rural credit programs and womens empowerment in bangladesh

Pergamon WorldDevelopment, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 635-653, 1996

Copyright 0 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved

0305750X/96 $15.00 + 0.00

0305-750x(95)00159-x

Rural Credit Programs and Women’s Empowerment in

Bangladesh

SYED M. HASHEMI Jahangimagar University, Dhaka, Bangladesh

SIDNEY RUTH SCHULER

and

ANN P. RILEY* JSI Research and Training Institute, Arlington, Virginia, U.S.A.

Summary. - This paper presents findings from a study of Grameen Bank and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), two programs that provide credit to poor rural women in Bangladesh. The programs were found to have significant effects on eight different dimensions of women’s empowerment. The authors use a combination of sample survey and case study data to argue that the success of Grameen Bank, is particular, in empowering women is due both to its strong, central focus on credit, and its skillful use of rules and rituals to make the loan program function. Copyright 0 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd

1. INTRODUCTION

Microenterprise credit for women has become increasingly common as a poverty alleviation inter- vention in developing countries worldwide. The rapid expansion of these programs has been accompanied by a growing emphasis on achieving high repayment rates and promoting efficiency and financial sustain- ability. Other components such as social and political consciousness-raising, literacy training and skill development have been increasingly downplayed. Many of the most prominent examples of “minimalist” microenterprise credit programs for women are in Bangladesh. A number of them have been remarkably successful in providing financial services to poor rural women on a large scale, with relatively low and diminishing levels of financial subsidy.

Critics of minimalist programs have argued that because of the patriarchal social structure in rural Bangladesh, programs that provide credit with minimal training or other supplementary support services do not empower their female participants and may even worsen their situations. Advocating more holistic approaches, they maintain that strategies such as nonformal education, social and political consciousness-raising, or political organizing are needed to con- front patriarchal power structures, and that programs

organized around credit cannot achieve this goal. They suggest that gender subordination can best be addressed by making confrontation of patriarchy, rather than credit, the focal point (e.g., Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1994; Hasan, 1985; Ahmed, 1982; Anisur Rahman, 1986; Nijera Kori, 1990; Casper, 1994).

*The authors gratefully acknowledge the support provided by Population Action International, The Summit Foundation, The Rockefeller Foundation, and International Development Research Centm, Canada for this research. We are grateful to Professor Muhammad Yunus and Muzammel Huq of Grameen Bank, and Dr. Mushtaque Chowdhury and M. Ghulam Sattar of BRAC for the valuable insights that emerged through numerous discussions, and to the field staff of Grameen Bank and BRAC in Rangpur, Faridpur and Magura for their generous assistance. We are deeply indebted to our ethnographic field research team: Tofazzal Hossain Monju, Nun11 Huda Chanchal, Rubina Ferdousi, Shamsul Huda Badal, Ashrafunnessa Tinni, Reaz Hossain, Dihuba Ahmed, Zakir Hossain, Laila Pervin, Shireen Akhter, Sharif Shamsher, Ahsan Habib Rumi, and Shamima Akhter. We thank the staff of Associates for Community and Population Research for carrying out the survey under the direction of Ghulam Mustafa Kamal, whom we miss and remember often. We are grateful to Amy Cullum for her assistance in the statistical analysis. Final revision accepted: November 15.1995.

635

636 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

Based on findings from a study of Grameen Bank and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), two rural credit programs in Bangladesh, this paper argues that minimalist credit programs do empower women. The analysis uses a combination of ethnographic and sample survey data to describe and measure the effects of the two programs on eight dimensions and a composite indicator of empowerment. It addresses issues of women’s control over credit and the relative magnitude of their economic contributions to their families’ support, and discusses differences in the approaches of the two programs.

The authors argue that credit programs empower women by strengthening their economic roles, increasing their ability to contribute to their families’ support, and that they also empower women through other mechanisms. Its consistent central focus on credit explains Grameen Bank’s stronger effect on women’s contribution to family support and on empowerment. The ritualistic, disciplined mode in which Grameen Bank, and to some extent BRAC, operates strengthens the participants’ ability to control their assets and income, as well as helping them to establish an identity outside of the family, and giving them experience and self-confidence in the public sphere.

2. BACKGROUND

Among the poor in rural Bangladesh, systems of patrilineal descent, patrilocal residence and purduh (the practice of secluding and protecting women to uphold social standards of modesty and morality) interact to isolate and subordinate women. Women are socially and economically dependent on men. Cultural norms are based on asymmetrical assump- tions regarding what is appropriate for each sex, what males versus females need, and what they are entitled to. Education is often considered irrelevant for girls, and at an early age they learn to accept deprivation relative to male family members. Because of purdah many women are confined to the homestead and the area immediately surrounding it, and their contacts with the world outside of the family are extremely 1imited.r These social norms curtail women’s involvement in market transactions and constrain their potential to generate incomes, reinforcing their economic dependence.

Grameen Bank and BRAC, through its Rural Development Program, with about two million and over one-half million female members respectively, are the two largest and best known nongovernmental organizations providing credit to the rural poor in Bangladesh.* Grameen Bank now works in half of all villages in rural Bangladesh. Both organizations started on a small scale in the early to mid-1970s. In their early years there was a distinct contrast in their

programmatic philosophies and strategies; Grameen Bank was fist and foremost a bank for poor rural people, and BRAC took a more multifaceted approach to alleviating rural poverty, with a strong focus on consciousness-raising and nonformal literacy training. In recent years BRAC’s Rural Development Program has come to resemble Grameen Bank to a large extent. Both organizations, as they have evolved, have focused their programs increasingly on women, and have attempted to draw women out of isolation mainly by providing them with economic opportunities. BRAC has continued to try to involve men as well as women to some extent, by establishing separate men’s groups, while Grameen Bank’s current program focuses almost exclusively on women. Both programs are believed to be contributing to social change, empowering women by drawing them out of their homes and strengthening their economic roles.

At the community level, BRAC and Grameen Bank have similar ways of working. Both organizations employ large numbers of field staff, mostly young men, who live in the areas where they work. When a new branch opens the field staff visit nearby villages and explain that the program will provide credit to poor, landless women to support income- earning activities. In order to participate, and to be eligible to receive credit, women are asked to organize themselves into small groups. There is a mandatory savings requirement, and each woman has her own savings account and passbook. Loans are repaid and savings deposited at weekly meetings. Loans are made to individuals, at commercial interest rates. There is no collateral but the group as a whole is responsible to ensure that each member makes the weekly repayments. The participants themselves decide how to use the loans. In most cases the loans are used for self-employment activities such as paddy processing, poultry and livestock, traditional crafts and small trade. The average loan is about $75-100. Before receiving credit, new members must attend training sessions so that they understand the program’s objectives and modes of operation. Grameen Bank has “Sixteen Decisions” having to do with self- improvement, social reform, and community development, which members must memorize and recite.’ Along the same lines, BRAC has “Seventeen Promises.”

3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA

(a) Six-village ethnographic study

Ethnographic research was undertaken in six villages during 1991-94 to document processes of change both in women’s roles and status and in norms related to reproduction. The data were collected through participant observation and informal inter-

RURAL CREDIT PROGRAMS 631

views, supplemented with various structured instru- ments. The researchers observed and documented the two credit programs in operation at the village level and interviewed program participants. Grameen Bank was operating in two of the villages, BRAC was in two villages, and two of the villages had no credit programs.

The study sites were purposively selected to include one area where both BRAC and Grameen Bank had been in operation for over six years, and one area where the programs were just starting; areas where both programs were operating in close proximity were avoided. The general areas were identified with guidance from the central offices of the two organizations, after deciding that the six villages should be concentrated in two groups to facilitate frequent interaction with the local principal Investigator.4 Once the two geographic areas had been identified, village selection was influenced by availability of living accommodations for the researchers. This component of the study was intended to provide insights into the social processes through which normative changes come about; the villages were not intended to be rep- resentative of the geographic areas in which they are located, nor of villages with credit programs. Although we had expected to find greater program impact in the older villages, it happened that they were located in an area of the country that is particularly poor and economically depressed; program perfor- mance (in terms of repayment of loans) and impact appears to be greater in the newer villages, where there are far more economic opportunities.

The ethnographic team consisted of six women and six men. The team received intensive training in qualitative research methods at the beginning of the project, and the principal investigators provided continuing informal training throughout the study. One male-female team resided in each village for a period of about two years, and made occasional visits during the following year. Their observations and interviews focused in particular on a quasi-random subsample of 120 households (20 from each village), about half of whom were households of credit program participants. The respondents were selected from poor families who were participating, or would have been eligible to participate, in BRAC or Grameen Bank’s programs5

A structured form (“household survival matrix”) was developed to collect detailed information at several points in time about the economic activities and earnings of members of the 120-household sample. The form also included information about children’s schooling and women’s participation in credit programs, and households’ responses to crises and economic stress events such as weddings and other rituals, and major investments. Information was collected monthly for a period of one year. This information was supplemented with economic analyses of

women’s microenterprises and information about control over various aspects of family enterprises and income.

(b) Sample survey of credit program participants and comparison groups

A survey of about 1,300 married women under age 50 was conducted in late 1992. Four separate samples were drawn, using a random multistage cluster design to include villages from all four geographic divisions of Bangladesh.6 The four groups consisted of Grameen Bank members, BRAC members, nonmembers residing in the Grameen Bank villages (who would have been eligible to join either BRAC or Grameen Bank), and a comparison group who lived in villages with no Grameen Bank or BRAC program but who would have qualified to join the credit programs.’ In the credit program villages almost all the women had been members for at least 18 months prior to the survey. (See Schuler and Hashemi, 1994 for a more detailed discussion of the survey design.) The inter- viewers were all women who had previous experience in conducting demographic surveys. The survey included questions related to women’s roles and status within the family and community, and fertility and contraceptive use.

(c) Operational definitions of survey variables

Developing valid and reliable measures of women’s empowerment was one of the most difficult tasks of this study. Behaviors and attitudes that might be used to measure women’s empowerment in one society may have no relevance in another. Even though the population of rural Bangladesh is relatively homogenous in terms of its language and cultural tra- ditions, many of the specific details of women’s lives vary because of small differences in social norms and because the geography, the physical infrastructure, and the configuration of social and economic opportunities varies from place to place. Nevertheless it was important to ask very specific questions because of the potential ambiguity of general questions. In this study series of questions related to a variety of different aspects of empowerment were developed through extensive observation, personal interviews with respondents in the ethnographic study villages and with credit program staff, and from baseline survey data.* (For more details see Hashemi and Schuler, 1993.) The responses were consolidated into eight indicators.

The eight indicators were constructed as scale variables. In two of these the components were given different weights (the scores for making large purchases and involvement in family decisions); in the other six


equal weights were assigned to all components. In most instances weights were not used in creating the scales because of the arbitrary judgements that this would have entailed (e.g., deciding that buying hair oil is twice as meaningful as buying ice cream). In addition, the layout of village paths and major roads, and geographic variability in access to markets and facili- ties influences many of the behaviors that comprise the empowerment indicators, such as mobility and making purchases in the market. Women living close to one particular market may have easy access to a certain set of goods and services while others might have to travel a considerable distance to get the same things; some villages have vendors who sell particular goods door to door, making it easier for women to make purchases without violating purdah norms. In creating the empowerment indicators, therefore, we intentionally included a variety of specific actions or items in each one, and made minimal use of weights.

All of the operational measures of empowerment employed in this analysis reduce the empowerment data to dichotomous variables. The cutoff points for empowered versus unempowered were based on percentage distributions for each dimension. Each measure attempts to separate those women who stand out as being relatively more empowered than most other poor women, but does not single out highly unusual respondents. The cutoff point for empowerment was made at around the 25th to 30th percentile for most dimensions. The cutoff points were not difficult to decide on because in most cases a move down one space on the scale would classify more than half the respondents as empowered and a move up one space would exclude all but the top 10% or less.9

We acknowledge that the concept of women’s empowerment is elusive for a variety of reasons (see Mason, 1984, 1987), and that the potential for structured surveys to contribute to our understanding of it is inherently limited. Although the measures developed in this study are the result of a long process involving extensive preliminary data collection, pretesting, reflection and discussion, at best they can only partially capture the phenomenon of women’s empowerment. The inherent shortcomings of the empowerment indicators, however, would tend to diminish the chances of producing statistically significant findings; it is unlikely that the multivariate models using these indicators would overstate the relationship of either credit programs to empowerment or empowerment to contraceptive use. The operational measures of the survey variables are described below.

(i) Empowerment indicators The eight indicators are: mobility, economic secu-

rity, ability to make small purchases, ability to make larger purchases, involvement in major household decisions, relative freedom from domination within the family, political and legal awareness, and involve-

ment in political campaigning and protests. - Mobility: The respondent was presented with a list of places (the market, a medical facility, the movies, outside the village) and asked if she had ever gone there. She was given one point for each place she had visited and an additional point if she had ever gone there alone. A respondent with a score of three or better was classified as “empowered” and coded as one. (In all of the empowerment variables “not empowered” was coded as zero.) - Economic security: One point was given if the respondent owned her house or homestead land, one point for any productive asset, one point for having cash savings, and an additional point if the savings were ever used for business or money- lending. A respondent with a score of two or better was classified as “empowered” and coded as one. -Ability to make small purchases: One point was given for purchasing small items used daily in food preparation for the family (kerosine oil, cooking oil, spices), one point was given for purchasing small items for oneself (hair oil, soap, glass ban- gles), and one point for purchasing ice cream or sweets for the children. For each of these types of purchases one additional point was given if the purchases normally were made without asking for the husband’s permission, and another additional point if the purchases were made at least in part with money earned by the respondent herself. A respondent with a score of seven or better was considered “empowered.” - Ability to make larger purchases: One point was given for purchasing pots and pans, two points for children’s clothing, three points for saris for oneself, and four for buying the family’s daily food. An additional point was given for each category if the purchase was made, at least in part, with money earned by the respondent herself. A respondent with a score of five or better was considered “empowered.” - Involvement in major decisions: One point was given for making a decision (individually or jointly with the husband) within the past few years about house repair or renovation, one point for a decision to take in a goat to raise for profit, three points for deciding to lease land, and four points for deciding to buy land, a boat or a bicycle rickshaw. An additional point was given for each category if money earned by the respondent was used. A respondent with a score of two or better was classified as “empowered” and coded as one. - Relative freedom from domination by the family: The respondent was asked if, within the past year, money had been taken from her against her will; land, jewelry or livestock had been taken from her against her will; she had been prevented from visiting her natal home; or she had been pre-


vented from working outside the home. A respondent was classified as “empowered” and coded as one if she said that none of these things had happened to her. - Political and legal awareness: One point each was given for knowing the name of a local govem- ment official, a Member of Parliament, and the Prime Minister, and one point each for knowing the significance of registering a marriage, and knowing the law governing inheritance. A respondent was classified as “empowered” if she had a score of four or five. - Participation in public protests and political campaigning: The respondent was classified as “empowered” if she had campaigned for a political candidate or had gotten together with others to protest: a man beating his wife, a man divorcing or abandoning his wife, unfair wages, unfair prices, misappropriation of relief goods, or “high-handed- ness” of police or government officials. - Composite empowerment indicator: A woman was classified as empowered if she had a positive score (was coded as one) on five or more of the eight indicators described above.

(ii) Indicator of contribution tofamily support This variable was based on the woman’s rough

assessment of her relative contribution. A dummy variable was created in which women who said that all, most, half, or some of their family expenses were met through their own earnings were given a score of one. Those who said they provided hardly any or none of their family’s support were given a score of zero.

(iii) Exposure to credit programs Four dichotomous, mutually exclusive variables

indicate whether the respondent was a participant in BRAC’s Rural Development Program, a Grameen Bank participant, a nonparticipant living in a Grameen Bank village, or a resident of a comparison village where no credit program existed. In all multivariate analyses the reference category is women from comparison villages. Another variable measures duration of membership, converted from months to years.

(iv) Control variables The analysis included three control variables

related to women’s demographic and socioeconomic status. These are respondent’s age (coded in single years), whether she had at least one surviving son/daughter (one if she had a surviving son/daughter, zero if not), religion (one for Hindu, zero for Muslim), whether she ever attended school (any schooling is one, no schooling is zero),lO an indicator of the relative economic level of the respondent’s household (one if the house was made at least partly of concrete or had a tin or tile roof, zero otherwise), and the geographic division in which the respondent was living (at the

time of the survey the four administrative divisions were: Chittagong, Dhaka, Khulna and Rajshahi).

(d) The issue of selection bias

The potential to measure effects of credit programs on women’s empowerment and other outcomes is limited by selection bias because women who are relatively innovative or empowered may be more likely than others to join credit programs. The statistical effect of participation in the programs, therefore, may be exaggerated.” In the absence of longitudinal data it is important to identify factors that might be influenced by selection bias and adjust for these to the extent possible in multivariate analyses.

A review of the background variables for the four groups (Table 1) suggests some selection bias, but that in most cases the differences between the four groups are not large. Women in both programs are two to five years older on average than nonmembers, and therefore, are more likely to have at least one surviving son or daughter. Women in both credit programs, but particularly Grameen Bank, are more likely to have had some education. Although both the credit program participants and comparison groups are poor in that they come from families with little or no land or other productive assets, credit program members are less likely to be among the poorest members of their communities than were women in either of the comparison groups. (Some of the difference in wealth may be a result of participation in the credit programs.) Our statistical models partially adjust for selection bias by controlling for age, education, relative wealth, religion, geographic division and surviving sons and daughters.

We acknowledge, however, that women who are already relatively more empowered for reasons unre- lated to the control variables may be more likely to join credit programs and, therefore, selection bias may exaggerate a statistical relationship between program participation and empowerment. In addition to controlling for the respondents’ demographic and socio-economic characteristics in the multivariate regression models, this study attempts to address the possibility of selection bias in other ways. One is by including nonparticipants as well as participants in Grameen Bank villages and comparing them with women residing in villages where the program is not operating. In a previous analysis (Schuler and Hashemi, 1994), participants and nonparticipants were combined and compared with residents of villages without credit programs, in order to look at village-level effects.i2 In addition, a membership duration variable tests whether the effect of credit programs on women’s empowerment increases over time, That women who are more empowered also may be more likely to join a credit program is


Table 1. Percentages and means of study variables by exposure to credit programs, married women aged less than 50, Bangladesh

Grameen Bank BRAC Grameen Bank Comparison members members nonmembers group

Mean (years) age 3 1 (7.9)* 31 (8.1) 26 (8.1) 29 (7.7) Mean number of surviving children 3.5 (1.8) 3.5 (2.1) 2.4 (1.7) 3.0 (2.0) % with one or more surviving sons 84 79 68 78 % with one or more surviving daughters 82 81 69 72 % Ever attended school 29 23 18 18 % Poorer households 43 39 59 67 % Chittagong division 19 10 22 15 % Dhaka division 30 49 33 38 % Khulna division 9 21 0 16 % Rajshahi division 42 20 44 32 % Contributes to family support 72 40 27 20 Mean duration of credit program

membership (years) 3.9 (2.4) 3.7 (1.7) n/a nJa 8 Beaten by husband in the past year 9 13 21 27 % Classified as empowered on: Mobility? 30 42 29 21 Economic security 53 39 14 13 Small purchases 61 43 21 19 Large purchases 48 44 24 17 Major decisions 59 42 21 17 Political/Legal awareness 34 38 15 18 Protest/Campaign 32 36 15 21 Freedom from domination 83 75 76 74 Composite empowerment 42 32 10 5

N of cases 284 232 315 394

*Standard deviation.

expected, but a significant duration effect would strongly suggest that credit programs further empower the women who join them. The analysis also adjusts for geographic division because both credit programs began operating in different parts of the country at different times. Thus, duration may function as a proxy for division as well as indication length of time in the program.

(e) Analytical procedures

The analysis begins with the sample survey data, using logistic regression models to explore whether Grameen Bank and BRAC affect different dimensions of empowerment. The first set of models examines the effects of exposure to BRAC’s and Grameen Bank’s credit programs and the sociodemographic variables on the eight aspects of empowerment, the aggregate empowerment indicator, and women’s contribution to family support. In the next set of models contribution to family support is used as an independent variable. In these models interactions between credit program participation and women’s contribution to family support are also examined. Predicted probabilities from

the model employing the composite indicator of empowerment are calculated to illustrate the levels of empowerment experienced by women participating in credit programs and those contributing to family support compared with women who are neither in credit programs nor contributing.

Next the paper turns to data from the six-village ethnographic study. Economic case studies, bivariate analyses and qualitative findings are used to explore further the question of how credit empowers women, starting with effects on women’s economic roles and proceeding to discuss other aspects of women’s lives such as physical mobility, interactions in the public sphere, and domination and violence within the household.

4. SURVEY BINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

(a) Effects of credit programs on eight dimensions of empowerment and women’s contribution to family

support

The logistic regression models summarized in Table 2 examine how women’s exposure to credit pro-


grams affects each of the eight empowerment indicators, the composite empowerment score, and women’s contribution to family support. Each row in the Table represents a separate regression model; the dependent variable is identified along the horizontal axis of the table. Findings are presented as odds ratios and their 95% confidence intervals for key variables. Odds ratios greater than one indicate positive relationships between the independent and dependent variables; those less than one indicate negative relationships. Statistical significance (p < 0.05) is indicated when the confidence interval does not contain 1 .O. The models also adjust for the sociodemographic characteristics discussed above, but because we are not concerned here with the magnitude of their effects on empowerment, and in the interest of parsimony, their estimates are not shown.

The effect of membership duration in either program is shown in column 1. Duration is statistically significant for three of the eight empowerment indicators: ability to make small independent purchases, involvement in major family decisions, and participation in political campaigns or public protests; it is nearly significant for mobility. In addition, the odds ratio for membership duration is significant in the models with contribution to family support and the composite empowerment score as the dependent variables. These findings demonstrate that the longer a woman is a member of either BRAC or Grameen Bank, the greater the likelihood that she will be empowered based on these indicators, and the more likely she is to make a substantial contribution to her family’s s~pp0r-t.~~

Even controlling for membership duration, participation in BRAC and Grameen Bank and, in a few cases, being a nonmember in a Grameen village, has a significant effect on women’s empowerment. These findings may result from several relationships which we cannot separate statistically with our cross-sec- tional data. The residual program effect may result in part from selection bias because, as noted earlier, women who are relatively more empowered probably are more likely to join a credit program than others. It is also possible that the programs have an effect on some aspects of empowerment soon after a woman joins, with little additional effect thereafter. Our ability to adjust for duration of membership was constrained by the fact that (with the exception of a few women who joined between this survey and a previous one) all women had been involved in Grameen or BRAC for a minimum of 18 months when the survey was conducted. Hence, the models cannot take into account program effects that may occur within a short time after joining. Differences between the two credit programs in the relative magnitudes of the odds ratios may indicate their relative strengths and weaknesses in empowering women or possibly that the programs are differentially selective in recruiting members.

Data from our ethnographic research, presented later in the paper, describe differences in the styles and modes of operation of the two programs which account to some extent for the apparent differences in the two programs’ effects on participants.

Columns 2 and 3 in Table 2 show that (adjusting for duration of the women’s participation in the programs) each of the credit programs has a significant effect on five empowerment dimensions, of which four overlap. Grameen Bank alone has a significant effect on women’s involvement in major decisions within the family, and BRAC alone has a significant effect on women’s mobility. Both programs significantly influence women’s economic security, ability to make small and large purchases, political/legal awareness, contribution to family support, and the composite empowerment score. In most cases where both programs have a significant effect on the same outcome, the odds ratios for Grameen Bank are larger, most notably for contribution to family support. BRAC, however, has a greater impact on political/legal awareness. Residence in a Grameen Bank village (for nonmembers) has a significant influence on mobility, ability to make large purchases, and the composite empowerment score, but in all cases the odds ratios are lower than for the nonmembers than for Grameen Bank and BRAC members. This suggests either selection bias related to program placement on the part of Grameen Bank, or a spill-over effect of the program. Again, we are unable to separate the two possible causes with these data. As noted earlier, lack of an additional comparison group of nonmembers in BRAC villages prevents a like comparison for that program.

Although one would assume that women who are relatively more empowered to begin with are more likely than others to join credit programs, the significant effect of membership duration on several of the empowerment indicators and the composite empowerment score indicates a true program effect. Once a woman has joined a credit program, her level of empowerment is likely to increase. It appears that Grameen Bank has a stronger effect than BRAC in empowering the women who participate, although selection bias may influence the relative magnitude of the effects of Grameen Bank versus BRAC to some extent.

(b) Effects of contribution to family support on empowerment

The contribution to family support variable serves as a crude indicator of women’s control over their loan funds. This is distinct from access to resources (Mason, 1986) which is conveyed by extending loans to women. In our survey women were asked what pro-

Tab

le

2.

Eff

ects

of

ex

posu

re

to

cred

it

prog

ram

s on

ei

ght

empo

wer

men

t di

men

sion

s an

d co

ntri

buti

on

to f

amil

y su

ppor

t:

odds

ra

tios

an

d 95

%

conf

iden

ce

inte

rval

s fr

om

logi

stic

re

gres

sion

m

odel

s*

Dep

ende

nt

vari

able

s:

(1)

Mem

bers

hip

dura

tion

(yea

rs)

Inde

pend

ent

vari

able

s:

(2)

Gra

mee

n B

ank

mem

ber

(3)

(4)

(5)

BR

AC

G

ram

een

Com

pari

son

mem

ber

nonm

embe

r !T

+oU

P

Em

pow

erm

ent

Indi

cato

rs

Mob

ility

E

cono

mic

se

curi

ty

Smal

l pu

rcha

ses

Lar

ge

purc

hase

s M

ajor

de

cisi

ons

Not

dom

inat

ed

by f

amily

Po

litic

aVle

gal

awar

enes

s C

ampa

ign/

prot

est

Con

trib

utio

n to

fam

ily

supp

ort

Com

posi

te

empo

wer

men

t sc

ore

N=

12

25

Odd

s ra

tio

1.09

1.

08

1.12

1.

03

1.19

1.

07

1.03

1.

12

1.12

1.

16

95%

C

onfi

denc

e in

terv

al

(1.0

0,1.

20)

(0.9

8,

1.18

) (1

.02,

1.23

) (0

.94.

1.12

) (1

.08,

1.

31)

(0.9

5,

1.20

) (0

.93,

1.13

) (1

.02,

1.

22)

(1.0

1,

1.24

) (1

.05,

1.

28)

Odd

s ra

tio

1.12

5.

18

3.92

3.

65

3.45

1.

28

1.84

1.

08

6.83

7.

52

95%

C

onfi

denc

e in

terv

al

(0.6

6,

1.92

) (3

.05,

8.79

) (2

.37,

6.49

) (2

.21,

6.05

) (2

.05.

5.80

) (0

.71,

2.30

) (1

.08,

3.

16)

(0.6

4,

1.83

) (3

.97,

11

.74)

(3

.87,

14

.60)

Odd

s ra

tio

1 .I6

2.

80

2.16

3.

15

1.49

0.

85

2.44

1.

36

1.94

4.

51

95%

C

onfi

denc

e in

terv

al

(1.0

6,2.

91)

(1.6

5,4.

74)

(1.3

0,3.

58)

(1.9

1,5.

19)

(0.8

8.2.

53)

(0.4

8,

1.50

) (1

.44.

4.14

) (0

.82,

2.27

) (1

.13,

3.33

) (2

.33.

8.73

)

*Mod

els

adju

st

for

educ

atio

n le

vel,

rela

tive

wea

lth,

relig

ion,

ag

e,

surv

ivin

g so

ns,

surv

ivin

g da

ught

ers,

an

d ge

ogra

phic

di

visi

on.

Odd

s ra

tio

1.71

1.

06

1.25

1.

62

1.41

1.

18

0.83

0.

71

1.45

2.

41

95%

C

onfi

denc

e in

terv

al

(1.1

9.2.

47)

(0.6

8,

1.66

) (0

.84,

1.

84)

(1.1

1,2.

39)

(0.9

5,2.

09)

(0.8

2,

1.69

) (0

.54,

1.

28)

(0.4

7,

1.07

) (1

.00,

2.10

) (1

.30,

4.45

)

1.00

1.

00

1.00

1.

00

1.00

1.

00

1.00

1.

00

1.00

1.

00


portion of the family’s expenses were met through their own independent earnings, and in the sequence of questions it was clear that the interviewer did not consider credit program loans (which have to be paid back) as part of earnings. All women who receive a loan gain access to additional resources, even if their husbands appropriate the money, but not all women succeed in controlling their loans and using them to generate independent incomes.

The next series of models, summarized in Table 3, examines the effect of women’s contribution to family support on the empowerment measures, and shows how its addition to the regressions changes the odds ratios for the credit program exposure variables (Grameen Bank membership, BRAC membership, and membership duration) shown in Table 2.

Table 3 is divided into two parts because for two of the empowerment domains and the composite score there was a statistically significant negative interaction between contribution to family support and participation in a credit program. The interactive effect of credit program membership and contribution likely reflects the intermediate position of contribution relative to credit programs and other dimensions of empowerment: credit programs increase women’s ability to contribute to family support, and both factors lead to greater empowerment of women.

Part A of Table 3 presents the odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals for contribution to family support, Grameen Bank, BRAC, and membership duration. Their interpretation is identical to that in Table 2, but contribution is now an independent rather than a dependent variable in each model. The models shown in Part B include a multiplicative interaction of contribution to family support and membership in a credit program.14 The interpretation is somewhat different in Part B (except for column 1, membership duration) than in Part A because the reference category is now “not in a credit program and not contributing to family support.” In column 4, Part B, for example, the odds ratio of 7.61 for small purchases indicates that among women who are not in either credit program the odds

of being empowered for this indicator is over seven times greater for contributors than for noncontribu- tors. Likewise, the odds ratio in column 5, Part B, for small purchases shows that women who are in Grameen Bank and contribute to family support are more than 11 times as likely to be empowered on the small purchases dimension than women who are not in a credit program and do not contribute.

Women’s contribution to family support has a significant effect on all the empowerment dimensions except for two (relative freedom from domination by the family, and political/legal awareness), and on the composite empowerment score. The strongest effect of contribution to family support on empowerment occurs in the three models with small and large purchases and the composite empowerment score as the

dependent variables, models which also include the significant interaction between contribution and credit. For these three empowerment measures the odds ratios for women who both contribute to family support and participate in credit programs are large and highly significant.

The addition of contribution to family support to the models in Table 3 reduces the credit program para- meter estimates shown in Table 2 in most cases, sug- gesting that the effect of credit programs on women’s empowerment comes about, at least in part, because credit programs create opportunities for women to earn independent incomes. When the contribution to family support variable is included (in Table 3) the effect of membership duration is somewhat reduced for seven of the empowerment variables, and falls below the 0.05 significance level in one case; it does not increase notably for any dimension of empowerment. Most odds ratios for Grameen Bank are considerably lower in Table 3 compared with Table 2 (for BRAC some odds ratios decrease and others increase). With the exception of the model with relative freedom from domination by the family as the dependent variable, model tit is significantly improved by the addition of the contribution to family support variable. This suggests that women who earn independent incomes and contribute to their families’ support are likely to be empowered regardless of whether this is a result of their involvement in a credit program.

(c) Predictedprobabilities of empowerment

The discussion now turns to the potential magnitude of impact of a credit program or other economic opportunity on the life of an individual woman. Using the composite empowerment score as the dependent variable, probabilities of empowerment were calculated for hypothetical “typical women” with six different profiles: (i) women who neither belong to a credit program nor contribute to family support, (ii) BRAC members who do not contribute to family support (either because their husbands appropriate their loans, or they do use the loans successfully to generate income or, in a few cases, because they have not yet received a loan), (iii) Grameen Bank members who do not contribute, (iv) women who contribute but are not in a credit program, (v) BRAC members who contribute, and (vi) Grameen members who contribute. We defined a typical woman as one who holds average values for all other variables employed in the regression modelsI

Figure 1 shows the predicted probabilities of empowerment for women with the six different profiles. The most striking feature of the figure is the extremely low probability of empowerment (about 2%) for women who are neither in a credit program

Tab

le

3. E

ffec

t of

con

trib

utio

n to

fam

ily

supp

ort

and

cred

it pro

gra

m

expo

sure

on

eig

ht d

imen

sion

s of

wom

en’s

em

pow

erm

ent

and

com

posi

te

empo

wer

men

t sc

ore:

od

ds

rati

os

and

95%

co

nfid

ence

in

terv

als f

rom

lo

gist

ic

regr

essi

on

mod

els*

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Mem

bers

hip

Gra

mee

n B

ank?

B

RA

CT

C

ontr

ibut

ion

to F

amily

du

ratio

n (y

ears

) m

embe

r m

embe

r Su

ppor

t

A

95%

O

dds

Con

fide

nce

ratio

in

terv

al

Mob

ility

1.

09

(0.9

9,

1.19

) E

cono

mic

se

curi

ty

1.05

(0

.96,

1.

16)

Maj

or

Dec

isio

ns

1.17

(1

.06,

1.

29)

Not

dom

inat

ed

by f

amily

1.

07

(0.9

5,

1.20

) Po

litic

al0e

ga.l

awar

enes

s 1.

02

(0.9

3,

1.13

) C

ampa

ign/

prot

est

1.10

(1

.01,

1.

21)

95%

O

dds

Con

fide

nce

ratio

in

terv

al

0.92

(0

.53,

1.

60)

3.49

(2

.01.

6.06

) 2.

66

(1.5

6,4.

56)

1.32

(0

.72,

2.43

) 1.

70

(0.9

8.2.

97)

0.85

(0

.49,

1.

47)

95%

O

dds

Con

fide

nce

ratio

in

terv

al

1.64

(0

.98,

2.73

) 2.

48

(1.4

4.4.

25)

1.38

(0

.81.

2.34

) 0.

86

(0.4

9,1.

52)

2.38

(1

.40,

4.05

) 1.

26

(0.7

52.1

1)

Odd

s E

itiO

95%

C

onfi

denc

e in

terv

al

1.61

3.

03

1.96

0.

91

1.22

1.

78

(1.2

0,2.

17)

(2.2

1.4.

14)

(1.4

6,2.

64)

(0.6

6,1.

25)

3

(0.8

8,

1.68

) (1

.31,

2.42

) E

g

(5)

(6)

Mem

bers

hip

Gra

mee

n B

ank

BR

AC

C

ontr

ibut

ion

to F

amily

G

B &

Con

trib

utio

n B

RA

C

and

Con

trib

utio

n

dura

tion

(yea

rs)

only

8 on

ly§

Supp

ort

to F

amily

Su

ppor

t$

to F

amily

Su

ppor

t$

B

95%

95

%

95%

95

%

95%

95

%

Odd

s C

onfi

denc

e O

dd

s C

onfi

denc

e O

dds

Con

fide

nce

Odd

s C

onfi

denc

e O

dds

Con

fide

nce

Odd

s C

onfi

denc

e

ratio

in

terv

al

ratio

in

terv

al

ratio

in

terv

al

ratio

in

terv

al

ratio

in

terv

al

ratio

in

terv

al

Smal

l pu

rcha

ses

1.09

(0

.99,

1.

21)

3.67

(2

.00,

6.74

) 2.

67

(1.5

1,4.

73)

7.61

(4

.97,

11

.66)

11

.19

(6.3

0,

19.8

7)

8.13

(4

.42,

14

.94)

Lar

ge

purc

hase

s 1.

00

(0.9

1,

1.09

) 3.

02

(1.6

5,5.

55)

3.47

(1

.98,

6.05

) 5.

30

(4.5

0,8.

02)

8.92

(5

.08,

15

.69)

10

.24

(5.6

3,18

.61)

Com

posi

te

empo

wer

men

t sc

ore

1.14

(1

.03,

1.

26)

9.55

(4

.15,

21.9

8)

7.12

(3

.20,

15

.82)

8.

65

(4.5

5,

16.4

3)

24.6

3 (1

1.12

,54.

58)

18.3

5 (8

.12.

41.5

0)

*Mod

els

adju

st

for

educ

atio

n le

vel,

rela

tive

wea

lth,

relig

ion,

ag

e,

surv

ivin

g so

ns,

surv

ivin

g da

ught

ers,

ge

ogra

phic

di

visi

on,

and

cont

ribu

tion

to f

amily

su

ppor

t. T

Ref

eren

ce

cate

gory

co

nsis

ts

of w

omen

w

ho d

o no

t liv

e in

cre

dit

prog

ram

vi

llage

s.

$Mod

els

adju

st

for

educ

atio

n le

vel,

rela

tive

wea

lth,

relig

ion,

ag

e,

surv

ivin

g so

ns,

surv

ivin

g da

ught

ers,

ge

ogra

phic

di

visi

on,

cont

ribu

tion

to f

amily

su

ppor

t, an

d a

mul

tiplic

ativ

e in

ter-

ac

tion

betw

een

cont

ribu

tion

to f

amily

su

ppor

t an

d m

embe

rshi

p in

eith

er

cred

it pr

ogra

m.

BR

efer

ence

ca

tego

ry

cons

ists

of

wom

en

who

ar

e no

t pa

rtic

ipat

ing

in c

redi

t pr

ogra

ms

and

who

do

not

con

trib

ute

to f

amily

su

ppor

t.


Figure 1. Predicted probability of empowennent for Grameen Bank and BRAC members, substantial contributors, and combinations. Control variables set at average

values (see note 15).

nor contributing to their family support. The probability of empowerment is eight to 12 times as high for a woman who is contributing to family support or involved in a credit program (and not contributing). This suggests that although credit programs empower woman in large part by strengthening their economic roles, women can become empowered even when this does not happen. In comparison, women in Grameen Bank who also make independent contributions to family support have a 45% chance of being empowered, over 20 times that of women who neither belong to a credit program nor contribute to family support.

The situation of the majority of women in rural Bangladesh is best represented by the first profile. Most women do not earn independent incomes that would enable them to contribute to their families’ support (only 20% of the women in our comparison group were contributing), and they do not have the opportunity to participate in a credit program. Figure 1 high- lights the enormous potential impact of credit programs and other economic opportunities for transforming women’s lives. Rutting women’s contribution to family support and involvement in credit programs in separate analytical categories, however, diverts attention from the fact that a large proportion of the women in the survey are contributing to their families’ support as a result of the credit programs. Seventy-four percent of the Grameen Bank members and 66% of the BRAC members said they used program loans to initiate economic activities that they were not involved in prior to joining the credit program.

In the sections that follow we turn to the ethnographic findings to explain more specifically how credit programs empower women - to what extent it is the credit per se as opposed to other aspects of participation in the programs. We focus fist on issues related to women’s economic positions within their families, and then on other aspects of their lives.

5. THE MAGNITUDE OF WOMEN’S CONTRI- BUTIONS TO FAMILY INCOME

The multivariate analyses demonstrate that women’s contribution to family support is an important intermediate variable explaining the effects of credit programs on women’s empowerment, but they do not assess the magnitude of this contribution. The difficulty of obtaining reliable estimates of income in structured surveys, particularly in populations with varied and inconsistent sources of income, is widely recognized. Therefore we did not attempt to collect this information in the random sample survey. Instead, data from case studies of the 120 households in our six village ethnographic sample were used to estimate women’s incomes, household incomes and, in the four credit program villages, the relative impact of program loans on household incomes. Information was collected monthly for each household, and women’s incomes and incomes derived from loan investments were recorded separately.

Although these case studies add a level of detail that would be difficult if not impossible to obtain using a highly structured survey questionnaire, the number of cases is relatively small and not representa- tive of any larger population. Twenty household case studies were done in each of the six villages. In order to obtain equal numbers of credit and noncredit households, only five households of nonmembers were included in each of the four credit program villages. Given wide variability in economic circumstances among the villages, the sample is not large enough to make valid comparisons between villages, or between credit program members and nonmembers. Other recent studies suffer from similar methodological lim- itations as our ethnographic work - that is, they are based on small and unrepresentative samples. Such data can provide insights into the mechanisms through which credit programs affect individual lives and, arguably, act as catalysts in altering gender relations within families and local communities. The data need to be interpreted with caution, however, and the results should not be extrapolated to represent all women involved in credit programs, nor any other population.

The case studies from the four credit program villages reveal considerable variability in women’s relative contributions to family income. For the one-year period from April 1992 to March 1993, the average


income generated by women in credit program households ranged from less than 5% of household income in one village to over one-quarter in another, out of an average cash income of a little over $300. Although one woman contributed over three-quarters of her family’s income (her husband was ill and unable to work for several months), in most households women’s relative contribution represented less than one-third. Average family incomes tended to be lower in households with both male and female income earners, as opposed to households dependent on men’s earnings alone. In addition, there was a tendency for women’s contribution (both relative and absolute) to be higher in the poorest households. This suggests that it is the poorest, most desperate families that, given the opportunity, are more willing to stretch purdah norms and take the social risks entailed when women engage in wage or self-employment.

Two of the credit program villages were in Rangpur District, one of the worst areas of the country in terms of economic activities and loan repayments. The other two were located in the better-off Faridpur- Magura region, but this was a relatively new area for both Grameen Bank and BRAC, and the participants were only in their second or third loan cycles. The income from credit program loans and the relative contributions to family income of program participants in our sample, therefore, probably were below average. In another recent study of women who had been involved in the Grameen Bank program for over 10 years, in the more prosperous Tangail region, it was reported that the women contributed 54% of total household earnings (Todd, 1995). Forty-one percent of this, however, came from borrowing and 19% came from shadow estimates of the cash value of women’s unpaid labor contributions at harvest-time. If the amounts from these two sources are excluded, women’s contributions amount to approximately one- quarter of all household income, about the same as we found in our best-performing village. (In our estimates of incomes the loan money itself was not treated as part of income, and we did not include estimates of income in kind.) Our recalculation of Todd’s figures on women’s contributions to family income probably provides a reasonably accurate picture of what can be expected under favorable circumstances, with some women contributing more, and some less in relative terms, depending upon the level of their husband’s contribution and the success of their own enterprises. In villages where conditions are less favorable, and limited economic opportunities and social barriers interact to severely restrict women’s involvement in independent enterprises, their relative cash contributions drop to almost nothing.

Our survey findings also suggest that women’s relative contributions to family income tend to be modest. Although involvement in credit programs, and particularly in Grameen Bank, has a dramatic effect

on women’s ability to make a recognized, cash contribution to their families’ support, in most cases these contributions are not large. While 72% of the Grameen bank members and 40% of the BRAC members in the survey were classified as “making a substantial contribution to family support,” only 26% of Grameen and 12% of BRAC members said that they contributed enough to cover half or more of the family’s expenses. (In the comparison sample only 4% of the women contributed half or more.)

There are two reasons why women’s contributions to household incomes in Grameen Bank and BRAC households tend to be so much smaller than men’s. First, activities that are primarily controlled by women (such as raising poultry or livestock) are home-based and typically generate only modest amounts of income compared with the daily wage work, services and petty trading activities that men engage in. Second, credit is not used exclusively for women’s enterprises. Grameen Bank and BRAC loans often are invested in more profitable family enterprises or enterprises run by male family members (trading, pulling rickshaw vans), where cash transactions typically are conducted by men and where visi- ble incomes are attributed to men. In the program- wide sample survey the respondents who had received one or more loans were asked who used the money from each loan. Only 10% of the BRAC members and 9% of the Grameen Bank members said that they used all of their loans exclusively to finance their own economic activities. But 70% of the Grameen Bank members and 47% of the BRAC members said that they had used all of the loans that they received at least in part for activities in which they were involved.

While the amount that most women in credit programs contribute to family incomes is typically small, under conditions of extreme scarcity this small amount of income makes a significant difference to a family’s well-being. It often means that a family can eat two meals rather than only one meal a day during the lean season, or eat one meal a day rather than going hungry if the husband falls ill and can’t work. Often the very poor are reduced to selling their homestead, the roof, the house posts, and even their cheap alu- minium cooking pots to survive illness, injury, natural disasters or other crises. Regular access to small amounts of credit often helps families to avoid such distress sales.

6. WOMEN’S CONTROL OVER THEIR ENTER- PRISES AND INCOMES

Several studies have pointed out that women in credit programs do not always retain full control over their loans, and that they may not be the managers of the funded enterprises (R. Rahman, 1986; White, 1992; Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1994). This raises two


questions: fiit, how much control do Grameen Bank and BRAC participants have over their loans and economic enterprises; and, second, can credit programs empower women who do not control their loans. The multivariate analyses presented earlier suggest that women with little or no control over their loans (those who do not contribute to family support) are more empowered than nonmembers. Our ethnographic study explored these issues in detail. Monthly interviews of the 60 credit program participants from four villages included a series of questions to elicit the extent of the female loan recipients’ control over the loan money and of their roles in managing the funded activities. The extent of women’s control was catego- rized as none, partial, significant or full for each separate activity funded through program loans. “Full control” meant control over every aspect of the enterprise including marketing. “Significant control” meant that women were keeping accounts and had control over funds but were not involved in market transactions. “Partial control” referred to women having some knowledge of accounts and having some access to the incomes generated. Table 4 suggests that women’s control over loan-funded activities varies considerably. In one BRAC village, for example, none of the women had any control. At the other extreme (another BRAC village), 70% had full or significant control. In the Grameen villages 27% and 63% had full or significant control. This compares with findings from R. Rahman’s study (1986), indicating that three-quarters of the women had significant control over the enterprises funded by Grameen Bank loans, and Goetz and Sen Gupta’s study (1994) stating that 62% of Grameen women and 28% of BRAC women have full or significant control.

Contrary to Goetz and Sen Gupta’s (1994) con- tention that women in minimalist credit programs fail to establish control over their loan-funded enterprises, we conclude from our own research and Rahman’s and Goetz and Sen Gupta’s studies that Grameen Bank’s minimalist strategy is quite effective in foster- ing women’s control over microenterprises. The lower figure of 28% who controlled their microenterprises in the Goetz and Sen Gupta study referred to their BRAC sample, the less “minimalist” of the programs they studied. Their figure of 62% female control over microenterprises, our calculation of 63% in the newer Grameen Bank village, and Rahman’s fig-

Table 4. Women’s control overfunded enterprises

None Partial Significant Full

Old GB village 64% 9% 9% 18% Old BRAC village 100% 0% 0% 0% New GB village 18% 18% 36% 27% New BRAC village 20% 10% 10% 60%

ure of 75% are probably quite typical for Grameen Bank. Judging from Goetz and Sen Gupta’s data, BRAC appears to be less successful in enabling its members to maintain control over the use of their loans. Our finding (from the program-wide sample survey) that 72% of Grameen Bank members, but only 40% of BRAC members, make a substantial contribution to their family’s support is consistent with this conclusion.

In the older BRAC and Grameen villages, where the credit programs had been in operation for about eight years, far fewer women had control over the enterprises funded through the loan programs (Table 4). This might suggest that women lose control as time passes. Goetz and Sen Gupta (1994), for example, found that the degree of women’s control over their loans steadily increased but then started to decrease after women had been in the program for six years or more. It is possible that women who successfully build up a small enterprise by investing their loan funds reach a point after a few years at which they can no longer profitably expand, and subsequently make their loan funds more. and more available for their husbands’ use. Todd (1995) suggests that since men’s enterprises are often more profitable than women’s, investing loans in men’s activities may be a rational strategy for a woman. While this may be true under some circumstances (depending in part upon what the man does with his profits), this pattern was not evident in any of the villages in our study. The villages where women exercised less control over loan-funded enterprises were in an economically depressed area. Opportunities for women to earn independent incomes were very limited, and competition for economic resources was intense. It appears that in situations where resources and opportunities are extremely scarce, men are more likely to appropriate women’s loans and incomes.

Our case studies suggest that women’s financial control over funded enterprises tends to be greater when loans are used for poultry or livestock, reflecting women’s traditional involvement in homestead-based activities and the perception of poultry and livestock as something that can be owned by women. Paddy trading generally refers to women parboiling, drying and cleaning the grain, with men engaging in buying and selling and taking the grain to the mill. In cases where loans were used for petty trade, the extent of women’s involvement varied; in some cases they were not involved at all, and in others they did everything, including the marketing. Most often, however, in joint enterprises women do the home-based productive work, such as making puffed rice or sweets, and men sell the products at the local market or from door to door in the village.

Although our sample survey did not include specific questions regarding control over loans and loan- funded enterprises, we did ask about use of loans. The


results are consistent with the finding that Grameen members are more likely than BRAC members to exercise significant control over the use of their loans. As noted above, 70% of the Grameen Bank members used all of their loans to finance microenterprises in which they alone or they and their husbands both were involved, compared with 47% of the BRAC members. Only 9% of the Grameen Bank sample, but 24% of the BRAC sample, relinquished all of their loans to their husbands or other relatives.

Even the credit program participants who never used a loan to finance their own economic activities, however, were considerably more likely to be empowered than women who were not participating in credit programs (Table 5). Of the women who received Grameen Bank or BRAC loans and used all or some of them to finance their own activities, 49% and 54% respectively fell into the “empowered” category. Among the women who were members of Grameen or BRAC but gave all of their loans to their husbands or other relatives, 36% were empowered, compared with only 15% and 9% in the two comparison groups. This is consistent with our interpretation of the predicted probabilities of empowerment shown in Figure 1. While levels of empowerment appear to be highest among women who maintain control over their loans and use them to generate independent incomes, participation in credit programs is empowering to some extent even for women who merely provide access to capital for their husbands or other family members, or use the loans for consumption needs.

Table 5. Percentage empowered by loan use

All loans used for own or joint activities

Some loans used for own of joint activities

No loans used for own of joint activities

No loans (Nonmember in Grameen villages)

No loans (No credit program in village)

N % empowered

308 49

109 54

80 36

315 15

394 9

7. NONECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT

Ethnographic case studies in villages where BRAC and Grameen are working show that even women who are used by their husbands to get access to loan funds often benefit from credit programs. It is unusual for women to participate in any nonfamily group activity, especially when this entails contact with adult men to

whom they are not related by blood or marriage. Most women probably would not be permitted to join if the programs only provided educational or social bene- fits. But the prospect of getting access to credit induces families to let the women participate.

Through the rituals of participation, and the contact with other members of their credit group, the women develop an identity outside of their families. They interact with men outside of the family and with authority figures, and this increases their self-confidence. Several of the women in the ethnographic study told the field investigators that through Grameen Bank they had “learned to talk,” and now they were not afraid to talk to outsiders. In both programs some members have the opportunity to play leadership roles. One woman told the researchers, “I have been made the Center Chief. Now all of the other women listen to me and give me their attention. Grameen Bank has made me important.” Such state- ments convey a sense of self-worth and confidence that is atypical of women in rural Bangladesh.

Grameen’s “Sixteen Decisions” and BRAC’s “Seventeen Promises,” help to instill a greater awareness of social and political issues. This appears to be true even for Grameen Bank members who typically do little more than to memorize and recite these vows. In BRAC there is somewhat more emphasis on dis- cussing them. Both programs increase women’s mobility within their villages by requiring that they attend weekly meetings. They also create opportunities for women to travel outside of their villages, by requiring some visits to the local program office, and through occasional training programs.

Another benefit for the credit program participant is that, even when she hands over her loan money to her husband, the family realizes that she is the source of this income. This increases her status and bargain- ing power in the household. Among the 60 BRAC and Grameen Bank members in the ethnographic study there were women told the researchers, unprompted, that other members of the family were kinder and more respectful around the time that they were sup- posed to receive a new loan. In some cases the husband or other family members provide assistance with cooking, childcare or other domestic tasks to make it easier for the Grameen Bank participant to attend meetings. Some of the women in the study perceived a decrease in physical violence against them around the time of credit group meetings. One woman thought her family was worried that she might retaliate by refusing to get another loan. In two cases the women attributed this to the family’s fear of public exposure (others might see the bruises or wounds, or she might say something in public). One woman told the researcher,

In the past my father-in-law would never stop my husband from beating me. But after I joined Grameen Bank


he said to my husband, “You had better stop beating and scolding your wife. Now she has contact with many people in society. She brings you loans from Grameen Bank. If you want to you can start a business with the money she brings!”

8. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BRAC AND GRAMEEN BANK

The objectives and strategies of Grameen Bank and BRAC are very similar, and the results presented above suggest that the two programs have similar effects on women’s roles and status. Grameen Bank, however, appears to be more successful in enabling women to control the loans that they receive; it has a stronger influence on women’s ability to contribute to their families’ support, and on several of the economic dimensions of empowerment. The differences between the programs are subtle but apparently important. First, in the communities where Grameen works it is widely understood that the central purpose of Grameen Bank is to provide credit to poor women. BRAC is perceived as an organization concerned more broadly with community development. BRAC promotes education for girls and runs nonformal schools for children who have dropped out of the for- mal system or have failed to enroll for economic reasons. BRAC has a separate health program and, in collaboration with the government, runs foodgrain distribution programs for destitute women. Of the eight dimensions of empowerment, participating in BRAC had a stronger effect than participating in Grameen Bank on two: mobility, and participation in political campaigns and public protests. This may be because BRAC provides more opportunities for its members to participate in training programs, which often give them an opportunity to travel outside of their villages, and because of its greater emphasis on creating awareness of social and political issues. BRAC’s more holistic approach was even more pro- nounced in the past. When it started in the early 1970s its emphasis was mainly on consciousness-raising and organizing, and credit was a relatively minor component in its program.

Second, Grameen Bank gives more loans, more quickly. Members get their first loan within two weeks, while BRAC members used to have to com- plete a three-month awareness-raising and training course. (Now this waiting period has been reduced to four weeks; but at one time it was a year.)16 As long as Grameen Bank members repay their loans on sched- ule, they get subsequent loans almost automatically. With BRAC the process takes somewhat longer. In our sample survey the Grameen Bank respondents had received an average of 3.9 loans, compared with 2.1 for the BRAC respondents, even though the mean duration of membership of the Grameen respondents was only slightly longer (47 months compared with 45

months for BRAC members). This probably is one of the reasons why more Grameen Bank members make a substantial contribution to their families’ support. The potential to use credit to acquire productive assets may explain why Grameen Bank membership has a stronger effect on the “economic security” dimension of empowerment (Tables 2 and 3). In addition, Grameen Bank gives separate loans for house con- struction, with the requirement that the homestead land be registered in the name of the female borrower. In some cases this encourages men to transfer title of their homestead land to their wives.

A third important difference is Grameen Bank’s greater emphasis on discipline, rules and rituals. Members must salute, sit on the floor in rows, and chant at weekly meetings. In some centers the members are required to do physical drills. The Grameen Bank worker sits in front of the women in a chair, whereas in BRAC’s weekly meetings the field orga- nizer typically sits on the floor with the women. BRAC’s meetings are more informal, and the women often come and go as they please. The women normally refer to Grameen Bank workers (most are men) as “The Sirs,” or ‘The Bank Sirs.” BRAC field staff are somewhat more likely to be female (though BRAC too employs mostly men), and they are more likely to be addressed as “Brother” or “Sister.” Much of the discussion at Grameen Bank’s weekly meetings has to do with maintaining regular attendance and discipline in repaying loans. Women who miss meetings or fall behind in their repayments are publicly scolded, and may be visited in their homes by Bank Workers or other members.

The regimented, ritualistic style of the Grameen Bank program appears to have several effects. The women develop an identity outside of the family, and they become experienced in interacting with male authority figures. The weekly rituals plainly cast them in a subservient role. but it is typical in interactions with government officials, and even representatives of nongovernmental organizations, for the poor to be perceived and to perceive themselves in a subservient role. At least in this case the women rather than their husbands are the ones interacting with the outsiders. Having a connection with someone more powerful is a source of status, and increases the women’s self-confidence. Hierarchy and regimentation are common elements of social life in the public sphere from which Bangladeshi women are usually excluded. Intentionally or unintentionally Grameen Bank has succeeded in coopting these styles of behavior to empower rural women.

Normally, any savings or asset that a woman might have can be legitimately (at least from her husband’s point of view) appropriated by him. Grameen Bank recognizes that this is a central problem in loan programs for women, and its style of operating reflects this concern. In addition to the general tactics of intim-


idation and confidence-building, Grameen counsels women to help them hold on to their loan money when their husbands try to take it away from them. Grameen communicates to the men, through the women, that if their wives fail to make loan repayments their names will be mentioned in public, and they may face embar- rassment and harassment by visiting Bank staff and members. At the same time, the men see that families who pay their loans on time immediately receive subsequent loans, that if they follow the rules they are ensured continuing access to larger and larger amounts of credit. BRAC uses some of the same tech- niques, but the program is more informal, and the direct communication with men (who are also invited to join the program) may make it less essential to put pressure on the women and to coach them in standing up to their husbands.

Grameen Bank’s strategies induce many of the husbands to let their wives use the loan money for their own economic activities, as the program intends. In other cases the members’ husbands appropriate part or all of the money, but they give their wives enough each week to meet the loan installments and required savings deposits. Realizing that some appropriation of loan funds by husbands is inevitable, the participants are given practical advice. For example, the researchers observed one training session in which the Bank Worker said:

Give your husband some of the loan but not all of it. Keep some of it yourself. Use the money for activities that don’t require much investment, like raising poultry or a calf. Your husband is getting this loan because of you. Live in harmony with your husband. Try to make sure that he does not misuse the loan.

Credit is the center of Grameen Bank’s program. Every aspect of the program is intended to facilitate the basic task of making loans to poor women and to ensure high rates of repayment. This is true even of the Sixteen Decisions, which the women are made to memorize and chant as a way of establishing discipline. This does not mean that Grameen is not inter- ested in empowering women; only that its founder and directors see credit as the best way to achieve this. Grameen Bank’s guiding vision has to do with poverty alleviation and social equity, and even empowerment of women is seen essentially as a means to these ends. While BRAC’s broad goals of social transformation and economic development are similar to those of Grameen, its strategy for achieving these goals is multifaceted. In fact, in its “Strategy for the 1990s” (Korten, 1989) credit is given relatively little emphasis. BRAC provides loans to women mainly through its Rural Development Program, which is very similar to Grameen Bank’s program in the way it operates, but in general is less regimented and ritualized, less strict, and not focused as single- mindedly on credit.

9. CONCLUSION

The success of Grameen Bank, BRAC and other similar programs in Bangladesh challenges the con- ventional idea that it is primarily sociocultural norms that discourage women from seeking paid employment. The success of these programs in reaching out to the vast numbers of women is clearly due to their pro- motion of economic opportunities. Although women who work are sometimes criticized, particularly if they work outside of the home, there is no demonstrated lack of demand for jobs among poor rural women. In the six villages in our ethnographic study there were abundant examples of women asking the researchers as well as women who already had jobs to help them find paid employment. Rather than a lack of demand, it appears that a severe shortage of paid employment opportunities is limiting women’s economic participation and holding back women’s empowerment in Bangladesh.

It has been argued that women’s empowerment can only be achieved by increasing women’s consciousness about gender and class relations, and organizing them to engage in grassroots struggles for women’s rights. Critics of minimalist credit contend that the participants typically cede financial and man- agerial control over funded enterprises to males within their households (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1994). In fail- ing to focus directly on challenging power relations, they argue, such programs enroll large numbers of women and give them access to a resources without eroding the basis of gender subordination.

This analysis, however, suggests that involvement in credit programs does empower women. Participation in Grameen Bank and BRAC increases women’s mobility, their ability to make purchases and major household decisions, their ownership of productive assets, their legal and political awareness and participation in public campaigns and protests. Another analysis suggests that the programs also decrease women’s vulnerability to family violence (Schuler et al., 1996). In spite of focusing narrowly on credit, Grameen Bank (and to a lesser extent, BRAC) functions as a catalyst in transforming the lives of women. Minimalist credit programs provide access to an important economic resource, and thus enable women to negotiate gender barriers, increase their control over their own lives, and improve their relative positions in their households. The majority of the women involved in these programs maintain a significant measure of control over their assets and incomes. While the magnitudes of their incomes may be relatively small, the effect on women’s empowerment is substantial.

We do not mean to suggest that the Grameen strategy holds the ultimate resolution to gender subordination in Bangladesh, nor to downplay the need for consciousness-raising, organizing and struggling for


women’s rights. Minimalist credit programs do, however, provide a cost-effective means of transferring scarce resources to the poor through women. Even though putting resources in women’s hands violates patriarchal norms, in a situation of pervasive poverty such resource transfers are welcomed.

The Grameen approach does not constitute a sus- tained movement to organize women at the grassroots level for a political struggle against patriarchal institu- tions. The organizational modality for this mobiliza-

tion cannot be credit programs (regardless of whether they are directly focused on gender issues), or for that matter any organization whose lifelines are connected to donor financing and state licensing. Within the existing spectrum of development interventions in Bangladesh, however, it appears that the Grameen model is more effective than programs that profess to combat gender inequality more directly, both in its demonstrated ability to reach poor women in large numbers, and in its potential to empower women.

NOTES

1. For a more detailed description of the purdah system see Abdullah and Zeidenstein (1982); Cain, Khanam and Nahar (1979); Mandelbaum (1988); Memissi (1987); Papanek and Minault (1982).

2. For more details on the two programs see: Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (199Oa, 199Ob); Chen (1983, 1989); Chowdhury (1989); Fuglesang and Chandler (1986); Grameen Bank (1989, 1990); Holcombe (1995); Hossain (1988); Atiur Rahman (1986); Rahman andHossain (1986); R. Rahman (1986); Ray (1987); Todd (1995); Wahid (1993).

3. Grameen Bank’s “Sixteen Decisions” are: 1. We shall follow and advance the four principles of Grameen Bank - Discipline, Unity, Courage and Hard Work-in all walks of our lives; 2. Prosperity we shall bring to our families; 3. We shall not live in dilapidated houses. We shall repair our houses and work towards constructing new houses at the ear- liest; 4. We shall grow vegetables all the year round. We shall eat plenty of them and sell the surplus; 5. During the planta- tion seasons, we shall plant as many seedlings as possible; 6. We shall plan to keep our families small. We shall minimize our expenditures. We shall look after our health; 7. We shall educate our children and ensure that we can eam to pay for their education; 8. We shall always keep our children and the environment clean; 9. We shall build and use pit-latrines; 10. We shall drink water from tubewells. If it is not available, we shall boil water or use alum; 11. We shall not take any dowry oat our sons’ weddings, neither shall we give any dowry at our daughters’ weddings. We shall keep the center free from the curse of dowry. We shall not practice child marriage; 12. We shall not inflict any injustice on anyone, neither shall we allow anyone to do so; 13. We shall collectively undertake bigger investments for higher incomes; 14. We shall always be ready to help each other. If anyone is in diff- culty, we. shall all help him or her; 15. If we come to know of any breach of discipline in any center, we shall all go there and help restore discipline; 16. We shall introduce physical exercise in all our centers. We shall take part in all social activities collectively.

4. We also avoided areas where other research studies were being conducted, and sites that were obviously excep tional in terms of access to various services, access to trans- portation, and economic base. The six villages are located in Magura, Faridpur and Rangpur Districts. One of these comparison villages was located in an area where a family planning nongovemment organization (NGO) has been working, to provide an independent assessment of the impact of better

access to family planning services on family planning practice and on empowerment.

5. To maximize the number of potential users of family planning in the 120-household sample, only households with a married woman age 39 or younger, with at least one living child, were included in the sampling frame. A household cen- sus was done in each of the six villages. The households were then stratified to get live households of nonparticipants and 15 households of participants in each of the four villages covered by the credit programs. Within these groups, stratification by age group was done to ensure a reasonable distribution.

6. In the first stage, a random sample of branches of each organization was selected for each of the four divisions. Next, a random sample was selected from membership lists of each branch.

7. For Grameen Bank “functionally landless” is defined as owning less than 50 decimals (l/2 acre) of cultivable land, and/or owning assets that have a total value of less than the value of one acre of medium quality land. BRAC targets households that subsist by selling manual labor, assuming that such households are functionally landless. Households that were obviously wealthy and those that owned more than 50 decimals of land were excluded from the control group. The comparison sample was selected from rural villages that are located in the same general area as the Grameen Bank and BRAC sites. The villages in this comparison group were matched with a credit program site on the basis of region, village size, and population density. Villages having an intensive presence of credit or family planning programs run by nongovernmental organizations were not included. We did not attempt to include a separate sample of nonmembers from BRAC villages because BRAC’s general approach is work with entire villages. In principle, BRAC encourages all village residents who are eligible (landless and poor but able to work) to join. (See Schuler and Hashemi, 1994 for a more detailed description of the survey methodology.)

8. Some aspects of participation in the credit programs might be described as empowering, or as manifestations of empowerment (e.g., belonging to a group outside of the family, learning to sign one’s name, having a bank account and passbook, taking a loan in one’s own name). Since this study is concerned with documenting effects of women’s involvement in credit programs, however, behaviors that are entailed in credit program participation were not included among the empowerment indicators.


9. We ran a correlation matrix for the eight empowerment dimensions and contribution to family support. Most correlations were less than 0.20. Those above 0.20 involved aspects of empowerment that have an economic dimension (making small and large purchases, economic security) and contribution to family support. The highest correlations were between small and large purchases (0.434). and small purchases and contribution to family support (0.408).

10. Since only one-fifth of the women had any schooling whatsoever, “whether ever attended school” was used rather than education level.

11. This is somewhat less an issue for BRAC because BRAC encourages all eligible women in participating villages to join.

12. As for the possibility of village-level selection bias, the extensive coverage of the Grameen Bank program, which was working in l/4 to 113 of all rural villages in mid- 1991 when the sample initially was selected, and now works in nearly half of all villages, suggests that Grameen Bank does not apply a narrow set of criteria in selecting program sites. In our survey, the fact that each of the comparison villages was located in the same general vicinity as a program village also provides some assurance against the possibility that there are important, systematic village-level differences. There may be a general tendency for development programs such as Grameen Bank to avoid the least accessible areas of the country when setting up branch offices, but in observing these programs our ethnographic study team did not notice a tendency to exclude certain types of villages once a branch had been established. At this point proximity to the Grameen Bank branch appears to be the most important factor determining whether program

activities are initiated in a village. Within a geographic area that might be covered by a Grameen Bank branch, villages to which access for some reason is particularly difficult (e.g., because of flooding) may be left out of credit schemes and other development programs. But since they also tend to be avoided by survey teams, it is unlikely that relatively less accessible villages are overrepresented in our comparison group.

13. As noted below, our models are constrained by the fact that most women had been members in one program or the other for a minimum of 18 months. They are also constrained by a linear specification of the duration variable. We explored nonlinear specifications of duration and found similar results; in addition, categorical dummy variables for duration of membership had a significant effect on the economic security variable.

14. In the regression model the interaction term is calculated by multiplying contribution to family support by a dummy variable coded as 1 if the respondent is a member of either BRAC or Grameen Bank. We also tested separate interactions between the two programs and contribution.

15. Values are set at the mean or median value for all control variables as follows: age = 29 years, at least one surviving son = 1 (yes), at least one surviving daughter = 1 (yes), education = 0 (none), wealthy household = (no), geographic division = 2 (Dhaka) and, for credit program participants, a membership duration of 40 months (the median).

16. The initial training period has been getting shorter. It had already decreased from one year to 13 weeks when the study was initiated; since then it has further decreased to nine weeks.

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