The Journal of Value btqui~ 26: 261-269, 1992. �9 1992 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed hi the Netherlands.

Satisficing rationality: In praise of folly*

GRANT BROWN Faculty of Management, The University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada TIK 3M4

1. Preliminaries

We may distinguish optimizing and maximizing as follows: optimizing is choosing the best available course of action, whereas maximizing is choosing the course of action which produces the most of something (profits, enjoyment, etc.). Clearly, optimizing and maximizing, as just defined, need not amount to the same thing. For example, choosing the course of action which maximizes inebriation will not be the best course of action if the marginal utility of the next pint of lager is negative. But when we talk about "maximizing rationality," we mean maximizing our long- term expected utility, and it is much more difficult not to equate optimizing with maximizing in this sense. What considerations, after all, can count against, without becoming a part of, long-term expected utility, when utility is conceived of as a measure of what we want?

Reasoning along these lines has without doubt put the expected-utility maximizing model of rationality into the position of paradigm within the social sciences, including philosophy. In contrast, satisficing, or choosing a course of action even when it does not produce the highest level of expected utility, is thought to be mere folly. In this essay I wish to challenge the paradigm and offer considerations which will put satisficing in a better light. If my suggestions are sound, then we can equate optimizing - and therefore true rationality - with satisficing, rather than with maximizing.

Before moving to my main arguments, I address the preliminary question of how we are to recognize a good formal theory of rationality. The obvious answer - that a good theory is one which resists falsification - is not appropriate here, for the equally obvious reason that we cannot falsify a

* I thank David Schmidtz and Jan Narveson, and the participants of a colloquium at the University of British Columbia, for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay.

262

normative theory. If a proposed normative theory fails to predict human behavior, this may not show that it is wrong, only that human beings are sometimes less then perfectly rational. As well, a resourceful defender of a normative theory will always be able to come up with ad hoc assumptions about agents' hidden beliefs or values, or about the possible long-range consequences of their actions, which "vindicate" the favored theory or render it immune from absolute refutation. The history of utilitarianism is replete with examples, and, as we shall see, the maximizing model must often resort to these strategems, too.

The way to recognize a good formal theory of rationality involves two things. First, it must provide a plausible account of our intuitions about specific examples. Admittedly, intuition is not something we want to rely heavily upon; it has a distinct tendency to be theoretically tainted. Indeed, I think theoreticians' intuitions in the area of rationality are often too much imbued with maximizing presuppositions. Nevertheless, I can see no other way to proceed in such a fundamental area of inquiry than to elicit and appeal to contrary intuitions at the start. A fair amount of work has been done on this in the literature, which I will be drawing on.

Second, a good formal theory of rationality must make these intuitions compelling by integrating them into a more comprehensive and more established theoretical structure3 Little systematic work has been done in an attempt to make theoretical sense of the intuitively apparent failings of the maximizing model; a constructive synthesis of a satisficing model of rationality has yet to be achieved. Here I suggest an idea which may prove to be valuable in constructing such a model.

2. The sructure of an autonomous agent 's will

Many of the failings of the maximizing model are due to the fact that it does not - and cannot - take into account the non-linear structure of a human agent's desires and values. This is because that model is committed to flattening out all desires, values, or preferences and putting them on the same level, onto a single linear scale, so that they can be homogenized and traded off against each other, until some resultant quantity is maximized. As Jon Elster says, "The rhetoric of Marcuse (1964) can be understood within this framework: if all preferences can be mapped onto a real line, we are indeed dealing with 'one dimensional man'. ''2 In a nutshell, my idea is that satisficing rationality, but not expected-utility maximization, fits the struc- ture of an autonomous agent's will. I explain briefly what I mean by this and then examine specific preferences to see if my suggestion can be borne out.

263

In his seminal article "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," Harry Frankfurt argues that what distinguishes persons from other creatures is the structure of their will) Creatures that are not persons, he says, can have a multiplicity of wants and desires, on the basis of which they make choices. They may even deliberate before making choices, for example by doing a cost-benefit analysis. But peculiar to persons is their ability to form what Frankfurt calls "second-order desires," that is, desires whose objects are other ("first-order") desires. He says:

Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires"..., which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires. 4

This ability to stand back from our first-order desires and evaluate them before acting underlies our autonomy, or freedom of the will.

Frankfurt understands second-order desires as desires which imply approval or disapproval of, identification with or dissociation from, first- order desires. And I agree that this is the basis of an important kind of autonomy. But second-order desires which preform this adjudicating function do not introduce distinct new values into the agent's preference set; they merely "weight" the values implied by first-order desires. Thus, the hierarchical structure of the autonomous will does not necessarily imply a non-linear structure of value. A maximizing agent could be autonomous in this way, without ceasing to be a maximizing agent.

I suggest that second-order desires need not be restricted to this kind of adjudicating role, the resolving of conflicts between first-order desires. A rational and autonomous satisficing agent also has second-order concerns about how first-order desires are related to one another, and how they are to be pursued. These second-order concerns are to a degree independent of the values implicit in the agent's first-order desires. They imply second-order values, which cannot be assimilated on the same level as the values implied by first-order desires. These are just the kind of concerns and values with which the maximizing model is incapable of dealing properly.

3. Non-istrumental moderation

In many ways, the maximizing model distorts people's preferences in order to fit them into a maximizing pattern. Specifically, rational agents can

264

exhibit a non-instrumental moderation in their desires, as well as a non- instrumental desire for spontaneity and integrity, which cannot be reduced to expected-utility maximization, even long-term maximization. 5 I begin with a discussion of moderation.

On the maximizing model, moderation can be understood in either of two ways, though neither of them properly captures our intuitions about familiar situations. First, we could say that rational moderation is simply instrumen- tal: we choose less than the most enjoyment or money in a given situation because we are concemdd about the long-term,, cumulative effects of pursuing these things too much, or because we prefer to devote our atten- tion to other pursuits. In other words, we abandon maximization in one area of interest or time for the sake of a more global maximization. No doubt this is true of some cases of moderation, but not all. Sometimes agents settle for what is satisfactory simply because they feel they have quite sufficient as it is and do not need or care for more. They might say, "I 'm fine as I am, or, "Who needs more?" - expressing an exasperated reluctance to hold out more than they need. Here moderation is non-instrumental.

Accepting that moderation can be non-instrumental, the maximization theorist might try to accommodate it as a "brute fact" about the agents' preferences. (This suggestion was made by David Schmidtz.) The most extreme statement of this view would be that the additional enjoyment or money are not really valued by the agent; he or she just doesn't want them. This is certainly not irrational, since enjoyment and money are not the only measures of value. But this characterization of the situation will not do either, since genuine moderation obtains only in those cases in which an agent does positively value what he or she is foregoing - otherwise, why call it moderation? What the maximizer can say is that this extra benefit, while real enough, is less significant to the agent than the value attached to being moderate. Money and moderation are simply the objects of two desires the agent has; like any other competing desires, they must be adjusted in relation to each other, and in this case moderation wins out.

This proposed solution is paradoxical. The point is that not all preferences can be accepted by the maximizer as (not irrational) "brute facts" about agents. For example, preferences for states of affairs known to be impossible are simply irrational. Given the equation of rationality with maximization, a non-instrumental desire for moderation seems to involve just such an intrinsically irrational preference. Saying you are weighing moderation in the scales with your other desires and choosing the maximiz- ing resultant mix is saying you aren't being moderate at all, or at best that you are compromising between moderation and maximization. In the latter case, the question arises why this is a rational thing to do. Thus, the maxi- mizing conception of rationality has trouble accommodating non-instrumen-

265

tal moderation even as a brute fact about preferences. Non-instrumental moderation does not cohere with a maximizing conception of rationality, since the language of trade-offs involving moderation suggests either instrumentality or the (partial) abdication of maximization. Saying that moderation is a brute fact about some people's preferences, then, does not really explain it, or render it compatible with reason conceived of as maximization.

If we suppose that people have second-order desires for moderation, however, a picture of human valuation emerges according to which non- instrumental moderation makes sense. What explains the moderate agent's reluctance to seek more, or the most, is a second-order desire for modera- tion which regulates first-order desires for various goods, without denying their intrinsic goodness or value to the agent. But what might motivate such a second-order desire? Why would a rational agent choose to regulate the pursuit of first-order desires in this way?

In contrast to the satisficing agent, the maximizer sometimes appears compulsive and grasping in the pursuit of value. Consider an elderly lady who habitually collects things of even minor worth. Whenever she goes to a restaurant, for example, she saves the small containers of butter mad jam that are supplied with the meal and have not been used. This does not save much on her grocery bill, but it does have some positive value, we may assume. Such a behavioral tendency might be the result of early childhood experiences during the Depression, but its cause does not in itself determine its irrationality. Indeed, from the maximizing point of view she is behaving completely rationally. Yet this behavior is sometimes the source of embar- rassment to those who find themselves in the company of such a person. This is difficult to account for on the maximizing model, since we are not normally embarrassed by displays of rationality.

A moderate, satisficing agent can make sense of this feeling of embarrass- ment, however: such an agent has a non-instrumental second-order desire not to be compulsively ruled by his or her first-order desires. As Slote says, "a moderate individual may derive a pleased sense of self-sufficiency from satisficing; but in satisficing he is not aiming at this satisfaction, nor is... the satisfaction involved always greater than any forgone through satisfic- ing. ''6 To the moderate, self-sufficient agent, the unrelenting maximizer appears almost inhuman - a maximizing machine. This image suggests again the "one-dimensionality" of the maximizing agent.

4. Spontaneity and integrity

If compulsive maximization is at odds with non-instrumental moderation, it

266

is equally at odds with other human virtues. Slote argues that maximizing rationality exhibits a characteristic lack of spontaneity:

[Maximizing] at given different times need not, I suppose, involve any sort of spelled-out life plan nor even the playing-it-safe so characteristic of prudence in the ordinary sense. But the habit of [maximizing] does share the aspect of unspontaneous and constrained living that is charac- teristic of these other traits, and it is in all these cases a conceptual fact, not an accidental psychological generalization, that these negative features should attach to what are sometimes presumed to be virtues. To some extent we feel sorry for, think less well of someone lacking in spontaneity, and the [maximizing] individual, who lacks spontaneity in a very high degree, can hardly seem admirable when regarded under that aspect]

The maximization theorist will naturally try to cast the desire for spon- taneity into the role of one value among many, saying that a life is less good if this value is completely ignored. Spontaneity is like alcohol on this interpretation: perhaps it may reduce our rationality temporarily, but sometimes this is the best way to have fun. The only possible conflict between spontaneity and maximization occurs when spontaneity oversteps its rational bounds and conflicts with long-term maximization. But advocat- ing controlled spontaneity again borders on paradox. A desire for spon- taneity does not operate on the same level as the desire for the goods spontaneity may bring about. The desire for spontaneity is a second-order desire concerning how the agent wishes to pursue his or her various first- order desires.

The case of spontaneity is more complicated than this account so far suggests. One of the things we love children for is their spontaneity, and it isn't obvious how a child's spontaneity can be thought of as involving a second-order phenomenon. (I owe this point to Jan Narveson.) This objection suggests two kinds of spontaneity: I will call them "naive" and "re-captured." A child's spontaneity is naive in the sense that it just hap- pens; the child doesn't strive for it or think about it in any way. One of the problems with growing up is that we become more aware, more self- conscious and reflective. Bernard Williams has argued that reflection can destroy ethical knowledge. 8 I add that in some cases reflection can destroy virtue. Spontaneity is one such virtue, which the highly reflective maxi- mizer has lost to an extreme. In order to recover it, the maximizer must become less reflective, less concerned with maximization; he or she must cultivate a disposition not always to maximize. The satisficer who has a second-order desire for acting spontaneously has re-captured this virtue as well as it can be for a reflective agent.

A similar account must be given of the non-instrumental value of

267

integrity, which Slote discusses under the heading of "rational restrictions on [maximizing] based on the past," Here the agent is concerned that his or her values exhibit a degree of continuity over time - that he or she does not simply abandon projects when something better comes along. The agent who does so is considered "flighty," and perhaps even disloyal to himself or herself. Again, to understand integrity as one value among many, or even as a long-term policy for maximization, distorts the concerns of the agent. Instead, integrity, like moderation and spontaneity, is a structural or organizing value. It shapes the agent's other values "from above," without impugning them.

The fundamental problem for maximization theorists is that results are not all that matter to people. Slote says, "an exclusive focus on the results precisely neglects the considerations that most strongly and intuitively favour the existence of rational restrictions on [maximizing].'9 It is possible to recognize that the result of a moderate choice is less good than the result of its alternative maximizing choice, yet think that the choice itself is better. K~ This thought is very suggestive of David Gauthier's account of morality, which I will discuss in the next section.

5. Failures of maximization in strategic situations

Strategic situations pose another problem for maximizing agents. This problem has been explored extensively by Gauthier, who makes it the basis of his moral theory. 11 I discuss Gauthier's views on constrained maximiza- tion because this disposition is a satisficing disposition rather than a maximizing one, and also because it illustrates clearly how a rational agent's will must be structured - or re-restructured - away from the linear model assumed by straightforward maximization.

In strategic situations, straightforward maximizers choose the dominant strategy when one is available. But in dilemmatic structures of interaction (such as the Prisoners' Dilemma), if all agents do so then the result will be inferior for all to what could have been achieved had they jointly chosen to act on the dominated strategy. Gauthier's solution to this problem is to have agents adopt moral dispositions (insofar as they can) which constrain the straightforward pursuit of their own utility. It does not matter for my purpose what the content of these moral dispositions are; the important point, as Gauthier himself stresses, is that these moral dispositions must be such as to genuinely override maximizing considerations. Unless they are genuine, the whole situation will tend to be unstable, or at least less effi- cient. Gauthier says:

'...altruism is the more efficient because it is not derived from calculated

268

self-interest.' ...[C]onstrained maximization is not straightforward maximization in its most effective guise. The constrained maximizer genuinely ignores the call of the utility-maximization in following the co-operative practices required by [morality]. There is no simulation; if there were, the benefits of co-operation would not be fully realized32

In response to the view that "Honesty is the best policy," Gauthier should say, "Honesty is not a policy, it's a virtue." - it's a disposition to act honestly without calculating the long-term effects of doing so. The dif- ference between a straightforward maximizer and a constrained maximizer is that the former identifies rationality at the level of individual acts, while the latter identifies rationality at the level of dispositions to act and carries through the implications of this identification for individual acts. Precisely this characterizes the satisficing agent as understood above. Individual acts of moderation, spontaneity, and integrity are rational even if they are not utility-maximizing, because the dispositions - the virtues - of moderation, spontaneity, and integrity are rational. Satisficing agents, cognizant of the fact that certain ways of pursuing their values are undesirable, develop second-order desires and endorse dispositions which, though not maximiz- ing, are nevertheless better.

6. Conclusion

From a psychological point of view, human wants and desires form a multi- tiered structure. If values are related in any way to human affectivity or desire - and this is something most maximizing theorists would certainly not dispute - then we are forced to recognize that human values also form a multi-tiered structure. Failure to appreciate this connection leads maximiza- tion theorists seriously astray, both in their interpretation of human behavior and in their postulates of rationality. Optimizing involves satisficing, not strictly maximization; satisficing is truly rational.

Notes

1. This is the method employed by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1971). However, while it may be accept- able, because unavoidable, to rely upon intuition when it comes to axiology and a formal theory of rationality, I do not think this is acceptable when it comes to social morality.

2. Jon Elster, Sour Grapes (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 9n. The maximizing model also fails to account for the apparent fact that many of our values exhibit incommensurabilities and intransitivities which are difficult to explain away in maximizing terms. I will not explore these

269

problems for the maximizing model in this essay, although they also illustrate the non-linearity of human values. Cf. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 325ff.

3. Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," Journal of Philosophy 68.1 (January 1971); reprinted in Harry Frankfurt, The Impor- tance of What We Care About (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 11-25.

4. Ibid., p. 12 5. My intuitions in this and the next section have been fertilized by Michael

Slote's recent book, Beyond Optimizing (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer- sity Press, 1989). My indebtedness to Slote will be obvious, though the theoretical underpinning I give to these intuitions is quite different from his.

6. Ibid., p. 179, nl0. 7. Ibid., p. 42. Since Slote's terminology is not consistent with mine, I have

substituted "maximizing" for "optimizing" throughout this passage, as well as later ones.

8. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985), pp. 167ff.

9. Slote, Beyond Optimizing, p. 59. 10. Ibid., p. 24. 11. David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). 12. Ibid., pp. 188-189; footnote omitted.