SABINA EXCONDE vs DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO GR No L-10068-70 June 29 1957 BAUTISTA ANGELO J FACTS Dante Capuno son of Delfin Capuno was accused of double homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperintildea and Amado Ticzon on March 31 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna During the trial Sabina Exconde as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperintildea reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages against the accused After trial Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged and on appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision Dante Capuno was only fifteen (15) years old when he committed the crime In line with her reservation Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of P295900 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperintildea Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperintildea he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident the former was not under the control supervision and custody of the latter This defense was sustained by the lower court and as a consequence it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the complaint From this decision plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals but the case was certified to the Supreme Court on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of law

It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the Balintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31 1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city schools supervisor From the school Dante with other students boarded a jeep and when the same started to run he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperintildea died as a consequence It further appears that Delfin Capuno father of Dante was not with his son at the time of the accident nor did he know that his son was going to attend a parade He only came to know it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question jointly and severally with his son Dante because at the time the latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim he was a minor and was then living with his father and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed the civil liability of the father is evident And so plaintiff contends the lower court erred in relieving the father from liability ISSUE Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable jointly and severally with his son Dante for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperintildea caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno

RULING YES1 RATIO Parents shall be liable for the tortious conduct of their minor children living with them although at the time of the tort the children were under the direct control or supervision of an academic institution (THIS IS A LANDMARK DOCTRINE WHICH WAS LATER MODIFIED BY J CRUZ IN AMADORA VS COURT OF APPEALS) REASONING The provision ldquoTeachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular activity he attended the parade in honor of Dr Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city schools supervisor And it was in connection with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it the accident occurred In the circumstances it is clear that neither the head of that school nor the city schools supervisor could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not

1 The case involves an interpretation of Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code paragraph 1 and 5 (schoolrsquos liability versus parental liability) which provides ART 1903 The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible The father and in case of his death or incapacity the mother are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them xxx xxx xxx Finally teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody

then a student of an institution of arts and trades as provided for by law The civil liability which the law impose upon the father and in case of his death or incapacity the mother for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them is obvious This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the duty of supporting them keeping them in their company educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means while on the other hand gives them the right to correct and punish them in moderation (Articles 154 and 155 Spanish Civil Code) The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article 1903 last paragraph Spanish Civil Code) This defendants failed to prove Wherefore the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P295900 as damages and the costs of action REYES JBL J dissenting I believe we should affirm the judgment relieving the father of liability I can see no sound reason for limiting Art 1903 of the old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones What substantial difference is there between them in so far as concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of

watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and supervision over the pupil In my opinion in the phrase teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades used in Art 1903 of the old Civil Code the words arts and trades does not qualify teachers but only heads of establishments The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms preceptores y artesanos used in the Italian and French Civil Codes If as conceded by all commentators the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents teachers etc are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority it would seem clear that where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher the latter and not the parent should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction And if there is no authority there can be no responsibility I submit that the father should not be held liable for a tort that he was in no way able to prevent and which he had every right to assume the school authorities would avoid Having proved that he entrusted his child to the custody of school authorities that were competent to exercise vigilance over him the father has rebutted the presumption of Art 1903 and the burden of proof shifted to the claimant to show

actual negligence on the part of the parent in order to render him liable Padilla and Reyes A JJ concur SALEN V BALCE FUELLAS V CADANO Nature Appeal from the Decision of the Trial Court making defendant therein now appellant Agapito Fuellas the father of the minor who caused the injuries to Pepito Cadano also a minor liable under Art 2180 of the new Civil Code for damages Facts Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas son of defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas were both 13 years old on September 16 1954 They were classmates at St Marys High School Dansalan City They had a quarrel that lead to Pepitorsquos injury his right arm was broken after Rico pushed him on the ground It is contended that in the decision of the Court of Appeals the petitioner-appellant was ordered to pay damages for the deliberate injury caused by his son that the said court held the petitioner liable pursuant to par 2 of Art 2180 of the Civil Code in connection with Art 2176 of the same Code that according to the last article the act of the minor must be one wherein fault or negligence is present and that there being no fault or negligence on the part of petitioner-appellants minor son but deliberate intent the above mentioned articles are not applicable for the existence of deliberate intent in the commission of an act negatives the presence of fault or negligence in its commission Appellant therefore submits that the appellate Court erred

in holding him liable for damages for the deliberate criminal act of his minor son Issue WON the father is liable civilly for the criminal act of his son Held Yes In an earlier case (Exconde vs Capuno et al GR No L-10132 prom June 29 1957) holding the defendants jointly and severally liable with his minor son Dante for damages arising from the criminal act committed by the latter this tribunal gave the following reasons for the rule mdash

The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and in case of his death or incapacity the mother for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them is obvious This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the duty of supporting them keeping them in their company educating them in proportion to their means while on the other hand gives them the right to correct and punish them in moderation (Arts 134 and 135 Spanish Civil Code) The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Art 1903 last paragraph Spanish Civil Code) This defendants failed to prove

In another case Salen and Salbanera vs Jose Balce the defendant Balce was the father of a minor Gumersindo Balce below 18 years of age who was living with him Gumersindo was found guilty of homicide for having killed Carlos Salen

minor son of plaintiffs The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case stating that the civil liability of the minor son of defendant arising from his criminal liability must be determined under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and not under Art 2180 of the new Civil Code In reversing the decision this tribunal held mdash

It is true that under Art 101 of the Revised Penal Code a father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile an insane under 9 years of age or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acts without discernment unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part This is because a son who commits the act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12 subdivisions 1 2 and 3 Revised Penal Code) The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority or control But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted In that case resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil Code The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180 the pertinent portion of which provides The father and in case of his death or incapacity the mother are responsible for damages caused by the minor children who live in their company To hold that this provision

does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent Verily the void apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical cases

Moreover the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of the evidence submitted therein by both parties independently of the criminal case And responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the action in the present case was instituted is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault of negligence under the Penal Code (Art 2177) and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore stated any discussion as to the minors criminal responsibility is of no moment IN VIEW HEREOF the petition is dismissed the decision appealed from is affirmed GUTIERREZ VS GUTIERREZ MALCOLM September 23 1931

Nature an action brought by the plaintiff in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the five

defendants to recover damages in the amount of P10000 for physical injuries suffered as a result of an automobile accident Facts A passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the municipality of Las Pintildeas Province of Rizal The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco and was owned by Saturnino Cortez The automobile was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez a lad 18 years of age and was owned by Bonifacios father and mother Mr and Mrs Manuel Gutierrez At the time of the collision the father was not in the car but the mother together will several other members of the Gutierrez family seven in all were accommodated therein Narcisso Gutierrez was a passenger of the bus He had a fracture on his right leg It was conceded that the collision was caused by negligence pure and simple But Narcisso Gutierrez blames both the bus and the car while the truck blames the car and the car in turn blames the truck the youth Bonifacio was in incompetent chauffeur that he was driving at an excessive rate of speed and that on approaching the bridge and the truck he lost his head and so contributed by his negligence to the accident The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his son Based on these facts pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code the father alone and not the minor or the mother would be liable for the damages caused by the minor

Issue

1 WON the father of Bonifacio (car) is liable

2 WON the owner of the truck is liable Held

1 Yes In the United States it is uniformly held that the head of a house the owner of an automobile who maintains it for the general use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children whom he designates or permits to run it where the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the owners family than the child driving it The theory of the law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of the owners business so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and servant

2 Yes The liability of Saturnino Cortez the owner of the truck and of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on a different basis namely that of contract The reason for this conclusion reaches to the findings of the trial court concerning the position of the truck on the bridge the speed in operating the machine and the lack of care employed by the chauffeur In its broader aspects the case is one of two drivers approaching a narrow bridge from opposite directions with neither being willing to slow up and give the right of way to the other with the

inevitable result of a collision and an accident

Disposition In consonance with the foregoing rulings the judgment appealed from will be modified and the plaintiff will have judgment in his favor against the defendants Manuel Gutierrez Abelardo Velasco and Saturnino Cortez jointly and severally for the sum of P5000 and the costs of both instances RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA) 135 SCRA 242 ABAD SANTOS February 28 1985 NATURE Petition to review a decision of CA FACTS Roberto Luna a businessman was killed in a vehicular collision (between Luna driving a gokart and Luis dela Rosa 13 years old driving a Toyota car without a license) at a gokart practice area Heirs of Luna brought a suit for damages against Luis and his father which the CFI ruled in favor of the Lunas awarding P1650000 as unearned net earnings of Luna P12000 compensatory damages and P50000 for loss of his companionship (come on) with legal interest from date of the decision and attorneyrsquos fees of P50000 (no interest mentioned) (Note father and son solidarily liable for damages) The Dela Rosas appealed in the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC In a MFR filed by the Dela Rosas the CA modified the decision this time reducing the unearned income to P450000 Both parties filed separate petitions for review in the SC

Petition of the Dela Rosas was denied for lack of merit The instant petition is the one filed by Lunas contending that the CA erred in reducing the award for unearned income and that the award for attyrsquos fees should include legal interest Pending the decision the SC came out with a resolution ordering the Dela Rosas in the interest of justice (since the death took place in 1970 and 15 years after the process of litigation is still not over) to pay the Lunas P450000 for unearned net earnings P12000 compensatory damages P50000 for loss of companionship all with legal interest and attyrsquos fees of P50000 within 30 days The Dela Rosas failed to pay the amounts saying that they had no cash money The writ of execution produced only a nominal amount In the meantime Luis is already of age married with 2 kids and living in Spain but only causally employed (ldquoHis compensation is hardly enough to support his family He has no assets of his own as yetrdquo) ISSUES 1 WON the CA erred in reducing the unearned income 2 WON the award for attyrsquos fees should have legal interest HELD 1 YES Ratio The reduction of the award of net unearned earnings had no basis thus is void Reasoning the RTC based its computation of the net unearned earnings on 2 factors life expectancy of the deceased of another 30 years and an annual net income of P55000 (P75000 gross income less P20000 personal expenses)

In coming out with the life expectancy RTC considered the age and health of the deceased However the CA modified this by factoring in the ldquoengagement of Luna in car racingrdquo thus lowering the life expectancy to only 10 years WRT to the gross income RTC considered the various positions the deceased held at the time of his death and the trend of his earnings over the span of his last few years thus coming up with a potential gross income of P75000 However the CA increased the annual personal expenses to P30000 due to the escalating gasoline expenses thus lowering the net annual unearned income to P45000 CA erred in ruling that the engagement with car racing reduced the life expectancy There is nothing on record that supports the claim that the car racing was a dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy ldquoThat Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low slung low powered vehicles only slightly larger than foot-pedaled four wheeled conveyances It was error on the part of the CA to have disturbed the determination of the RTC which it had previously affirmedrdquo Also it was an error to increase the expenses without increasing the gross income ldquoIt stands to reason that if his annual personal expenses should increase because of the lsquoescalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R Lunas social standingrsquo [a statement which lacks complete basis] it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would also increase considering the manifold sources thereofrdquo 2 YES

Ratio The attorneys fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and under the circumstances interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the court (The attyrsquos fees should accrue interest from the date of filing of the compliant) Obiter The Dela Rosas invoke the ruling in Elcano v Hilll where the court held that A2180 applied to Atty Hill nothwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of his son but since the son had attained majority as a matter of equity the liability of Atty Hill became merely subsidiarily to that of his son The Dela Rosas now invoke that the father should also be held only subsidiarily To this contention the court is ldquounwilling to apply equity instead of strict law because to do so will not serve the ends of justice Luis is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine Courts Also he has no property in the Phils or elsewhererdquo Disposition resolution of CA SET ASIDE reinstating the earlier decision with slight modification regarding the award of attyrsquos fees LIBI V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SPS GOTIONG) 214 SCRA 16 REGALADO September 181992 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court FACTS - respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from

which she died on January 141979 was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos Cebu City while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents and who also died in the same event on the same date - More than 2 years before their deaths Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December 1978 when Julie Ann broke up with Wendell after she found him to be sadistic and irresponsible - January 1979 - Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the Julie refused prompting him to resort to threats against her In order to avoid him Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend Malou Alfonso - January 141979 - Julie and Wendell died from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm licensed under Cresencio Libi father of Wendell - both set of parents came up with versions of the story Gotiongs gt Wendell caused her death by shooting her and thereafter turning the gun on himself to commit suicide Libis gt an unknown third party whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU) must have caused Wendells death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification - CFI Cebu Gotiongs filed civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latters vicarious liability under A2180

CC CFI dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of the evidence - IAC CFI decision set aside and found Libis subsidiarily liable ISSUE WON A2180 CC is applicable in making Libirsquos liable for vicarious liability HELD YES Ratio The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists to a large extent of the instruction and supervision of the child Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their son Wendell and in keeping said gun from his reach they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong Therefore appellants are liable under A2180 CC Reasoning - undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet It should be emphasized however that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not as the body was cleaned already in the funeral parlor - Amelita Libi mother of Wendell testified that her husband Cresencio Libi owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelitas key is always in her bag all of which facts were known to Wendell They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun She admitted however that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box We accordingly

cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was - A2180 The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by A2180 CC covers obligations wising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses - BUT Liability is not subsidiary BUT primary gt if the liability of the parents for crimes and QDs of their minor children is subsidiary they they can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damages But if the liability id direct and primary the diligence would constitute a valid substantial defense HENCE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR QDS OF THEIR MINOR KIDS AS CONTEMPLATED IN A2180 ID PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY gt applying A2194 (solidary liability of joint tortfeasors) the parent is also solidarily liable with the child THE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR FELONIES IS LIKEWISE PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY A101 RPC SAYS SO gt RULES + for civil liability from crimes committed by minors under the legal authority and control or who live in the company of the parents PRIMARY = premised on A101 RPC fot damages ex delicto by kids 9 or under or 9-15 but without discernment = premised on A2180 CC for kids 9-15 with discernment or 15-21 (now 18)

+ liability effected against father or mother BOTH PARENTS AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE PARENTAL AUHTORITY OVER THE MINOR = youth welfare code = FC responsibility of parents + for civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors same rules in A2180 and A2182 Disposition Instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED TAMARGO vs CA (Rubio Bundoc) 209 SCRA 518 Feliciano J 1992 NATURE Appeal for review of CA decision FACTS - On October 20 1982 Adelberto Bundoc then aged ten shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death He was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide but was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability ob the ground that he had acted without discernment The adopting and natural parents of Jennifer filed a civil complaint for damages against the parents of Bundoc - The parents of Adelberto claimed that they are not the indispensable party in the action as their son adopted by the spouses Rapisura on November 18 1982 via an adoption decree granted by the CFI of Ilocos Sur The trial Court agreed with the respondents and dismissed the complaint

- The case contained procedural questions which were raised in the appeal The SC however decided to hear the appeal based on substantial justice ISSUE - WON the spouses Bundoc were indispensable party to the tort action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code HELD- - Yes The Court held that parental authority did not retroactively transfer to and vested in the adopting parents at the time the shooting incident occurred The adopting parents had no actual or physical custody of Adelberto at the time of the incident as they were then in the US were they live To do so and hold them liable for the tortious act when be unfair and unconscionable Reasoning- - The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him under Article 2176 However because of his minority the provision of Article 2180 would be applicable Article 2180 reads ldquo the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for onersquos own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsiblehellip The father and incase of his death or incapacity the mother are responsible for the damages caused by the children who live in their companyhellip The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage - The principle of parental liability is designated as vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed

liability under the Anglo-American tort law Thus under this doctrine a person is not only liable for torts committed by him also torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsibility Thus parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of the parents which include the instructing controlling and disciplining of the child The presumption under law is that when a child under their care commits a tortuous act the parents were negligent in the performance of these duties and responsibilities As stated sufficient proof can be presented to overcome this presumption Disposition ndash Petition granted Decision set aside MERCADO v COURT OF APPEALS AND QUISUMBING L-14342 LABRADOR May 30 1960 NATURE This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing Jr is the son of his co-plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L Quisumbing while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L Mercado Manuel Quisumbing Jr and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon Quezon City - A pitogo which figures prominently in this case may be described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank On February 22 1956 Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing Jr quarrelled over a pitogo As a

result Augusto wounded Manuel Jr on the right cheek with a piece of razor ISSUES 1 WON the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the of the father since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time) 2 WON the moral damages fixed at P2000 are excessive HELD 1 NO The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should be made liable is as follows

ART 2180 Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody

- It would be seem that the clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil - Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply nor does paragraph 2 of

said article which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children 2 YES It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219 Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augustos resentment which motivated the assault was occasioned by the fact that Manuel Jr had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get his pitogo from Renato It is therefore apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbings own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy (Art 2179 Civil Code) After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals we find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code which authorizes the grant of moral damages was shown to have existed Consequently the grant of moral damages is not justified PALISOC VS BRILLANTES 41 SCRA 548 TEEHANKEE October 4 1971 NATURE An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the CFI Manila FACTS - Palisoc spouses as parents of their 16-year old son Dominador Palisoc and a student in

automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute filed the action below for damages arising from the death of their son at the hands of a fellow student defendant Virgilio L Daffon at the laboratory room of the said Institute - the deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L Daffon were classmates and one afternoon they together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor At that time the classes were in recess Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face Daffon in retaliation gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward Palisoc became pale and fainted First aid was administered to him but he was not revived so he was immediately taken to a hospital He never regained consciousness finally he died - Defendants were Antonio C Brillantes at the time when the incident occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute Teodosio Valenton the president thereof Santiago M Quibulue instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged and Virgilio L Daffon a fellow student of the deceased - At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship but lately it was duly incorporated

- the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code - The trial court however absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute in this wise ldquoIn the opinion of the Court this article(art2180) of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar since this contemplates the situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parentsThe clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parentsThere is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the schoolrdquo ISSUE WON the school officials are jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors with Daffon HELD a YES (head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute Valenton and Quibulue respectively) Ratio The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students so long as they remain in their custody is that they stand to a certain extent as to their pupils and students in loco parentis and are called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child In the law of torts the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of

the parents and hence it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school including recess time as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students Reasoning - The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Courts dictum in Mercado vs Court of Appeals that (I)t would seem that the clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control direction and influence It is true that under the law abovequoted teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution - phrase used in the cited article mdash so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school including recess time There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school as erroneously held by the lower court and the dicta in Mercado on which it relied must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision

- At any rate the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180 Civil Code by (proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage In the light of the factual findings of the lower courts decision said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability b NO (Brillantes as a mere member of the schools board of directors and the school) itself cannot be held similarly liable since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant - the school had been incorporated since and therefore the school itself as thus incorporated should have been brought in as party defendant DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows 1 Sentencing the Daffon Valenton and Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P1200000 for the death of Dominador Palisoc (b) P337500 for actual and compensatory expenses (c) P500000 for moral damages (d) P1000000 for loss of earning power and (e) P200000 for attorneys fee plus the costs of this action in both instances 2 absolving defendant Antonio C Brillantes from the complaint and 3 dismissing defendants counterclaims REYES JBL J concurring -I would like to clarify that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect that the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils who are minors is not in accord with the plain text of the law

- Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority the article expressly so provides as in the case of the parents and of the guardians It is natural to expect that if the law had intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of persons enumerated in the article it would have expressly so stated The fact that it has not done so indicates an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age Further it is not without significance that - finally that while in the case of parents and guardians their authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter MAKALINTAL J dissenting - I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v Court of Appeals I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results considering the size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions academic and non-academic as well as the temper attitudes and often destructive activism of the students to hold their teachers andor the administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts committed by them - It would demand responsibility without commensurate authority rendering teachers and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control - one other factor constrains me to dissent The opinion of the majority states Here the parents of the student at fault defendant Daffon are not involved since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident Note that for parental

responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their companyit stands to reason that (1) the clause so long as they remain in their custody as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase who live in their company as used in reference to parents and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer minors so should teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLLETOS) 160 SCRA 315 CRUZ April 15 1988

Facts It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to graduate at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes Alfredo went to the school to submit his ldquoReport in Physicrdquo While they were in the auditorium of their school hewas shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon

ISSUE WON Art 2180 is applicable Held Yes Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools academic or non-academic Teachers are liable for acts of their student except where the school is technical in nature (arts and trade establishment) in which case the head thereof shall be answerable

ldquoThere is really no substantial difference distinction between the academic and non-

academic schools in so far as torts committed by their students are concerned The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the student under their control and supervision whatever the nature of the school where he is teachingrdquo ldquox x x x The distinction no longer obtains at present x x x ldquo

The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises whether the semester has not ended or has ended or has not yet begun The term ldquocustodyrdquo signifies that the student is within the control and influence of the school authorities The teacher in charge is the one designated by the dean principal or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils or students in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned It is not necessary that at the time of the injury the teacher is physically present and in a position to prevent it

Thus for injuries caused by the student the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him

In any event the school may be held to answer for the acts of its teacher or the head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior but it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias Such defense they had taken necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of and thus be exonerated from liability imposed by Art 2180

Basis of teacherrsquos vicarious liability is as such they acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents) However teachers are not expected to have the same measure of responsibility as that imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree x x x The parent can instill more lasting discipline more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or the head for the tort committed by the child

As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent nor the school remised in the discharged of their duties they were exonerated of liability (Note ndash the court view on increasing students activism likely causing violence resulting to injuries in or out of the school premises ndash J Guttierez Jr concurringly said many student x x x view some teachers as part of the bourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice on behavior deportment and other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively rejected It seems most unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has outlived its purpose The court cannot make law it can only apply the law with its imperfections However the court can suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY) 160 SCRA 785 PARAS April 25 1988

NATURE Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order dismissing the complaint as against the respondent school and denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal FACTS - A group of students walking inside Araneta University were accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karin Madidis alias ldquoTengrdquo Petitioner (Reynaldo) was subsequently stabbed by Teng requiring him to be hospitalized and to undergo surgery - Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng and Arante University based on Art 2190 CC - Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the provision only applies to vocational schools and not to academic institutions They also claim that the civil liability in this case arose from a crime which they did not commit Since it was a civil case respondent school claims that a demand should have been made by the plaintiff rendering it premature to bring an action for damages against respondent school MTD was granted by the CA - Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of Dismissal Motion was denied due to insufficient justification to disturb ruling ISSUE WON the Art 2180 CC2 applies to academic institutions

2 Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody

HELD It is unnecessary to answer the issue What the petitioner wants to know is WON the school or the university itself is liable The answer is no since the provision speaks of ldquoteachers or headsrdquo Dispositive WHEREFORE this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit YLARDE vs AQUINO GANCAYCO 1988 July 29 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School and private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein At that time the school was littered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez stated burying them all by himself Deciding to help his colleague private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils aged ten to eleven Being their teacher-in-charge he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried The work was left unfinished The following day also after classes private respondent Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging These four pupils ---- Reynaldo Alonso Fransico Alcantara Ismael Abaga and Novelito

Ylarde dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep At this point private respondent Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole Then said private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope Before leaving private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children not to touch the stone A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left three of the four kids Alonso Alcantara and Ylarde playfully jumped into the pit Then without any warning at all the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde the concrete block caught him before he could get out pinning him to the wall in a standing position As a result thereof Ylarde sustained injuries and died three (3) days later Ylardes parents petitioners in this case filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of

a very cautious person and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence ISSUE WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code both private respondents can be held liable for damages Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter On the other hand the applicable provision of Article 2180 states Art 2180 xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody HELD Only Aquino the teacher is liable Ratio As regards the principal We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades Reasoning

This is in line with the Courtrsquos ruling in Amadora vs Court of Appeals wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades it is only the head of the school who can be held liable Ratio Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons Reasoning (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the childrens safety and (5) left the children close to the excavation an obviously attractive nuisance (6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity This should not be the case The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself A minor

should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age capacity discretion knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances Bearing this in mind We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence DISPOSITION Granted SALVOSA v IAC (CASTRO) 166 SCRA 274 PADILLA J October 5 1988 FACTS Jimmy Abon a commerce student of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977 at around 800 pm in the parking space of BCF BCF is both an academic and arts and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP Subsequently the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages impleading Jimmy B Abon Roberto C Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF) Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF) Libertad D Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc as party defendants

After hearing the Trial Court rendered a decision (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B Abon Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc jointly and severally to pay private respondents as heirs of Napoleon Castro (2) absolving the other defendants and (3) dismissing the defendants counterclaim for lack of merit ISSUE WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B Abon HELD NO Jimmy B Abon cannot be considered to have been at attendance in the school or in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro Logically therefore petitioners cannot under Art 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages resulting from his acts Ratio Under the penultimate paragraph of Art 2180 of the Civil Code teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher the latter stands to a certain extent in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student] Likewise the phrase used in [Art 2180 mdash so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and

students for as long as they are at attendance in the school including recess time Reasoning a The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the CA According to the CA while it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident which was at about 8 oclock in the evening but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter The time interval is safely within the recess time that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case supra In line with the case of Palisoc 17 a student not at attendance in the school cannot be in recess thereat A recess as the concept is embraced in the phrase at attendance in the school contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises or the area within which the school activity is conducted Recess by its nature does not include dismissal Likewise the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute attending school or being in the protective and supervisory custody of the school as contemplated in the law b Jimmy B Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior the ROTC Commandant when he shot Napoleon Castro ST FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v CA(CastilloCadiz)

194 SCRA 340 Paras J Feb 25 1991 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS -Ferdinand Castillo then a freshman student at St Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach Quezon His parents didnrsquot allow him to go due to short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home However he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher -his parents filed a complaint against St Francis HS represented by its principal Illumin and several teachers for damages incurred from the death of their son contending that it occurred due to petitionersrsquo failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family The TC found against the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim Also the male teachers who were to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which was not school sanctioned and as the latter had her own class to supervise then and was not actually invited -Both parties appealed to the CA On the issue of the liability of St Francis HS and the Illumin the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 They cannot escape liability simply because it wasnrsquot an ldquoextra-curricular activity of the HSrdquo From the evidence

it was shown that the principal had known of the picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the event As such under Article 2180 both are jointly and severally liable w the teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the ownermanager (St Francis and the principal) Petitioners contend that the victimrsquos parents failed to prove by evidence that they didnrsquot give their son consent to join the picnic The Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence of their liability Also 2 of the teachers who arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers Hence this petition ISSUE (1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants (2) WON Art 2180 in relation to 2176 is applicable (3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper HELD (1) NO Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them At the outset it should be noted that the victimrsquos parents allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination -Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it If the CArsquos findings are to be upheld employers will be forever exposed to the risk and

danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the performance of their duties -No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised diligence of a good father of the family In fact 2 PE teachers were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming Life savers were brought in the event of such an accident The records also show that the 2 PE teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim (2) NO The CA erred in applying Art 2180 particularly par 4 For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his employee the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task In the case at bar the teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity (3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence required of them no moral or exemplary damages under Art 2177 may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses PREMISES CONSIDERED the questioned decision is SET ASIDE PSBA v CA (BENITEZBAUTISTA) 205 SCRA 729 Padilla J Feb 4 1992 FACTS -Carlitos Bautista enrolled in the 3rd year commerce course of PSBA was stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants who were

from outside the schoolrsquos academic community This prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers alleging negligence recklessness and lack of security precautions means and methods before during and after the attack of the victim -PSBA sought to dismiss the case alleging that since they were presumably sued under Art 2180 there was no cause of action since academic institutions are not subject to the said provision -A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by the TC yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA Hence this petition ISSUES (1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180 HELD (1) NO Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the parties the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern but the court has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a contract -Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroadrdquohellip the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the partiesrdquo

-Using the test in Cangco a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBArsquos liability hence any finding of negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual obligation only -When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment a contract is established between them resulting in a bilateral obligation The school is obliged to provide the student with an education along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge In turn the student abides by the schoolrsquos academic requirements and observes its rules and regulations However a school cannot be an insurer for its students against all risks one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons time and place - In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was breached due to PSBArsquos negligence in providing proper security measures At this stage the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondentrsquos complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC can determine WHEREFORE the petition is DENIED The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court Costs against the petitioners SOLIMAN JR V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 FELICIANO J May 18 1992 NATURE Civil complaint for damages FACTS

- On August 13 1982 while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman Jr a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC) was in the campus premises thereof the defendant Jimmy Solomon who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant RL Security Agency Inc without any provocation shot the plaintiff on the abdomen The plaintiff was confined in a hospital and as per doctors opinion he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months Petitioner represented by his guardian filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC RL Security Agency and Solomon - RCC filed a motion to dismiss contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon It further argued that Article 2180 7th paragraph of the Civil Code did not apply since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil student or apprentice of the school - Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCCrsquos motion to dismiss Petitionerrsquos MFR was denied Hence this appeal ISSUES 1 WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180 as well as those of Articles 349 350 and 352 of the Civil Code

2 WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1 NO - Under Art 2180 the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for ones own act or omission but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils their students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody - The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman Jr RCC was not the employer of Solomon The employer of Solomon was the RL Security Agency Inc while the school was the client of the latter It is settled that where the security agency as here recruits hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency and not to the clients of such agency There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC

and Solomon petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges he being in fact an employee of the RL Security Agency Inc the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows Art 349 The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority xxx xxx xxx (2) Teachers and professors xxx xxx xxx (4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices xxx xxx xxx Art 350 The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child xxx xxx xxx Art 352 The relations between teacher and pupil professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student - In Palisoc v Brillantes the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc a student of that Institute which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon another student of the Institute It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th

paragraph of Article 2180 quoted above but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case - Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority In the instant case Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner was not a pupil student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon 2 YES - In the case of PSBA v CA the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision At the same time however the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment on the one hand and the students who are enrolled on the other hand which contract results in obligations for both parties It held When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment there is established a contract between them resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with For its part the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession On the other hand the student covenants to abide by the schools academic requirements and observe its rules and regulationsInstitutions of learning must also meet the implicit or built-in obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary

undertaking of imparting knowledge Certainly no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb Necessarily the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof - It was also pointed out in said case that In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar however there is as yet no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the formers negligence in providing proper security measures This would be for the trial court to determine And even if there be a finding of negligence the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only Using the test of Cangco supra the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract In fact that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista In other words a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the schools liability The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code - In the PSBA case the trial court had denied the schools motion to dismiss the complaint against it and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial courts order In the case at bar the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC upon the assumption that petitioners cause of action was based and could have been based only on Art 2180 of the Civil Code As PSBA however states acts which are

tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have in the interest of justice allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the caseThis case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings ST MARYrsquoS ACADEMY VS CARPITANOS PARDO February 6 2002 NATURE Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos together with James Daniel II (then 15 driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached Carpitanos sued the school James Daniel II his parents and Vivencio Villanueva -TC absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II held parents and school liable

-CA school liable under A218 and 219 FC finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them ISSUE (regarding liability of St Maryrsquos Academy) WON St Maryrsquos Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos and therefore liable for damages HELD NO The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep Ratio For the school to be liable it must be shown that the lsquoinjury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events unbroken by intervening efficient causes Reasoning The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva It was

Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep -Liability for the accident whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep must be pinned on the minorrsquos parents primarily The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeepConsidering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy had no control and which was the proximate cause of the accident petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident - It is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos Disposition WHEREFORE the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants excluding petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy Dipolog City No costs SO ORDERED PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO March 25 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision

FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines Inc and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS Inc its manager BALINGIT and the driver PINEDA - It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK owned by Phil-Am along the natrsquol highway at Sto Tomas Pampanga The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan owned by Phil Rabbit Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days This deprived the company of earnings of about P8600 - Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pinedas employer Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him - CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art2180 CC - In the appeal the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41200 Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality But this was not alleged in their complaint ISSUE WON the terms employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise

used in Art 2180 NCC (Art1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments Art2180 uses the term manager (director in the Spanish version) to mean employerrdquo - Hence under the allegations of the complaint no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders Inc in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer Phil-American Forwarders Inc This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses Dispositive Lower courtrsquos order of dismissal is AFFIRMED PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE June 17 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence recklessness

violation of traffic rules and regulations abandonment of victim and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondentsrsquo Version -In the early morning of March 24 1990 about 600 orsquoclock the victim Ramon A Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine -The Magsaysay Blvd runs perpendicular to Gomez St and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street -As the bus was pushed its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A Acuesta who as a result thereof fell and thereafter was run over by the said bus Petitionerrsquos Version -Manilhig in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street the victim who was biking towards the same direction as the bus suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road

-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear which caused the death of the victim Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied MFR -Hence this appeal

ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes -Civil Case No 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 21763 and 21804 of the Civil Code against petitioner

(limited to that involved in the outline) 3Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 4Art 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxxxxxxxx

Manilhig and his employer petitioner Philtranco respectively -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle like petitioner Philtranco for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary direct and joint and several or solidary with the driver As to solidarity Article 2194 expressly provides the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary -Since the employers liability is primary direct and solidary its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed (with regard to this issue) CASTILEX V VASQUEZ Dec 21 1999 Davide Facts At around 130 to 200 in the morning Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmentildea Rotunda He was traveling counter-clockwise (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time Upon the

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

other hand Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no GBW-794 On the same date and time Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmentildea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St or to Belvic St

In the process the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute So the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez Jr and Luisa So Vasquez parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation In the same action Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez Issue WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

Held Castilez is absolved from any liability The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision Instead the fourth paragraph should apply Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable Both provisions apply to employers the fourth paragraph to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise and the fifth paragraph to employers in general whether or not engaged in any business or industry The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included Negligent acts of employees whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry are covered so long as they were acting

within the scope of their assigned task even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions For admittedly employees oftentimes wear different hats They perform functions which are beyond their office title or designation but which nevertheless are still within the call of dutyThis court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 whether or not engaged in any business or industry an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship once this is done the plaintiff must show to hold the employer liable that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee

It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect and even finality at times This rule is however subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations surmises or conjectures Such exception obtain in the present

case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager

On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks ABAD who was presented as a hostile witness testified that at the time of the incident he was driving a company-issued vehicle registered under the name of petitioner He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment an employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction but rather the result varies with each state of facts The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances The SC does not agree The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle

I Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle

II Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee and not a part of his services to his employer Hence in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle 14 cda

The employer may however be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and presumably spending more time at his actual duties Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving commission rule under which it can be

found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home However even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own

III Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept it has been held that he has not resumed his employment and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business or within the

scope of his assigned task ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident It was then about 200 am way beyond the normal working hours ABADs working day had ended his overtime work had already been completed His being at a place which as petitioner put it was known as a haven for prostitutes pimps and drug pushers and addicts had no connection to petitioners business neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager Rather using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR August 17 1992

NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI He is also employed as a janitor The president of FCI is Agustin Masa Agustin has a son Allan who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver Allan lives with his dad Funtecha also lives in the presidentrsquos house free of charge while a student at FCI - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home then go back to the school then go home in the school jeep He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hersquos supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school - One night Funtecha wanted to drive home He has a student license After a dangerous curb

and seeing that the road was clear Allan let Funtecha drive Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians) The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night - TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan SC reversed saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school Allans job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose Moreover it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtechas possession of a student drivers license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans house Funtecha

definitely was not having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a frolic of his own but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner Hence the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

then a student of an institution of arts and trades as provided for by law The civil liability which the law impose upon the father and in case of his death or incapacity the mother for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them is obvious This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the duty of supporting them keeping them in their company educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means while on the other hand gives them the right to correct and punish them in moderation (Articles 154 and 155 Spanish Civil Code) The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article 1903 last paragraph Spanish Civil Code) This defendants failed to prove Wherefore the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P295900 as damages and the costs of action REYES JBL J dissenting I believe we should affirm the judgment relieving the father of liability I can see no sound reason for limiting Art 1903 of the old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones What substantial difference is there between them in so far as concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of

watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and supervision over the pupil In my opinion in the phrase teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades used in Art 1903 of the old Civil Code the words arts and trades does not qualify teachers but only heads of establishments The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms preceptores y artesanos used in the Italian and French Civil Codes If as conceded by all commentators the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents teachers etc are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority it would seem clear that where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher the latter and not the parent should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction And if there is no authority there can be no responsibility I submit that the father should not be held liable for a tort that he was in no way able to prevent and which he had every right to assume the school authorities would avoid Having proved that he entrusted his child to the custody of school authorities that were competent to exercise vigilance over him the father has rebutted the presumption of Art 1903 and the burden of proof shifted to the claimant to show

actual negligence on the part of the parent in order to render him liable Padilla and Reyes A JJ concur SALEN V BALCE FUELLAS V CADANO Nature Appeal from the Decision of the Trial Court making defendant therein now appellant Agapito Fuellas the father of the minor who caused the injuries to Pepito Cadano also a minor liable under Art 2180 of the new Civil Code for damages Facts Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas son of defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas were both 13 years old on September 16 1954 They were classmates at St Marys High School Dansalan City They had a quarrel that lead to Pepitorsquos injury his right arm was broken after Rico pushed him on the ground It is contended that in the decision of the Court of Appeals the petitioner-appellant was ordered to pay damages for the deliberate injury caused by his son that the said court held the petitioner liable pursuant to par 2 of Art 2180 of the Civil Code in connection with Art 2176 of the same Code that according to the last article the act of the minor must be one wherein fault or negligence is present and that there being no fault or negligence on the part of petitioner-appellants minor son but deliberate intent the above mentioned articles are not applicable for the existence of deliberate intent in the commission of an act negatives the presence of fault or negligence in its commission Appellant therefore submits that the appellate Court erred

in holding him liable for damages for the deliberate criminal act of his minor son Issue WON the father is liable civilly for the criminal act of his son Held Yes In an earlier case (Exconde vs Capuno et al GR No L-10132 prom June 29 1957) holding the defendants jointly and severally liable with his minor son Dante for damages arising from the criminal act committed by the latter this tribunal gave the following reasons for the rule mdash

The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and in case of his death or incapacity the mother for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them is obvious This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the duty of supporting them keeping them in their company educating them in proportion to their means while on the other hand gives them the right to correct and punish them in moderation (Arts 134 and 135 Spanish Civil Code) The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Art 1903 last paragraph Spanish Civil Code) This defendants failed to prove

In another case Salen and Salbanera vs Jose Balce the defendant Balce was the father of a minor Gumersindo Balce below 18 years of age who was living with him Gumersindo was found guilty of homicide for having killed Carlos Salen

minor son of plaintiffs The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case stating that the civil liability of the minor son of defendant arising from his criminal liability must be determined under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and not under Art 2180 of the new Civil Code In reversing the decision this tribunal held mdash

It is true that under Art 101 of the Revised Penal Code a father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile an insane under 9 years of age or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acts without discernment unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part This is because a son who commits the act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12 subdivisions 1 2 and 3 Revised Penal Code) The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority or control But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted In that case resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil Code The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180 the pertinent portion of which provides The father and in case of his death or incapacity the mother are responsible for damages caused by the minor children who live in their company To hold that this provision

does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent Verily the void apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical cases

Moreover the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of the evidence submitted therein by both parties independently of the criminal case And responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the action in the present case was instituted is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault of negligence under the Penal Code (Art 2177) and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore stated any discussion as to the minors criminal responsibility is of no moment IN VIEW HEREOF the petition is dismissed the decision appealed from is affirmed GUTIERREZ VS GUTIERREZ MALCOLM September 23 1931

Nature an action brought by the plaintiff in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the five

defendants to recover damages in the amount of P10000 for physical injuries suffered as a result of an automobile accident Facts A passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the municipality of Las Pintildeas Province of Rizal The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco and was owned by Saturnino Cortez The automobile was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez a lad 18 years of age and was owned by Bonifacios father and mother Mr and Mrs Manuel Gutierrez At the time of the collision the father was not in the car but the mother together will several other members of the Gutierrez family seven in all were accommodated therein Narcisso Gutierrez was a passenger of the bus He had a fracture on his right leg It was conceded that the collision was caused by negligence pure and simple But Narcisso Gutierrez blames both the bus and the car while the truck blames the car and the car in turn blames the truck the youth Bonifacio was in incompetent chauffeur that he was driving at an excessive rate of speed and that on approaching the bridge and the truck he lost his head and so contributed by his negligence to the accident The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his son Based on these facts pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code the father alone and not the minor or the mother would be liable for the damages caused by the minor

Issue

1 WON the father of Bonifacio (car) is liable

2 WON the owner of the truck is liable Held

1 Yes In the United States it is uniformly held that the head of a house the owner of an automobile who maintains it for the general use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children whom he designates or permits to run it where the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the owners family than the child driving it The theory of the law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of the owners business so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and servant

2 Yes The liability of Saturnino Cortez the owner of the truck and of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on a different basis namely that of contract The reason for this conclusion reaches to the findings of the trial court concerning the position of the truck on the bridge the speed in operating the machine and the lack of care employed by the chauffeur In its broader aspects the case is one of two drivers approaching a narrow bridge from opposite directions with neither being willing to slow up and give the right of way to the other with the

inevitable result of a collision and an accident

Disposition In consonance with the foregoing rulings the judgment appealed from will be modified and the plaintiff will have judgment in his favor against the defendants Manuel Gutierrez Abelardo Velasco and Saturnino Cortez jointly and severally for the sum of P5000 and the costs of both instances RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA) 135 SCRA 242 ABAD SANTOS February 28 1985 NATURE Petition to review a decision of CA FACTS Roberto Luna a businessman was killed in a vehicular collision (between Luna driving a gokart and Luis dela Rosa 13 years old driving a Toyota car without a license) at a gokart practice area Heirs of Luna brought a suit for damages against Luis and his father which the CFI ruled in favor of the Lunas awarding P1650000 as unearned net earnings of Luna P12000 compensatory damages and P50000 for loss of his companionship (come on) with legal interest from date of the decision and attorneyrsquos fees of P50000 (no interest mentioned) (Note father and son solidarily liable for damages) The Dela Rosas appealed in the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC In a MFR filed by the Dela Rosas the CA modified the decision this time reducing the unearned income to P450000 Both parties filed separate petitions for review in the SC

Petition of the Dela Rosas was denied for lack of merit The instant petition is the one filed by Lunas contending that the CA erred in reducing the award for unearned income and that the award for attyrsquos fees should include legal interest Pending the decision the SC came out with a resolution ordering the Dela Rosas in the interest of justice (since the death took place in 1970 and 15 years after the process of litigation is still not over) to pay the Lunas P450000 for unearned net earnings P12000 compensatory damages P50000 for loss of companionship all with legal interest and attyrsquos fees of P50000 within 30 days The Dela Rosas failed to pay the amounts saying that they had no cash money The writ of execution produced only a nominal amount In the meantime Luis is already of age married with 2 kids and living in Spain but only causally employed (ldquoHis compensation is hardly enough to support his family He has no assets of his own as yetrdquo) ISSUES 1 WON the CA erred in reducing the unearned income 2 WON the award for attyrsquos fees should have legal interest HELD 1 YES Ratio The reduction of the award of net unearned earnings had no basis thus is void Reasoning the RTC based its computation of the net unearned earnings on 2 factors life expectancy of the deceased of another 30 years and an annual net income of P55000 (P75000 gross income less P20000 personal expenses)

In coming out with the life expectancy RTC considered the age and health of the deceased However the CA modified this by factoring in the ldquoengagement of Luna in car racingrdquo thus lowering the life expectancy to only 10 years WRT to the gross income RTC considered the various positions the deceased held at the time of his death and the trend of his earnings over the span of his last few years thus coming up with a potential gross income of P75000 However the CA increased the annual personal expenses to P30000 due to the escalating gasoline expenses thus lowering the net annual unearned income to P45000 CA erred in ruling that the engagement with car racing reduced the life expectancy There is nothing on record that supports the claim that the car racing was a dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy ldquoThat Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low slung low powered vehicles only slightly larger than foot-pedaled four wheeled conveyances It was error on the part of the CA to have disturbed the determination of the RTC which it had previously affirmedrdquo Also it was an error to increase the expenses without increasing the gross income ldquoIt stands to reason that if his annual personal expenses should increase because of the lsquoescalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R Lunas social standingrsquo [a statement which lacks complete basis] it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would also increase considering the manifold sources thereofrdquo 2 YES

Ratio The attorneys fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and under the circumstances interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the court (The attyrsquos fees should accrue interest from the date of filing of the compliant) Obiter The Dela Rosas invoke the ruling in Elcano v Hilll where the court held that A2180 applied to Atty Hill nothwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of his son but since the son had attained majority as a matter of equity the liability of Atty Hill became merely subsidiarily to that of his son The Dela Rosas now invoke that the father should also be held only subsidiarily To this contention the court is ldquounwilling to apply equity instead of strict law because to do so will not serve the ends of justice Luis is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine Courts Also he has no property in the Phils or elsewhererdquo Disposition resolution of CA SET ASIDE reinstating the earlier decision with slight modification regarding the award of attyrsquos fees LIBI V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SPS GOTIONG) 214 SCRA 16 REGALADO September 181992 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court FACTS - respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from

which she died on January 141979 was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos Cebu City while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents and who also died in the same event on the same date - More than 2 years before their deaths Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December 1978 when Julie Ann broke up with Wendell after she found him to be sadistic and irresponsible - January 1979 - Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the Julie refused prompting him to resort to threats against her In order to avoid him Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend Malou Alfonso - January 141979 - Julie and Wendell died from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm licensed under Cresencio Libi father of Wendell - both set of parents came up with versions of the story Gotiongs gt Wendell caused her death by shooting her and thereafter turning the gun on himself to commit suicide Libis gt an unknown third party whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU) must have caused Wendells death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification - CFI Cebu Gotiongs filed civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latters vicarious liability under A2180

CC CFI dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of the evidence - IAC CFI decision set aside and found Libis subsidiarily liable ISSUE WON A2180 CC is applicable in making Libirsquos liable for vicarious liability HELD YES Ratio The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists to a large extent of the instruction and supervision of the child Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their son Wendell and in keeping said gun from his reach they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong Therefore appellants are liable under A2180 CC Reasoning - undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet It should be emphasized however that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not as the body was cleaned already in the funeral parlor - Amelita Libi mother of Wendell testified that her husband Cresencio Libi owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelitas key is always in her bag all of which facts were known to Wendell They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun She admitted however that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box We accordingly

cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was - A2180 The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by A2180 CC covers obligations wising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses - BUT Liability is not subsidiary BUT primary gt if the liability of the parents for crimes and QDs of their minor children is subsidiary they they can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damages But if the liability id direct and primary the diligence would constitute a valid substantial defense HENCE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR QDS OF THEIR MINOR KIDS AS CONTEMPLATED IN A2180 ID PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY gt applying A2194 (solidary liability of joint tortfeasors) the parent is also solidarily liable with the child THE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR FELONIES IS LIKEWISE PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY A101 RPC SAYS SO gt RULES + for civil liability from crimes committed by minors under the legal authority and control or who live in the company of the parents PRIMARY = premised on A101 RPC fot damages ex delicto by kids 9 or under or 9-15 but without discernment = premised on A2180 CC for kids 9-15 with discernment or 15-21 (now 18)

+ liability effected against father or mother BOTH PARENTS AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE PARENTAL AUHTORITY OVER THE MINOR = youth welfare code = FC responsibility of parents + for civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors same rules in A2180 and A2182 Disposition Instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED TAMARGO vs CA (Rubio Bundoc) 209 SCRA 518 Feliciano J 1992 NATURE Appeal for review of CA decision FACTS - On October 20 1982 Adelberto Bundoc then aged ten shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death He was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide but was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability ob the ground that he had acted without discernment The adopting and natural parents of Jennifer filed a civil complaint for damages against the parents of Bundoc - The parents of Adelberto claimed that they are not the indispensable party in the action as their son adopted by the spouses Rapisura on November 18 1982 via an adoption decree granted by the CFI of Ilocos Sur The trial Court agreed with the respondents and dismissed the complaint

- The case contained procedural questions which were raised in the appeal The SC however decided to hear the appeal based on substantial justice ISSUE - WON the spouses Bundoc were indispensable party to the tort action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code HELD- - Yes The Court held that parental authority did not retroactively transfer to and vested in the adopting parents at the time the shooting incident occurred The adopting parents had no actual or physical custody of Adelberto at the time of the incident as they were then in the US were they live To do so and hold them liable for the tortious act when be unfair and unconscionable Reasoning- - The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him under Article 2176 However because of his minority the provision of Article 2180 would be applicable Article 2180 reads ldquo the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for onersquos own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsiblehellip The father and incase of his death or incapacity the mother are responsible for the damages caused by the children who live in their companyhellip The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage - The principle of parental liability is designated as vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed

liability under the Anglo-American tort law Thus under this doctrine a person is not only liable for torts committed by him also torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsibility Thus parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of the parents which include the instructing controlling and disciplining of the child The presumption under law is that when a child under their care commits a tortuous act the parents were negligent in the performance of these duties and responsibilities As stated sufficient proof can be presented to overcome this presumption Disposition ndash Petition granted Decision set aside MERCADO v COURT OF APPEALS AND QUISUMBING L-14342 LABRADOR May 30 1960 NATURE This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing Jr is the son of his co-plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L Quisumbing while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L Mercado Manuel Quisumbing Jr and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon Quezon City - A pitogo which figures prominently in this case may be described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank On February 22 1956 Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing Jr quarrelled over a pitogo As a

result Augusto wounded Manuel Jr on the right cheek with a piece of razor ISSUES 1 WON the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the of the father since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time) 2 WON the moral damages fixed at P2000 are excessive HELD 1 NO The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should be made liable is as follows

ART 2180 Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody

- It would be seem that the clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil - Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply nor does paragraph 2 of

said article which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children 2 YES It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219 Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augustos resentment which motivated the assault was occasioned by the fact that Manuel Jr had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get his pitogo from Renato It is therefore apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbings own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy (Art 2179 Civil Code) After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals we find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code which authorizes the grant of moral damages was shown to have existed Consequently the grant of moral damages is not justified PALISOC VS BRILLANTES 41 SCRA 548 TEEHANKEE October 4 1971 NATURE An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the CFI Manila FACTS - Palisoc spouses as parents of their 16-year old son Dominador Palisoc and a student in

automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute filed the action below for damages arising from the death of their son at the hands of a fellow student defendant Virgilio L Daffon at the laboratory room of the said Institute - the deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L Daffon were classmates and one afternoon they together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor At that time the classes were in recess Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face Daffon in retaliation gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward Palisoc became pale and fainted First aid was administered to him but he was not revived so he was immediately taken to a hospital He never regained consciousness finally he died - Defendants were Antonio C Brillantes at the time when the incident occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute Teodosio Valenton the president thereof Santiago M Quibulue instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged and Virgilio L Daffon a fellow student of the deceased - At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship but lately it was duly incorporated

- the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code - The trial court however absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute in this wise ldquoIn the opinion of the Court this article(art2180) of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar since this contemplates the situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parentsThe clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parentsThere is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the schoolrdquo ISSUE WON the school officials are jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors with Daffon HELD a YES (head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute Valenton and Quibulue respectively) Ratio The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students so long as they remain in their custody is that they stand to a certain extent as to their pupils and students in loco parentis and are called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child In the law of torts the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of

the parents and hence it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school including recess time as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students Reasoning - The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Courts dictum in Mercado vs Court of Appeals that (I)t would seem that the clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control direction and influence It is true that under the law abovequoted teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution - phrase used in the cited article mdash so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school including recess time There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school as erroneously held by the lower court and the dicta in Mercado on which it relied must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision

- At any rate the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180 Civil Code by (proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage In the light of the factual findings of the lower courts decision said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability b NO (Brillantes as a mere member of the schools board of directors and the school) itself cannot be held similarly liable since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant - the school had been incorporated since and therefore the school itself as thus incorporated should have been brought in as party defendant DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows 1 Sentencing the Daffon Valenton and Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P1200000 for the death of Dominador Palisoc (b) P337500 for actual and compensatory expenses (c) P500000 for moral damages (d) P1000000 for loss of earning power and (e) P200000 for attorneys fee plus the costs of this action in both instances 2 absolving defendant Antonio C Brillantes from the complaint and 3 dismissing defendants counterclaims REYES JBL J concurring -I would like to clarify that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect that the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils who are minors is not in accord with the plain text of the law

- Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority the article expressly so provides as in the case of the parents and of the guardians It is natural to expect that if the law had intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of persons enumerated in the article it would have expressly so stated The fact that it has not done so indicates an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age Further it is not without significance that - finally that while in the case of parents and guardians their authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter MAKALINTAL J dissenting - I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v Court of Appeals I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results considering the size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions academic and non-academic as well as the temper attitudes and often destructive activism of the students to hold their teachers andor the administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts committed by them - It would demand responsibility without commensurate authority rendering teachers and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control - one other factor constrains me to dissent The opinion of the majority states Here the parents of the student at fault defendant Daffon are not involved since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident Note that for parental

responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their companyit stands to reason that (1) the clause so long as they remain in their custody as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase who live in their company as used in reference to parents and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer minors so should teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLLETOS) 160 SCRA 315 CRUZ April 15 1988

Facts It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to graduate at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes Alfredo went to the school to submit his ldquoReport in Physicrdquo While they were in the auditorium of their school hewas shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon

ISSUE WON Art 2180 is applicable Held Yes Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools academic or non-academic Teachers are liable for acts of their student except where the school is technical in nature (arts and trade establishment) in which case the head thereof shall be answerable

ldquoThere is really no substantial difference distinction between the academic and non-

academic schools in so far as torts committed by their students are concerned The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the student under their control and supervision whatever the nature of the school where he is teachingrdquo ldquox x x x The distinction no longer obtains at present x x x ldquo

The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises whether the semester has not ended or has ended or has not yet begun The term ldquocustodyrdquo signifies that the student is within the control and influence of the school authorities The teacher in charge is the one designated by the dean principal or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils or students in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned It is not necessary that at the time of the injury the teacher is physically present and in a position to prevent it

Thus for injuries caused by the student the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him

In any event the school may be held to answer for the acts of its teacher or the head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior but it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias Such defense they had taken necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of and thus be exonerated from liability imposed by Art 2180

Basis of teacherrsquos vicarious liability is as such they acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents) However teachers are not expected to have the same measure of responsibility as that imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree x x x The parent can instill more lasting discipline more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or the head for the tort committed by the child

As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent nor the school remised in the discharged of their duties they were exonerated of liability (Note ndash the court view on increasing students activism likely causing violence resulting to injuries in or out of the school premises ndash J Guttierez Jr concurringly said many student x x x view some teachers as part of the bourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice on behavior deportment and other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively rejected It seems most unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has outlived its purpose The court cannot make law it can only apply the law with its imperfections However the court can suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY) 160 SCRA 785 PARAS April 25 1988

NATURE Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order dismissing the complaint as against the respondent school and denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal FACTS - A group of students walking inside Araneta University were accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karin Madidis alias ldquoTengrdquo Petitioner (Reynaldo) was subsequently stabbed by Teng requiring him to be hospitalized and to undergo surgery - Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng and Arante University based on Art 2190 CC - Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the provision only applies to vocational schools and not to academic institutions They also claim that the civil liability in this case arose from a crime which they did not commit Since it was a civil case respondent school claims that a demand should have been made by the plaintiff rendering it premature to bring an action for damages against respondent school MTD was granted by the CA - Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of Dismissal Motion was denied due to insufficient justification to disturb ruling ISSUE WON the Art 2180 CC2 applies to academic institutions

2 Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody

HELD It is unnecessary to answer the issue What the petitioner wants to know is WON the school or the university itself is liable The answer is no since the provision speaks of ldquoteachers or headsrdquo Dispositive WHEREFORE this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit YLARDE vs AQUINO GANCAYCO 1988 July 29 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School and private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein At that time the school was littered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez stated burying them all by himself Deciding to help his colleague private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils aged ten to eleven Being their teacher-in-charge he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried The work was left unfinished The following day also after classes private respondent Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging These four pupils ---- Reynaldo Alonso Fransico Alcantara Ismael Abaga and Novelito

Ylarde dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep At this point private respondent Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole Then said private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope Before leaving private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children not to touch the stone A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left three of the four kids Alonso Alcantara and Ylarde playfully jumped into the pit Then without any warning at all the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde the concrete block caught him before he could get out pinning him to the wall in a standing position As a result thereof Ylarde sustained injuries and died three (3) days later Ylardes parents petitioners in this case filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of

a very cautious person and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence ISSUE WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code both private respondents can be held liable for damages Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter On the other hand the applicable provision of Article 2180 states Art 2180 xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody HELD Only Aquino the teacher is liable Ratio As regards the principal We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades Reasoning

This is in line with the Courtrsquos ruling in Amadora vs Court of Appeals wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades it is only the head of the school who can be held liable Ratio Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons Reasoning (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the childrens safety and (5) left the children close to the excavation an obviously attractive nuisance (6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity This should not be the case The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself A minor

should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age capacity discretion knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances Bearing this in mind We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence DISPOSITION Granted SALVOSA v IAC (CASTRO) 166 SCRA 274 PADILLA J October 5 1988 FACTS Jimmy Abon a commerce student of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977 at around 800 pm in the parking space of BCF BCF is both an academic and arts and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP Subsequently the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages impleading Jimmy B Abon Roberto C Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF) Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF) Libertad D Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc as party defendants

After hearing the Trial Court rendered a decision (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B Abon Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc jointly and severally to pay private respondents as heirs of Napoleon Castro (2) absolving the other defendants and (3) dismissing the defendants counterclaim for lack of merit ISSUE WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B Abon HELD NO Jimmy B Abon cannot be considered to have been at attendance in the school or in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro Logically therefore petitioners cannot under Art 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages resulting from his acts Ratio Under the penultimate paragraph of Art 2180 of the Civil Code teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher the latter stands to a certain extent in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student] Likewise the phrase used in [Art 2180 mdash so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and

students for as long as they are at attendance in the school including recess time Reasoning a The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the CA According to the CA while it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident which was at about 8 oclock in the evening but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter The time interval is safely within the recess time that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case supra In line with the case of Palisoc 17 a student not at attendance in the school cannot be in recess thereat A recess as the concept is embraced in the phrase at attendance in the school contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises or the area within which the school activity is conducted Recess by its nature does not include dismissal Likewise the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute attending school or being in the protective and supervisory custody of the school as contemplated in the law b Jimmy B Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior the ROTC Commandant when he shot Napoleon Castro ST FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v CA(CastilloCadiz)

194 SCRA 340 Paras J Feb 25 1991 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS -Ferdinand Castillo then a freshman student at St Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach Quezon His parents didnrsquot allow him to go due to short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home However he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher -his parents filed a complaint against St Francis HS represented by its principal Illumin and several teachers for damages incurred from the death of their son contending that it occurred due to petitionersrsquo failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family The TC found against the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim Also the male teachers who were to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which was not school sanctioned and as the latter had her own class to supervise then and was not actually invited -Both parties appealed to the CA On the issue of the liability of St Francis HS and the Illumin the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 They cannot escape liability simply because it wasnrsquot an ldquoextra-curricular activity of the HSrdquo From the evidence

it was shown that the principal had known of the picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the event As such under Article 2180 both are jointly and severally liable w the teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the ownermanager (St Francis and the principal) Petitioners contend that the victimrsquos parents failed to prove by evidence that they didnrsquot give their son consent to join the picnic The Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence of their liability Also 2 of the teachers who arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers Hence this petition ISSUE (1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants (2) WON Art 2180 in relation to 2176 is applicable (3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper HELD (1) NO Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them At the outset it should be noted that the victimrsquos parents allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination -Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it If the CArsquos findings are to be upheld employers will be forever exposed to the risk and

danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the performance of their duties -No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised diligence of a good father of the family In fact 2 PE teachers were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming Life savers were brought in the event of such an accident The records also show that the 2 PE teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim (2) NO The CA erred in applying Art 2180 particularly par 4 For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his employee the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task In the case at bar the teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity (3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence required of them no moral or exemplary damages under Art 2177 may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses PREMISES CONSIDERED the questioned decision is SET ASIDE PSBA v CA (BENITEZBAUTISTA) 205 SCRA 729 Padilla J Feb 4 1992 FACTS -Carlitos Bautista enrolled in the 3rd year commerce course of PSBA was stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants who were

from outside the schoolrsquos academic community This prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers alleging negligence recklessness and lack of security precautions means and methods before during and after the attack of the victim -PSBA sought to dismiss the case alleging that since they were presumably sued under Art 2180 there was no cause of action since academic institutions are not subject to the said provision -A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by the TC yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA Hence this petition ISSUES (1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180 HELD (1) NO Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the parties the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern but the court has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a contract -Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroadrdquohellip the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the partiesrdquo

-Using the test in Cangco a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBArsquos liability hence any finding of negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual obligation only -When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment a contract is established between them resulting in a bilateral obligation The school is obliged to provide the student with an education along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge In turn the student abides by the schoolrsquos academic requirements and observes its rules and regulations However a school cannot be an insurer for its students against all risks one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons time and place - In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was breached due to PSBArsquos negligence in providing proper security measures At this stage the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondentrsquos complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC can determine WHEREFORE the petition is DENIED The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court Costs against the petitioners SOLIMAN JR V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 FELICIANO J May 18 1992 NATURE Civil complaint for damages FACTS

- On August 13 1982 while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman Jr a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC) was in the campus premises thereof the defendant Jimmy Solomon who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant RL Security Agency Inc without any provocation shot the plaintiff on the abdomen The plaintiff was confined in a hospital and as per doctors opinion he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months Petitioner represented by his guardian filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC RL Security Agency and Solomon - RCC filed a motion to dismiss contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon It further argued that Article 2180 7th paragraph of the Civil Code did not apply since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil student or apprentice of the school - Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCCrsquos motion to dismiss Petitionerrsquos MFR was denied Hence this appeal ISSUES 1 WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180 as well as those of Articles 349 350 and 352 of the Civil Code

2 WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1 NO - Under Art 2180 the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for ones own act or omission but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils their students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody - The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman Jr RCC was not the employer of Solomon The employer of Solomon was the RL Security Agency Inc while the school was the client of the latter It is settled that where the security agency as here recruits hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency and not to the clients of such agency There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC

and Solomon petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges he being in fact an employee of the RL Security Agency Inc the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows Art 349 The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority xxx xxx xxx (2) Teachers and professors xxx xxx xxx (4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices xxx xxx xxx Art 350 The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child xxx xxx xxx Art 352 The relations between teacher and pupil professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student - In Palisoc v Brillantes the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc a student of that Institute which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon another student of the Institute It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th

paragraph of Article 2180 quoted above but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case - Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority In the instant case Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner was not a pupil student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon 2 YES - In the case of PSBA v CA the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision At the same time however the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment on the one hand and the students who are enrolled on the other hand which contract results in obligations for both parties It held When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment there is established a contract between them resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with For its part the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession On the other hand the student covenants to abide by the schools academic requirements and observe its rules and regulationsInstitutions of learning must also meet the implicit or built-in obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary

undertaking of imparting knowledge Certainly no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb Necessarily the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof - It was also pointed out in said case that In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar however there is as yet no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the formers negligence in providing proper security measures This would be for the trial court to determine And even if there be a finding of negligence the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only Using the test of Cangco supra the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract In fact that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista In other words a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the schools liability The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code - In the PSBA case the trial court had denied the schools motion to dismiss the complaint against it and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial courts order In the case at bar the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC upon the assumption that petitioners cause of action was based and could have been based only on Art 2180 of the Civil Code As PSBA however states acts which are

tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have in the interest of justice allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the caseThis case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings ST MARYrsquoS ACADEMY VS CARPITANOS PARDO February 6 2002 NATURE Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos together with James Daniel II (then 15 driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached Carpitanos sued the school James Daniel II his parents and Vivencio Villanueva -TC absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II held parents and school liable

-CA school liable under A218 and 219 FC finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them ISSUE (regarding liability of St Maryrsquos Academy) WON St Maryrsquos Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos and therefore liable for damages HELD NO The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep Ratio For the school to be liable it must be shown that the lsquoinjury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events unbroken by intervening efficient causes Reasoning The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva It was

Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep -Liability for the accident whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep must be pinned on the minorrsquos parents primarily The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeepConsidering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy had no control and which was the proximate cause of the accident petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident - It is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos Disposition WHEREFORE the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants excluding petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy Dipolog City No costs SO ORDERED PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO March 25 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision

FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines Inc and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS Inc its manager BALINGIT and the driver PINEDA - It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK owned by Phil-Am along the natrsquol highway at Sto Tomas Pampanga The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan owned by Phil Rabbit Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days This deprived the company of earnings of about P8600 - Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pinedas employer Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him - CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art2180 CC - In the appeal the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41200 Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality But this was not alleged in their complaint ISSUE WON the terms employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise

used in Art 2180 NCC (Art1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments Art2180 uses the term manager (director in the Spanish version) to mean employerrdquo - Hence under the allegations of the complaint no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders Inc in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer Phil-American Forwarders Inc This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses Dispositive Lower courtrsquos order of dismissal is AFFIRMED PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE June 17 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence recklessness

violation of traffic rules and regulations abandonment of victim and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondentsrsquo Version -In the early morning of March 24 1990 about 600 orsquoclock the victim Ramon A Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine -The Magsaysay Blvd runs perpendicular to Gomez St and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street -As the bus was pushed its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A Acuesta who as a result thereof fell and thereafter was run over by the said bus Petitionerrsquos Version -Manilhig in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street the victim who was biking towards the same direction as the bus suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road

-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear which caused the death of the victim Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied MFR -Hence this appeal

ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes -Civil Case No 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 21763 and 21804 of the Civil Code against petitioner

(limited to that involved in the outline) 3Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 4Art 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxxxxxxxx

Manilhig and his employer petitioner Philtranco respectively -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle like petitioner Philtranco for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary direct and joint and several or solidary with the driver As to solidarity Article 2194 expressly provides the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary -Since the employers liability is primary direct and solidary its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed (with regard to this issue) CASTILEX V VASQUEZ Dec 21 1999 Davide Facts At around 130 to 200 in the morning Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmentildea Rotunda He was traveling counter-clockwise (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time Upon the

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

other hand Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no GBW-794 On the same date and time Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmentildea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St or to Belvic St

In the process the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute So the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez Jr and Luisa So Vasquez parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation In the same action Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez Issue WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

Held Castilez is absolved from any liability The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision Instead the fourth paragraph should apply Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable Both provisions apply to employers the fourth paragraph to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise and the fifth paragraph to employers in general whether or not engaged in any business or industry The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included Negligent acts of employees whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry are covered so long as they were acting

within the scope of their assigned task even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions For admittedly employees oftentimes wear different hats They perform functions which are beyond their office title or designation but which nevertheless are still within the call of dutyThis court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 whether or not engaged in any business or industry an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship once this is done the plaintiff must show to hold the employer liable that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee

It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect and even finality at times This rule is however subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations surmises or conjectures Such exception obtain in the present

case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager

On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks ABAD who was presented as a hostile witness testified that at the time of the incident he was driving a company-issued vehicle registered under the name of petitioner He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment an employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction but rather the result varies with each state of facts The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances The SC does not agree The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle

I Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle

II Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee and not a part of his services to his employer Hence in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle 14 cda

The employer may however be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and presumably spending more time at his actual duties Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving commission rule under which it can be

found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home However even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own

III Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept it has been held that he has not resumed his employment and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business or within the

scope of his assigned task ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident It was then about 200 am way beyond the normal working hours ABADs working day had ended his overtime work had already been completed His being at a place which as petitioner put it was known as a haven for prostitutes pimps and drug pushers and addicts had no connection to petitioners business neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager Rather using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR August 17 1992

NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI He is also employed as a janitor The president of FCI is Agustin Masa Agustin has a son Allan who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver Allan lives with his dad Funtecha also lives in the presidentrsquos house free of charge while a student at FCI - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home then go back to the school then go home in the school jeep He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hersquos supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school - One night Funtecha wanted to drive home He has a student license After a dangerous curb

and seeing that the road was clear Allan let Funtecha drive Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians) The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night - TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan SC reversed saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school Allans job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose Moreover it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtechas possession of a student drivers license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans house Funtecha

definitely was not having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a frolic of his own but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner Hence the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

in holding him liable for damages for the deliberate criminal act of his minor son Issue WON the father is liable civilly for the criminal act of his son Held Yes In an earlier case (Exconde vs Capuno et al GR No L-10132 prom June 29 1957) holding the defendants jointly and severally liable with his minor son Dante for damages arising from the criminal act committed by the latter this tribunal gave the following reasons for the rule mdash

The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and in case of his death or incapacity the mother for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them is obvious This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the duty of supporting them keeping them in their company educating them in proportion to their means while on the other hand gives them the right to correct and punish them in moderation (Arts 134 and 135 Spanish Civil Code) The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Art 1903 last paragraph Spanish Civil Code) This defendants failed to prove

In another case Salen and Salbanera vs Jose Balce the defendant Balce was the father of a minor Gumersindo Balce below 18 years of age who was living with him Gumersindo was found guilty of homicide for having killed Carlos Salen

minor son of plaintiffs The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case stating that the civil liability of the minor son of defendant arising from his criminal liability must be determined under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and not under Art 2180 of the new Civil Code In reversing the decision this tribunal held mdash

It is true that under Art 101 of the Revised Penal Code a father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile an insane under 9 years of age or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acts without discernment unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part This is because a son who commits the act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12 subdivisions 1 2 and 3 Revised Penal Code) The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority or control But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted In that case resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil Code The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180 the pertinent portion of which provides The father and in case of his death or incapacity the mother are responsible for damages caused by the minor children who live in their company To hold that this provision

does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent Verily the void apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical cases

Moreover the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of the evidence submitted therein by both parties independently of the criminal case And responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the action in the present case was instituted is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault of negligence under the Penal Code (Art 2177) and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore stated any discussion as to the minors criminal responsibility is of no moment IN VIEW HEREOF the petition is dismissed the decision appealed from is affirmed GUTIERREZ VS GUTIERREZ MALCOLM September 23 1931

Nature an action brought by the plaintiff in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the five

defendants to recover damages in the amount of P10000 for physical injuries suffered as a result of an automobile accident Facts A passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the municipality of Las Pintildeas Province of Rizal The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco and was owned by Saturnino Cortez The automobile was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez a lad 18 years of age and was owned by Bonifacios father and mother Mr and Mrs Manuel Gutierrez At the time of the collision the father was not in the car but the mother together will several other members of the Gutierrez family seven in all were accommodated therein Narcisso Gutierrez was a passenger of the bus He had a fracture on his right leg It was conceded that the collision was caused by negligence pure and simple But Narcisso Gutierrez blames both the bus and the car while the truck blames the car and the car in turn blames the truck the youth Bonifacio was in incompetent chauffeur that he was driving at an excessive rate of speed and that on approaching the bridge and the truck he lost his head and so contributed by his negligence to the accident The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his son Based on these facts pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code the father alone and not the minor or the mother would be liable for the damages caused by the minor

Issue

1 WON the father of Bonifacio (car) is liable

2 WON the owner of the truck is liable Held

1 Yes In the United States it is uniformly held that the head of a house the owner of an automobile who maintains it for the general use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children whom he designates or permits to run it where the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the owners family than the child driving it The theory of the law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of the owners business so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and servant

2 Yes The liability of Saturnino Cortez the owner of the truck and of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on a different basis namely that of contract The reason for this conclusion reaches to the findings of the trial court concerning the position of the truck on the bridge the speed in operating the machine and the lack of care employed by the chauffeur In its broader aspects the case is one of two drivers approaching a narrow bridge from opposite directions with neither being willing to slow up and give the right of way to the other with the

inevitable result of a collision and an accident

Disposition In consonance with the foregoing rulings the judgment appealed from will be modified and the plaintiff will have judgment in his favor against the defendants Manuel Gutierrez Abelardo Velasco and Saturnino Cortez jointly and severally for the sum of P5000 and the costs of both instances RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA) 135 SCRA 242 ABAD SANTOS February 28 1985 NATURE Petition to review a decision of CA FACTS Roberto Luna a businessman was killed in a vehicular collision (between Luna driving a gokart and Luis dela Rosa 13 years old driving a Toyota car without a license) at a gokart practice area Heirs of Luna brought a suit for damages against Luis and his father which the CFI ruled in favor of the Lunas awarding P1650000 as unearned net earnings of Luna P12000 compensatory damages and P50000 for loss of his companionship (come on) with legal interest from date of the decision and attorneyrsquos fees of P50000 (no interest mentioned) (Note father and son solidarily liable for damages) The Dela Rosas appealed in the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC In a MFR filed by the Dela Rosas the CA modified the decision this time reducing the unearned income to P450000 Both parties filed separate petitions for review in the SC

Petition of the Dela Rosas was denied for lack of merit The instant petition is the one filed by Lunas contending that the CA erred in reducing the award for unearned income and that the award for attyrsquos fees should include legal interest Pending the decision the SC came out with a resolution ordering the Dela Rosas in the interest of justice (since the death took place in 1970 and 15 years after the process of litigation is still not over) to pay the Lunas P450000 for unearned net earnings P12000 compensatory damages P50000 for loss of companionship all with legal interest and attyrsquos fees of P50000 within 30 days The Dela Rosas failed to pay the amounts saying that they had no cash money The writ of execution produced only a nominal amount In the meantime Luis is already of age married with 2 kids and living in Spain but only causally employed (ldquoHis compensation is hardly enough to support his family He has no assets of his own as yetrdquo) ISSUES 1 WON the CA erred in reducing the unearned income 2 WON the award for attyrsquos fees should have legal interest HELD 1 YES Ratio The reduction of the award of net unearned earnings had no basis thus is void Reasoning the RTC based its computation of the net unearned earnings on 2 factors life expectancy of the deceased of another 30 years and an annual net income of P55000 (P75000 gross income less P20000 personal expenses)

In coming out with the life expectancy RTC considered the age and health of the deceased However the CA modified this by factoring in the ldquoengagement of Luna in car racingrdquo thus lowering the life expectancy to only 10 years WRT to the gross income RTC considered the various positions the deceased held at the time of his death and the trend of his earnings over the span of his last few years thus coming up with a potential gross income of P75000 However the CA increased the annual personal expenses to P30000 due to the escalating gasoline expenses thus lowering the net annual unearned income to P45000 CA erred in ruling that the engagement with car racing reduced the life expectancy There is nothing on record that supports the claim that the car racing was a dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy ldquoThat Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low slung low powered vehicles only slightly larger than foot-pedaled four wheeled conveyances It was error on the part of the CA to have disturbed the determination of the RTC which it had previously affirmedrdquo Also it was an error to increase the expenses without increasing the gross income ldquoIt stands to reason that if his annual personal expenses should increase because of the lsquoescalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R Lunas social standingrsquo [a statement which lacks complete basis] it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would also increase considering the manifold sources thereofrdquo 2 YES

Ratio The attorneys fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and under the circumstances interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the court (The attyrsquos fees should accrue interest from the date of filing of the compliant) Obiter The Dela Rosas invoke the ruling in Elcano v Hilll where the court held that A2180 applied to Atty Hill nothwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of his son but since the son had attained majority as a matter of equity the liability of Atty Hill became merely subsidiarily to that of his son The Dela Rosas now invoke that the father should also be held only subsidiarily To this contention the court is ldquounwilling to apply equity instead of strict law because to do so will not serve the ends of justice Luis is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine Courts Also he has no property in the Phils or elsewhererdquo Disposition resolution of CA SET ASIDE reinstating the earlier decision with slight modification regarding the award of attyrsquos fees LIBI V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SPS GOTIONG) 214 SCRA 16 REGALADO September 181992 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court FACTS - respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from

which she died on January 141979 was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos Cebu City while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents and who also died in the same event on the same date - More than 2 years before their deaths Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December 1978 when Julie Ann broke up with Wendell after she found him to be sadistic and irresponsible - January 1979 - Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the Julie refused prompting him to resort to threats against her In order to avoid him Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend Malou Alfonso - January 141979 - Julie and Wendell died from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm licensed under Cresencio Libi father of Wendell - both set of parents came up with versions of the story Gotiongs gt Wendell caused her death by shooting her and thereafter turning the gun on himself to commit suicide Libis gt an unknown third party whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU) must have caused Wendells death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification - CFI Cebu Gotiongs filed civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latters vicarious liability under A2180

CC CFI dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of the evidence - IAC CFI decision set aside and found Libis subsidiarily liable ISSUE WON A2180 CC is applicable in making Libirsquos liable for vicarious liability HELD YES Ratio The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists to a large extent of the instruction and supervision of the child Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their son Wendell and in keeping said gun from his reach they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong Therefore appellants are liable under A2180 CC Reasoning - undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet It should be emphasized however that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not as the body was cleaned already in the funeral parlor - Amelita Libi mother of Wendell testified that her husband Cresencio Libi owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelitas key is always in her bag all of which facts were known to Wendell They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun She admitted however that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box We accordingly

cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was - A2180 The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by A2180 CC covers obligations wising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses - BUT Liability is not subsidiary BUT primary gt if the liability of the parents for crimes and QDs of their minor children is subsidiary they they can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damages But if the liability id direct and primary the diligence would constitute a valid substantial defense HENCE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR QDS OF THEIR MINOR KIDS AS CONTEMPLATED IN A2180 ID PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY gt applying A2194 (solidary liability of joint tortfeasors) the parent is also solidarily liable with the child THE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR FELONIES IS LIKEWISE PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY A101 RPC SAYS SO gt RULES + for civil liability from crimes committed by minors under the legal authority and control or who live in the company of the parents PRIMARY = premised on A101 RPC fot damages ex delicto by kids 9 or under or 9-15 but without discernment = premised on A2180 CC for kids 9-15 with discernment or 15-21 (now 18)

+ liability effected against father or mother BOTH PARENTS AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE PARENTAL AUHTORITY OVER THE MINOR = youth welfare code = FC responsibility of parents + for civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors same rules in A2180 and A2182 Disposition Instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED TAMARGO vs CA (Rubio Bundoc) 209 SCRA 518 Feliciano J 1992 NATURE Appeal for review of CA decision FACTS - On October 20 1982 Adelberto Bundoc then aged ten shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death He was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide but was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability ob the ground that he had acted without discernment The adopting and natural parents of Jennifer filed a civil complaint for damages against the parents of Bundoc - The parents of Adelberto claimed that they are not the indispensable party in the action as their son adopted by the spouses Rapisura on November 18 1982 via an adoption decree granted by the CFI of Ilocos Sur The trial Court agreed with the respondents and dismissed the complaint

- The case contained procedural questions which were raised in the appeal The SC however decided to hear the appeal based on substantial justice ISSUE - WON the spouses Bundoc were indispensable party to the tort action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code HELD- - Yes The Court held that parental authority did not retroactively transfer to and vested in the adopting parents at the time the shooting incident occurred The adopting parents had no actual or physical custody of Adelberto at the time of the incident as they were then in the US were they live To do so and hold them liable for the tortious act when be unfair and unconscionable Reasoning- - The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him under Article 2176 However because of his minority the provision of Article 2180 would be applicable Article 2180 reads ldquo the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for onersquos own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsiblehellip The father and incase of his death or incapacity the mother are responsible for the damages caused by the children who live in their companyhellip The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage - The principle of parental liability is designated as vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed

liability under the Anglo-American tort law Thus under this doctrine a person is not only liable for torts committed by him also torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsibility Thus parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of the parents which include the instructing controlling and disciplining of the child The presumption under law is that when a child under their care commits a tortuous act the parents were negligent in the performance of these duties and responsibilities As stated sufficient proof can be presented to overcome this presumption Disposition ndash Petition granted Decision set aside MERCADO v COURT OF APPEALS AND QUISUMBING L-14342 LABRADOR May 30 1960 NATURE This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing Jr is the son of his co-plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L Quisumbing while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L Mercado Manuel Quisumbing Jr and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon Quezon City - A pitogo which figures prominently in this case may be described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank On February 22 1956 Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing Jr quarrelled over a pitogo As a

result Augusto wounded Manuel Jr on the right cheek with a piece of razor ISSUES 1 WON the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the of the father since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time) 2 WON the moral damages fixed at P2000 are excessive HELD 1 NO The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should be made liable is as follows

ART 2180 Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody

- It would be seem that the clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil - Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply nor does paragraph 2 of

said article which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children 2 YES It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219 Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augustos resentment which motivated the assault was occasioned by the fact that Manuel Jr had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get his pitogo from Renato It is therefore apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbings own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy (Art 2179 Civil Code) After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals we find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code which authorizes the grant of moral damages was shown to have existed Consequently the grant of moral damages is not justified PALISOC VS BRILLANTES 41 SCRA 548 TEEHANKEE October 4 1971 NATURE An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the CFI Manila FACTS - Palisoc spouses as parents of their 16-year old son Dominador Palisoc and a student in

automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute filed the action below for damages arising from the death of their son at the hands of a fellow student defendant Virgilio L Daffon at the laboratory room of the said Institute - the deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L Daffon were classmates and one afternoon they together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor At that time the classes were in recess Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face Daffon in retaliation gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward Palisoc became pale and fainted First aid was administered to him but he was not revived so he was immediately taken to a hospital He never regained consciousness finally he died - Defendants were Antonio C Brillantes at the time when the incident occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute Teodosio Valenton the president thereof Santiago M Quibulue instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged and Virgilio L Daffon a fellow student of the deceased - At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship but lately it was duly incorporated

- the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code - The trial court however absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute in this wise ldquoIn the opinion of the Court this article(art2180) of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar since this contemplates the situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parentsThe clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parentsThere is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the schoolrdquo ISSUE WON the school officials are jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors with Daffon HELD a YES (head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute Valenton and Quibulue respectively) Ratio The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students so long as they remain in their custody is that they stand to a certain extent as to their pupils and students in loco parentis and are called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child In the law of torts the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of

the parents and hence it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school including recess time as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students Reasoning - The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Courts dictum in Mercado vs Court of Appeals that (I)t would seem that the clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control direction and influence It is true that under the law abovequoted teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution - phrase used in the cited article mdash so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school including recess time There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school as erroneously held by the lower court and the dicta in Mercado on which it relied must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision

- At any rate the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180 Civil Code by (proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage In the light of the factual findings of the lower courts decision said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability b NO (Brillantes as a mere member of the schools board of directors and the school) itself cannot be held similarly liable since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant - the school had been incorporated since and therefore the school itself as thus incorporated should have been brought in as party defendant DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows 1 Sentencing the Daffon Valenton and Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P1200000 for the death of Dominador Palisoc (b) P337500 for actual and compensatory expenses (c) P500000 for moral damages (d) P1000000 for loss of earning power and (e) P200000 for attorneys fee plus the costs of this action in both instances 2 absolving defendant Antonio C Brillantes from the complaint and 3 dismissing defendants counterclaims REYES JBL J concurring -I would like to clarify that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect that the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils who are minors is not in accord with the plain text of the law

- Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority the article expressly so provides as in the case of the parents and of the guardians It is natural to expect that if the law had intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of persons enumerated in the article it would have expressly so stated The fact that it has not done so indicates an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age Further it is not without significance that - finally that while in the case of parents and guardians their authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter MAKALINTAL J dissenting - I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v Court of Appeals I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results considering the size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions academic and non-academic as well as the temper attitudes and often destructive activism of the students to hold their teachers andor the administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts committed by them - It would demand responsibility without commensurate authority rendering teachers and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control - one other factor constrains me to dissent The opinion of the majority states Here the parents of the student at fault defendant Daffon are not involved since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident Note that for parental

responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their companyit stands to reason that (1) the clause so long as they remain in their custody as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase who live in their company as used in reference to parents and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer minors so should teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLLETOS) 160 SCRA 315 CRUZ April 15 1988

Facts It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to graduate at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes Alfredo went to the school to submit his ldquoReport in Physicrdquo While they were in the auditorium of their school hewas shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon

ISSUE WON Art 2180 is applicable Held Yes Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools academic or non-academic Teachers are liable for acts of their student except where the school is technical in nature (arts and trade establishment) in which case the head thereof shall be answerable

ldquoThere is really no substantial difference distinction between the academic and non-

academic schools in so far as torts committed by their students are concerned The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the student under their control and supervision whatever the nature of the school where he is teachingrdquo ldquox x x x The distinction no longer obtains at present x x x ldquo

The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises whether the semester has not ended or has ended or has not yet begun The term ldquocustodyrdquo signifies that the student is within the control and influence of the school authorities The teacher in charge is the one designated by the dean principal or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils or students in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned It is not necessary that at the time of the injury the teacher is physically present and in a position to prevent it

Thus for injuries caused by the student the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him

In any event the school may be held to answer for the acts of its teacher or the head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior but it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias Such defense they had taken necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of and thus be exonerated from liability imposed by Art 2180

Basis of teacherrsquos vicarious liability is as such they acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents) However teachers are not expected to have the same measure of responsibility as that imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree x x x The parent can instill more lasting discipline more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or the head for the tort committed by the child

As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent nor the school remised in the discharged of their duties they were exonerated of liability (Note ndash the court view on increasing students activism likely causing violence resulting to injuries in or out of the school premises ndash J Guttierez Jr concurringly said many student x x x view some teachers as part of the bourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice on behavior deportment and other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively rejected It seems most unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has outlived its purpose The court cannot make law it can only apply the law with its imperfections However the court can suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY) 160 SCRA 785 PARAS April 25 1988

NATURE Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order dismissing the complaint as against the respondent school and denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal FACTS - A group of students walking inside Araneta University were accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karin Madidis alias ldquoTengrdquo Petitioner (Reynaldo) was subsequently stabbed by Teng requiring him to be hospitalized and to undergo surgery - Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng and Arante University based on Art 2190 CC - Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the provision only applies to vocational schools and not to academic institutions They also claim that the civil liability in this case arose from a crime which they did not commit Since it was a civil case respondent school claims that a demand should have been made by the plaintiff rendering it premature to bring an action for damages against respondent school MTD was granted by the CA - Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of Dismissal Motion was denied due to insufficient justification to disturb ruling ISSUE WON the Art 2180 CC2 applies to academic institutions

2 Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody

HELD It is unnecessary to answer the issue What the petitioner wants to know is WON the school or the university itself is liable The answer is no since the provision speaks of ldquoteachers or headsrdquo Dispositive WHEREFORE this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit YLARDE vs AQUINO GANCAYCO 1988 July 29 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School and private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein At that time the school was littered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez stated burying them all by himself Deciding to help his colleague private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils aged ten to eleven Being their teacher-in-charge he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried The work was left unfinished The following day also after classes private respondent Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging These four pupils ---- Reynaldo Alonso Fransico Alcantara Ismael Abaga and Novelito

Ylarde dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep At this point private respondent Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole Then said private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope Before leaving private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children not to touch the stone A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left three of the four kids Alonso Alcantara and Ylarde playfully jumped into the pit Then without any warning at all the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde the concrete block caught him before he could get out pinning him to the wall in a standing position As a result thereof Ylarde sustained injuries and died three (3) days later Ylardes parents petitioners in this case filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of

a very cautious person and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence ISSUE WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code both private respondents can be held liable for damages Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter On the other hand the applicable provision of Article 2180 states Art 2180 xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody HELD Only Aquino the teacher is liable Ratio As regards the principal We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades Reasoning

This is in line with the Courtrsquos ruling in Amadora vs Court of Appeals wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades it is only the head of the school who can be held liable Ratio Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons Reasoning (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the childrens safety and (5) left the children close to the excavation an obviously attractive nuisance (6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity This should not be the case The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself A minor

should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age capacity discretion knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances Bearing this in mind We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence DISPOSITION Granted SALVOSA v IAC (CASTRO) 166 SCRA 274 PADILLA J October 5 1988 FACTS Jimmy Abon a commerce student of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977 at around 800 pm in the parking space of BCF BCF is both an academic and arts and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP Subsequently the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages impleading Jimmy B Abon Roberto C Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF) Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF) Libertad D Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc as party defendants

After hearing the Trial Court rendered a decision (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B Abon Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc jointly and severally to pay private respondents as heirs of Napoleon Castro (2) absolving the other defendants and (3) dismissing the defendants counterclaim for lack of merit ISSUE WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B Abon HELD NO Jimmy B Abon cannot be considered to have been at attendance in the school or in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro Logically therefore petitioners cannot under Art 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages resulting from his acts Ratio Under the penultimate paragraph of Art 2180 of the Civil Code teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher the latter stands to a certain extent in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student] Likewise the phrase used in [Art 2180 mdash so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and

students for as long as they are at attendance in the school including recess time Reasoning a The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the CA According to the CA while it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident which was at about 8 oclock in the evening but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter The time interval is safely within the recess time that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case supra In line with the case of Palisoc 17 a student not at attendance in the school cannot be in recess thereat A recess as the concept is embraced in the phrase at attendance in the school contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises or the area within which the school activity is conducted Recess by its nature does not include dismissal Likewise the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute attending school or being in the protective and supervisory custody of the school as contemplated in the law b Jimmy B Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior the ROTC Commandant when he shot Napoleon Castro ST FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v CA(CastilloCadiz)

194 SCRA 340 Paras J Feb 25 1991 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS -Ferdinand Castillo then a freshman student at St Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach Quezon His parents didnrsquot allow him to go due to short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home However he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher -his parents filed a complaint against St Francis HS represented by its principal Illumin and several teachers for damages incurred from the death of their son contending that it occurred due to petitionersrsquo failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family The TC found against the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim Also the male teachers who were to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which was not school sanctioned and as the latter had her own class to supervise then and was not actually invited -Both parties appealed to the CA On the issue of the liability of St Francis HS and the Illumin the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 They cannot escape liability simply because it wasnrsquot an ldquoextra-curricular activity of the HSrdquo From the evidence

it was shown that the principal had known of the picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the event As such under Article 2180 both are jointly and severally liable w the teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the ownermanager (St Francis and the principal) Petitioners contend that the victimrsquos parents failed to prove by evidence that they didnrsquot give their son consent to join the picnic The Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence of their liability Also 2 of the teachers who arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers Hence this petition ISSUE (1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants (2) WON Art 2180 in relation to 2176 is applicable (3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper HELD (1) NO Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them At the outset it should be noted that the victimrsquos parents allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination -Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it If the CArsquos findings are to be upheld employers will be forever exposed to the risk and

danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the performance of their duties -No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised diligence of a good father of the family In fact 2 PE teachers were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming Life savers were brought in the event of such an accident The records also show that the 2 PE teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim (2) NO The CA erred in applying Art 2180 particularly par 4 For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his employee the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task In the case at bar the teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity (3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence required of them no moral or exemplary damages under Art 2177 may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses PREMISES CONSIDERED the questioned decision is SET ASIDE PSBA v CA (BENITEZBAUTISTA) 205 SCRA 729 Padilla J Feb 4 1992 FACTS -Carlitos Bautista enrolled in the 3rd year commerce course of PSBA was stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants who were

from outside the schoolrsquos academic community This prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers alleging negligence recklessness and lack of security precautions means and methods before during and after the attack of the victim -PSBA sought to dismiss the case alleging that since they were presumably sued under Art 2180 there was no cause of action since academic institutions are not subject to the said provision -A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by the TC yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA Hence this petition ISSUES (1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180 HELD (1) NO Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the parties the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern but the court has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a contract -Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroadrdquohellip the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the partiesrdquo

-Using the test in Cangco a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBArsquos liability hence any finding of negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual obligation only -When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment a contract is established between them resulting in a bilateral obligation The school is obliged to provide the student with an education along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge In turn the student abides by the schoolrsquos academic requirements and observes its rules and regulations However a school cannot be an insurer for its students against all risks one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons time and place - In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was breached due to PSBArsquos negligence in providing proper security measures At this stage the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondentrsquos complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC can determine WHEREFORE the petition is DENIED The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court Costs against the petitioners SOLIMAN JR V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 FELICIANO J May 18 1992 NATURE Civil complaint for damages FACTS

- On August 13 1982 while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman Jr a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC) was in the campus premises thereof the defendant Jimmy Solomon who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant RL Security Agency Inc without any provocation shot the plaintiff on the abdomen The plaintiff was confined in a hospital and as per doctors opinion he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months Petitioner represented by his guardian filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC RL Security Agency and Solomon - RCC filed a motion to dismiss contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon It further argued that Article 2180 7th paragraph of the Civil Code did not apply since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil student or apprentice of the school - Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCCrsquos motion to dismiss Petitionerrsquos MFR was denied Hence this appeal ISSUES 1 WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180 as well as those of Articles 349 350 and 352 of the Civil Code

2 WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1 NO - Under Art 2180 the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for ones own act or omission but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils their students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody - The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman Jr RCC was not the employer of Solomon The employer of Solomon was the RL Security Agency Inc while the school was the client of the latter It is settled that where the security agency as here recruits hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency and not to the clients of such agency There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC

and Solomon petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges he being in fact an employee of the RL Security Agency Inc the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows Art 349 The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority xxx xxx xxx (2) Teachers and professors xxx xxx xxx (4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices xxx xxx xxx Art 350 The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child xxx xxx xxx Art 352 The relations between teacher and pupil professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student - In Palisoc v Brillantes the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc a student of that Institute which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon another student of the Institute It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th

paragraph of Article 2180 quoted above but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case - Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority In the instant case Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner was not a pupil student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon 2 YES - In the case of PSBA v CA the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision At the same time however the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment on the one hand and the students who are enrolled on the other hand which contract results in obligations for both parties It held When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment there is established a contract between them resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with For its part the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession On the other hand the student covenants to abide by the schools academic requirements and observe its rules and regulationsInstitutions of learning must also meet the implicit or built-in obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary

undertaking of imparting knowledge Certainly no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb Necessarily the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof - It was also pointed out in said case that In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar however there is as yet no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the formers negligence in providing proper security measures This would be for the trial court to determine And even if there be a finding of negligence the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only Using the test of Cangco supra the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract In fact that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista In other words a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the schools liability The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code - In the PSBA case the trial court had denied the schools motion to dismiss the complaint against it and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial courts order In the case at bar the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC upon the assumption that petitioners cause of action was based and could have been based only on Art 2180 of the Civil Code As PSBA however states acts which are

tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have in the interest of justice allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the caseThis case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings ST MARYrsquoS ACADEMY VS CARPITANOS PARDO February 6 2002 NATURE Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos together with James Daniel II (then 15 driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached Carpitanos sued the school James Daniel II his parents and Vivencio Villanueva -TC absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II held parents and school liable

-CA school liable under A218 and 219 FC finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them ISSUE (regarding liability of St Maryrsquos Academy) WON St Maryrsquos Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos and therefore liable for damages HELD NO The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep Ratio For the school to be liable it must be shown that the lsquoinjury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events unbroken by intervening efficient causes Reasoning The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva It was

Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep -Liability for the accident whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep must be pinned on the minorrsquos parents primarily The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeepConsidering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy had no control and which was the proximate cause of the accident petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident - It is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos Disposition WHEREFORE the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants excluding petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy Dipolog City No costs SO ORDERED PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO March 25 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision

FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines Inc and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS Inc its manager BALINGIT and the driver PINEDA - It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK owned by Phil-Am along the natrsquol highway at Sto Tomas Pampanga The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan owned by Phil Rabbit Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days This deprived the company of earnings of about P8600 - Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pinedas employer Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him - CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art2180 CC - In the appeal the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41200 Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality But this was not alleged in their complaint ISSUE WON the terms employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise

used in Art 2180 NCC (Art1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments Art2180 uses the term manager (director in the Spanish version) to mean employerrdquo - Hence under the allegations of the complaint no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders Inc in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer Phil-American Forwarders Inc This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses Dispositive Lower courtrsquos order of dismissal is AFFIRMED PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE June 17 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence recklessness

violation of traffic rules and regulations abandonment of victim and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondentsrsquo Version -In the early morning of March 24 1990 about 600 orsquoclock the victim Ramon A Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine -The Magsaysay Blvd runs perpendicular to Gomez St and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street -As the bus was pushed its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A Acuesta who as a result thereof fell and thereafter was run over by the said bus Petitionerrsquos Version -Manilhig in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street the victim who was biking towards the same direction as the bus suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road

-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear which caused the death of the victim Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied MFR -Hence this appeal

ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes -Civil Case No 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 21763 and 21804 of the Civil Code against petitioner

(limited to that involved in the outline) 3Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 4Art 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxxxxxxxx

Manilhig and his employer petitioner Philtranco respectively -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle like petitioner Philtranco for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary direct and joint and several or solidary with the driver As to solidarity Article 2194 expressly provides the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary -Since the employers liability is primary direct and solidary its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed (with regard to this issue) CASTILEX V VASQUEZ Dec 21 1999 Davide Facts At around 130 to 200 in the morning Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmentildea Rotunda He was traveling counter-clockwise (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time Upon the

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

other hand Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no GBW-794 On the same date and time Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmentildea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St or to Belvic St

In the process the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute So the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez Jr and Luisa So Vasquez parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation In the same action Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez Issue WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

Held Castilez is absolved from any liability The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision Instead the fourth paragraph should apply Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable Both provisions apply to employers the fourth paragraph to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise and the fifth paragraph to employers in general whether or not engaged in any business or industry The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included Negligent acts of employees whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry are covered so long as they were acting

within the scope of their assigned task even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions For admittedly employees oftentimes wear different hats They perform functions which are beyond their office title or designation but which nevertheless are still within the call of dutyThis court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 whether or not engaged in any business or industry an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship once this is done the plaintiff must show to hold the employer liable that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee

It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect and even finality at times This rule is however subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations surmises or conjectures Such exception obtain in the present

case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager

On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks ABAD who was presented as a hostile witness testified that at the time of the incident he was driving a company-issued vehicle registered under the name of petitioner He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment an employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction but rather the result varies with each state of facts The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances The SC does not agree The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle

I Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle

II Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee and not a part of his services to his employer Hence in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle 14 cda

The employer may however be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and presumably spending more time at his actual duties Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving commission rule under which it can be

found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home However even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own

III Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept it has been held that he has not resumed his employment and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business or within the

scope of his assigned task ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident It was then about 200 am way beyond the normal working hours ABADs working day had ended his overtime work had already been completed His being at a place which as petitioner put it was known as a haven for prostitutes pimps and drug pushers and addicts had no connection to petitioners business neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager Rather using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR August 17 1992

NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI He is also employed as a janitor The president of FCI is Agustin Masa Agustin has a son Allan who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver Allan lives with his dad Funtecha also lives in the presidentrsquos house free of charge while a student at FCI - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home then go back to the school then go home in the school jeep He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hersquos supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school - One night Funtecha wanted to drive home He has a student license After a dangerous curb

and seeing that the road was clear Allan let Funtecha drive Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians) The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night - TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan SC reversed saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school Allans job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose Moreover it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtechas possession of a student drivers license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans house Funtecha

definitely was not having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a frolic of his own but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner Hence the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

defendants to recover damages in the amount of P10000 for physical injuries suffered as a result of an automobile accident Facts A passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the municipality of Las Pintildeas Province of Rizal The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco and was owned by Saturnino Cortez The automobile was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez a lad 18 years of age and was owned by Bonifacios father and mother Mr and Mrs Manuel Gutierrez At the time of the collision the father was not in the car but the mother together will several other members of the Gutierrez family seven in all were accommodated therein Narcisso Gutierrez was a passenger of the bus He had a fracture on his right leg It was conceded that the collision was caused by negligence pure and simple But Narcisso Gutierrez blames both the bus and the car while the truck blames the car and the car in turn blames the truck the youth Bonifacio was in incompetent chauffeur that he was driving at an excessive rate of speed and that on approaching the bridge and the truck he lost his head and so contributed by his negligence to the accident The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his son Based on these facts pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code the father alone and not the minor or the mother would be liable for the damages caused by the minor

Issue

1 WON the father of Bonifacio (car) is liable

2 WON the owner of the truck is liable Held

1 Yes In the United States it is uniformly held that the head of a house the owner of an automobile who maintains it for the general use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children whom he designates or permits to run it where the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the owners family than the child driving it The theory of the law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of the owners business so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and servant

2 Yes The liability of Saturnino Cortez the owner of the truck and of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on a different basis namely that of contract The reason for this conclusion reaches to the findings of the trial court concerning the position of the truck on the bridge the speed in operating the machine and the lack of care employed by the chauffeur In its broader aspects the case is one of two drivers approaching a narrow bridge from opposite directions with neither being willing to slow up and give the right of way to the other with the

inevitable result of a collision and an accident

Disposition In consonance with the foregoing rulings the judgment appealed from will be modified and the plaintiff will have judgment in his favor against the defendants Manuel Gutierrez Abelardo Velasco and Saturnino Cortez jointly and severally for the sum of P5000 and the costs of both instances RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA) 135 SCRA 242 ABAD SANTOS February 28 1985 NATURE Petition to review a decision of CA FACTS Roberto Luna a businessman was killed in a vehicular collision (between Luna driving a gokart and Luis dela Rosa 13 years old driving a Toyota car without a license) at a gokart practice area Heirs of Luna brought a suit for damages against Luis and his father which the CFI ruled in favor of the Lunas awarding P1650000 as unearned net earnings of Luna P12000 compensatory damages and P50000 for loss of his companionship (come on) with legal interest from date of the decision and attorneyrsquos fees of P50000 (no interest mentioned) (Note father and son solidarily liable for damages) The Dela Rosas appealed in the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC In a MFR filed by the Dela Rosas the CA modified the decision this time reducing the unearned income to P450000 Both parties filed separate petitions for review in the SC

Petition of the Dela Rosas was denied for lack of merit The instant petition is the one filed by Lunas contending that the CA erred in reducing the award for unearned income and that the award for attyrsquos fees should include legal interest Pending the decision the SC came out with a resolution ordering the Dela Rosas in the interest of justice (since the death took place in 1970 and 15 years after the process of litigation is still not over) to pay the Lunas P450000 for unearned net earnings P12000 compensatory damages P50000 for loss of companionship all with legal interest and attyrsquos fees of P50000 within 30 days The Dela Rosas failed to pay the amounts saying that they had no cash money The writ of execution produced only a nominal amount In the meantime Luis is already of age married with 2 kids and living in Spain but only causally employed (ldquoHis compensation is hardly enough to support his family He has no assets of his own as yetrdquo) ISSUES 1 WON the CA erred in reducing the unearned income 2 WON the award for attyrsquos fees should have legal interest HELD 1 YES Ratio The reduction of the award of net unearned earnings had no basis thus is void Reasoning the RTC based its computation of the net unearned earnings on 2 factors life expectancy of the deceased of another 30 years and an annual net income of P55000 (P75000 gross income less P20000 personal expenses)

In coming out with the life expectancy RTC considered the age and health of the deceased However the CA modified this by factoring in the ldquoengagement of Luna in car racingrdquo thus lowering the life expectancy to only 10 years WRT to the gross income RTC considered the various positions the deceased held at the time of his death and the trend of his earnings over the span of his last few years thus coming up with a potential gross income of P75000 However the CA increased the annual personal expenses to P30000 due to the escalating gasoline expenses thus lowering the net annual unearned income to P45000 CA erred in ruling that the engagement with car racing reduced the life expectancy There is nothing on record that supports the claim that the car racing was a dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy ldquoThat Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low slung low powered vehicles only slightly larger than foot-pedaled four wheeled conveyances It was error on the part of the CA to have disturbed the determination of the RTC which it had previously affirmedrdquo Also it was an error to increase the expenses without increasing the gross income ldquoIt stands to reason that if his annual personal expenses should increase because of the lsquoescalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R Lunas social standingrsquo [a statement which lacks complete basis] it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would also increase considering the manifold sources thereofrdquo 2 YES

Ratio The attorneys fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and under the circumstances interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the court (The attyrsquos fees should accrue interest from the date of filing of the compliant) Obiter The Dela Rosas invoke the ruling in Elcano v Hilll where the court held that A2180 applied to Atty Hill nothwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of his son but since the son had attained majority as a matter of equity the liability of Atty Hill became merely subsidiarily to that of his son The Dela Rosas now invoke that the father should also be held only subsidiarily To this contention the court is ldquounwilling to apply equity instead of strict law because to do so will not serve the ends of justice Luis is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine Courts Also he has no property in the Phils or elsewhererdquo Disposition resolution of CA SET ASIDE reinstating the earlier decision with slight modification regarding the award of attyrsquos fees LIBI V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SPS GOTIONG) 214 SCRA 16 REGALADO September 181992 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court FACTS - respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from

which she died on January 141979 was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos Cebu City while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents and who also died in the same event on the same date - More than 2 years before their deaths Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December 1978 when Julie Ann broke up with Wendell after she found him to be sadistic and irresponsible - January 1979 - Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the Julie refused prompting him to resort to threats against her In order to avoid him Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend Malou Alfonso - January 141979 - Julie and Wendell died from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm licensed under Cresencio Libi father of Wendell - both set of parents came up with versions of the story Gotiongs gt Wendell caused her death by shooting her and thereafter turning the gun on himself to commit suicide Libis gt an unknown third party whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU) must have caused Wendells death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification - CFI Cebu Gotiongs filed civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latters vicarious liability under A2180

CC CFI dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of the evidence - IAC CFI decision set aside and found Libis subsidiarily liable ISSUE WON A2180 CC is applicable in making Libirsquos liable for vicarious liability HELD YES Ratio The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists to a large extent of the instruction and supervision of the child Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their son Wendell and in keeping said gun from his reach they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong Therefore appellants are liable under A2180 CC Reasoning - undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet It should be emphasized however that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not as the body was cleaned already in the funeral parlor - Amelita Libi mother of Wendell testified that her husband Cresencio Libi owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelitas key is always in her bag all of which facts were known to Wendell They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun She admitted however that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box We accordingly

cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was - A2180 The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by A2180 CC covers obligations wising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses - BUT Liability is not subsidiary BUT primary gt if the liability of the parents for crimes and QDs of their minor children is subsidiary they they can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damages But if the liability id direct and primary the diligence would constitute a valid substantial defense HENCE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR QDS OF THEIR MINOR KIDS AS CONTEMPLATED IN A2180 ID PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY gt applying A2194 (solidary liability of joint tortfeasors) the parent is also solidarily liable with the child THE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR FELONIES IS LIKEWISE PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY A101 RPC SAYS SO gt RULES + for civil liability from crimes committed by minors under the legal authority and control or who live in the company of the parents PRIMARY = premised on A101 RPC fot damages ex delicto by kids 9 or under or 9-15 but without discernment = premised on A2180 CC for kids 9-15 with discernment or 15-21 (now 18)

+ liability effected against father or mother BOTH PARENTS AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE PARENTAL AUHTORITY OVER THE MINOR = youth welfare code = FC responsibility of parents + for civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors same rules in A2180 and A2182 Disposition Instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED TAMARGO vs CA (Rubio Bundoc) 209 SCRA 518 Feliciano J 1992 NATURE Appeal for review of CA decision FACTS - On October 20 1982 Adelberto Bundoc then aged ten shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death He was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide but was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability ob the ground that he had acted without discernment The adopting and natural parents of Jennifer filed a civil complaint for damages against the parents of Bundoc - The parents of Adelberto claimed that they are not the indispensable party in the action as their son adopted by the spouses Rapisura on November 18 1982 via an adoption decree granted by the CFI of Ilocos Sur The trial Court agreed with the respondents and dismissed the complaint

- The case contained procedural questions which were raised in the appeal The SC however decided to hear the appeal based on substantial justice ISSUE - WON the spouses Bundoc were indispensable party to the tort action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code HELD- - Yes The Court held that parental authority did not retroactively transfer to and vested in the adopting parents at the time the shooting incident occurred The adopting parents had no actual or physical custody of Adelberto at the time of the incident as they were then in the US were they live To do so and hold them liable for the tortious act when be unfair and unconscionable Reasoning- - The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him under Article 2176 However because of his minority the provision of Article 2180 would be applicable Article 2180 reads ldquo the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for onersquos own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsiblehellip The father and incase of his death or incapacity the mother are responsible for the damages caused by the children who live in their companyhellip The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage - The principle of parental liability is designated as vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed

liability under the Anglo-American tort law Thus under this doctrine a person is not only liable for torts committed by him also torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsibility Thus parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of the parents which include the instructing controlling and disciplining of the child The presumption under law is that when a child under their care commits a tortuous act the parents were negligent in the performance of these duties and responsibilities As stated sufficient proof can be presented to overcome this presumption Disposition ndash Petition granted Decision set aside MERCADO v COURT OF APPEALS AND QUISUMBING L-14342 LABRADOR May 30 1960 NATURE This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing Jr is the son of his co-plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L Quisumbing while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L Mercado Manuel Quisumbing Jr and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon Quezon City - A pitogo which figures prominently in this case may be described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank On February 22 1956 Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing Jr quarrelled over a pitogo As a

result Augusto wounded Manuel Jr on the right cheek with a piece of razor ISSUES 1 WON the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the of the father since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time) 2 WON the moral damages fixed at P2000 are excessive HELD 1 NO The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should be made liable is as follows

ART 2180 Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody

- It would be seem that the clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil - Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply nor does paragraph 2 of

said article which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children 2 YES It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219 Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augustos resentment which motivated the assault was occasioned by the fact that Manuel Jr had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get his pitogo from Renato It is therefore apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbings own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy (Art 2179 Civil Code) After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals we find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code which authorizes the grant of moral damages was shown to have existed Consequently the grant of moral damages is not justified PALISOC VS BRILLANTES 41 SCRA 548 TEEHANKEE October 4 1971 NATURE An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the CFI Manila FACTS - Palisoc spouses as parents of their 16-year old son Dominador Palisoc and a student in

automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute filed the action below for damages arising from the death of their son at the hands of a fellow student defendant Virgilio L Daffon at the laboratory room of the said Institute - the deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L Daffon were classmates and one afternoon they together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor At that time the classes were in recess Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face Daffon in retaliation gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward Palisoc became pale and fainted First aid was administered to him but he was not revived so he was immediately taken to a hospital He never regained consciousness finally he died - Defendants were Antonio C Brillantes at the time when the incident occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute Teodosio Valenton the president thereof Santiago M Quibulue instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged and Virgilio L Daffon a fellow student of the deceased - At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship but lately it was duly incorporated

- the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code - The trial court however absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute in this wise ldquoIn the opinion of the Court this article(art2180) of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar since this contemplates the situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parentsThe clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parentsThere is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the schoolrdquo ISSUE WON the school officials are jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors with Daffon HELD a YES (head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute Valenton and Quibulue respectively) Ratio The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students so long as they remain in their custody is that they stand to a certain extent as to their pupils and students in loco parentis and are called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child In the law of torts the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of

the parents and hence it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school including recess time as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students Reasoning - The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Courts dictum in Mercado vs Court of Appeals that (I)t would seem that the clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control direction and influence It is true that under the law abovequoted teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution - phrase used in the cited article mdash so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school including recess time There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school as erroneously held by the lower court and the dicta in Mercado on which it relied must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision

- At any rate the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180 Civil Code by (proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage In the light of the factual findings of the lower courts decision said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability b NO (Brillantes as a mere member of the schools board of directors and the school) itself cannot be held similarly liable since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant - the school had been incorporated since and therefore the school itself as thus incorporated should have been brought in as party defendant DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows 1 Sentencing the Daffon Valenton and Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P1200000 for the death of Dominador Palisoc (b) P337500 for actual and compensatory expenses (c) P500000 for moral damages (d) P1000000 for loss of earning power and (e) P200000 for attorneys fee plus the costs of this action in both instances 2 absolving defendant Antonio C Brillantes from the complaint and 3 dismissing defendants counterclaims REYES JBL J concurring -I would like to clarify that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect that the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils who are minors is not in accord with the plain text of the law

- Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority the article expressly so provides as in the case of the parents and of the guardians It is natural to expect that if the law had intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of persons enumerated in the article it would have expressly so stated The fact that it has not done so indicates an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age Further it is not without significance that - finally that while in the case of parents and guardians their authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter MAKALINTAL J dissenting - I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v Court of Appeals I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results considering the size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions academic and non-academic as well as the temper attitudes and often destructive activism of the students to hold their teachers andor the administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts committed by them - It would demand responsibility without commensurate authority rendering teachers and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control - one other factor constrains me to dissent The opinion of the majority states Here the parents of the student at fault defendant Daffon are not involved since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident Note that for parental

responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their companyit stands to reason that (1) the clause so long as they remain in their custody as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase who live in their company as used in reference to parents and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer minors so should teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLLETOS) 160 SCRA 315 CRUZ April 15 1988

Facts It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to graduate at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes Alfredo went to the school to submit his ldquoReport in Physicrdquo While they were in the auditorium of their school hewas shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon

ISSUE WON Art 2180 is applicable Held Yes Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools academic or non-academic Teachers are liable for acts of their student except where the school is technical in nature (arts and trade establishment) in which case the head thereof shall be answerable

ldquoThere is really no substantial difference distinction between the academic and non-

academic schools in so far as torts committed by their students are concerned The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the student under their control and supervision whatever the nature of the school where he is teachingrdquo ldquox x x x The distinction no longer obtains at present x x x ldquo

The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises whether the semester has not ended or has ended or has not yet begun The term ldquocustodyrdquo signifies that the student is within the control and influence of the school authorities The teacher in charge is the one designated by the dean principal or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils or students in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned It is not necessary that at the time of the injury the teacher is physically present and in a position to prevent it

Thus for injuries caused by the student the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him

In any event the school may be held to answer for the acts of its teacher or the head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior but it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias Such defense they had taken necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of and thus be exonerated from liability imposed by Art 2180

Basis of teacherrsquos vicarious liability is as such they acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents) However teachers are not expected to have the same measure of responsibility as that imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree x x x The parent can instill more lasting discipline more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or the head for the tort committed by the child

As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent nor the school remised in the discharged of their duties they were exonerated of liability (Note ndash the court view on increasing students activism likely causing violence resulting to injuries in or out of the school premises ndash J Guttierez Jr concurringly said many student x x x view some teachers as part of the bourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice on behavior deportment and other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively rejected It seems most unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has outlived its purpose The court cannot make law it can only apply the law with its imperfections However the court can suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY) 160 SCRA 785 PARAS April 25 1988

NATURE Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order dismissing the complaint as against the respondent school and denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal FACTS - A group of students walking inside Araneta University were accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karin Madidis alias ldquoTengrdquo Petitioner (Reynaldo) was subsequently stabbed by Teng requiring him to be hospitalized and to undergo surgery - Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng and Arante University based on Art 2190 CC - Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the provision only applies to vocational schools and not to academic institutions They also claim that the civil liability in this case arose from a crime which they did not commit Since it was a civil case respondent school claims that a demand should have been made by the plaintiff rendering it premature to bring an action for damages against respondent school MTD was granted by the CA - Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of Dismissal Motion was denied due to insufficient justification to disturb ruling ISSUE WON the Art 2180 CC2 applies to academic institutions

2 Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody

HELD It is unnecessary to answer the issue What the petitioner wants to know is WON the school or the university itself is liable The answer is no since the provision speaks of ldquoteachers or headsrdquo Dispositive WHEREFORE this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit YLARDE vs AQUINO GANCAYCO 1988 July 29 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School and private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein At that time the school was littered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez stated burying them all by himself Deciding to help his colleague private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils aged ten to eleven Being their teacher-in-charge he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried The work was left unfinished The following day also after classes private respondent Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging These four pupils ---- Reynaldo Alonso Fransico Alcantara Ismael Abaga and Novelito

Ylarde dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep At this point private respondent Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole Then said private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope Before leaving private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children not to touch the stone A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left three of the four kids Alonso Alcantara and Ylarde playfully jumped into the pit Then without any warning at all the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde the concrete block caught him before he could get out pinning him to the wall in a standing position As a result thereof Ylarde sustained injuries and died three (3) days later Ylardes parents petitioners in this case filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of

a very cautious person and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence ISSUE WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code both private respondents can be held liable for damages Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter On the other hand the applicable provision of Article 2180 states Art 2180 xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody HELD Only Aquino the teacher is liable Ratio As regards the principal We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades Reasoning

This is in line with the Courtrsquos ruling in Amadora vs Court of Appeals wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades it is only the head of the school who can be held liable Ratio Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons Reasoning (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the childrens safety and (5) left the children close to the excavation an obviously attractive nuisance (6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity This should not be the case The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself A minor

should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age capacity discretion knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances Bearing this in mind We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence DISPOSITION Granted SALVOSA v IAC (CASTRO) 166 SCRA 274 PADILLA J October 5 1988 FACTS Jimmy Abon a commerce student of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977 at around 800 pm in the parking space of BCF BCF is both an academic and arts and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP Subsequently the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages impleading Jimmy B Abon Roberto C Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF) Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF) Libertad D Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc as party defendants

After hearing the Trial Court rendered a decision (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B Abon Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc jointly and severally to pay private respondents as heirs of Napoleon Castro (2) absolving the other defendants and (3) dismissing the defendants counterclaim for lack of merit ISSUE WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B Abon HELD NO Jimmy B Abon cannot be considered to have been at attendance in the school or in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro Logically therefore petitioners cannot under Art 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages resulting from his acts Ratio Under the penultimate paragraph of Art 2180 of the Civil Code teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher the latter stands to a certain extent in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student] Likewise the phrase used in [Art 2180 mdash so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and

students for as long as they are at attendance in the school including recess time Reasoning a The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the CA According to the CA while it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident which was at about 8 oclock in the evening but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter The time interval is safely within the recess time that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case supra In line with the case of Palisoc 17 a student not at attendance in the school cannot be in recess thereat A recess as the concept is embraced in the phrase at attendance in the school contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises or the area within which the school activity is conducted Recess by its nature does not include dismissal Likewise the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute attending school or being in the protective and supervisory custody of the school as contemplated in the law b Jimmy B Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior the ROTC Commandant when he shot Napoleon Castro ST FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v CA(CastilloCadiz)

194 SCRA 340 Paras J Feb 25 1991 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS -Ferdinand Castillo then a freshman student at St Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach Quezon His parents didnrsquot allow him to go due to short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home However he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher -his parents filed a complaint against St Francis HS represented by its principal Illumin and several teachers for damages incurred from the death of their son contending that it occurred due to petitionersrsquo failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family The TC found against the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim Also the male teachers who were to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which was not school sanctioned and as the latter had her own class to supervise then and was not actually invited -Both parties appealed to the CA On the issue of the liability of St Francis HS and the Illumin the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 They cannot escape liability simply because it wasnrsquot an ldquoextra-curricular activity of the HSrdquo From the evidence

it was shown that the principal had known of the picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the event As such under Article 2180 both are jointly and severally liable w the teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the ownermanager (St Francis and the principal) Petitioners contend that the victimrsquos parents failed to prove by evidence that they didnrsquot give their son consent to join the picnic The Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence of their liability Also 2 of the teachers who arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers Hence this petition ISSUE (1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants (2) WON Art 2180 in relation to 2176 is applicable (3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper HELD (1) NO Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them At the outset it should be noted that the victimrsquos parents allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination -Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it If the CArsquos findings are to be upheld employers will be forever exposed to the risk and

danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the performance of their duties -No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised diligence of a good father of the family In fact 2 PE teachers were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming Life savers were brought in the event of such an accident The records also show that the 2 PE teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim (2) NO The CA erred in applying Art 2180 particularly par 4 For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his employee the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task In the case at bar the teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity (3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence required of them no moral or exemplary damages under Art 2177 may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses PREMISES CONSIDERED the questioned decision is SET ASIDE PSBA v CA (BENITEZBAUTISTA) 205 SCRA 729 Padilla J Feb 4 1992 FACTS -Carlitos Bautista enrolled in the 3rd year commerce course of PSBA was stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants who were

from outside the schoolrsquos academic community This prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers alleging negligence recklessness and lack of security precautions means and methods before during and after the attack of the victim -PSBA sought to dismiss the case alleging that since they were presumably sued under Art 2180 there was no cause of action since academic institutions are not subject to the said provision -A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by the TC yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA Hence this petition ISSUES (1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180 HELD (1) NO Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the parties the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern but the court has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a contract -Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroadrdquohellip the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the partiesrdquo

-Using the test in Cangco a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBArsquos liability hence any finding of negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual obligation only -When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment a contract is established between them resulting in a bilateral obligation The school is obliged to provide the student with an education along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge In turn the student abides by the schoolrsquos academic requirements and observes its rules and regulations However a school cannot be an insurer for its students against all risks one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons time and place - In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was breached due to PSBArsquos negligence in providing proper security measures At this stage the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondentrsquos complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC can determine WHEREFORE the petition is DENIED The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court Costs against the petitioners SOLIMAN JR V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 FELICIANO J May 18 1992 NATURE Civil complaint for damages FACTS

- On August 13 1982 while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman Jr a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC) was in the campus premises thereof the defendant Jimmy Solomon who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant RL Security Agency Inc without any provocation shot the plaintiff on the abdomen The plaintiff was confined in a hospital and as per doctors opinion he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months Petitioner represented by his guardian filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC RL Security Agency and Solomon - RCC filed a motion to dismiss contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon It further argued that Article 2180 7th paragraph of the Civil Code did not apply since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil student or apprentice of the school - Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCCrsquos motion to dismiss Petitionerrsquos MFR was denied Hence this appeal ISSUES 1 WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180 as well as those of Articles 349 350 and 352 of the Civil Code

2 WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1 NO - Under Art 2180 the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for ones own act or omission but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils their students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody - The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman Jr RCC was not the employer of Solomon The employer of Solomon was the RL Security Agency Inc while the school was the client of the latter It is settled that where the security agency as here recruits hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency and not to the clients of such agency There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC

and Solomon petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges he being in fact an employee of the RL Security Agency Inc the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows Art 349 The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority xxx xxx xxx (2) Teachers and professors xxx xxx xxx (4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices xxx xxx xxx Art 350 The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child xxx xxx xxx Art 352 The relations between teacher and pupil professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student - In Palisoc v Brillantes the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc a student of that Institute which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon another student of the Institute It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th

paragraph of Article 2180 quoted above but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case - Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority In the instant case Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner was not a pupil student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon 2 YES - In the case of PSBA v CA the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision At the same time however the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment on the one hand and the students who are enrolled on the other hand which contract results in obligations for both parties It held When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment there is established a contract between them resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with For its part the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession On the other hand the student covenants to abide by the schools academic requirements and observe its rules and regulationsInstitutions of learning must also meet the implicit or built-in obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary

undertaking of imparting knowledge Certainly no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb Necessarily the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof - It was also pointed out in said case that In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar however there is as yet no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the formers negligence in providing proper security measures This would be for the trial court to determine And even if there be a finding of negligence the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only Using the test of Cangco supra the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract In fact that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista In other words a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the schools liability The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code - In the PSBA case the trial court had denied the schools motion to dismiss the complaint against it and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial courts order In the case at bar the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC upon the assumption that petitioners cause of action was based and could have been based only on Art 2180 of the Civil Code As PSBA however states acts which are

tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have in the interest of justice allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the caseThis case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings ST MARYrsquoS ACADEMY VS CARPITANOS PARDO February 6 2002 NATURE Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos together with James Daniel II (then 15 driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached Carpitanos sued the school James Daniel II his parents and Vivencio Villanueva -TC absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II held parents and school liable

-CA school liable under A218 and 219 FC finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them ISSUE (regarding liability of St Maryrsquos Academy) WON St Maryrsquos Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos and therefore liable for damages HELD NO The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep Ratio For the school to be liable it must be shown that the lsquoinjury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events unbroken by intervening efficient causes Reasoning The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva It was

Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep -Liability for the accident whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep must be pinned on the minorrsquos parents primarily The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeepConsidering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy had no control and which was the proximate cause of the accident petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident - It is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos Disposition WHEREFORE the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants excluding petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy Dipolog City No costs SO ORDERED PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO March 25 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision

FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines Inc and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS Inc its manager BALINGIT and the driver PINEDA - It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK owned by Phil-Am along the natrsquol highway at Sto Tomas Pampanga The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan owned by Phil Rabbit Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days This deprived the company of earnings of about P8600 - Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pinedas employer Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him - CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art2180 CC - In the appeal the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41200 Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality But this was not alleged in their complaint ISSUE WON the terms employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise

used in Art 2180 NCC (Art1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments Art2180 uses the term manager (director in the Spanish version) to mean employerrdquo - Hence under the allegations of the complaint no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders Inc in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer Phil-American Forwarders Inc This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses Dispositive Lower courtrsquos order of dismissal is AFFIRMED PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE June 17 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence recklessness

violation of traffic rules and regulations abandonment of victim and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondentsrsquo Version -In the early morning of March 24 1990 about 600 orsquoclock the victim Ramon A Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine -The Magsaysay Blvd runs perpendicular to Gomez St and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street -As the bus was pushed its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A Acuesta who as a result thereof fell and thereafter was run over by the said bus Petitionerrsquos Version -Manilhig in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street the victim who was biking towards the same direction as the bus suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road

-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear which caused the death of the victim Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied MFR -Hence this appeal

ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes -Civil Case No 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 21763 and 21804 of the Civil Code against petitioner

(limited to that involved in the outline) 3Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 4Art 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxxxxxxxx

Manilhig and his employer petitioner Philtranco respectively -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle like petitioner Philtranco for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary direct and joint and several or solidary with the driver As to solidarity Article 2194 expressly provides the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary -Since the employers liability is primary direct and solidary its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed (with regard to this issue) CASTILEX V VASQUEZ Dec 21 1999 Davide Facts At around 130 to 200 in the morning Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmentildea Rotunda He was traveling counter-clockwise (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time Upon the

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

other hand Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no GBW-794 On the same date and time Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmentildea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St or to Belvic St

In the process the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute So the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez Jr and Luisa So Vasquez parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation In the same action Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez Issue WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

Held Castilez is absolved from any liability The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision Instead the fourth paragraph should apply Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable Both provisions apply to employers the fourth paragraph to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise and the fifth paragraph to employers in general whether or not engaged in any business or industry The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included Negligent acts of employees whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry are covered so long as they were acting

within the scope of their assigned task even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions For admittedly employees oftentimes wear different hats They perform functions which are beyond their office title or designation but which nevertheless are still within the call of dutyThis court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 whether or not engaged in any business or industry an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship once this is done the plaintiff must show to hold the employer liable that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee

It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect and even finality at times This rule is however subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations surmises or conjectures Such exception obtain in the present

case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager

On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks ABAD who was presented as a hostile witness testified that at the time of the incident he was driving a company-issued vehicle registered under the name of petitioner He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment an employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction but rather the result varies with each state of facts The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances The SC does not agree The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle

I Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle

II Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee and not a part of his services to his employer Hence in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle 14 cda

The employer may however be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and presumably spending more time at his actual duties Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving commission rule under which it can be

found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home However even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own

III Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept it has been held that he has not resumed his employment and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business or within the

scope of his assigned task ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident It was then about 200 am way beyond the normal working hours ABADs working day had ended his overtime work had already been completed His being at a place which as petitioner put it was known as a haven for prostitutes pimps and drug pushers and addicts had no connection to petitioners business neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager Rather using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR August 17 1992

NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI He is also employed as a janitor The president of FCI is Agustin Masa Agustin has a son Allan who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver Allan lives with his dad Funtecha also lives in the presidentrsquos house free of charge while a student at FCI - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home then go back to the school then go home in the school jeep He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hersquos supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school - One night Funtecha wanted to drive home He has a student license After a dangerous curb

and seeing that the road was clear Allan let Funtecha drive Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians) The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night - TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan SC reversed saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school Allans job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose Moreover it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtechas possession of a student drivers license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans house Funtecha

definitely was not having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a frolic of his own but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner Hence the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

Petition of the Dela Rosas was denied for lack of merit The instant petition is the one filed by Lunas contending that the CA erred in reducing the award for unearned income and that the award for attyrsquos fees should include legal interest Pending the decision the SC came out with a resolution ordering the Dela Rosas in the interest of justice (since the death took place in 1970 and 15 years after the process of litigation is still not over) to pay the Lunas P450000 for unearned net earnings P12000 compensatory damages P50000 for loss of companionship all with legal interest and attyrsquos fees of P50000 within 30 days The Dela Rosas failed to pay the amounts saying that they had no cash money The writ of execution produced only a nominal amount In the meantime Luis is already of age married with 2 kids and living in Spain but only causally employed (ldquoHis compensation is hardly enough to support his family He has no assets of his own as yetrdquo) ISSUES 1 WON the CA erred in reducing the unearned income 2 WON the award for attyrsquos fees should have legal interest HELD 1 YES Ratio The reduction of the award of net unearned earnings had no basis thus is void Reasoning the RTC based its computation of the net unearned earnings on 2 factors life expectancy of the deceased of another 30 years and an annual net income of P55000 (P75000 gross income less P20000 personal expenses)

In coming out with the life expectancy RTC considered the age and health of the deceased However the CA modified this by factoring in the ldquoengagement of Luna in car racingrdquo thus lowering the life expectancy to only 10 years WRT to the gross income RTC considered the various positions the deceased held at the time of his death and the trend of his earnings over the span of his last few years thus coming up with a potential gross income of P75000 However the CA increased the annual personal expenses to P30000 due to the escalating gasoline expenses thus lowering the net annual unearned income to P45000 CA erred in ruling that the engagement with car racing reduced the life expectancy There is nothing on record that supports the claim that the car racing was a dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy ldquoThat Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low slung low powered vehicles only slightly larger than foot-pedaled four wheeled conveyances It was error on the part of the CA to have disturbed the determination of the RTC which it had previously affirmedrdquo Also it was an error to increase the expenses without increasing the gross income ldquoIt stands to reason that if his annual personal expenses should increase because of the lsquoescalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R Lunas social standingrsquo [a statement which lacks complete basis] it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would also increase considering the manifold sources thereofrdquo 2 YES

Ratio The attorneys fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and under the circumstances interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the court (The attyrsquos fees should accrue interest from the date of filing of the compliant) Obiter The Dela Rosas invoke the ruling in Elcano v Hilll where the court held that A2180 applied to Atty Hill nothwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of his son but since the son had attained majority as a matter of equity the liability of Atty Hill became merely subsidiarily to that of his son The Dela Rosas now invoke that the father should also be held only subsidiarily To this contention the court is ldquounwilling to apply equity instead of strict law because to do so will not serve the ends of justice Luis is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine Courts Also he has no property in the Phils or elsewhererdquo Disposition resolution of CA SET ASIDE reinstating the earlier decision with slight modification regarding the award of attyrsquos fees LIBI V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SPS GOTIONG) 214 SCRA 16 REGALADO September 181992 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court FACTS - respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from

which she died on January 141979 was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos Cebu City while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents and who also died in the same event on the same date - More than 2 years before their deaths Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December 1978 when Julie Ann broke up with Wendell after she found him to be sadistic and irresponsible - January 1979 - Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the Julie refused prompting him to resort to threats against her In order to avoid him Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend Malou Alfonso - January 141979 - Julie and Wendell died from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm licensed under Cresencio Libi father of Wendell - both set of parents came up with versions of the story Gotiongs gt Wendell caused her death by shooting her and thereafter turning the gun on himself to commit suicide Libis gt an unknown third party whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU) must have caused Wendells death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification - CFI Cebu Gotiongs filed civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latters vicarious liability under A2180

CC CFI dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of the evidence - IAC CFI decision set aside and found Libis subsidiarily liable ISSUE WON A2180 CC is applicable in making Libirsquos liable for vicarious liability HELD YES Ratio The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists to a large extent of the instruction and supervision of the child Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their son Wendell and in keeping said gun from his reach they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong Therefore appellants are liable under A2180 CC Reasoning - undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet It should be emphasized however that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not as the body was cleaned already in the funeral parlor - Amelita Libi mother of Wendell testified that her husband Cresencio Libi owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelitas key is always in her bag all of which facts were known to Wendell They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun She admitted however that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box We accordingly

cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was - A2180 The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by A2180 CC covers obligations wising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses - BUT Liability is not subsidiary BUT primary gt if the liability of the parents for crimes and QDs of their minor children is subsidiary they they can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damages But if the liability id direct and primary the diligence would constitute a valid substantial defense HENCE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR QDS OF THEIR MINOR KIDS AS CONTEMPLATED IN A2180 ID PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY gt applying A2194 (solidary liability of joint tortfeasors) the parent is also solidarily liable with the child THE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR FELONIES IS LIKEWISE PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY A101 RPC SAYS SO gt RULES + for civil liability from crimes committed by minors under the legal authority and control or who live in the company of the parents PRIMARY = premised on A101 RPC fot damages ex delicto by kids 9 or under or 9-15 but without discernment = premised on A2180 CC for kids 9-15 with discernment or 15-21 (now 18)

+ liability effected against father or mother BOTH PARENTS AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE PARENTAL AUHTORITY OVER THE MINOR = youth welfare code = FC responsibility of parents + for civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors same rules in A2180 and A2182 Disposition Instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED TAMARGO vs CA (Rubio Bundoc) 209 SCRA 518 Feliciano J 1992 NATURE Appeal for review of CA decision FACTS - On October 20 1982 Adelberto Bundoc then aged ten shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death He was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide but was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability ob the ground that he had acted without discernment The adopting and natural parents of Jennifer filed a civil complaint for damages against the parents of Bundoc - The parents of Adelberto claimed that they are not the indispensable party in the action as their son adopted by the spouses Rapisura on November 18 1982 via an adoption decree granted by the CFI of Ilocos Sur The trial Court agreed with the respondents and dismissed the complaint

- The case contained procedural questions which were raised in the appeal The SC however decided to hear the appeal based on substantial justice ISSUE - WON the spouses Bundoc were indispensable party to the tort action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code HELD- - Yes The Court held that parental authority did not retroactively transfer to and vested in the adopting parents at the time the shooting incident occurred The adopting parents had no actual or physical custody of Adelberto at the time of the incident as they were then in the US were they live To do so and hold them liable for the tortious act when be unfair and unconscionable Reasoning- - The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him under Article 2176 However because of his minority the provision of Article 2180 would be applicable Article 2180 reads ldquo the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for onersquos own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsiblehellip The father and incase of his death or incapacity the mother are responsible for the damages caused by the children who live in their companyhellip The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage - The principle of parental liability is designated as vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed

liability under the Anglo-American tort law Thus under this doctrine a person is not only liable for torts committed by him also torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsibility Thus parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of the parents which include the instructing controlling and disciplining of the child The presumption under law is that when a child under their care commits a tortuous act the parents were negligent in the performance of these duties and responsibilities As stated sufficient proof can be presented to overcome this presumption Disposition ndash Petition granted Decision set aside MERCADO v COURT OF APPEALS AND QUISUMBING L-14342 LABRADOR May 30 1960 NATURE This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing Jr is the son of his co-plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L Quisumbing while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L Mercado Manuel Quisumbing Jr and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon Quezon City - A pitogo which figures prominently in this case may be described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank On February 22 1956 Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing Jr quarrelled over a pitogo As a

result Augusto wounded Manuel Jr on the right cheek with a piece of razor ISSUES 1 WON the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the of the father since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time) 2 WON the moral damages fixed at P2000 are excessive HELD 1 NO The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should be made liable is as follows

ART 2180 Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody

- It would be seem that the clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil - Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply nor does paragraph 2 of

said article which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children 2 YES It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219 Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augustos resentment which motivated the assault was occasioned by the fact that Manuel Jr had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get his pitogo from Renato It is therefore apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbings own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy (Art 2179 Civil Code) After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals we find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code which authorizes the grant of moral damages was shown to have existed Consequently the grant of moral damages is not justified PALISOC VS BRILLANTES 41 SCRA 548 TEEHANKEE October 4 1971 NATURE An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the CFI Manila FACTS - Palisoc spouses as parents of their 16-year old son Dominador Palisoc and a student in

automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute filed the action below for damages arising from the death of their son at the hands of a fellow student defendant Virgilio L Daffon at the laboratory room of the said Institute - the deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L Daffon were classmates and one afternoon they together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor At that time the classes were in recess Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face Daffon in retaliation gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward Palisoc became pale and fainted First aid was administered to him but he was not revived so he was immediately taken to a hospital He never regained consciousness finally he died - Defendants were Antonio C Brillantes at the time when the incident occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute Teodosio Valenton the president thereof Santiago M Quibulue instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged and Virgilio L Daffon a fellow student of the deceased - At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship but lately it was duly incorporated

- the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code - The trial court however absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute in this wise ldquoIn the opinion of the Court this article(art2180) of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar since this contemplates the situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parentsThe clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parentsThere is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the schoolrdquo ISSUE WON the school officials are jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors with Daffon HELD a YES (head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute Valenton and Quibulue respectively) Ratio The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students so long as they remain in their custody is that they stand to a certain extent as to their pupils and students in loco parentis and are called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child In the law of torts the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of

the parents and hence it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school including recess time as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students Reasoning - The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Courts dictum in Mercado vs Court of Appeals that (I)t would seem that the clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control direction and influence It is true that under the law abovequoted teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution - phrase used in the cited article mdash so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school including recess time There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school as erroneously held by the lower court and the dicta in Mercado on which it relied must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision

- At any rate the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180 Civil Code by (proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage In the light of the factual findings of the lower courts decision said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability b NO (Brillantes as a mere member of the schools board of directors and the school) itself cannot be held similarly liable since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant - the school had been incorporated since and therefore the school itself as thus incorporated should have been brought in as party defendant DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows 1 Sentencing the Daffon Valenton and Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P1200000 for the death of Dominador Palisoc (b) P337500 for actual and compensatory expenses (c) P500000 for moral damages (d) P1000000 for loss of earning power and (e) P200000 for attorneys fee plus the costs of this action in both instances 2 absolving defendant Antonio C Brillantes from the complaint and 3 dismissing defendants counterclaims REYES JBL J concurring -I would like to clarify that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect that the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils who are minors is not in accord with the plain text of the law

- Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority the article expressly so provides as in the case of the parents and of the guardians It is natural to expect that if the law had intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of persons enumerated in the article it would have expressly so stated The fact that it has not done so indicates an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age Further it is not without significance that - finally that while in the case of parents and guardians their authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter MAKALINTAL J dissenting - I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v Court of Appeals I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results considering the size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions academic and non-academic as well as the temper attitudes and often destructive activism of the students to hold their teachers andor the administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts committed by them - It would demand responsibility without commensurate authority rendering teachers and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control - one other factor constrains me to dissent The opinion of the majority states Here the parents of the student at fault defendant Daffon are not involved since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident Note that for parental

responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their companyit stands to reason that (1) the clause so long as they remain in their custody as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase who live in their company as used in reference to parents and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer minors so should teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLLETOS) 160 SCRA 315 CRUZ April 15 1988

Facts It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to graduate at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes Alfredo went to the school to submit his ldquoReport in Physicrdquo While they were in the auditorium of their school hewas shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon

ISSUE WON Art 2180 is applicable Held Yes Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools academic or non-academic Teachers are liable for acts of their student except where the school is technical in nature (arts and trade establishment) in which case the head thereof shall be answerable

ldquoThere is really no substantial difference distinction between the academic and non-

academic schools in so far as torts committed by their students are concerned The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the student under their control and supervision whatever the nature of the school where he is teachingrdquo ldquox x x x The distinction no longer obtains at present x x x ldquo

The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises whether the semester has not ended or has ended or has not yet begun The term ldquocustodyrdquo signifies that the student is within the control and influence of the school authorities The teacher in charge is the one designated by the dean principal or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils or students in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned It is not necessary that at the time of the injury the teacher is physically present and in a position to prevent it

Thus for injuries caused by the student the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him

In any event the school may be held to answer for the acts of its teacher or the head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior but it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias Such defense they had taken necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of and thus be exonerated from liability imposed by Art 2180

Basis of teacherrsquos vicarious liability is as such they acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents) However teachers are not expected to have the same measure of responsibility as that imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree x x x The parent can instill more lasting discipline more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or the head for the tort committed by the child

As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent nor the school remised in the discharged of their duties they were exonerated of liability (Note ndash the court view on increasing students activism likely causing violence resulting to injuries in or out of the school premises ndash J Guttierez Jr concurringly said many student x x x view some teachers as part of the bourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice on behavior deportment and other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively rejected It seems most unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has outlived its purpose The court cannot make law it can only apply the law with its imperfections However the court can suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY) 160 SCRA 785 PARAS April 25 1988

NATURE Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order dismissing the complaint as against the respondent school and denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal FACTS - A group of students walking inside Araneta University were accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karin Madidis alias ldquoTengrdquo Petitioner (Reynaldo) was subsequently stabbed by Teng requiring him to be hospitalized and to undergo surgery - Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng and Arante University based on Art 2190 CC - Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the provision only applies to vocational schools and not to academic institutions They also claim that the civil liability in this case arose from a crime which they did not commit Since it was a civil case respondent school claims that a demand should have been made by the plaintiff rendering it premature to bring an action for damages against respondent school MTD was granted by the CA - Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of Dismissal Motion was denied due to insufficient justification to disturb ruling ISSUE WON the Art 2180 CC2 applies to academic institutions

2 Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody

HELD It is unnecessary to answer the issue What the petitioner wants to know is WON the school or the university itself is liable The answer is no since the provision speaks of ldquoteachers or headsrdquo Dispositive WHEREFORE this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit YLARDE vs AQUINO GANCAYCO 1988 July 29 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School and private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein At that time the school was littered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez stated burying them all by himself Deciding to help his colleague private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils aged ten to eleven Being their teacher-in-charge he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried The work was left unfinished The following day also after classes private respondent Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging These four pupils ---- Reynaldo Alonso Fransico Alcantara Ismael Abaga and Novelito

Ylarde dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep At this point private respondent Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole Then said private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope Before leaving private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children not to touch the stone A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left three of the four kids Alonso Alcantara and Ylarde playfully jumped into the pit Then without any warning at all the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde the concrete block caught him before he could get out pinning him to the wall in a standing position As a result thereof Ylarde sustained injuries and died three (3) days later Ylardes parents petitioners in this case filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of

a very cautious person and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence ISSUE WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code both private respondents can be held liable for damages Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter On the other hand the applicable provision of Article 2180 states Art 2180 xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody HELD Only Aquino the teacher is liable Ratio As regards the principal We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades Reasoning

This is in line with the Courtrsquos ruling in Amadora vs Court of Appeals wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades it is only the head of the school who can be held liable Ratio Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons Reasoning (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the childrens safety and (5) left the children close to the excavation an obviously attractive nuisance (6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity This should not be the case The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself A minor

should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age capacity discretion knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances Bearing this in mind We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence DISPOSITION Granted SALVOSA v IAC (CASTRO) 166 SCRA 274 PADILLA J October 5 1988 FACTS Jimmy Abon a commerce student of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977 at around 800 pm in the parking space of BCF BCF is both an academic and arts and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP Subsequently the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages impleading Jimmy B Abon Roberto C Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF) Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF) Libertad D Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc as party defendants

After hearing the Trial Court rendered a decision (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B Abon Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc jointly and severally to pay private respondents as heirs of Napoleon Castro (2) absolving the other defendants and (3) dismissing the defendants counterclaim for lack of merit ISSUE WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B Abon HELD NO Jimmy B Abon cannot be considered to have been at attendance in the school or in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro Logically therefore petitioners cannot under Art 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages resulting from his acts Ratio Under the penultimate paragraph of Art 2180 of the Civil Code teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher the latter stands to a certain extent in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student] Likewise the phrase used in [Art 2180 mdash so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and

students for as long as they are at attendance in the school including recess time Reasoning a The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the CA According to the CA while it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident which was at about 8 oclock in the evening but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter The time interval is safely within the recess time that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case supra In line with the case of Palisoc 17 a student not at attendance in the school cannot be in recess thereat A recess as the concept is embraced in the phrase at attendance in the school contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises or the area within which the school activity is conducted Recess by its nature does not include dismissal Likewise the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute attending school or being in the protective and supervisory custody of the school as contemplated in the law b Jimmy B Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior the ROTC Commandant when he shot Napoleon Castro ST FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v CA(CastilloCadiz)

194 SCRA 340 Paras J Feb 25 1991 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS -Ferdinand Castillo then a freshman student at St Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach Quezon His parents didnrsquot allow him to go due to short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home However he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher -his parents filed a complaint against St Francis HS represented by its principal Illumin and several teachers for damages incurred from the death of their son contending that it occurred due to petitionersrsquo failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family The TC found against the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim Also the male teachers who were to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which was not school sanctioned and as the latter had her own class to supervise then and was not actually invited -Both parties appealed to the CA On the issue of the liability of St Francis HS and the Illumin the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 They cannot escape liability simply because it wasnrsquot an ldquoextra-curricular activity of the HSrdquo From the evidence

it was shown that the principal had known of the picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the event As such under Article 2180 both are jointly and severally liable w the teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the ownermanager (St Francis and the principal) Petitioners contend that the victimrsquos parents failed to prove by evidence that they didnrsquot give their son consent to join the picnic The Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence of their liability Also 2 of the teachers who arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers Hence this petition ISSUE (1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants (2) WON Art 2180 in relation to 2176 is applicable (3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper HELD (1) NO Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them At the outset it should be noted that the victimrsquos parents allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination -Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it If the CArsquos findings are to be upheld employers will be forever exposed to the risk and

danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the performance of their duties -No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised diligence of a good father of the family In fact 2 PE teachers were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming Life savers were brought in the event of such an accident The records also show that the 2 PE teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim (2) NO The CA erred in applying Art 2180 particularly par 4 For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his employee the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task In the case at bar the teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity (3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence required of them no moral or exemplary damages under Art 2177 may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses PREMISES CONSIDERED the questioned decision is SET ASIDE PSBA v CA (BENITEZBAUTISTA) 205 SCRA 729 Padilla J Feb 4 1992 FACTS -Carlitos Bautista enrolled in the 3rd year commerce course of PSBA was stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants who were

from outside the schoolrsquos academic community This prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers alleging negligence recklessness and lack of security precautions means and methods before during and after the attack of the victim -PSBA sought to dismiss the case alleging that since they were presumably sued under Art 2180 there was no cause of action since academic institutions are not subject to the said provision -A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by the TC yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA Hence this petition ISSUES (1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180 HELD (1) NO Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the parties the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern but the court has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a contract -Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroadrdquohellip the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the partiesrdquo

-Using the test in Cangco a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBArsquos liability hence any finding of negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual obligation only -When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment a contract is established between them resulting in a bilateral obligation The school is obliged to provide the student with an education along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge In turn the student abides by the schoolrsquos academic requirements and observes its rules and regulations However a school cannot be an insurer for its students against all risks one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons time and place - In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was breached due to PSBArsquos negligence in providing proper security measures At this stage the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondentrsquos complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC can determine WHEREFORE the petition is DENIED The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court Costs against the petitioners SOLIMAN JR V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 FELICIANO J May 18 1992 NATURE Civil complaint for damages FACTS

- On August 13 1982 while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman Jr a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC) was in the campus premises thereof the defendant Jimmy Solomon who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant RL Security Agency Inc without any provocation shot the plaintiff on the abdomen The plaintiff was confined in a hospital and as per doctors opinion he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months Petitioner represented by his guardian filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC RL Security Agency and Solomon - RCC filed a motion to dismiss contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon It further argued that Article 2180 7th paragraph of the Civil Code did not apply since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil student or apprentice of the school - Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCCrsquos motion to dismiss Petitionerrsquos MFR was denied Hence this appeal ISSUES 1 WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180 as well as those of Articles 349 350 and 352 of the Civil Code

2 WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1 NO - Under Art 2180 the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for ones own act or omission but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils their students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody - The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman Jr RCC was not the employer of Solomon The employer of Solomon was the RL Security Agency Inc while the school was the client of the latter It is settled that where the security agency as here recruits hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency and not to the clients of such agency There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC

and Solomon petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges he being in fact an employee of the RL Security Agency Inc the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows Art 349 The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority xxx xxx xxx (2) Teachers and professors xxx xxx xxx (4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices xxx xxx xxx Art 350 The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child xxx xxx xxx Art 352 The relations between teacher and pupil professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student - In Palisoc v Brillantes the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc a student of that Institute which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon another student of the Institute It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th

paragraph of Article 2180 quoted above but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case - Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority In the instant case Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner was not a pupil student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon 2 YES - In the case of PSBA v CA the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision At the same time however the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment on the one hand and the students who are enrolled on the other hand which contract results in obligations for both parties It held When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment there is established a contract between them resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with For its part the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession On the other hand the student covenants to abide by the schools academic requirements and observe its rules and regulationsInstitutions of learning must also meet the implicit or built-in obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary

undertaking of imparting knowledge Certainly no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb Necessarily the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof - It was also pointed out in said case that In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar however there is as yet no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the formers negligence in providing proper security measures This would be for the trial court to determine And even if there be a finding of negligence the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only Using the test of Cangco supra the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract In fact that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista In other words a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the schools liability The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code - In the PSBA case the trial court had denied the schools motion to dismiss the complaint against it and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial courts order In the case at bar the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC upon the assumption that petitioners cause of action was based and could have been based only on Art 2180 of the Civil Code As PSBA however states acts which are

tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have in the interest of justice allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the caseThis case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings ST MARYrsquoS ACADEMY VS CARPITANOS PARDO February 6 2002 NATURE Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos together with James Daniel II (then 15 driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached Carpitanos sued the school James Daniel II his parents and Vivencio Villanueva -TC absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II held parents and school liable

-CA school liable under A218 and 219 FC finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them ISSUE (regarding liability of St Maryrsquos Academy) WON St Maryrsquos Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos and therefore liable for damages HELD NO The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep Ratio For the school to be liable it must be shown that the lsquoinjury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events unbroken by intervening efficient causes Reasoning The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva It was

Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep -Liability for the accident whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep must be pinned on the minorrsquos parents primarily The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeepConsidering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy had no control and which was the proximate cause of the accident petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident - It is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos Disposition WHEREFORE the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants excluding petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy Dipolog City No costs SO ORDERED PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO March 25 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision

FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines Inc and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS Inc its manager BALINGIT and the driver PINEDA - It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK owned by Phil-Am along the natrsquol highway at Sto Tomas Pampanga The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan owned by Phil Rabbit Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days This deprived the company of earnings of about P8600 - Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pinedas employer Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him - CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art2180 CC - In the appeal the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41200 Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality But this was not alleged in their complaint ISSUE WON the terms employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise

used in Art 2180 NCC (Art1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments Art2180 uses the term manager (director in the Spanish version) to mean employerrdquo - Hence under the allegations of the complaint no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders Inc in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer Phil-American Forwarders Inc This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses Dispositive Lower courtrsquos order of dismissal is AFFIRMED PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE June 17 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence recklessness

violation of traffic rules and regulations abandonment of victim and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondentsrsquo Version -In the early morning of March 24 1990 about 600 orsquoclock the victim Ramon A Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine -The Magsaysay Blvd runs perpendicular to Gomez St and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street -As the bus was pushed its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A Acuesta who as a result thereof fell and thereafter was run over by the said bus Petitionerrsquos Version -Manilhig in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street the victim who was biking towards the same direction as the bus suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road

-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear which caused the death of the victim Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied MFR -Hence this appeal

ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes -Civil Case No 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 21763 and 21804 of the Civil Code against petitioner

(limited to that involved in the outline) 3Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 4Art 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxxxxxxxx

Manilhig and his employer petitioner Philtranco respectively -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle like petitioner Philtranco for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary direct and joint and several or solidary with the driver As to solidarity Article 2194 expressly provides the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary -Since the employers liability is primary direct and solidary its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed (with regard to this issue) CASTILEX V VASQUEZ Dec 21 1999 Davide Facts At around 130 to 200 in the morning Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmentildea Rotunda He was traveling counter-clockwise (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time Upon the

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

other hand Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no GBW-794 On the same date and time Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmentildea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St or to Belvic St

In the process the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute So the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez Jr and Luisa So Vasquez parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation In the same action Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez Issue WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

Held Castilez is absolved from any liability The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision Instead the fourth paragraph should apply Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable Both provisions apply to employers the fourth paragraph to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise and the fifth paragraph to employers in general whether or not engaged in any business or industry The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included Negligent acts of employees whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry are covered so long as they were acting

within the scope of their assigned task even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions For admittedly employees oftentimes wear different hats They perform functions which are beyond their office title or designation but which nevertheless are still within the call of dutyThis court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 whether or not engaged in any business or industry an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship once this is done the plaintiff must show to hold the employer liable that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee

It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect and even finality at times This rule is however subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations surmises or conjectures Such exception obtain in the present

case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager

On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks ABAD who was presented as a hostile witness testified that at the time of the incident he was driving a company-issued vehicle registered under the name of petitioner He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment an employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction but rather the result varies with each state of facts The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances The SC does not agree The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle

I Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle

II Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee and not a part of his services to his employer Hence in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle 14 cda

The employer may however be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and presumably spending more time at his actual duties Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving commission rule under which it can be

found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home However even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own

III Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept it has been held that he has not resumed his employment and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business or within the

scope of his assigned task ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident It was then about 200 am way beyond the normal working hours ABADs working day had ended his overtime work had already been completed His being at a place which as petitioner put it was known as a haven for prostitutes pimps and drug pushers and addicts had no connection to petitioners business neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager Rather using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR August 17 1992

NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI He is also employed as a janitor The president of FCI is Agustin Masa Agustin has a son Allan who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver Allan lives with his dad Funtecha also lives in the presidentrsquos house free of charge while a student at FCI - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home then go back to the school then go home in the school jeep He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hersquos supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school - One night Funtecha wanted to drive home He has a student license After a dangerous curb

and seeing that the road was clear Allan let Funtecha drive Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians) The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night - TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan SC reversed saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school Allans job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose Moreover it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtechas possession of a student drivers license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans house Funtecha

definitely was not having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a frolic of his own but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner Hence the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

which she died on January 141979 was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos Cebu City while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents and who also died in the same event on the same date - More than 2 years before their deaths Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December 1978 when Julie Ann broke up with Wendell after she found him to be sadistic and irresponsible - January 1979 - Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the Julie refused prompting him to resort to threats against her In order to avoid him Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend Malou Alfonso - January 141979 - Julie and Wendell died from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm licensed under Cresencio Libi father of Wendell - both set of parents came up with versions of the story Gotiongs gt Wendell caused her death by shooting her and thereafter turning the gun on himself to commit suicide Libis gt an unknown third party whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU) must have caused Wendells death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification - CFI Cebu Gotiongs filed civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latters vicarious liability under A2180

CC CFI dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of the evidence - IAC CFI decision set aside and found Libis subsidiarily liable ISSUE WON A2180 CC is applicable in making Libirsquos liable for vicarious liability HELD YES Ratio The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists to a large extent of the instruction and supervision of the child Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their son Wendell and in keeping said gun from his reach they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong Therefore appellants are liable under A2180 CC Reasoning - undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet It should be emphasized however that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not as the body was cleaned already in the funeral parlor - Amelita Libi mother of Wendell testified that her husband Cresencio Libi owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelitas key is always in her bag all of which facts were known to Wendell They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun She admitted however that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box We accordingly

cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was - A2180 The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by A2180 CC covers obligations wising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses - BUT Liability is not subsidiary BUT primary gt if the liability of the parents for crimes and QDs of their minor children is subsidiary they they can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damages But if the liability id direct and primary the diligence would constitute a valid substantial defense HENCE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR QDS OF THEIR MINOR KIDS AS CONTEMPLATED IN A2180 ID PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY gt applying A2194 (solidary liability of joint tortfeasors) the parent is also solidarily liable with the child THE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR FELONIES IS LIKEWISE PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY A101 RPC SAYS SO gt RULES + for civil liability from crimes committed by minors under the legal authority and control or who live in the company of the parents PRIMARY = premised on A101 RPC fot damages ex delicto by kids 9 or under or 9-15 but without discernment = premised on A2180 CC for kids 9-15 with discernment or 15-21 (now 18)

+ liability effected against father or mother BOTH PARENTS AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE PARENTAL AUHTORITY OVER THE MINOR = youth welfare code = FC responsibility of parents + for civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors same rules in A2180 and A2182 Disposition Instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED TAMARGO vs CA (Rubio Bundoc) 209 SCRA 518 Feliciano J 1992 NATURE Appeal for review of CA decision FACTS - On October 20 1982 Adelberto Bundoc then aged ten shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death He was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide but was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability ob the ground that he had acted without discernment The adopting and natural parents of Jennifer filed a civil complaint for damages against the parents of Bundoc - The parents of Adelberto claimed that they are not the indispensable party in the action as their son adopted by the spouses Rapisura on November 18 1982 via an adoption decree granted by the CFI of Ilocos Sur The trial Court agreed with the respondents and dismissed the complaint

- The case contained procedural questions which were raised in the appeal The SC however decided to hear the appeal based on substantial justice ISSUE - WON the spouses Bundoc were indispensable party to the tort action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code HELD- - Yes The Court held that parental authority did not retroactively transfer to and vested in the adopting parents at the time the shooting incident occurred The adopting parents had no actual or physical custody of Adelberto at the time of the incident as they were then in the US were they live To do so and hold them liable for the tortious act when be unfair and unconscionable Reasoning- - The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him under Article 2176 However because of his minority the provision of Article 2180 would be applicable Article 2180 reads ldquo the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for onersquos own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsiblehellip The father and incase of his death or incapacity the mother are responsible for the damages caused by the children who live in their companyhellip The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage - The principle of parental liability is designated as vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed

liability under the Anglo-American tort law Thus under this doctrine a person is not only liable for torts committed by him also torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsibility Thus parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of the parents which include the instructing controlling and disciplining of the child The presumption under law is that when a child under their care commits a tortuous act the parents were negligent in the performance of these duties and responsibilities As stated sufficient proof can be presented to overcome this presumption Disposition ndash Petition granted Decision set aside MERCADO v COURT OF APPEALS AND QUISUMBING L-14342 LABRADOR May 30 1960 NATURE This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing Jr is the son of his co-plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L Quisumbing while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L Mercado Manuel Quisumbing Jr and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon Quezon City - A pitogo which figures prominently in this case may be described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank On February 22 1956 Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing Jr quarrelled over a pitogo As a

result Augusto wounded Manuel Jr on the right cheek with a piece of razor ISSUES 1 WON the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the of the father since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time) 2 WON the moral damages fixed at P2000 are excessive HELD 1 NO The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should be made liable is as follows

ART 2180 Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody

- It would be seem that the clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil - Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply nor does paragraph 2 of

said article which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children 2 YES It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219 Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augustos resentment which motivated the assault was occasioned by the fact that Manuel Jr had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get his pitogo from Renato It is therefore apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbings own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy (Art 2179 Civil Code) After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals we find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code which authorizes the grant of moral damages was shown to have existed Consequently the grant of moral damages is not justified PALISOC VS BRILLANTES 41 SCRA 548 TEEHANKEE October 4 1971 NATURE An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the CFI Manila FACTS - Palisoc spouses as parents of their 16-year old son Dominador Palisoc and a student in

automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute filed the action below for damages arising from the death of their son at the hands of a fellow student defendant Virgilio L Daffon at the laboratory room of the said Institute - the deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L Daffon were classmates and one afternoon they together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor At that time the classes were in recess Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face Daffon in retaliation gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward Palisoc became pale and fainted First aid was administered to him but he was not revived so he was immediately taken to a hospital He never regained consciousness finally he died - Defendants were Antonio C Brillantes at the time when the incident occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute Teodosio Valenton the president thereof Santiago M Quibulue instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged and Virgilio L Daffon a fellow student of the deceased - At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship but lately it was duly incorporated

- the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code - The trial court however absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute in this wise ldquoIn the opinion of the Court this article(art2180) of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar since this contemplates the situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parentsThe clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parentsThere is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the schoolrdquo ISSUE WON the school officials are jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors with Daffon HELD a YES (head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute Valenton and Quibulue respectively) Ratio The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students so long as they remain in their custody is that they stand to a certain extent as to their pupils and students in loco parentis and are called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child In the law of torts the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of

the parents and hence it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school including recess time as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students Reasoning - The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Courts dictum in Mercado vs Court of Appeals that (I)t would seem that the clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control direction and influence It is true that under the law abovequoted teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution - phrase used in the cited article mdash so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school including recess time There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school as erroneously held by the lower court and the dicta in Mercado on which it relied must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision

- At any rate the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180 Civil Code by (proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage In the light of the factual findings of the lower courts decision said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability b NO (Brillantes as a mere member of the schools board of directors and the school) itself cannot be held similarly liable since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant - the school had been incorporated since and therefore the school itself as thus incorporated should have been brought in as party defendant DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows 1 Sentencing the Daffon Valenton and Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P1200000 for the death of Dominador Palisoc (b) P337500 for actual and compensatory expenses (c) P500000 for moral damages (d) P1000000 for loss of earning power and (e) P200000 for attorneys fee plus the costs of this action in both instances 2 absolving defendant Antonio C Brillantes from the complaint and 3 dismissing defendants counterclaims REYES JBL J concurring -I would like to clarify that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect that the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils who are minors is not in accord with the plain text of the law

- Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority the article expressly so provides as in the case of the parents and of the guardians It is natural to expect that if the law had intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of persons enumerated in the article it would have expressly so stated The fact that it has not done so indicates an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age Further it is not without significance that - finally that while in the case of parents and guardians their authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter MAKALINTAL J dissenting - I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v Court of Appeals I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results considering the size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions academic and non-academic as well as the temper attitudes and often destructive activism of the students to hold their teachers andor the administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts committed by them - It would demand responsibility without commensurate authority rendering teachers and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control - one other factor constrains me to dissent The opinion of the majority states Here the parents of the student at fault defendant Daffon are not involved since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident Note that for parental

responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their companyit stands to reason that (1) the clause so long as they remain in their custody as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase who live in their company as used in reference to parents and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer minors so should teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLLETOS) 160 SCRA 315 CRUZ April 15 1988

Facts It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to graduate at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes Alfredo went to the school to submit his ldquoReport in Physicrdquo While they were in the auditorium of their school hewas shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon

ISSUE WON Art 2180 is applicable Held Yes Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools academic or non-academic Teachers are liable for acts of their student except where the school is technical in nature (arts and trade establishment) in which case the head thereof shall be answerable

ldquoThere is really no substantial difference distinction between the academic and non-

academic schools in so far as torts committed by their students are concerned The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the student under their control and supervision whatever the nature of the school where he is teachingrdquo ldquox x x x The distinction no longer obtains at present x x x ldquo

The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises whether the semester has not ended or has ended or has not yet begun The term ldquocustodyrdquo signifies that the student is within the control and influence of the school authorities The teacher in charge is the one designated by the dean principal or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils or students in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned It is not necessary that at the time of the injury the teacher is physically present and in a position to prevent it

Thus for injuries caused by the student the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him

In any event the school may be held to answer for the acts of its teacher or the head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior but it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias Such defense they had taken necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of and thus be exonerated from liability imposed by Art 2180

Basis of teacherrsquos vicarious liability is as such they acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents) However teachers are not expected to have the same measure of responsibility as that imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree x x x The parent can instill more lasting discipline more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or the head for the tort committed by the child

As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent nor the school remised in the discharged of their duties they were exonerated of liability (Note ndash the court view on increasing students activism likely causing violence resulting to injuries in or out of the school premises ndash J Guttierez Jr concurringly said many student x x x view some teachers as part of the bourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice on behavior deportment and other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively rejected It seems most unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has outlived its purpose The court cannot make law it can only apply the law with its imperfections However the court can suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY) 160 SCRA 785 PARAS April 25 1988

NATURE Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order dismissing the complaint as against the respondent school and denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal FACTS - A group of students walking inside Araneta University were accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karin Madidis alias ldquoTengrdquo Petitioner (Reynaldo) was subsequently stabbed by Teng requiring him to be hospitalized and to undergo surgery - Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng and Arante University based on Art 2190 CC - Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the provision only applies to vocational schools and not to academic institutions They also claim that the civil liability in this case arose from a crime which they did not commit Since it was a civil case respondent school claims that a demand should have been made by the plaintiff rendering it premature to bring an action for damages against respondent school MTD was granted by the CA - Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of Dismissal Motion was denied due to insufficient justification to disturb ruling ISSUE WON the Art 2180 CC2 applies to academic institutions

2 Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody

HELD It is unnecessary to answer the issue What the petitioner wants to know is WON the school or the university itself is liable The answer is no since the provision speaks of ldquoteachers or headsrdquo Dispositive WHEREFORE this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit YLARDE vs AQUINO GANCAYCO 1988 July 29 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School and private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein At that time the school was littered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez stated burying them all by himself Deciding to help his colleague private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils aged ten to eleven Being their teacher-in-charge he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried The work was left unfinished The following day also after classes private respondent Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging These four pupils ---- Reynaldo Alonso Fransico Alcantara Ismael Abaga and Novelito

Ylarde dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep At this point private respondent Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole Then said private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope Before leaving private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children not to touch the stone A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left three of the four kids Alonso Alcantara and Ylarde playfully jumped into the pit Then without any warning at all the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde the concrete block caught him before he could get out pinning him to the wall in a standing position As a result thereof Ylarde sustained injuries and died three (3) days later Ylardes parents petitioners in this case filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of

a very cautious person and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence ISSUE WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code both private respondents can be held liable for damages Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter On the other hand the applicable provision of Article 2180 states Art 2180 xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody HELD Only Aquino the teacher is liable Ratio As regards the principal We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades Reasoning

This is in line with the Courtrsquos ruling in Amadora vs Court of Appeals wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades it is only the head of the school who can be held liable Ratio Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons Reasoning (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the childrens safety and (5) left the children close to the excavation an obviously attractive nuisance (6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity This should not be the case The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself A minor

should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age capacity discretion knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances Bearing this in mind We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence DISPOSITION Granted SALVOSA v IAC (CASTRO) 166 SCRA 274 PADILLA J October 5 1988 FACTS Jimmy Abon a commerce student of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977 at around 800 pm in the parking space of BCF BCF is both an academic and arts and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP Subsequently the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages impleading Jimmy B Abon Roberto C Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF) Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF) Libertad D Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc as party defendants

After hearing the Trial Court rendered a decision (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B Abon Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc jointly and severally to pay private respondents as heirs of Napoleon Castro (2) absolving the other defendants and (3) dismissing the defendants counterclaim for lack of merit ISSUE WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B Abon HELD NO Jimmy B Abon cannot be considered to have been at attendance in the school or in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro Logically therefore petitioners cannot under Art 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages resulting from his acts Ratio Under the penultimate paragraph of Art 2180 of the Civil Code teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher the latter stands to a certain extent in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student] Likewise the phrase used in [Art 2180 mdash so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and

students for as long as they are at attendance in the school including recess time Reasoning a The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the CA According to the CA while it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident which was at about 8 oclock in the evening but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter The time interval is safely within the recess time that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case supra In line with the case of Palisoc 17 a student not at attendance in the school cannot be in recess thereat A recess as the concept is embraced in the phrase at attendance in the school contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises or the area within which the school activity is conducted Recess by its nature does not include dismissal Likewise the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute attending school or being in the protective and supervisory custody of the school as contemplated in the law b Jimmy B Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior the ROTC Commandant when he shot Napoleon Castro ST FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v CA(CastilloCadiz)

194 SCRA 340 Paras J Feb 25 1991 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS -Ferdinand Castillo then a freshman student at St Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach Quezon His parents didnrsquot allow him to go due to short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home However he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher -his parents filed a complaint against St Francis HS represented by its principal Illumin and several teachers for damages incurred from the death of their son contending that it occurred due to petitionersrsquo failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family The TC found against the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim Also the male teachers who were to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which was not school sanctioned and as the latter had her own class to supervise then and was not actually invited -Both parties appealed to the CA On the issue of the liability of St Francis HS and the Illumin the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 They cannot escape liability simply because it wasnrsquot an ldquoextra-curricular activity of the HSrdquo From the evidence

it was shown that the principal had known of the picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the event As such under Article 2180 both are jointly and severally liable w the teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the ownermanager (St Francis and the principal) Petitioners contend that the victimrsquos parents failed to prove by evidence that they didnrsquot give their son consent to join the picnic The Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence of their liability Also 2 of the teachers who arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers Hence this petition ISSUE (1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants (2) WON Art 2180 in relation to 2176 is applicable (3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper HELD (1) NO Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them At the outset it should be noted that the victimrsquos parents allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination -Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it If the CArsquos findings are to be upheld employers will be forever exposed to the risk and

danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the performance of their duties -No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised diligence of a good father of the family In fact 2 PE teachers were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming Life savers were brought in the event of such an accident The records also show that the 2 PE teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim (2) NO The CA erred in applying Art 2180 particularly par 4 For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his employee the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task In the case at bar the teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity (3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence required of them no moral or exemplary damages under Art 2177 may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses PREMISES CONSIDERED the questioned decision is SET ASIDE PSBA v CA (BENITEZBAUTISTA) 205 SCRA 729 Padilla J Feb 4 1992 FACTS -Carlitos Bautista enrolled in the 3rd year commerce course of PSBA was stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants who were

from outside the schoolrsquos academic community This prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers alleging negligence recklessness and lack of security precautions means and methods before during and after the attack of the victim -PSBA sought to dismiss the case alleging that since they were presumably sued under Art 2180 there was no cause of action since academic institutions are not subject to the said provision -A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by the TC yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA Hence this petition ISSUES (1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180 HELD (1) NO Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the parties the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern but the court has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a contract -Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroadrdquohellip the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the partiesrdquo

-Using the test in Cangco a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBArsquos liability hence any finding of negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual obligation only -When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment a contract is established between them resulting in a bilateral obligation The school is obliged to provide the student with an education along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge In turn the student abides by the schoolrsquos academic requirements and observes its rules and regulations However a school cannot be an insurer for its students against all risks one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons time and place - In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was breached due to PSBArsquos negligence in providing proper security measures At this stage the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondentrsquos complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC can determine WHEREFORE the petition is DENIED The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court Costs against the petitioners SOLIMAN JR V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 FELICIANO J May 18 1992 NATURE Civil complaint for damages FACTS

- On August 13 1982 while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman Jr a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC) was in the campus premises thereof the defendant Jimmy Solomon who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant RL Security Agency Inc without any provocation shot the plaintiff on the abdomen The plaintiff was confined in a hospital and as per doctors opinion he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months Petitioner represented by his guardian filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC RL Security Agency and Solomon - RCC filed a motion to dismiss contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon It further argued that Article 2180 7th paragraph of the Civil Code did not apply since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil student or apprentice of the school - Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCCrsquos motion to dismiss Petitionerrsquos MFR was denied Hence this appeal ISSUES 1 WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180 as well as those of Articles 349 350 and 352 of the Civil Code

2 WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1 NO - Under Art 2180 the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for ones own act or omission but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils their students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody - The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman Jr RCC was not the employer of Solomon The employer of Solomon was the RL Security Agency Inc while the school was the client of the latter It is settled that where the security agency as here recruits hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency and not to the clients of such agency There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC

and Solomon petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges he being in fact an employee of the RL Security Agency Inc the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows Art 349 The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority xxx xxx xxx (2) Teachers and professors xxx xxx xxx (4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices xxx xxx xxx Art 350 The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child xxx xxx xxx Art 352 The relations between teacher and pupil professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student - In Palisoc v Brillantes the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc a student of that Institute which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon another student of the Institute It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th

paragraph of Article 2180 quoted above but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case - Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority In the instant case Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner was not a pupil student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon 2 YES - In the case of PSBA v CA the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision At the same time however the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment on the one hand and the students who are enrolled on the other hand which contract results in obligations for both parties It held When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment there is established a contract between them resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with For its part the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession On the other hand the student covenants to abide by the schools academic requirements and observe its rules and regulationsInstitutions of learning must also meet the implicit or built-in obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary

undertaking of imparting knowledge Certainly no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb Necessarily the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof - It was also pointed out in said case that In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar however there is as yet no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the formers negligence in providing proper security measures This would be for the trial court to determine And even if there be a finding of negligence the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only Using the test of Cangco supra the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract In fact that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista In other words a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the schools liability The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code - In the PSBA case the trial court had denied the schools motion to dismiss the complaint against it and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial courts order In the case at bar the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC upon the assumption that petitioners cause of action was based and could have been based only on Art 2180 of the Civil Code As PSBA however states acts which are

tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have in the interest of justice allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the caseThis case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings ST MARYrsquoS ACADEMY VS CARPITANOS PARDO February 6 2002 NATURE Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos together with James Daniel II (then 15 driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached Carpitanos sued the school James Daniel II his parents and Vivencio Villanueva -TC absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II held parents and school liable

-CA school liable under A218 and 219 FC finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them ISSUE (regarding liability of St Maryrsquos Academy) WON St Maryrsquos Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos and therefore liable for damages HELD NO The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep Ratio For the school to be liable it must be shown that the lsquoinjury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events unbroken by intervening efficient causes Reasoning The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva It was

Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep -Liability for the accident whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep must be pinned on the minorrsquos parents primarily The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeepConsidering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy had no control and which was the proximate cause of the accident petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident - It is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos Disposition WHEREFORE the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants excluding petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy Dipolog City No costs SO ORDERED PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO March 25 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision

FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines Inc and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS Inc its manager BALINGIT and the driver PINEDA - It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK owned by Phil-Am along the natrsquol highway at Sto Tomas Pampanga The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan owned by Phil Rabbit Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days This deprived the company of earnings of about P8600 - Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pinedas employer Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him - CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art2180 CC - In the appeal the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41200 Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality But this was not alleged in their complaint ISSUE WON the terms employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise

used in Art 2180 NCC (Art1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments Art2180 uses the term manager (director in the Spanish version) to mean employerrdquo - Hence under the allegations of the complaint no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders Inc in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer Phil-American Forwarders Inc This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses Dispositive Lower courtrsquos order of dismissal is AFFIRMED PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE June 17 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence recklessness

violation of traffic rules and regulations abandonment of victim and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondentsrsquo Version -In the early morning of March 24 1990 about 600 orsquoclock the victim Ramon A Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine -The Magsaysay Blvd runs perpendicular to Gomez St and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street -As the bus was pushed its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A Acuesta who as a result thereof fell and thereafter was run over by the said bus Petitionerrsquos Version -Manilhig in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street the victim who was biking towards the same direction as the bus suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road

-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear which caused the death of the victim Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied MFR -Hence this appeal

ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes -Civil Case No 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 21763 and 21804 of the Civil Code against petitioner

(limited to that involved in the outline) 3Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 4Art 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxxxxxxxx

Manilhig and his employer petitioner Philtranco respectively -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle like petitioner Philtranco for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary direct and joint and several or solidary with the driver As to solidarity Article 2194 expressly provides the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary -Since the employers liability is primary direct and solidary its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed (with regard to this issue) CASTILEX V VASQUEZ Dec 21 1999 Davide Facts At around 130 to 200 in the morning Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmentildea Rotunda He was traveling counter-clockwise (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time Upon the

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

other hand Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no GBW-794 On the same date and time Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmentildea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St or to Belvic St

In the process the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute So the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez Jr and Luisa So Vasquez parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation In the same action Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez Issue WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

Held Castilez is absolved from any liability The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision Instead the fourth paragraph should apply Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable Both provisions apply to employers the fourth paragraph to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise and the fifth paragraph to employers in general whether or not engaged in any business or industry The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included Negligent acts of employees whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry are covered so long as they were acting

within the scope of their assigned task even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions For admittedly employees oftentimes wear different hats They perform functions which are beyond their office title or designation but which nevertheless are still within the call of dutyThis court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 whether or not engaged in any business or industry an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship once this is done the plaintiff must show to hold the employer liable that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee

It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect and even finality at times This rule is however subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations surmises or conjectures Such exception obtain in the present

case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager

On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks ABAD who was presented as a hostile witness testified that at the time of the incident he was driving a company-issued vehicle registered under the name of petitioner He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment an employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction but rather the result varies with each state of facts The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances The SC does not agree The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle

I Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle

II Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee and not a part of his services to his employer Hence in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle 14 cda

The employer may however be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and presumably spending more time at his actual duties Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving commission rule under which it can be

found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home However even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own

III Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept it has been held that he has not resumed his employment and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business or within the

scope of his assigned task ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident It was then about 200 am way beyond the normal working hours ABADs working day had ended his overtime work had already been completed His being at a place which as petitioner put it was known as a haven for prostitutes pimps and drug pushers and addicts had no connection to petitioners business neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager Rather using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR August 17 1992

NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI He is also employed as a janitor The president of FCI is Agustin Masa Agustin has a son Allan who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver Allan lives with his dad Funtecha also lives in the presidentrsquos house free of charge while a student at FCI - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home then go back to the school then go home in the school jeep He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hersquos supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school - One night Funtecha wanted to drive home He has a student license After a dangerous curb

and seeing that the road was clear Allan let Funtecha drive Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians) The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night - TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan SC reversed saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school Allans job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose Moreover it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtechas possession of a student drivers license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans house Funtecha

definitely was not having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a frolic of his own but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner Hence the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

+ liability effected against father or mother BOTH PARENTS AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE PARENTAL AUHTORITY OVER THE MINOR = youth welfare code = FC responsibility of parents + for civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors same rules in A2180 and A2182 Disposition Instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED TAMARGO vs CA (Rubio Bundoc) 209 SCRA 518 Feliciano J 1992 NATURE Appeal for review of CA decision FACTS - On October 20 1982 Adelberto Bundoc then aged ten shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death He was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide but was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability ob the ground that he had acted without discernment The adopting and natural parents of Jennifer filed a civil complaint for damages against the parents of Bundoc - The parents of Adelberto claimed that they are not the indispensable party in the action as their son adopted by the spouses Rapisura on November 18 1982 via an adoption decree granted by the CFI of Ilocos Sur The trial Court agreed with the respondents and dismissed the complaint

- The case contained procedural questions which were raised in the appeal The SC however decided to hear the appeal based on substantial justice ISSUE - WON the spouses Bundoc were indispensable party to the tort action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code HELD- - Yes The Court held that parental authority did not retroactively transfer to and vested in the adopting parents at the time the shooting incident occurred The adopting parents had no actual or physical custody of Adelberto at the time of the incident as they were then in the US were they live To do so and hold them liable for the tortious act when be unfair and unconscionable Reasoning- - The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him under Article 2176 However because of his minority the provision of Article 2180 would be applicable Article 2180 reads ldquo the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for onersquos own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsiblehellip The father and incase of his death or incapacity the mother are responsible for the damages caused by the children who live in their companyhellip The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage - The principle of parental liability is designated as vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed

liability under the Anglo-American tort law Thus under this doctrine a person is not only liable for torts committed by him also torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsibility Thus parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of the parents which include the instructing controlling and disciplining of the child The presumption under law is that when a child under their care commits a tortuous act the parents were negligent in the performance of these duties and responsibilities As stated sufficient proof can be presented to overcome this presumption Disposition ndash Petition granted Decision set aside MERCADO v COURT OF APPEALS AND QUISUMBING L-14342 LABRADOR May 30 1960 NATURE This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing Jr is the son of his co-plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L Quisumbing while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L Mercado Manuel Quisumbing Jr and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon Quezon City - A pitogo which figures prominently in this case may be described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank On February 22 1956 Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing Jr quarrelled over a pitogo As a

result Augusto wounded Manuel Jr on the right cheek with a piece of razor ISSUES 1 WON the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the of the father since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time) 2 WON the moral damages fixed at P2000 are excessive HELD 1 NO The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should be made liable is as follows

ART 2180 Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody

- It would be seem that the clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil - Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply nor does paragraph 2 of

said article which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children 2 YES It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219 Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augustos resentment which motivated the assault was occasioned by the fact that Manuel Jr had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get his pitogo from Renato It is therefore apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbings own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy (Art 2179 Civil Code) After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals we find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code which authorizes the grant of moral damages was shown to have existed Consequently the grant of moral damages is not justified PALISOC VS BRILLANTES 41 SCRA 548 TEEHANKEE October 4 1971 NATURE An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the CFI Manila FACTS - Palisoc spouses as parents of their 16-year old son Dominador Palisoc and a student in

automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute filed the action below for damages arising from the death of their son at the hands of a fellow student defendant Virgilio L Daffon at the laboratory room of the said Institute - the deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L Daffon were classmates and one afternoon they together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor At that time the classes were in recess Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face Daffon in retaliation gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward Palisoc became pale and fainted First aid was administered to him but he was not revived so he was immediately taken to a hospital He never regained consciousness finally he died - Defendants were Antonio C Brillantes at the time when the incident occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute Teodosio Valenton the president thereof Santiago M Quibulue instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged and Virgilio L Daffon a fellow student of the deceased - At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship but lately it was duly incorporated

- the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code - The trial court however absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute in this wise ldquoIn the opinion of the Court this article(art2180) of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar since this contemplates the situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parentsThe clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parentsThere is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the schoolrdquo ISSUE WON the school officials are jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors with Daffon HELD a YES (head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute Valenton and Quibulue respectively) Ratio The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students so long as they remain in their custody is that they stand to a certain extent as to their pupils and students in loco parentis and are called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child In the law of torts the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of

the parents and hence it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school including recess time as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students Reasoning - The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Courts dictum in Mercado vs Court of Appeals that (I)t would seem that the clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control direction and influence It is true that under the law abovequoted teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution - phrase used in the cited article mdash so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school including recess time There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school as erroneously held by the lower court and the dicta in Mercado on which it relied must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision

- At any rate the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180 Civil Code by (proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage In the light of the factual findings of the lower courts decision said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability b NO (Brillantes as a mere member of the schools board of directors and the school) itself cannot be held similarly liable since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant - the school had been incorporated since and therefore the school itself as thus incorporated should have been brought in as party defendant DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows 1 Sentencing the Daffon Valenton and Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P1200000 for the death of Dominador Palisoc (b) P337500 for actual and compensatory expenses (c) P500000 for moral damages (d) P1000000 for loss of earning power and (e) P200000 for attorneys fee plus the costs of this action in both instances 2 absolving defendant Antonio C Brillantes from the complaint and 3 dismissing defendants counterclaims REYES JBL J concurring -I would like to clarify that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect that the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils who are minors is not in accord with the plain text of the law

- Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority the article expressly so provides as in the case of the parents and of the guardians It is natural to expect that if the law had intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of persons enumerated in the article it would have expressly so stated The fact that it has not done so indicates an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age Further it is not without significance that - finally that while in the case of parents and guardians their authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter MAKALINTAL J dissenting - I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v Court of Appeals I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results considering the size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions academic and non-academic as well as the temper attitudes and often destructive activism of the students to hold their teachers andor the administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts committed by them - It would demand responsibility without commensurate authority rendering teachers and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control - one other factor constrains me to dissent The opinion of the majority states Here the parents of the student at fault defendant Daffon are not involved since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident Note that for parental

responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their companyit stands to reason that (1) the clause so long as they remain in their custody as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase who live in their company as used in reference to parents and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer minors so should teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLLETOS) 160 SCRA 315 CRUZ April 15 1988

Facts It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to graduate at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes Alfredo went to the school to submit his ldquoReport in Physicrdquo While they were in the auditorium of their school hewas shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon

ISSUE WON Art 2180 is applicable Held Yes Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools academic or non-academic Teachers are liable for acts of their student except where the school is technical in nature (arts and trade establishment) in which case the head thereof shall be answerable

ldquoThere is really no substantial difference distinction between the academic and non-

academic schools in so far as torts committed by their students are concerned The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the student under their control and supervision whatever the nature of the school where he is teachingrdquo ldquox x x x The distinction no longer obtains at present x x x ldquo

The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises whether the semester has not ended or has ended or has not yet begun The term ldquocustodyrdquo signifies that the student is within the control and influence of the school authorities The teacher in charge is the one designated by the dean principal or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils or students in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned It is not necessary that at the time of the injury the teacher is physically present and in a position to prevent it

Thus for injuries caused by the student the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him

In any event the school may be held to answer for the acts of its teacher or the head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior but it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias Such defense they had taken necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of and thus be exonerated from liability imposed by Art 2180

Basis of teacherrsquos vicarious liability is as such they acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents) However teachers are not expected to have the same measure of responsibility as that imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree x x x The parent can instill more lasting discipline more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or the head for the tort committed by the child

As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent nor the school remised in the discharged of their duties they were exonerated of liability (Note ndash the court view on increasing students activism likely causing violence resulting to injuries in or out of the school premises ndash J Guttierez Jr concurringly said many student x x x view some teachers as part of the bourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice on behavior deportment and other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively rejected It seems most unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has outlived its purpose The court cannot make law it can only apply the law with its imperfections However the court can suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY) 160 SCRA 785 PARAS April 25 1988

NATURE Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order dismissing the complaint as against the respondent school and denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal FACTS - A group of students walking inside Araneta University were accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karin Madidis alias ldquoTengrdquo Petitioner (Reynaldo) was subsequently stabbed by Teng requiring him to be hospitalized and to undergo surgery - Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng and Arante University based on Art 2190 CC - Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the provision only applies to vocational schools and not to academic institutions They also claim that the civil liability in this case arose from a crime which they did not commit Since it was a civil case respondent school claims that a demand should have been made by the plaintiff rendering it premature to bring an action for damages against respondent school MTD was granted by the CA - Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of Dismissal Motion was denied due to insufficient justification to disturb ruling ISSUE WON the Art 2180 CC2 applies to academic institutions

2 Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody

HELD It is unnecessary to answer the issue What the petitioner wants to know is WON the school or the university itself is liable The answer is no since the provision speaks of ldquoteachers or headsrdquo Dispositive WHEREFORE this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit YLARDE vs AQUINO GANCAYCO 1988 July 29 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School and private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein At that time the school was littered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez stated burying them all by himself Deciding to help his colleague private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils aged ten to eleven Being their teacher-in-charge he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried The work was left unfinished The following day also after classes private respondent Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging These four pupils ---- Reynaldo Alonso Fransico Alcantara Ismael Abaga and Novelito

Ylarde dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep At this point private respondent Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole Then said private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope Before leaving private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children not to touch the stone A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left three of the four kids Alonso Alcantara and Ylarde playfully jumped into the pit Then without any warning at all the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde the concrete block caught him before he could get out pinning him to the wall in a standing position As a result thereof Ylarde sustained injuries and died three (3) days later Ylardes parents petitioners in this case filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of

a very cautious person and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence ISSUE WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code both private respondents can be held liable for damages Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter On the other hand the applicable provision of Article 2180 states Art 2180 xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody HELD Only Aquino the teacher is liable Ratio As regards the principal We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades Reasoning

This is in line with the Courtrsquos ruling in Amadora vs Court of Appeals wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades it is only the head of the school who can be held liable Ratio Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons Reasoning (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the childrens safety and (5) left the children close to the excavation an obviously attractive nuisance (6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity This should not be the case The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself A minor

should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age capacity discretion knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances Bearing this in mind We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence DISPOSITION Granted SALVOSA v IAC (CASTRO) 166 SCRA 274 PADILLA J October 5 1988 FACTS Jimmy Abon a commerce student of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977 at around 800 pm in the parking space of BCF BCF is both an academic and arts and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP Subsequently the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages impleading Jimmy B Abon Roberto C Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF) Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF) Libertad D Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc as party defendants

After hearing the Trial Court rendered a decision (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B Abon Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc jointly and severally to pay private respondents as heirs of Napoleon Castro (2) absolving the other defendants and (3) dismissing the defendants counterclaim for lack of merit ISSUE WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B Abon HELD NO Jimmy B Abon cannot be considered to have been at attendance in the school or in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro Logically therefore petitioners cannot under Art 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages resulting from his acts Ratio Under the penultimate paragraph of Art 2180 of the Civil Code teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher the latter stands to a certain extent in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student] Likewise the phrase used in [Art 2180 mdash so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and

students for as long as they are at attendance in the school including recess time Reasoning a The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the CA According to the CA while it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident which was at about 8 oclock in the evening but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter The time interval is safely within the recess time that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case supra In line with the case of Palisoc 17 a student not at attendance in the school cannot be in recess thereat A recess as the concept is embraced in the phrase at attendance in the school contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises or the area within which the school activity is conducted Recess by its nature does not include dismissal Likewise the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute attending school or being in the protective and supervisory custody of the school as contemplated in the law b Jimmy B Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior the ROTC Commandant when he shot Napoleon Castro ST FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v CA(CastilloCadiz)

194 SCRA 340 Paras J Feb 25 1991 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS -Ferdinand Castillo then a freshman student at St Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach Quezon His parents didnrsquot allow him to go due to short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home However he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher -his parents filed a complaint against St Francis HS represented by its principal Illumin and several teachers for damages incurred from the death of their son contending that it occurred due to petitionersrsquo failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family The TC found against the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim Also the male teachers who were to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which was not school sanctioned and as the latter had her own class to supervise then and was not actually invited -Both parties appealed to the CA On the issue of the liability of St Francis HS and the Illumin the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 They cannot escape liability simply because it wasnrsquot an ldquoextra-curricular activity of the HSrdquo From the evidence

it was shown that the principal had known of the picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the event As such under Article 2180 both are jointly and severally liable w the teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the ownermanager (St Francis and the principal) Petitioners contend that the victimrsquos parents failed to prove by evidence that they didnrsquot give their son consent to join the picnic The Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence of their liability Also 2 of the teachers who arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers Hence this petition ISSUE (1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants (2) WON Art 2180 in relation to 2176 is applicable (3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper HELD (1) NO Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them At the outset it should be noted that the victimrsquos parents allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination -Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it If the CArsquos findings are to be upheld employers will be forever exposed to the risk and

danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the performance of their duties -No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised diligence of a good father of the family In fact 2 PE teachers were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming Life savers were brought in the event of such an accident The records also show that the 2 PE teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim (2) NO The CA erred in applying Art 2180 particularly par 4 For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his employee the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task In the case at bar the teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity (3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence required of them no moral or exemplary damages under Art 2177 may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses PREMISES CONSIDERED the questioned decision is SET ASIDE PSBA v CA (BENITEZBAUTISTA) 205 SCRA 729 Padilla J Feb 4 1992 FACTS -Carlitos Bautista enrolled in the 3rd year commerce course of PSBA was stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants who were

from outside the schoolrsquos academic community This prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers alleging negligence recklessness and lack of security precautions means and methods before during and after the attack of the victim -PSBA sought to dismiss the case alleging that since they were presumably sued under Art 2180 there was no cause of action since academic institutions are not subject to the said provision -A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by the TC yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA Hence this petition ISSUES (1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180 HELD (1) NO Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the parties the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern but the court has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a contract -Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroadrdquohellip the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the partiesrdquo

-Using the test in Cangco a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBArsquos liability hence any finding of negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual obligation only -When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment a contract is established between them resulting in a bilateral obligation The school is obliged to provide the student with an education along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge In turn the student abides by the schoolrsquos academic requirements and observes its rules and regulations However a school cannot be an insurer for its students against all risks one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons time and place - In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was breached due to PSBArsquos negligence in providing proper security measures At this stage the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondentrsquos complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC can determine WHEREFORE the petition is DENIED The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court Costs against the petitioners SOLIMAN JR V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 FELICIANO J May 18 1992 NATURE Civil complaint for damages FACTS

- On August 13 1982 while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman Jr a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC) was in the campus premises thereof the defendant Jimmy Solomon who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant RL Security Agency Inc without any provocation shot the plaintiff on the abdomen The plaintiff was confined in a hospital and as per doctors opinion he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months Petitioner represented by his guardian filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC RL Security Agency and Solomon - RCC filed a motion to dismiss contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon It further argued that Article 2180 7th paragraph of the Civil Code did not apply since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil student or apprentice of the school - Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCCrsquos motion to dismiss Petitionerrsquos MFR was denied Hence this appeal ISSUES 1 WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180 as well as those of Articles 349 350 and 352 of the Civil Code

2 WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1 NO - Under Art 2180 the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for ones own act or omission but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils their students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody - The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman Jr RCC was not the employer of Solomon The employer of Solomon was the RL Security Agency Inc while the school was the client of the latter It is settled that where the security agency as here recruits hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency and not to the clients of such agency There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC

and Solomon petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges he being in fact an employee of the RL Security Agency Inc the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows Art 349 The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority xxx xxx xxx (2) Teachers and professors xxx xxx xxx (4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices xxx xxx xxx Art 350 The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child xxx xxx xxx Art 352 The relations between teacher and pupil professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student - In Palisoc v Brillantes the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc a student of that Institute which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon another student of the Institute It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th

paragraph of Article 2180 quoted above but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case - Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority In the instant case Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner was not a pupil student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon 2 YES - In the case of PSBA v CA the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision At the same time however the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment on the one hand and the students who are enrolled on the other hand which contract results in obligations for both parties It held When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment there is established a contract between them resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with For its part the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession On the other hand the student covenants to abide by the schools academic requirements and observe its rules and regulationsInstitutions of learning must also meet the implicit or built-in obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary

undertaking of imparting knowledge Certainly no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb Necessarily the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof - It was also pointed out in said case that In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar however there is as yet no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the formers negligence in providing proper security measures This would be for the trial court to determine And even if there be a finding of negligence the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only Using the test of Cangco supra the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract In fact that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista In other words a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the schools liability The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code - In the PSBA case the trial court had denied the schools motion to dismiss the complaint against it and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial courts order In the case at bar the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC upon the assumption that petitioners cause of action was based and could have been based only on Art 2180 of the Civil Code As PSBA however states acts which are

tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have in the interest of justice allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the caseThis case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings ST MARYrsquoS ACADEMY VS CARPITANOS PARDO February 6 2002 NATURE Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos together with James Daniel II (then 15 driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached Carpitanos sued the school James Daniel II his parents and Vivencio Villanueva -TC absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II held parents and school liable

-CA school liable under A218 and 219 FC finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them ISSUE (regarding liability of St Maryrsquos Academy) WON St Maryrsquos Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos and therefore liable for damages HELD NO The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep Ratio For the school to be liable it must be shown that the lsquoinjury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events unbroken by intervening efficient causes Reasoning The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva It was

Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep -Liability for the accident whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep must be pinned on the minorrsquos parents primarily The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeepConsidering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy had no control and which was the proximate cause of the accident petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident - It is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos Disposition WHEREFORE the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants excluding petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy Dipolog City No costs SO ORDERED PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO March 25 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision

FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines Inc and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS Inc its manager BALINGIT and the driver PINEDA - It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK owned by Phil-Am along the natrsquol highway at Sto Tomas Pampanga The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan owned by Phil Rabbit Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days This deprived the company of earnings of about P8600 - Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pinedas employer Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him - CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art2180 CC - In the appeal the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41200 Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality But this was not alleged in their complaint ISSUE WON the terms employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise

used in Art 2180 NCC (Art1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments Art2180 uses the term manager (director in the Spanish version) to mean employerrdquo - Hence under the allegations of the complaint no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders Inc in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer Phil-American Forwarders Inc This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses Dispositive Lower courtrsquos order of dismissal is AFFIRMED PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE June 17 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence recklessness

violation of traffic rules and regulations abandonment of victim and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondentsrsquo Version -In the early morning of March 24 1990 about 600 orsquoclock the victim Ramon A Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine -The Magsaysay Blvd runs perpendicular to Gomez St and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street -As the bus was pushed its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A Acuesta who as a result thereof fell and thereafter was run over by the said bus Petitionerrsquos Version -Manilhig in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street the victim who was biking towards the same direction as the bus suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road

-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear which caused the death of the victim Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied MFR -Hence this appeal

ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes -Civil Case No 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 21763 and 21804 of the Civil Code against petitioner

(limited to that involved in the outline) 3Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 4Art 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxxxxxxxx

Manilhig and his employer petitioner Philtranco respectively -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle like petitioner Philtranco for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary direct and joint and several or solidary with the driver As to solidarity Article 2194 expressly provides the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary -Since the employers liability is primary direct and solidary its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed (with regard to this issue) CASTILEX V VASQUEZ Dec 21 1999 Davide Facts At around 130 to 200 in the morning Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmentildea Rotunda He was traveling counter-clockwise (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time Upon the

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

other hand Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no GBW-794 On the same date and time Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmentildea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St or to Belvic St

In the process the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute So the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez Jr and Luisa So Vasquez parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation In the same action Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez Issue WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

Held Castilez is absolved from any liability The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision Instead the fourth paragraph should apply Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable Both provisions apply to employers the fourth paragraph to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise and the fifth paragraph to employers in general whether or not engaged in any business or industry The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included Negligent acts of employees whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry are covered so long as they were acting

within the scope of their assigned task even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions For admittedly employees oftentimes wear different hats They perform functions which are beyond their office title or designation but which nevertheless are still within the call of dutyThis court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 whether or not engaged in any business or industry an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship once this is done the plaintiff must show to hold the employer liable that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee

It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect and even finality at times This rule is however subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations surmises or conjectures Such exception obtain in the present

case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager

On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks ABAD who was presented as a hostile witness testified that at the time of the incident he was driving a company-issued vehicle registered under the name of petitioner He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment an employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction but rather the result varies with each state of facts The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances The SC does not agree The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle

I Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle

II Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee and not a part of his services to his employer Hence in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle 14 cda

The employer may however be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and presumably spending more time at his actual duties Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving commission rule under which it can be

found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home However even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own

III Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept it has been held that he has not resumed his employment and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business or within the

scope of his assigned task ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident It was then about 200 am way beyond the normal working hours ABADs working day had ended his overtime work had already been completed His being at a place which as petitioner put it was known as a haven for prostitutes pimps and drug pushers and addicts had no connection to petitioners business neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager Rather using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR August 17 1992

NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI He is also employed as a janitor The president of FCI is Agustin Masa Agustin has a son Allan who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver Allan lives with his dad Funtecha also lives in the presidentrsquos house free of charge while a student at FCI - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home then go back to the school then go home in the school jeep He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hersquos supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school - One night Funtecha wanted to drive home He has a student license After a dangerous curb

and seeing that the road was clear Allan let Funtecha drive Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians) The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night - TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan SC reversed saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school Allans job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose Moreover it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtechas possession of a student drivers license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans house Funtecha

definitely was not having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a frolic of his own but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner Hence the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

result Augusto wounded Manuel Jr on the right cheek with a piece of razor ISSUES 1 WON the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the of the father since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time) 2 WON the moral damages fixed at P2000 are excessive HELD 1 NO The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should be made liable is as follows

ART 2180 Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody

- It would be seem that the clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil - Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply nor does paragraph 2 of

said article which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children 2 YES It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219 Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augustos resentment which motivated the assault was occasioned by the fact that Manuel Jr had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get his pitogo from Renato It is therefore apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbings own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy (Art 2179 Civil Code) After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals we find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code which authorizes the grant of moral damages was shown to have existed Consequently the grant of moral damages is not justified PALISOC VS BRILLANTES 41 SCRA 548 TEEHANKEE October 4 1971 NATURE An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the CFI Manila FACTS - Palisoc spouses as parents of their 16-year old son Dominador Palisoc and a student in

automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute filed the action below for damages arising from the death of their son at the hands of a fellow student defendant Virgilio L Daffon at the laboratory room of the said Institute - the deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L Daffon were classmates and one afternoon they together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor At that time the classes were in recess Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face Daffon in retaliation gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward Palisoc became pale and fainted First aid was administered to him but he was not revived so he was immediately taken to a hospital He never regained consciousness finally he died - Defendants were Antonio C Brillantes at the time when the incident occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute Teodosio Valenton the president thereof Santiago M Quibulue instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged and Virgilio L Daffon a fellow student of the deceased - At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship but lately it was duly incorporated

- the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code - The trial court however absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute in this wise ldquoIn the opinion of the Court this article(art2180) of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar since this contemplates the situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parentsThe clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parentsThere is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the schoolrdquo ISSUE WON the school officials are jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors with Daffon HELD a YES (head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute Valenton and Quibulue respectively) Ratio The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students so long as they remain in their custody is that they stand to a certain extent as to their pupils and students in loco parentis and are called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child In the law of torts the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of

the parents and hence it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school including recess time as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students Reasoning - The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Courts dictum in Mercado vs Court of Appeals that (I)t would seem that the clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control direction and influence It is true that under the law abovequoted teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution - phrase used in the cited article mdash so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school including recess time There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school as erroneously held by the lower court and the dicta in Mercado on which it relied must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision

- At any rate the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180 Civil Code by (proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage In the light of the factual findings of the lower courts decision said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability b NO (Brillantes as a mere member of the schools board of directors and the school) itself cannot be held similarly liable since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant - the school had been incorporated since and therefore the school itself as thus incorporated should have been brought in as party defendant DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows 1 Sentencing the Daffon Valenton and Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P1200000 for the death of Dominador Palisoc (b) P337500 for actual and compensatory expenses (c) P500000 for moral damages (d) P1000000 for loss of earning power and (e) P200000 for attorneys fee plus the costs of this action in both instances 2 absolving defendant Antonio C Brillantes from the complaint and 3 dismissing defendants counterclaims REYES JBL J concurring -I would like to clarify that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect that the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils who are minors is not in accord with the plain text of the law

- Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority the article expressly so provides as in the case of the parents and of the guardians It is natural to expect that if the law had intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of persons enumerated in the article it would have expressly so stated The fact that it has not done so indicates an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age Further it is not without significance that - finally that while in the case of parents and guardians their authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter MAKALINTAL J dissenting - I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v Court of Appeals I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results considering the size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions academic and non-academic as well as the temper attitudes and often destructive activism of the students to hold their teachers andor the administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts committed by them - It would demand responsibility without commensurate authority rendering teachers and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control - one other factor constrains me to dissent The opinion of the majority states Here the parents of the student at fault defendant Daffon are not involved since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident Note that for parental

responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their companyit stands to reason that (1) the clause so long as they remain in their custody as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase who live in their company as used in reference to parents and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer minors so should teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLLETOS) 160 SCRA 315 CRUZ April 15 1988

Facts It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to graduate at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes Alfredo went to the school to submit his ldquoReport in Physicrdquo While they were in the auditorium of their school hewas shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon

ISSUE WON Art 2180 is applicable Held Yes Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools academic or non-academic Teachers are liable for acts of their student except where the school is technical in nature (arts and trade establishment) in which case the head thereof shall be answerable

ldquoThere is really no substantial difference distinction between the academic and non-

academic schools in so far as torts committed by their students are concerned The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the student under their control and supervision whatever the nature of the school where he is teachingrdquo ldquox x x x The distinction no longer obtains at present x x x ldquo

The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises whether the semester has not ended or has ended or has not yet begun The term ldquocustodyrdquo signifies that the student is within the control and influence of the school authorities The teacher in charge is the one designated by the dean principal or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils or students in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned It is not necessary that at the time of the injury the teacher is physically present and in a position to prevent it

Thus for injuries caused by the student the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him

In any event the school may be held to answer for the acts of its teacher or the head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior but it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias Such defense they had taken necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of and thus be exonerated from liability imposed by Art 2180

Basis of teacherrsquos vicarious liability is as such they acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents) However teachers are not expected to have the same measure of responsibility as that imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree x x x The parent can instill more lasting discipline more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or the head for the tort committed by the child

As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent nor the school remised in the discharged of their duties they were exonerated of liability (Note ndash the court view on increasing students activism likely causing violence resulting to injuries in or out of the school premises ndash J Guttierez Jr concurringly said many student x x x view some teachers as part of the bourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice on behavior deportment and other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively rejected It seems most unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has outlived its purpose The court cannot make law it can only apply the law with its imperfections However the court can suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY) 160 SCRA 785 PARAS April 25 1988

NATURE Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order dismissing the complaint as against the respondent school and denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal FACTS - A group of students walking inside Araneta University were accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karin Madidis alias ldquoTengrdquo Petitioner (Reynaldo) was subsequently stabbed by Teng requiring him to be hospitalized and to undergo surgery - Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng and Arante University based on Art 2190 CC - Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the provision only applies to vocational schools and not to academic institutions They also claim that the civil liability in this case arose from a crime which they did not commit Since it was a civil case respondent school claims that a demand should have been made by the plaintiff rendering it premature to bring an action for damages against respondent school MTD was granted by the CA - Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of Dismissal Motion was denied due to insufficient justification to disturb ruling ISSUE WON the Art 2180 CC2 applies to academic institutions

2 Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody

HELD It is unnecessary to answer the issue What the petitioner wants to know is WON the school or the university itself is liable The answer is no since the provision speaks of ldquoteachers or headsrdquo Dispositive WHEREFORE this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit YLARDE vs AQUINO GANCAYCO 1988 July 29 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School and private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein At that time the school was littered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez stated burying them all by himself Deciding to help his colleague private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils aged ten to eleven Being their teacher-in-charge he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried The work was left unfinished The following day also after classes private respondent Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging These four pupils ---- Reynaldo Alonso Fransico Alcantara Ismael Abaga and Novelito

Ylarde dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep At this point private respondent Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole Then said private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope Before leaving private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children not to touch the stone A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left three of the four kids Alonso Alcantara and Ylarde playfully jumped into the pit Then without any warning at all the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde the concrete block caught him before he could get out pinning him to the wall in a standing position As a result thereof Ylarde sustained injuries and died three (3) days later Ylardes parents petitioners in this case filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of

a very cautious person and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence ISSUE WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code both private respondents can be held liable for damages Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter On the other hand the applicable provision of Article 2180 states Art 2180 xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody HELD Only Aquino the teacher is liable Ratio As regards the principal We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades Reasoning

This is in line with the Courtrsquos ruling in Amadora vs Court of Appeals wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades it is only the head of the school who can be held liable Ratio Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons Reasoning (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the childrens safety and (5) left the children close to the excavation an obviously attractive nuisance (6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity This should not be the case The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself A minor

should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age capacity discretion knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances Bearing this in mind We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence DISPOSITION Granted SALVOSA v IAC (CASTRO) 166 SCRA 274 PADILLA J October 5 1988 FACTS Jimmy Abon a commerce student of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977 at around 800 pm in the parking space of BCF BCF is both an academic and arts and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP Subsequently the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages impleading Jimmy B Abon Roberto C Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF) Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF) Libertad D Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc as party defendants

After hearing the Trial Court rendered a decision (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B Abon Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc jointly and severally to pay private respondents as heirs of Napoleon Castro (2) absolving the other defendants and (3) dismissing the defendants counterclaim for lack of merit ISSUE WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B Abon HELD NO Jimmy B Abon cannot be considered to have been at attendance in the school or in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro Logically therefore petitioners cannot under Art 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages resulting from his acts Ratio Under the penultimate paragraph of Art 2180 of the Civil Code teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher the latter stands to a certain extent in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student] Likewise the phrase used in [Art 2180 mdash so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and

students for as long as they are at attendance in the school including recess time Reasoning a The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the CA According to the CA while it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident which was at about 8 oclock in the evening but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter The time interval is safely within the recess time that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case supra In line with the case of Palisoc 17 a student not at attendance in the school cannot be in recess thereat A recess as the concept is embraced in the phrase at attendance in the school contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises or the area within which the school activity is conducted Recess by its nature does not include dismissal Likewise the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute attending school or being in the protective and supervisory custody of the school as contemplated in the law b Jimmy B Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior the ROTC Commandant when he shot Napoleon Castro ST FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v CA(CastilloCadiz)

194 SCRA 340 Paras J Feb 25 1991 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS -Ferdinand Castillo then a freshman student at St Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach Quezon His parents didnrsquot allow him to go due to short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home However he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher -his parents filed a complaint against St Francis HS represented by its principal Illumin and several teachers for damages incurred from the death of their son contending that it occurred due to petitionersrsquo failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family The TC found against the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim Also the male teachers who were to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which was not school sanctioned and as the latter had her own class to supervise then and was not actually invited -Both parties appealed to the CA On the issue of the liability of St Francis HS and the Illumin the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 They cannot escape liability simply because it wasnrsquot an ldquoextra-curricular activity of the HSrdquo From the evidence

it was shown that the principal had known of the picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the event As such under Article 2180 both are jointly and severally liable w the teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the ownermanager (St Francis and the principal) Petitioners contend that the victimrsquos parents failed to prove by evidence that they didnrsquot give their son consent to join the picnic The Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence of their liability Also 2 of the teachers who arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers Hence this petition ISSUE (1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants (2) WON Art 2180 in relation to 2176 is applicable (3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper HELD (1) NO Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them At the outset it should be noted that the victimrsquos parents allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination -Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it If the CArsquos findings are to be upheld employers will be forever exposed to the risk and

danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the performance of their duties -No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised diligence of a good father of the family In fact 2 PE teachers were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming Life savers were brought in the event of such an accident The records also show that the 2 PE teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim (2) NO The CA erred in applying Art 2180 particularly par 4 For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his employee the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task In the case at bar the teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity (3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence required of them no moral or exemplary damages under Art 2177 may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses PREMISES CONSIDERED the questioned decision is SET ASIDE PSBA v CA (BENITEZBAUTISTA) 205 SCRA 729 Padilla J Feb 4 1992 FACTS -Carlitos Bautista enrolled in the 3rd year commerce course of PSBA was stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants who were

from outside the schoolrsquos academic community This prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers alleging negligence recklessness and lack of security precautions means and methods before during and after the attack of the victim -PSBA sought to dismiss the case alleging that since they were presumably sued under Art 2180 there was no cause of action since academic institutions are not subject to the said provision -A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by the TC yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA Hence this petition ISSUES (1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180 HELD (1) NO Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the parties the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern but the court has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a contract -Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroadrdquohellip the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the partiesrdquo

-Using the test in Cangco a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBArsquos liability hence any finding of negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual obligation only -When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment a contract is established between them resulting in a bilateral obligation The school is obliged to provide the student with an education along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge In turn the student abides by the schoolrsquos academic requirements and observes its rules and regulations However a school cannot be an insurer for its students against all risks one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons time and place - In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was breached due to PSBArsquos negligence in providing proper security measures At this stage the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondentrsquos complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC can determine WHEREFORE the petition is DENIED The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court Costs against the petitioners SOLIMAN JR V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 FELICIANO J May 18 1992 NATURE Civil complaint for damages FACTS

- On August 13 1982 while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman Jr a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC) was in the campus premises thereof the defendant Jimmy Solomon who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant RL Security Agency Inc without any provocation shot the plaintiff on the abdomen The plaintiff was confined in a hospital and as per doctors opinion he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months Petitioner represented by his guardian filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC RL Security Agency and Solomon - RCC filed a motion to dismiss contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon It further argued that Article 2180 7th paragraph of the Civil Code did not apply since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil student or apprentice of the school - Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCCrsquos motion to dismiss Petitionerrsquos MFR was denied Hence this appeal ISSUES 1 WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180 as well as those of Articles 349 350 and 352 of the Civil Code

2 WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1 NO - Under Art 2180 the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for ones own act or omission but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils their students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody - The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman Jr RCC was not the employer of Solomon The employer of Solomon was the RL Security Agency Inc while the school was the client of the latter It is settled that where the security agency as here recruits hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency and not to the clients of such agency There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC

and Solomon petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges he being in fact an employee of the RL Security Agency Inc the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows Art 349 The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority xxx xxx xxx (2) Teachers and professors xxx xxx xxx (4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices xxx xxx xxx Art 350 The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child xxx xxx xxx Art 352 The relations between teacher and pupil professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student - In Palisoc v Brillantes the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc a student of that Institute which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon another student of the Institute It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th

paragraph of Article 2180 quoted above but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case - Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority In the instant case Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner was not a pupil student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon 2 YES - In the case of PSBA v CA the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision At the same time however the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment on the one hand and the students who are enrolled on the other hand which contract results in obligations for both parties It held When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment there is established a contract between them resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with For its part the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession On the other hand the student covenants to abide by the schools academic requirements and observe its rules and regulationsInstitutions of learning must also meet the implicit or built-in obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary

undertaking of imparting knowledge Certainly no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb Necessarily the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof - It was also pointed out in said case that In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar however there is as yet no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the formers negligence in providing proper security measures This would be for the trial court to determine And even if there be a finding of negligence the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only Using the test of Cangco supra the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract In fact that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista In other words a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the schools liability The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code - In the PSBA case the trial court had denied the schools motion to dismiss the complaint against it and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial courts order In the case at bar the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC upon the assumption that petitioners cause of action was based and could have been based only on Art 2180 of the Civil Code As PSBA however states acts which are

tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have in the interest of justice allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the caseThis case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings ST MARYrsquoS ACADEMY VS CARPITANOS PARDO February 6 2002 NATURE Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos together with James Daniel II (then 15 driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached Carpitanos sued the school James Daniel II his parents and Vivencio Villanueva -TC absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II held parents and school liable

-CA school liable under A218 and 219 FC finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them ISSUE (regarding liability of St Maryrsquos Academy) WON St Maryrsquos Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos and therefore liable for damages HELD NO The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep Ratio For the school to be liable it must be shown that the lsquoinjury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events unbroken by intervening efficient causes Reasoning The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva It was

Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep -Liability for the accident whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep must be pinned on the minorrsquos parents primarily The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeepConsidering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy had no control and which was the proximate cause of the accident petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident - It is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos Disposition WHEREFORE the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants excluding petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy Dipolog City No costs SO ORDERED PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO March 25 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision

FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines Inc and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS Inc its manager BALINGIT and the driver PINEDA - It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK owned by Phil-Am along the natrsquol highway at Sto Tomas Pampanga The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan owned by Phil Rabbit Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days This deprived the company of earnings of about P8600 - Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pinedas employer Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him - CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art2180 CC - In the appeal the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41200 Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality But this was not alleged in their complaint ISSUE WON the terms employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise

used in Art 2180 NCC (Art1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments Art2180 uses the term manager (director in the Spanish version) to mean employerrdquo - Hence under the allegations of the complaint no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders Inc in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer Phil-American Forwarders Inc This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses Dispositive Lower courtrsquos order of dismissal is AFFIRMED PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE June 17 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence recklessness

violation of traffic rules and regulations abandonment of victim and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondentsrsquo Version -In the early morning of March 24 1990 about 600 orsquoclock the victim Ramon A Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine -The Magsaysay Blvd runs perpendicular to Gomez St and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street -As the bus was pushed its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A Acuesta who as a result thereof fell and thereafter was run over by the said bus Petitionerrsquos Version -Manilhig in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street the victim who was biking towards the same direction as the bus suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road

-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear which caused the death of the victim Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied MFR -Hence this appeal

ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes -Civil Case No 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 21763 and 21804 of the Civil Code against petitioner

(limited to that involved in the outline) 3Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 4Art 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxxxxxxxx

Manilhig and his employer petitioner Philtranco respectively -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle like petitioner Philtranco for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary direct and joint and several or solidary with the driver As to solidarity Article 2194 expressly provides the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary -Since the employers liability is primary direct and solidary its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed (with regard to this issue) CASTILEX V VASQUEZ Dec 21 1999 Davide Facts At around 130 to 200 in the morning Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmentildea Rotunda He was traveling counter-clockwise (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time Upon the

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

other hand Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no GBW-794 On the same date and time Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmentildea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St or to Belvic St

In the process the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute So the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez Jr and Luisa So Vasquez parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation In the same action Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez Issue WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

Held Castilez is absolved from any liability The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision Instead the fourth paragraph should apply Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable Both provisions apply to employers the fourth paragraph to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise and the fifth paragraph to employers in general whether or not engaged in any business or industry The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included Negligent acts of employees whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry are covered so long as they were acting

within the scope of their assigned task even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions For admittedly employees oftentimes wear different hats They perform functions which are beyond their office title or designation but which nevertheless are still within the call of dutyThis court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 whether or not engaged in any business or industry an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship once this is done the plaintiff must show to hold the employer liable that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee

It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect and even finality at times This rule is however subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations surmises or conjectures Such exception obtain in the present

case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager

On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks ABAD who was presented as a hostile witness testified that at the time of the incident he was driving a company-issued vehicle registered under the name of petitioner He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment an employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction but rather the result varies with each state of facts The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances The SC does not agree The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle

I Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle

II Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee and not a part of his services to his employer Hence in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle 14 cda

The employer may however be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and presumably spending more time at his actual duties Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving commission rule under which it can be

found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home However even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own

III Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept it has been held that he has not resumed his employment and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business or within the

scope of his assigned task ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident It was then about 200 am way beyond the normal working hours ABADs working day had ended his overtime work had already been completed His being at a place which as petitioner put it was known as a haven for prostitutes pimps and drug pushers and addicts had no connection to petitioners business neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager Rather using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR August 17 1992

NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI He is also employed as a janitor The president of FCI is Agustin Masa Agustin has a son Allan who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver Allan lives with his dad Funtecha also lives in the presidentrsquos house free of charge while a student at FCI - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home then go back to the school then go home in the school jeep He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hersquos supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school - One night Funtecha wanted to drive home He has a student license After a dangerous curb

and seeing that the road was clear Allan let Funtecha drive Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians) The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night - TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan SC reversed saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school Allans job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose Moreover it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtechas possession of a student drivers license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans house Funtecha

definitely was not having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a frolic of his own but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner Hence the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

- the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code - The trial court however absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute in this wise ldquoIn the opinion of the Court this article(art2180) of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar since this contemplates the situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parentsThe clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parentsThere is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the schoolrdquo ISSUE WON the school officials are jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors with Daffon HELD a YES (head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute Valenton and Quibulue respectively) Ratio The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students so long as they remain in their custody is that they stand to a certain extent as to their pupils and students in loco parentis and are called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child In the law of torts the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of

the parents and hence it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school including recess time as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students Reasoning - The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Courts dictum in Mercado vs Court of Appeals that (I)t would seem that the clause so long as they remain in their custody contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher such that the control direction and influence It is true that under the law abovequoted teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution - phrase used in the cited article mdash so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school including recess time There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school as erroneously held by the lower court and the dicta in Mercado on which it relied must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision

- At any rate the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180 Civil Code by (proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage In the light of the factual findings of the lower courts decision said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability b NO (Brillantes as a mere member of the schools board of directors and the school) itself cannot be held similarly liable since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant - the school had been incorporated since and therefore the school itself as thus incorporated should have been brought in as party defendant DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows 1 Sentencing the Daffon Valenton and Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P1200000 for the death of Dominador Palisoc (b) P337500 for actual and compensatory expenses (c) P500000 for moral damages (d) P1000000 for loss of earning power and (e) P200000 for attorneys fee plus the costs of this action in both instances 2 absolving defendant Antonio C Brillantes from the complaint and 3 dismissing defendants counterclaims REYES JBL J concurring -I would like to clarify that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect that the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils who are minors is not in accord with the plain text of the law

- Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority the article expressly so provides as in the case of the parents and of the guardians It is natural to expect that if the law had intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of persons enumerated in the article it would have expressly so stated The fact that it has not done so indicates an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age Further it is not without significance that - finally that while in the case of parents and guardians their authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter MAKALINTAL J dissenting - I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v Court of Appeals I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results considering the size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions academic and non-academic as well as the temper attitudes and often destructive activism of the students to hold their teachers andor the administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts committed by them - It would demand responsibility without commensurate authority rendering teachers and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control - one other factor constrains me to dissent The opinion of the majority states Here the parents of the student at fault defendant Daffon are not involved since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident Note that for parental

responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their companyit stands to reason that (1) the clause so long as they remain in their custody as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase who live in their company as used in reference to parents and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer minors so should teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLLETOS) 160 SCRA 315 CRUZ April 15 1988

Facts It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to graduate at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes Alfredo went to the school to submit his ldquoReport in Physicrdquo While they were in the auditorium of their school hewas shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon

ISSUE WON Art 2180 is applicable Held Yes Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools academic or non-academic Teachers are liable for acts of their student except where the school is technical in nature (arts and trade establishment) in which case the head thereof shall be answerable

ldquoThere is really no substantial difference distinction between the academic and non-

academic schools in so far as torts committed by their students are concerned The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the student under their control and supervision whatever the nature of the school where he is teachingrdquo ldquox x x x The distinction no longer obtains at present x x x ldquo

The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises whether the semester has not ended or has ended or has not yet begun The term ldquocustodyrdquo signifies that the student is within the control and influence of the school authorities The teacher in charge is the one designated by the dean principal or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils or students in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned It is not necessary that at the time of the injury the teacher is physically present and in a position to prevent it

Thus for injuries caused by the student the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him

In any event the school may be held to answer for the acts of its teacher or the head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior but it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias Such defense they had taken necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of and thus be exonerated from liability imposed by Art 2180

Basis of teacherrsquos vicarious liability is as such they acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents) However teachers are not expected to have the same measure of responsibility as that imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree x x x The parent can instill more lasting discipline more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or the head for the tort committed by the child

As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent nor the school remised in the discharged of their duties they were exonerated of liability (Note ndash the court view on increasing students activism likely causing violence resulting to injuries in or out of the school premises ndash J Guttierez Jr concurringly said many student x x x view some teachers as part of the bourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice on behavior deportment and other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively rejected It seems most unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has outlived its purpose The court cannot make law it can only apply the law with its imperfections However the court can suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY) 160 SCRA 785 PARAS April 25 1988

NATURE Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order dismissing the complaint as against the respondent school and denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal FACTS - A group of students walking inside Araneta University were accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karin Madidis alias ldquoTengrdquo Petitioner (Reynaldo) was subsequently stabbed by Teng requiring him to be hospitalized and to undergo surgery - Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng and Arante University based on Art 2190 CC - Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the provision only applies to vocational schools and not to academic institutions They also claim that the civil liability in this case arose from a crime which they did not commit Since it was a civil case respondent school claims that a demand should have been made by the plaintiff rendering it premature to bring an action for damages against respondent school MTD was granted by the CA - Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of Dismissal Motion was denied due to insufficient justification to disturb ruling ISSUE WON the Art 2180 CC2 applies to academic institutions

2 Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody

HELD It is unnecessary to answer the issue What the petitioner wants to know is WON the school or the university itself is liable The answer is no since the provision speaks of ldquoteachers or headsrdquo Dispositive WHEREFORE this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit YLARDE vs AQUINO GANCAYCO 1988 July 29 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School and private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein At that time the school was littered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez stated burying them all by himself Deciding to help his colleague private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils aged ten to eleven Being their teacher-in-charge he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried The work was left unfinished The following day also after classes private respondent Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging These four pupils ---- Reynaldo Alonso Fransico Alcantara Ismael Abaga and Novelito

Ylarde dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep At this point private respondent Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole Then said private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope Before leaving private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children not to touch the stone A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left three of the four kids Alonso Alcantara and Ylarde playfully jumped into the pit Then without any warning at all the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde the concrete block caught him before he could get out pinning him to the wall in a standing position As a result thereof Ylarde sustained injuries and died three (3) days later Ylardes parents petitioners in this case filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of

a very cautious person and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence ISSUE WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code both private respondents can be held liable for damages Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter On the other hand the applicable provision of Article 2180 states Art 2180 xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody HELD Only Aquino the teacher is liable Ratio As regards the principal We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades Reasoning

This is in line with the Courtrsquos ruling in Amadora vs Court of Appeals wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades it is only the head of the school who can be held liable Ratio Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons Reasoning (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the childrens safety and (5) left the children close to the excavation an obviously attractive nuisance (6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity This should not be the case The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself A minor

should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age capacity discretion knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances Bearing this in mind We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence DISPOSITION Granted SALVOSA v IAC (CASTRO) 166 SCRA 274 PADILLA J October 5 1988 FACTS Jimmy Abon a commerce student of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977 at around 800 pm in the parking space of BCF BCF is both an academic and arts and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP Subsequently the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages impleading Jimmy B Abon Roberto C Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF) Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF) Libertad D Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc as party defendants

After hearing the Trial Court rendered a decision (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B Abon Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc jointly and severally to pay private respondents as heirs of Napoleon Castro (2) absolving the other defendants and (3) dismissing the defendants counterclaim for lack of merit ISSUE WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B Abon HELD NO Jimmy B Abon cannot be considered to have been at attendance in the school or in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro Logically therefore petitioners cannot under Art 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages resulting from his acts Ratio Under the penultimate paragraph of Art 2180 of the Civil Code teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher the latter stands to a certain extent in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student] Likewise the phrase used in [Art 2180 mdash so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and

students for as long as they are at attendance in the school including recess time Reasoning a The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the CA According to the CA while it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident which was at about 8 oclock in the evening but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter The time interval is safely within the recess time that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case supra In line with the case of Palisoc 17 a student not at attendance in the school cannot be in recess thereat A recess as the concept is embraced in the phrase at attendance in the school contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises or the area within which the school activity is conducted Recess by its nature does not include dismissal Likewise the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute attending school or being in the protective and supervisory custody of the school as contemplated in the law b Jimmy B Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior the ROTC Commandant when he shot Napoleon Castro ST FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v CA(CastilloCadiz)

194 SCRA 340 Paras J Feb 25 1991 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS -Ferdinand Castillo then a freshman student at St Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach Quezon His parents didnrsquot allow him to go due to short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home However he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher -his parents filed a complaint against St Francis HS represented by its principal Illumin and several teachers for damages incurred from the death of their son contending that it occurred due to petitionersrsquo failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family The TC found against the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim Also the male teachers who were to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which was not school sanctioned and as the latter had her own class to supervise then and was not actually invited -Both parties appealed to the CA On the issue of the liability of St Francis HS and the Illumin the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 They cannot escape liability simply because it wasnrsquot an ldquoextra-curricular activity of the HSrdquo From the evidence

it was shown that the principal had known of the picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the event As such under Article 2180 both are jointly and severally liable w the teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the ownermanager (St Francis and the principal) Petitioners contend that the victimrsquos parents failed to prove by evidence that they didnrsquot give their son consent to join the picnic The Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence of their liability Also 2 of the teachers who arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers Hence this petition ISSUE (1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants (2) WON Art 2180 in relation to 2176 is applicable (3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper HELD (1) NO Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them At the outset it should be noted that the victimrsquos parents allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination -Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it If the CArsquos findings are to be upheld employers will be forever exposed to the risk and

danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the performance of their duties -No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised diligence of a good father of the family In fact 2 PE teachers were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming Life savers were brought in the event of such an accident The records also show that the 2 PE teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim (2) NO The CA erred in applying Art 2180 particularly par 4 For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his employee the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task In the case at bar the teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity (3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence required of them no moral or exemplary damages under Art 2177 may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses PREMISES CONSIDERED the questioned decision is SET ASIDE PSBA v CA (BENITEZBAUTISTA) 205 SCRA 729 Padilla J Feb 4 1992 FACTS -Carlitos Bautista enrolled in the 3rd year commerce course of PSBA was stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants who were

from outside the schoolrsquos academic community This prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers alleging negligence recklessness and lack of security precautions means and methods before during and after the attack of the victim -PSBA sought to dismiss the case alleging that since they were presumably sued under Art 2180 there was no cause of action since academic institutions are not subject to the said provision -A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by the TC yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA Hence this petition ISSUES (1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180 HELD (1) NO Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the parties the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern but the court has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a contract -Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroadrdquohellip the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the partiesrdquo

-Using the test in Cangco a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBArsquos liability hence any finding of negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual obligation only -When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment a contract is established between them resulting in a bilateral obligation The school is obliged to provide the student with an education along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge In turn the student abides by the schoolrsquos academic requirements and observes its rules and regulations However a school cannot be an insurer for its students against all risks one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons time and place - In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was breached due to PSBArsquos negligence in providing proper security measures At this stage the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondentrsquos complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC can determine WHEREFORE the petition is DENIED The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court Costs against the petitioners SOLIMAN JR V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 FELICIANO J May 18 1992 NATURE Civil complaint for damages FACTS

- On August 13 1982 while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman Jr a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC) was in the campus premises thereof the defendant Jimmy Solomon who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant RL Security Agency Inc without any provocation shot the plaintiff on the abdomen The plaintiff was confined in a hospital and as per doctors opinion he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months Petitioner represented by his guardian filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC RL Security Agency and Solomon - RCC filed a motion to dismiss contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon It further argued that Article 2180 7th paragraph of the Civil Code did not apply since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil student or apprentice of the school - Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCCrsquos motion to dismiss Petitionerrsquos MFR was denied Hence this appeal ISSUES 1 WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180 as well as those of Articles 349 350 and 352 of the Civil Code

2 WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1 NO - Under Art 2180 the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for ones own act or omission but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils their students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody - The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman Jr RCC was not the employer of Solomon The employer of Solomon was the RL Security Agency Inc while the school was the client of the latter It is settled that where the security agency as here recruits hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency and not to the clients of such agency There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC

and Solomon petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges he being in fact an employee of the RL Security Agency Inc the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows Art 349 The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority xxx xxx xxx (2) Teachers and professors xxx xxx xxx (4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices xxx xxx xxx Art 350 The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child xxx xxx xxx Art 352 The relations between teacher and pupil professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student - In Palisoc v Brillantes the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc a student of that Institute which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon another student of the Institute It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th

paragraph of Article 2180 quoted above but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case - Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority In the instant case Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner was not a pupil student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon 2 YES - In the case of PSBA v CA the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision At the same time however the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment on the one hand and the students who are enrolled on the other hand which contract results in obligations for both parties It held When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment there is established a contract between them resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with For its part the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession On the other hand the student covenants to abide by the schools academic requirements and observe its rules and regulationsInstitutions of learning must also meet the implicit or built-in obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary

undertaking of imparting knowledge Certainly no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb Necessarily the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof - It was also pointed out in said case that In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar however there is as yet no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the formers negligence in providing proper security measures This would be for the trial court to determine And even if there be a finding of negligence the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only Using the test of Cangco supra the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract In fact that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista In other words a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the schools liability The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code - In the PSBA case the trial court had denied the schools motion to dismiss the complaint against it and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial courts order In the case at bar the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC upon the assumption that petitioners cause of action was based and could have been based only on Art 2180 of the Civil Code As PSBA however states acts which are

tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have in the interest of justice allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the caseThis case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings ST MARYrsquoS ACADEMY VS CARPITANOS PARDO February 6 2002 NATURE Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos together with James Daniel II (then 15 driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached Carpitanos sued the school James Daniel II his parents and Vivencio Villanueva -TC absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II held parents and school liable

-CA school liable under A218 and 219 FC finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them ISSUE (regarding liability of St Maryrsquos Academy) WON St Maryrsquos Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos and therefore liable for damages HELD NO The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep Ratio For the school to be liable it must be shown that the lsquoinjury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events unbroken by intervening efficient causes Reasoning The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva It was

Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep -Liability for the accident whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep must be pinned on the minorrsquos parents primarily The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeepConsidering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy had no control and which was the proximate cause of the accident petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident - It is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos Disposition WHEREFORE the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants excluding petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy Dipolog City No costs SO ORDERED PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO March 25 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision

FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines Inc and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS Inc its manager BALINGIT and the driver PINEDA - It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK owned by Phil-Am along the natrsquol highway at Sto Tomas Pampanga The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan owned by Phil Rabbit Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days This deprived the company of earnings of about P8600 - Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pinedas employer Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him - CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art2180 CC - In the appeal the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41200 Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality But this was not alleged in their complaint ISSUE WON the terms employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise

used in Art 2180 NCC (Art1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments Art2180 uses the term manager (director in the Spanish version) to mean employerrdquo - Hence under the allegations of the complaint no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders Inc in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer Phil-American Forwarders Inc This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses Dispositive Lower courtrsquos order of dismissal is AFFIRMED PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE June 17 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence recklessness

violation of traffic rules and regulations abandonment of victim and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondentsrsquo Version -In the early morning of March 24 1990 about 600 orsquoclock the victim Ramon A Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine -The Magsaysay Blvd runs perpendicular to Gomez St and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street -As the bus was pushed its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A Acuesta who as a result thereof fell and thereafter was run over by the said bus Petitionerrsquos Version -Manilhig in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street the victim who was biking towards the same direction as the bus suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road

-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear which caused the death of the victim Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied MFR -Hence this appeal

ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes -Civil Case No 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 21763 and 21804 of the Civil Code against petitioner

(limited to that involved in the outline) 3Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 4Art 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxxxxxxxx

Manilhig and his employer petitioner Philtranco respectively -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle like petitioner Philtranco for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary direct and joint and several or solidary with the driver As to solidarity Article 2194 expressly provides the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary -Since the employers liability is primary direct and solidary its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed (with regard to this issue) CASTILEX V VASQUEZ Dec 21 1999 Davide Facts At around 130 to 200 in the morning Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmentildea Rotunda He was traveling counter-clockwise (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time Upon the

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

other hand Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no GBW-794 On the same date and time Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmentildea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St or to Belvic St

In the process the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute So the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez Jr and Luisa So Vasquez parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation In the same action Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez Issue WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

Held Castilez is absolved from any liability The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision Instead the fourth paragraph should apply Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable Both provisions apply to employers the fourth paragraph to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise and the fifth paragraph to employers in general whether or not engaged in any business or industry The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included Negligent acts of employees whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry are covered so long as they were acting

within the scope of their assigned task even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions For admittedly employees oftentimes wear different hats They perform functions which are beyond their office title or designation but which nevertheless are still within the call of dutyThis court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 whether or not engaged in any business or industry an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship once this is done the plaintiff must show to hold the employer liable that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee

It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect and even finality at times This rule is however subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations surmises or conjectures Such exception obtain in the present

case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager

On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks ABAD who was presented as a hostile witness testified that at the time of the incident he was driving a company-issued vehicle registered under the name of petitioner He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment an employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction but rather the result varies with each state of facts The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances The SC does not agree The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle

I Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle

II Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee and not a part of his services to his employer Hence in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle 14 cda

The employer may however be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and presumably spending more time at his actual duties Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving commission rule under which it can be

found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home However even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own

III Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept it has been held that he has not resumed his employment and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business or within the

scope of his assigned task ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident It was then about 200 am way beyond the normal working hours ABADs working day had ended his overtime work had already been completed His being at a place which as petitioner put it was known as a haven for prostitutes pimps and drug pushers and addicts had no connection to petitioners business neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager Rather using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR August 17 1992

NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI He is also employed as a janitor The president of FCI is Agustin Masa Agustin has a son Allan who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver Allan lives with his dad Funtecha also lives in the presidentrsquos house free of charge while a student at FCI - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home then go back to the school then go home in the school jeep He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hersquos supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school - One night Funtecha wanted to drive home He has a student license After a dangerous curb

and seeing that the road was clear Allan let Funtecha drive Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians) The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night - TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan SC reversed saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school Allans job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose Moreover it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtechas possession of a student drivers license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans house Funtecha

definitely was not having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a frolic of his own but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner Hence the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

- Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority the article expressly so provides as in the case of the parents and of the guardians It is natural to expect that if the law had intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of persons enumerated in the article it would have expressly so stated The fact that it has not done so indicates an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age Further it is not without significance that - finally that while in the case of parents and guardians their authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter MAKALINTAL J dissenting - I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v Court of Appeals I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results considering the size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions academic and non-academic as well as the temper attitudes and often destructive activism of the students to hold their teachers andor the administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts committed by them - It would demand responsibility without commensurate authority rendering teachers and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control - one other factor constrains me to dissent The opinion of the majority states Here the parents of the student at fault defendant Daffon are not involved since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident Note that for parental

responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their companyit stands to reason that (1) the clause so long as they remain in their custody as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase who live in their company as used in reference to parents and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer minors so should teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLLETOS) 160 SCRA 315 CRUZ April 15 1988

Facts It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to graduate at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes Alfredo went to the school to submit his ldquoReport in Physicrdquo While they were in the auditorium of their school hewas shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon

ISSUE WON Art 2180 is applicable Held Yes Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools academic or non-academic Teachers are liable for acts of their student except where the school is technical in nature (arts and trade establishment) in which case the head thereof shall be answerable

ldquoThere is really no substantial difference distinction between the academic and non-

academic schools in so far as torts committed by their students are concerned The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the student under their control and supervision whatever the nature of the school where he is teachingrdquo ldquox x x x The distinction no longer obtains at present x x x ldquo

The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises whether the semester has not ended or has ended or has not yet begun The term ldquocustodyrdquo signifies that the student is within the control and influence of the school authorities The teacher in charge is the one designated by the dean principal or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils or students in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned It is not necessary that at the time of the injury the teacher is physically present and in a position to prevent it

Thus for injuries caused by the student the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him

In any event the school may be held to answer for the acts of its teacher or the head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior but it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias Such defense they had taken necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of and thus be exonerated from liability imposed by Art 2180

Basis of teacherrsquos vicarious liability is as such they acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents) However teachers are not expected to have the same measure of responsibility as that imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree x x x The parent can instill more lasting discipline more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or the head for the tort committed by the child

As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent nor the school remised in the discharged of their duties they were exonerated of liability (Note ndash the court view on increasing students activism likely causing violence resulting to injuries in or out of the school premises ndash J Guttierez Jr concurringly said many student x x x view some teachers as part of the bourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice on behavior deportment and other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively rejected It seems most unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has outlived its purpose The court cannot make law it can only apply the law with its imperfections However the court can suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY) 160 SCRA 785 PARAS April 25 1988

NATURE Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order dismissing the complaint as against the respondent school and denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal FACTS - A group of students walking inside Araneta University were accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karin Madidis alias ldquoTengrdquo Petitioner (Reynaldo) was subsequently stabbed by Teng requiring him to be hospitalized and to undergo surgery - Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng and Arante University based on Art 2190 CC - Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the provision only applies to vocational schools and not to academic institutions They also claim that the civil liability in this case arose from a crime which they did not commit Since it was a civil case respondent school claims that a demand should have been made by the plaintiff rendering it premature to bring an action for damages against respondent school MTD was granted by the CA - Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of Dismissal Motion was denied due to insufficient justification to disturb ruling ISSUE WON the Art 2180 CC2 applies to academic institutions

2 Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody

HELD It is unnecessary to answer the issue What the petitioner wants to know is WON the school or the university itself is liable The answer is no since the provision speaks of ldquoteachers or headsrdquo Dispositive WHEREFORE this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit YLARDE vs AQUINO GANCAYCO 1988 July 29 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School and private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein At that time the school was littered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez stated burying them all by himself Deciding to help his colleague private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils aged ten to eleven Being their teacher-in-charge he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried The work was left unfinished The following day also after classes private respondent Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging These four pupils ---- Reynaldo Alonso Fransico Alcantara Ismael Abaga and Novelito

Ylarde dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep At this point private respondent Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole Then said private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope Before leaving private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children not to touch the stone A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left three of the four kids Alonso Alcantara and Ylarde playfully jumped into the pit Then without any warning at all the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde the concrete block caught him before he could get out pinning him to the wall in a standing position As a result thereof Ylarde sustained injuries and died three (3) days later Ylardes parents petitioners in this case filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of

a very cautious person and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence ISSUE WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code both private respondents can be held liable for damages Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter On the other hand the applicable provision of Article 2180 states Art 2180 xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody HELD Only Aquino the teacher is liable Ratio As regards the principal We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades Reasoning

This is in line with the Courtrsquos ruling in Amadora vs Court of Appeals wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades it is only the head of the school who can be held liable Ratio Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons Reasoning (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the childrens safety and (5) left the children close to the excavation an obviously attractive nuisance (6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity This should not be the case The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself A minor

should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age capacity discretion knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances Bearing this in mind We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence DISPOSITION Granted SALVOSA v IAC (CASTRO) 166 SCRA 274 PADILLA J October 5 1988 FACTS Jimmy Abon a commerce student of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977 at around 800 pm in the parking space of BCF BCF is both an academic and arts and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP Subsequently the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages impleading Jimmy B Abon Roberto C Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF) Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF) Libertad D Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc as party defendants

After hearing the Trial Court rendered a decision (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B Abon Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc jointly and severally to pay private respondents as heirs of Napoleon Castro (2) absolving the other defendants and (3) dismissing the defendants counterclaim for lack of merit ISSUE WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B Abon HELD NO Jimmy B Abon cannot be considered to have been at attendance in the school or in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro Logically therefore petitioners cannot under Art 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages resulting from his acts Ratio Under the penultimate paragraph of Art 2180 of the Civil Code teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher the latter stands to a certain extent in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student] Likewise the phrase used in [Art 2180 mdash so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and

students for as long as they are at attendance in the school including recess time Reasoning a The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the CA According to the CA while it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident which was at about 8 oclock in the evening but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter The time interval is safely within the recess time that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case supra In line with the case of Palisoc 17 a student not at attendance in the school cannot be in recess thereat A recess as the concept is embraced in the phrase at attendance in the school contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises or the area within which the school activity is conducted Recess by its nature does not include dismissal Likewise the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute attending school or being in the protective and supervisory custody of the school as contemplated in the law b Jimmy B Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior the ROTC Commandant when he shot Napoleon Castro ST FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v CA(CastilloCadiz)

194 SCRA 340 Paras J Feb 25 1991 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS -Ferdinand Castillo then a freshman student at St Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach Quezon His parents didnrsquot allow him to go due to short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home However he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher -his parents filed a complaint against St Francis HS represented by its principal Illumin and several teachers for damages incurred from the death of their son contending that it occurred due to petitionersrsquo failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family The TC found against the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim Also the male teachers who were to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which was not school sanctioned and as the latter had her own class to supervise then and was not actually invited -Both parties appealed to the CA On the issue of the liability of St Francis HS and the Illumin the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 They cannot escape liability simply because it wasnrsquot an ldquoextra-curricular activity of the HSrdquo From the evidence

it was shown that the principal had known of the picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the event As such under Article 2180 both are jointly and severally liable w the teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the ownermanager (St Francis and the principal) Petitioners contend that the victimrsquos parents failed to prove by evidence that they didnrsquot give their son consent to join the picnic The Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence of their liability Also 2 of the teachers who arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers Hence this petition ISSUE (1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants (2) WON Art 2180 in relation to 2176 is applicable (3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper HELD (1) NO Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them At the outset it should be noted that the victimrsquos parents allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination -Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it If the CArsquos findings are to be upheld employers will be forever exposed to the risk and

danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the performance of their duties -No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised diligence of a good father of the family In fact 2 PE teachers were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming Life savers were brought in the event of such an accident The records also show that the 2 PE teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim (2) NO The CA erred in applying Art 2180 particularly par 4 For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his employee the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task In the case at bar the teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity (3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence required of them no moral or exemplary damages under Art 2177 may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses PREMISES CONSIDERED the questioned decision is SET ASIDE PSBA v CA (BENITEZBAUTISTA) 205 SCRA 729 Padilla J Feb 4 1992 FACTS -Carlitos Bautista enrolled in the 3rd year commerce course of PSBA was stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants who were

from outside the schoolrsquos academic community This prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers alleging negligence recklessness and lack of security precautions means and methods before during and after the attack of the victim -PSBA sought to dismiss the case alleging that since they were presumably sued under Art 2180 there was no cause of action since academic institutions are not subject to the said provision -A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by the TC yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA Hence this petition ISSUES (1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180 HELD (1) NO Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the parties the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern but the court has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a contract -Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroadrdquohellip the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the partiesrdquo

-Using the test in Cangco a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBArsquos liability hence any finding of negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual obligation only -When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment a contract is established between them resulting in a bilateral obligation The school is obliged to provide the student with an education along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge In turn the student abides by the schoolrsquos academic requirements and observes its rules and regulations However a school cannot be an insurer for its students against all risks one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons time and place - In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was breached due to PSBArsquos negligence in providing proper security measures At this stage the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondentrsquos complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC can determine WHEREFORE the petition is DENIED The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court Costs against the petitioners SOLIMAN JR V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 FELICIANO J May 18 1992 NATURE Civil complaint for damages FACTS

- On August 13 1982 while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman Jr a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC) was in the campus premises thereof the defendant Jimmy Solomon who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant RL Security Agency Inc without any provocation shot the plaintiff on the abdomen The plaintiff was confined in a hospital and as per doctors opinion he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months Petitioner represented by his guardian filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC RL Security Agency and Solomon - RCC filed a motion to dismiss contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon It further argued that Article 2180 7th paragraph of the Civil Code did not apply since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil student or apprentice of the school - Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCCrsquos motion to dismiss Petitionerrsquos MFR was denied Hence this appeal ISSUES 1 WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180 as well as those of Articles 349 350 and 352 of the Civil Code

2 WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1 NO - Under Art 2180 the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for ones own act or omission but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils their students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody - The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman Jr RCC was not the employer of Solomon The employer of Solomon was the RL Security Agency Inc while the school was the client of the latter It is settled that where the security agency as here recruits hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency and not to the clients of such agency There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC

and Solomon petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges he being in fact an employee of the RL Security Agency Inc the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows Art 349 The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority xxx xxx xxx (2) Teachers and professors xxx xxx xxx (4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices xxx xxx xxx Art 350 The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child xxx xxx xxx Art 352 The relations between teacher and pupil professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student - In Palisoc v Brillantes the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc a student of that Institute which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon another student of the Institute It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th

paragraph of Article 2180 quoted above but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case - Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority In the instant case Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner was not a pupil student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon 2 YES - In the case of PSBA v CA the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision At the same time however the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment on the one hand and the students who are enrolled on the other hand which contract results in obligations for both parties It held When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment there is established a contract between them resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with For its part the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession On the other hand the student covenants to abide by the schools academic requirements and observe its rules and regulationsInstitutions of learning must also meet the implicit or built-in obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary

undertaking of imparting knowledge Certainly no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb Necessarily the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof - It was also pointed out in said case that In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar however there is as yet no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the formers negligence in providing proper security measures This would be for the trial court to determine And even if there be a finding of negligence the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only Using the test of Cangco supra the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract In fact that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista In other words a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the schools liability The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code - In the PSBA case the trial court had denied the schools motion to dismiss the complaint against it and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial courts order In the case at bar the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC upon the assumption that petitioners cause of action was based and could have been based only on Art 2180 of the Civil Code As PSBA however states acts which are

tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have in the interest of justice allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the caseThis case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings ST MARYrsquoS ACADEMY VS CARPITANOS PARDO February 6 2002 NATURE Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos together with James Daniel II (then 15 driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached Carpitanos sued the school James Daniel II his parents and Vivencio Villanueva -TC absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II held parents and school liable

-CA school liable under A218 and 219 FC finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them ISSUE (regarding liability of St Maryrsquos Academy) WON St Maryrsquos Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos and therefore liable for damages HELD NO The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep Ratio For the school to be liable it must be shown that the lsquoinjury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events unbroken by intervening efficient causes Reasoning The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva It was

Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep -Liability for the accident whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep must be pinned on the minorrsquos parents primarily The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeepConsidering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy had no control and which was the proximate cause of the accident petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident - It is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos Disposition WHEREFORE the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants excluding petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy Dipolog City No costs SO ORDERED PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO March 25 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision

FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines Inc and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS Inc its manager BALINGIT and the driver PINEDA - It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK owned by Phil-Am along the natrsquol highway at Sto Tomas Pampanga The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan owned by Phil Rabbit Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days This deprived the company of earnings of about P8600 - Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pinedas employer Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him - CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art2180 CC - In the appeal the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41200 Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality But this was not alleged in their complaint ISSUE WON the terms employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise

used in Art 2180 NCC (Art1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments Art2180 uses the term manager (director in the Spanish version) to mean employerrdquo - Hence under the allegations of the complaint no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders Inc in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer Phil-American Forwarders Inc This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses Dispositive Lower courtrsquos order of dismissal is AFFIRMED PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE June 17 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence recklessness

violation of traffic rules and regulations abandonment of victim and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondentsrsquo Version -In the early morning of March 24 1990 about 600 orsquoclock the victim Ramon A Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine -The Magsaysay Blvd runs perpendicular to Gomez St and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street -As the bus was pushed its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A Acuesta who as a result thereof fell and thereafter was run over by the said bus Petitionerrsquos Version -Manilhig in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street the victim who was biking towards the same direction as the bus suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road

-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear which caused the death of the victim Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied MFR -Hence this appeal

ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes -Civil Case No 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 21763 and 21804 of the Civil Code against petitioner

(limited to that involved in the outline) 3Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 4Art 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxxxxxxxx

Manilhig and his employer petitioner Philtranco respectively -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle like petitioner Philtranco for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary direct and joint and several or solidary with the driver As to solidarity Article 2194 expressly provides the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary -Since the employers liability is primary direct and solidary its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed (with regard to this issue) CASTILEX V VASQUEZ Dec 21 1999 Davide Facts At around 130 to 200 in the morning Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmentildea Rotunda He was traveling counter-clockwise (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time Upon the

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

other hand Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no GBW-794 On the same date and time Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmentildea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St or to Belvic St

In the process the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute So the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez Jr and Luisa So Vasquez parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation In the same action Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez Issue WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

Held Castilez is absolved from any liability The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision Instead the fourth paragraph should apply Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable Both provisions apply to employers the fourth paragraph to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise and the fifth paragraph to employers in general whether or not engaged in any business or industry The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included Negligent acts of employees whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry are covered so long as they were acting

within the scope of their assigned task even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions For admittedly employees oftentimes wear different hats They perform functions which are beyond their office title or designation but which nevertheless are still within the call of dutyThis court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 whether or not engaged in any business or industry an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship once this is done the plaintiff must show to hold the employer liable that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee

It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect and even finality at times This rule is however subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations surmises or conjectures Such exception obtain in the present

case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager

On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks ABAD who was presented as a hostile witness testified that at the time of the incident he was driving a company-issued vehicle registered under the name of petitioner He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment an employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction but rather the result varies with each state of facts The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances The SC does not agree The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle

I Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle

II Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee and not a part of his services to his employer Hence in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle 14 cda

The employer may however be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and presumably spending more time at his actual duties Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving commission rule under which it can be

found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home However even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own

III Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept it has been held that he has not resumed his employment and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business or within the

scope of his assigned task ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident It was then about 200 am way beyond the normal working hours ABADs working day had ended his overtime work had already been completed His being at a place which as petitioner put it was known as a haven for prostitutes pimps and drug pushers and addicts had no connection to petitioners business neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager Rather using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR August 17 1992

NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI He is also employed as a janitor The president of FCI is Agustin Masa Agustin has a son Allan who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver Allan lives with his dad Funtecha also lives in the presidentrsquos house free of charge while a student at FCI - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home then go back to the school then go home in the school jeep He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hersquos supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school - One night Funtecha wanted to drive home He has a student license After a dangerous curb

and seeing that the road was clear Allan let Funtecha drive Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians) The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night - TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan SC reversed saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school Allans job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose Moreover it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtechas possession of a student drivers license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans house Funtecha

definitely was not having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a frolic of his own but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner Hence the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

Basis of teacherrsquos vicarious liability is as such they acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents) However teachers are not expected to have the same measure of responsibility as that imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree x x x The parent can instill more lasting discipline more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or the head for the tort committed by the child

As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent nor the school remised in the discharged of their duties they were exonerated of liability (Note ndash the court view on increasing students activism likely causing violence resulting to injuries in or out of the school premises ndash J Guttierez Jr concurringly said many student x x x view some teachers as part of the bourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice on behavior deportment and other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively rejected It seems most unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has outlived its purpose The court cannot make law it can only apply the law with its imperfections However the court can suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY) 160 SCRA 785 PARAS April 25 1988

NATURE Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order dismissing the complaint as against the respondent school and denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal FACTS - A group of students walking inside Araneta University were accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karin Madidis alias ldquoTengrdquo Petitioner (Reynaldo) was subsequently stabbed by Teng requiring him to be hospitalized and to undergo surgery - Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng and Arante University based on Art 2190 CC - Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the provision only applies to vocational schools and not to academic institutions They also claim that the civil liability in this case arose from a crime which they did not commit Since it was a civil case respondent school claims that a demand should have been made by the plaintiff rendering it premature to bring an action for damages against respondent school MTD was granted by the CA - Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of Dismissal Motion was denied due to insufficient justification to disturb ruling ISSUE WON the Art 2180 CC2 applies to academic institutions

2 Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody

HELD It is unnecessary to answer the issue What the petitioner wants to know is WON the school or the university itself is liable The answer is no since the provision speaks of ldquoteachers or headsrdquo Dispositive WHEREFORE this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit YLARDE vs AQUINO GANCAYCO 1988 July 29 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School and private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein At that time the school was littered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez stated burying them all by himself Deciding to help his colleague private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils aged ten to eleven Being their teacher-in-charge he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried The work was left unfinished The following day also after classes private respondent Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging These four pupils ---- Reynaldo Alonso Fransico Alcantara Ismael Abaga and Novelito

Ylarde dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep At this point private respondent Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole Then said private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope Before leaving private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children not to touch the stone A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left three of the four kids Alonso Alcantara and Ylarde playfully jumped into the pit Then without any warning at all the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde the concrete block caught him before he could get out pinning him to the wall in a standing position As a result thereof Ylarde sustained injuries and died three (3) days later Ylardes parents petitioners in this case filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of

a very cautious person and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence ISSUE WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code both private respondents can be held liable for damages Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter On the other hand the applicable provision of Article 2180 states Art 2180 xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody HELD Only Aquino the teacher is liable Ratio As regards the principal We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades Reasoning

This is in line with the Courtrsquos ruling in Amadora vs Court of Appeals wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades it is only the head of the school who can be held liable Ratio Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons Reasoning (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the childrens safety and (5) left the children close to the excavation an obviously attractive nuisance (6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity This should not be the case The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself A minor

should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age capacity discretion knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances Bearing this in mind We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence DISPOSITION Granted SALVOSA v IAC (CASTRO) 166 SCRA 274 PADILLA J October 5 1988 FACTS Jimmy Abon a commerce student of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977 at around 800 pm in the parking space of BCF BCF is both an academic and arts and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP Subsequently the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages impleading Jimmy B Abon Roberto C Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF) Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF) Libertad D Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc as party defendants

After hearing the Trial Court rendered a decision (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B Abon Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc jointly and severally to pay private respondents as heirs of Napoleon Castro (2) absolving the other defendants and (3) dismissing the defendants counterclaim for lack of merit ISSUE WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B Abon HELD NO Jimmy B Abon cannot be considered to have been at attendance in the school or in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro Logically therefore petitioners cannot under Art 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages resulting from his acts Ratio Under the penultimate paragraph of Art 2180 of the Civil Code teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher the latter stands to a certain extent in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student] Likewise the phrase used in [Art 2180 mdash so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and

students for as long as they are at attendance in the school including recess time Reasoning a The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the CA According to the CA while it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident which was at about 8 oclock in the evening but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter The time interval is safely within the recess time that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case supra In line with the case of Palisoc 17 a student not at attendance in the school cannot be in recess thereat A recess as the concept is embraced in the phrase at attendance in the school contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises or the area within which the school activity is conducted Recess by its nature does not include dismissal Likewise the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute attending school or being in the protective and supervisory custody of the school as contemplated in the law b Jimmy B Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior the ROTC Commandant when he shot Napoleon Castro ST FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v CA(CastilloCadiz)

194 SCRA 340 Paras J Feb 25 1991 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS -Ferdinand Castillo then a freshman student at St Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach Quezon His parents didnrsquot allow him to go due to short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home However he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher -his parents filed a complaint against St Francis HS represented by its principal Illumin and several teachers for damages incurred from the death of their son contending that it occurred due to petitionersrsquo failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family The TC found against the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim Also the male teachers who were to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which was not school sanctioned and as the latter had her own class to supervise then and was not actually invited -Both parties appealed to the CA On the issue of the liability of St Francis HS and the Illumin the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 They cannot escape liability simply because it wasnrsquot an ldquoextra-curricular activity of the HSrdquo From the evidence

it was shown that the principal had known of the picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the event As such under Article 2180 both are jointly and severally liable w the teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the ownermanager (St Francis and the principal) Petitioners contend that the victimrsquos parents failed to prove by evidence that they didnrsquot give their son consent to join the picnic The Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence of their liability Also 2 of the teachers who arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers Hence this petition ISSUE (1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants (2) WON Art 2180 in relation to 2176 is applicable (3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper HELD (1) NO Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them At the outset it should be noted that the victimrsquos parents allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination -Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it If the CArsquos findings are to be upheld employers will be forever exposed to the risk and

danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the performance of their duties -No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised diligence of a good father of the family In fact 2 PE teachers were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming Life savers were brought in the event of such an accident The records also show that the 2 PE teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim (2) NO The CA erred in applying Art 2180 particularly par 4 For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his employee the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task In the case at bar the teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity (3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence required of them no moral or exemplary damages under Art 2177 may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses PREMISES CONSIDERED the questioned decision is SET ASIDE PSBA v CA (BENITEZBAUTISTA) 205 SCRA 729 Padilla J Feb 4 1992 FACTS -Carlitos Bautista enrolled in the 3rd year commerce course of PSBA was stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants who were

from outside the schoolrsquos academic community This prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers alleging negligence recklessness and lack of security precautions means and methods before during and after the attack of the victim -PSBA sought to dismiss the case alleging that since they were presumably sued under Art 2180 there was no cause of action since academic institutions are not subject to the said provision -A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by the TC yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA Hence this petition ISSUES (1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180 HELD (1) NO Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the parties the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern but the court has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a contract -Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroadrdquohellip the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the partiesrdquo

-Using the test in Cangco a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBArsquos liability hence any finding of negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual obligation only -When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment a contract is established between them resulting in a bilateral obligation The school is obliged to provide the student with an education along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge In turn the student abides by the schoolrsquos academic requirements and observes its rules and regulations However a school cannot be an insurer for its students against all risks one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons time and place - In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was breached due to PSBArsquos negligence in providing proper security measures At this stage the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondentrsquos complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC can determine WHEREFORE the petition is DENIED The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court Costs against the petitioners SOLIMAN JR V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 FELICIANO J May 18 1992 NATURE Civil complaint for damages FACTS

- On August 13 1982 while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman Jr a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC) was in the campus premises thereof the defendant Jimmy Solomon who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant RL Security Agency Inc without any provocation shot the plaintiff on the abdomen The plaintiff was confined in a hospital and as per doctors opinion he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months Petitioner represented by his guardian filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC RL Security Agency and Solomon - RCC filed a motion to dismiss contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon It further argued that Article 2180 7th paragraph of the Civil Code did not apply since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil student or apprentice of the school - Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCCrsquos motion to dismiss Petitionerrsquos MFR was denied Hence this appeal ISSUES 1 WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180 as well as those of Articles 349 350 and 352 of the Civil Code

2 WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1 NO - Under Art 2180 the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for ones own act or omission but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils their students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody - The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman Jr RCC was not the employer of Solomon The employer of Solomon was the RL Security Agency Inc while the school was the client of the latter It is settled that where the security agency as here recruits hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency and not to the clients of such agency There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC

and Solomon petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges he being in fact an employee of the RL Security Agency Inc the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows Art 349 The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority xxx xxx xxx (2) Teachers and professors xxx xxx xxx (4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices xxx xxx xxx Art 350 The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child xxx xxx xxx Art 352 The relations between teacher and pupil professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student - In Palisoc v Brillantes the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc a student of that Institute which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon another student of the Institute It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th

paragraph of Article 2180 quoted above but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case - Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority In the instant case Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner was not a pupil student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon 2 YES - In the case of PSBA v CA the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision At the same time however the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment on the one hand and the students who are enrolled on the other hand which contract results in obligations for both parties It held When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment there is established a contract between them resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with For its part the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession On the other hand the student covenants to abide by the schools academic requirements and observe its rules and regulationsInstitutions of learning must also meet the implicit or built-in obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary

undertaking of imparting knowledge Certainly no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb Necessarily the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof - It was also pointed out in said case that In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar however there is as yet no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the formers negligence in providing proper security measures This would be for the trial court to determine And even if there be a finding of negligence the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only Using the test of Cangco supra the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract In fact that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista In other words a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the schools liability The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code - In the PSBA case the trial court had denied the schools motion to dismiss the complaint against it and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial courts order In the case at bar the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC upon the assumption that petitioners cause of action was based and could have been based only on Art 2180 of the Civil Code As PSBA however states acts which are

tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have in the interest of justice allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the caseThis case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings ST MARYrsquoS ACADEMY VS CARPITANOS PARDO February 6 2002 NATURE Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos together with James Daniel II (then 15 driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached Carpitanos sued the school James Daniel II his parents and Vivencio Villanueva -TC absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II held parents and school liable

-CA school liable under A218 and 219 FC finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them ISSUE (regarding liability of St Maryrsquos Academy) WON St Maryrsquos Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos and therefore liable for damages HELD NO The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep Ratio For the school to be liable it must be shown that the lsquoinjury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events unbroken by intervening efficient causes Reasoning The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva It was

Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep -Liability for the accident whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep must be pinned on the minorrsquos parents primarily The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeepConsidering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy had no control and which was the proximate cause of the accident petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident - It is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos Disposition WHEREFORE the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants excluding petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy Dipolog City No costs SO ORDERED PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO March 25 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision

FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines Inc and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS Inc its manager BALINGIT and the driver PINEDA - It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK owned by Phil-Am along the natrsquol highway at Sto Tomas Pampanga The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan owned by Phil Rabbit Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days This deprived the company of earnings of about P8600 - Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pinedas employer Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him - CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art2180 CC - In the appeal the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41200 Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality But this was not alleged in their complaint ISSUE WON the terms employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise

used in Art 2180 NCC (Art1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments Art2180 uses the term manager (director in the Spanish version) to mean employerrdquo - Hence under the allegations of the complaint no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders Inc in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer Phil-American Forwarders Inc This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses Dispositive Lower courtrsquos order of dismissal is AFFIRMED PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE June 17 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence recklessness

violation of traffic rules and regulations abandonment of victim and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondentsrsquo Version -In the early morning of March 24 1990 about 600 orsquoclock the victim Ramon A Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine -The Magsaysay Blvd runs perpendicular to Gomez St and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street -As the bus was pushed its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A Acuesta who as a result thereof fell and thereafter was run over by the said bus Petitionerrsquos Version -Manilhig in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street the victim who was biking towards the same direction as the bus suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road

-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear which caused the death of the victim Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied MFR -Hence this appeal

ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes -Civil Case No 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 21763 and 21804 of the Civil Code against petitioner

(limited to that involved in the outline) 3Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 4Art 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxxxxxxxx

Manilhig and his employer petitioner Philtranco respectively -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle like petitioner Philtranco for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary direct and joint and several or solidary with the driver As to solidarity Article 2194 expressly provides the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary -Since the employers liability is primary direct and solidary its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed (with regard to this issue) CASTILEX V VASQUEZ Dec 21 1999 Davide Facts At around 130 to 200 in the morning Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmentildea Rotunda He was traveling counter-clockwise (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time Upon the

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

other hand Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no GBW-794 On the same date and time Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmentildea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St or to Belvic St

In the process the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute So the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez Jr and Luisa So Vasquez parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation In the same action Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez Issue WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

Held Castilez is absolved from any liability The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision Instead the fourth paragraph should apply Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable Both provisions apply to employers the fourth paragraph to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise and the fifth paragraph to employers in general whether or not engaged in any business or industry The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included Negligent acts of employees whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry are covered so long as they were acting

within the scope of their assigned task even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions For admittedly employees oftentimes wear different hats They perform functions which are beyond their office title or designation but which nevertheless are still within the call of dutyThis court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 whether or not engaged in any business or industry an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship once this is done the plaintiff must show to hold the employer liable that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee

It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect and even finality at times This rule is however subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations surmises or conjectures Such exception obtain in the present

case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager

On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks ABAD who was presented as a hostile witness testified that at the time of the incident he was driving a company-issued vehicle registered under the name of petitioner He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment an employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction but rather the result varies with each state of facts The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances The SC does not agree The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle

I Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle

II Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee and not a part of his services to his employer Hence in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle 14 cda

The employer may however be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and presumably spending more time at his actual duties Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving commission rule under which it can be

found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home However even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own

III Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept it has been held that he has not resumed his employment and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business or within the

scope of his assigned task ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident It was then about 200 am way beyond the normal working hours ABADs working day had ended his overtime work had already been completed His being at a place which as petitioner put it was known as a haven for prostitutes pimps and drug pushers and addicts had no connection to petitioners business neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager Rather using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR August 17 1992

NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI He is also employed as a janitor The president of FCI is Agustin Masa Agustin has a son Allan who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver Allan lives with his dad Funtecha also lives in the presidentrsquos house free of charge while a student at FCI - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home then go back to the school then go home in the school jeep He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hersquos supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school - One night Funtecha wanted to drive home He has a student license After a dangerous curb

and seeing that the road was clear Allan let Funtecha drive Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians) The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night - TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan SC reversed saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school Allans job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose Moreover it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtechas possession of a student drivers license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans house Funtecha

definitely was not having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a frolic of his own but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner Hence the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

Ylarde dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep At this point private respondent Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole Then said private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope Before leaving private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children not to touch the stone A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left three of the four kids Alonso Alcantara and Ylarde playfully jumped into the pit Then without any warning at all the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde the concrete block caught him before he could get out pinning him to the wall in a standing position As a result thereof Ylarde sustained injuries and died three (3) days later Ylardes parents petitioners in this case filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of

a very cautious person and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence ISSUE WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code both private respondents can be held liable for damages Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter On the other hand the applicable provision of Article 2180 states Art 2180 xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody HELD Only Aquino the teacher is liable Ratio As regards the principal We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades Reasoning

This is in line with the Courtrsquos ruling in Amadora vs Court of Appeals wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades it is only the head of the school who can be held liable Ratio Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons Reasoning (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the childrens safety and (5) left the children close to the excavation an obviously attractive nuisance (6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity This should not be the case The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself A minor

should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age capacity discretion knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances Bearing this in mind We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence DISPOSITION Granted SALVOSA v IAC (CASTRO) 166 SCRA 274 PADILLA J October 5 1988 FACTS Jimmy Abon a commerce student of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977 at around 800 pm in the parking space of BCF BCF is both an academic and arts and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP Subsequently the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages impleading Jimmy B Abon Roberto C Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF) Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF) Libertad D Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc as party defendants

After hearing the Trial Court rendered a decision (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B Abon Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc jointly and severally to pay private respondents as heirs of Napoleon Castro (2) absolving the other defendants and (3) dismissing the defendants counterclaim for lack of merit ISSUE WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B Abon HELD NO Jimmy B Abon cannot be considered to have been at attendance in the school or in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro Logically therefore petitioners cannot under Art 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages resulting from his acts Ratio Under the penultimate paragraph of Art 2180 of the Civil Code teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher the latter stands to a certain extent in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student] Likewise the phrase used in [Art 2180 mdash so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and

students for as long as they are at attendance in the school including recess time Reasoning a The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the CA According to the CA while it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident which was at about 8 oclock in the evening but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter The time interval is safely within the recess time that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case supra In line with the case of Palisoc 17 a student not at attendance in the school cannot be in recess thereat A recess as the concept is embraced in the phrase at attendance in the school contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises or the area within which the school activity is conducted Recess by its nature does not include dismissal Likewise the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute attending school or being in the protective and supervisory custody of the school as contemplated in the law b Jimmy B Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior the ROTC Commandant when he shot Napoleon Castro ST FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v CA(CastilloCadiz)

194 SCRA 340 Paras J Feb 25 1991 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS -Ferdinand Castillo then a freshman student at St Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach Quezon His parents didnrsquot allow him to go due to short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home However he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher -his parents filed a complaint against St Francis HS represented by its principal Illumin and several teachers for damages incurred from the death of their son contending that it occurred due to petitionersrsquo failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family The TC found against the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim Also the male teachers who were to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which was not school sanctioned and as the latter had her own class to supervise then and was not actually invited -Both parties appealed to the CA On the issue of the liability of St Francis HS and the Illumin the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 They cannot escape liability simply because it wasnrsquot an ldquoextra-curricular activity of the HSrdquo From the evidence

it was shown that the principal had known of the picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the event As such under Article 2180 both are jointly and severally liable w the teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the ownermanager (St Francis and the principal) Petitioners contend that the victimrsquos parents failed to prove by evidence that they didnrsquot give their son consent to join the picnic The Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence of their liability Also 2 of the teachers who arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers Hence this petition ISSUE (1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants (2) WON Art 2180 in relation to 2176 is applicable (3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper HELD (1) NO Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them At the outset it should be noted that the victimrsquos parents allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination -Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it If the CArsquos findings are to be upheld employers will be forever exposed to the risk and

danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the performance of their duties -No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised diligence of a good father of the family In fact 2 PE teachers were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming Life savers were brought in the event of such an accident The records also show that the 2 PE teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim (2) NO The CA erred in applying Art 2180 particularly par 4 For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his employee the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task In the case at bar the teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity (3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence required of them no moral or exemplary damages under Art 2177 may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses PREMISES CONSIDERED the questioned decision is SET ASIDE PSBA v CA (BENITEZBAUTISTA) 205 SCRA 729 Padilla J Feb 4 1992 FACTS -Carlitos Bautista enrolled in the 3rd year commerce course of PSBA was stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants who were

from outside the schoolrsquos academic community This prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers alleging negligence recklessness and lack of security precautions means and methods before during and after the attack of the victim -PSBA sought to dismiss the case alleging that since they were presumably sued under Art 2180 there was no cause of action since academic institutions are not subject to the said provision -A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by the TC yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA Hence this petition ISSUES (1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180 HELD (1) NO Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the parties the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern but the court has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a contract -Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroadrdquohellip the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the partiesrdquo

-Using the test in Cangco a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBArsquos liability hence any finding of negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual obligation only -When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment a contract is established between them resulting in a bilateral obligation The school is obliged to provide the student with an education along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge In turn the student abides by the schoolrsquos academic requirements and observes its rules and regulations However a school cannot be an insurer for its students against all risks one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons time and place - In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was breached due to PSBArsquos negligence in providing proper security measures At this stage the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondentrsquos complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC can determine WHEREFORE the petition is DENIED The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court Costs against the petitioners SOLIMAN JR V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 FELICIANO J May 18 1992 NATURE Civil complaint for damages FACTS

- On August 13 1982 while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman Jr a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC) was in the campus premises thereof the defendant Jimmy Solomon who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant RL Security Agency Inc without any provocation shot the plaintiff on the abdomen The plaintiff was confined in a hospital and as per doctors opinion he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months Petitioner represented by his guardian filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC RL Security Agency and Solomon - RCC filed a motion to dismiss contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon It further argued that Article 2180 7th paragraph of the Civil Code did not apply since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil student or apprentice of the school - Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCCrsquos motion to dismiss Petitionerrsquos MFR was denied Hence this appeal ISSUES 1 WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180 as well as those of Articles 349 350 and 352 of the Civil Code

2 WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1 NO - Under Art 2180 the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for ones own act or omission but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils their students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody - The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman Jr RCC was not the employer of Solomon The employer of Solomon was the RL Security Agency Inc while the school was the client of the latter It is settled that where the security agency as here recruits hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency and not to the clients of such agency There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC

and Solomon petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges he being in fact an employee of the RL Security Agency Inc the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows Art 349 The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority xxx xxx xxx (2) Teachers and professors xxx xxx xxx (4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices xxx xxx xxx Art 350 The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child xxx xxx xxx Art 352 The relations between teacher and pupil professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student - In Palisoc v Brillantes the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc a student of that Institute which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon another student of the Institute It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th

paragraph of Article 2180 quoted above but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case - Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority In the instant case Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner was not a pupil student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon 2 YES - In the case of PSBA v CA the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision At the same time however the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment on the one hand and the students who are enrolled on the other hand which contract results in obligations for both parties It held When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment there is established a contract between them resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with For its part the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession On the other hand the student covenants to abide by the schools academic requirements and observe its rules and regulationsInstitutions of learning must also meet the implicit or built-in obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary

undertaking of imparting knowledge Certainly no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb Necessarily the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof - It was also pointed out in said case that In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar however there is as yet no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the formers negligence in providing proper security measures This would be for the trial court to determine And even if there be a finding of negligence the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only Using the test of Cangco supra the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract In fact that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista In other words a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the schools liability The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code - In the PSBA case the trial court had denied the schools motion to dismiss the complaint against it and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial courts order In the case at bar the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC upon the assumption that petitioners cause of action was based and could have been based only on Art 2180 of the Civil Code As PSBA however states acts which are

tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have in the interest of justice allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the caseThis case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings ST MARYrsquoS ACADEMY VS CARPITANOS PARDO February 6 2002 NATURE Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos together with James Daniel II (then 15 driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached Carpitanos sued the school James Daniel II his parents and Vivencio Villanueva -TC absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II held parents and school liable

-CA school liable under A218 and 219 FC finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them ISSUE (regarding liability of St Maryrsquos Academy) WON St Maryrsquos Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos and therefore liable for damages HELD NO The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep Ratio For the school to be liable it must be shown that the lsquoinjury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events unbroken by intervening efficient causes Reasoning The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva It was

Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep -Liability for the accident whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep must be pinned on the minorrsquos parents primarily The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeepConsidering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy had no control and which was the proximate cause of the accident petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident - It is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos Disposition WHEREFORE the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants excluding petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy Dipolog City No costs SO ORDERED PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO March 25 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision

FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines Inc and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS Inc its manager BALINGIT and the driver PINEDA - It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK owned by Phil-Am along the natrsquol highway at Sto Tomas Pampanga The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan owned by Phil Rabbit Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days This deprived the company of earnings of about P8600 - Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pinedas employer Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him - CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art2180 CC - In the appeal the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41200 Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality But this was not alleged in their complaint ISSUE WON the terms employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise

used in Art 2180 NCC (Art1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments Art2180 uses the term manager (director in the Spanish version) to mean employerrdquo - Hence under the allegations of the complaint no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders Inc in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer Phil-American Forwarders Inc This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses Dispositive Lower courtrsquos order of dismissal is AFFIRMED PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE June 17 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence recklessness

violation of traffic rules and regulations abandonment of victim and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondentsrsquo Version -In the early morning of March 24 1990 about 600 orsquoclock the victim Ramon A Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine -The Magsaysay Blvd runs perpendicular to Gomez St and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street -As the bus was pushed its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A Acuesta who as a result thereof fell and thereafter was run over by the said bus Petitionerrsquos Version -Manilhig in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street the victim who was biking towards the same direction as the bus suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road

-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear which caused the death of the victim Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied MFR -Hence this appeal

ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes -Civil Case No 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 21763 and 21804 of the Civil Code against petitioner

(limited to that involved in the outline) 3Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 4Art 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxxxxxxxx

Manilhig and his employer petitioner Philtranco respectively -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle like petitioner Philtranco for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary direct and joint and several or solidary with the driver As to solidarity Article 2194 expressly provides the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary -Since the employers liability is primary direct and solidary its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed (with regard to this issue) CASTILEX V VASQUEZ Dec 21 1999 Davide Facts At around 130 to 200 in the morning Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmentildea Rotunda He was traveling counter-clockwise (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time Upon the

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

other hand Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no GBW-794 On the same date and time Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmentildea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St or to Belvic St

In the process the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute So the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez Jr and Luisa So Vasquez parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation In the same action Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez Issue WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

Held Castilez is absolved from any liability The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision Instead the fourth paragraph should apply Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable Both provisions apply to employers the fourth paragraph to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise and the fifth paragraph to employers in general whether or not engaged in any business or industry The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included Negligent acts of employees whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry are covered so long as they were acting

within the scope of their assigned task even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions For admittedly employees oftentimes wear different hats They perform functions which are beyond their office title or designation but which nevertheless are still within the call of dutyThis court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 whether or not engaged in any business or industry an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship once this is done the plaintiff must show to hold the employer liable that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee

It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect and even finality at times This rule is however subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations surmises or conjectures Such exception obtain in the present

case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager

On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks ABAD who was presented as a hostile witness testified that at the time of the incident he was driving a company-issued vehicle registered under the name of petitioner He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment an employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction but rather the result varies with each state of facts The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances The SC does not agree The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle

I Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle

II Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee and not a part of his services to his employer Hence in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle 14 cda

The employer may however be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and presumably spending more time at his actual duties Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving commission rule under which it can be

found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home However even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own

III Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept it has been held that he has not resumed his employment and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business or within the

scope of his assigned task ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident It was then about 200 am way beyond the normal working hours ABADs working day had ended his overtime work had already been completed His being at a place which as petitioner put it was known as a haven for prostitutes pimps and drug pushers and addicts had no connection to petitioners business neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager Rather using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR August 17 1992

NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI He is also employed as a janitor The president of FCI is Agustin Masa Agustin has a son Allan who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver Allan lives with his dad Funtecha also lives in the presidentrsquos house free of charge while a student at FCI - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home then go back to the school then go home in the school jeep He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hersquos supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school - One night Funtecha wanted to drive home He has a student license After a dangerous curb

and seeing that the road was clear Allan let Funtecha drive Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians) The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night - TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan SC reversed saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school Allans job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose Moreover it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtechas possession of a student drivers license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans house Funtecha

definitely was not having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a frolic of his own but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner Hence the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age capacity discretion knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances Bearing this in mind We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence DISPOSITION Granted SALVOSA v IAC (CASTRO) 166 SCRA 274 PADILLA J October 5 1988 FACTS Jimmy Abon a commerce student of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977 at around 800 pm in the parking space of BCF BCF is both an academic and arts and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP Subsequently the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages impleading Jimmy B Abon Roberto C Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF) Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF) Libertad D Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc as party defendants

After hearing the Trial Court rendered a decision (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B Abon Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc jointly and severally to pay private respondents as heirs of Napoleon Castro (2) absolving the other defendants and (3) dismissing the defendants counterclaim for lack of merit ISSUE WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B Abon HELD NO Jimmy B Abon cannot be considered to have been at attendance in the school or in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro Logically therefore petitioners cannot under Art 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B Abon for damages resulting from his acts Ratio Under the penultimate paragraph of Art 2180 of the Civil Code teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher the latter stands to a certain extent in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student] Likewise the phrase used in [Art 2180 mdash so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and

students for as long as they are at attendance in the school including recess time Reasoning a The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the CA According to the CA while it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident which was at about 8 oclock in the evening but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter The time interval is safely within the recess time that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case supra In line with the case of Palisoc 17 a student not at attendance in the school cannot be in recess thereat A recess as the concept is embraced in the phrase at attendance in the school contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises or the area within which the school activity is conducted Recess by its nature does not include dismissal Likewise the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute attending school or being in the protective and supervisory custody of the school as contemplated in the law b Jimmy B Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior the ROTC Commandant when he shot Napoleon Castro ST FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v CA(CastilloCadiz)

194 SCRA 340 Paras J Feb 25 1991 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS -Ferdinand Castillo then a freshman student at St Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach Quezon His parents didnrsquot allow him to go due to short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home However he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher -his parents filed a complaint against St Francis HS represented by its principal Illumin and several teachers for damages incurred from the death of their son contending that it occurred due to petitionersrsquo failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family The TC found against the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim Also the male teachers who were to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which was not school sanctioned and as the latter had her own class to supervise then and was not actually invited -Both parties appealed to the CA On the issue of the liability of St Francis HS and the Illumin the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 They cannot escape liability simply because it wasnrsquot an ldquoextra-curricular activity of the HSrdquo From the evidence

it was shown that the principal had known of the picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the event As such under Article 2180 both are jointly and severally liable w the teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the ownermanager (St Francis and the principal) Petitioners contend that the victimrsquos parents failed to prove by evidence that they didnrsquot give their son consent to join the picnic The Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence of their liability Also 2 of the teachers who arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers Hence this petition ISSUE (1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants (2) WON Art 2180 in relation to 2176 is applicable (3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper HELD (1) NO Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them At the outset it should be noted that the victimrsquos parents allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination -Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it If the CArsquos findings are to be upheld employers will be forever exposed to the risk and

danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the performance of their duties -No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised diligence of a good father of the family In fact 2 PE teachers were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming Life savers were brought in the event of such an accident The records also show that the 2 PE teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim (2) NO The CA erred in applying Art 2180 particularly par 4 For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his employee the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task In the case at bar the teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity (3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence required of them no moral or exemplary damages under Art 2177 may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses PREMISES CONSIDERED the questioned decision is SET ASIDE PSBA v CA (BENITEZBAUTISTA) 205 SCRA 729 Padilla J Feb 4 1992 FACTS -Carlitos Bautista enrolled in the 3rd year commerce course of PSBA was stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants who were

from outside the schoolrsquos academic community This prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers alleging negligence recklessness and lack of security precautions means and methods before during and after the attack of the victim -PSBA sought to dismiss the case alleging that since they were presumably sued under Art 2180 there was no cause of action since academic institutions are not subject to the said provision -A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by the TC yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA Hence this petition ISSUES (1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180 HELD (1) NO Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the parties the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern but the court has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a contract -Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroadrdquohellip the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the partiesrdquo

-Using the test in Cangco a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBArsquos liability hence any finding of negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual obligation only -When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment a contract is established between them resulting in a bilateral obligation The school is obliged to provide the student with an education along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge In turn the student abides by the schoolrsquos academic requirements and observes its rules and regulations However a school cannot be an insurer for its students against all risks one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons time and place - In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was breached due to PSBArsquos negligence in providing proper security measures At this stage the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondentrsquos complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC can determine WHEREFORE the petition is DENIED The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court Costs against the petitioners SOLIMAN JR V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 FELICIANO J May 18 1992 NATURE Civil complaint for damages FACTS

- On August 13 1982 while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman Jr a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC) was in the campus premises thereof the defendant Jimmy Solomon who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant RL Security Agency Inc without any provocation shot the plaintiff on the abdomen The plaintiff was confined in a hospital and as per doctors opinion he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months Petitioner represented by his guardian filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC RL Security Agency and Solomon - RCC filed a motion to dismiss contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon It further argued that Article 2180 7th paragraph of the Civil Code did not apply since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil student or apprentice of the school - Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCCrsquos motion to dismiss Petitionerrsquos MFR was denied Hence this appeal ISSUES 1 WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180 as well as those of Articles 349 350 and 352 of the Civil Code

2 WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1 NO - Under Art 2180 the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for ones own act or omission but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils their students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody - The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman Jr RCC was not the employer of Solomon The employer of Solomon was the RL Security Agency Inc while the school was the client of the latter It is settled that where the security agency as here recruits hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency and not to the clients of such agency There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC

and Solomon petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges he being in fact an employee of the RL Security Agency Inc the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows Art 349 The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority xxx xxx xxx (2) Teachers and professors xxx xxx xxx (4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices xxx xxx xxx Art 350 The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child xxx xxx xxx Art 352 The relations between teacher and pupil professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student - In Palisoc v Brillantes the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc a student of that Institute which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon another student of the Institute It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th

paragraph of Article 2180 quoted above but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case - Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority In the instant case Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner was not a pupil student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon 2 YES - In the case of PSBA v CA the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision At the same time however the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment on the one hand and the students who are enrolled on the other hand which contract results in obligations for both parties It held When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment there is established a contract between them resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with For its part the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession On the other hand the student covenants to abide by the schools academic requirements and observe its rules and regulationsInstitutions of learning must also meet the implicit or built-in obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary

undertaking of imparting knowledge Certainly no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb Necessarily the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof - It was also pointed out in said case that In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar however there is as yet no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the formers negligence in providing proper security measures This would be for the trial court to determine And even if there be a finding of negligence the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only Using the test of Cangco supra the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract In fact that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista In other words a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the schools liability The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code - In the PSBA case the trial court had denied the schools motion to dismiss the complaint against it and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial courts order In the case at bar the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC upon the assumption that petitioners cause of action was based and could have been based only on Art 2180 of the Civil Code As PSBA however states acts which are

tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have in the interest of justice allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the caseThis case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings ST MARYrsquoS ACADEMY VS CARPITANOS PARDO February 6 2002 NATURE Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos together with James Daniel II (then 15 driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached Carpitanos sued the school James Daniel II his parents and Vivencio Villanueva -TC absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II held parents and school liable

-CA school liable under A218 and 219 FC finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them ISSUE (regarding liability of St Maryrsquos Academy) WON St Maryrsquos Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos and therefore liable for damages HELD NO The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep Ratio For the school to be liable it must be shown that the lsquoinjury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events unbroken by intervening efficient causes Reasoning The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva It was

Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep -Liability for the accident whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep must be pinned on the minorrsquos parents primarily The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeepConsidering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy had no control and which was the proximate cause of the accident petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident - It is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos Disposition WHEREFORE the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants excluding petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy Dipolog City No costs SO ORDERED PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO March 25 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision

FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines Inc and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS Inc its manager BALINGIT and the driver PINEDA - It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK owned by Phil-Am along the natrsquol highway at Sto Tomas Pampanga The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan owned by Phil Rabbit Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days This deprived the company of earnings of about P8600 - Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pinedas employer Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him - CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art2180 CC - In the appeal the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41200 Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality But this was not alleged in their complaint ISSUE WON the terms employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise

used in Art 2180 NCC (Art1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments Art2180 uses the term manager (director in the Spanish version) to mean employerrdquo - Hence under the allegations of the complaint no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders Inc in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer Phil-American Forwarders Inc This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses Dispositive Lower courtrsquos order of dismissal is AFFIRMED PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE June 17 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence recklessness

violation of traffic rules and regulations abandonment of victim and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondentsrsquo Version -In the early morning of March 24 1990 about 600 orsquoclock the victim Ramon A Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine -The Magsaysay Blvd runs perpendicular to Gomez St and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street -As the bus was pushed its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A Acuesta who as a result thereof fell and thereafter was run over by the said bus Petitionerrsquos Version -Manilhig in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street the victim who was biking towards the same direction as the bus suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road

-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear which caused the death of the victim Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied MFR -Hence this appeal

ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes -Civil Case No 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 21763 and 21804 of the Civil Code against petitioner

(limited to that involved in the outline) 3Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 4Art 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxxxxxxxx

Manilhig and his employer petitioner Philtranco respectively -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle like petitioner Philtranco for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary direct and joint and several or solidary with the driver As to solidarity Article 2194 expressly provides the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary -Since the employers liability is primary direct and solidary its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed (with regard to this issue) CASTILEX V VASQUEZ Dec 21 1999 Davide Facts At around 130 to 200 in the morning Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmentildea Rotunda He was traveling counter-clockwise (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time Upon the

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

other hand Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no GBW-794 On the same date and time Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmentildea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St or to Belvic St

In the process the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute So the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez Jr and Luisa So Vasquez parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation In the same action Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez Issue WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

Held Castilez is absolved from any liability The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision Instead the fourth paragraph should apply Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable Both provisions apply to employers the fourth paragraph to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise and the fifth paragraph to employers in general whether or not engaged in any business or industry The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included Negligent acts of employees whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry are covered so long as they were acting

within the scope of their assigned task even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions For admittedly employees oftentimes wear different hats They perform functions which are beyond their office title or designation but which nevertheless are still within the call of dutyThis court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 whether or not engaged in any business or industry an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship once this is done the plaintiff must show to hold the employer liable that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee

It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect and even finality at times This rule is however subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations surmises or conjectures Such exception obtain in the present

case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager

On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks ABAD who was presented as a hostile witness testified that at the time of the incident he was driving a company-issued vehicle registered under the name of petitioner He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment an employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction but rather the result varies with each state of facts The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances The SC does not agree The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle

I Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle

II Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee and not a part of his services to his employer Hence in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle 14 cda

The employer may however be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and presumably spending more time at his actual duties Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving commission rule under which it can be

found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home However even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own

III Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept it has been held that he has not resumed his employment and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business or within the

scope of his assigned task ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident It was then about 200 am way beyond the normal working hours ABADs working day had ended his overtime work had already been completed His being at a place which as petitioner put it was known as a haven for prostitutes pimps and drug pushers and addicts had no connection to petitioners business neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager Rather using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR August 17 1992

NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI He is also employed as a janitor The president of FCI is Agustin Masa Agustin has a son Allan who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver Allan lives with his dad Funtecha also lives in the presidentrsquos house free of charge while a student at FCI - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home then go back to the school then go home in the school jeep He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hersquos supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school - One night Funtecha wanted to drive home He has a student license After a dangerous curb

and seeing that the road was clear Allan let Funtecha drive Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians) The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night - TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan SC reversed saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school Allans job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose Moreover it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtechas possession of a student drivers license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans house Funtecha

definitely was not having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a frolic of his own but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner Hence the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

194 SCRA 340 Paras J Feb 25 1991 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS -Ferdinand Castillo then a freshman student at St Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach Quezon His parents didnrsquot allow him to go due to short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home However he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher -his parents filed a complaint against St Francis HS represented by its principal Illumin and several teachers for damages incurred from the death of their son contending that it occurred due to petitionersrsquo failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family The TC found against the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim Also the male teachers who were to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which was not school sanctioned and as the latter had her own class to supervise then and was not actually invited -Both parties appealed to the CA On the issue of the liability of St Francis HS and the Illumin the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 They cannot escape liability simply because it wasnrsquot an ldquoextra-curricular activity of the HSrdquo From the evidence

it was shown that the principal had known of the picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the event As such under Article 2180 both are jointly and severally liable w the teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the ownermanager (St Francis and the principal) Petitioners contend that the victimrsquos parents failed to prove by evidence that they didnrsquot give their son consent to join the picnic The Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence of their liability Also 2 of the teachers who arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers Hence this petition ISSUE (1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants (2) WON Art 2180 in relation to 2176 is applicable (3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper HELD (1) NO Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them At the outset it should be noted that the victimrsquos parents allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination -Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it If the CArsquos findings are to be upheld employers will be forever exposed to the risk and

danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the performance of their duties -No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised diligence of a good father of the family In fact 2 PE teachers were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming Life savers were brought in the event of such an accident The records also show that the 2 PE teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim (2) NO The CA erred in applying Art 2180 particularly par 4 For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his employee the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task In the case at bar the teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity (3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence required of them no moral or exemplary damages under Art 2177 may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses PREMISES CONSIDERED the questioned decision is SET ASIDE PSBA v CA (BENITEZBAUTISTA) 205 SCRA 729 Padilla J Feb 4 1992 FACTS -Carlitos Bautista enrolled in the 3rd year commerce course of PSBA was stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants who were

from outside the schoolrsquos academic community This prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers alleging negligence recklessness and lack of security precautions means and methods before during and after the attack of the victim -PSBA sought to dismiss the case alleging that since they were presumably sued under Art 2180 there was no cause of action since academic institutions are not subject to the said provision -A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by the TC yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA Hence this petition ISSUES (1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180 HELD (1) NO Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the parties the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern but the court has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a contract -Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroadrdquohellip the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the partiesrdquo

-Using the test in Cangco a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBArsquos liability hence any finding of negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual obligation only -When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment a contract is established between them resulting in a bilateral obligation The school is obliged to provide the student with an education along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge In turn the student abides by the schoolrsquos academic requirements and observes its rules and regulations However a school cannot be an insurer for its students against all risks one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons time and place - In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was breached due to PSBArsquos negligence in providing proper security measures At this stage the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondentrsquos complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC can determine WHEREFORE the petition is DENIED The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court Costs against the petitioners SOLIMAN JR V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 FELICIANO J May 18 1992 NATURE Civil complaint for damages FACTS

- On August 13 1982 while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman Jr a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC) was in the campus premises thereof the defendant Jimmy Solomon who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant RL Security Agency Inc without any provocation shot the plaintiff on the abdomen The plaintiff was confined in a hospital and as per doctors opinion he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months Petitioner represented by his guardian filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC RL Security Agency and Solomon - RCC filed a motion to dismiss contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon It further argued that Article 2180 7th paragraph of the Civil Code did not apply since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil student or apprentice of the school - Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCCrsquos motion to dismiss Petitionerrsquos MFR was denied Hence this appeal ISSUES 1 WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180 as well as those of Articles 349 350 and 352 of the Civil Code

2 WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1 NO - Under Art 2180 the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for ones own act or omission but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils their students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody - The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman Jr RCC was not the employer of Solomon The employer of Solomon was the RL Security Agency Inc while the school was the client of the latter It is settled that where the security agency as here recruits hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency and not to the clients of such agency There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC

and Solomon petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges he being in fact an employee of the RL Security Agency Inc the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows Art 349 The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority xxx xxx xxx (2) Teachers and professors xxx xxx xxx (4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices xxx xxx xxx Art 350 The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child xxx xxx xxx Art 352 The relations between teacher and pupil professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student - In Palisoc v Brillantes the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc a student of that Institute which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon another student of the Institute It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th

paragraph of Article 2180 quoted above but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case - Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority In the instant case Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner was not a pupil student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon 2 YES - In the case of PSBA v CA the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision At the same time however the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment on the one hand and the students who are enrolled on the other hand which contract results in obligations for both parties It held When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment there is established a contract between them resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with For its part the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession On the other hand the student covenants to abide by the schools academic requirements and observe its rules and regulationsInstitutions of learning must also meet the implicit or built-in obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary

undertaking of imparting knowledge Certainly no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb Necessarily the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof - It was also pointed out in said case that In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar however there is as yet no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the formers negligence in providing proper security measures This would be for the trial court to determine And even if there be a finding of negligence the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only Using the test of Cangco supra the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract In fact that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista In other words a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the schools liability The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code - In the PSBA case the trial court had denied the schools motion to dismiss the complaint against it and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial courts order In the case at bar the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC upon the assumption that petitioners cause of action was based and could have been based only on Art 2180 of the Civil Code As PSBA however states acts which are

tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have in the interest of justice allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the caseThis case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings ST MARYrsquoS ACADEMY VS CARPITANOS PARDO February 6 2002 NATURE Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos together with James Daniel II (then 15 driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached Carpitanos sued the school James Daniel II his parents and Vivencio Villanueva -TC absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II held parents and school liable

-CA school liable under A218 and 219 FC finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them ISSUE (regarding liability of St Maryrsquos Academy) WON St Maryrsquos Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos and therefore liable for damages HELD NO The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep Ratio For the school to be liable it must be shown that the lsquoinjury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events unbroken by intervening efficient causes Reasoning The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva It was

Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep -Liability for the accident whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep must be pinned on the minorrsquos parents primarily The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeepConsidering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy had no control and which was the proximate cause of the accident petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident - It is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos Disposition WHEREFORE the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants excluding petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy Dipolog City No costs SO ORDERED PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO March 25 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision

FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines Inc and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS Inc its manager BALINGIT and the driver PINEDA - It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK owned by Phil-Am along the natrsquol highway at Sto Tomas Pampanga The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan owned by Phil Rabbit Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days This deprived the company of earnings of about P8600 - Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pinedas employer Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him - CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art2180 CC - In the appeal the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41200 Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality But this was not alleged in their complaint ISSUE WON the terms employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise

used in Art 2180 NCC (Art1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments Art2180 uses the term manager (director in the Spanish version) to mean employerrdquo - Hence under the allegations of the complaint no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders Inc in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer Phil-American Forwarders Inc This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses Dispositive Lower courtrsquos order of dismissal is AFFIRMED PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE June 17 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence recklessness

violation of traffic rules and regulations abandonment of victim and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondentsrsquo Version -In the early morning of March 24 1990 about 600 orsquoclock the victim Ramon A Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine -The Magsaysay Blvd runs perpendicular to Gomez St and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street -As the bus was pushed its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A Acuesta who as a result thereof fell and thereafter was run over by the said bus Petitionerrsquos Version -Manilhig in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street the victim who was biking towards the same direction as the bus suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road

-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear which caused the death of the victim Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied MFR -Hence this appeal

ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes -Civil Case No 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 21763 and 21804 of the Civil Code against petitioner

(limited to that involved in the outline) 3Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 4Art 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxxxxxxxx

Manilhig and his employer petitioner Philtranco respectively -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle like petitioner Philtranco for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary direct and joint and several or solidary with the driver As to solidarity Article 2194 expressly provides the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary -Since the employers liability is primary direct and solidary its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed (with regard to this issue) CASTILEX V VASQUEZ Dec 21 1999 Davide Facts At around 130 to 200 in the morning Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmentildea Rotunda He was traveling counter-clockwise (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time Upon the

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

other hand Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no GBW-794 On the same date and time Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmentildea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St or to Belvic St

In the process the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute So the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez Jr and Luisa So Vasquez parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation In the same action Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez Issue WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

Held Castilez is absolved from any liability The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision Instead the fourth paragraph should apply Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable Both provisions apply to employers the fourth paragraph to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise and the fifth paragraph to employers in general whether or not engaged in any business or industry The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included Negligent acts of employees whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry are covered so long as they were acting

within the scope of their assigned task even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions For admittedly employees oftentimes wear different hats They perform functions which are beyond their office title or designation but which nevertheless are still within the call of dutyThis court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 whether or not engaged in any business or industry an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship once this is done the plaintiff must show to hold the employer liable that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee

It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect and even finality at times This rule is however subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations surmises or conjectures Such exception obtain in the present

case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager

On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks ABAD who was presented as a hostile witness testified that at the time of the incident he was driving a company-issued vehicle registered under the name of petitioner He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment an employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction but rather the result varies with each state of facts The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances The SC does not agree The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle

I Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle

II Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee and not a part of his services to his employer Hence in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle 14 cda

The employer may however be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and presumably spending more time at his actual duties Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving commission rule under which it can be

found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home However even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own

III Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept it has been held that he has not resumed his employment and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business or within the

scope of his assigned task ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident It was then about 200 am way beyond the normal working hours ABADs working day had ended his overtime work had already been completed His being at a place which as petitioner put it was known as a haven for prostitutes pimps and drug pushers and addicts had no connection to petitioners business neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager Rather using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR August 17 1992

NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI He is also employed as a janitor The president of FCI is Agustin Masa Agustin has a son Allan who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver Allan lives with his dad Funtecha also lives in the presidentrsquos house free of charge while a student at FCI - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home then go back to the school then go home in the school jeep He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hersquos supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school - One night Funtecha wanted to drive home He has a student license After a dangerous curb

and seeing that the road was clear Allan let Funtecha drive Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians) The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night - TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan SC reversed saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school Allans job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose Moreover it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtechas possession of a student drivers license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans house Funtecha

definitely was not having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a frolic of his own but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner Hence the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

from outside the schoolrsquos academic community This prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers alleging negligence recklessness and lack of security precautions means and methods before during and after the attack of the victim -PSBA sought to dismiss the case alleging that since they were presumably sued under Art 2180 there was no cause of action since academic institutions are not subject to the said provision -A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by the TC yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA Hence this petition ISSUES (1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180 HELD (1) NO Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the parties the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern but the court has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a contract -Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroadrdquohellip the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the partiesrdquo

-Using the test in Cangco a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBArsquos liability hence any finding of negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual obligation only -When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment a contract is established between them resulting in a bilateral obligation The school is obliged to provide the student with an education along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge In turn the student abides by the schoolrsquos academic requirements and observes its rules and regulations However a school cannot be an insurer for its students against all risks one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons time and place - In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was breached due to PSBArsquos negligence in providing proper security measures At this stage the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondentrsquos complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC can determine WHEREFORE the petition is DENIED The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court Costs against the petitioners SOLIMAN JR V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 FELICIANO J May 18 1992 NATURE Civil complaint for damages FACTS

- On August 13 1982 while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman Jr a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC) was in the campus premises thereof the defendant Jimmy Solomon who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant RL Security Agency Inc without any provocation shot the plaintiff on the abdomen The plaintiff was confined in a hospital and as per doctors opinion he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months Petitioner represented by his guardian filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC RL Security Agency and Solomon - RCC filed a motion to dismiss contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon It further argued that Article 2180 7th paragraph of the Civil Code did not apply since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil student or apprentice of the school - Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCCrsquos motion to dismiss Petitionerrsquos MFR was denied Hence this appeal ISSUES 1 WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180 as well as those of Articles 349 350 and 352 of the Civil Code

2 WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1 NO - Under Art 2180 the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for ones own act or omission but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils their students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody - The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman Jr RCC was not the employer of Solomon The employer of Solomon was the RL Security Agency Inc while the school was the client of the latter It is settled that where the security agency as here recruits hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency and not to the clients of such agency There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC

and Solomon petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges he being in fact an employee of the RL Security Agency Inc the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows Art 349 The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority xxx xxx xxx (2) Teachers and professors xxx xxx xxx (4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices xxx xxx xxx Art 350 The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child xxx xxx xxx Art 352 The relations between teacher and pupil professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student - In Palisoc v Brillantes the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc a student of that Institute which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon another student of the Institute It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th

paragraph of Article 2180 quoted above but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case - Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority In the instant case Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner was not a pupil student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon 2 YES - In the case of PSBA v CA the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision At the same time however the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment on the one hand and the students who are enrolled on the other hand which contract results in obligations for both parties It held When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment there is established a contract between them resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with For its part the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession On the other hand the student covenants to abide by the schools academic requirements and observe its rules and regulationsInstitutions of learning must also meet the implicit or built-in obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary

undertaking of imparting knowledge Certainly no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb Necessarily the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof - It was also pointed out in said case that In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar however there is as yet no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the formers negligence in providing proper security measures This would be for the trial court to determine And even if there be a finding of negligence the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only Using the test of Cangco supra the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract In fact that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista In other words a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the schools liability The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code - In the PSBA case the trial court had denied the schools motion to dismiss the complaint against it and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial courts order In the case at bar the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC upon the assumption that petitioners cause of action was based and could have been based only on Art 2180 of the Civil Code As PSBA however states acts which are

tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have in the interest of justice allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the caseThis case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings ST MARYrsquoS ACADEMY VS CARPITANOS PARDO February 6 2002 NATURE Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos together with James Daniel II (then 15 driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached Carpitanos sued the school James Daniel II his parents and Vivencio Villanueva -TC absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II held parents and school liable

-CA school liable under A218 and 219 FC finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them ISSUE (regarding liability of St Maryrsquos Academy) WON St Maryrsquos Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos and therefore liable for damages HELD NO The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep Ratio For the school to be liable it must be shown that the lsquoinjury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events unbroken by intervening efficient causes Reasoning The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva It was

Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep -Liability for the accident whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep must be pinned on the minorrsquos parents primarily The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeepConsidering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy had no control and which was the proximate cause of the accident petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident - It is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos Disposition WHEREFORE the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants excluding petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy Dipolog City No costs SO ORDERED PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO March 25 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision

FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines Inc and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS Inc its manager BALINGIT and the driver PINEDA - It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK owned by Phil-Am along the natrsquol highway at Sto Tomas Pampanga The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan owned by Phil Rabbit Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days This deprived the company of earnings of about P8600 - Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pinedas employer Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him - CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art2180 CC - In the appeal the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41200 Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality But this was not alleged in their complaint ISSUE WON the terms employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise

used in Art 2180 NCC (Art1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments Art2180 uses the term manager (director in the Spanish version) to mean employerrdquo - Hence under the allegations of the complaint no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders Inc in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer Phil-American Forwarders Inc This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses Dispositive Lower courtrsquos order of dismissal is AFFIRMED PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE June 17 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence recklessness

violation of traffic rules and regulations abandonment of victim and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondentsrsquo Version -In the early morning of March 24 1990 about 600 orsquoclock the victim Ramon A Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine -The Magsaysay Blvd runs perpendicular to Gomez St and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street -As the bus was pushed its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A Acuesta who as a result thereof fell and thereafter was run over by the said bus Petitionerrsquos Version -Manilhig in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street the victim who was biking towards the same direction as the bus suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road

-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear which caused the death of the victim Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied MFR -Hence this appeal

ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes -Civil Case No 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 21763 and 21804 of the Civil Code against petitioner

(limited to that involved in the outline) 3Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 4Art 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxxxxxxxx

Manilhig and his employer petitioner Philtranco respectively -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle like petitioner Philtranco for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary direct and joint and several or solidary with the driver As to solidarity Article 2194 expressly provides the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary -Since the employers liability is primary direct and solidary its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed (with regard to this issue) CASTILEX V VASQUEZ Dec 21 1999 Davide Facts At around 130 to 200 in the morning Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmentildea Rotunda He was traveling counter-clockwise (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time Upon the

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

other hand Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no GBW-794 On the same date and time Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmentildea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St or to Belvic St

In the process the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute So the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez Jr and Luisa So Vasquez parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation In the same action Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez Issue WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

Held Castilez is absolved from any liability The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision Instead the fourth paragraph should apply Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable Both provisions apply to employers the fourth paragraph to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise and the fifth paragraph to employers in general whether or not engaged in any business or industry The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included Negligent acts of employees whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry are covered so long as they were acting

within the scope of their assigned task even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions For admittedly employees oftentimes wear different hats They perform functions which are beyond their office title or designation but which nevertheless are still within the call of dutyThis court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 whether or not engaged in any business or industry an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship once this is done the plaintiff must show to hold the employer liable that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee

It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect and even finality at times This rule is however subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations surmises or conjectures Such exception obtain in the present

case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager

On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks ABAD who was presented as a hostile witness testified that at the time of the incident he was driving a company-issued vehicle registered under the name of petitioner He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment an employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction but rather the result varies with each state of facts The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances The SC does not agree The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle

I Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle

II Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee and not a part of his services to his employer Hence in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle 14 cda

The employer may however be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and presumably spending more time at his actual duties Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving commission rule under which it can be

found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home However even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own

III Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept it has been held that he has not resumed his employment and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business or within the

scope of his assigned task ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident It was then about 200 am way beyond the normal working hours ABADs working day had ended his overtime work had already been completed His being at a place which as petitioner put it was known as a haven for prostitutes pimps and drug pushers and addicts had no connection to petitioners business neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager Rather using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR August 17 1992

NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI He is also employed as a janitor The president of FCI is Agustin Masa Agustin has a son Allan who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver Allan lives with his dad Funtecha also lives in the presidentrsquos house free of charge while a student at FCI - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home then go back to the school then go home in the school jeep He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hersquos supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school - One night Funtecha wanted to drive home He has a student license After a dangerous curb

and seeing that the road was clear Allan let Funtecha drive Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians) The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night - TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan SC reversed saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school Allans job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose Moreover it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtechas possession of a student drivers license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans house Funtecha

definitely was not having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a frolic of his own but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner Hence the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

2 WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1 NO - Under Art 2180 the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for ones own act or omission but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxx xxx xxx Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils their students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody - The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman Jr RCC was not the employer of Solomon The employer of Solomon was the RL Security Agency Inc while the school was the client of the latter It is settled that where the security agency as here recruits hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency and not to the clients of such agency There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC

and Solomon petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges he being in fact an employee of the RL Security Agency Inc the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon - The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows Art 349 The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority xxx xxx xxx (2) Teachers and professors xxx xxx xxx (4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices xxx xxx xxx Art 350 The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child xxx xxx xxx Art 352 The relations between teacher and pupil professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student - In Palisoc v Brillantes the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc a student of that Institute which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon another student of the Institute It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th

paragraph of Article 2180 quoted above but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case - Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority In the instant case Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner was not a pupil student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon 2 YES - In the case of PSBA v CA the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision At the same time however the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment on the one hand and the students who are enrolled on the other hand which contract results in obligations for both parties It held When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment there is established a contract between them resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with For its part the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession On the other hand the student covenants to abide by the schools academic requirements and observe its rules and regulationsInstitutions of learning must also meet the implicit or built-in obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary

undertaking of imparting knowledge Certainly no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb Necessarily the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof - It was also pointed out in said case that In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar however there is as yet no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the formers negligence in providing proper security measures This would be for the trial court to determine And even if there be a finding of negligence the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only Using the test of Cangco supra the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract In fact that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista In other words a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the schools liability The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code - In the PSBA case the trial court had denied the schools motion to dismiss the complaint against it and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial courts order In the case at bar the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC upon the assumption that petitioners cause of action was based and could have been based only on Art 2180 of the Civil Code As PSBA however states acts which are

tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have in the interest of justice allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the caseThis case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings ST MARYrsquoS ACADEMY VS CARPITANOS PARDO February 6 2002 NATURE Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos together with James Daniel II (then 15 driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached Carpitanos sued the school James Daniel II his parents and Vivencio Villanueva -TC absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II held parents and school liable

-CA school liable under A218 and 219 FC finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them ISSUE (regarding liability of St Maryrsquos Academy) WON St Maryrsquos Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos and therefore liable for damages HELD NO The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep Ratio For the school to be liable it must be shown that the lsquoinjury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events unbroken by intervening efficient causes Reasoning The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva It was

Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep -Liability for the accident whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep must be pinned on the minorrsquos parents primarily The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeepConsidering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy had no control and which was the proximate cause of the accident petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident - It is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos Disposition WHEREFORE the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants excluding petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy Dipolog City No costs SO ORDERED PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO March 25 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision

FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines Inc and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS Inc its manager BALINGIT and the driver PINEDA - It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK owned by Phil-Am along the natrsquol highway at Sto Tomas Pampanga The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan owned by Phil Rabbit Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days This deprived the company of earnings of about P8600 - Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pinedas employer Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him - CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art2180 CC - In the appeal the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41200 Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality But this was not alleged in their complaint ISSUE WON the terms employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise

used in Art 2180 NCC (Art1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments Art2180 uses the term manager (director in the Spanish version) to mean employerrdquo - Hence under the allegations of the complaint no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders Inc in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer Phil-American Forwarders Inc This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses Dispositive Lower courtrsquos order of dismissal is AFFIRMED PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE June 17 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence recklessness

violation of traffic rules and regulations abandonment of victim and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondentsrsquo Version -In the early morning of March 24 1990 about 600 orsquoclock the victim Ramon A Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine -The Magsaysay Blvd runs perpendicular to Gomez St and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street -As the bus was pushed its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A Acuesta who as a result thereof fell and thereafter was run over by the said bus Petitionerrsquos Version -Manilhig in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street the victim who was biking towards the same direction as the bus suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road

-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear which caused the death of the victim Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied MFR -Hence this appeal

ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes -Civil Case No 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 21763 and 21804 of the Civil Code against petitioner

(limited to that involved in the outline) 3Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 4Art 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxxxxxxxx

Manilhig and his employer petitioner Philtranco respectively -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle like petitioner Philtranco for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary direct and joint and several or solidary with the driver As to solidarity Article 2194 expressly provides the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary -Since the employers liability is primary direct and solidary its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed (with regard to this issue) CASTILEX V VASQUEZ Dec 21 1999 Davide Facts At around 130 to 200 in the morning Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmentildea Rotunda He was traveling counter-clockwise (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time Upon the

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

other hand Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no GBW-794 On the same date and time Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmentildea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St or to Belvic St

In the process the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute So the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez Jr and Luisa So Vasquez parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation In the same action Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez Issue WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

Held Castilez is absolved from any liability The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision Instead the fourth paragraph should apply Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable Both provisions apply to employers the fourth paragraph to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise and the fifth paragraph to employers in general whether or not engaged in any business or industry The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included Negligent acts of employees whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry are covered so long as they were acting

within the scope of their assigned task even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions For admittedly employees oftentimes wear different hats They perform functions which are beyond their office title or designation but which nevertheless are still within the call of dutyThis court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 whether or not engaged in any business or industry an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship once this is done the plaintiff must show to hold the employer liable that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee

It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect and even finality at times This rule is however subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations surmises or conjectures Such exception obtain in the present

case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager

On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks ABAD who was presented as a hostile witness testified that at the time of the incident he was driving a company-issued vehicle registered under the name of petitioner He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment an employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction but rather the result varies with each state of facts The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances The SC does not agree The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle

I Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle

II Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee and not a part of his services to his employer Hence in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle 14 cda

The employer may however be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and presumably spending more time at his actual duties Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving commission rule under which it can be

found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home However even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own

III Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept it has been held that he has not resumed his employment and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business or within the

scope of his assigned task ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident It was then about 200 am way beyond the normal working hours ABADs working day had ended his overtime work had already been completed His being at a place which as petitioner put it was known as a haven for prostitutes pimps and drug pushers and addicts had no connection to petitioners business neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager Rather using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR August 17 1992

NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI He is also employed as a janitor The president of FCI is Agustin Masa Agustin has a son Allan who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver Allan lives with his dad Funtecha also lives in the presidentrsquos house free of charge while a student at FCI - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home then go back to the school then go home in the school jeep He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hersquos supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school - One night Funtecha wanted to drive home He has a student license After a dangerous curb

and seeing that the road was clear Allan let Funtecha drive Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians) The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night - TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan SC reversed saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school Allans job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose Moreover it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtechas possession of a student drivers license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans house Funtecha

definitely was not having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a frolic of his own but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner Hence the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

undertaking of imparting knowledge Certainly no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb Necessarily the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof - It was also pointed out in said case that In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar however there is as yet no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the formers negligence in providing proper security measures This would be for the trial court to determine And even if there be a finding of negligence the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only Using the test of Cangco supra the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract In fact that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista In other words a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the schools liability The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code - In the PSBA case the trial court had denied the schools motion to dismiss the complaint against it and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial courts order In the case at bar the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC upon the assumption that petitioners cause of action was based and could have been based only on Art 2180 of the Civil Code As PSBA however states acts which are

tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have in the interest of justice allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the caseThis case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings ST MARYrsquoS ACADEMY VS CARPITANOS PARDO February 6 2002 NATURE Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos together with James Daniel II (then 15 driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached Carpitanos sued the school James Daniel II his parents and Vivencio Villanueva -TC absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II held parents and school liable

-CA school liable under A218 and 219 FC finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them ISSUE (regarding liability of St Maryrsquos Academy) WON St Maryrsquos Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos and therefore liable for damages HELD NO The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep Ratio For the school to be liable it must be shown that the lsquoinjury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events unbroken by intervening efficient causes Reasoning The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva It was

Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep -Liability for the accident whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep must be pinned on the minorrsquos parents primarily The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeepConsidering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy had no control and which was the proximate cause of the accident petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident - It is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos Disposition WHEREFORE the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants excluding petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy Dipolog City No costs SO ORDERED PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO March 25 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision

FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines Inc and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS Inc its manager BALINGIT and the driver PINEDA - It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK owned by Phil-Am along the natrsquol highway at Sto Tomas Pampanga The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan owned by Phil Rabbit Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days This deprived the company of earnings of about P8600 - Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pinedas employer Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him - CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art2180 CC - In the appeal the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41200 Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality But this was not alleged in their complaint ISSUE WON the terms employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise

used in Art 2180 NCC (Art1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments Art2180 uses the term manager (director in the Spanish version) to mean employerrdquo - Hence under the allegations of the complaint no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders Inc in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer Phil-American Forwarders Inc This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses Dispositive Lower courtrsquos order of dismissal is AFFIRMED PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE June 17 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence recklessness

violation of traffic rules and regulations abandonment of victim and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondentsrsquo Version -In the early morning of March 24 1990 about 600 orsquoclock the victim Ramon A Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine -The Magsaysay Blvd runs perpendicular to Gomez St and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street -As the bus was pushed its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A Acuesta who as a result thereof fell and thereafter was run over by the said bus Petitionerrsquos Version -Manilhig in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street the victim who was biking towards the same direction as the bus suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road

-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear which caused the death of the victim Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied MFR -Hence this appeal

ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes -Civil Case No 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 21763 and 21804 of the Civil Code against petitioner

(limited to that involved in the outline) 3Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 4Art 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxxxxxxxx

Manilhig and his employer petitioner Philtranco respectively -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle like petitioner Philtranco for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary direct and joint and several or solidary with the driver As to solidarity Article 2194 expressly provides the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary -Since the employers liability is primary direct and solidary its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed (with regard to this issue) CASTILEX V VASQUEZ Dec 21 1999 Davide Facts At around 130 to 200 in the morning Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmentildea Rotunda He was traveling counter-clockwise (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time Upon the

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

other hand Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no GBW-794 On the same date and time Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmentildea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St or to Belvic St

In the process the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute So the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez Jr and Luisa So Vasquez parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation In the same action Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez Issue WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

Held Castilez is absolved from any liability The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision Instead the fourth paragraph should apply Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable Both provisions apply to employers the fourth paragraph to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise and the fifth paragraph to employers in general whether or not engaged in any business or industry The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included Negligent acts of employees whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry are covered so long as they were acting

within the scope of their assigned task even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions For admittedly employees oftentimes wear different hats They perform functions which are beyond their office title or designation but which nevertheless are still within the call of dutyThis court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 whether or not engaged in any business or industry an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship once this is done the plaintiff must show to hold the employer liable that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee

It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect and even finality at times This rule is however subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations surmises or conjectures Such exception obtain in the present

case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager

On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks ABAD who was presented as a hostile witness testified that at the time of the incident he was driving a company-issued vehicle registered under the name of petitioner He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment an employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction but rather the result varies with each state of facts The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances The SC does not agree The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle

I Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle

II Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee and not a part of his services to his employer Hence in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle 14 cda

The employer may however be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and presumably spending more time at his actual duties Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving commission rule under which it can be

found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home However even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own

III Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept it has been held that he has not resumed his employment and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business or within the

scope of his assigned task ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident It was then about 200 am way beyond the normal working hours ABADs working day had ended his overtime work had already been completed His being at a place which as petitioner put it was known as a haven for prostitutes pimps and drug pushers and addicts had no connection to petitioners business neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager Rather using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR August 17 1992

NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI He is also employed as a janitor The president of FCI is Agustin Masa Agustin has a son Allan who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver Allan lives with his dad Funtecha also lives in the presidentrsquos house free of charge while a student at FCI - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home then go back to the school then go home in the school jeep He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hersquos supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school - One night Funtecha wanted to drive home He has a student license After a dangerous curb

and seeing that the road was clear Allan let Funtecha drive Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians) The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night - TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan SC reversed saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school Allans job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose Moreover it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtechas possession of a student drivers license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans house Funtecha

definitely was not having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a frolic of his own but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner Hence the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep -Liability for the accident whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep must be pinned on the minorrsquos parents primarily The negligence of petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy was only a remote cause of the accident Between the remote cause and the injury there intervened the negligence of the minorrsquos parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeepConsidering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy had no control and which was the proximate cause of the accident petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident - It is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos Disposition WHEREFORE the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants excluding petitioner St Maryrsquos Academy Dipolog City No costs SO ORDERED PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO March 25 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision

FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines Inc and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS Inc its manager BALINGIT and the driver PINEDA - It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK owned by Phil-Am along the natrsquol highway at Sto Tomas Pampanga The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan owned by Phil Rabbit Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days This deprived the company of earnings of about P8600 - Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pinedas employer Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him - CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art2180 CC - In the appeal the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41200 Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality But this was not alleged in their complaint ISSUE WON the terms employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise

used in Art 2180 NCC (Art1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments Art2180 uses the term manager (director in the Spanish version) to mean employerrdquo - Hence under the allegations of the complaint no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders Inc in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer Phil-American Forwarders Inc This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses Dispositive Lower courtrsquos order of dismissal is AFFIRMED PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE June 17 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence recklessness

violation of traffic rules and regulations abandonment of victim and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondentsrsquo Version -In the early morning of March 24 1990 about 600 orsquoclock the victim Ramon A Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine -The Magsaysay Blvd runs perpendicular to Gomez St and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street -As the bus was pushed its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A Acuesta who as a result thereof fell and thereafter was run over by the said bus Petitionerrsquos Version -Manilhig in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street the victim who was biking towards the same direction as the bus suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road

-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear which caused the death of the victim Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied MFR -Hence this appeal

ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes -Civil Case No 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 21763 and 21804 of the Civil Code against petitioner

(limited to that involved in the outline) 3Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 4Art 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxxxxxxxx

Manilhig and his employer petitioner Philtranco respectively -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle like petitioner Philtranco for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary direct and joint and several or solidary with the driver As to solidarity Article 2194 expressly provides the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary -Since the employers liability is primary direct and solidary its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed (with regard to this issue) CASTILEX V VASQUEZ Dec 21 1999 Davide Facts At around 130 to 200 in the morning Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmentildea Rotunda He was traveling counter-clockwise (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time Upon the

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

other hand Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no GBW-794 On the same date and time Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmentildea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St or to Belvic St

In the process the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute So the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez Jr and Luisa So Vasquez parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation In the same action Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez Issue WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

Held Castilez is absolved from any liability The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision Instead the fourth paragraph should apply Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable Both provisions apply to employers the fourth paragraph to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise and the fifth paragraph to employers in general whether or not engaged in any business or industry The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included Negligent acts of employees whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry are covered so long as they were acting

within the scope of their assigned task even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions For admittedly employees oftentimes wear different hats They perform functions which are beyond their office title or designation but which nevertheless are still within the call of dutyThis court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 whether or not engaged in any business or industry an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship once this is done the plaintiff must show to hold the employer liable that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee

It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect and even finality at times This rule is however subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations surmises or conjectures Such exception obtain in the present

case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager

On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks ABAD who was presented as a hostile witness testified that at the time of the incident he was driving a company-issued vehicle registered under the name of petitioner He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment an employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction but rather the result varies with each state of facts The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances The SC does not agree The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle

I Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle

II Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee and not a part of his services to his employer Hence in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle 14 cda

The employer may however be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and presumably spending more time at his actual duties Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving commission rule under which it can be

found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home However even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own

III Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept it has been held that he has not resumed his employment and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business or within the

scope of his assigned task ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident It was then about 200 am way beyond the normal working hours ABADs working day had ended his overtime work had already been completed His being at a place which as petitioner put it was known as a haven for prostitutes pimps and drug pushers and addicts had no connection to petitioners business neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager Rather using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR August 17 1992

NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI He is also employed as a janitor The president of FCI is Agustin Masa Agustin has a son Allan who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver Allan lives with his dad Funtecha also lives in the presidentrsquos house free of charge while a student at FCI - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home then go back to the school then go home in the school jeep He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hersquos supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school - One night Funtecha wanted to drive home He has a student license After a dangerous curb

and seeing that the road was clear Allan let Funtecha drive Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians) The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night - TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan SC reversed saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school Allans job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose Moreover it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtechas possession of a student drivers license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans house Funtecha

definitely was not having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a frolic of his own but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner Hence the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

violation of traffic rules and regulations abandonment of victim and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondentsrsquo Version -In the early morning of March 24 1990 about 600 orsquoclock the victim Ramon A Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine -The Magsaysay Blvd runs perpendicular to Gomez St and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street -As the bus was pushed its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A Acuesta who as a result thereof fell and thereafter was run over by the said bus Petitionerrsquos Version -Manilhig in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street the victim who was biking towards the same direction as the bus suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road

-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear which caused the death of the victim Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied MFR -Hence this appeal

ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes -Civil Case No 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 21763 and 21804 of the Civil Code against petitioner

(limited to that involved in the outline) 3Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 4Art 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxxxxxxxx

Manilhig and his employer petitioner Philtranco respectively -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle like petitioner Philtranco for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary direct and joint and several or solidary with the driver As to solidarity Article 2194 expressly provides the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary -Since the employers liability is primary direct and solidary its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed (with regard to this issue) CASTILEX V VASQUEZ Dec 21 1999 Davide Facts At around 130 to 200 in the morning Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmentildea Rotunda He was traveling counter-clockwise (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time Upon the

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

other hand Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no GBW-794 On the same date and time Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmentildea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St or to Belvic St

In the process the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute So the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez Jr and Luisa So Vasquez parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation In the same action Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez Issue WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

Held Castilez is absolved from any liability The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision Instead the fourth paragraph should apply Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable Both provisions apply to employers the fourth paragraph to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise and the fifth paragraph to employers in general whether or not engaged in any business or industry The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included Negligent acts of employees whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry are covered so long as they were acting

within the scope of their assigned task even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions For admittedly employees oftentimes wear different hats They perform functions which are beyond their office title or designation but which nevertheless are still within the call of dutyThis court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 whether or not engaged in any business or industry an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship once this is done the plaintiff must show to hold the employer liable that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee

It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect and even finality at times This rule is however subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations surmises or conjectures Such exception obtain in the present

case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager

On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks ABAD who was presented as a hostile witness testified that at the time of the incident he was driving a company-issued vehicle registered under the name of petitioner He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment an employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction but rather the result varies with each state of facts The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances The SC does not agree The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle

I Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle

II Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee and not a part of his services to his employer Hence in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle 14 cda

The employer may however be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and presumably spending more time at his actual duties Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving commission rule under which it can be

found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home However even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own

III Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept it has been held that he has not resumed his employment and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business or within the

scope of his assigned task ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident It was then about 200 am way beyond the normal working hours ABADs working day had ended his overtime work had already been completed His being at a place which as petitioner put it was known as a haven for prostitutes pimps and drug pushers and addicts had no connection to petitioners business neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager Rather using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR August 17 1992

NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI He is also employed as a janitor The president of FCI is Agustin Masa Agustin has a son Allan who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver Allan lives with his dad Funtecha also lives in the presidentrsquos house free of charge while a student at FCI - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home then go back to the school then go home in the school jeep He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hersquos supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school - One night Funtecha wanted to drive home He has a student license After a dangerous curb

and seeing that the road was clear Allan let Funtecha drive Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians) The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night - TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan SC reversed saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school Allans job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose Moreover it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtechas possession of a student drivers license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans house Funtecha

definitely was not having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a frolic of his own but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner Hence the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

other hand Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no GBW-794 On the same date and time Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmentildea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St or to Belvic St

In the process the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute So the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez Jr and Luisa So Vasquez parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation In the same action Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez Issue WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

Held Castilez is absolved from any liability The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision Instead the fourth paragraph should apply Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable Both provisions apply to employers the fourth paragraph to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise and the fifth paragraph to employers in general whether or not engaged in any business or industry The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included Negligent acts of employees whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry are covered so long as they were acting

within the scope of their assigned task even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions For admittedly employees oftentimes wear different hats They perform functions which are beyond their office title or designation but which nevertheless are still within the call of dutyThis court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 whether or not engaged in any business or industry an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship once this is done the plaintiff must show to hold the employer liable that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee

It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect and even finality at times This rule is however subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations surmises or conjectures Such exception obtain in the present

case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager

On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks ABAD who was presented as a hostile witness testified that at the time of the incident he was driving a company-issued vehicle registered under the name of petitioner He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment an employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction but rather the result varies with each state of facts The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances The SC does not agree The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle

I Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle

II Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee and not a part of his services to his employer Hence in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle 14 cda

The employer may however be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and presumably spending more time at his actual duties Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving commission rule under which it can be

found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home However even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own

III Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept it has been held that he has not resumed his employment and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business or within the

scope of his assigned task ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident It was then about 200 am way beyond the normal working hours ABADs working day had ended his overtime work had already been completed His being at a place which as petitioner put it was known as a haven for prostitutes pimps and drug pushers and addicts had no connection to petitioners business neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager Rather using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR August 17 1992

NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI He is also employed as a janitor The president of FCI is Agustin Masa Agustin has a son Allan who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver Allan lives with his dad Funtecha also lives in the presidentrsquos house free of charge while a student at FCI - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home then go back to the school then go home in the school jeep He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hersquos supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school - One night Funtecha wanted to drive home He has a student license After a dangerous curb

and seeing that the road was clear Allan let Funtecha drive Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians) The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night - TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan SC reversed saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school Allans job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose Moreover it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtechas possession of a student drivers license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans house Funtecha

definitely was not having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a frolic of his own but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner Hence the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager

On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks ABAD who was presented as a hostile witness testified that at the time of the incident he was driving a company-issued vehicle registered under the name of petitioner He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment an employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction but rather the result varies with each state of facts The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances The SC does not agree The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle

I Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle

II Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee and not a part of his services to his employer Hence in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle 14 cda

The employer may however be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and presumably spending more time at his actual duties Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving commission rule under which it can be

found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home However even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own

III Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept it has been held that he has not resumed his employment and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business or within the

scope of his assigned task ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident It was then about 200 am way beyond the normal working hours ABADs working day had ended his overtime work had already been completed His being at a place which as petitioner put it was known as a haven for prostitutes pimps and drug pushers and addicts had no connection to petitioners business neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager Rather using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR August 17 1992

NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI He is also employed as a janitor The president of FCI is Agustin Masa Agustin has a son Allan who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver Allan lives with his dad Funtecha also lives in the presidentrsquos house free of charge while a student at FCI - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home then go back to the school then go home in the school jeep He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hersquos supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school - One night Funtecha wanted to drive home He has a student license After a dangerous curb

and seeing that the road was clear Allan let Funtecha drive Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians) The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night - TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan SC reversed saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school Allans job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose Moreover it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtechas possession of a student drivers license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans house Funtecha

definitely was not having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a frolic of his own but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner Hence the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

scope of his assigned task ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident It was then about 200 am way beyond the normal working hours ABADs working day had ended his overtime work had already been completed His being at a place which as petitioner put it was known as a haven for prostitutes pimps and drug pushers and addicts had no connection to petitioners business neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager Rather using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR August 17 1992

NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI He is also employed as a janitor The president of FCI is Agustin Masa Agustin has a son Allan who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver Allan lives with his dad Funtecha also lives in the presidentrsquos house free of charge while a student at FCI - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home then go back to the school then go home in the school jeep He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hersquos supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school - One night Funtecha wanted to drive home He has a student license After a dangerous curb

and seeing that the road was clear Allan let Funtecha drive Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians) The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night - TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan SC reversed saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school Allans job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose Moreover it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtechas possession of a student drivers license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allans house Funtecha

definitely was not having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a frolic of his own but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage Even if somehow the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner Hence the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

and Allan There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep - The petitioner thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees The liability of the employer is under Article 2180 primary and solidary However the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff NPC v CA (PHESCO INC) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO August 14 1998

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22 1979 a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City Unfortunately enroute to its destination one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks) - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba driver of the dump truck which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting In a labor only contract the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him Finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor including the latters workers - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry - In this regard NPCs liability is direct primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver Of

course NPC if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY amp RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD amp PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG JFebruary 6 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE APPEAL from CArsquos DECISION - 14 Oct 1993 about 730pm Nicanor Navidad then drunk entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare) - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks Junelito Escartin the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight - No evidence however was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who between the two delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks - At the exact moment that Navidad fell an LRT train operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman was coming in Navidad was struck by the moving train and he was killed instantaneously - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanorrsquos widow) along with their children filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin Rodolfo Roman the LRTA the Metro Transit Organization Inc (Metro Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent Prudent in its answer denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin instead of presenting evidence filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task - TC Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following a) 1) Actual damages of P4483000 2) Compensatory damages of P44352000 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P5000000 b) Moral damages of P5000000 c) Attorneyrsquos fees of P20000 d) Costs of suit - TC dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals - CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and instead holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts a) P4483000 as actual damages b) P5000000 as nominal damages c) P5000000 as moral damages d) P5000000 as indemnity for the death of the deceased and e) P2000000 as and for attorneyrsquos fees -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor In

exempting Prudent from liability the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train - CA denied petitionersrsquo motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000 ISSUES WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD JR WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTArsquos CLAIMS -Escartinrsquos assault upon Navidad which caused the latter to fall on the tracks was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA Navidads Contention - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier HELD 1 NO The foundation of LRTArsquos liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task In either case the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions in conjunction with Article 218013 of the Civil Code (But there wasnrsquot any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise however for the employerrsquos liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee - Once such fault is established the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee a factual matter that has not been shown - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the

injury one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana Article 219414 of the Civil Code can well apply - In fine a liability for tort may arise even under a contract where tort is that which breaches the contract Stated differently when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties the contract can be said to have been breached by tort thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply 2 YES There is no showing that Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission he must also be absolved from liability as Prudent is Needless to say the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman thus Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence REASONING - Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers - The Civil Code governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers provides

Article 1755 A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with a due regard for all the circumstances

Article 1756 In case of death of or injuries to passengers common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed

extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755

Article 1759 Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the formerrsquos employees although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers

This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees

Article 1763 A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrierrsquos employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission -The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances - Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage - The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrierrsquos employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission

- In case of such death or injury a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent and by simple proof of injury the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred which LRTA and Roman according to the CA have failed to show the presumption would be that it has been at fault an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved DISPOSITION CArsquoS DECISION AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability No costs ______________ 12 Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 13 Art 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for onersquos own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible The father and in case of his death or incapacity the mother are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable Lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage 14 Art 2194 The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary MCKEE V IAC (TAYAG amp MANALO) 221 SCRA 517 Davide Jr July 16 1992 NATURE - Petition to review the resolution of the CA FACTS - On January 8 1977 in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway Pampanga a head-on-collision took place between an International

cargo truck Loadstar owned by private respondents Jaime Tayag and Rosalina Manalo and driven by Ruben Galang and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh Kim McKee and Loida Bondoc and physical injuries to George McKee Christopher McKee and Araceli McKee all passengers of the Ford Escort - Immediately before the collision the cargo truck which was loaded with 200 cavans of rice weighing about 10000 kilos was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga and was bound for Manila The Ford Escort on the other hand was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando When the northbound car was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge 2 boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car The boys were moving back and forth unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back Jose Koh blew the horn of the car swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck he then switched on the headlights of the car applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane Before he could do so his car collided with the truck The collision occurred in the lane of the truck which was the opposite lane on the said bridge - Please see first Mckee digest for details on the collision - Civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were filed as a result of a vehicular accident ISSUE WON the owners of the cargo truck (Tayag and Manalo) are liable for the resulting damages HELD YES

- The Court rules that it was the truck drivers negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was in law the proximate cause of the collision As employers of the truck driver Manalo and Tayag are under Article 2180 of the Civil Code directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee That presumption however is only juris tantum not juris et de jure Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage Article 2180 reads as follows The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry xxx xxx xxx The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and supervision of employees - The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense Neither did they attempt to prove it VALENZUELA v CA (LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL INC) 253 SCRA 303

KAPUNAN February 7 1996

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - Ma Lourdes Valenzuela was driving when she realized she had a flat tire She parked along the sidewalk of Aurora Blvd put on her emergency lights alighted from the car and went to the rear to open the trunk She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a car driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial Inc - Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant which was destroyed and then fell to the ground She was pulled out from under defendants car Plaintiffs left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg She filed a claim for damages against defendant - Lirsquos alibi was that he was driving at 55kph when he was suddenly confronted with a speeding car coming from the opposite direction He instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle and bumped plaintiffs car which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color with no parking lights or early warning device and the area was poorly lighted Defendants counterclaimed for damages alleging that plaintiff was the one who was reckless or negligent -RTC found Li and Alexander solidarily liable CA absolved Alexander

ISSUE 1 WON Li was grossly negligent in driving the company issued car 2 WON Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence 3 WON Alexander Commercial is liable as Lirsquos employer HELD 1 YES - The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li Given a light rainfall the visibility of the street and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard Li would have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were alert as every driver should be to those conditions Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses Physiological fight or flight mechanisms are at work provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs alcohol exhaustion drowsiness etc Lis failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident could therefore have been only due to either or both of the two factors 1) that he was driving at a very fast speed as testified by one of the witneses and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol Either factor working independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road conditions since normally he would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuelas car rather than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly apply his brakes - Li was therefore negligent in driving his company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer 2 NO

- Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection Under the emergency rule adopted by this Court in Gan vs Court of Appeals an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence - While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought or the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent the conduct which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoroughful care but by the over-all nature of the circumstances A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her - Negligence as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others It is the failure to observe that degree of care precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand whereby such other person suffers injury 3 YES

- Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises the provision for the unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car the managerial employee or company sales agent As such in providing for a company car for business use andor for the purpose of furthering the companys image a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly - In fine Alexander Commercial inc has not demonstrated to our satisfaction that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li said company based on the principle of bonus pater familias ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident DISPOSITION Judgment of RTC reinstated

- Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises the provision for the unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car the managerial employee or company sales agent As such in providing for a company car for business use andor for the purpose of furthering the companys image a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly - In fine Alexander Commercial inc has not demonstrated to our satisfaction that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li said company based on the principle of bonus pater familias ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident DISPOSITION Judgment of RTC reinstated