sartre monismo

8/12/2019 Sartre Monismo

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After extracting Sartre's distinctive view of intentionality from what Hatzimoysis argues are

problematically subjectivist and idealist alternatives, he explains how this view motivates

Sartre's critique of the substantial ego (in Chapter 3, "The Ego"). Here, Hatzymosis is adept at

outlining the landscape of various traditional interpretations and problems of Sartrean

consciousness. In the first sections, he separates Sartre's elusive non-positional consciousness

from the standard interpretation in terms of the focal/ periphery and the equally misleading

"non-attentiveness" hypothesis. This analysis lays the groundwork for Hatzimoysis' central

claim of the chapter, that the ego is an object for consciousness, not its source. In the rest of

the chapter, Hatzimoysis unpacks Sartre's arguments that the ego is redundant in the

explanation of the unity and individuality of consciousness, shattering traditional

understandings of an ego or subject that "has" consciousness.

Chapters 4 and 5, "Emotion" and "Imagination," build directly from the problem of explaining

the unity of consciousness and the constitution of psychical life, Sartre's phenomenological

psychology. Sartre's externalized consciousness is crucial for distinguishing his theory of

emotion from other theories; imagination is likewise clarified. In this sense, Hatzimoysis is

successful in building the connection between his chosen themes. In content, these two

chapters are the richest of the book. It is not surprising that the author is able to draw such a

complex picture of emotion, both what it is and what it is not for Sartre, given the breadth of

work he has already completed in this area (i.e., Philosophy and the Emotions, "motions in

Heidegger and Sartre," "Sentimental Value"). Hatzimoysis painstakingly lays out the competing

theories of emotion in order to tease out the nuance of Sartre's own theory, and his

methodology is faithful to Sartre's own dialectical process: concentrating on the arguments,

considering possible interpretations, and eliminating alternative or oppositional explanations.

He begins by staking out the difference between Sartre's understanding of psychic states andperipheric (somatic) as well as behaviorist accounts, in an effort to rescue Sartre from the

common assumption that he equates emotions to actions. Hatzimoysis also develops the

argument against unconscious emotions, the existence of which would be devastating to

Sartre's understanding of consciousness.

After this negative mode of presentation, Hatzimoysis presents Sartre's positive account: "the

core of the Sartrean view is that during an emotional episode one's relation to the world is

'magically' transformed by means of one's body" (68). Interestingly, Hatzimoysis develops this

perplexing idea in terms of the passage from the non-reflective consciousness 'instrumental

world' to the 'emotional world' in a way that opens the possibility for interpreting emotions asmore than merely ways of avoiding reality. Just as in the analysis of intentionality, "in genuine

emotion, . . . one's consciousness is not reflective, but out in the world, a case of living the

significance of the situation with one's whole body" (76). Emotions are meaningful and add to

our understanding of the world. Hatzimoysis uses the last section to establish a clear

connection to the next theme in his book, concluding that, if this activity of consciousness

(magical transformation of emotion) does indeed change the way that reality is experienced by

the subject, it raises questions about the status of these qualities and different modes of

apprehension of the world, leading to an investigation of Sartre's theory of imagination as the

primary place where there arise questions of intending things differently from the way they

exist in reality.


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The leading question of chapter 5 on imagination is how consciousness can intend an object

that is not there, which Hatzimoysis, following Sartre, quickly transforms into the more

interesting one of what is consciousness given this ability. The most illuminative part of the

chapter is Hatzimoysis' description of the analogon, Sartre's solution to explaining the absent

intended object through knowledge, affectivity, and kinaesthetic sensation. Reiterating

Sartre's anti-idealism, Hatzimoysis emphasizes how the image is not a psychic miniature or

mental replica of an object but a different mode of intending a real object; it is also distinct

from other forms of conscious activity such as perception, which requires a present object. As

Hatzimoysis is quick to explain, these activities are different modes of intending the same

object, immediately present (perceiving) or intended as absent (imagining). Hatzimoysis,

following Sartre, asserts that the irreal, as negation of the worldly status of the object, is

essential to imagining: "being able to intend things as being otherwise than they are is a

necessary condition for acting so as to effect changes that would make the real world fit one's

'irreal view' of it" (103). Teasing out the implications of this statement would have been a

fruitful way to further cement the imagination as central to Sartre's entire project, as it isdirectly related to the possibility of freedom and the political to think otherwise.

Lastly, Hatzimoysis moves to Sartre's ontology, returning consciousness to the irreducibility of

being. This section considers both the "being of appearing" and the "being of the object"

elicited from Sartrean monism in order to consider Sartre's own preoccupation with whether

we can have a direct apprehension of reality. Hatzimoysis explains that, for Sartre, the being

(of the object) is transphenomenal: existence is the presupposition for the object to have any

dimensions in the first place. Thus we are returned to Nauseaand the superfluous. This is a

problem in that it belies the project of having access to reality in a way that Sartre thought he

had overcome in overcoming the dualism of traditional philosophy. Hatzimoysis problematizesthis on two levels. First, he questions the Sartrean essence, the fact that the appearance can

be a "full positivity" and, second, he challenges the language of "modes of being" as implying

existence as a sort of predicative of an object. Hatzimoysis leaves the reader with several

critical problems to consider, such as, if being is the condition of every revelation, is the

phenomenological gesture toward the immediacy of the experience of being thwarted?

The guiding thread in Hatzimoysis' account is the emphasis on Sartre's commitment to the

phenomenological process, and through his own analysis, as well as the opening up of Sartre's

own method, he provides a clear view of how central this is to Sartre's philosophy. Hatzimoysis

is at his best when clearly analyzing alternative interpretive claimants, an eliminative processthat both showcases his knowledge of the various debates in which Sartre was engaged and

presents the opportunity for greater precision of Sartre's main concepts. I found it sometimes

hard to discern where Sartre's nuances end and the insertion of modern concerns of

philosophy of mind begin. That being said, there are definitely fruitful lines of engagement in

this book, especially for those looking for a fresh perspective on issues of consciousness and

elements of psychic activity. The book accomplishes the task of expositing several key Sartrean

themes, offering the reader the possibility of thinking with the author about problems that

have significance in current philosophical frameworks, thus reviving Sartre for a new audience.

Thus, Anthony Hatzimoysis' The Philosophy of Sartre does serve as a good introduction tosome aspects of Sartre's thought, yet, as a reader familiar with Sartre, I found the absence of


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key ideas such as responsibility, the relation to others, and freedom or transcendence

conspicuous. Granted, the decision towards circumspection is admitted in the preface, but, in

a book that seeks to explain the life of consciousness, the absence of things such as the

significance of the other for self-awareness is striking. Likewise striking is the effort not to deal

with Sartre on certain levels: "Popular misconceptions to the contrary, there are no political,

moral, humanistic, theistic or secular overtones in Sartre's primary use of the notion of

freedom" (103). This statement is revealing in its singularity and abrupt placement, from

another discussion perhaps, and it remains undeveloped, a refusal that seems to underlie

certain choices in the book. In effect, this book is primarily an analysis of the various elements

of consciousness proposed by Sartre, an introduction to Sartre's phenomenological

psychology, not a book that seeks to understand Sartre's philosophic prerogative, which was

undoubtedly political.

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