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Phaedo of Elis and Plato on the Soul

Author(s): George Boys-StonesSource: Phronesis, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2004), pp. 1-23Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182741 .

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Phaedo of Elis and Plato on the Soul'

GEORGE BOYS-STONES

ABSTRACT

Phaedo of Elis was well-known as a writer of Socratic dialogues, and it seems

inconceivablethatPlato could have been innocentof intertextualitywhen, excus-

ing himself on the grounds of illness, he made him the narratorof one of his

own: the Phaedo. In fact the psychological model outlined by Socrates in this

dialogue converges with the evidence we have (especially from fragmentsof the

Zopyrus)for Phaedo's own beliefs about the soul. Specifically, Phaedo seems to

have thought that non-rationaldesires were ineliminable epiphenomenaof thebody, that reasonwas somethingdistinct,and that the purpose of philosophywas

its 'cure' and 'purification'. If Plato's intention with the Phaedo is to assert theseparabilityand immortalityof reason (whatever one might think about desireand pleasure), then Phaedo provides a useful standpointfor him. In particular,Phaedo has arguments hat are useful against the 'harmony-theorists'and are themore useful rhetoricallyspeaking since it is only over the independence of rea-son that Phaedo disagrees with them). At the same time as allying himself withPhaedo, however, Plato is able to improveon him by adding to the demonstra-tion that reason is independenta proof that it is actually immortal.

With a growingacknowledgement hat the study of Plato's philosophycannotproceedwithout a sensitivity o the mannerof its presentation ascome a growinginterest n the characterswho people the dialogues.2Theassumption surelyright is thatPlato'schoiceof social milieu,of inter-locutor, n the case of frameddialogues of the narratoroo, must be rel-evant one way or another o the philosophical ubjectmatter n hand.Onefigure n all of this has attracted articular ttention vertheyears,namelyPhaedoof Elis: narrator,nterlocutor, nd eponym of the Phaedo.3 There

AcceptedAugust2003

This articlecomes out of work I have been doing for a forthcomingcollaborativestudy of physiognomy in the ancient world under the general editorship of SimonSwain(Physiognomy:anInterdisciplinary tudyrom Graeco-RomanAntiquity oIslam).My thanksto ChristopherRowe and David Sedley for their critical comments on ear-lier drafts.

2 See now D. Nails' invaluableresource,The People of Plato. A ProsopographyofPlato and OtherSocratics (Indianopolis,2002).

3 Testimoniaandfragmentsof Phaedo nG.Giannantonied.),SocratisetSocraticorumReliquiae [SSR] (Naples, 1990), IIIA, with discussion at vol. 4, 115-27. Giannantoni

is rigorousin excluding texts that do not name Phaedo;a more generouscollection oftestimonia for the Zopyrus is presented and discussed in L. Rossetti, 'Ricerche sui

? KoninklijkeBrill NV, Leiden, 2004 Phronesis XLIXI1Also available online - www.brill.nl



2 GEORGEBOYS-STONES

seem to be several reasons for this level of interest in him. First, the

Phaedo is one of Plato's most poignantdialogues:the dramaticcontext

evoked around the impendingexecution of Socrates asserts itself with

unusual force. Secondly, Phaedo's role as the ostensible narrator f the

dialogue is given an unusual emphasis by Plato. The Phaedo not only

opens with an emphaticassertionof Phaedo's right to narrateas a wit-

ness of Socrates' last hours (ac'T6, J, Dai86wv, xapry6vov...; aryo , X

'EXC'pate;), ut also, extraordinarily,makes a point of explainingwhy

Plato could not narrate vents himself:he was off sick at the time(HX6rov

8&oloat 19a0vEVt:59blO). Finally, it happens that evidence about Phaedo's

backgroundrom outsidethe Phaedo providesa readyanswer o the ques-

tion of why, from a dramaticpointof view, Plato shouldhave chosen to

speak throughPhaedorather han one of the otherSocraticswho were

supposed o have been presentwith him in Socrates'cell. Phaedo,we are

told, had been a prisonerof war, and made to work as a prostitute.The

analogywith the soul as Socratesdescribes t in the Phaedo is not hard

to see: for it too, during ife, is imprisoned, rapped n pollutingservice

to carnality.Andjust as the soul is eventuallypurifiedandreleased rom

attachmento corporealityhrough he practiceof philosophy, o Phaedo

was liberated rom his enslavementat the instigationof Socrates;became,

indeed,a philosopherhimself,and the founderof his own school at Elis.4

"Dialoghi Socratici"di Fedone e di Euclide', Hermes 108 (1980), 183-200, at 183-98.

With most commentators(including Giannantoni:SSR 4.126), I assume as the only

serious hypothesis available for their provenancethat the fragments describing the

famous encounter between Zopyrus and Socrates (frr.6-11 Rossetti) ultimatelyderive

from Phaedo's Zopyrus althoughit is truethat Phaedo is mentioned n none of them.

On Phaedogenerally(includingearlier suggestionsthatwe mightreconstructomething

of his views from Plato), cf. K. von Fritz, 'Phaidon (3)', RE xix.2 (1938), 1538-42;L. Rossetti, 'Therapeia n the MinorSocratics',Theta-Pi3 (1974), 145-57;"'Socratica"

in Fedone di Elide', Studi urbinati (Ser. B) 47 (1973), 364-81, a revised version of

which appears n his Aspettidella letteraturasocratica antica at 121-53 (cf. 133-4 for

the suggestion that Phaedo 88e-89a represents Phaedo's own view of Socrates);

H.Toole, 'Ei';noiovYwKparucovpEIEt v&a'ro86G ij&uop(pia oz ECOlcpa&ou;.ep'

T'ig XpovoXo i?rco; 'rCv 'EpywvTrovYwipattKwv', Athena 75 (1974-5), 303-17 (esp.

306-7 for the suggestionthatPhaedolies behindPlato's portraitof Socratesin the Sym-

posium);M. Montuori, Su Fedone di Elide',Atti dellaAccademiaPontaniana25 (1976),

2740; S. Dusanik 'Phaedo's Enslavementand Liberation',Illinois Classical Studies

19 (1993), 83-97 (arguingat 96-7 that the Phaedo has been colouredby a criticalatti-

tude to Spartanaggression that Dusanic attributesto Phaedo himself); C. H. Kahn,Plato and the Socratic Dialogue (Cambridge,1996), 11-12; Nails, People of Plato 231.

4 So e.g. K. Dorter,Plato's Phaedo: An InterpretationToronto Buffalo/ London,

1982), 9-10, 89. For the various accounts of Phaedo's life, see SSR IIIA 1-3. E. I.

McQueen and C. J. Rowe have shown that his capture in war is at least historically



PHAEDO OF ELIS AND PLATO ON THE SOUL 3

Giventhe ostensiblepsychologicalmodel of thePhaedo, then,it is pos-

sible to start hinkingof reasonswhy Phaedo'sbiographymightmakehim

an appropriate arrator.But it cannot be satisfactory o leave thingslike

this.For one thing,it is quite possiblethat ancientbiographiesof Phaedo

were themselves embroideredn the light of his role in the Phaedo (or

indeedin the light of what I shall go on to suggest was his own philos-

ophy).Foranother,he 'dramatic' xplanationof Phaedo'spresence n the

Phaedo makesno mentionof the one thingwe know for sure: hat Phaedo

was himself a philosopherof substanceand, more than this, a writer of

his own Socratic dialogues. (Two of these, the Zopyrusand the Simon,

preservedhis fame throughout ntiquity.)5 his has some claim to be the

morestriking act abouthis presence n thePhaedo- for how could Plato

possible: 'Phaedo, Socrates and the Chronology of the Spartan War with Elis',

Methexis 2 (1989), 1-18 (cf. also Dusanic, 'Phaedo's Enslavement and Liberation').

Whether it is plausible that he was prostitutedis another question (it is denied by

Montuori: Su Fedone di Elide', 36-40; 'Di Fedone di Elide e di Sir KennethDover',

Corolla Londoniensis 2 (1982), 119-22). Other explanations for Plato's choice of

Phaedo as narratorof the Phaedo have been suggested. In the view of L. Parmentier,

Plato was paying a simple homage to a dead friend ('L'age de Phedond'Elis', Bulletinde l'AssociationGuillaumeBude 10 (1926), 22-4 at 23). W. D. Geddes (Plato, Phaedo

(2nd edn.: London, 1885), xiii-xiv) suggests that Phaedo was chosen as being known

for having the right balance of artistic sensitivity and philosophical acumen for the

occasion. Giannantoni,by contrast,thinks that the choice of Phaedo is motivated pre-

cisely by his insignificancefor the circle of Socrates: by choosing Phaedo as his nar-

rator, Plato ensures that our view of Socrates at such an importantmoment will not

be clouded by association with a Euclides, Antisthenes, or Aristippus (SSR 4.119).

There is always the possibility that Phaedo was in fact Plato's source for events on

that day: one would not have to assume just because of this that the discussions in

the dialogue were mere transcripts.Cf. R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo (Cambridge,

1955), 13; and the cautious remarksof J. R. Baron on the last words of Socrates: 'OnSeparating the Socratic from the Platonic in Phaedo 118', Classical Philology 70

(1975), 268-9. D. N. Sedley is unusual in looking to Phaedo's philosophical position

for an explanation of his presence, observing a 'philosophical kinship' between the

Zopyrusand the Phaedo: 'The Dramatis Personae of the Phaedo' in T. Smiley (ed.),

PhilosophicalDialogues. Plato,Hume,Wittgenstein.Dawes Hicks Lectureson Philosophy

- Proceedings of the British Academy 85 (Oxford, 1995), 3-26, esp. 8-9.

5 Out of a longish list of dialogues attributed o him (DL 2.105; Suda s.v. od6owv),

Diogenes Laertius(loc. cit.) thinks these two genuine. The Simon seems to be behind

the invective of one of the 'Letters of Aristippus' (no. 13 = SSR IVA 224; cf. Letter

12 (part) = SSR IVA 223, with K. von Fritz, 'Phaidon von Elis und der 12. und 13.

Sokratikerbrief',Philologus 90 (1935), 240-4). Since these letters are later composi-tions than they pretend to be (cf. e.g. Giannantoni, SSR 4.165-8), this indicates an

interestin the Simon somewhat laterthan the generation after Socrates. The moredis-

tinguished sources of testimonia for Phaedo include Cicero, Seneca and (into the 4th

century AD) the EmperorJulian.



4 GEORGE BOYS-STONES

be innocent of intertextualitywhen he writes a dialogue narratedby

another rival? collaborative?)writer of dialogues?6 t could be thatwe

should not just be looking to explain Plato's choice of Phaedo in terms

of what is distinctiveabout the dialogue he narrates,but that we might

also (conversely)explain what is distinctiveaboutthe Phaedo in termsof

Phaedo'spresenceas its narrator.

The Phaedo seems to stand apartfrom other Platonic texts in the psy-

chological model with which it works. It stands apart, in particular,

through ts treatment f desire- desire, that is, for corporeal timulation

or satisfaction.According o the 'standard'Platonic account,this sortof

desire forms a distinct 'part' of the soul, of which anotherpart s reason.

Like reason(with which it may conflict), such desireis a psychological

determinant f action. What makes this a plausibleaccountof desire is,

first,the very fact that it is one source of impulse for a body whose life

and activity dependson the presenceof the soul; and, secondly, the fact

that thepleasurewhich is positedby desire as the end of humanactivity

is itself something that registers in the soul.7 In the Phaedo, however, Plato

appears o be tryingsomethingdifferent.According o the Socratesof the

Phaedo, desire is not of the soul at all, but of the body. It has an impact

on the soul (whichin essence is pure reason);but as an externaldistrac-

tion to it, not as a wayward partof it. The idea seems to be that,once

animatedby the directivepresenceof reason,the needs and the satisfac-

tion of the bodyassertthemselvesas appropriate bjectsof reason'scare.

Inmanycases,reason(broughto forgetfulness f its proper,divinesphere

at the momentof incarnation) ctually goes so far as to identifyits own

interestswith those of the body.Nevertheless, he body, and the desires

thatcome fromit, areproperlyalien to the soul,which standsto themas

a guard o his post (cf. 62b), or a man to his cloak(cf. 87b-e)- or a con-

demnedprisoner o his cell, or, if you like, a noble P.O.W. to his igno-

minious bordello.

It would be wrong to deny the familial resemblance between the

Phaedo and otherdialoguesin which Plato discussesthe character f the

soul. In particular,Plato never denies the primacyof reason;8 nd if, in

6 The Phaedo is not the only case of this: the Theaetetusis narratedby Euclides,

founder of the Megarianschool (cf. DL 2.108 for his dialogues).

I Compareesp. Philebus 21a-d (for the mental dimension to pleasure); 35cd (forthe location of desire and impulse in the soul).

I T. Johansen notes references to our rational natureas 'original' in the Republic

(61 Id) and Timaeus (42d, 90d): 'Body, Soul, and Tripartition n Plato's Timaeus',

OxfordStudies in Ancient Philosophy 19 (2000), 87-111 at 109 with n. 34.




the Gorgias and Phaedrus,desire is so far from being alien to the soul

thatit seems to be an essentialandeternalcomponent f it, in theRepublic

and TimaeusPlato takeswhat mightbe thoughtof as the middleground

betweenthis view and thatof the Phaedo.According o these dialogues,

desireis of thesoul, indeed,but as accidentnotessence,so that t becomes

a 'mortal'accompanimento immortal easonwhichmight(in imagescon-

vergent with the dominant hemeof the Phaedo) eventuallybe 'purged'

of it.9

Just as importantly,Plato never denies the crucialrole played by the

body in shaping desire,or the irrational oul moregenerally.'0Even if the

desireforpleasure prings rom thesoul, the body,as themeans by which

the pleasureis attained,naturallyhas a significant nput into the shape

taken by an individual'sdesires.In exploringthis aspect of the question,

Plato sometimessails quite close to the positionof the Phaedo- the posi-

tion that desires spring from the body in the first place. It has recently

been argued or the Timaeus n particular hat Plato sees the character f

the soul there n reductionist erms,as 'following' the temperament f the

body; as a straightforwardunction of the body's physiological state in

termsvery similarto those of the Phaedo. This is how Plato can say, in

the Timaeus, hatno-oneerrswillingly: vice is a resultof bodily disease."

It seems to me, however,that this cannotbe quite right- and that Plato

never(i.e. outsidethe Phaedo) commitshimself to anythingstronger han

the claim that the body is one influenceon the character f the irrational

9 Republicesp. 10, 61lb-612a; Timaeus esp. 41d, 69cd (42b for the escape of thejust soul from incarnation).

10Themes in the dialogues which reflect Plato's interestin the scope of the body's

effect on the characterof the soul include speculationabout the psychological impli-cations of the physical environment(e.g. for the characterof the Greeks at Timaeus24c; for the Atlantans at Critias 1Ile; for Northernraces such as Thracians andScythians at Republic 435e; cf. also Laws 747de). Or, again, his discussions of theinheritanceof character e.g. Charmides157d-158b;Cratylus394a; hence also the pos-sibility of breedingfor good character:Republic 375-6, 459; Politicus 310 and Laws773ab; cf. Critias 121b).Neitherthemecontradictswhat I shall go on to argue,namelythat Plato's standardposition is that the body does not determine character:both,rather,operateon the assumptionthat the natureof the body mightpredispose some-one lacking the appropriate ontrol of reason to acquirea certain sort of character.

11Timaeus 86e. See ChristopherGill, 'The Body's Fault? Plato's Timaeus on

Psychic Illness' in M. R. Wright ed.), Reasonand Necessity.Essayson Plato's Timaeus(London, 2000), 59-84. Gill invokes Galen to his aid; and the language of 'following[bodily] temperament' 'E'?caOtKcpiaeal)is taken from Galen's reductionist nterpre-tationof Plato in his QAM(Quod animi mores;or, to give it its full title and in Greek:"OTt tacl ToV OaTo; Kpaevotv ati Tiw vXi vvaiget; 'tovtaQ).



6 GEORGEBOYS-STONES

soul. He neverin fact says that the bodydetermines ne's desiresor incli-nations. The Timaeus, n particular,makes it very clear that reasonand

philosophy are forces which counter-balance he influence of physical

state: a person becomes bad because of a bad state of body and an

'upbringingwithouteducation' 86e); or where a poor state of body com-

bines with a poorgovernment ndpoor parenting87b); the route to hap-

piness involves both physical and intellectual raining 88bc).'2Thereis

no overwhelming eason,whatever he state of a person'sbody, why their

psychology houldbe marred ybaddesires so long as thenatural estraints

of reasonare in place. (The reason n questionmightbe one's own or thatof one's parentsor society: it makes no difference.)'3n a fully natural

society, nobodywould have a bad character t all; and this is not a ques-

tion of the needs or temperament f the body. Desire (andthe irrational

soul more generally)remainsdistinct rom the body, and underno com-

pulsionto 'follow' it.

This, then,is where the modelpresentedn the Phaedois unique.It is,

to be sure, possibleto arguethatthe Phaedo does not give us a license

to thinkthat Plato changedhis mind over the natureof the soul. It is

entirelypossible,even probable,hatthemodelwe arepresentedwith hereis ultimately ntendedto be read as emphasisingcertainfeaturesof his

psychologicalbeliefs at the expenseof otherswithoutactually implying

inconsistency with the 'standard' view.'4 In any case, nothing in what I

12 Gill recognises ('The Body's Fault?', e.g. 60), but plays down (61) the signi-

ficance of educationaland political influences on psychological development,partly

because he assumes that one's mental capacities are determinedby the body as well.

This itself seems to me mistaken. It is true that 'madness and ignorance' can be

explained by physical disease (86bc); but the point is that the mind's naturalactivity

here is disturbedby an unusualdegree of turmoil in the body, not that it is in gen-

eral a function of physiological state. Cf. e.g. F. M. Cornford,Plato's Cosmology

(London, 1937), 346-9; D. J. Zeyl, Plato, Timaeus(Indianapolis,2000), lxxxv-lxxxvi.

1' It should be emphasised that both doing and being receptive to philosophy are

entirely natural human functions. (For the place of philosophicaleducation in one's

development,see 44bc; cf. 88bc.) Indeed,both are inscribedin the body, every bit as

much as the tendencytowardsirrationalvice: so man's philosophicaldestiny(cf. 42ab)

is an explanatory actorbehind,for example, the structureof the sense-organs 47b-e),

the mouth(75e), andeven thegut (72e-73a). Cf. Johansen, Body, Soul, andTripartition

in Plato's Timaeus', 109-10; C. Steel, 'The Moral Purpose of the Human Body. A

Reading of Timaeus 69-72', Phronesis 46 (2001), 105-28. I take it that all of this

allows us to say that even someone who was 'constitutionally'mad or ignorantshould

in the naturalcourse of things be under the care of others, whose reason would be

substitutefor his own in counterbalancing he effects of excessive physical disorder.

14 A common way of doing this is to say that the soul manifests its naturediffer-



PHAEDOOF ELIS AND PLATO ON THE SOUL 7

shall go on to argueoffersany sort of challengeto this position(I do notassumethatPlato held or wished to be thoughtof as holdinga differentpositionon the soul in thePhaedo).Nevertheless,t is importanto recog-nise thatthereare differencesat least in the presentation f Plato's psy-chologyin thisdialogue:even if one assumesthat that is all they are,theyare still strikingenoughto need explanation.On a straightforwardead-ing of the Phaedo, desires are presentedas functionsof the body, andnothingelse; desirescanbe resisted,but not, during ife, eliminated.Thereis no scope for 'harmonising' hemwith reason or subduing hem by it,because thereis, moregenerally, no possibility for uprooting hemfromthe body. And this suggests a furtherdivergence from the 'standard'Platonicmodel.Foraccording o the standardmodel,in whichdesires areproperlypartof thepsyche, one's natural haracter an be workedon andimproved:desire can come under the influenceof reasonand be trainedto a betterstate. But as far as the Phaedo is concerned(at least on astraightforwardeading f it),one's naturalharacters ineliminablynscribedin one's body. Of course reason can resist: desire does not determine

behaviour.'5But reason cannoteradicateor (withinbroad imits, perhaps)restrain nclination.In these terms, a personhas control of their behav-iour, but not theircharacter r 'nature'.AndI put it in thesetermsbecauseit seems that this might have been exactlywhat Phaedo of Elis thought.

Ourevidence for Phaedo'sviews abouthumanpsychology comes fromthe fragmentsof his lost work, the Zopyrus,and in particular romwhatseems to have been the centralepisodeof thatdialogue in which a visi-tor to Athens named Zopyrus was prevailed upon to demonstrateon

ently in its incarnateand discarnatestates. In particular, f 'desire' is thought of asthe operation of the soul in respect of the body, it can be consideredan essential andimmortal capacity of the soul (which would explain the Gorgias and Phaedrus), yet'mortal' in its actualisation,since this does not outlast its connection with the body.The Phaedo, then, focusses on desire qua mortal and insofar as it is related to theactivityof the body. So e.g. R. D. Archer-Hind,ThePhaedo of Plato (New York, 1973),27-31; cf. R. S. Bluck, Plato's Phaedo (London, 1955), 2-5; L. P. Gerson, 'A Noteon Tripartition nd Immortalityn Plato',Apeiron20 (1987), 81-96; C. J. Rowe, Plato,Phaedo(Cambridge,1993),9;Johansen, Body,Soul,andTripartitionnPlato'sTimaeus'.

'5 Despite the apparentlycompelling natureof desires which leave no room for phi-

losophy (66b-d), and the unavoidabledemandsof pleasure and pain which 'rivet' thesoul to the body (83b-d), reason is capable of maintainingcontrol- in the first placeprecisely by avoiding situations of intense pleasure and pain which might impede itsown activity (83b).



8 GEORGEBOYS-STONES

Socrateshis claimthathe could divinea man'scharacterrom his phys-ical appearance.'6

Our fragmentsdifferin their reportof the details, but concurin the

general thrust of what happened.Confrontedwith Socrates, Zopyrus

announced hathe was a manpossessedof 'manyvices' (fr. 7 Rossetti);

the thicknessof his neck indicatedthat he was 'stupidand dull' (fr. 6

Rossetti);his eyes showedhimto be eithera womaniser frr.6, 9 Rossetti;

cf. 8), or perhapsa pederast fr. 11 Rossetti,fromCassian,who is pur-

portingto quote). In either case, Socrates'companions,and Alcibiades

in particular,had reason to laugh (frr. 6, 8-10). Socratesno doubt inPhaedo'swork as muchas in Plato'swas a paragonof virtue;not stupid

but the wisest man alive (if it were Plato,one might thinkof the oracle

reportedat Apology21a); not licentious,but preternaturallybstinent if

itwerePlato,onewouldhearAlcibiades'aughand hinkof theSymposium).

Zopyrus'diagnosis must be wrong: his false claims to knowledgeex-

ploded.But Phaedohasa surprisen store.The onlookersaughatZopyrus,

and the reader aughswiththem;but Socrates ells us all to stop:'Thisis

how I am,' he said (or something ike it; see furtherbelow);'butthrough

the practiceof philosophyI have become betterthanmy nature.'Is Socratesmerelybeing ironichere?To answerthis questionwe need

context;and it so happens hat the one otherfragmentof theZopyruswe

have might provide t. We knowthatsomeone n theZopyrus old thefol-

lowing story (fr. 1 Rossetti= SSRIIIA 11):

They say, Socrates, that the youngest son of the King made a pet of a lion

cub ... And it seems to me that it was because the lion was broughtup with the

child that it followed him whereverhe went even when he was a young man, so

that the Persianssaid that it was besottedwith the boy.

The story is preservedfor no betterreason than that the grammarianTheon thought t a happy llustration f the changefromindirect o direct

speech in narrative. t is lacunose;we do not know who told it (though

16 The premiseof the Zopyrusmight, then, be comparedwith the starting-pointor

some of Plato's dialogues: in the Protagoras too, for example, or the Ion, a foreigner

arrives in Athens with a claim to special expertise.That Zopyruswas a foreigneris

clear from fr. 9 Rossetti ('When he [sc. Socrates] was alive, a man called Zopyrus

came to Athens...'). It has been suggested that Zopyrus was, more specifically, a

Persian,partlybecause of his name (cf. e.g. Herodotus3.153-60) and partlythrough

the circumstantialdetail that someone in the dialogue told a story concerninga Persian

prince (quoted below in the text; for the argument,cf. Rossetti, Aspettidella lettera-

tura socratica antica 145-6). Neither piece of evidence is unassailable,however: the

latteris merelycircumstantial andcf. next note); andwe know thatthe name Zopyrus

was not confined to Persians(Plato, Alcibiades 122ab and below note 20).




Zopyrusseems the best guess on the face of it);'7and,most importantly,we have nothingat all to suggest where andhow the tellingof this storystood in relationto the physiognomical pisode.But despiteall this, it ishard to ignorethe powerful hematicconnections inkingthis narrativeothe physiognomicalepisode. In both cases, the ostensible moral is, orinvolves, the possibilitythata creature'snaturecan be changed- in par-ticularthat savage and brutal nclinationscan be tamed.In the one, welearn that someone as stupid and licentious as Socratescan become achastephilosopher;n the other, that a memberof the wildest species ofanimal can becomeas tame andbrokenas a besotted over.

Evidence thatjust such a moral is one thathis readershipmighthaveexpectedfromPhaedocomes from the Emperor ulian(Epistle50, 445A= SSR IIIA 2):

Phaedo... supposed that nothing was beyond the cure of philosophy, but that

everyone can be curedof any kind of life through t - of theirbehaviour,desires,everything, in a word, of the sort. If it helped only the well born and wellbrought-upthere would be nothing amazing about what it did, but if it bringspeople in such a bad state to the light, it seems to me surpassingwonderful.

There is no way of telling on which of Phaedo'sworksJulianbasedhisassessment;'8 ut it does seem to be the case that the Zopyrusofferedatleast one candidate o whom such a moralwould be particularly ppro-priate. For there is one furtherlink between the two episodes of theZopyrusI have been considering:he personof Alcibiades.According ofrr. 6 and 8 Rossetti, it was Alcibiades in particularwho laughed atZopyrus'diagnosisof Socrates;and,althoughwe have no informationhathe was there to hear the story of the lion cub, we might rememberourselvesthatAlcibiadescomparedhimselfandwas comparedby others

to a lion.'9The possibilityof this connection is surely strengthened y

17 But the reference to Persia could as well be in deference to Zopyrus' presenceas an indicationthat he was the narrator; nd then again, it could be incidental(sincethe identificationof Zopyrus' nationality itself rests in parton the referenceto Persiahere). Socrates himself is not ruled as the narratorof the story by the fact that it isaddressedto him: the Platonic Socrates, anyway, is quite capable of relating narra-tives as told to him, or discussions he has had with others (as with Diotima atSymposium201dff., for example) in which he himself is addressed.

18 The Zopyrusis a possibility (so von Fritz, 'Phaidon', 1540; Kahn, Plato and the

Socratic Dialogue, 12); but Nails pessimistically wonders (The People of Plato 231)whetherhe has read any genuine works of Phaedo at all.

'9 Alcibiades' leonine nature is suggested by Plato (Alcibiades 122e-123a: cf.N. Denyer, Plato, Alcibiades (Cambridge,2001), 186), Aristophanes(Frogs 1431-2),and Alcibiades himself at Plutarch,Alcibiades 2.2.



10 GEORGEBOYS-STONES

the fact that Alcibiadeshad a tutor who sharedhis name with the dia-logue's eponym:Zopyrus.Indeed, t mightnot be too fancifulto suggest

that the firstreadersof the Zopyruswere supposedto assume from the

title thatthey were purchasing et anotherdialogueaboutAlcibiadesand

his education.20

Whatever he truthof the matter, he important onclusionfor now is

that such evidence as we have for the Zopyrusaside from the physiog-

nomicalepisodehintsat a remarkable egreeof convergencewitha read-

ing of the physiognomical pisode that treats t seriously, not ironically;

thatat least one of its themes was the transforming owerof philosophy.It starts, n otherwords,to look as if theZopyrusas a whole is best served

if Zopyrusreally did get Socrates right; and Socrates (as written by

Phaedo)was not being ironic n defendinghim and confessing o a wicked

nature.Thepoint is his reformthroughphilosophy.But if this shouldbe

accepted, then we can surely go further and ask by what mechanism

Phaedomighthave explainedall this. WhatmightPhaedohave believed

aboutthe soul to lead him to the conclusionthat 'natural' haracterman-

ifesteditself in physicalappearance, ut was the kind of thingwhichphi-

losophycould overcome?Thereis, of course,no reasonat all to supposethatPhaedoascribed o

Zopyrusa theoretical iew of the soul's relationshipwith the body,or that

Socrateswas supposedto be in agreementwith him about this. In fact,

the dynamicof the dialoguewould be betterexplained f Zopyrushadno

theoryat all. If Phaedo'sdialogueswere anything ike Plato's, it is a fair

bet that Socratesspenta good deal of his time talkingpreciselyto peo-

ple whose abilities ranahead of theircapacityto give them a theoretical

underpinning whose 'skills' and 'virtues'were empirical,where they

shouldhave been knowledge-based.2'erhapsZopyruswas like this: a

20 Rossetti supposes that Alcibiades' tutor(for whom, see Plato,Alcibiades 122ab)

was the dialogue's eponym ("'Socratica" n Fedone di Elide', 371; more cautiouslyat

Aspettidella letteraturasocratica antica 145; cf. also Nails, The People of Plato 305

s.v. 'Zopyrus').But this seems unlikely if Phaedo's Zopyruswas a stranger n Athens

at the time of his encounterwith Socrates- and especially if he really was a Persian

(cf. note 16): Alcibiades' tutorwas Thracian(Alcibiades 122b). For Alcibiades as a

stock figureof the Socraticdialogue,cf. Denyer,Plato,Alcibiades5, notingthatAeschines

(DL 2.61), Antisthenes(ib.; also DL 6.18), and Euclides (DL 2.108) as well as Plato

and Phaedo himself (Suda s.v. 'Dalci8v) are all creditedwith dialogues named after

Alcibiades.21 The bravery of Laches, despite his inability to define bravery in the Laches,

would be a good example. Cf. for the theoreticalpoint the two types of physicianat

Plato, Laws 720ab, who share the same title 'whetherthey are free men - or whether




'I am', says Socrates frr.8, 11); 'I do incline'(fr.9); Socrateshasbecomebetterthan a naturewhich he nevertheless etains(fr. 10).

The evidence, I am suggestingthen, attributes he following claims to

Phaedo: 1) that each personhas a 'nature'whichencompasses heirirra-

tional impulses; 2) that this 'nature' s related o the body in such a waythatan expert n the mattercoulddeduce the former rom the appearanceof the latter;and(3) that one's 'nature'does not determinebehaviour. fwe assume, as seems likely, that what determinesbehaviour in caseswherenaturedoes not is reason, thenPhaedois workingwith a bipartitemodel of behaviourfamiliar enough from Plato and Aristotle. WherePhaedonow seems to differ,however,is in the claimthat irrationalurgesare no more susceptibleto trainingor rehabituationhan the set of theeyes or the shapeof the neck. How could he claim this?

One possibility s that Phaedobelievedsomethinga little bit like Plato:at least that there arerationaland irrationalpartsto the soul; but that hebelieved in addition(and unlikePlato) that the irrationalpartautomati-cally throws its lot in with the body andremains hroughout eaf to rea-son. Possiblebut, it seems to me, unlikely:such a model has no parallelsin antiquity;andone mightwonder n a case where the irrationalwas sofully determinedby the body what advantage here mightbe in claimingthat it was different rom the body at all.

Anotherpossibility, hen, is thatPhaedoheld something ike an 'emer-gentist' view of the soul. The idea would be that 'psychological' func-tions (includingdesire and reason)somehowsuperveneon physiologicalactivity,but thatreasonacquiresn its turna causalefficacywhich is inde-pendentof the body. Philosophically, his is undoubtedlya more attrac-tive view; andI thinkit cannotbe positively ruled out for Phaedo. But italso has historicalproblems o contendwith:for the only (other)evidencefor emergentist heoriesof soul in antiquitysuggests that they post-dateAristotleand, more than this, makes it look as if they were inspiredbyhim.25The form of psychological reductionism known to Plato and

25 Dicaearchus,a pupil of Aristotle's might be one early example: R. W. Sharples,anyway, ascribes an emergentistview of the soul to him ('Dicaearchus on the Souland on Divination' in W. W. Forenbaughand E. Schutrumpf edd.), Dicaearchus ofMessana. Text, Translationand Discussion (New Brunswick, 2001), 143-73; thoughsee against this V. Caston, 'Dicaearchus' Philosophy of Mind', ib. 175-93; and cf.

H. B. Gottschalk, 'Soul as Harmonia',Phronesis 16 (1971), 179-98). For the emer-gentistpositionof a laterAristotelian,Alexanderof Aphrodisias, ee Caston's'Epipheno-menalisms, Ancient and Modern', The Philosophical Review 106 (1997), 309-54, esp.347-9.



14 GEORGE BOYS-STONES

Aristotle,on the otherhand,seems to have reliedon a simple dentificationof the soul with a 'harmony'of physical elements;to have been a form

of reductionismwhich left no room for the independent ctivityof reason

so essential for Phaedo.6

If this represents he historicalsituation airly, thenwe are left with a

thirdpossibility,which falls somewherebetween the last two and has, it

seemsto me, the best measureof philosophical ndhistoricalplausibility.

It could be that Phaedobelieved in an independent, ationalsoul on the

one hand,and explaineddesires on the other as physiological(epi)phe-

nomena. Their corporealroots would explain why physical appearancecan be used as a guide to theircharacter one's 'nature');and also why

reasoncould have no effect on them: one could no more change one's

'nature' hrough easonthanone could improveone's physicalappearance

by thinkingabout it. Whatreason can do, however, is to take charge:a

personcan make a rationalchoice to organisetheir life in any way they

see fit, despite the predispositionswritten nto theirphysiology:reason is

preciselynot determined y the body in which it resides. And it seems to

me that this possibilitygainscredibilitypreciselythroughts convergence

with the ostensiblepositionof the Socratesof the Phaedo.

My suggestion,then, is that the distinctive eaturesof the psychologyof

the Phaedo(allowing,as I saidabove,that hesemightbe differencesmerelyof presentation) an be explained f we assumethatit is Plato's intention

to invoke the philosophyof Phaedoof Elis. What is distinctive about

Plato's psychologyas presentedn the Phaedo is preciselywhat was dis-

tinctiveabout hepsychologyof the historicalPhaedo. f this s right, hough,there s an obviousquestion:why mighthe have wished to do this? What

end would an invocationof Phaedo'spsychologyserve for him?In a certainway, this questionmightbe thought o be the same as the

question hat,whether am right orwrongaboutPhaedo'spresence n the

Phaedo,faces all commentators n the dialogue:why does Platopresenta model of the soul in thatdialoguethat seems so differentn important

26 For Plato, see Phaedo 85e-86d (where such a theoryis outlined by Simmias) and

91b-95a (where it is refuted by Socrates). For Aristotle, see de anima 1.4, 407b27-

408a30; also fr. 45 Rose3 (from his Eudemus).Argumentsex silentio are never ideal;

but if Phaedohad been an emergentist,and Platoknew it, the decision to make Phaedo

the narrator f the Phaedo would have been very strange ndeed. The attackon reduc-

tionism so importantfor establishing the immortalityof the soul would be fatally

underminedby the constantreminder hat Phaedo himself held an alternative orm of

epiphenomenalism ess vulnerableto much of Socrates' argument.




respectsfrom his discussionselsewhere?The answer often given to thisquestion s thatthe differencesare more of presentationhan of substance:

that Plato here wishes to examine the soul from a certain point of view,

wishes for exampleto focus on reason as the soul's essentialattribute.27

But if this is the right answer,then it alreadyprovidesan explanation or

why he might adoptPhaedo'sviewpoint: t is preciselyby his engagement

with Phaedo's psychology that Plato adoptsthe appropriate oint of view

(the appropriateocus on reason).Of course,Plato mighthave focussed

his discussionin the appropriateway without invoking Phaedo;but by

puttinghis discussion n Phaedo'shands,so to speak,he can remindthe

reader hatthe discussionof the soul in the Phaedois preciselyone per-

spective:a 'Phaedonian'perspective,not the whole Platonicstory.

But whetherthis is right or wrong, there is somethingelse to consider

here as well. The Phaedo is not just an exploration f the soul (fromwhat-

ever perspective);t is, morespecifically,a discussionof its immortality,

andpartof thereasonwhy Platopresents he psychologicalmodel that he

does (or in the way thathe does) must be that he thinks t allows him to

argue the soul's immortalitymore clearly or more securely. One might

think,for example,thatby associatingdesirewith the body and identify-

ing 'soul' with reason, Plato leaves himself free to argue for what really

matters,namelythe immortality f reason,withoutgetting bogged down

in objectionsthat someonemight raise againstargumentswhich implied

a commitment o the immortalityof 'physical' desire as well.28 n other

words, the positionthat Plato adopts n the Phaedo allows him a clear run

at showingin the strongestpossible termsthat the minimumone wouldhave to believe aboutthe soul is that reasonat least is separable romthe

bodyand not liableto dissolution.But such a position s not only one that

mightbe most easily be madefroma psychologicalperspective ike thatof Phaedo; t could be thatwe have as a matterof fact already seen the

firststep in the argument owards t in Phaedo'sZopyrus.For one of the

main points of the Zopyruswas Socrates'assertionthat reason always

27 See again note 14 above.28 There will be time elsewhere for Plato to make clear his views about the psy-

chological status of non-rational mpulse. In fact, the need for a furtherdiscussion of

pleasure in particular s cued, perhaps,in Socrates' reflectionat the beginning of the

Phaedo that pleasureand pain always come together (60bc; cf. perhaps,as an alter-

native- or additional reading to the one suggestedin note 35 below, Phaedo's 'mix-ture' of pleasure and pain at 59a). The reflectionseems to have little significance for

the immediatediscussion,but lies at the heartof the analysis of pleasure n the Gorgias

(496c-497a) and, especially, Philebus (31bff).




text itself that Platomighthave had Phaedo n mindduringhis attackonthe harmony-theorymootedby Simmias.My argument o far has dealtwithtwoPhaedos:hehistoricalPhaedo,philosopherf Elis,and hePlatoniccharacter,Phaedo,who narrates he Phaedo and Socrates'argumentsnthat dialogue. But there is a thirdPhaedo to be reckonedwith here aswell. For Phaedois also an interlocutor n the Platonicdialoguehe nar-rates,andPhaedo he interlocutor ecomesimportant reciselyas Socratesis about to make his final assault on the crucialobjections o the hypoth-esis of the soul's immortalitymadeby Simmias andCebes.

Phaedo'sappearancewithin theframeof thePhaedocanbe easily sum-marised- they are not, as it happens,very many.We learn,first of allandearlyon, that on the day of Socrates'executionhe was suffering,notpity for Socrates,but a strange mixture'of pleasureand pain(58e-59a).His next appearances 30 Stephanuspages later,when we are told thatalthough,along with the others,he hadbeen convincedby Socrates'ear-lierargumentsor the immortality f the soul,he was 'unpleasurably' is-turbedby the objections of Cebes and Simmias and throwninto doubtagain (88c). Socratesteases him for his long hair,and correctlyguessesthat Phaedo was expecting to cut it in mourning for him (89ab). ButSocratesthinks thathe shouldcheer up: the arguments an be defeated,thatthere will be nothing to mourn or. Indeed,Socratespledgesto helpPhaedodefeat them:Phaedowill be Heracles,Socrateshis Iolaus(89c).29Phaedoreverses heroles(he will be lolaus;Socratesshouldbe Heracles);

29 The allusion is to Heracles' encounterwith the LernaeanHydra, during whichhe was attacked as well by a giant crab,and required he assistance of lolaus. For thestoiy, see e.g. Apollodorus,Library2.5.2. It is worth speculatingwhether the appeal

to 'Heracles' here might have particularresonance for readersof Phaedo: it seems,anyway, thatthe eponymouscobbler of his Simon 'refuted' the Encomiumof Heraclesby Prodicus (SSR IVA 224.1-4; for Prodicus'Encomium,cf. Xenophon,Memorabilia2.1.21-34). But this is not the only occasion on which Plato alludes to the myth: forhis richly suggestive use of it at Euthydemus297b-d, see R. Jackson,'Socrates' Iolaos:Myth and Eristic in Plato's Euthydemus', Classical Quarterly 40 (1990), 378-95.R. Burger(The Phaedo:A Platonic Labyrinth New Haven, 1984), 159-60) is unusualamong commentators n trying to explain the image as it occurs in the Phaedo. Hissuggestion is that Phaedoqua narratorfulfils the role of lolaus throughhis hesitancyin reporting 'what should presumablyconstitute the philosophical peak of the dia-logue'. The idea is that he therebyexemplifies, 'however unwittingly, the inevitable

"impurity"of the procedure of hypothetical reasoning' and 'shows himself to be amost appropriate olaus to Socrates' Heracles in the battle for the salvation of thelogos'. This explanationseems rather orced, however: in makingPhaedo's labourthe'salvationof the logos' rather hanthatof the soul; in makingthe narrator f Socrates'words his assistantas such; and in making his assistance so negative.




Socrates ays that t will be all thesame,andgoes on to address o Phaedo

his remarksabout 'misology'. Once again,Phaedodrops out of the nar-

rative untilvery nearthe end (at 117c),when he breaksdown in tears-

not, he says, for the fate of Socrates,butforhis own misfortunen losing

such a friend.

That Phaedothe interlocutor as such a smallrole mightnot seem too

disturbing t first.It mightbe assumed hathe is mentionedat all only to

remindus thatPhaedothe narrator was presentat the eventshe is nar-

rating;an assertionof his rightto narrate quivalentn its ownway to the

repeateda{t6; [sc. napt_ysv6pgvJith which the dialogueopens. In this

case, we would not expect him to intrudehimself into the conversation

more than necessary.But there is, in fact, a good reason to think that

Phaedo'srelative ackof involvementas an interlocutorn thediscussions

aboutthe soul has a positive significance.The reasonis that is thathis

relativesilence problematises is one smallmomentof glory.Forrightat

the heartof the dialogue,after the crucialchallengesby Simmias and

Cebes, ustbefore heargumentativelimaxwhich s their efutation,ocrates

appointsPhaedoas the Heracleswho will tacklethem(89c):

'If I were you and the argument led me I would swear an oath like the Argives,not to allow my hair to grow before I had fought and defeated the argumentof

Simmias and Cebes.'

[Phaedoreplies:] 'But,' I said, 'even Heracles is said not to have been able to

deal with two.'

'Then, while there is still light, call me to your aid as Iolaus,' he said.

'I call you to my aid, then,' I said: 'not as if I were Heracles, but as if I were

lolaus calling Heracles.'

'It won't make any difference,'he said.

It is importanthatPhaedo himselfacceptsthe image thus elaboratedby

Socrates,houghhe reverses heroles(hewill be lolausandaidtheHeraclean

Socrates):orall themodestyof thetransposition, e accepts, hereby,hat

he has a crucialrole to play. This is importantbecausethe truthof the

matter s thatPhaedodoes nothingat all: he nods agreemento Socrates'

discourseon misology which follows, and then shrinksagain into the

background ntilhis tearfuloutburst t 117c.He does not lead thecharge

againstSimmiasandCebes - in fact Socratesexplicitlymarchesagainst

theircombinedargumentn the singular(oircoal Fp%xo,ixl n't bv X6,yov:91b). Nordoes he lift a fingerto help (the firstpersonpluralswithwhich

Socratessurveys the progressof the argumentat 95a are inclusive of

Cebes and Simmias as his interlocutors here). So why does Socrates




invoke the comparison?And why does Phaedoaccept it, albeit with a

modificationof parts?

The answer is not in the text: Phaedo does nothingat all. So perhaps

Socratesis lookingto a futurethatlies outsideof the text? Phaedomust

have been a young man at the time of Socrates'death;it has been sug-

gestedthat the long hairremarked n by Socrates n the immediatelypre-

ceding passage s meant,one way or another,as an indicationof thefact.30

Certainly,he is notwithin the text ascribeda 'mature'philosophicalposi-

tion: he is, for example,convincedand thenthrown nto doubtagain about

the immortalityof the soul. Now Plato quite often (presumablyrather

more often than we can tell) plays with his reader'sknowledgeof what

was to become later on of characters n his dialogues- the historical ate

of some;3 the philosophical ate of others.32Consider, n particular, he

difference t makes to ourreadingof Socrates' commentson Isocratesat

Phaedrus278e-279a that we possess so much of his work. Perhaps, hen,

the suggestion hatPhaedowill performHeracleandeedsin supportof the

positionSocratesgoes on thedevelop againstSimmiasand Cebes is meantto make us look forward o Phaedo'sfutureachievements. f Phaedowas,

in his own philosophicalcareer,known preciselyfor the developmentof

argumentswhich could be used againstpositionssuch as that of Simmias

(the positionthat the soul, reasonand all, was an epiphenomenon f the

30 It has been taken to indicate that Phaedo was still a boy (e.g. Burnet, Plato,

Phaedo, ad 89b2; R. S. Bluck, Plato, Phaedo (London, 1955), 34); or, since Socrates

'used to tease' him for the lengthof his hair, it might indicatethat he had, by Athenian

conventions, outgrownthe style, and was a young man. So L. Robin (Platon, Phedon(Paris, 1926), p. x) followed by Rossetti (Aspetti della letteratura socratica antica

122-6), and Rowe (Plato, Phaedo, 212 ad 89b3-4). (McQueenand Rowe argue in fact

that Phaedo must have been around 20-22 at the time of Socrates' death: 'Phaedo,Socrates and the Chronologyof the SpartanWar with Elis', 2 n. 7 with 14 n. 65.) Itshould be noted that not everyone thinksthe hair significant(Giannantoni,SSR4.119),and of those who do, not everyone reads it as a sign of Phaedo's age. Some see pro-

Spartanaffiliation n it (e.g. Parmentier, L'age de Phedon d'Elis' 22-3; Montuori, Su

Fedone di Elide' 35-6; Nails, People of Plato 231); J. Davidson (Courtesans andFishcakes: The ConsumingPassion of AncientAthens (New York, 1998), 332 n. 56)

suggests an allusion to Phaedo's time as a prostitute.

31 E.g. on Cephalus,M. Gifford, 'DramaticDialectic in Republic Book 1', OxfordStudies in Ancient Philosophy 20 (2001), 35-106 esp. 52-8.

32 There are ways of twisting the trope too: the 'might have been' of Theaetetus

(Theaetetus142c), for example, is already negatedby his impending death(142b); thepromise of the youthful Socrates in the Parmenides, on the other hand, seems alto-gether too great, since he seems to have Plato's theory of forms well on the way to

completion.




body), then Socrates'suggestionthatthey will combine efforts to defeatSimmiasandCebesstarts o make a lot of sense:it is, as it were, an indi-

cation that the argumentshatfollow are notjust Socrates'arguments, ut

rely on or includepositionsdevelopedby (the historical)Phaedoas well.

As I have alreadysuggested,Phaedo'scontributionwouldbe preciselyto

have shown the fallacy inherent n a position like that of Simmias by

which we might be led by the plausiblesuggestion hatsome psycholog-

ical functionsaredependent n and cannotoutlivethe body(namely, unc-

tions suchas those desires whose object of care is the body)to the more

generalclaimthatthewhole soul is dependent n the body. WhatPhaedohas, on my reconstruction,stablisheds that,even if one supposesdesires

to be corporeal, easoncan still be thoughtof as independent f the body;

and, more than this, that the fact that rational choice might actually

conflictwith andoverridedesiresand inclinationsgeneratedby the body

shows that it must be thoughtof as such. This, as I noted,is the point of

the encounterbetween Socrates and Zopyrus;and it is the argument

againstSimmias given at Phaedo94b-95a.

None of this,of course,starts o answerCebes,who worried hat,even

if Simmiaswas wrong and one could prove thatthe soul is independentof andoutlasts he body,one has neverthelessnotyet proved hat the soul

is immortal.The soul mightbe like a manwho outlastsa series of cloaks,

butneverthelessdies in the end: 86e-88b.)But this is quiteconsistentwith

the ideathatPhaedo s invokedas Socrates'collaborator.f Phaedocould

provideargumentshatwere valid againstSimmias,we have no evidence

that his own work could be takento furnishargumentsagainstCebes -

no evidence,in fact, thatPhaedoaddressed he immortality f the soul as

such (howeverinclinedone mightbe to assumethat he believed in it).

Neither s it possiblethattheargumentwe get againstCebesin thePhaedo(at 95a-107a)was drawnfromPhaedo- not least becauseit is premised

on a characteristicallyPlatonic theory of forms.33This, then, is why

Phaedoneeds an Tolausor is an Iolausin needof a Heracles): t is only

bythecombinationf hisargument ithargumentsuppliedhrough ocrates

by Plato that the combined threat of Simmias and Cebes is finally

defeated.

33 CharacteristicallyPlatonic theory also plays a role in one of the arguments

broughtagainst Simmias, viz the appeal to the theory of recollection (9le-92e: the

soul could hardlyrememberknowledge it acquiredbefore enteringthe body if the soul

were an epiphenomenonof the body). This however, is only one of the arguments

against Simmias: a Platonic addition, I am suggesting, to an argumentfound also in

Phaedo.




Phaedo, in short, is a useful ally for Socrates in the refutationofSimmias and Cebes if he was knownto Plato's readersas a championofa radicaldistinctionbetweenthe irrational nd the rational n discussionsof the relationshipbetween the soul and thebody- andall the moreuse-ful as an ally if I was right earlierto suggest that he accepted the forceof a 'harmony-theory' f soul, at least to the extent of acceptingthat

desires, andirrationalmpulsemoregenerally,were physiologicalepiphe-nomena.On the back of his arguments,Socrates can add his final proofof the soul's immortality ndsecurehis positionagainstCebesas well asSimmias. So does this make Phaedo a Heracles or an lolaus after all?Socratessays that 'it won't make any difference'.The point,perhaps, sthat it depends on how one readsSocrates'appropriation f (the histori-cal) Phaedo. The arguments f the historicalPhaedocame first;they arealso are logically prior, nsofaras one first has to establish that the soulis independent f the body before the questionof its longevity is raised;andfinallyit might be supposed hat the positionthey attack(psycholog-ical epiphenomenalism)s the moreseductive and the moredangerousofthe objectionsposedby Simmias andCebes. For thesereasons,then, onemightwell thinkof him as the Heracles whose positionis shoredup in

Socrates'appropriation f him and the additionof the argumentsagainstCebes. In another ense, however,Socrates s betterseen as the Heraclesof piece:he draws on the arguments f the historicalPhaedo(who to thisextenthelps),but the labour s his labour: t is Socrates,not Phaedo,whoaddresses he issue of immortality s such;and his is the definitivesolu-tion.34But whicheverway one reads the situation, he argumentsare notaffected.Philosophically peaking (and that, afterall, is what is impor-tant),it won't makeany difference.

According o my reconstruction,hen, Phaedoof Elis thought hat desiresand emotions were epiphenomenaof physiological states; were to beidentified with particulartemperamentsof the body.35To this extent,

3 The implication, in this case, would be thatPlato has outdonePhaedo- an impli-cation presentalready,perhaps,in the very fact of his appropriation f him. If G. W.Most is right that the Phaedo (at least the end of the Phaedo) is intended to securePlato's claim to be Socrates' legitimateheir, theremight be a sharperpolemical edgeto the suggestion ("A Cock for Asclepius", CQ 43 (1993), 96-111; cf. G. Tanner,

'Xenophon's Socrates - Who were his informants?',Prudentia28 (1996), 35-47, esp.42-3, arguing that there was rivalry between Plato on the one hand and Phaedo andXenophonon the other).But see note 36 below for an alternative nterpretation f thelast words of Socrates,on which Most bases his argument.

5 There might even be a hint at this position in Phaedo's description of himself at




Phaedocould understandhe force of psychologicalepiphenomalism. uthe arguedthatone must not be misled (perhapsby the economyof the

thought) nto thinking hatreason comes aboutin the same way. In fact

reason s a qualitatively ifferenteatureof humanactivity,andsomething

that is in no way defined by, or dependenton, or even (therefore?)

confinedto the body - as emotions and desires seem to be. When the

activity of reasonis correctlyanalysed,when one considers ts capacity

to opposethebody andcorporealdesiresin directingaction,one sees that

it must be somethingdistinct and free.36Apart fromthe particular rgu-

ment againstSimmiaswhich I have suggestedmighthave madeits wayinto the Phaedo from Phaedo'sown works, Phaedo'spsychologymore

generally husprovides he idealstarting-pointor Plato'sreaders o think

aboutthe immortality f the soul as the topicis developed n thePhaedo,

andthe ideal standpointrom which Plato himselfcould defendthe posi-

tion that reasonat the veryleast mustbe immortal.

I should emphasise hatI am not in all of this tryingto claim thatthe

Phaedo at any point represents he views of Phaedoof Elis insteadof

Plato'sviews. Apartfrom the fact thatthe specificissue of the immortal-

ity of the soul is not fully confrontedby Phaedo's argumentsPhaedoon

this score is only an lolaus, or at best a Heracles n need of Iolaus'help),

I have been carefulto leave open the possibilitythat we might, in the

the beginning of his narration.For he tells us that he was, on the day of Socrates'

execution, in the grip of a 'mixture' of emotions. The word for 'mixture' is Kpaat;

(59a5), the standardword in medical contextsfor the 'temperament'of the body - i.e.

the particularblend of corporealelements or parts which underlies a given physio-

logical or pathologicalstate (alreadyin the Hippocraticcorpuse.g. Natureof Man 4).

The very same word is used lateron in the dialogue as a synonymfor the 'harmony'

of corporealelements which is said by the harmony-theoristso constitute the soul:Otiat Ey? yE. . . 1cpatV EiVat Sat apjovtav avOT6,v oUTCOvrv ijUXI1v Tlg(.v (Phaedo

86b; cf. d2). Phaedo's 'mixture'of emotions might well have had a basis in his phys-

iological 'harmony'.

36 And perhaps it was Phaedo who originally spoke of the soul's 'purification'

(Kca&expa;t;)n muchthe termsused by Socratespassim in the Phaedo, and of its 'cure'

in the terms implied by Socrates' dying wish to have a cock sacrificedto Asclepius.

In any case, we have the evidence of Julian(as cited above) that Phaedo believed in

the curative and purifying power of philosopher (o&&ev&viarov Elvat M (ptXoaopti,

ncavcxa;? Kicvtwv urs' awtij; KcaOaipea0atMwv).This is not, by the way, to say

that either Phaedo or Plato saw death as the purificationor cure of the soul (which is

Most's objectionto readingthe last words of Socratesas a referenceto his own 'cure':

"'A Cock for Asclepius"', 100-4). The point, more generally, is about the freeing of

one's rationalityfrom service to the body - something for which death might itself

stand as a metaphor.




mannerof a significantnumberof commentators, eadthe psychology of

the Phaedo as an exploration of Plato's own 'standard'psychological

model from a particular point of view. What I do hope to have done, how-

ever, is to have given that point of view a name and a context and, in

doing so, to show thatthe Phaedo can be used as further vidence for the

views of Phaedo of Elis himself.

University of Durham

boys-stones, george - phaedo of elis and plato on the soul

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