russia and the world: scenarios to 2025: executive summary
DESCRIPTION
For decades Russia, as the dominant constituent of the Soviet Union, was indisputably a superpower. The reality today is very different. With a population of 144 million, Russia has approximately as many inhabitants as Pakistan (which, like Russia, possesses nuclear weapons), and an economy about the size of the Netherlands (population 16 million). Russia has gone through major changes since the break up of the Soviet Union, with a 30% decrease in gross domestic product (GDP) from 1992 to 1998 and challenges to Moscow’s rule in some provinces. In addition to that, declining birth rates combined with emigration and disease have shrunk the working-age population. However, at the start of the 21st Century, the indications from Russia are more favourable, not least because it has experienced a strong real GDP growth in the past five years that has created large current account surpluses and reserves. The economic boom has been supported by high oil prices—but the benefits of this increased economic prosperity are shared only among the elite, while the income gap between regions and groups within society continues to grow. While the upturn in itself is not enough to ensure sustained economic development, it has provided President Vladimir Putin with a window of opportunity, which he has used to introduce a number of reforms, including a flat income tax, a new land and legal code, and legislation on currency liberalization. Indeed, his most significant achievement has been to balance the budget and dramatically reduce IMF borrowing. More recently, a number of issues have started to become more pressing, including inflation, ethnic tensions and some slowing in economic growth just to mention a few. It is thus appropriate to ask whether the combination of these different demographic, economic, social and political elements will eventually have a negative impact, or if Russia can successfully turn itself around.TRANSCRIPT
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Russia and the World: Scenarios to 2025
Executive Summary
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Long March
Vozrozhdenie
Executive Summary
Oil's Curse
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For decades Russia, as the dominant constituent
of the Soviet Union, was indisputably a
superpower. The reality today is very different.
With a population of 144 million, Russia has
approximately as many inhabitants as Pakistan
(which, like Russia, possesses nuclear weapons),
and an economy about the size of the
Netherlands (population 16 million).
Russia has gone through major changes
since the break up of the Soviet Union,
with a 30% decrease in gross domestic product
(GDP) from 1992 to 1998 and challenges to
Moscow’s rule in some provinces. In addition
to that, declining birth rates combined with
emigration and disease have shrunk the
working-age population. However, at the start
of the 21st Century, the indications from Russia
are more favourable, not least because it has
experienced a strong real GDP growth in the
past five years that has created large current
account surpluses and reserves.
The economic boom has been supported
by high oil prices—but the benefits of this
increased economic prosperity are shared only
among the elite, while the income gap between
regions and groups within society continues
to grow.
While the upturn in itself is not enough to
ensure sustained economic development, it
has provided President Vladimir Putin with a
window of opportunity, which he has used to
introduce a number of reforms, including a flat
income tax, a new land and legal code, and
legislation on currency liberalization. Indeed, his
most significant achievement has been to
balance the budget and dramatically reduce
IMF borrowing.
More recently, a number of issues have started
to become more pressing, including inflation,
ethnic tensions and some slowing in economic
growth just to mention a few.
It is thus appropriate to ask whether the
combination of these different demographic,
economic, social and political elements will
eventually have a negative impact, or if Russia
can successfully turn itself around.
The Key Questions for the Scenarios
Among the many challenges confronting Russia,
two questions are key to how Russia will look
in the next two decades:
• Will Russia be able to develop
legitimate and effective governance,
based on the rule of law?
• How effectively can Russia develop
a broad-based economy given its
extensive energy resources?
A number of factors will influence Russia’s
response to these questions:
• The nature, openness and leadership
qualities of the Russian elite, and its interest
and ability to impose the rule of law;
• The choice of economic policy, and the
extent of the freedom granted to private
capital in the energy and non-energy
sectors ;
• The challenge of maintaining social cohesion
given the country’s geographic spread and
its serious demographic problems; and,
• Russia’s relations with the rest of the world.
Different scenario paths for Russia up to 2025
are represented in figure 1, in which the axes
reflect different possible outcomes with respect
to the key questions.
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The Long March scenario covers a situation
in which Russia continues to leverage its
natural resources, to the detriment of the full
development of other sectors. A gradual
transition takes place to a system of governance
based on the rule of law. In this scenario, Russia
is able to achieve relative prosperity, but a far
less benign future is also possible.
In Oil’s Curse, a political class bent on
its own enrichment is in charge, resulting
in slow growth, poor levels of investment in
infrastructure, capital flight, increased corruption
and a decline in the competitiveness of domestic
industries.
A radical departure from the past is also
possible, in which Russia would gradually
achieve real economic and social progress.
Vozrozhdenie (“Renaissance” in Russian)
foresees initially gradual but eventually wide-
reaching governance reforms combined with
market reforms leading to strong GDP growth,
an increase in real income, and general
improvement in the quality of life for the
population at large.
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LongMarch
Vozrozhdenie
Oil's Curse
Figure 1: Russia and the World: Scenarios to 2025
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ExecutiveSum
mary
Long March describes a Russia that is still highly dependent
on natural resources. Increasingly moderate and pragmatic
conservatives make investments in oil infrastructure so as to
fully leverage the advantages Russia derives from its natural
resources while struggling to enforce a greater rule of law.
In other sectors of the economy, international competitiveness
remains limited.
This scenario is set out in the notional form of a transcript
in the Dupree Quarterly—an investment journal—of a keynote
speech at its annual meeting in New York City in 2025.
In Oil’s Curse Russia continues to rely heavily on natural
resources. With high oil prices worldwide and strong demand
for energy, the implementation of far-reaching institutional
reforms and investment in oil and public infrastructure are
neglected, in part due to ineffective leadership.
The scenario is told as an article (by Russian sceptics) in The
Online Newsletter of the Russian Development Group, aimed
at potential investors.
Vozrozhdenie describes a Russia that implements a series of
bold reforms under the leadership of a democratically elected
President. These reforms lead to the economic, political and
social rebirth of Russia.
The scenario is narrated in the Online Encyclopaedia of the
World (OEW) and provides a factual account of what Russia
has achieved over a 20-year period.
Long March
Oil’s Curse
Vozrozhdenie(“Renaissance”)
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2006-2010: Decreasing oil and gas production, low efficiencyand productivity in all sectors, and a worsening of the businessenvironment cause a slowdown of the economy, after years ofrelatively high GDP growth. Corruption and poor governancereach into virtually all areas of public and private life, and socialservices, such as health and education, are suffering from yearsof insufficient budget allocations. After the 2008 elections, conflictsflare inside the Kremlin between conservatives and marketreformers, and a new Prime Minister closer to the latter group is chosen. He begins some much-needed reforms, but iseventually ousted by conservatives. As the economy continuesto shift downwards, the “traditional” measures—state intervention,dirigisme, political pricing, etc.—prove unsuccessful.
2011-2020: Popular opposition following the slowing of theeconomy (and of income growth) and the scandals surroundinga failed anti-corruption campaign builds up ahead of the 2012elections, and enables the ousted Prime Minister to obtain thePresidency. Over the two terms of his mandate, he succeeds inimplementing some radical reforms both in the public sector(progression towards greater democracy and division of powers;civil service and army reform; greater independence of regionsvis-à-vis the centre) and in business (establishment of the free
market and gradual withdrawal of the state from the economy;reduction of red tape and trade barriers ; encouragement ofdiversification to non-energy sectors), whilst also addressing thehealth and the education systems. Corruption is tackled, andconfidence in state and business grows as the economy startsto recover, with improvements in productivity across all sectors.Internationally, Russia strengthens its ties with the EU and to someextent with the US, while its relationship with China is good inthe context of the supply of energy, but tenser elsewhere.
2021-2025: The succeeding Presidency builds upon the strongfoundations created over the previous years, although with astronger emphasis on social aspects and regional development.The diversification achieved ensures a solid and sustainableeconomic growth, despite the slowing in oil production, whileinsulating the economy from energy shocks and increasing thefinancial independence of the regions. The rise of a burgeoningmiddle class also ensures the emergence and development of a strong civil society. Abroad, Russia is positioning itself as thegrowth engine for the Eurasia and Central Asia region, and isperceived as a major power, with the ability to counter-balanceboth China and the US.
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ary2006-2010: Following a period of economic upswing, inefficiencyand declining productivity in the energy sector become increasinglyapparent, as oil and gas production start to trend downward.Inequality and corruption levels increase, while social spendingon healthcare and education is underfunded. The 2008 electionsbring leadership changes and new vision to Russia. A modelemerges, similar to Canada, where energy and natural resourcesare seen as a strategic asset that can be leveraged for botheconomic development and geopolitical aims.
2011-2020: The new President (2008-2016) and his successormaintain Putin’s approach to a managed democracy and amanaged economy, while committing to the redistribution ofrevenues from the state-controlled energy sector to the populationat large, improving their living standards through increased socialspending. Despite the lack of serious structural reforms in theeconomy and public governance, the government is relativelysuccessful in fighting corruption and reforming the military, whileits focus on the energy sector ensures much-needed investmentand gradual improvement in efficiency and productivity in thatsector. Other industries remain underdeveloped despite their
potential, because of limited access to financing and human capitaland the absence of a free-market dynamic. Energy also shapesforeign policy, drawing Russia closer to China and improving itsrelations with both the European Union and the United States.
2021-2025: Russia follows essentially the same path, maintaininga benign authoritarian regime and a strong involvement of thestate in the economy, primarily focused on the energy sector.Advances in the rule of law and a solid increase in real incomefor the population in general encourage the development of amiddle class that, at this point, begins to resent the state’sstranglehold on all areas of public and economic life. Non-oilindustries are growing, but over the years their competitivenesson the international scene is affected by the lack of exposure to a real market economy, the strengthening of the rouble, and theprotectionist attitude of the state. This in turn sparkes pressurefor market-friendly reforms. Furthermore, the regions, whichhave benefited from more efficient administration, are beginningto question the role of the state, while ethnic tensions are on theincrease. On the international scene, Russia is seen as a stableand reliable oil provider.
2006-2010: The conservatives reinforce their power in theKremlin as despair and apathy spread among the populationand high oil prices reduce the sense of urgency for the need for substantial economic reforms. Efficiency and fiscaldiscipline appear less important, given the revenues flowinginto the state’s vaults. However, the lack of reforms, as well asuncertainty and instability, affect the economy, bringing abouta substantial decrease in productivity and efficiency in allsectors—including energy, where insufficient investments in exploration and extraction affect oil production growth. As corruption undermines the rule of law, elections do notlead to any change in power or policy. Ethnic tensionsincrease, and the international position becomes tenserand more difficult.
2011-2020: The deteriorating economic situation spurs anumber of short term measures.The loosening of fiscal policyas the government withdraws from the Stabilization Fund,without backing the withdrawals with the necessary structuralreforms, actually worsens the situation by fuelling inflationand inefficiency. The state reacts by reinforcing its industrialpolicy and increasing its hold over the energy sector. More companies are brought under state control, encouragingan internal political struggle over the control of natural resource
companies. As the state is unable to improve the economy,more and more industries are subject to government directives.The private sector has only limited access to finance, humancapital, fixed capital and management, whilst capital flightsoars. Eventually, a new wave of privatization creates a secondgeneration of oligarchs. Protectionist measures in favour ofweaker domestic companies and dwindling oil productioncontribute to the souring of international relations.
2021-2025: Alarmed by a potential collapse of the Russianeconomy, international financial institutions try to pump infunds—but these are mostly squandered without achievingany real effect. The state does not follow a long-term socialpolicy, and welfare expenditures are crisis-driven, unsustainableand inadequate, while the number of those dependent onthe state for survival—pensioners, unemployed, the poor—grows. Businesses continue to be hampered by loss ofcompetitiveness, low productivity, and an unfavourable marketenvironment. Internally, Russia experiences mounting centre-periphery and ethnic tensions, which often erupt into violentclashes. Externally, international relationships deteriorate asRussia unsuccessfully attempts to recreate an imperialiststate, further alienating its neighbours, and eventually turnsinwards, becoming more and more isolated.
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LongMarch
Vozrozhdenie
Oil's Curse
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Comparing the Three Scenarios
This table provides a comparison of some of the most important aspects and developments of the
scenarios, with further analysis presented in the following Annex
Long March
• Strong investment in oilinfrastructure, improvementsin public infrastructure,limited growth elsewhere
• Higher but inefficient socialspending stabilizes incomegap
• Civil society remainsembryonic—but pressuresfor ‘independence’ grow
• Mildly benign attitude towardsthe West, focus on China &India
• Russia has positioned itselfas a crucial supplier ofenergy in a world wheresecurity of supply is majorissue
• Power maintained byincreasingly moderate andpragmatic conservatives
• Successful war on corruptionlegitimizes the central state
Oil’s Curse
• Strong state regulation andprotection of the economyfrom outside forces lead toslow and fluctuating GDPgrowth
• High social tensions due toprevailing corruption andgrowing inequalities
• Quality of life worsens andsocial services close tocollapse
• Relationship with Chinathrives on the back ofgrowing energy trade
• Closer relations with EUdriven by security of energysupply
• US relationship grows distant
• Power maintained andconcentrated by small elitesat national and regional levels
• Dissatisfaction withineffective governance
Vozrozhdenie
• Push to diversify theeconomy away from energy,leads to healthy and stablebalanced GDP growth
• Social spending andimproved efficiency hasreduced inequality
• Greater involvement of thepopulation in political life
• Russia becomesincreasingly active on the world stage and ininternational organizations
• Greater readiness tosubstantially align with EUand US views.
• Full development of a moreeffective and democraticform of governance
• Transparency, personalrights and publicaccountability are greatlyimproved
Economic performance
Social development
External relationships
Leadership & governance
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The following section allows a side-by-side comparison
of the evolution of some key economic and social
indicators as featured in each scenario. The underlying
economic modelling and analysis has been developed,
with contributions from several experts, in order to
ensure that the storylines and the development of their
different dimensions are both plausible and consistent
with each other.
Key indicators considered:
1. World GDP growth
2. Russia GDP growth
3. Export growth (excluding oil)
4. Export composition
- Export breakdown by destination
- Export breakdown by industry
5. Oil exports
6. FDI inflows
7. Percentage of people living under
“subsistence level”
Using the data
The main objective of the above data is to help develop
leading indicators to determine which of the three scenarios is
actually unfolding. Scenario users should keep in mind that
the scenarios and the related analysis are descriptions of
only a set of possible outcomes, as seen from the current
perspective.
They should not be seen as predictions or forecasts.
The data provided therefore should only be seen as a guide,
and should be applied with careful judgement.
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Annexe: Comparing the Three Scenarios
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In Long March, global integration progresses worldwide and global growth peaks in 2008; however, in the long run, scepticism
and nationalism emerge, preventing the global economy from fully reaping the benefits of globalization and slowing down growth.
In Oil’s Curse, a difficult international environment, characterized by lack of trust and instability, undermines international cooperation
and integration, leading to a global recession in 2010-2014. In contrast, in Vozrozhdenie, the global economy benefits from increasing
globalization and a more harmonious external environment, reaching annual growth rates of up to 4%.
Source: World Economic Forum
World GDP Growth Figure A.1
World real GDP % growth p.a. (moving 5-year averages)
5
4
3
2
1
0
Perc
enta
ges
Vozrozhdenie Long March
Actual Projected
Oil’s Curse
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Source: Moody's Economy.com
Russia GDP Growth Figure A.2
Russia’s GDP growth p.a. (moving 5-year averages)
8
6
4
2
0
Perc
enta
ges
Vozrozhdenie Long March Oil’s Curse
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Actual Projected
Following the 2002-2006 period of high growth, mostly driven by oil prices and consumer demand, Russia’s GDP growth
starts to slow. In Long March the maintained reliance on energy is backed by substantial investments and efficiency
improvements in the sector, while in the non-energy economy, small but efficient investments lead to moderate growth.
In Oil’s Curse, on the other hand, the dependence on energy is not sustained by the necessary investments; as decreasing
rule of law and negative business environment affect economic performance in all sectors, GDP growth is minimal.
In Vozrozhdenie, after an initial period of mediocre performance, the economy picks up thanks to encouraged diversification
and increased rule of law, attaining higher and sustainable growth levels.
1. World GDP growth
2. Russia GDP growth
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Source: World Economic Forum
Export Breakdown by Destination 2005 and 2025Figure A.4
Long March
Oil’s Curse
Vozrozhdenie
Russia in 2005
18
20
12
17
14 4 2
10 5 5
20 315
15
8
13
10
6 5 4
54
47
40
54
Percentages
Percentages
CIS Europe China Middle East & AfricaAsia ex China Americas, Australia and Oceania
In 2025
In 2005
3. Export growth (excluding oil)
In Long March, the importance of the countries of the European Union as trading partners
is maintained, driven by energy exports. The breakdown of export destinations in Oil’s Curse
shows a slight reduction in the amount of exports towards the EU, mostly absorbed by Asia.
Vozrozhdenie offers a more balanced profile of export destinations, as differentiation and
globalization encourage Russia’s integration in international trade.
Source: Moody's Economy.com
Export Growth Excluding Oil Figure A.3
Export excluding oil (nominal, moving 5-year averages)
350 300 250 200 150 100
50 0
Billio
n US
$
Vozrozhdenie Long March Oil’s Curse
Actual Projected
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
In all scenarios, export growth slows down significantly in the period 2006-2011, to stabilize at
lower levels as of 2012. In Long March, growth remains the same throughout the rest of the period,
as domestic companies remain less competitive than their international counterparts. In Oil’s Curse,
not only does growth not pick up, but it remains, comparatively, at the lowest level. In Vozrozhdenie,
the level at which growth stabilizes is relatively higher than in the other scenarios; moreover, growth
picks up again in 2019 thanks to increasing diversification of the economy.
4. Export composition Export breakdown by destination
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Source: Moody's Economy.com
Oil Exports Figure A.6
Crude oil export p.a. (volumes)
9
8
7
6
5
4
Milli
on B
pd
Vozrozhdenie Long March Oil’s Curse
Actual Projected
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Long March and Oil’s Curse both depict an ongoing reliance on natural resources for their
external trade. In Vozrozhdenie, differentiation and higher competitiveness of Russian businesses
are reflected by a more varied export composition.
The quantity of oil exports is higher in the Long March scenario. In Oil’s Curse, it is lower,
due to insufficient investments and inefficiencies. In Vozrozhdenie, a greater proportion of the oil
produced fuels the growing economy.
Source: Moody's Economy.com
Export Breakdown by Industry 2005 and 2025 Figure A.5
Long March
Oil’s Curse
Vozrozhdenie
Russia in 2005
36
42
21
54
11 12 3 13
8 3 9
18 73 20
5
23
27 7
14
3 3 97
3
4
18
18
Percentages
Percentages
Mined and Mineral Products Forest and Paper Products Metals, Precious Gems, and Their Products Chemical and Rubber Manufacturing
Machinery, Equipment, and Transportation Related Goods Consumer and Other Goods Services
In 2025
In 2005
5. Export breakdown by industry
5. Oil exports
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Source: World Economic Forum
FDI Inflows Figure A.7
Billio
n US
$
2006-2010 2011-2015 2016-2020 2021-20251996-2000 2001-2005
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Vozrozhdenie Long March Oil’s Curse
Actual Projected
Source: World Economic Forum
People Living Under “Subsistence Level” Share of people
Figure A.8
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Perc
enta
ges
Vozrozhdenie Long March Oil’s Curse
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Actual Projected
In Long March, Russia attracts a higher level of FDI in the period 2006-2010—directed predominantly
towards the energy sector—than in any of the other scenarios. In the period 2011-2025, however,
the greater differentiation and the market economy in Vozrozhdenie see a greater inflow of FDI.
The negative business environment and poor rule of law discourage the majority of potential
investors in Oil’s Curse.
Both Long March and Vozrozhdenie see a decrease in poverty. While in Long March this is
due to the state, which ensures a redistribution of wealth through social policies and spending,
in Vozrozhdenie, it is the market mechanism that guarantees a greater participation of the people
in the improvement of the economy. In Oil’s Curse, poor economic performance, coupled with
the absence of proper redistribution mechanisms and minimal rule of law, causes many to remain
trapped below subsistence levels.
6. FDI inflows
7. Percentage of people living under “subsistence level”
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