schiller. ''phaedo'' 104-105_is the soul a form

8/11/2019 Schiller. ''Phaedo'' 104-105_Is the Soul a Form

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"Phaedo" 104-105: Is the Soul a Form?

Author(s): Jerome SchillerReviewed work(s):Source: Phronesis, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1967), pp. 50-58Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181792.

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(the

absolute

form)

nor

the form in

things

(the

immanent

form)

will

admit its opposite and become other than what it was, but sooner would

depart

or perish (102B-103B);

that there are things,

such as

snow

and fire, which,

though

not the

forms cold and heat,

behave

just

like

these forms

when the

opposites

of the

forms

approach: they

either

depart

or

perish

(103C-103E);

that this

is true of other

things,

for

instance,

the number

three

(which

will not admit the form even)

and

two (which

will not admit

the form odd) (103

E - 104 C). Socrates

then

poses

the

question,

What sort of

things

are these? and A is the

answer.

Between

A and

B,

in

addition

to a

summary

of

points

made

previously,

we have the observation that we can now name such things as causes

of the presence

of

a

certain

quality

in

something:

thus

fire

(and

not

the old,

'safe'

heat)

can be cited

as the cause

of

something's being hot,

or

fever

(and

not

illness)

the cause

of

someone's

being ill (104

D

-

105

C). B

is

then presented

as an elaboration

of

an

instance of the

principle

just

developed:

the soul is

(parallel

to fire) that which causes

the body

in which it

is

to

be

alive

(parallel

to its

being hot).

The

immortality

of the soul

is

then established

by recalling

the earlier

admission

that

things,

such as

three,

which are associated with

particular

forms,

such

as

odd,

cannot admit the

opposite

of

those

forms.

And

just

as what

cannot admit the

even and has no

part

in

the

even

is 'uneven'

(aCvxpTLov),

o the

soul,

which does not

admit

death,

is 'immortal' (&Oavaoov) (105

D

-

105

E). (Then

Socrates

goes

on to

prove

that

if it is

immortal,

it is

imperishable

[105E-107A], but

we

are

not concerned

with this

phase

of his

argument.)

Does

Plato

view

the

soul, up

to 105

E

at least, as an immanent

form?

The

soul is introduced as

being parallel

to certain things

-

snow,

fire,

and three

-

each of

which,

while

being

so

intimately

associated

with a form

that it cannot exist

without

that

form,

is

never really

called

a

form, and,

commonsensically,

should not be taken as other

than

a concrete thing.

Two

points,

however,

seem to shatter

this

simple

answer:

one of these

'things,'

at

least,

does seem to be

identified

as a form

in the

course of the

argument,

namely,

three at 104D5-6

( V

TPv

EpOv

'L); moreover,

this

form

is

said to occupy

(xorOCay-n)

something, just

as the

soul

is said to

occupy

(xc-aXa-)

the body

at

105

D3.

Hackforth

develops

his

argument

in this fashion: In

103 C 10

-

105

B 4,

he claims, Plato

is

extending

to other entities the

principle

of exclusion

of opposites established earlier. These other entities are

forms

such as

'twoness'

and 'fieriness'. Though

not

themselves opposites, they

51

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exclude forms which are opposites. Hackforth defends his

inter-

pretation of these other entities being forms (and not things) in these

words: "Here [104E10-105A1]

at

least,

whatever be

the case else-

where...,

-To-sup

is conceived as a

form, fieriness,

not as

a

particular

fire; not merely

because

it

is

mentioned

in

the

same breath with

a&uc,

but also because

the

whole

paragraph

in

which it

occurs is

concerned

not with

things

but

with forms...

Plato

defines

[these

forms] by

reference to

the

things

which

they

come

to

'occupy'

(104 D1, 6): and

that he should do so

is

quite natural, since the form

which he

has in

mind

- the form to which all the

illustrations of his

principles point - is soul, which occupies a body, and 'brings up' into

that body

the form

of an

opposite,

viz.

the form

'aliveness'

(life)

."3

In commenting

later on his

interpretation

of

the soul as

a

form, he

notes: Only

if soul

is

regarded

as

a

form

"can

what

is

now

asserted of

soul

be

a

corollary,

or

deduction,

or

application

-

whatever

one chooses

to

call

it

-

of the

elaborate

argument

about

the

exclusion of

opposite

forms:

provided,

that

is,

that

I have

been

right

in

regarding

that

argument

as

concerned

with

forms...

And

if

any

doubt still

lingers in

the reader's

mind, surely

the

use of the word

XoaraGZ-n

n

105

D

3 is,

despite

Burnet's

note, conclusive;

to

my mind,

at all

events,

it

is

inconceivable

that

it could mean there

anything

other than

what it

meant

at 104

D

1, namely

the

occupation

of a

subject by

an

immanent

form."4

In

light of

this

last

statement,

Archer-Hind's comment

on

araCaxB

at

105

D

3

is

perplexing:

"It is to be

noted that the

usage

of

xa-nxa-j&

here

is

different from

that

in

104

D.

The soul

does not

occupy

the

body

in the sense

in which

IpL&'

occupies -pta:

the triad

is

the cause

why

three

are

three,

the

soul

is

not

the cause

why body

is

body,

but

the

cause

why

it

is

alive.

The

difference

lies

in

this:

the triad is

the idea

of

three;

the soul which

quickens

the

body

is not the

idea of

soul,

but

a

particular soul, just

as the fever

is

a

particular

fever."5

How

shall

we decide between

these

readings?

We

might suspect

Archer-Hind of

sacrificing

the

parallelism

of the

passages

because

he

is

convinced

-

on

evidence

external

to

the

argument

-

that

there

cannot be an

'idea of

soul,'

but

only particular

souls. But he

cannot

be

guilty

of

such

prejudice,

for he

goes on,

in

this

very note,

to claim

that the

argument

commits

Plato to an idea of

soul

-

though

this

is

a

3Hackforth, op. cit., 156.

4

Hackforth,

op. cit., 162.

5

R. D. Archer-Hind,

The

Phaedo

of

Plato

(2nd

ed. London, 1894), 115-116.

52



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'metaphysical

monstrosity'

-

which

supplies

the idea of life to

par-

ticular souls, which in turn bear this idea to bodies. Even though this

idea

of soul

is not mentioned in the

argument,

he claims that it

is

necessitated

by

'the

elaborate parallel'

and

supported

by

other

passages

from

early

Plato.6

I

believe

that

three features of this

argument

conclusively support

Archer-Hind's

reading

that the soul functions here as a

particular

thing,

not

as an

immanent

form.

First,

if

Hackforth

is

correct,

Plato

has not

only equivocated

on

'soul,'

but he would also be

forced to

accept

the absurd

implication

that the

body

is

immortal.

Second,

the

shift in xovraX necessitated by Archer-Hind's interpretation does not

spoil

the

argument,

but fits

naturally

into its

development. Third,

a

study of

the locutions Plato uses

for

'three'

undermines Hackforth's

reading.

Hackforth

translates

104 D5-7 of

passage

A above

(olaOo

..

7rept-ToZq)

in this way: "You

know presumably that

anything occupied by the

character of three must

be not

only

three but also

odd."7

Plato

continues

(104D9-10):

'E7r.L

rO' oLtQov

8",

Y04LEV, I

EVOCVT'CBea ?XCSLVy)

fn

UopqPn

asxv

7OUO

iUMpYOCJTOC

L

OUU7MOT

OaV E'XOOL.

Here Hackforth translates:

"Well,

what we

maintain

is

that such a

thing

can never be

visited

by

the character that is

opposite to the

form which

brings

that

about."8 The

second passage clearly

indicates

that the

thing

occupied by

the character of

three (ro toLoitov)can

never

admit of

evenness. Now if

xoc-&aX-n

ere

being

used in a

perfectly

parallel

fashion here and at

105 D3,

as

Hackforth

maintains,

the thing

occupied

in

that

passage (the

body)

could

never be visited

by the

character that is

opposite

to

the

form which

brings life about

(death):

in other words, Plato would have shown that the body cannot admit of

death,

that

is,

that the

body

is

immortal.

Three considerations show that

the shift in the

use of

xot&aXj

from

104

D

to 105

D

is

a natural

and

expected one. First, the use

of

xovc(X&a

at

105 D3

may

be

viewed

as

reminding the reader

of

a

previous part

of the

argument and not

necessarily

as

asserting any

parallels with its

previous use. It is

certainly clear that Plato is

pressing the parallel

6

Archer-Hind, op. cit., 116.

7Hackforth,

op.

cit.,

152.

8

Idem.

53



6/10

between

the

soul and

three. Thus at

104E1

ff. he

claims

successively

that the even never visits three

(O86no'Te i"s),

that three has no part

(o`4otpa)

in

the

even, and

that

it is

thus uneven

(iv0ap'ro4).

At 105 D

lOff.

he notes that the

soul

will

never

admit

(ou'

.o$no'r

8r6-iqto)

death,

that

we

now

(v5v) agree

to call

that which does not

admit the even,

the uneven

(v6p4rtov);

so we

should

call the

soul

immortal

(iOOvourov).

But between these

two

passages

Plato

introduces

his

extension of the

causal

principle (105B-C).

The later use

of

xmrx-Zn

may thusi be

justified

as

welding together

two

parts of the

argument. It preserves

the

continuity by being

'a

simple military metaphor' which

'implies

no metaphysical theory.'9

A

second reason

for

thinking the

shift in the

use of

xoo&a/yr

o

be

an

easy one

lies in

the

translation of

104D1-3. Alternatetranslationsof

this part of

passage

A above

(TAp'

o'v...

-uvO4;) demand

very

different

degrees

of

parallelism

in

the

two

uses.

Contrast

Hackforth's translation

with

Tredennick's:

Hackforth:

"Must

they

not be

those

which

compel

the object which

they

come

to

occupy

to

have

not

only

its own

character,

but

also the character

of a

certain

opposite,

which it

will

never lose?"10 Tredennick:

"Well, then, Cebes,

would

this

describe

them

-

that they are things which are compelled by some form which

takes possession

of them

to

assume

not

only

its own

form

but

in-

variably also

that of some

other

form

which

is an

opposite?"11

No doubt

Hackforth's translation conforms well

to

the

Greek,

but

things

can

be said

for

Tredennick's

rendering

which

perhaps

over-

weigh this.

First,

it

makes

the

reference

of

X

in

D

1

consistent

with that

in D5 as 'things occupied.'

Secondly,

it

obviates Burnet's note

on the

shift

from

the

plural (1)

to the

singular (octu'ro5)

n the

reference

to

the

occupying things.'2

(Of

course

this note

is

also obviated

in

Hackforth's

translation

with

ai&ro5 eing

taken

as

referring

to the

thing

occupied.13)

9John

Burnet, Plato's Phaedo

(Oxford,

1911),

123.

10

Hackforth,

op. cit.,

151.

11 Hugh Tredennick,

'Phaedo,'

in Last Days of Socrates,

reprinted in E.

Hamilton

and

H. Cairns, eds. Collected

Dialogues

of Plato

(New York, 1961),

86.

3 Burnet, op.

cit., 119-120.

13

Tredennick's

or

Burnet's

translation

of

uT-rO

in

which

it

refers to

the

occu-

pying form

- "forces the thing occupied

to assume the

form of the occupier"

-

when coupled

with

Hackforth's

interpretation

of

the

parallels of 104

I) and

105

D, may appear to

lead to an even

greater paradox

than that

of

the

body's

immortality, namely, the paradox that the body is really a soul. Thus, following

the

lead of 103E3

and 104A2

where

things

other

than forms are

said to receive

names

of forms, it

might be

argued

that

the

object occupied wouild lhave

to

54



7/10

As Burnet notes, 'the pronouns

are

a

little puzzling' in this passage

;14

perhaps in such a situation the advantages of Tredennick's translation

outweigh those of

Hackforth's.

If we do adopt Tredennick's

reading, there seems to be less demand

for parallelism

in

the use

of

xcetaCXq

t 104 D and 105 D. The 'things'

which behave like opposites are things occupied

by forms and not

forms which

actively occupy.

Thus it is an

object occupied by

the form

of three,

and

not

the threeness which

occupies

it, which, not accepting

the

opposite

of the

form

that

accompanies threeness,

is

said to

be

uneven (104E).

The

stress on

these things

which

passively receive

their properties de-emphasizes

xcnaz-p

in its first appearance, while

paving the way for

a soul

which

is

immortal, just

as three is uneven.

But though

the

way

is

prepared

for

an

easy transition

to

the

different

use

of

xo&aXy,

one

further step is required: to associate these

objects,

hitherto characterized

primarily

in

a

passive fashion,

with

some sort of activity. The transition is accomplished

by making these

things

into

causes.

Thus, according

to

the new, refined answer

to the

causal question,

it

is

not

heat

which makes

a

body hot, but fire; not

illness which makes

a

body ill, but fever. But

this observation will not

convince anyone who takes the fire or fever of 105 C to be forms, and

not to

be

examples

of

things occupied.

I

suggest

that Plato shows,

in

another difficult passage, 105

A

3-5, that the latter

is the

more

plausible

interpretation.

As

we have

seen

above,

such

things

as three do not admit

the

opposite

of the

form

accompanying

their occupying

form. Until

104 E 10 these things

are

not characterized as

engaging in any activity

further

than

this

refusal to admit forms.

At

104E7-105A1, however,

they

not

only

do not

admit

(axeLroc) the

opposite,

but

they bring

forward (Ernpepet)

the opposite they contain against the intruding

form,

as

three brings

forth oddness against the even, two brings

forth

evenness,

and

fire,

heat.

In

his

next breath, Plato elaborates

their

receive the

name of the occupying form, so

that, assuming the parallelism of the

two passages,

the

body would have to be named 'soul' in conformance

with

its

occupying form.

But there are two reasons

for not pressing this paradox. First, the reference

of

muTro5

s

not at

all

clear.

Second,

even

if

Tredennick's translation

is

correct,

Plato need

not be taken as saying that

the thing occupied must receive

the

name of the occupying

form as

its substantial

name, but only as an attribute.

Thus heat causes an object to be hot, not to be heat; life causes it to be alive,

not life; so

soul would cause body to be besouled,

perhaps, and not soul.

14

Burnet,

op. cit., 119.

55



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activity

in another

direction:

not

only will

opposites

not admit

opposites, but (105A3-5):

xalt

?XE6VO,

O

V

k7r typpf

tL

&VOCVTLOV

X'LVW,

p'

OTC V

OC'r6

t.

aur

TO

?7rvppOV

V

VO

Lc7p[LSVOU

V

VLXV87OT

S7tOt

?e

a'XCaOC

.

Fowler translates this

passage

thus:

"nothing which brings

an opposite

to that which it

approaches

will

ever admit in

itself

the oppositeness of

that which is

brought."'5

Note

the

important

shift here.

The context

clearly

indicates

that

the

'things'

being

discussed

are the

same entities

(such

as

three)

which were first

characterized

as

not

admitting

opposites,

and then were said to

bring

forth

an

opposite

against

an

approaching opposite. Now they are said to bring an opposite to some-

thing

which

they approach

(Xcp'

-r

xv

cc&r6.

Though Plato

proceeds

to

sum

up

his

argument

at

105

A8ff. by

noting

that

these

objects

will

not

admit

(ou taerxL)

opposites,

he

almost

immediately utilizes their

newly acquired

activity

in

his

refined

theory

of

causes. He

does not

say

explicitly

that fire and fever

cause

bodies

to

be

hot and

ill

by

bringing

an

opposite

to

them,

but

this mechanism

becomes obvious

in his

parallel

treatment of

the soul. Just before

the

passage

we have

called

B

above,

Plato establishes

that it is the

soul

which always

causes the body

in which

it

is

to be alive. He then relates cause and

activity

in

these

words

(in

Hackforth's

translation)

B:

"Then soul

always brings

life

along

with

it

to

anything

that

it

occupies.'"16

This sentence seems

simply

to

relate

105A3-5 to

the soIl.

In

105A3-5

something

is

said

to

bring something opposite

(ea7rp6pn

-n

Spvaw'tov)

to

what it

approaches

(sup'

oa

ocv&'CU-6

).

Here

the

soul

brings

life

("xze cppouao

Ccov)

to

what

it

occupies

(xartas).

The

military

overtones

of

&

c

1

are

caught

in the

xoavraaX?n

f

the

second

passage.

The use

of

xcxra'C^n

at

105 D

3 in a

fashion not

perfectlv

16

H. N. Fowler, Plato with an English Translation,

Vol.

1

(London, 1914), 361.

Hackforth translates the passage thus: "if any

form brings up one

of

two

opposites

into

that

which

it

itself enters, that

form itself will never admit the

character opposite

to

the one brought up." (Hackforth, op. cit., 152-153)

Fowler's 'oppositeness' is a bit clumsy, but Hackforth's

'form' is clearly not

indicated in the Greek, and prejudices the discussion.

Fowler's translation seems

also preferable to Tredennick's,

which

underemphasizes

the

thing's activity.

(See Tredennick, op. cit., 86.)

16

Hackforth, op. cit., 159.

17

See Hackforth, op. cit., 152

n.

4; Burnet, op. cit.,

121.

56



9/10

parallel to

its earlier use at

104

D

is thus natural and

required

by

the

development of the argument."8

The third

support for Archer-Hind's

interpretation

is Plato's

mode

of

referring to

numbers in

104-105. We saw above that

Hackforth

feels

that this mode of reference

actually supports

his

interpretation:

thus

a

reason

for

thinking

that

rO7Up is a form at

lOSA1

is

"that it is

mentioned in the same breath

with

n

aua&.'.

But I think

Hackforth is

mistaken.

The most

noteworthy

feature here is Plato's

studied

in-

difference to the locutions

by

which he refers to

numbers. Thus

he

explains, at 104A7ff., that

n rpr.&4,

and half of numbers in general

(o

%uavUq

'o0

&pLO0,oii

&7rtCo)

are odd

though

not

identical to the

odd,

'and in the same

way'

(xc'

cx

')

r'c

3o and

all

the other series of

numbers

(OC7=a

o

-TpOG

o

U

a-TLZoq

ro5

OpLOV?o5)

re

even, though not

identical

to

evenness. But if

rpL&4 nd

Ta&

36o are

equaUy parts of the

number

series,

so

similarly,

we

might

expect, would

be TL0C

pLoC and n 8uG.

Indeed,

Plato's

easy moves

from

r-'

tptL

to

n

'pLacq

at

104C1-5 and

104E3-5, which

indicate no

obvious change in

his reference,

support

this view.

In light of this situation Hackforth's notes at 104C2 and 104E3

can

only

be

misleading.

At

104C2

he writes

"-o&

-cpLa

s

not of course

three

things,

but

(as

is

evident

from the immediate substitution

of

'rptoc

in

C5) immanent

'threeness'"';19 at

104E3, "here

again the

meaning

of

ro-c

rpca is

determined

by

the substitution

of

-

rpLmqn

ES."20

I

would

certainly

agree with

Hackforth, as

against Archer-

Hind,

for

instance,

that ra'

tpLoc t

104E1, does

not

refer

to three

things.21

But I

cannot

accept

his

implication

that it thus

must

refer to

'threeness.' It

seems

plausible,

in

this

argument

at

least, to see it

as

referring to

the number

three, which is

different both from

things

(which it

occupies)

and threeness

(which

occupies it).

Plato

explicitly

refers

to threeness

only

once in

the argument

(

'&v TpLWV

Be'a

at

104

D5-6)

in

stating

that

this form

occupies 'things'

in such a

way

18

Hackforth himself

notes the

importance of

105

A3-5

as an

amplification of the

earlier

argument

(Hackforth,

op. cit., 152

n.). But he reads

it

as an

explanation

of the

&vayxaCe,t

of

104 D

1-3 to the

effect that

the form

wlich

possesses

things

carries an

accompanying form

and will

not allow either

itself

or

the

thing it

occupies to

admit the

opposite of this

accompanying form.

But I

believe that

my

interpretation better

prepares

us for the

causal

account to

come.

19

Hackforth,

op. cit.,

151 n.

20

Hackforth, op.

cit., 152 n.

21

Archer-Hind, op.

cit., 113 n.

57



10/10

that they must be odd as well as three. The things possessed,

which

have no part in the even and are uneven, are the r& ptoac

n

trp6xqf

104E1-5, that is, the number three.

The use of the alternate forms

p

pcq

and TrcX

pLto

or the number

three seems to support this intermediate status between forms and

things.

I do

not

wish to

comment

further

on this suggestion, either to

try to clarify the nature of such 'intermediates' or to argue for their

appearance in other Platonic writings.

I

want

merely

to emphasize

their seeming difference from

rv

rptv

'am

and thus

change what

seems to be a support for Hackforth's position to a

support

for our

interpretation.22

In

conclusion, the paradoxical consequence of Hackforth's inter-

pretation, the plausibility of the new use of

xovmaxn

at 105D3, and

the evidence of Plato's references

to numbers in

104-105

force

us to

accept Archer-Hind's interpretation that the soul is construed

as a

thing in this argument, and

not

as a form

as

claimed

by

Hackforth

and

Keyt.23 We might

have to

agree with

Archer-Hind

that the argument

implies the existence of that metaphysical monstrosity,

an idea of

soul.

But such an idea is never used in this argumenit. And thus we can at

least free Plato from the logical monstrosity

of

equivocation

which

Hackforth claims he commits.

Washington University, St. Loutis,

Missouri

22

The parallel

between

the number three (uneven)

and soul (immortal) which

assures the

support has been developed

above. Keyt seems

also to rely too

heavily on

104 D5-6 as

setting the tone for all references

to three (Keyt, op.

cit.,

168 n.).

23

I

should perhaps note that Archer-Hind offers a translation of 104 D 1-3

close to Hackforth's. I

find, however, that this

makes the transition

between

the two uses

of

xor&axn

more

difficuilt

to accept.

58

schiller. ''phaedo'' 104-105_is the soul a form

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