heavy fire from a villageand the ground commander requested artillery fire. TheDivision Commander was reluctant to use HE in attacking thevillage. The enemy was located within a small area in thevillage and accuracy and time were important. The decisionwas.made to use CS mortar rounds while HE fires wereauthorized only as a last resort and only on small targets.The mortars were required to register outside the villagewith HE prior to shifting to the village with CS; fourtubes delivered 80 rounds of CS on the village within twoand one-half minutes, ground troops then swept the areaencountering only minor resistance. The village was takenwithout casualties or major damage."

• m0 "Damage to property as well as civilian and militarycasualties during combat in urban areas can be reduced bythe use of RCA. While not the sole means of achieving thesegoals, CS was employed effectively to drive enemy personnelfrom buildings and fortified positions. This has lessenedthe requirement to engage in sustained combat in urbanareas. The use of CS from helicopters permits rapidclearance of villages. Because of the haste with whichpersonnel leave the buildings, little time is available forhiding or caching weapons and munitions. Single munitionssuch as grenades can save lives in reconnoitering caves,tunnels and houses within a village. -The number ofcasualties both to the attacking force and to noncombatantsare greatly reduced. In one case, a company attempted toclear a village and in the course of the day sustained J2casualties. When RCA was employed the village was swept.within one hour with no casualties"to either side."

n., "Many troops.have used single CS grenades inreconnaissance of villages. One grenade very effectivelyassures that no personnel remain in a house. This haslessened friendly casualties and reduced the danger to non-combatants who are merely hiding. A similar technique hasproved effective in tunnels and bunkers in heavily populatedareas where civilians may be hiding."

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se memorandum for mr. henry a. kissinger subject: nssm … · 7119321 department of state...

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